REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
EMMANUEL C. CORTEZ, Respondent.

G.R. No. 186639 February 5, 2014

Facts:

Mr. Cortez filed with the RTC an application for judicial confirmation of title over a 110 sqm of
land at Bgy. Poblacion, Pateros, Metro Manila. In support of his application, Cortez submitted Tax
Declarations from the year 1966 to 2005 that were under the name of his mother form which he
inherited the land, Survey Plan classifying the land as alienable and disposable, as well as other
documents conveying the land to him. He also claimed that the land had been in their family’s
possession for over 60 years.

RTC granted Cortez’ application. After its finality, RP, represented by the Solicitor General,
appealed to the CA alleging that the RTC erred in granting the application. RP pointed out that there
was no document presented that Cortez and his predecessors-in-interest had been in an open,
adverse, and continuous possession of the land for more than 30 years. CA dismissed the appeal
and affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue:

Whether CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC.

Held:

The petition is meritorious.

After a careful scrutiny of the records of this case, the Court finds that Cortez failed to comply
with the legal requirements for the registration of the subject property under Section 14(1) and (2) of
P.D. No. 1529.

(1) Applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish first, that the subject land forms part
of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; second, that the applicant and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the same; and third, that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of
existing laws.

The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. The only evidence to prove the character
of the subject lands as required by law is the notation appearing in the Advance Plan stating in effect
that the said properties are alienable and disposable. However, this is hardly the kind of proof
required by law. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an
applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may also secure a certification
from the Government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable. In the case at bar,
while the Advance Plan bearing the notation was certified by the Lands Management Services of the
DENR, the certification refers only to the technical correctness of the survey plotted in the said plan
and has nothing to do whatsoever with the nature and character of the property surveyed.
Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper government agency to prove that the
lands subject for registration are indeed alienable and disposable. Anent the second and third
requirements, the Court finds that Cortez likewise failed to establish the same. Cortez failed to
present any evidence to show that he and his predecessors-in-interest indeed possessed the subject
property prior to 1946.

Accordingly, although lands of the public domain that are considered patrimonial may be
acquired by prescription under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, before acquisitive prescription could
commence, the property sought to be registered must not only be classified as alienable and
disposable; it must also be declared by the State that it is no longer intended for public use, public
service or the development of the national wealth. Thus, absent an express declaration by the State,
the land remains to be property of public dominion.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
LUIS MIGUEL O. ABOITIZ, Respondent.

G.R. No. 174626 October 23, 2013

Facts:

Mr. Aboitiz filed his Application for Registration of Land Title of a 1,254 sqm land in
Talamban, Cebu City before the RTC. In support of his application, Aboitiz attached the original
Tracing Cloth Plan with a blueprint copy, the technical description of the land, the certificate of the
geodetic engineer surveying the land, and the documents evidencing possession and ownership of
the land. Aboitiz presented as well 2 witnesses. One is his caretaker Sarah who testified that he
purchased the land from the previous owner Irenea and that he had been in actual, open,
continuous, and exclusive possession of the subject property in the concept of an owner; that as per
record of the DENR, the land had been classified as alienable and disposable; that per CENRO, the
land was not covered by any subsisting public land application; and that the land had been covered
by tax declarations from 1963 to 1994 in Irenea’s name, and from 1994 to present, in his name. The
RTC granted Aboitiz’s application for registration of the subject property.

Not in conformity, the RP appealed the RTC ruling before the CA. Subsequently, the CA
reversed the ruling of the RTC and denied Aboitiz’s application for registration of land title.
Thereafter, Aboitiz moved for reconsideration of Decision of the CA which dismissed his application
for registration of title. Aboitiz asserted, that although the subject land was classified as alienable
and disposable only in 1957, the tax declarations, from 1963 to 1994, for a period of 31 years,
converted the land, by way of acquisitive prescription, to private property. He asserted that the
evidence he presented substantially met the requisite nature and character of possession under P.D.
No. 1529.

The CA reversed itself and granted the application for registration of land title of Aboitiz. The
CA explained that the period of 31 years, converted the said property into private land and, thus,
susceptible to registration. CA also declared that although tax declarations and real property tax
payments were not by themselves conclusive evidence of ownership of land, they were nevertheless
good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner. The CA reversed itself and granted the
application for registration of land title of Aboitiz.

Issue:

Whether Aboitiz is entitled to the registration of land title under Section 14(1) of P.D. No.
1529, or, in the alternative, pursuant to Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529.

Held:

Applicants for registration of land title must establish and prove: (1) that the subject land
forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; (2) that the applicant and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the same; and (3) that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945,
or earlier.

Anent the first requisite, to establish the subject land’s alienable and disposable character, the
applicant must present a CENRO or PENRO Certification; and a copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records. The Court cannot find any evidence to show the subject land’s alienable and disposable
character, except for a CENRO certification submitted by Aboitiz. Clearly, his attempt to comply with
the first requisite of Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 fell short due to his own omission. The CENRO is
not the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring the
alienability and disposability of public lands. Thus, the CENRO Certification should be accompanied
by an official publication of the DENR Secretary’s issuance declaring the land alienable and
disposable. For this reason, the application for registration of Aboitiz should be denied.

With regard to the third requisite, it must be shown that the possession and occupation of
land by the applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, started on June 12, 1945 or
earlier. Aboitiz likewise failed to satisfy this third requisite. The earliest that he and his predecessor-
in-interest can trace back possession and occupation of the land was only in the year 1963.
Evidently, his possession of the subject property commenced roughly eighteen (18) years. Here, he
neglected to present any convincing and persuasive evidence to manifest compliance with the
requisite period of possession and occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Accordingly, his
application for registration of land title was legally infirm.

The Court authoritatively stated that the land continues to be ineligible for land registration
under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the
President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth. Thus, under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, for acquisitive
prescription to commence and operate against the State, the classification of ' land as alienable and
disposable alone is not sufficient.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Amended Decision and the Resolution of the
Court of Appeals, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Application for
Registration of Title of respondent Luis Miguel O. Aboitiz in Land Registration Case is DENIED.
 HON. HEHERSON ALVAREZ, Petitioner,
vs.
PICOP RESOURCES, INC., Respondent.

G.R. No. 162243 December 3, 2009

Facts:

The cause of action of PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) in its Petition for Mandamus with the
trial court is clear: the government is bound by contract, a 1969 Document signed by then President
Ferdinand Marcos, to enter into an Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) with PICOP.
Since the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, and since
the 1969 Document itself has a proviso requiring compliance with the laws and the Constitution.

To recall, PICOP filed with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
an application to have its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 converted into an IFMA. In the
middle of the processing of PICOP’s application, however, PICOP refused to attend further meetings
with the DENR. Instead, on 2 September 2002, PICOP filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City a Petition for Mandamus against then DENR Secretary Heherson T. Alvarez. PICOP
seeks the issuance of a privileged writ of mandamus to compel the DENR Secretary to sign, execute
and deliver an IFMA to PICOP, as well as to –

Issue the corresponding IFMA assignment number on the area covered by the IFMA,
formerly TLA No. 43, as amended; b) to issue the necessary permit allowing petitioner to act and
harvest timber from the said area of TLA No. 43, sufficient to meet the raw material requirements of
petitioner’s pulp and paper mills in accordance with the warranty and agreement of July 29, 1969
between the government and PICOP’s predecessor-in-interest; and c) to honor and respect the
Government Warranties and contractual obligations to PICOP strictly in accordance with the
warranty and agreement dated July 29, [1969] between the government and PICOP’s predecessor-
in-interest.

Issues:

I. Is the 1969 Document a contract enforceable under the Non-Impairment Clause of

the Constitution, so as to make the signing of the IFMA a ministerial duty?
II. Did PICOP comply with all the legal and constitutional requirements for the issuance
of an IFMA? (I’m not sure po kung Property question pa ito.)

Held:

I. We have ruled, however, that the 1969 Document is not a contract recognized under the
non-impairment clause, much less a contract specifically enjoining the DENR Secretary
to issue the IFMA. The conclusion that the 1969 Document is not a contract recognized
under the non-impairment clause has even been disposed of in another case decided by
another division of this Court, PICOP Resources, Inc. v. Base Metals Mineral Resources
Corporation, the Decision in which case has become final and executory. PICOP’s
Petition for Mandamus should, therefore, fail.
II. PICOP has not complied with all administrative and statutory requirements for the
issuance of an IFMA.
 The second issue has both legal and factual sub-issues. Legal sub-issues include whether
PICOP is legally required to (1) consult with and acquire an approval from the Sanggunian
concerned under Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government Code; and (2) acquire a
Certification from the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) that the concession
area does not overlap with any ancestral domain. Factual sub-issues include whether, at the
time it filed its Petition for Mandamus, PICOP had submitted the required Five-Year Forest
Protection Plan and Seven-Year Reforestation Plan and whether PICOP had paid all forest
charges.

While we have withdrawn our pronouncements in the assailed Decision that (1) PICOP had
not submitted the required forest protection and reforestation plans, and that (2) PICOP had
unpaid forestry charges, thus effectively ruling in favor of PICOP on all factual issues in this
case, PICOP still insists that the requirements of an NCIP certification and Sanggunian
consultation and approval do not apply to it. To affirm PICOP’s position on these matters would
entail nothing less than rewriting the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act and the Local Government
Code, an act simply beyond our jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of PICOP Resources, Inc. is DENIED.

Bracewell vs CA
 GR No. 107427 Jan. 25, 2000

Facts:

The controversy involves a 9,657 sqm of land in Las Pinas, Metro Manila. On 1908, Maria
Cailles, married to James Bracewell, Sr., acquired the land from the Dalandan and Jimenez families
of Las Pinas; after which corresponding Tax Declarations were issued in the name of Maria Cailles.
Son 1961, Maria Cailles sold the said parcels of land to her son, the petitioner, by virtue of a Deed of
Sale which was duly annotated and registered with the Registry of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal. Tax
Declarations were thereafter issued in the name of petitioner, cancelling the previous Tax
Declarations issued to Maria Cailles.

On 1963, the petitioner filed before the Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal an action for
confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141. The Director of
Lands, represented by the Solicitor General, opposed petitioners application on the grounds that
neither he nor his predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the subject land nor have
they been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same for
at least thirty (30) years prior to the application, and that the subject land is part of the public domain.

The Solicitor General resubmitted his opposition to the application, this time alleging the
following additional grounds: (1) the failure of petitioner to prosecute his action for an unreasonable
length of time; and (2) that the tax declarations attached to the complaint do not constitute
acquisition of the lands applied for.

On 1989, the lower court issued an Order granting the application of petitioner.
Subsequently, the Solicitor General promptly appealed to respondent Court which, on 1992, was
reversed and set aside the lower courts Order. It also denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
in its Resolution on the same year.

Issue:

Whether the tax declarations attached to the complaint do not constitute acquisition of the
lands applied for? (Baka may mas better issue kayong ma-construct. Huhu.)

Held:

On one hand, petitioner asserts his right of title to the subject land under Section 48 (b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, having by himself and through his predecessors-in-interest been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject parcels of land,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since 1908. On the other hand it is the
respondents position that since the subject parcels of land were only classified as alienable or
disposable on 1972. Petitioner did not have any title to confirm when he filed his application in 1963.
Neither was the requisite thirty years possession met. Clear from the above is the requirement that
the applicant must prove that the land is alienable public land. On this score, the Court agreed with
respondents that petitioner failed to show that the parcels of land subject of his application are
alienable or disposable. On the contrary, it was conclusively shown by the government that the same
were only classified as alienable or disposable on March 27, 1972. Thus, even granting that
petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest had occupied the same since 1908, he still cannot claim
title thereto by virtue of such possession since the subject parcels of land were not yet alienable land
at that time nor capable of private appropriation. The adverse possession which may be the basis of
a grant of title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of
the public domain.

Furthermore, the homestead patent was issued to petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, the

subject land belong to the inalienable and undisposable portion of the public domain. Thus, any title
issued in their name by mistake or oversight is void ab initio because at the time the homestead
patent was issued to petitioners, as successors-in-interest of the original patent applicant, the
Director of Lands was not then authorized to dispose of the same because the area was not yet
classified as disposable public land. Consequently, the title issued to herein petitioners by the
Bureau of Lands is void ab initio.

Neither has petitioner shown proof that the subject Forestry Administrative Order recognizes
private or vested rights under which his case may fall. We only find on record the Endorsement of
the Bureau of Forest Development from which no indication of such exemption may be gleaned. The
instant Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
 Chavez vs NHA

GR No. 164527 Aug. 15, 2008

Facts:

On March 1, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Memorandum Order No. (MO)
161 approving and directing the implementation of the Comprehensive and Integrated Metropolitan
Manila Waste Management Plan (the Plan). Pursuant to MO 161-A, NHA prepared the feasibility
studies of the Smokey Mountain low-cost housing project which resulted in the formulation of the
Smokey Mountain Development Plan and Reclamation of the Area Across R-10 or the Smokey
Mountain Development and Reclamation Project (SMDRP; the Project). The Project aimed to
convert the Smokey Mountain dumpsite into a habitable housing project, inclusive of the reclamation
of the area across R-10, adjacent to the Smokey Mountain as the enabling component of the project.

As a result, President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 39 on September 9, 1992, which

reads:
WHEREAS, the National Housing Authority has presented a viable conceptual plan to
convert the Smokey Mountain dumpsite into a habitable housing project, inclusive of the reclamation
of the area across Road Radial 10 (R-10) adjacent to the Smokey Mountain as the enabling
component of the project;
These parcels of land of public domain are hereby placed under the
administration and disposition of the National Housing Authority to develop,
subdivide and dispose to qualified beneficiaries, as well as its development for
mix land use (commercial/industrial) to provide employment opportunities to
on-site families and additional areas for port-related activities.

Afterwards, the President again issued Proclamation No. 465 dated August
31, 1994 increasing the proposed area for reclamation across R-10 from 40
hectares to 79 hectares, to wit:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the

Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
law, and as recommended by the SMDRP Executive Committee, do
hereby authorize the increase of the area of foreshore or submerged
lands of Manila Bay to be reclaimed, as previously authorized under
Proclamation No. 39 (s. 1992) and Memorandum Order No. 415 (s.
1992), from Four Hundred Thousand (400,000) square meters, more or
less, to Seven Hundred Ninety Thousand (790,000) square meters, more
or less.

Issue:
Because said lands are no longer intended for public use or service,
shall those lands form part of the patrimonial properties of the State?

Held:
Yes, under Art. 442 of the New Civil Code. The lands classified
as patrimonial parties of the NHA in the case at bar, and ready
for disposition when the titles are registered in its name by the
Register of Deeds.
 Chavez vs NHA

GR No. 164527 Aug. 15, 2008

Facts: