Prospective and Retrospective Effect of Judicial Decisions in Ireland

The prospective and retrospective effect of judicial
decisions in Ireland
Niamh Connolly
Abstract
This article examines the operation of the common law system in Ireland. The Republic of Ireland
differs from many common law jurisdictions in that it has a written constitution which empowers
judges to invalidate unconstitutional legislation. The importance of judicial decision-making in
constitutional cases has influenced judicial practice more generally. Irish judges feel a constitutional
duty to prioritise doing justice in each case. They have historically been less formalistic than judges
in some common law jurisdictions. They follow precedent in a reasonably flexible way which allows
the common law to develop. They have a creative role, although they exercise self-restraint in
changing the law due to the separation of powers. This article considers whether the Irish legal
system accepts prospective overruling or similar techniques designed to limit the retrospective
effect of judicial decision-making. The question of retrospective effect has arisen most acutely in
constitutional cases, where the courts find a statute to be invalid after it has been in force and
people have relied on it. Two landmark cases limit the effects of a ruling of unconstitutionality by
different means. Murphy v Attorney General states that an unconstitutional statute is void ab initio
and that there should be redress in all but exceptional cases. A v Governor of Arbour Hill Prison
precludes people who have been convicted under an unconstitutional statute and whose cases have
reached finality from availing of the invalidity. The relationship between these authorities requires
clarification, but they represent a functional equivalent of prospective overruling. If similar measures
can apply when judges develop common law rules, then it appears that Irish law accepts prospective
overruling.

Niamh Connolly
Trinity College Dublin

E-mail: niamh.connolly@tcd.ie

1
Introduction
The Republic of Ireland possesses a common law system, governed by a written constitution.1 Its
common law nature and the substance of many laws reveal its close historical ties with the law of
England and Wales. However, Ireland’s constitutionalist order diverges markedly from the English
model. The constitutional framework has strongly influenced the conception of the judicial function
in Ireland. A self-assured judiciary adopts a reasonably flexible approach to precedent in the
common law, in order to do justice between the parties in each case.
Prospective overruling has not been expressly adopted in Ireland. As in England, some decisions
employ techniques which resemble prospective overruling. The problem of the retroactive effect of
judicial changes to the law has arisen most obviously in the constitutional context. Irish judges have
the power to declare that statutes which have been in force are unconstitutional and invalid. This
function has the potential to create serious problems in unwinding actions taken when the statute
was thought to be lawful. Over the past thirty years, the courts have struggled to find a solution
which upholds constitutional theory while also avoiding chaos or injustice. The measures which the
judiciary have used to restrict the retrospective effect of a finding of unconstitutionality may be
regarded as a form of prospective overruling. If similar measures might apply when judges develop
common law rules, then it appears that Ireland does accept prospective overruling. It would,
however, remain vanishingly rare, and only appropriate in cases where a change to the law would
have exceptionally prejudicial effects on people who relied on the previous understanding of the
law.
The Irish Legal System’s Constitutional Framework

Compared with other common law jurisdictions, Ireland has a distinctive constitutional order,
characterised notably by vigorous judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation. The People
are sovereign.2 The State is “subject to the constitution, which limits, confines and restricts its
powers.”3 The Constitution is predicated on the separation of powers.4 Article 15.2.1° attributes the
“sole and exclusive power of making laws” to the Oireachtas, which body comprises the President
and a bicameral parliament.5 The Oireachtas is prohibited from enacting any law which is
inconsistent with the Constitution; any unconstitutional laws are invalid.6 The High Court and the
Supreme Court may determine the validity of any law by reference to the Constitution.7 The

1
Bunreacht na hÉireann (The Constitution of Ireland) 1937 (Ireland).
2
Article 6, Bunreacht na hÉireann 1937 (Ireland); see also Finn v Attorney General [1983] 1 IR 154 (IESC);
Riordan v An Taoiseach (No 1) [1999] 4 IR 321 (IESC).
3
Byrne v Ireland [1972] IR 241 (IESC).
4
Buckley and Others (Sinn Féin) v Attorney General and Another [1950] IR 67, 81 (IESC); Boland v An
Taoiseach [1974] IR 338, 370 (IESC); Maguire v Ardagh [2002] 1 IR 385, 575 (IESC).
5
Article 15.1.2, Bunreacht na hÉireann 1937 (Ireland); Wireless Dealers Association v The Minister for Industry
& Commerce (Unreported, Supreme Court, 14th March, 1956) (IESC).
6
Articles 15.4.1° and 15.4.2°, Bunreacht na hÉireann 1937 (Ireland); In Re Article 26 of the Constitution and the
Regulation of Information (Services outside the State for the Termination of Pregnancies) Bill [1995] 1 IR 1, 39
(IESC).
7
Article 34.3.2°, Bunreacht na hÉireann 1937 (Ireland).

2
Constitution Review Group terms this “a key provision of the Constitution which to date has proved
to be conspicuously successful.”8
The Common Law in Ireland

Ireland has inherited both the common law method and the substance of many laws from its
connection with the United Kingdom. Between 1800 and 1922, Ireland was an integral part of the
United Kingdom legal order. The United Kingdom’s House of Lords was the court of ultimate appeal
for Irish cases.9 From 1924 until 1933, appeals could be brought from the Irish Supreme Court to the
Privy Council in London.10 There was a great deal of continuity in Irish law before and after
independence.11 Both the 1922 Constitution and the 1937 Constitution expressly provided that all
the substantive laws in force in Ireland immediately prior to the introduction of the new Constitution
would continue in force.12
The Republic of Ireland’s written constitution “was superimposed on, and indeed presumes the
existence of, the common law system.”13 Many areas of law are predominantly governed by case
law. For example, the law of judicial review of administrative acts is largely judge-made.14 Other
examples include contract law, the constitutional protection of citizens’ fundamental rights, and the
law of evidence. It is widely accepted that judges make law, and that their role is not merely
interpretative, but also creative.15
On its face, the provision which grants the Legislature the “sole and exclusive power of making laws”
seems incompatible with the common law system.16 To avoid the conflict, this rule must be
understood to refer to “laws” in the sense of statutes. However, in DPP v Cash,17 Charleton J held
that the constitutional allocation of the legislative function to Parliament restricts judges’ power to
make new common law rules.18 If so, the Constitution reinforces the common law’s own stricture
that judges may develop existing common law, but may not create entirely new rules.

8
Constitution Review Group. 1996. Report of the Constitution Review Group. Dublin: Stationery Office.
9
Article 8, Act of Union 1800 (United Kingdom).
10
Article 66, Constitution of Saorstát Éireann (Constitution of the Irish Free State) 1922; Courts of Justice Act,
1924 (Ireland); Constitution (Amendment No 22) Act 1933 (Ireland).
11
Performing Rights Society v Bray UDC [1928] IR 506, 511 (IESC); Irish Shell Ltd v Elm Motors Ltd [1984] IR
200, 225-226 (IESC).
12
Article 73, Constitution of The Irish Free State 1922 (Ireland); Article 50 Bunreacht na hÉireann 1937
(Ireland).
13
A v Governor of Arbour Hill Prison [2006] IESC 45, [2006] 4 IR 88, 115 (IESC).
14
Ghandi Nawaf Mallak v The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2012] IESC 59, para 1 (IESC).
15
Henchy, S. 1962. Precedent in the Irish Supreme Court. Modern Law Review 25: 544, 555; Walsh, B.
Foreword to First Edition. In McMahon B, and Binchy, W. 1990. Irish Law of Torts. 2nd ed. Dublin: Butterworth:
v ff; see also In re Spectrum Plus Ltd (in liquidation) [2005] UKHL 41, para 32 (UKHL).
16
Article 15.1.2, Bunreacht na hÉireann 1937 (Ireland); Wireless Dealers Association v The Minister for
Industry & Commerce (Unreported, Supreme Court, 14th March, 1956) (IESC).
17
DPP v Cash [2007] IEHC 108 (IEHC).
18
Ibid para 62.

3
The Place of Statutes
The courts are keenly aware of the imperative not to encroach on the legislative function.19 The
power of the courts to decide cases by applying judge-made rules is subordinate to statute law. If
Parliament has enacted a statute which applies to the case before the court, the court must
interpret and apply the statute.20 A statute must prevail over a conflicting common law rule.21
As in any legal system, the importance of the power of interpreting written law should not be
underestimated.22 The Interpretation Act 2005 guides judges in interpreting statutes, and they may
use a purposive approach to discern Parliament’s intention.23 The common law frequently retains a
supporting role in giving meaning to the terms and concepts used. Parliament is understood to be
aware of the pre-existing law when it drafts legislation.24 In interpreting laws, judges must not be
influenced by their own preferences as to what they should say.25 The judge’s function is to apply
the law, not to reform it.26
The courts are very conscious of the need not to trespass on the legislative function in performing
their duty to interpret statutes.27 They are “strictly confined to ascertaining the true meaning of each
statutory provision”.28 They have no right to interpret the statute to say what the judges wish it did
say. They cannot fill gaps in the statute and are sometimes powerless to avoid an unjust result.29 In
The State (Murphy) v Johnston,30 an error in a criminal statute made a nonsense of it. The Supreme
Court ruled that the courts had no power to rectify the error. Only Parliament could correct it, even
though it meant that many prosecutions for drunk driving would fail on a technicality until the
legislation was amended.31
Precedent
The common law method aims to achieve a delicate balance between two goals, which may
frequently conflict. The law should be certain and predictable; it should also be just and move with

19
See Hogan, GW and Whyte, GF. 2003. JM Kelly: The Irish Constitution. 4th ed. Dublin: Tottel: 256.
20
The State (Murphy) v Johnston [1983] IR 235, 240 (IESC); In re Spectrum Plus Ltd (in liquidation) [2005] UKHL
41, paras 36-38 (UKHL).
21
Geasley v DPP [2009] IECCA 22, para 45 (IECCA).
22
Crilly v T & J Farrington Limited [2001] 3 IR 251, 286 (IESC).
23
Mulcahy v Minister for Marine (unreported, High Court, Keane J, 4 November 1994), page 23 (IEHC); C(R) v
Minister for Health [2008] 1 IESC 33, 36 (IESC).
24
JF v The Minister for Health and Children (Unreported, Supreme Court, 10 April 2008), page 8 (IESC).
25
Finlay, T. 2005. The Role of the Judge. Judicial Studies Institute Journal: 1, 3.
26
TD v. Minister of Education [2001] 4 IR 259, 332 (IESC); Norris v Attorney General [1984] IR 36, 53 (IESC).
27
Private Residential Tenancies Board v Linnane [2010] IEHC 476 (IEHC).
28
McGrath v McDermott [1988] IR 258, 276 (IESC).
29
PJ v JJ [1993] 1 IR 150, 154-155 (IEHC); EC v Clinical Director of the Central Mental Hospital 2012 IEHC 152,
para 34 (IEHC).
30
The State (Murphy) v Johnston [1983] 1 IR 235 (IESC).
31
Ibid 240; Re Green Dale Building Company [1977] 1 I.R. 256, 266 (IESC).

4
the times.32 Precedent is “the means by which the common law achieves, so far as possible,
uniformity, consistency, predictability and certainty.”33 Since people rely on the law to organise their
affairs, it should be consistent. Citizens should be able to inform themselves of the law. 34
The doctrine of precedent is entwined with the hierarchical courts structure: “the authority of
precedent is vertical and that lower courts are bound by decisions of higher courts.”35 Courts are
obliged to follow and apply relevant authorities emanating from higher courts, “even when they
disagree with them and even when such disagreement appears well founded.” 36 A court may refuse
to follow a precedent from a court of the same level if it was decided disregarding an important
argument. However, it is more appropriate for a trial court to apply the rules of precedent, and, if
necessary, its decision can be appealed to a higher court, which will not be constrained by the same
case law. 37
Developing the Common Law

The law must also change: it is not “a mausoleum.”38 Both continuity and creativity are legitimate
values in the development of the common law.39 Precedent is not a straight-jacket. Judges can use
their power to interpret past authorities to nudge the law in new directions. They have wide latitude
in determining the ratio decidendi of a prior case.40 Whenever collegiate judges have agreed on the
outcome but given divergent reasons, this sows the seeds of uncertainty and creative ambiguity.
Determining the effect of an apparent precedent frequently requires complex analysis of the case
law, including the contexts in which principles were developed and the interrelationship between
different decisions.41 By distinguishing or reinterpreting a decision, later judges might determine that
it supports a principle quite different from what was previously thought.42

32
Reid, J. 1974. The Judge as Law Maker. Journal of Society of Public Teachers of Law 12: 22, 26.
33
Geasley v DPP [2009] IECCA 22, para 39 (IECCA); Health Services Executive v 248 Named Complainants
[2013] 24 ELR 206, 213 (IELC); Kleinwort Benson v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 A.C. 349, 378 (UKHL); Attorney
General v Ryan’s Car Hire Ltd [1965] IR 642, 653 (IESC); Hutchinson, AC. 2000. The Importance of Leading
Cases: a Critical Analysis. In Leading Cases of the Twentieth Century ed. O’Dell, E. Dublin: Round Hall: 14.
34
Irish Trust Bank Ltd v Central Bank of Ireland [1976-7] ILRM 50, 53 (IEHC); In Re Worldport Ireland Limited (In
Liquidation) [2005] IEHC 189 (IEHC).
35
Geasley v DPP [2009] IECCA 22, para 42 (IECCA); McDonnell v Byrne Engineering Co. Ltd (Unreported,
Supreme Court, Irish Times, October 4, 1987) (IESC); The Health Service Executive v MX [2011] IEHC 326, para
63 (IEHC).
36
37
Irish Trust Bank Ltd v Central Bank of Ireland [1976-7] ILRM 50, 53 (IEHC); In Re Worldport Ireland Limited (In
Liquidation) [2005] IEHC 189 (IEHC); Kadri v Governor of Wheatfield Prison [2012] 2 ILRM 392, 401 (IESC).
38
McInerney v Liddy [1945] IR 100, 104 (IEHC); McDonnell v Ireland [1998] 1 IR 134, 157 (IESC); In the Matter
of Flightlease (Ireland) Ltd [2008] 1 ILRM 543, 558 (IEHC).
39
Posner, R.A. 1999. The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press,
Harvard University Press: 244.
40
The State (Quinn) v Ryan [1965] IR 70 (IESC).
41
The People (DPP) v Mallon [2011] IECCA 29, para 49 (IECCA); Gormley v Smyth [2010] IESC 5, para 21 (IESC).
42
Henchy n 15 above 558.

5
Besides, rules which were created by judges “can be changed and altered by judges.”43 The common
law judge, conscious of the bounds of his power to make law and the dangers of making sweeping
pronouncements, is usually cautious. Judges usually refrain from attempting to propound and
delimit an exhaustive set of rules for future application.44 Even when they develop new principles,
they leave them open-ended.45 The contours of a new rule are best defined, “step by step,
precedent after precedent, and when set against the concrete facts of a specific case.”46
Yet the common law is capable of dramatic evolution.47 Changes in law and society eventually
provoke eruptions in the case law. The Irish law on the recognition of foreign divorces needed to
change after divorce was introduced in this jurisdiction.48 The law of unjust enrichment provides a
striking example of an area in which the common law rules have been transformed in the past
quarter century. For example, the House of Lords abolished a long-established common law rule that
money could not be recovered on the ground that it was paid by mistake, if the mistake was a
mistake about the law.49 While the common law method is built on judicial restraint, occasionally
judges deem it necessary to take a larger step than usual. Hutchinson reconciles the tension
between stability and change in the common law by placing its transformative capacity at the
centre.50
A Permeable Legal System

Irish judges frequently look to the case law of other jurisdictions for guidance or support.51 Because
Ireland is a small jurisdiction, in which relatively few cases are decided, there may be no recent
domestic precedent on a point.52 English case law is a particularly strong influence.53 Decisions of the
English courts delivered since Irish independence are of persuasive authority.54 The Irish courts also
pay attention to the evolution of the common law in other countries which share our heritage.
Authorities from other legal systems will be more likely to be adopted in Ireland if the two systems
have a similar approach to the area of law. As various private law rules have evolved differently in

43
The State (Lynch) v Cooney [1982] 1 IR 337, 369 (IESC).
44
Ryan v Attorney General [1965] IR 294, 344-345 (IESC); The People (Attorney General) v O'Brien [1965] IR
142, 161 (IESC).
45
Attorney General v Ryan’s Car Hire Ltd [1965] IR 642, 654 (IESC).
46
Murphy v Attorney General [1982] 1 IR 241, 315 (IESC).
47
A v Governor of Arbour Hill Prison [2006] IESC 45, [2006] 4 IR 88, 115-116 (IESC); Kleinwort Benson v Lincoln
City Council [1999] 2 A.C. 349, 378 (UKHL).
48
GMcG v DW [2000] 1 IR 96, 104, 106 (IEHC).
49
Kleinwort Benson v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 A.C. 349 (UKHL).
50
Hutchinson n 33 above 2.
51
Murray, J.L. 2008. Judicial Cosmopolitanism. Judicial Studies Institute Journal 2: 1, 12; see Attorney General v
Ryan’s Car Hire Ltd [1965] IR 642 (IESC).
52
Goodall, K. 2000. What Defines The Roles Of A Judge? First Steps towards the Construction of a Comparative
Method. Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 51: 535, 544.
53
Brady, J.C. 1978. English Law in the Republic of Ireland. University of Tasmania Law Review 6: 60.
54
Irish Shell Ltd v Elm Motors Ltd [1984] IR 200, 225, 227 (IESC); see also Henchy n 15 above 549.

6
different common law jurisdictions, precedents advanced in argument as authority are examined to
determine how well they fit. For example, the law on remedial constructive trusts in Ireland
resembles that which has developed in New Zealand, but departs strongly from English law, which
does not recognise this remedy. The Irish Supreme Court has emphasised the idea of a consensus
among common law jurisdictions.55 Our courts will be more likely to make radical changes in the
common law in this jurisdiction, when such changes conform with the evolution of the law in
comparator jurisdictions. This wider context offers comfort for the judiciary when they choose to
make significant changes to common law rules without wishing to appear to depart from precedent.
We should distinguish between foreign influences in public and private law, because Ireland’s
constitutional order contrasts significantly with that of many common law jurisdictions.56 In
constitutional cases, Irish judgments have frequently discussed the law of the United States. More
recently, they refer to European constitutional courts. Murray CJ explains this as a “transnational
communication of knowledge, concepts and ideals of justice” which inform the interpretation of
national law.57
Ireland’s Constitutional Jurisprudence

The law-making power of judges is particularly important in constitutional law.58 The interpretation
of the Constitution in each case “can shape what the Constitution means in the future”.59 A deep
and complex body of constitutional case law has developed rapidly over the past half century.
Ireland’s constitutional jurisprudence thus offers a striking example of the power of case law to
transform the law.
The Constitution contains a declaration of fundamental rights, which partially adopts and subsumes
rights traditionally recognised in the common law tradition, such as habeas corpus.60 Articles 40 to
44 of the Constitution protect fundamental rights, under subheadings which include personal rights,
family, education, private property and religion. These extensive guarantees of fundamental rights
were one of the “conspicuous novelties” of the Constitution.61 Initially, neither its drafters nor the
legal profession believed that the fundamental rights provisions would have far-reaching effects.62
Since the early 1960s, the superior courts have vigorously developed a body of case law giving
meaning to the personal rights enunciated in the Constitution.63 Significantly, they determined that

55
In Re Flightlease (Ireland) Limited [2012] 2 ILRM 461, 483-484 (IESC).
56
The State (Quinn) v Ryan [1965] IR 70, 126 (IESC); Irish Shell Ltd v Elm Motors Ltd [1984] IR 200, 227 (IESC).
57
Murray n 51 above 16.
58
Walsh, B. 1980. In O'Reilly J. and Redmond, M. Cases and Materials on the Irish Constitution. Dublin:
Incorporated Law Society of Ireland: xi.
59
Walsh, B. 1996. Constitutional Adjudication. Holdsworth Law Review 17: 153, 155, 162.
60
Kelly, J.M. 1967. Fundamental Rights in the Irish Law and Constitution. 2nd ed. Dublin: Allen Figgis & Co: 22.
61
Hogan and Whyte n 19 above 1245.
62
Kelly n 60 above 15.
63
See eg Ryan v Attorney General [1965] IR 294 (IESC); Kelly n 60 above 25; see also Hogan, G.W. and Whyte,
G.F. 1994. The Irish Constitution. 3rd ed. Dublin: Butterworths: 675.

7
the Constitution also protects an open category of unenumerated personal rights.64 The courts have
followed the common law methodology in determining the content of the category of
unenumerated personal rights. Rather than developing an abstract or general theory of rights, the
courts wait for litigants to claim that they enjoy a certain right before deciding whether the claimed
right does indeed fall within the constitutional guarantee. As common lawyers, Irish judges prefer
deciding on concrete rather than hypothetical scenarios.65
They treat the constitution as a living document, to be interpreted in light of contemporary values
rather than adhering to the values of the society which enacted it.66 The substance and effect of
constitutional provisions can evolve over time, with the effect that a law which might be compatible
with the constitution at one time can become unconstitutional at a later time.67 This implies a need
for the Supreme Court not strictly to be bound by precedent.68
Dissenting judgments provide raw material for the common law to evolve.69 However, until 2013,
Article 34.4.5° provided that, in cases where the Supreme Court was called upon to determine the
constitutionality of a law, the Court would give a single judgment. There would be no assenting or
dissenting opinions.70 This “one judgment rule” was not applied to statutes inherited from prior
constitutional regimes.71 The Constitution has now been amended to remove this restriction, except
for cases where the President refers a Bill to the Supreme Court before promulgation to verify its
constitutionality.72 The rationale behind the “one judgment rule” was to enhance the certainty and
authority of determinations by the highest court in the land on the validity of laws. However, it
risked doing so by creating a “false picture of unanimity”.73 Dissenting judgments legitimately serve
the useful purpose of articulating minority reasoning which might persuade future generations.
Reviewing the compatibility of enacted legislation with the Constitution raises particular risks of
encroachment on the legislative function. The courts, keenly aware of the separation of powers,
regularly address the limits of their power in this regard. They use a presumption of constitutionality
to avoid condemning legislation where possible. Furthermore, if a statute is unconstitutional and
invalid, the courts cannot substitute an unobjectionable provision for it.74 Nor can the court

64
Ryan v Attorney General [1965] IR 294, 344-345 (IESC); McGee v Attorney General [1974] IR 284 (IESC).
65
Walsh n 59 above 160.
66
Ibid 154.
67
Blake v Attorney General [1982] IR 117. 125 (IESC); McMenamin v Ireland [1996] 3 IR 100 (IESC); McGee v.
Attorney General [1974] IR 284, 318 (IESC); The State (Healy) v Donoghue [1976] IR 326 (IESC).
68
Hogan and Whyte n 19 above 987-988.
69
Barrington, D. 1987. The Constitution in the Courts. In The Constitution of Ireland 1937-1987, ed. Litton, F.
Dublin: Institute of Public Administration: 121.
70
Ní Loinsigh, N. 2014. Judicial Dissent in Ireland: Theory, Practice and the Constraints of the Single Opinion
Rule. Irish Jurist: 123; see eg Crotty v An Taoiseach [1987] IR 713 (IESC).
71
Melling v Ó Mathghamhna [1962] IR 1 (IESC); The State (Shanahan) v Conroy [1964] IR 239 (IESC); The State
(Quinn) v Ryan [1965] IR 70 (IESC).
72
73
Kelly n 60 above 33.
74
The State (Woods) v Attorney General [1969] IR 385, 398 (IESC).

8
recommend to the Legislature how to replace it.75 The judiciary refrains from enforcing socio-
economic rights, because to do so would infringe the separation of powers: “it is not the function of
the courts to make an assessment of the validity of the many competing claims on national
resources”.76 Lastly, the theory of unenumerated rights has declined in recent years and judges
emphasise the need for restraint in identifying new constitutional rights.77 In a recent case, the
Supreme Court found that the text of the Constitution did not indicate a right constitutional right to
end one's life at a time of one's choosing.78
The Relaxation of Precedent in the Supreme Court

Common law courts are challenged to find the appropriate balance “between certainty and
flexibility.”79 Precedent must not be “our master”.80 Before the 1960s, it was generally assumed
that the doctrine of stare decisis applied to decisions of the Supreme Court, rendering them immune
from future challenge.81 In 1962, Henchy J, writing extrajudicially, argued that a legal order based on
a rigid, supreme constitution should not adhere to the stare decisis rule. He reasoned that the
English courts could assume that Parliament has the power to overturn all their decisions through
legislation, whereas in Ireland, an erroneous interpretation of the Constitution, if it were not
susceptible to correction by the Supreme Court itself, could only be cured by recourse to the People
in a referendum.82
The first sign of a rejection of stare decisis came in The State (Quinn) v Ryan,83 where the Supreme
Court invalidated a provision which it had previously upheld as compatible with the Constitution.84
Strictly speaking, the decision in Ryan did not require overruling the previous authority because the
earlier case had not considered the arguments on which the current challenge was based. However,
Walsh J expressed strong views on the doctrine of stare decisis. Like Henchy J, Walsh J considered it
implausible that the People, in enacting the Constitution, intended to give the case law of the
Supreme Court the same normative status as the Constitution itself. This would be the inevitable
consequence if every interpretation of the Constitution by the Supreme Court was fully binding in all

75
Somjee v Minister for Justice [1981] ILRM 324 (IEHC); Mhic Mhathúna v Ireland [1995] 1 ILRM 69 (IEHC);
Maguire v Ardagh [2002] 1 IR 385, 575 (IESC).
76
TD v. Minister of Education [2001] 4 IR 259, 288 (IESC); O'Reilly v. Limerick Corporation [1989] I.L.R.M. 181,
195 (IEHC).
77
IO'T v B [1998] 2 I.R. 321, 370 (IESC); TD v. Minister of Education [2001] 4 IR 259, 281 (IESC); Keane, R. 2004.
Judges as Lawmakers: The Irish Experience. Judicial Studies Institute Journal: 1, 14.
78
Fleming v Ireland [2013] IESC 19 (IESC).
79
80
Reid n 32 above 25.
81
Kelly n 60 above 30; see Henchy n 15 above 553.
82
83
The State (Quinn) v Ryan [1965] IR 70 (IESC).
84
State (Dowling) v Kingston (No. 2) [1937] IR 699 (IESC).

9
future decisions.85 Walsh J concluded that for any court of final appeal, stare decisis might not “ever
be anything more than judicial policy, albeit strong judicial policy.”86
Shortly afterwards, in Attorney General v Ryan’s Car Hire87 the Supreme Court expressly overruled
one of its own previous decisions for the first time. Kingsmill Moore J approved the distinction
“between the general principle of following precedent and the strict rule of stare decisis.”88 Judges
are not infallible and the primary concern of judges must be to do justice. The rigid rule of stare
decisis must be replaced by a “more elastic formula”, whereby a court of ultimate appeal can refuse
to follow a precedent when it is clearly of the opinion that it was erroneous.89 It remains reasonably
unusual for the Supreme Court to reverse its prior positions. More often, there might be two
seemingly inconsistent authorities and the challenge is to work out whether and how they can be
reconciled.90
There is one notable exception to the power of the Supreme Court to overrule its past decisions. The
President may refer Bills voted in Parliament to the Supreme Court, in order to determine, before
promulgation, whether they contradict the Constitution.91 Article 34.3.3° prohibits any court from
later questioning the validity of a law which was approved by the Supreme Court prior to
promulgation under an Article 26 reference. The Irish Constitution thereby gives one specific and
limited category of decision unusually wide, binding and permanent effect.92 The Article 26
reference procedure is the only case in which future courts will be bound by a decision concerning a
point which was not argued before the court. The sweeping effect of a declaration of validity in an
Article 26 reference is said to deter the President from using this power.
Reasons not to Follow a Precedent

A court may be justified in refusing to follow a precedent if there was a severe defect in the original
authority. This means more than that the previous decision must have been wrong. The defects
which justify disregarding a precedent include insufficient authority having been pleaded or
submissions being incorrect, or the judge having misunderstood an important element.93 A decision
can be stigmatised as per incuriam if it failed to consider “a relevant argument, an important judicial
precedent or a relevant statutory provision”.94 For example, Geasley v DPP concerned a precedent

85
The State (Quinn) v Ryan [1965] IR 70, 127 (IESC).
86
Ibid 125.
87
Attorney General v Ryan’s Car Hire Ltd [1965] IR 642 (IESC).
88
Ibid 653.
89
Ibid 654.
90
The People (DPP) v Mallon [2011] IECCA 29, para 48 (IECCA).
91
92
The State (Quinn) v Ryan [1965] IR 70, 120 (IESC).
93
Irish Trust Bank Ltd v Central Bank of Ireland [1976-7] ILRM 50, 53 (IEHC).
94

10
which was clearly decided in ignorance of the law: it turned on a statutory wording which was no
longer in force at that time.95 This defect entitled the later judge to refuse to follow it.
In Re Worldport Ireland Limited, decided in 2005, Clarke J stated that a “clear error in the judgment”
might suffice.96 He also indicated that the age of the precedent is relevant where the law has
subsequently advanced.97 Another case asks whether the precedent is “manifestly wrong”.98 More
recently, some judges may be applying a more liberal approach, which could apply where there is a
disagreement about the law between courts of the same level.99 In EC v Clinical Director of the
Central Mental Hospital, Hogan J emphasises the need for caution and respect in departing from a
precedent of the same level, before setting out the reasoning which compels him to a contrary
solution.100 Similarly, in XA v Minister for Justice,101 he states that the matter is so fundamental that
he cannot follow another High Court precedent with which he disagrees.102
The Limits of Making and Changing Judge-Made Law

Although we accept that judges make law, there are still limits to the power of judges to make
common law rules. Common lawyers frequently speak of judges “developing” the common law.103
This is “a helpful description, not a misleading euphemism.”104 Lord Bingham points out that
changing the common law in a modest, incremental fashion ensures that change remains within the
confines of what citizens might reasonably expect.105 Existing principles may be expanded or
adapted, but it is not usually possible for judges to invent entirely new rules. How far judges have
the power to modify the common law seems is a question of degree: it is not entirely clear where
the line should be drawn.106
Irish courts confronted the limits of their power to develop the common law in a series of decisions
on the nullity of marriages. During the 1980s, judges expanded the common law grounds on which
nullity could be declared, to cover cases of mental illness which prevented a person from carrying on
a caring interpersonal relationship.107 In UF v JC, the court was asked to recognise a new ground to

95
Ibid para 44.
96
In Re Worldport Ireland Limited (In Liquidation) [2005] IEHC 189 (IEHC); Kadri v Governor of Wheatfield
Prison [2012] 2 ILRM 392, 401 (IESC); Rory Brady v Director of Public Prosecutions [2010] IEHC 231 (IEHC).
97
In Re Worldport Ireland Limited (In Liquidation) [2005] IEHC 189 (IEHC).
98
Rory Brady v Director of Public Prosecutions [2010] IEHC 231 (IEHC).
99
FX v Clinical Director of the Central Mental Hospital (No 1) [2012] IEHC 271, para 25 (IEHC).
100
L v Clinical Director of the Central Mental Hospital [2010] IEHC 195 (IEHC).
101
XA v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Ireland and the Attorney General [2011] IEHC 397
(IEHC).
102
Ibid para 32.
103
Kleinwort Benson v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 A.C. 349, 378 (UKHL).
104
In re Spectrum Plus Ltd (in liquidation) [2005] UKHL 41, para 33 (UKHL).
105
Bingham, T. 2008. The Rule of Law. Judicial Studies Institute Journal: 121, 126.
106
107
RSJ v JSJ [1982] ILRM 263 (IEHC); D v C [1984] ILRM 173, 188-189 (IEHC).

11
annul a marriage due to the homosexuality of one spouse. In the High Court, Keane J criticised the
recent extensions of the law. He believed it was impermissible for judges to introduce entirely new
grounds for nullity.108 However, Keane J’s decision was overturned on appeal to the Supreme Court,
which approved the homosexuality of a spouse as a new ground for nullity and expressly approved
the earlier decisions as extensions warranted by analogy with existing rules.109
In contrast, the Supreme Court ruled in L v L that a proposed change to the common law was
impermissible. The High Court had awarded equitable ownership of half of the family property to a
wife following her separation from her husband.110 Existing rules authorise the creation of trusts
over property in circumstances of relationship breakup where the plaintiff has contributed
financially to the acquisition of the property. In L v L, the wife had made no financial contribution,
having worked full-time in the home. The Supreme Court held that the High Court decision moved
beyond merely extending existing law. The courts do not have the power to “identify a brand new
right”.111
Recently, the Irish courts have been consistently rejecting the power to make new common law
rules. Accordingly, Hogan J refused to invent a new tort of reckless lending in Healy v Stepstone
Mortgage Funding Limited.112 On a number of occasions, Charleton J has ruled that the Constitution
prohibits judges from creating new common law rules.113 In Re Flightlease (Ireland) Limited, the
Supreme Court refused to move to a test of a test of real and substantial connection for jurisdiction
in private international law. This was not “a matter of detail but a fundamental reorientation of the
law”.114
In Hussein v The Labour Court,115 Hogan J reluctantly applied a common law rule which deprived a
worker who did not have an employment permit of legal protection against exploitation. Disturbed
by the court’s inability to offer redress, he stated that he would transmit a copy to the executive and
legislative organs of government for them to consider possible legislative reforms. This unusual step
demonstrates that Hogan J would have wished to change the rule if he could, accepted that it was
for the Legislature to consider reform, and was open to initiating an unusual degree of dialogue
between the judicial and legislative powers. Respect for the separation of powers and the idea of
democratic legitimacy are not the only reasons why judges defer to Parliament when the law needs
reform. Judges accept that the Legislature is better situated to make informed holistic policy

108
UF v JC [1991] 2 IR 330, 341 (IESC).
109
Ibid 354, 356.
110
L v L [1992] I.L.R.M. 115 (IESC).
111
Ibid 120.
112
Healy v Stepstone Mortgage Funding Limited [2014] IEHC 134 (IEHC).
113
DPP v Cash [2007] IEHC 108, para 62 (IEHC); ICS Building Society v Grant [2010] IEHC 17 (IEHC).
114
In Re Flightlease (Ireland) Limited [2012] 2 ILRM 461, 495 (IESC).
115
Hussein v The Labour Court [2012] 2 I.L.R.M. 508 (IEHC).

12
decisions.116 In UF v JC, Keane J indicated that judicial law-making could entail a fragmented
approach and the risk of uncertainty.117
A Judicial Culture which Prioritises Justice over Formalism

Although judges respect the limits of their law-making power, on the whole, the case law suggests
that Irish judges are more willing than their counterparts in some other common law jurisdictions to
use their power to modify the common law. In London Street Tramways v London City Council, Lord
Halsbury articulated a highly formalist perspective, when he accepted the occasional injustice as
preferable to the inconvenience of having each question reargued in every case.118 Kingsmill Moore J
strenuously rejected this view in Attorney General v Ryan’s Car Hire.119 Irish judges generally seem to
be relatively willing to emulate Lord Denning’s flexible and inventive approach to the common
law.120
Many dramatic innovations in Irish common law are informed by the constitutional background.121
The constitutional tort exemplifies this. In Meskell v Córas Iompair Éireann,122 the Supreme Court
ruled that a constitutional right can be protected by legal action “even though such action may not
fit into any of the ordinary forms of action in either common law or equity.”123 Another dramatic
example of judicial law-making creating new rights is Murphy v Attorney General, which established
a right to recover wrongfully demanded taxes from the State.124 This preceded similar developments
in Canada and the United Kingdom.125
In private law, the Irish courts also moved ahead of other common law jurisdictions in awarding
compensatory damages for negligently inflicted psychiatric harm.126 They have been highly receptive
to proprietary remedies including the remedial constructive trust.127 Some of these changes may
reflect sympathy for parties who found themselves in difficult situations. The liberal development of
the law on marital nullity seems to fit this mould.128 Innovative landmark decisions do not usually

116
In Re Flightlease (Ireland) Limited [2012] 2 ILRM 461, 488 (IESC).
117
UF v JC [1991] 2 IR 330, 348 (IESC).
118
The London Tramways Company, Limited v The London County Council [1898] 1 AC 375, 380 (UKHL).
119
Attorney General v Ryan’s Car Hire Ltd [1965] IR 642 (IESC).
120
Stevens, R. 1975. Judicial Legislation and the Law Lords: Four Interpretations—II. Irish Jurist: 216.
121
Healy v Stepstone Mortgage Funding Limited [2014] IEHC 134, para 9 (IEHC).
122
Meskell v Córas Iompair Éireann [1973] IR 121 (IESC).
123
Ibid 132-133.
124
125
Woolwich Equitable Building Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1993] 1 AC 70 (UKHL); Kingstreet
Investments v. New Brunswick (2007) 276 DLR (4th) 342 (SCC).
126
McMahon, B. and Binchy, W. 1990. Irish Law of Torts. 2nd ed. Dublin: Butterworth: 305.
127
Kelly v Cahill [2001] 2 ILRM 205, 211 (IEHC); Dublin Corporation v Building and Allied Trade Union (High
Court, Unreported, 6 March 1996, Budd J), pp. 119, 120 (IEHC): Budd J cites In Re Irish Shipping Ltd (In
Liquidation) [1986] ILRM 518 (IEHC) and HKN Invest OY v Incotrade PVT Ltd [1993] 3 IR 152 (IEHC); In Re
Frederick Inns Ltd [1991] ILRM 582, 591-592 (IESC).
128
RSJ v JSJ [1982] ILRM 263 (IEHC); D v C [1984] ILRM 173 (IEHC); UF v JC [1991] 2 IR 330 (IESC).

13
result from conservatism and disciplined legal reasoning.129 In a contest between the ‘legally correct’
answer and the desired, just solution, the latter frequently triumphs. The concern to do justice in
each individual case outweighs the risk of complicating or undermining the wider structure of rules
and doctrine.
The apparent tendency of the Irish judiciary to favour substantive justice over a more formalist
approach, which would favour certainty and predictability, is influenced by the Constitution.130
Article 40.3.1° obliges the State “as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate the
personal rights of the citizen.” In addition, the State must, through its laws, “protect as best it may
from unjust attack and, in the case of injustice done, vindicate the life, person, good name, and
property rights of every citizen.” This constitutional duty binds the judiciary as an organ of the State.
In addition, the Preamble invokes the ideal of justice. Walsh J interpreted this as imposing on judges
a duty to interpret people’s rights in conformity with the ideal of justice.131
In light of these constitutional provisions, Finlay CJ identifies the first fundamental function of the
judge as to do justice between the parties.132 Secondly, the judge must be seen to do justice. Thirdly,
he must consider the longer term effects of his decision, including on the public and including on the
development of case law.133 He emphasises that achieving the just outcome in the individual case is
the highest priority. Kavanagh believes that the Irish Constitution led the Irish judiciary to reject the
positivist notion that they could be required to “blindly enforce the law as it was, irrespective of
what injustice that would cause”.134 Binchy argues that the mindset which our judges developed to
adjudicate on constitutional matters informed their reasoning in other areas, so that they moved,
“from the incrementalist philosophy of the common law into a way of thinking that looks for the
broad principle, expressed in more abstract and, at times, rhetorical language”135
Another explanation for the relative flexibility of Irish judges may relate to the size of a legal
system.136 Goodall argues that there is a weaker need for a legal system in a small jurisdiction to be
highly formalist. There is less fear of opening the floodgates to an uncontrollable flow of cases. In a
small jurisdiction, judges can be confident that they will be able to refine the legal principles as
future cases gradually arise. She also observes that smaller legal systems tend to have more
consistency in the judgments given throughout their courts structure.137 This increased innate
coherence within the system may free the judges of the superior courts from the strictest adherence
to stare decisis: we need not fear that occasionally changing a common law rule would lead to chaos.

129
130
Goodall n 52 above 538.
131
McGee v Attorney General [1974] I.R. 284, 319 (IESC).
132
Attorney General v Ryan’s Car Hire Ltd [1965] IR 642, 653 (IESC).
133
Finlay n 25 above 1-2; see also O’Doherty v Attorney General [1941] IR 569, 582 (IEHC); Quinn v IBRC [2012]
IEHC 36, para E4 (IEHC).
134
Kavanagh, A. 2012. The Irish Constitution at 75 Years: Natural Law, Christian Values and the Ideal of Justice.
Irish Jurist 48: 71, 81.
135
Binchy, W. 2001. The Irish Legal System. International Journal of Legal Information 29: 201 , 203.
136
Goodall n 52 above 538.
137
Ibid 541.

14
The success of landmark decisions depends on them being accepted as ‘politically valid and socially
acceptable’.138 The judiciary is a strongly legitimate authority within the Irish constitutional order.139
It is on an equal footing with the other powers of the State and granted the power to control the
actions of the legislature and the executive. Society views this strong and active judiciary as
legitimate. Ireland ranks third in the world for public confidence in the independence of the
judiciary.140 In this context, it is natural for judicial power to possess a high degree of self-confidence
which emboldens its decision-making. Ultimately, there is no evidence that the public considers Irish
judges to have struck the wrong balance between certainty and justice.
The Declaratory Theory of Judicial Decision-Making

The traditional understanding of the role of the judge in the common law has been that the judge
discovers and declares what the law already is.141 This declaratory theory of law is essentially a
fiction, or “fairy tale”.142 It usefully circumscribed the law-making power of judges, keeping them
conservative, deterring them from overstepping the bounds through a zealous desire to reform the
law. Some advocates of the declaratory theory want judicial rule-making, if it must happen, to be
“covert and imperceptible”.143 The fiction has been challenged in more recent times. Moves away
from the strictest form of adherence to precedent reflect the acknowledgement that judges can,
indeed, change the common law.144 It is now generally accepted that judges do make law, and that
this is proper, within the appropriate limits.145
Kleinwort Benson v Lincoln City Council146 breathed new life into a modern conception of the
declaratory theory of law. This conception does not imply that the law is “static and unchanging” or
that judicial decisions are “infallible or immutable”.147 In Kleinwort Benson, a claim for restitution
turned on whether the payments could be described as mistaken, when everyone thought that they
were legal at the time they were made. After the payments were made, the courts ruled that local
authorities had lacked the capacity to engage in these deals.148 Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s view was
that, since the law changed after the payment was made, then “at the time of payment, the payer
was not labouring under any mistake”.149 However, he was in the minority. Lord Goff, leading the
majority, acknowledged the fiction of the idea that judges discover pre-existing law, but reasoned
that the common law is nonetheless based on a form of the declaratory theory. This means that

138
139
Goodall n 52 above 550-551.
140
Schwab, K. 2014. The Global Competitiveness Report 2013–2014. World Economic Forum: 223.
141
Jones v Secretary of State for Social Services [1972] A.C. 944, 1026 (UKHL).
142
Reid n 32 above 22.
143
Bingham, T. 2000. The Business of Judging. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000: 27.
144
Ibid 28.
145
Ibid 27.
146
Kleinwort Benson v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 A.C. 349 (UKHL).
147
R v Governor of Brockhill Prison, ex parte Evans (No 2) [2001] 2 A.C. 19, 48 (EWCA).
148
Hazell v. Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council [1992] 2 A.C. 1 (UKHL).
149

15
judicial statements of the law must be applied to events which occurred at an earlier date, and
applied equally to all cases. Consequently, he rejected prospective overruling as having “no place in
our legal system.”150 Since the payments were unlawful when they were made, and the parties
believed them to be legally required, they were mistaken. Lord Goff also rejected two proposed
defences, which would protect payments which were either made on a settled understanding of the
law or honestly received.151
There has not been much explicit discussion of theories of judicial decision-making in the Irish case
law. It is generally accepted that judges can change the law from what it was previously. In A v
Governor of Arbour Hill Prison, Murray CJ said that we have moved on from the belief that judges
merely draw on existing law “at least in its purest form…”152 One of the few explicit references to
declaratory theory came from Hogan J in FX v Clinical Director of the Central Mental Hospital (No
1).153 Hogan J invoked the declaratory theory, while suggesting it was not fully representative of
what occurred when the court departed from previous authority and acknowledging the difficulty
that parties would have relied upon the law as it was believed to be before the change.154 In Re
Flightlease, Clarke J acknowledged that judgments can effect “radical change” to the common law,
which can have an unsettling effect on citizens’ transactions.155
It is understood that judgments generally have retrospective effect.156 In A v Governor of Arbour Hill
Prison,157 Murray CJ affirms the common law position that judicial decisions as to what the law is
apply retrospectively to facts which have already occurred.158 Lord Goff said he could not “imagine
how a common law system, or indeed any legal system, can operate otherwise if the law is be
applied equally to all and yet be capable of organic change.”159 In West Midland Baptist Association
v Birmingham Corporation, the House of Lords considered whether it could legitimately revisit a
judge-made rule of law.160 Lord Reid reasoned that whichever rule the judges chose must be taken
to have applied all along: “[w]e cannot say that the law was one thing yesterday but is to be
something different tomorrow.”161 That would mean that people who were previously affected by
the old rule would, if it was now changed, have been deprived of the benefit of the “correct” rule.
This raises the question of whether the retrospective effect of changes to the common law should
ever be limited.

150
Ibid 379.
151
Ibid 384.
152
A v Governor of Arbour Hill Prison [2006] IESC 45; [2006] 4 IR 88, 116-117 (IESC).
153
FX v Clinical Director of the Central Mental Hospital (No 1) [2012] IEHC 271 (IEHC).
154
Ibid para 46.
155
In Re Flightlease (Ireland) Ltd [2008] 1 ILRM 543, 558-559 (IEHC).
156
Reid n 32 above 23.
157
A v Governor of Arbour Hill Prison [2006] IESC 45; [2006] 4 IR 88 (IESC).
158
Ibid 117.
159
160
West Midland Baptist Association v Birmingham Corporation [1970] A.C. 874, 898 (UKHL).
161
Ibid 898-899.

16
Prospective Overruling in English and Irish Law
Two distinct aspects of the judicial function in Ireland could raise questions about the temporal
effects of judicial decision-making. The first arises when judges change common law rules. The
second occurs when then declare a statute which has been in force for a period to be contrary to the
Constitution. It may be important to protect past reliance on the accepted understanding of the
law.162 Judges are keenly aware of this issue and their first response is restraint when tempted to
change the law.163 Another partial solution is the availability of defences such as limitation,164 laches,
and res judicata.165 A range of other potential responses falls under the heading of “prospective
overruling”.166 The Irish courts have engaged with these difficulties in depth in the constitutional
context. There are strong indications that the Irish judiciary regards these questions as two sides of
the one coin.167 On the other hand, academic commentators have doubted that the same solutions
should apply in both types of case.168
The English courts have not fully adopted the technique of prospective overruling, but occasional
dicta have expressed support for the notion.169 In Hall v Simons, Lord Hope said he hoped the change
to the law which abolished the previous rule that barristers were immune from suit would operate
from the date of the judgment.170 In Jones v Secretary of State for Social Services, Lord Simon
suggested that the most satisfactory solution might have been to apply the law as it then stood to
the parties in the case, while prospectively overruling it for the future. However, he believed that
judges should not claim the power to use this technique without statutory authorisation by
Parliament, as it would affect the constitutional balance of powers between the Legislature and
judiciary.171 In R v Governor of Brockhill Prison, ex parte Evans (No 2), the House of Lords considered
the possibility of prospective effect in cases where judicial interpretation of a statute changed. Lord
Slynn observed that “there may be situations in which it would be desirable, and in no way unjust,
that the effect of judicial rulings should be prospective or limited to certain claimants”.172 However,
there was no justification for this in the present case.

162
Nicol, A. 1976. Prospective Overruling: A New Device for English Courts? Modern Law Review 39: 542, 543.
163
In Re Flightlease (Ireland) Ltd [2008] 1 ILRM 543, 558 (IEHC).
164
See Cadder v Her Majesty’s Advocate [2010] UKSC 43, paras 105-106 (UKSC); McDonnell v Ireland [1998] 1
IR 134 (IESC).
165
In re Spectrum Plus Ltd (in liquidation) [2005] UKHL 41, para 26 (UKHL); Murphy v Attorney General [1982]
1 IR 241, 314 (IESC).
166
Arden, M. 2004. Prospective Overruling. Law Quarterly Review 7, 7.
167
A v Governor of Arbour Hill Prison [2006] IESC 45, [2006] 4 IR 88, 117 (IESC); FX v Clinical Director of the
Central Mental Hospital (No 1) [2012] IEHC 271 para 46 (IEHC).
168
Binchy W. and Byrne, R. 2002. Annual Review of Irish Law 2001. Dublin: Round Hall: 658.
169
Arden n 166 above 11.
170
Hall v Simons [2002] 1 AC 615 (UKHL).
171
Jones v Secretary of State for Social Services [1972] A.C. 944, 1026 (UKHL).
172

17
The House of Lords again considered prospective overruling in Re Spectrum Plus in 2005.173 It
changed the common law rules on distinguishing between types of security which received different
levels of preference on insolvency. This would affect many commercial lenders. Lord Nicholls
concluded that,
“there could be circumstances in this country where prospective overruling would be

necessary to serve the underlying objective of the courts of this country: to administer justice
fairly and in accordance with the law.”174
This might arise where a decision,
“would have such gravely unfair and disruptive consequences for past transactions or
happenings that this House would be compelled to depart from the normal principles”175
However, the reliance on a previous understanding of the law by commercial actors in the present
case was far from sufficient to justify the exceptional measure of prospective overruling. Based on
these authorities, it seems prospective overruling might be possible in England, if a sufficiently
exceptional case arose.176
There are also dicta against prospective overruling. In Evans, Lord Hobhouse considered it
“extremely doubtful” that there would ever be a case which would justify limiting the retrospective
effect of a judicial statement of the law.177 He disapproved of the idea as a denial of the courts’
constitutional function to grant the parties their legal rights. Furthermore, it would invade the
legislative power for judges to declare a legal rule to bind others in the future. Lastly, he said, a
statement of the law which was not applied to the determination of the case before the court must
necessarily be obiter dictum and therefore cannot constitute an authoritative precedent for the
future. Lord Hobhouse’s objections reflect the sense that there is a distinction between the
legitimacy of the common law judge deciding a case in a manner which will be followed in the
future, and independently of a decision in a case before him, purporting to invent a new rule.178 As
Lord Nicholls expresses it so clearly: “Prospective overruling robs a ruling of its essential authenticity
as a judicial act.”179
Irish judgments do not directly discuss prospective overruling except in the specific constitutional
context. Many of the considerations which English judges evoke would apply. The very cautious

173
See Sheehan, D. and Arvind, T.T. 2006. Prospective Overruling and the Fixed-Floating Charge Debate. Law
Quarterly Review: 20.
174
175
Ibid para 40.
176
Cadder v Her Majesty’s Advocate [2010] UKSC 43, para 58.
177
178
Devlin, P. 1979. The Judge. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 12; R v Governor of Brockhill Prison, ex parte
Evans (No 2) [2001] 2 A.C. 19, 48; Nicol n 162 above 550.
179

18
approach in England and Ireland contrasts with American acceptance of prospective overruling. This
may reflect wider differences in legal culture between these jurisdictions. American adherence to
legal realist and law and economics analysis provides a favourable environment for prospective
overruling.180 The declaratory theory of judicial decision-making, even in its more sophisticated and
modern forms, finds prospective overruling problematic.181
Several distinctive features of Irish judicial culture might affect our judges’ views on prospective
overruling. On one hand, the courts’ constitutional duty to do justice in all cases might argue against
prospective effect in ordinary common law cases. On the other hand, Irish judges’ less strict
adherence to precedent may raise more acute problems of reliance and a stronger sense that the
declaratory theory is outmoded. Another consideration which may be relevant is that there are likely
constitutional constraints on retrospectively imposing new liabilities - either criminal or civil -
through a change in the law.182 Retrospectively depriving people of vested legal rights would be
unjust and unconstitutional.183
Functional Equivalents of Prospective Overruling

Although the English courts have not explicitly employed prospective overruling in a common law
context, they do use other approaches which closely resemble prospective overruling.184 Friedmann
considers the landmark judgment on liability for negligent misstatement in Hedley Byrne v Heller185
tantamount to prospective overruling.186 The House of Lords could simply have dismissed the case
on the ground of the exclusion clause agreed by the parties. Instead, it set out detailed opinions on
how it would deal with liability for financial misstatements in future. Technically, the judgments
were obiter dicta, but they established a new cause of action which was followed in future cases.187
Secondly, Lady Arden identifies the decision of the House of Lords in Royal Bank of Scotland v
Etridge (No 2) as a “low key” example of a form of prospective overruling.188 The case concerned
undue influence in the context where a loan is secured against the property of the borrower’s
spouse. Lord Nicholls set down criteria which would – in the future – be used to assess whether a
bank had taken sufficient steps to protect a spouse’s interests. He clearly stated that the new criteria
would apply to future actions, while previous criteria would continue to govern past transactions.189

180
Sheehan and Arvind n 173 above.
181
Ibid 23; see Friedmann, W. 1966. Limits of Judicial Lawmaking and Prospective Overruling. Modern Law
Review 29: 593, 593, 605.
182
Hamilton v Hamilton [1982] IR 466 (IESC); Dublin City Council v Fennell [2005] 2 ILRM 288 (IESC); Sloan v
Culligan [1992] 1 IR 223 (IESC); In Re Hefferon Kearns Ltd. (No. 1) [1993] 3 IR 177 (IEHC).
183
In Re Health (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2004 [2005] IESC 7; [2005] 1 IR 105 (IESC).
184
Rodger, A. 2005. A Time for Everything Under the Law: Some Reflections on Retrospectivity. Law Quarterly
Review: 57, 78.
185
Hedley Byrne v Heller [1964] A.C. 465 (UKHL).
186
Friedmann n 181 above 605; cf Nicol n 162 above 551.
187
Securities Trust Ltd. v. Hugh Moore & Alexander Ltd. [1964] IR 417 (IEHC); Bank of Ireland v Smith [1968]
102 I.L.T.R. 69 (IEHC).
188
Arden n 166 above 10; In re Spectrum Plus Ltd (in liquidation) [2005] UKHL 41, para 15 (UKHL).
189
Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No 2) [2002] 2 AC 773, 812 (UKHL).

19
Both these decisions have been followed in Ireland and there is no reason why similar approaches to
stating the law for the future would not be used in this jurisdiction.
In Vesey v. Bus Éireann,190 the Irish Supreme Court expressed its reluctance to change the common
law without warning. The plaintiff successfully sued the defendant in negligence after a traffic
accident. The defendant argued that damages should be reduced because the plaintiff lied
consistently about the amount of his loss. Hardiman J said that even if courts have an inherent
power to reduce damages because of dishonesty, “it would not be appropriate to exercise it without
warning in the circumstances of the present case.”191 Commentators wondered whether Hardiman J
meant a warning by a trial judge, because
“there is no principle that an appellate court, which is entitled and indeed required to
develop legal principles, has to relieve the litigants in a case before them of the prospect of
their being affected, to their surprise, by the articulation in their case of a new legal
principle.”192
Hardiman J revisited his remarks in O'Connor v Dublin Bus.193 This judgment indicates that he viewed
the judgment in Vesey as itself beginning a process of giving fair warning to dishonest plaintiffs that
they could be penalised. He said,
“it is fair publicly to state what I believe to be the inherent powers of the court in cases of
gross dishonesty, precisely so as to remove the possible unfairness involved in exercising
those powers without warning.”194
Hardiman J’s obiter dicta have subsequently been understood to represent the law and therefore
themselves constitute the prior warning that the courts will henceforth penalise people who are
grossly dishonest in their pursuit of a legal action.195 The leading text on practice and procedure
sternly warns its readership that plaintiffs would ignore Hardiman J’s warning at their peril.196 This,
then, is another functional equivalent of prospective overruling.

190
Vesey v Bus Éireann [2001] 4 IR 192 (IEHC).
191
Ibid 201-202.
192
Binchy and Byrne n 168 above 658.
193
O'Connor v Dublin Bus [2003] 4 IR 459 (IESC).
194
Ibid 502.
195
Larkin v Joosub [2006] IEHC 51 (IEHC); Allied Irish Banks, plc v McKenna [2013] IEHC 194 (IEHC).
196
Delany H. and McGrath, D. 2012. Civil Procedure in the Superior Courts. 3rd ed. Dublin: Thomson Reuters,
2012: paras 16-52.

20
Irish Constitutional Law and the Retroactivity Problem
In Ireland, the problem of the implications of a judicial decision for prior conduct has been
considered primarily in the context of unconstitutional legislation.197 Judicial review of the
constitutionality of legislation which is already in force is a defining feature of the legal system.
Constitutional theory indicates that a law which is not authorised by the superior norm cannot be
valid.198 This implies that we should also deprive the invalid law of legal effect and reverse acts
purportedly justified by it. However, experience has shown that undoing what has been done under
an unconstitutional statute can be highly problematic. It may be impractical or undesirable.199 This is
a common problem across jurisdictions.200 The United States Supreme Court has, controversially,
ruled that it can deny retroactive effect to constitutional decisions.201 Canada permits the
suspension of declarations of unconstitutionality where necessary to avoid creating a danger to the
public, threatening the rule of law, or prejudicing citizens without vindicating the rights infringed.202
Constitutional rulings in Ireland have raised the prospect that elections,203 criminal trials204 and the
levying of income tax205 were all unconstitutional for extended periods. In the early 1970s, the
Supreme Court found that the Electoral Act 1923 was unconstitutional but did not consider the
effect this finding might have on the validity of prior elections.206 A few years later, in de Búrca v.
Attorney General, the Supreme Court ruled that the Juries Act was unconstitutional because it
established unrepresentative juries. O’Higgins CJ expressed the concern about the possibility of the
invalidation of “tens of thousands of criminal jury trials”.207 He argued that the “overriding
requirements of an ordered society” would defeat any attempt to declare all previous jury trials
invalid on foot of de Búrca or to invalidate prior elections after McMahon.208
In The State (Byrne) v Frawley, a convicted person did challenge the validity of his jury trial.209 The
judges who heard the case divided between two incompatible reasons why he should be left in

197
O’Neill, A. 2006. Invalidity and Retrospectivity under the Irish and Canadian Constitutions. Constitutional
Forum Constitutionnel: 147.
198
Kelsen, H. 1986. The Function of a Constitution. In Essays on Kelsen, ed. Tur, R. and Twining, W. Oxford:
Clarendon Press: 109, 119.
199
O’Neill, A. 2007. The Effect of a Finding that Legislation is Unconstitutional: The Approach of the Irish
Supreme Court. Common Law World Review 36: 220, 221; Murphy v Attorney General [1982] 1 IR 241, 322.
200
Cappelletti, M. and Adams, J.C. 1966. Judicial Review of Legislation: European Antecedents and
Adaptations. Harvard Law Review 79: 1207, 1223; see Chicot County Drainage Dist. v Baxter State Bank, 308
US 371, 374 (USSC).
201
Linkletter v Walker 381 US 618 (1965) (USSC).
202
Schachter v Queen (1992) 93 DLR (4th) 1, 28 (SCC); R v. Bain [1992] 2 SCR 679 (SCC).
203
McMahon v Attorney General [1972] IR 69 (IESC).
204
De Búrca v Attorney General [1976] IR 38 (IESC).
205
Murphy v Attorney General [1982] 1 IR 241 (IESC).
206
McMahon v Attorney General [1972] IR 69 (IESC).
207
De Búrca v Attorney General [1976] IR 38, 63 (IESC).
208
Ibid 63.
209
The State (Byrne) v Frawley [1978] IR 326 (IESC).

21
prison. Finlay P in the High Court and Henchy J in the Supreme Court held that the applicant was
estopped by his conduct from protesting that his jury was unlawful.210 In contrast, O’Higgins CJ in the
Supreme Court upheld the validity of the trial and rejected the idea of estoppel.211 He reasoned that
trials with restricted jury panels were not fundamentally flawed and that the public interest would
militate against invalidating them. If this reasoning were not adopted, he believed it would “follow
with inexorable logic” that each earlier jury trial would be a nullity and sentences imposed would
have no legal authority. This could not be allowed: “could organised society accept such a
conclusion?”212 He expressly rejected the view that acquiescence or estoppel could reincarnate an
unconstitutional statute.213 Ultimately, the Supreme Court opted 3:2 for the combination of
invalidity and estoppel.
Invalidity ab Initio of Unconstitutional Statutes and Redress

In the leading Irish constitutional case of Murphy v Attorney General, the Supreme Court found that
the income tax laws were unconstitutional because they discriminated against people who were
married.214 Henchy J led the majority, ruling that the terms of the Constitution necessitated the
conclusion that an unconstitutional statute was void ab initio.215 Purported enactments outside the
delimited scope of Parliament’s power to make laws are to be deemed null and void from the time
of enactment, in the same manner as if they had been created by a person lacking the legislative
power. Both general constitutional principle and Article 15.4.2° indicate that an unconstitutional
statute must be void from the beginning.216
In a lone dissenting judgment, O’Higgins CJ held that a declaration of unconstitutionality only
rendered laws invalid from the date of the declaration.217 This solution would avoid the difficulty of
conduct engaged in under the authorisation of the impugned law suddenly becoming unlawful.218 He
further considered it “unthinkable” that the People could have intended that “laws, formally passed,
which went into operation and which were respected and obeyed, could, years after their
enactment, be declared never to have had the force of law”.219
After finding that an unconstitutional law is void ab initio, Henchy J unequivocally asserted the
general principle of a right to redress. He stated,

210
Ibid 350.
211
Ibid 342.
212
Ibid 341.
213
Ibid 341-342.
214
Murphy v Attorney General [1982] 1 IR 241 (IESC).
215
Ibid 307.
216
Ibid 309; The People (DPP) v Cunningham [2012] IECCA 64 (IECCS); see also Walsh n 59 above 161.
217
218
Ibid 297.
219
Ibid 300.

22
“the condemned provision will normally provide no legal justification for any acts done or left
undone, or for transactions undertaken in pursuance of it; and the person damnified by the
operation of the invalid provision will normally be accorded by the Courts all permitted and
necessary redress.”220
In Murphy, the remedy sought was restitutionary. Another common form of redress is to release a
person who is being detained. 221 In addition, a number of Irish cases in the last fifteen years have
explored the potential conditions for State liability to compensate citizens for damage caused by the
enactment of unconstitutional laws. In An Blascaod Mór Teo v Commissioners of Public Works (No.
4),222 Budd J rejected strict liability and suggested that the State should only be liable for damages in
respect of invalid legislation “in exceptional circumstances”.223 However, Redmond v Minister for the
Environment (No. 2)224 adopted a more liberal approach to the possibility of compensatory damages
for the enactment of unconstitutional laws. Herbert J rejected the view that the courts should be
slow to award compensation for loss caused by invalid statutes or only do so in extreme
circumstances.225 In Blehein v Minister for Health and Children,226 Laffoy J offered further support to
the availability of compensatory damages as redress for the infringement of citizens’ rights by
unconstitutional laws. The plaintiff had been detained in a mental health institution for long periods
under legislation which was declared unconstitutional. Laffoy J rejected an argument that the
obligation to obey laws in force should preclude the award of a remedy when a statute was later
invalidated.227 Ultimately, however, the plaintiff’s claim for damages was mostly statute barred, and
for some of his losses, his right was fully vindicated by the declaration of unconstitutionality.228
Given Irish law’s general commitment to granting concrete remedies for breaches of constitutional
rights, Hogan J has described the “scope, range and effectiveness of the remedies available where an
unconstitutionality has been established” as one of “the Constitution's great strengths.”229
However, the admirable constitutional principles that unconstitutional statutes are completely void
and that citizens should obtain redress for acts done under them can have dramatic implications. In
Murphy itself, the finding of unconstitutionality undermined the legal basis on which income taxes
had been levied in the State for a decade. How could the State possible give back such vast sums of
money?

220
Ibid 313; Redmond v Minister for the Environment (No. 2) [2004] IEHC 24; [2006] 3 IR 1, 3 (IEHC); see also
Byrne v Ireland [1972] IR 241, 281 (IESC).
221
Article 40.4.2°, Bunreacht na hÉireann 1937 (Ireland); FX v Clinical Director of the Central Mental Hospital
(No 1) [2012] IEHC 271, para 41 (IEHC).
222
An Blascaod Mór Teo v. Commissioners of Public Works (No. 4) [2000] 3 IR 565 (IEHC).
223
Ibid 584.
224
Redmond v Minister for the Environment (No. 2) [2006] 3 IR 1 (IEHC).
225
Ibid 3.
226
Blehein v Minister for Health and Children [2010] IEHC 329 (IEHC); Blehein v Minister for Health and
Children [2013] IEHC 319 (IEHC).
227
Blehein v Minister for Health and Children [2010] IEHC 329, para. 10.6 (IEHC).
228
Blehein v Minister for Health and Children [2013] IEHC 319 (IEHC).
229

23
One Solution: an Exceptional Defence to Claims for Redress
The facts of Murphy present a clear example of a case where full redress would entail fiscal chaos.230
Having insisted on the principles of invalidity ab initio and a prima facie right to redress, Henchy J
relied on defences to prevent unjust or chaotic consequences. He emphasised that the common law
has developed various defences which protect people who act justifiably in reliance on the law they
reasonably understand to be in force. He referred to
“prescription (negative or positive), waiver, estoppel, laches, a statute of limitation, res

judicata, or other matters (most of which may be grouped under the heading of public
policy)...”66
In addition, Henchy J proposed that there must be cases in which full redress was not awarded:
“the law has to recognize that there may be transcendent considerations which make such a
course undesirable, impractical, or impossible.”231
Full redress might not be possible when the circumstances made it “impossible, or unjust, or
contrary to the common good” to undo what was done under an unconstitutional law.232
The solution adopted in Murphy is to accept the retroactive effect of the declaration of invalidity,
but to allow an exceptional policy-motivated defence to some claims for full redress.233 This
defence to the general rule which Henchy J so emphatically asserted must be strictly limited to
rare cases of exceptional difficulty.234 The defence was refused in O’Rourke v Revenue
Commissioners, where far lesser amounts were at stake.235 Mere expense or inconvenience is not
enough to deny the right to redress.236 Keane CJ has acknowledged that the decision in Murphy
had adopted a form of prospective overruling, but noted that, “the circumstances in that case
were exceptional and, it may be, unique.”237
While the Murphy defence to the principle of redress is essentially pragmatic, it may be
defensible from a constitutional perspective. Kelly reasons that, if the right to redress is itself

230
Muckley v Ireland [1985] IR 472, 482 (IESC); see also Doyle, O.J. 2008. Constitutional Law: Text, Cases and
Materials. Dublin: Clarus: 449-450.
231
Murphy v Attorney General [1982] IR 241, 314 (IESC).
232
Ibid 323.
233
Ibid; See In Re Article 26 of the Constitution and the Health (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2004 [2005] 1 IR 105
(IESC).
234
Byrne, R. and Binchy, W. 2006. Annual Review of Irish Law 2006. Dublin: Round Hall Sweet & Maxwell: 176;
See Hogan and Whyte n 19 above 906.
235
O'Rourke v The Revenue Commissioners [1996] 2 IR 1 (IEHC).
236
De Búrca v Attorney General [1976] IR 38, 72 (IESC).
237
Kelly v Minister for the Environment [2003] 2 ILRM 81, 92 (IESC).

24
constitutionally founded in Article 40.3, which requires the State to vindicate the rights of
citizens, it follows that this right, like other constitutional rights, is not absolute.238 Consequently,
it may be legitimate for the State to curtail the right to redress when it conflicts with other rights
or compelling demands of the public interest.239
Distinguishing the Date of Invalidity from Completeness of Redress

The practical difference between finding that the statute is void ab initio but denying a remedy (as in
Murphy), and limiting the temporal effect of the invalidity is not obvious: the two approaches
produce “more or less the same result.” Conceptually, however, they are very different.240
On the analysis adopted in Murphy, the inquiry in cases concerning the constitutionality of laws or
other enactments falls into two stages. In the first place, the direct effect of the finding of
incompatibility is that the measure is void. In principle, it has been void from the outset. The second,
distinct stage of analysis is to determine whether the law offers a remedy to restore a just state to
the relationship between the parties. In Murphy, Henchy J is quite clear that, in those cases where
he limits redress, he does not deny the principle that unconstitutional statutes are void.
The eminent Constitution Review Group differentiated between two possible solutions to the
problems which a finding of unconstitutionality can cause: (a) declaring that the law only becomes
invalid at a specified date, or (b) circumscribing the effects of its invalidity. The Group recommended
that the courts should not depart from the principle that unconstitutional statutes are void ab initio.
On the second question, it expressed concern that the pragmatic solutions used in previous cases,
such as the doctrine of estoppel, might not be available in every problematic case. Consequently, it
recommended:
“amending the Constitution to provide the courts with an express discretion, where justice,
equity or, exceptionally, the common good so requires, to afford such relief as they consider
necessary and appropriate in respect of any detriment arising from acts done in reliance in
good faith on an invalid law.”
The Group expresses the reservation that this amendment should not be so broad as to tempt the
State to enact unconstitutional laws, and proposes that it should direct judges in exercising their
discretion as to the consequences of invalidity to weigh the rights of every affected person.
An Alternative Solution: Limiting Invalidity to Prospective Effect

Murphy established the “orthodoxy” in Irish law that unconstitutional statutes are void ab initio.241 It
was applied in Muckley v Ireland242 and expressly approved by Barrington J in McDonnell v Ireland.243

238
239
240
McDonnell v Ireland [1998] 1 IR 134 (IESC).
241
Doyle n 230 above 450.
242
Muckley v Ireland [1985] IR 472 (IESC).

25
Later, however, this approach would be called into question in the second major case on the effect
of declarations of invalidity: A v Governor of Arbour Hill Prison.244 The road to the A Case, which
seems to favour limiting the retroactive effect of declarations of unconstitutionality, begins with
McDonnell v Ireland.245 A postal worker who was convicted of membership of an unlawful
organisation lost his job in the public sector, under a statute which was subsequently found to be
unconstitutional.246 The plaintiff’s claim for redress was statute barred. However, O’Flaherty J’s
obiter remarks on the temporal effect of declarations of unconstitutionality would later prove
influential.
O'Flaherty J seemed to lean towards the possibility of limiting a declaration of unconstitutionality to

prospective effect only, with the consequent denial of a remedy. He based his views on the premise
that, "laws should be observed until they are struck down as unconstitutional".247 Given the
mandatory nature of the requirement to obey enacted laws, O’Flaherty J reasoned that,
“A rule of constitutional interpretation, which preserves the distinct status of statute law
which, as such, is necessitated by the requirements of an ordered society and by "the reality
of situation" (to adopt Griffin J.'s phrase), should have the effect that laws must be observed
until struck down as unconstitutional. The consequences of striking down legislation can only
crystallise in respect of the immediate litigation which gave rise to the declaration of
invalidity.”248
This reasoning suggests that the presumption of the validity of laws prior to challenge implies that a
declaration of unconstitutionality can only have prospective effect. It is doubtful that this conclusion
is logically supported by its premise. Furthermore, Doyle points out that this logic is inconsistent
with both Murphy and the outcome of Muckley v Attorney General. In Muckley v Attorney
General,249 the Supreme Court “foiled” Parliament’s efforts effectively to reinstate the original pre-
Murphy tax demands against married couples who were in arrears and therefore had not yet paid
the unconstitutional taxes.250 According to O’Flaherty J in McDonnell, only the specific plaintiffs who
challenge an unconstitutional law may obtain the benefit of its invalidation. In Muckley, however,
the successful plaintiffs had not initiated the original challenge to the validity of the taxation statute
in Murphy.

243
244
245
246
Cox v Ireland [1992] IR 53 (IESC).
247
McDonnell v Ireland [1998] 1 IR 134, 143 (IESC).
248
Ibid 144.
249
Muckley v Ireland [1985] IR 472 (IESC).
250
Scannell, Y. 2000. The Taxation of Married Women – Murphy v. Attorney General (1982). In Leading Cases
of the Twentieth Century ed. O’Dell, E. Dublin: Round Hall Sweet & Maxwell: 327, 350.

26
Matters came to a head in A v Governor of Arbour Hill Prison.251 In CC v Ireland,252 the Supreme Court
found that the provision criminalising unlawful carnal knowledge with a child was unconstitutional
because it did not allow for a defence that an accused person was honestly mistaken as to the age of
the child.253 The applicant in the A Case had been convicted of unlawful carnal knowledge of a child,
whom he knew to be twelve years old. Laffoy J in the High Court accepted that he was not validly
convicted. As the unconstitutional statute had ceased to exist with the coming into force of the
Constitution in 1937, “the offence with which the applicant was charged did not exist in law when it
was purported to charge him with it”.254
The Supreme Court, however, reversed this ruling. It drew widely from the Murphy Supreme Court
decisions, and thus superficially accepted Murphy, in order to create a decision which contradicts
Murphy in very important ways. Murray CJ praised O’Flaherty J’s dicta in McDonnell as, “the logical
and ineluctable application of the principles and considerations set out in the judgment of the Court
in Murphy”.255 He described the Constitution as “holistic”, invoking the ideas of an ordered society
and the common good.256 He qualified the “abstract” rule that unconstitutional statutes are void as
incompatible with the administration of justice.257 The Chief Justice interpreted Murphy as authority
against the undoing of all that was done pursuant to an unconstitutional law.258 Murray CJ
characterised the applicant’s case as a “collateral” attack on a final verdict in a criminal trial.259 He
stated the rule, applicable in the criminal law context, as being that a person convicted of a criminal
offence, and who has not impugned his prosecution, may not generally later challenge his conviction
due to the unconstitutionality of the statute, though as an exception to the rule there may be cases
in which such a conviction should be revisited.260
Despite the Chief Justice’s reliance on Murphy, the approaches endorsed in the two cases are
incompatible. Doyle argues persuasively that the critical importance of Muckley is that it
demonstrates conclusively that Murphy did indeed render the unconstitutional statute void ab
initio.261 It proves that Murphy involves two separate stages of analysis; the first resulting in the
statute being found to be void ab initio, and the second considering the parameters of the redress
available to taxpayers. Secondly, Murphy affirmed a general principle that there should be redress.
Murray CJ’s highly expansive reading of the Murphy defence, to the detriment of the primary

251
252
CC v Ireland [2006] IESC 33; [2006] 4 IR 1 (IESC).
253
Ibid 78-79.
254
255
Ibid 141.
256
Ibid 113.
257
Ibid 113.
258
Ibid 137.
259
Ibid 114.
260
Ibid 143.
261
Byrne and Binchy n 234 above 178.

27
principle of redress, “reversed the principle and the exception”.262 There is an enormous difference
between saying something is not an absolute rule and saying it is not a rule at all.
The Supreme Court decision has been widely criticised by legal scholars. The philosophical problem
with its reasoning is that it purports to maintain the validity of a law which is incompatible with the
constitution, contrary to the hierarchy of norms and constitutional principle. By narrowing the
category of persons against whom the statute is deemed invalid to those who brought the successful
legal action, this approach would permit the continued infringement of other citizens’ rights in
exactly the same way as had led to the court’s finding of unconstitutionality, to the knowledge of the
courts, which are charged with upholding the Constitution. This would undermine the courts’ duty to
do justice and to treat parties equally. The A Case is also criticised for mischaracterising the claim of
the applicant. He was not seeking redress for past wrongs, necessitating the retroactive effect of the
invalidation of the law in question. Rather, he sought to be released from prison, because there was
currently no legal ground for detaining him263 Doyle and Feldman conclude that overruling Murphy
and introducing prospective invalidity would, though not the best reading of the constitution, be
“more consistent and defensible” than the position which obtains after the A Case.264
However, the decision also has eminent supporters. Former Attorney General Gallagher defends the
Supreme Court judgments as “a detailed and cogent rationale for a decision that was not only legally
justifiable but, in my view, sensible and consistent with justice.”265 Strikingly, the United Kingdom
Supreme Court has expressly adopted the reasoning and solution proposed by Murray CJ in the A
Case.266 Cadder v Her Majesty’s Advocate followed a ruling of the European Court of Human Rights
that criminal trials should not have used incriminating statements made by accused persons without
access to legal advice.267 Awareness of the ECHR ruling had “disrupted and delayed the progress of
criminal trials throughout Scotland” as many accused persons objected to their trial.268 This created
“compelling reasons” for limiting its effect on past convictions.269 The United Kingdom Supreme
Court allowed the appellant’s appeal against his conviction but ruled that any convicted person who
did not appeal in good time cannot avail of the clarification of the law. It emphatically endorsed the
position taken by the Irish Supreme Court in A v Governor of Arbour Hill Prison. In particular, Lord
Hope and Lord Rodger adopted Murray CJ’s solution.270 Lord Hope quoted the principle that, in a
criminal case, where the State relies in good faith on the validity of a statute, and the accused
person does not challenge the validity of the prosecution before the case reaches finality, then the

262
Doyle n 230 above 451.
263
Fanning, R. 2005. Hard Case; Bad Law? The Supreme Court Decision in A v Governor of Arbour Hill Prison.
Irish Jurist 40: 188, 207-208.
264
Byrne and Binchy n 234 above 178.
265
Gallagher, P. 2010. The Irish Constitution—Its Unique Nature and The Relevance of International
Jurisprudence. Irish Jurist: 22, 44.
266
Cadder v Her Majesty’s Advocate [2010] UKSC 43 (UKSC).
267
Salduz v Turkey (2009) 49 EHRR 19 (ECtHR).
268
Cadder v Her Majesty’s Advocate [2010] UKSC 43, para 56 (UKSC).
269
Ibid para 56.
270
Ibid paras 60, 62.

28
final decision stands even if a later decision finds that the statute was invalid. Lord Hope concluded
that,
“there are strong grounds for ruling today… that the decision in this case does not permit the
reopening of closed cases.”271
This is a forceful declaration from the highest court in the United Kingdom, but it is also necessarily
obiter dictum, since it does not concern the case before the court. If, however, the courts heed this
restriction on the effect of the ruling in this case, it will have limited the legal consequences of the
finding of the inadmissibility of incriminating statements obtained without legal advice to certain
categories of litigant.
Reconciling the Authorities

Subsequent Irish cases have confronted the need to reconcile Murphy and the A Case – and continue
to apply both these precedents. The decision of Laffoy J in the 2010 compensatory redress case of
Blehein v Minister for Health is encouraging for the Murphy analysis.272 The State had relied on the
decision of O’Flaherty J in McDonnell, but Laffoy J distinguished McDonnell as not applying where
the plaintiff had personally challenged the validity of the law in question. Laffoy J dismissed the
argument based on people’s obligation to obey the law, at least in so far as it applied to the plaintiff
who had successfully challenged the statute, as inconsistent with the decision of the Supreme Court
in the Murphy case.273 She also expressly related redress in the form of compensation for prejudice
caused by invalid laws to Henchy J’s recommendation of all “permitted and necessary redress” in
Murphy. The compensatory damages cases indicate that, despite Murphy coming under attack in A v
Governor of Arbour Hill Prison,274 Murphy remains good law and Irish law recognises an expansive
right to a remedy for harm caused pursuant to unconstitutional legislation, subject only to a very
limited exception.
In parallel, recent case law, especially in the criminal context, has confirmed and applied the
precedent set in A v Governor of Arbour Hill Prison. Consequently, the exact contours of the
relationship between the two cases are unclear: are the restrictive A Case rules limited to demands
to overturn criminal convictions? On Murray CJ’s own characterisation, the A Case decision turns on
the undoing of previously final judicial determinations. The principle, as he frames it, applies to
criminal prosecutions.275 Cadder v Her Majesty’s Advocate derived from the A Case a principle
applicable to criminal cases.276 On this view, the A Case provides for a specific rule concerning
criminal convictions under unconstitutional laws, whereas the more general principles remain those
articulated in Murphy v Attorney General. The Murphy logic could still apply to other matters, such

271
Ibid para 60.
272
Blehein v Minister for Health and Children [2010] IEHC 329, para 10.2 (IEHC).
273
Ibid para 10.6.
274
A v Governor of Arbour Hill Prison [2006] IESC 45; [2006] 4 IR 88, 128 (IESC).
275
Ibid 143.
276
Cadder v Her Majesty’s Advocate [2010] UKSC 43 (UKSC).

29
as overpaid taxes. Another possibility is that the A Case concerns the standing of an applicant to
raise the matter of a declaration of unconstitutionality in a separate case, rather than the substantial
effects of a finding of unconstitutionality, which remain as expounded in Murphy.
Most of the subsequent authorities on this problem arose in the criminal context, following a
Supreme Court ruling that the legislation relied upon to authorise search warrants was
unconstitutional.277 This had the potential to affect a large number of criminal trials and led to
several cases about whether other convicted persons should now be released. In DPP v Hughes, the
applicant fell foul of the A Case principle, since he had pleaded guilty and thereby acknowledged his
guilt regardless of the invalidity affecting the search warrant.278
In The People (DPP) v Cunningham, the appellant argued that the A Case should be distinguished,
firstly because he had an appeal outstanding when the law was declared unconstitutional.279 The
Court of Criminal Appeal ruled that the principle in the A Case could not apply where the appellant
had an appeal in being when the law was found unconstitutional. Only where an appeal was
concluded or the time limit for an appeal had expired could the conviction be said to be final. The
Court proceeded to consider whether the appellant was estopped from benefiting from the
declaration that the law was unconstitutional. The A Case applicant had pleaded guilty, had not
appealed, and never raised an issue about his knowledge of the victim’s age. This was material to the
A Case decision, and did not apply to the applicant in Cunningham.280 Overall, Cunningham seems to
endorse, but limit, the decision in the A Case. The finality principle can only apply when an appeal
was disposed of or no appeal was instituted within the time limits. In addition, Cunningham
emphasises the estoppel aspect of the decision in the A Case.
Cunningham also expressly espouses the views expressed in the Murphy Case that unconstitutional
laws are void ab initio and inoperative as against the citizenry in general, and that there is a general
principle of redress.281 The court confirms the existence of the Murphy defence, and that it is
exceptional. The statement that unconstitutionality does not require all acts done under the invalid
law to be undone is compatible with either Murphy or the A Case. It is important for the future to
know which rationale is used, and how exceptional the denial of redress is. By endorsing both
authorities, Cunningham does not resolve these questions.
In People (DPP) v Kavanagh, the Supreme Court also applied the principle in the A Case to prisoners
convicted under an unconstitutional statute.282 As they had raised the constitutional argument in
their appeal, they were not estopped from relying on the invalidity of the statute.283 Denham CJ
restated the general principle that a finding of unconstitutionality does not operate only in relation

277
Damache v DPP [2012] IESC 11 (IESC).
278
DPP v Hughes [2012] IECCA 69 (IECCA).
279
The People (DPP) v Cunningham [2012] IECCA 64 (IECCA); A v Governor of Arbour Hill Prison [2006] 4 IR 88,
143 (IESC).
280
The People (DPP) v Cunningham [2012] IECCA 64, para 72 (IECCA).
281
Ibid para 73.
282
People (DPP) v Kavanagh [2012] IECCA 65, para 54 (IECCA).
283
Ibid para 62.

30
to the litigants who bring a challenge. It will affect others, at least as concerns current and future
dealings.284 The Chief Justice formulated the general rule, based on the A Case, as follows:
“In general, a finding of the invalidity of a statute is applied prospectively, and to cases in
which the issue was raised but in which finality had not yet been reached.”285
This appears to confirm the reversal of the Murphy position that an unconstitutional statute is void
ab initio – unless the more recent formulation is limited to cases of criminal convictions.
Continuing under the rubric, “Potential catastrophic consequences”, Denham CJ expressly refrained
from indicating her view as to when “a court would decline to give full (or even partial) retroactive
effect to a finding of unconstitutionality if this were to have catastrophic consequences”.286
However, she added an endorsement of the Murphy Case’s proposition that in exceptional cases, full
redress may need to be denied for the public good:
“While the first duty of the courts is to secure legal redress for those whose rights have been
infringed by unconstitutional action, this duty is, as Article 40.3.1 itself recognises, tempered
by considerations of feasibility and practicability.”287
The law on the effects of a finding of unconstitutionality is not entirely clear, because the case
law continues to approve elements from both the A Case and Murphy, without resolving the
fundamental contradiction between the solutions used in these two cases. It appears that
unconstitutional statutes are indeed deemed to be invalid ab initio, but that, while there is a
general right to redress, that right is limited in some cases. In cases involving criminal convictions
under an unconstitutional statute, it is pertinent whether the criminal process has reached its
final determination, with no possibility of further appeal, and whether the applicant is estopped
by his own conduct from raising the question of invalidity. More generally, the public good and
the avoidance of exceptionally disruptive consequences may, in very limited cases, require the
denial of full redress to affected persons.
Suspensory Declarations
Another interesting development has introduced the possibility of a brief suspension of an order to
release people from detention, in very limited circumstances. In principle, when a person is detained
without legal authority, the court must order his immediate release.288 However, in very exceptional
cases, the Irish courts may place a stay on an order for habeas corpus.289 In FX v Clinical Director of

284
Ibid para 72.
285
Ibid para 65.
286
Ibid para 74.
287
Ibid para 74.
288
The State (Browne) v Feran [1967] 1 IR 147 (IESC); The State (Trimbole) v. The Governor of Mountjoy Prison
[1985] IR 550 (IESC).
289
N v Health Service Executive [2006] 4 IR 374 (IESC); JH v Russell [2007] IEHC 7; [2007] 4 IR 242 (IEHC).

31
the Central Mental Hospital (No 2), the applicant was detained in the Central Mental Hospital after
committing a serious crime.290 His detention was ruled unlawful (the statue was not
unconstitutional, but statutory procedure had not been followed).291 Hogan J was faced with the
decision as to whether the applicant must immediately be released. The applicant was “possibly the
most seriously disturbed individual currently detained” in the State and there was strong medical
evidence that “he would pose a real and immediate risk to himself, identifiable individuals and to
society at large”.292 The respondents argued that the court had a general discretion to stay the order
of release to allow the authorities to regularise the legality of the applicant's detention. Hogan J
considered that this “superficially attractive option” had very dangerous implications for
constitutional liberties and the rule of law.293 On the other hand, he feared that, if findings of
unconstitutionality lead inexorably to devastating consequences, there is a risk that the courts will
hesitate to declare transgressions by the State. Mindful of the dangers of allowing remedies from
infringements of fundamental constitutional rights such as personal liberty to become excessively
discretionary, Hogan J chose to use a limited power to exercise discretion to place a stay on the
order for release, in order to allow the executive a brief opportunity to solve a difficult problem.294
However, he carefully circumscribed this discretion. He said that the suspensory order for release
under Article 40.4.2° can only apply to “persons detained for their own good” who pose a danger to
themselves or others. Furthermore, the court must always keep the period of suspension very short
(in this case two days).295 In the Supreme Court, Denham CJ also affirmed the importance of the right
to liberty. She characterised the relevant Supreme Court precedent as “controlling the release, for
the purpose of protecting the person who is incapable of protecting themselves”.296 This implies that
the Supreme Court believes that this exception should be very strictly limited.
The Need for Pragmatism

The Irish constitutional cases clearly illustrate that there are some extreme circumstances in which
there are compelling reasons not to follow the logic of constitutional theory through to reversing all
that has been done under an invalid law. Indeed, as Hogan J has warned, if redress must always
follow a declaration of invalidity, there is a risk of a chilling effect on the judicial defence of citizens’
rights.297 The sweeping scale of the full consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality risks
deterring the courts from exercising their power to declare laws invalid.298

290
291
292
293
Ibid para 6.
294
Ibid para 25.
295
Ibid para 27-28.
296
FX v Clinical Director of the Central Mental Hospital [2014] IESC 1 para 79 (IESC).
297
298
FX v Clinical Director of the Central Mental Hospital (No 2) [2012] IEHC 272, para 21 (IEHC); Gallagher n 265
above 49.

32
Faced with those exceptional cases in which there is a truly compelling reason not to allow full
redress to people affected by an unconstitutional law, something has to give. Any possible solution
to the difficulties posed by fully upholding constitutional principle requires a compromise. The
Constitution Review Group considered that the American approach of limiting retrospective effect is
pragmatic, but “intellectually difficult to defend” and “leads to arbitrary results”.299 O’Neill describes
the Canadian approach of allowing an unconstitutional law to remain effective for a time as
“counterintuitive and unpalatable”, yet she approves of the requirement for the Canadian courts to
identify clear reasons for the departure from principle.300 Two alternatives which emerge from the
Irish constitutional case law are that we could deny either that the unconstitutional statute is invalid
or that redress should be given. Both of these escape routes sacrifice sound principle and justice to
pragmatic considerations. However, it seems less objectionable to limit the remedy than to deny the
principle that a law which conflicts with a higher norm must be completely void. It is critically
important, in the interests of justice, that we continue to insist that only truly exceptional cases
could justify sacrificing the rights of individuals to the common good as was done in Murphy.
Conclusion: Relationship Between the Constitutional and Common Law

Contexts
As we have seen, Irish law has devoted far more attention to issues related to prospective overruling
in the constitutional context than in relation to changes to the common law. However, having
adopted techniques to limit the full retrospective effect of their decisions in constitutional cases, it is
likely that the courts would be open to some form of prospective overruling in other contexts if
necessary. This is supported by the indications that judges consider limiting the retrospective effect
of judgments in common law and constitutional contexts to be very closely related.301 The judgment
in FX (No 1) seems to blur the division between constitutional and other cases where the courts
might wish to protect reliance on a previous understanding of the law. The courts’ primary duty is to
protect individual rights, but this is not always “feasible or practicable.”302 This judgment seems to
treat retrospectivity as raising similar considerations regardless of the context in which it arises.
If there is not a clear distinction between the constitutional cases and the common law context, then
we might infer that prospective overruling is already part of Irish law across the board. It may just be
that, as in England, we are still waiting for a case outside the constitutional context where the
circumstances are sufficiently exceptional to warrant prospective overruling. In the meantime, pure
prospective overruling remains a hypothetical possibility beyond the context of the invalidity of
enacted legislation.

299
Constitution Review Group n 8 above.
300
O’Neill n 197 above 147.
301
302
Ibid para 47.

33

Prospective and Retrospective Effect of Judicial Decisions in Ireland

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Prospective and Retrospective Effect of Judicial Decisions in Ireland

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The prospective and retrospective effect of judicial

Trinity College Dublin

The Irish Legal System’s Constitutional Framework

The Common Law in Ireland

Developing the Common Law

A Permeable Legal System

Ireland’s Constitutional Jurisprudence

The Relaxation of Precedent in the Supreme Court

Reasons not to Follow a Precedent

The Limits of Making and Changing Judge-Made Law

A Judicial Culture which Prioritises Justice over Formalism

The Declaratory Theory of Judicial Decision-Making

“there could be circumstances in this country where prospective overruling would be

This might arise where a decision,

Functional Equivalents of Prospective Overruling

Invalidity ab Initio of Unconstitutional Statutes and Redress

“prescription (negative or positive), waiver, estoppel, laches, a statute of limitation, res

Distinguishing the Date of Invalidity from Completeness of Redress

An Alternative Solution: Limiting Invalidity to Prospective Effect

O'Flaherty J seemed to lean towards the possibility of limiting a declaration of unconstitutionality to

Reconciling the Authorities

The Need for Pragmatism

Conclusion: Relationship Between the Constitutional and Common Law

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