Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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TEODORO DARCEN, MAMERTO DARCEN, JR., NESTOR DARCEN, BENILDA
DARCEN-SANTOS, and ELENITA DARCEN-VERGEL, petitioners, vs. V.R.
GONZALES CREDIT ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by its President,
VERONICA L. GONZALES, respondent.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale; The purchaser in
an extrajudicial foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property if no redemption
is made within one (1) year from the registration of the certificate of sale by those who are
entitled to redeem.—The established rule is that the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure
sale becomes the absolute owner of the property if no redemption is made within one (1)
year from the registration of the certificate of sale by those who are entitled to
redeem. Possession being a recognized essential attribute of ownership, after consolidation
of title the purchaser may demand possession as a matter of right. Under Section 7 of Act No.
3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, the issuance of the writ is merely a ministerial function
of the RTC, which the new owner may obtain through an ex parte motion.
Same; Same; Same; The possession may be granted to the buyer either (a) within the one-
year redemption period, upon the filing by the purchaser of a bond, or (b) after the lapse of the
redemption period, without need of a bond.—The possession may be granted to the buyer
either (a) within the one-year redemption period, upon the filing by the purchaser of a bond,
or (b) after the lapse of the redemption period, without need of a bond. As explained
in Spouses Arquiza v. CA, 459 SCRA 753 (2005): Indeed, it is well-settled that an ordinary
action to acquire possession in favor of the purchaser at an extrajudicial foreclosure of real
property is not necessary. There is no law in this jurisdiction whereby the purchaser at a
sheriff’s sale of real property is obliged to bring a separate and independent suit for
possession after the one-year period for redemption has expired and after he has obtained
the sheriff’s final certificate of sale. The basis
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* FIRST DIVISION.
208
210
210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Darcen vs. V.R. Gonzales Credit Enterprises, Inc.
aside the Orders dated March 16, 20103 and May 4, 20104 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of the City of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 81, in P-826-2009, entitled, “In Re: Ex-
Parte Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession, V.R. Gonzalez Credit Enterprises,
Inc., as represented by its President Veronica Gonzalez, Petitioner, Teodoro Darcen, et
al., Oppositors.”
Antecedent Facts
The spouses Mamerto Darcen (Mamerto) and Flora De Guzman (Flora) were
married on February 2, 1947, and they begot seven (7) children, namely: Teodoro,
Mamerto, Jr., Nestor, Benilda, and Elenita (the petitioners), and their brothers
Arturo and Manuel. Mamerto died on September 18, 1986, leaving behind an estate
consisting of three titled parcels of land located in Baliuag, Bulacan and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-19565 (T-41394), TCT No. RT-19566 (T-
11678), and TCT No. RT-19564 (T-193099), all under the name “Mamerto Darcen
married to Flora de Guzman.”
According to the petitioners, sometime in 1990 their late brother Manuel borrowed
money from Veronica Gonzales (Gonzales), president of V.R. Gonzales Credit
Enterprises, Inc. (respondent company). Manuel sought their consent in constituting
a mortgage over the above properties of their father, but the petitioners refused.
Manuel then caused the execution of an Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate with
Waiver by forging the signatures of the petitioners and their mother Flora. In the said
instrument, the petitioners and their siblings were said to have waived their shares
in their father’s estate in favor of their mother, thus making Flora the sole owner of
the three lots.5 Meanwhile, fire had razed part of the Office of the Register of Deeds
of Bulacan and destroyed
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3 Rendered by Judge Herminia V. Pasamba; id., at pp. 130-131.
4 Id., at p. 140.
5 Id., at p. 12.
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Darcen vs. V.R. Gonzales Credit Enterprises, Inc.
the titles to the said parcels. After the reconstitution of the titles on April 7,
1992,6 new titles were issued in the name of “Flora de Guzman, Filipino, of legal age,
widow,” to wit:
(1) TCT No. T-19267, which is a transfer from TCT No. RT-19565 (T-41394),
containing an area of 512 square meters, located in Barangay Sabang, Baliuag,
Bulacan;
(2) TCT No. T-19268, which is a transfer from TCT No. RT-19566 (T-116789),
covering an area of 478.4 sq m, located at P. Angeles St., Baliuag, Bulacan; and
(3) TCT No. T-19269, which is a transfer from TCT No. RT-19564 (T-193099),
covering an area of 580 sq m, located in Baliuag, Bulacan.7
Petitioners further claim that on the day that the above new titles were issued,
they caused the annotation thereon of their hereditary claim in their father’s
estate.8 On December 4, 2000, Flora died.
Sometime in January 2007, Gonzales appeared and, claiming that the petitioners’
late mother Flora had mortgaged the above properties to respondent company in
1995, demanded payment from the petitioners of several loans allegedly taken out by
Flora, as follows:9
(i) P3,000,000.00, borrowed by Flora on January 30, 1995 secured by a mortgage
contract over TCT No. T-19269;
(ii) P3,500,000.00, taken out on July 12, 1995 by Flora upon a mortgage over TCT
No. T-19267;
(iii) P500,000.00, also borrowed on July 12, 1995 by Flora secured by a mortgage
over TCT No. T-19268;
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6 Id., at p. 13.
7 Id., at pp. 60-65.
8 Id., at pp. 12-13.
9 Id., at pp. 68-75.
212
212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Darcen vs. V.R. Gonzales Credit Enterprises, Inc.
On February 16, 2007, the petitioners were able to verify from the Register of
Deeds of Bulacan that the above properties had indeed been mortgaged to respondent
company in 1995, but they now say that they “immediately noted that the purported
signatures of their mother on the three (3) mortgage contracts were actually forgeries,
and that the mortgage contracts did not state when the supposed loan obligations
would become due and demandable.”10 They maintain that their mother did not
contract the loans, and they point to their brothers Manuel and Arturo, whose
signatures appear as witnesses on the mortgage documents, as guilty of forging her
signatures and of receiving the proceeds of the loans. The petitioners also disclaim
any knowledge of the loans, or of their consent thereto, either before or after.
The respondent company extrajudicially foreclosed on the mortgage over the
aforesaid lots sometime in 2007, but meanwhile, on June 8, 2007, the petitioners filed
Civil Case No. 333-M-200711 with the RTC-Branch 78, for “Annulment of Mortgage,
Extra-Judicial Foreclosure, Auction Sale, Certificate of Sale, and Damages,” seeking
to void the real estate mortgages, the extrajudicial foreclosure and the auction sale of
the lots. Named defendants were respondent company and their brothers Manuel and
Arturo.
After posting and publication of the notice of sheriff’s sale dated October 20, 2008,
the three properties were sold at auction held on November 18, 2008 for a total price
of P8,000,000, with the respondent company as the highest bidder. A certificate of
sale was issued by Ex-Officio Sheriff Emmanuel Ortega on November 20, 2008, duly
annotated on the titles on November 28, 2008.12
The one-year period to redeem lapsed. Respondent company executed an affidavit
of consolidation of ownership. On
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10 Id., at p. 112.
11 Id., at pp. 42-50.
12 Id., at pp. 93-100.
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Darcen vs. V.R. Gonzales Credit Enterprises, Inc.
December 8, 2009, it filed an ex parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession
in the RTC-Branch 81 docketed as P-826-2009.13 In its Order14 dated December 17,
2009, the court set the petition for hearing on February 26, 2010. Meanwhile, on
February 25, 2010, the petitioners were able to file an Opposition15 to the petition,
praying for the outright denial thereof on the ground of forum shopping because the
respondent company did not disclose the pendency of Civil Case No. 333-M-2007 in
its certification against forum-shopping. On March 10, 2010, V.R. Gonzales filed a
Comment to the Opposition,16 to which the petitioners filed a Reply17 on March 23,
2010.
In its Order18 dated March 16, 2010, the RTC-Branch 81 denied the petitioners’
opposition and ruled that the respondent company was not guilty of forum shopping.
Citing Sps. Ong v. CA,19 it held that the issuance of the writ of possession was a mere
ministerial function of the court, and was summary in nature.20 Not being a judgment
on the merits, litis pendentia or res judicata would not set in to bar the filing of Civil
Case No. 333-M-2007.Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied in the court’s
Order21 dated May 4, 2010.
On June 2, 2010, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari22 in the CA docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 114265, whose decision therein, dated July 20, 2011, is now the
subject of this Petition.
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13 Id., at pp. 88-91.
14 Id., at pp. 101-102.
15 Id., at pp. 103-108.
16 Id., at pp. 179-181.
17 Id., at pp. 182-184.
18 Id., at pp. 130-131.
19 388 Phil. 857; 333 SCRA 189 (2000).
20 Id., at p. 867; p. 199.
21 Rollo, p. 140.
22 Id., at pp. 141-157.
214
214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Darcen vs. V.R. Gonzales Credit Enterprises, Inc.
Meanwhile, on February 28, 2011, the RTC-Branch 81 granted the writ of
possession sought by the respondent company in P-826-2009. The notice to vacate
was issued on April 26, 2011 against the petitioners.
In a related development, on August 10, 2010, the RTC-Branch 78 dismissed the
complaint in Civil Case No. 333-M-2007, holding that the mortgage contracts
executed by Flora in favor of the respondent company over TCT Nos. T-19267, T-
19268 and T-19269 are valid, and declaring valid the extrajudicial foreclosure and
auction sale of the said properties. The decision is now pending appeal in the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 96251.
Petition for Certiorari in the CA
In CA-G.R. SP No. 114265,23 the petitioners reiterated their arguments: (1) that
due to identity of parties and cause of action, the respondent company committed
forum shopping for failing to disclose the pendency of Civil Case No. 333-M-2007; (2)
that due to the pendency of Civil Case No. 333-M-2007, the RTC-Branch 81 has no
jurisdiction over the ex parte petition for writ of possession, since the question of
possession was already laid before the RTC-Branch 78; and (3) that the issue of
validity of the mortgage contracts executed by Flora and the foreclosure of the
mortgages are material to the issue of possession.
On April 25, 2011, the CA denied petitioners’ urgent motion for writ of preliminary
injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order.
On July 20, 2011, the CA rendered its now assailed decision denying the petition
in CA-G.R. SP No. 114265, ruling that respondent company was not guilty of forum
shopping since the ex parte petition for writ of possession it filed in P-826-2009 is not
an initiatory pleading as to require that a
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23 Id., at pp. 141-157.
215
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Darcen vs. V.R. Gonzales Credit Enterprises, Inc.
certification of non-forum shopping be attached thereto; that the issuance of the writ
of possession is merely a ministerial function of the court a quo, the possession being
incidental to the transfer of title to the new owner; that the issuance of the writ is
summary in nature and is not a judgment on the merits.
The CA further explained that the ex parte writ of possession is for the sole benefit
of the new owner, without need of notice to or consent by any party who might be
adversely affected. Thus, notwithstanding the pendency of a suit to annul the real
estate mortgage and the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale, the purchaser is
entitled to a writ of possession, without prejudice to the outcome in the annulment
case, which can proceed without encroaching on the jurisdiction of the court resolving
the ex parte petition for writ of possession.
Petition for Review in the Supreme Court
On December 12, 2011, the CA denied the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration
from its above decision.24Hence, this petition for review.
The petitioners now contend that the CA erred in failing to take into account the
fact that they, against whom the writ of possession issued by the RTC in P-826-2009
was directed, are adverse claimants who are third parties and strangers to the real
estate mortgages executed by their mother. They cite Villanueva v. Cherdan Lending
Investors Corporation,25 where it was reiterated that the issuance of a writ of
possession in favor of the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases to be
ministerial where the property is in the possession of a third party who holds the
property under a claim adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor.26
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24 Id., at p. 41.
25 G.R. No. 177881, October 13, 2010, 633 SCRA 173.
26 Id., at p. 181.
216
216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Darcen vs. V.R. Gonzales Credit Enterprises, Inc.
The petitioners maintain that they knew nothing about the mortgage contracts,
whose validity is now the subject of their appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 96251. They
further claim that their signatures in the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with
Waiver, which they supposedly executed in favor of their mother Flora, were forged.
As co-heirs and co-owners with their mother of the subject lots, they have a claim
directly adverse to hers, and therefore, also directly adverse to her successor-in-
interest, the respondent company. Consequently, the duty of the RTC to issue the
writ of possession to respondent company ceases to be ministerial.
Our Ruling
We dismiss the petition.
The long-settled rule in extrajudicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage is
that after consolidation of ownership
of the foreclosed property, it is the
ministerial duty of the court to issue,
as a matter of right, an ex parte writ
of possession to the buyer.
The established rule is that the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale
becomes the absolute owner of the property if no redemption is made within one (1)
year from the registration of the certificate of sale by those who are entitled to
redeem.27 Possession being a recognized essential attribute of ownership,28 after
consolidation of title the purchaser may demand possession as a matter of
right.29 Under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, the issuance of
the writ is merely a ministerial function of the RTC, which the
_______________
27 Act No. 3135, Section 6.
28 See NEW CIVIL CODE, Book II, Title II, Articles 428-430.
29 Samson v. Rivera, G.R. No. 154355, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 759, 768-769.
217
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Darcen vs. V.R. Gonzales Credit Enterprises, Inc.
new owner may obtain through an ex parte motion.30 Section 7 of Act No. 3135
provides:
Sec. 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the
Court of First Instance of the province or place where the property or any part thereof is
situated, to give him possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an
amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the
debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating the mortgage or without
complying with the requirements of this Act. Such petition shall be made under oath and
filed in form of an ex partemotion in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the property
is registered, or in special proceedings in the case of property registered under the Mortgage
Law or under section one hundred and ninety-four of the Administrative Code, or of any other
real property encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in the office of any register of
deeds in accordance with any existing law, and in each case the clerk of the court shall, upon
the filing of such petition, collect the fees specified in paragraph eleven of section one hundred
and fourteen of Act numbered Four hundred and ninety-six, as amended by Act numbered
Twenty-eight hundred and sixty-six, and the court shall, upon approval of the bond, order
that a writ of possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the property
is situated, who shall execute said order immediately.
The possession may be granted to the buyer either (a) within the one-year
redemption period, upon the filing by the purchaser of a bond, or (b) after the lapse
of the redemption period, without need of a bond.31 As explained in Spouses Arquiza
v. CA:32
Indeed, it is well-settled that an ordinary action to acquire possession in favor of the
purchaser at an extrajudicial foreclosure of
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30 Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Santos, G.R. No. 157867, December 15, 2009, 608 SCRA 222, 234.
(Citations omitted)
31 Idolor v. Court of Appeals, 490 Phil. 808, 813; 450 SCRA 396, 401 (2005).
32 498 Phil. 793; 459 SCRA 753 (2005).
218
We repeated the above rule in Asia United Bank v. Goodland Company, Inc.,34 in
this wise:
It is a time-honored legal precept that after the consolidation of titles in the buyer’s name,
for failure of the mortgagor to redeem, entitlement to a writ of possession becomes a matter
of right. As the confirmed owner, the purchaser’s right to possession becomes absolute. There
is even no need for him to post a bond, and it is the ministerial duty of the courts to issue the
same upon proper application and proof of title. To accentuate the writ’s ministerial
character, the Court has consistently disallowed injunction to prohibit its issuance despite a
pending action for annulment of mortgage or the foreclosure itself.
The nature of an ex parte petition for issuance of the possessory writ under Act No. 3135
has been described as a non-litigious proceeding and summary in nature. As an ex
parte proceeding, it is brought for the benefit of one party only, and without notice to or
consent by any person adversely interested.35 (Citations omitted)
Moreover, we made it clear in the recent case of BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. v.
Golden Power Diesel Sales Center, Inc.,36 that not even a pending action for
annulment of mortgage or foreclosure sale will stay the issuance of the writ of
possession:
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33 Id., at p. 804; p. 764.
34 G.R. No. 188051, November 22, 2010, 635 SCRA 637.
35 Id., at pp. 646-647.
36 G.R. No. 176019, January 12, 2011, 639 SCRA 405.
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Darcen vs. V.R. Gonzales Credit Enterprises, Inc.
Furthermore, it is settled that a pending action for annulment of mortgage or foreclosure
sale does not stay the issuance of the writ of possession. The trial court, where the application
for a writ of possession is filed, does not need to look into the validity of the mortgage or the
manner of its foreclosure. The purchaser is entitled to a writ of possession without prejudice
to the outcome of the pending annulment case.37 (Citations omitted)
220
The application of the above Section has been extended to extrajudicial foreclosure
sales pursuant to Section 6 of Act No. 3135, to wit:
Sec. 6. In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power
hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his successors in interest or any judicial creditor or
judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person having a lien on the property subsequent to
the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold, may redeem the same at any
time within the term of one year from and after the date of sale; and such redemption shall
be governed by the provisions of section four hundred and sixty-four to four hundred and
sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as these are not inconsistent with
the provisions of this Act.
221
222
222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Darcen vs. V.R. Gonzales Credit Enterprises, Inc.
But in China Banking Corporation v. Lozada,40 the Supreme Court clarified that
it is not enough that the property be possessed by a third party, but the same must
also held by the third party adversely to the debtor/mortgagor:
Where a parcel levied upon on execution is occupied by a party other than a judgment
debtor, the procedure is for the court to order a hearing to determine the nature of said
adverse possession. Similarly, in an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property, when the
foreclosed property is in the possession of a third party holding the same adversely to the
defaulting debtor/mortgagor, the issuance by the RTC of a writ of possession in favor of the
purchaser of the said real property ceases to be ministerial and may no longer be done ex
parte. For the exception to apply, however, the property need not only be possessed by a third
party, but also held by the third party adversely to the debtor/mortgagor.41 (Citation omitted
and emphasis ours)
The Court then discussed the meaning of “third party who is actually holding the
property adversely to the judgment obligor,”42 thus:
The exception provided under Section 33 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court
contemplates a situation in which a third party holds the property by adverse title or right,
such as that of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary. The co-owner, agricultural tenant, and
usufructuary possess the property in their own right, and they are not merely the successor
or transferee of the right of possession of another co-owner or the owner of the property.
x x x.43 (Citations omitted)
Thus, it was held in BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. that to be error for the court
to issue an ex parte writ of possession to the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure,
or to refuse to abate one already granted, where a third party claimant in
_______________
40 G.R. No. 164919, July 4, 2008, 557 SCRA 177.
41 Supra note 41, at p. 198.
42 Supra note 37, at pp. 417-418.
43 Supra note 41, at pp. 202-204.
223
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Darcen vs. V.R. Gonzales Credit Enterprises, Inc.
actual possession has raised, in an opposition to the writ or in a motion to quash the
same, the matter of his actual possession upon a claim of ownership or a right adverse
to that of the debtor or mortgagor. The procedure, accordingly to Unchuan v. CA,44 is
for the trial court to order a hearing to determine the nature of the adverse
possession:45
Note, however, that a third party not privy to the debtor is protected by the law. He may
be ejected from the premises only after he has been given an opportunity to be heard,
conformably with the time-honored principle of due process. “Where a parcel of land levied
on execution is occupied by a party other than the judgment debtor, the proper procedure is
for the court to order a hearing to determine the nature of said adverse
possession.”46(Citations omitted)
224
224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Darcen vs. V.R. Gonzales Credit Enterprises, Inc.
Realizing that their claim of forgery of their mother’s signature in the mortgage
contracts was tenuous after the RTC-Branch 78 dismissed Civil Case No. 333-M-
2007, the petitioners now claim that an earlier instrument, an Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate with Waiver, was falsified by their brothers Manuel and Arturo
who forged their signatures. Yet, why the said instrument named neither Manuel nor
Arturo but their mother Flora as the sole beneficiary of the heirs’ waiver, the
petitioners did not explain. Thus, through the said instrument, on April 7, 1992, TCT
No. RT-19565 (T-41394), TCT No. RT-19566 (T-11678), and TCT No. RT-19564 (T-
193099), all under the name of “Mamerto Darcen married to Flora de Guzman,” were
cancelled and replaced with TCT Nos. T-19267, T-19268, and T-19269, respectively,
now in the name solely of “Flora de Guzman, Filipino, of legal age, widow.”
Considering that the petitioners are now stridently asserting that their signatures
in the aforesaid Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver had been forged, it is
inexplicable why they failed to attach a copy thereof either to their Opposition to
the ex parte petition for writ of possession, or to this petition. All that they could say
about this “oversight” is that they “were never able to insist on the presentation of
the said document because they were never parties in the case for writ of possession.
Besides, the case for writ of possession is summary and non-adversarial.”47
But this is a lie and an obvious subterfuge, for the fact is that the RTC set a hearing
on February 26, 2010 to hear out the petitioners on the nature of their claimed
adverse possession. They appeared with their lawyer, and had an opportunity to lay
out the complete facts and present whatever pertinent documents were in their
possession. They did no such thing, and only affirmed the contents of their
Opposition,
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47 Rollo, p. 13.
225
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Darcen vs. V.R. Gonzales Credit Enterprises, Inc.
wherein they chiefly asserted their defense of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC-Branch
81 and forum shopping.
Not only did petitioners not sue to annul the extrajudicial settlement, but on the
very day, April 7, 1992, that the new titles were issued to Flora, an inscription
appears in the said titles announcing that one-half (½) of the lots would be bound for
the next two years to possible claims by other heirs or unknown creditors against the
estate of Mamerto, pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. All three
titles bear this same inscription,48which the petitioners admit that they themselves
had caused to be annotated on their mother’s titles,49 in the following words:
Entry No. 7550 – The ½ portion of the land described herein is subject to the provision of Sec.
4, Rule 74 of the Rules with respect to the inheritance left by the deceased Mamerto Darcen.
Date of instrument – March 7, 1992
Date of inscription – April 7, 1992 at 9:35 a.m.50
All the above leave little doubt that the petitioners had always known about, and
had consented to, the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of their father Mamerto,
as well as waiver by them of their shares therein in favor of their mother Flora. For
this very reason, they cannot now be permitted to interpose an adverse claim in the
subject mortgaged lots and defeat the writ of possession issued to the respondent
company.
The petitioners were accorded an
opportunity to be heard on the nature
of their claimed adverse possession,
conformably with the time-honored
principle of due process.
_______________
48 Id., at pp. 61, 63, 65.
49 Id., at p. 13.
50 Id.
226
226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Darcen vs. V.R. Gonzales Credit Enterprises, Inc.
On December 17, 2009, the RTC-Branch 81 set for hearing on February 26, 2010
the petition for writ of possession in P-826-2009.51 On February 25, 2010, the
petitioners were able to file their Opposition52 to the said petition, wherein they
asserted that they are co-owners of the properties, being heirs of the deceased
Mamerto; that they filed a case, Civil Case No. 333-M-2007, to annul the mortgages
over the three lots on account of forgery; and that the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of
the lots was invalid. They, thus, prayed for outright denial of the writ on the ground
of forum shopping, because respondent company did not disclose the pendency of Civil
Case No. 333-M-2007 in its certification against forum shopping.
At the hearing on February 26, 2010, the petitioners appeared with their counsel,
Atty. Enrique dela Cruz, Jr. They did not however present any documents, and only
affirmed their Opposition already in the records.53 On March 11, 2010, respondent
company filed its comment to petitioners’ Opposition.54 On March 23, 2010, the
petitioners filed their reply.55
In its Order dated March 16, 2010, the RTC-Branch 81 held that respondent
company was not guilty of forum shopping, citing Sagarbarria v. Philippine Business
Bank,56 as follows:
[A]ct No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, is categorical in stating that the purchaser
must first be placed in possession of the mortgaged property pending proceedings assailing
the issuance of the writ of possession.
Consequently, the RTC under which the application for the issuance of a writ of possession
over the subject property is pending cannot defer the issuance of the said writ in view of the
pendency of
_______________
51 Id., at pp. 101-102.
52 Id., at pp. 103-108.
53 Id., at pp. 177-178.
54 Id., at pp. 179-181.
55 Id., at pp. 182-184.
56 G.R. No. 178330, July 23, 2009, 593 SCRA 645.
227
On April 8, 2010, petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration58 from the
denial of their opposition, but it was denied on May 4, 2010.
Even granting that the petitioners
should be allowed to retain posses-
sion, the petition has been rendered
moot and academic by the issuance
and satisfaction of the writ of pos-
session issued in P-826-2009.
As the petitioners have themselves admitted in their Petition,59 the RTC-Branch
81, issued a Writ of Possession60 dated April 18, 2011, and on October 4, 2011 they
were physically evicted from the disputed lots by the Sheriff, and the respondent
company was placed in possession thereof, per the Sheriff’s report dated October 4,
2011.61 With the writ of possession having been served and fully satisfied, the instant
petition has ceased to present a justiciable controversy for this Court
_______________
57 Id., at p. 654, citing Fernandez v. Espinosa, G.R. No. 156421, April 14, 2008, 551 SCRA 136, 149-
150; Rollo, pp. 130-131.
58 Rollo, pp. 132-138.
59 Id., at p. 18.
60 Id., at pp. 234-236.
61 Id., at p. 237.
228
228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Darcen vs. V.R. Gonzales Credit Enterprises, Inc.
to resolve, and a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value,62 in view
of the pendency in the CA of the petitioners’ appeal from the decision in Civil Case
No. 333-M-2007 on the question of the ownership of the subject mortgaged lots, and
thus of the rightful possession thereover. As we have reiterated in Madriaga, Jr. v.
China Banking Corporation:63
Judicial power presupposes actual controversies, the very antithesis of mootness. Where
there is no more live subject of controversy, the Court ceases to have a reason to render any
ruling or make any pronouncement. Courts generally decline jurisdiction on the ground of
mootness―save when, among others, a compelling constitutional issue raised requires the
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public; or when the
case is capable of repetition yet evading judicial review, which are not extant in this
case.64 (Citations omitted)
What is now left for the petitioners to do is to await the resolution of their appeal
in Civil Case No. 333-M-2007. Their restoration to possession may then be sought
therein as an incident or relief, if justified.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review
on Certiorari is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (C.J., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin and Villarama, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Petition denied.
_______________
62 See Madriaga, Jr. v. China Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 192377, July 25, 2012, 677 SCRA 560,
citing Sps. de Vera v. Hon. Agloro, 489 Phil. 185; 448 SCRA 203 (2005).
63 G.R. No. 192377, July 25, 2012, 677 SCRA 560.
64 Id.
229
VOL. 695, APRIL 3, 2013 229
Darcen vs. V.R. Gonzales Credit Enterprises, Inc.
Notes.―Purchaser at an extrajudicial foreclosure sale has a right to the possession
of the property even during the one-year redemption period provided the purchaser
files an indemnity bond. After the lapse of the said period with no redemption having
been made, that right becomes absolute and may be demanded by the purchaser even
without the posting of the bond. (Cua Lai Chu vs. Laqui, 612 SCRA 227 [2010])
In extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage, the rule is upon the expiration
of the one year redemption period, it forecloses the obligors’ right to redeem and that
the sale thereby becomes absolute. (Erdenberger vs. Aquino, 656 SCRA 44 [2011])
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