ISABELO MONTANO Y MARCIAL vs.THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, ET AL.

THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, appellant.

Attorney-General Araneta, for appellant.

F. Buencamino, for appellee.

TRACEY, J.:

Isabelo Montano presents a petition to the Court of Land Registration for the inscription of a piece of land in the barrio
of Libis, municipality of Caloocan, used as a fishery having a superficial area of 10,805 square meters, and bounded as
set out in the petition; its value according to the last assessment being $505.05, United States currency.

This petition was opposed by the Solicitor-General in behalf of the Director of Lands, and by the entity known as Obras
Pias de la Sagrada Mitra, the former on the ground that the land in question belonged to the Government of the United
States, and the latter, that it was the absolute owner of all the dry land along the eastern boundary of the said fishery.

The Court of Land Registration in its decision of December 1, 1906, dismissed the said oppositions without costs and
decreed, after a general entry by default, the adjudication and registration of the property described in the petition, in
favor of Isabelo Montano y Marcial.

From this decision only counsel for the Director of Public Lands appealed to this court. It is a kindred case to Cirilo Mapa
vs. The Insular Government, decided by this court on February 19, 1908, reported in 10 Phil. Rep., 175.

As some discussion has arisen as to the scope of that decision, it appears opportune to reaffirm the principle there laid
down. The issue was, whether the lands used as a fishery , for the growth of nipa, and as salt deposits, inland some
distance from the sea, and asserted, though not clearly proved to be overflowed at high tide could be registered as
private property on the strength of ten years' occupation, under paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926 of the Phil.
Commission. The point decided was that such land within the meaning of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, was
agricultural, the reasoning leading up to the conclusion being that congress having divided all the public lands of the
Islands into three classes it must be included in one of the three, and being clearly neither forest nor mineral, it must of
necessity fall into two division of agricultural land. In the concurring opinion, in order to avoid misapprehension on the
part of those not familiar with United States land legislation and a misunderstanding of the reach of the doctrine, it was
pointed out that under the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States the phrase "public lands" is held to be
equivalent to "public domain," and dos not by any means include all lands of Government ownership, but only so much
of said lands as are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement by homestead and other like general laws.
Accordingly, "government land" and "public domain" are not synonymous items; the first includes not only the second,
but also other lands of the Government already reserved or devoted to public use or subject to private right. In other
words, the Government owns real estate which is part of the "public lands" and other real estate which is not part
thereof.

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This meaning attached to the phrase "public lands" by Congress in its land legislation is settled by usage and adjudication
beyond a doubt, and without variation. It is therefore doing the utmost violence to all rules of construction to contend
that in this law, dealing with the same subject-matter in connection with these Islands, a different meaning had, without
indication or motive, been imported into the words. They cannot have one meaning in any other statute and a different
and conflicting meaning in this statute. Where property in general is referred to therein, other and apt phrases are used
in order to include it; for instance, section 12 provides "that all the property and rights which have been acquired in the
Phil. Islands by the United States ... are hereby placed under the control of the Government of the said Islands."
Therefore, there is much real property belonging to the Government which is not affected by statutes for the
settlement, prescription or sale of public lands. Examples in point are properties occupied by public buildings or devoted
to municipal or other governmental uses.

Among the authorities cited in the Mapa case are two, Shively vs. Bowlby (152 U.S., 1), and Mann vs. Tacoma Land Co.
(153 U.S., 273), in which it was held that general public land laws did not apply to land over which the tide ebbs and
flows. Mr. Justice Gray, in Shively vs. Bowlby, which is in itself an epitome of the American Law of Waters, speaking of
the tide lands, said:

But Congress has never undertaken by general laws to dispose of such lands. . . .

The Congress of the United States, in disposing of the public lands, has constantly acted upon the theory that those
lands, whether in the interior, or on the coast, above high- water mark, may be taken up by actual occupants, in order to
encourage the settlement of the country, but that the navigable water and the soils under them. whether within the
above the ebb and flow of the tide, shall be and remain public highways; and being chiefly valuable for the public
purposes of commerce, navigation, and fishery, and for the improvement necessary to secure and promote those
purposes, shall not be granted away during the period of territorial government. (Pp. 48 and 49.)

The conclusions of the court are in part stated as follows:

Lands under tide waters are incapable of cultivation or improvement in the manner of lands above high-water mark.
They are of great value to the public for the purposes of commerce, navigation, and fishery. Their improvement by
individuals, when permitted, is incidental or subordinate to the public use and right. Therefore the title and the control
of them are vested in the sovereign for the benefit of the whole people . . . .

Upon the acquisition of a territory by the United States, whether by cession from one of the States, or by treaty with a
foreign country, or by discovery and settlement, the same title and dominion passed to the United States, for the benefit
of whole people, and in trust for the several States to be ultimately created out of the territory . . . .

The United States, while hold the country as a territory, having all the powers both of national and municipal
government, may grant, for appropriate purposes, titles or rights in the soil below high-water mark of tide waters. But
that have never done so in general laws. (Pp. 57 and 58.)

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In Mann vs. Tacoma Land Co., it was said by Mr. Justice Brewer (p. 284);

It is settled that the general legislation of Congress in respect to public lands does not extend to tide lands .... It provided
that the scrip might be located on the unoccupied and unappropriated public lands. As said in Newhall vs. Sanger (92
U.S., 761, 763.) "The words "public lands" are habitually used in our legislation to described such as are subject to sale or
other disposal under general laws."

In Illinois Central R.R. Company vs. Illinois (146 U.S., 387) Mr. Justice Field, delivering the opinion of the court, said:

That the State holds the title tot he lands under the navigable waters of lake Michigan within its limits, in the same
manner that the State hold title to soils under tide water, by the common law, we have already shown, and that title
necessarily carries with it control over the waters above them whenever the lands are subjected to use. But it is a title
different in character from that which the States holds in lands intended for sale. It is different from the title which the
United States hold in the public lands which are open to preemption and sale. It is a title held in trust for the people of
the States that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing
therein freed from the obstruction or interference of private parties. The interest of the people in the navigation of the
waters and in commerce over them may be improved in many instances by the erection of wharves, docks, and piers
therein, for which purpose the State may grant parcels of the submerged lands; and so long as their disposition is made
for such purposes, no valid objections can be made to the grants .... The control of the State for the purposes of the trust
can never be lost, except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the public therein, or can be
disposed of without any substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and waters remaining .... The State
can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are interested, like navigable waters and soils
under them, so as to leave them entirely under the use and control of private parties, except in the instance of parcels
mentioned for the improvement of the navigation and use of the waters, or when parcels can be disposed of without
impairment of the public interest in what remains, that can abdicate its police powers in the administration of
government and the preservation of the peace .... So with trusts connected with public property, or property of a special
character, like lands under navigable waters, they can not be placed entirely beyond the direction and control of the
State.

The ownership of the navigable waters of the harbor and the lands under them is a subject of public concern to the
whole people of the State. The trust with which they are held, therefore, is governmental and can not be alienated,
except in those instances mentioned of parcels used in the improvement of the interest thus held, or when parcels can
be disposed of without detriment to the public interest in the lands and waters remaining. . . . . (Pp. 452-455.)

Mr. Justice Fields quotes from an opinion by Mr. Justice Bradley, delivered in a case in the Circuit Court, speaking of
lands under water, as follows (p. 457):

Being subject to this trust, they were publici juris; in other words, they were held for the use of the people at large. It is
true that to utilize the fisheries, especially those of shellfish, it was necessary to parcel them out to particular operators,
and employ the rent or consideration for the benefit of the whole people; but this did not alter the character of the title.
The land remained subject to all other public uses as before, especially to those of navigation and commerce, which are
always paramount to those of public fisheries. It is also true that portions of the submerged shoals and flats, which really
interfered with navigation, and could better subserve the purposes of commerce by being filled up and reclaimed, were

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disposed of to individuals for that purpose. But neither did these dispositions of useless parts affect the character of the
title to the remainder.

These citations are thus given at length in order to make clear, first, the lands under the ebb and flow of the tide of
navigable waters are not in America understood to be included in the phrase "public lands" in Acts of Congress of United
States; nor, perforce, can they best understood in laws of the Philippine Commission drawn immediately under the
sanction of those Acts; and second, that such lands are under existing Congressional legislation the subject of private
ownership, any occupation therefore be subordinate to the public purpose of navigation and fishery. While as well in the
original thirteen States in which there was never a national public domain to which the land laws of Congress could
apply as in States more recently created out of that domain and which upon their formation became masters of their
own land policy the local laws govern riparian and littoral rights, subject only to Congressional control in matters of
foreign and interstate commerce ( U.S. vs. Mission Rock Co., 189 U. S., 391), yet, as to the unappropriated public lands
constituting the public domain the sole power of legislation is vested in Congress, which are uniformly and consistently
declined to assume the function of authorizing or regulating private appropriation of such rights. Therefore, in the
absence of specific Congressional legislation, it is impossible for individuals to acquire title under the ten years provision
of Act No. 926 or even through a definite grants from the local legislature of lands beneath navigable waters in which
the tide ebbs and flows, except for wharf-age or other purposes auxiliary to navigation or other public uses, unless in
conformity with the preexisting local law of the Archipelago.

The matter is dwelt is upon for the reason that the late Attorney-General in his very able brief calls attention to the
effect apprehended from the extension of the words "agricultural lands" as used in Act No. 926 to include all public
lands not forest or mineral in character, specifying two acts of the Philippine Commission, the validity of which he fears
might thereby be called into question. The first of these, Act No. 1039, dedicates to use of the Navy Department of the
United States Government certain ground and buildings in Cavite, while the other, Act No. 1654, is a fore-shore law
regulating the control and disposal of filled Government lands. If the term "agricultural lands" be held to include all
government property not forest or mineral in character, he suggests that these Acts, not being in conformity with the
procedure of Act No. 926, as approved by Congress, would be invalid, and moreover, that the Philippine Government
would be seriously tied up in the management and disposition of other lands owned by it.

Without finally passing on this question in relation to lands the owners of which are not before us parties to this action,
it is appropriate, in answering the argument of the law officer of the State, to point out that this consequence appears to
be avoided by the restricted sense given to the words "public lands" or "public domain" in the Act of Congress and in Act
No. 926, as hereinbefore noted. Neither the property affected by Act No. 1039, already in use by the Navy Department
of the United States, nor the foreshore land mentioned in Act No. 1654, which is under the ebb and flow of the tide,
was, in so far as appears in the Acts before us, part of the public domain to be disposed of under sections 13, 14, 15, and
16 of the Act of congress of July 1, 1902, and for that reason it is not included in any of the three subdivisions of "public
lands" as agricultural or otherwise, although it was part of the property acquired in the Philippine Islands by the United
States by the treaty of peace with Spain, which by section 12 of that Act was "placed under the control of the
Government of said Islands, to be administered for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof." It would seem that the
validity of the Cavite Act can not be successfully assailed on this ground, while it may well be that The Fore-shore Act on
examination will be found to fall, as to its general purpose, within the authorization of section 11 of the Act of Congress,
whereby the duty is imposed upon the Island government of improving the harbors and navigable waters in the interest
of commerce.

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As a consequence, it follows that The Public Land Act did not apply to the fisheries in the Mapa case, if they are to be
regarded as constituting, in a general sense, land under tidal waters. It becomes necessary, therefore, to refer to the
character of the lands.

Although argued at different times, five of these cases have been presented substantially together, all being covered by
one brief of the late Attorney-General in behalf of the Government in which, with many interesting historical and
graphic citations he describes that part of the marginal seashore of the Philippine Islands known as manglares, with their
characteristic vegetation. In brief, it may be said that they are mud flats, alternately washed and exposed by the tide, in
which grow various kindred plants which will not live except when watered by the sea, extending their roots deep into
the mud and casting their seeds, which also germinate there. These constitute the mangrove flats of the tropics, which
exist naturally, but which are also, to some extent, cultivated by man for the sake of the combustible wood of the
mangrove and like trees as well as for the useful nipa palm propagated thereon. Although these flats are literally tidal
lands, yet we are of the opinion that they can not be so regarded in the sense in which that term is used in the cases
cited or in general American Jurisprudence. The waters flowing over them are not available for purpose of navigation,
and they "may be disposed of without impairment of the public interest in what remains." Mr. Justice Bradley, in the
passage quoted by Mr. Justice Field, makes an exception of submerged shoals and flats. In Railroad Company vs.
Schurmeir (74 U.S., 272) , a Government patent of public land bordering upon a river was held to include a parcel
submerge at very high water and separated from the mainland by a slough in which the water ran when ordinarily high.
In Mobile vs. Hallett (41 U.S., 260), at page 266. Mr. Justice Catron remarked in his dissenting opinion:

. . . and that a mud flat, flowed by tide water, is the subject of grant by the Government to an individual, I think can not
well be doubted by anyone acquainted with the southern country; when such valuable portions of it are mud flats, in the
constant course of reclamation.

In several of the older States along the Atlantic coast such flats, either by force of ordinance, custom, judicial
construction, or local laws are held to pass under private grants as appurtenant to the uplands. (Winslow vs. Patten, 34
Maine, 25; Litchfield vs. Scituate, 135 Mass., 39; People vs. New York and Staten Island Ferry Co., 68 N.Y., 71; Stevens vs.
P.& N. Railroad, 5 Vroom, 34 N.J. Law, 532.) There is even stronger reason for excepting mud flats from the rule of tide
lands in these Islands, owing to the peculiarities of their configuration and to the nature of the tropical growth thereon,
and whatever may be action of the tide, we do not think that in the Philippines such of the shoals covered by this
vegetation, whether spontaneously or by cultivation, as are not available for free navigation, or required for any other
purpose of general benefit, can be considered tidal land reserved for public use alone, under the governmental trust for
commerce and public fishery, but on the contrary, we regard them as public property, susceptible of a sort of cultivation
and of improvement, and as such, subject to occupation under paragraph 6 of section 54 of the Land Law. Instances may
hereafter arise of fisheries unduly established in what are clearly navigable waters which would constitute a nuisance,
and not be the subject of prescription or of grant. A brief reference to the five cases under consideration in this court,
however, will serve to show that they all fairly fall within the benefits of the law. In the Mapa case1 the property was far
from the the sea, partly occupied as fish pond, as nipa land, and as a salt pit. It does not appear whether it was
connected with the sea by nature or by art, or whether the tide ebbed or flowed upon it, or whether the salt was
sufficient to impart to any portion of it a mineral character. In the Santiago case2 there was a fishery about two
thousand yards from the sea, with which it communicated by a river, and a portion of the inclosure was dedicated to
growing the aquatic tree called bacawan. The fishery had been constructed by man, upon land heretofore sown with
this tree. In the Gutierrez case3 it was shown that the land was partly highland, growing fruit trees, and partly lowland ,
converted by the occupant of the upland into a fishery by this labor. In the Baello case,4 the river running to the sea was
a hundred meters away, the salt water therefrom reaching the lowland by means of an artificial canal cut by the owner
of the land when he gave up cultivating bacawan thereon, an made it into a fishery. In the Montano case, although there

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was a considerable depth of water over the soil, yet before the fishery was made, some thirty years before the trial,
bacawan had been sown and propagated in the mud by the owner who finally sold the entire cut when he built the
dikes.

All these lots, in their original state, whether near the sea or at a distance from it inland, and whether bare or washed by
the tides, were not covered by waters practically navigable and were filled, whether naturally or artificially, with
vegetation sometimes cultivated and in common use for fuel and for building purposes, and they were all adapted to
fisheries or fish hatcheries by the labor of man introducing or regulating the access of salt water thereto. It is obvious
that that all five cases are of the same general nature and that one rule must be applied to them all.

In this discussion of the meaning which the Congress of the United States attached to the phrase "public lands" in the
Philippine Bill, we have assumed that it was used in the same sense as in other laws enacted by that body. If, however, it
can be considered as employed with reference to the peculiar conditions of the territory to which it was to be applied
and to the local law or usage prevailing therein, the result would not be different. In many of its general features the
Spanish law of public lands in the Philippines resembled the American. Government property was of two kinds — first,
that of public use or service, said to be of public ownership, and second, that of having a private character or use. (Civil
Code, arts. 339 and 340.) Lands of the first class, while they retain their public character are inalienable; those of the
second are not.

By the royal decree of February 13, 1894, it was enacted that all "the land, soil, ground not under cultivation, and forests
in the Philippine Islands should be considered saleable crown lands," which are not included in the four exceptions
stated, among which were "those which belonged to the forest zones which the State desires to hold for the
Commonwealth." This corresponds in the main to the American classification into Government property, public lands,
and forest reserve. Mineral lands are elsewhere defined. It is to be noted, however, that in the two languages terms
ordinarily equivalent are not in this relation employed in the same sense and that lands de dominio publico signify quite
a different thing from the arbitrary English Phrases "public lands" or "public domain."

The Law of Waters of 1866, which was the latest Spanish Law of Waters extended to these Islands, provides that private
property can not be acquired in lands preserving the character of public ownership (title 1, art. 1, par. 29), and among
the lands declared of public ownership and use by article 1 of chapter 1 of title 5 of the same law are:

The seashore. — By shore is understood the land alternately covered and uncovered by the sea in its tidal movement. Its
interior, or land limit, is the point reached by the highest and equinoctial tides. At those places not affected by tides, the
land limit is the highest point reached by sea water in ordinary storms or hurricanes. (Par. 3.)

So that under this legislation the same question also presented itself as to what constituted seashore, which was of
public use and trust and therefore not alienable. This question can not be said to have been settled by official ruling at
the time of the American occupation. From the official records it appears that there were then pending for registration a
great number of possessory expedientes, twenty-two of which, made before April 17, 1895, were from the Province of
Pampanga alone, in which the land was described as manglares. Under the royal decree of 1894 such manglares appear
at the outset to have been registered and considered alienable and numbers of them were conceded by adjustment,
including considerable tracts in the town of Sexmoan and Lubao in Pampanga. Claims having been made that on account
of the trees growing thereon they formed part of the forest reserve and also because, being covered and uncovered by

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the tide, they were part of the shore, and in either case were inalienable, the engineer in chief of the forestry district of
the center of Luzon addressed, on January 7, 1893, a communication to the inspector general de montes ( Forestry
Department) in which he expressed an opinion that as part of the shore they were not subject to private ownership and
asked for an early decision of the question. On November 26, 1893, the acting inspector-general notified the chief of the
district of the Visayas in Mindanao that his excellency, the governor-general, had that they ordered all action suspended
on expedientes of manglar and nipa lands and salt marshes until the questions involved in regard thereto should be
determined. In this condition the matter remained until the expiration of the Spanish sovereignty.

By article 14 of the Law of Waters the right of shore fishery was declared public, but by article 23 authority might be
granted individuals to establish shore hatcheries for fish and shellfish, and by article 15 salt-water ponds on private
ground not communicating with the sea by water navigable by boats were recognized as private property, while chapter
10 permitted and regulated the draining of swamps and marshes, both of private and of public ownership.

Under this uncertain and somewhat unsatisfactory condition of the law the custom had grown up of converting
manglares and nipa lands into fisheries which became common feature of settlements along the coast and at the time of
the change of sovereignty constituted one of the most productive industries of the Islands, the abrogation of which
would destroy vested interests and prove a public disaster. In our opinion it was the object of Congress not to work such
a result but, on the contrary, in furtherance of the purposes of the treaty of Paris, to recognize and safeguard such
property. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Land Registration is affirmed, without costs.

Torres, Mapa, and Carson, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

ARELLANO, C.J., concurring:

I concur in the foregoing decision, but reserve my opinion as to the scope of the phrase "public lands" in the Act of
Congress referred to.

WILLIARD, J., concurring in the result.

In the case of Mapa vs. The Insular Government ( 10 Phil. Rep., 175 ) it is stated in the opinion, page 176, that —

The only question submitted tot he court below or to this court by the Attorney-General is the question whether the
land in controversy is agricultural land within the meaning of the section above quoted.

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The section quoted is section 54, paragraph 6, Act No. 926, in which the phrase used is "agricultural public lands."

Throughout the opinion the phrase "public lands" is repeatedly and exclusively used. The entire discussion was directed
to the question as to whether the property there in question being "public land," it could be considered as agricultural
public land, and the conclusion reached is stated at page 182, as follows:

In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land," as used in Act No. 926, means those public lands acquired from Spain
which are not timber or mineral lands.

In that case the land in question was a long distance from the sea. In fact, the entire town of Molo was between it and
the water. It could in no sense be called tidal land. Therefore, the opinion was devoted to a consideration of not what
were "public lands" but whether this particular tract was or was not agricultural public land. The question what the
phrase "public lands" meant neither considered nor decided in that opinion, for its resolution was not necessary. In the
concurring opinion, however, that question was discussed and it was stated that the phrase "public lands" used in Act
No. 926 must be interpreted according to the American understanding of the words employed and the meaning of the
terms as definitely fixed by the decrees of the United States Supreme Court.

This statement was not necessary to the decision of the case then under discussion and was moreover, as shall attempt
to show hereafter, not a correct statement made in that opinion, to the effect that there may be real property belonging
to the Government which would not be included in the phrase "public lands," there can be no doubt concerning its
correctness. This is and always has been apparent. It is indicated by articles 339 and 340 of the Civil Code, which are as
follows:

ART. 339. Property of public ownership is —

1. That destined to the public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports, and bridges constructed by the
State, and banks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character.

2. That belonging exclusively to the State without being for public use which is destined to some public service, or
to the development of the national wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other works for the defense of the territory,
and mines, until concession has been granted.

ART. 340. All other property belonging to the State which has not the conditions stated in the preceding article is
considered as private property.

Articles 24 and 25 of the Regulations for the Execution of the Mortgage Law also indicate it. These articles are as follows:

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ART. 24. All real estate and property rights thereto may be recorded, without exception, whether belonging to
private parties, to the State, to the province, to the municipality, or to civil or ecclesiastical corporations.

ART. 25. Exceptions to the record required by article 2 of the law are:

First. Property which belongs exclusively to the eminent domain of the State, and which is for the use of all, such as the
shores of the sea, islands, rivers and their borders, wagon roads, and roads of all kinds, with the exception of railroads;
streets, parks, public promenades, and commons of towns. provided they are not lands of common profit to the
inhabitants; walls of cities and parks, ports, and roadsteads, any other analogous property during the time they are in
common and general use, always reserving the servitudes established by law on the shores of the sea and borders of
navigable rivers.

Second. Public temples dedicated to the Catholic faith.

In the Mapa case it was not necessary to decide, nor was it there decided, what the real property was which, belonging
to the government, still would not come within the phrase "public lands," nor how private persons could acquire rights
in such property, nor whether that phrase should have the same meaning here as it has in the United states. In the
present case, it is said in the opinion that "all these five cases are of the same general character, and that the same rule
should be applied to all." If it was not necessary to decide in the Mapa case the questions above mentioned, why is it
necessary to discuss and decide them here? We are all agreed (1) that these lands are not tidal lands and are public
lands, and (2) that they are agricultural lands. Having arrived at these conclusions, I see no reason for the question as to
what the result would be if they were tidal lands. It is apparent that anything said upon that question is not necessary to
the decision of these cases and is obiter dictum.

Whether Act. No. 1654, relating to the reclaimed land in Manila near the Luneta, is authorized by section 11 of the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902, or by section 12, is a question outside of the issues in the case at bar, and it seems unnecessary
now to commit the court to any definite resolution thereof. If it is the purpose of the decision to announce the doctrine
that rights in tidal waters in the Philippines must be governed by the principles already announced by the Supreme
Court in the decisions cited, this objection attains greater force. Thus construed, it decides the rights of innumerable
persons in the Islands who have reclaimed land from the sea and built upon it, none of whom has had an opportunity to
be heard before his rights are thus decided.

These objections to the decision, on the ground that it discusses and apparently decides questions not before the court,
and which affect parties not before it, would not be so serious if the conclusions reached were sound. But they are, as I
believe, erroneous. The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States cited the opinion have nothing to do either
with the question as to what rights private persons can acquire in tidal lands in the Philippines or with the meaning
which should be given to the phrase "public lands" found in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902.

1. Upon the first question as to private rights in tidal lands, it has been definitely settled by the Supreme Court at
Washington in many decisions, which are collected in the case of Shively vs. Bowlby (152 U.S., 1 ), cited in the opinion,
that the rights of private persons in such lands depend upon the law of the State where the lands are. The court said in
that case (p. 40) :

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VII. The later judgments of this court clearly establish that the title and rights of riparian or littoral proprietors in the
soil below high water mark of navigable waters are governed by the local laws of the several States, subject, of course,
to the rights granted to the United States by the Constitution.

It also appears from that case that these laws vary in different States. The court said, at page 26:

The foregoing summary of the laws of the original States shows that there is no universal and uniform law upon the
subject; but that each State has dealt with the lands under the tide waters within its borders according to its own views
of justice and policy, reserving its own control over such lands, or granting rights therein to individuals or corporations,
whether owners of the adjoining upland or not, as it considered for the best interests of the public. Great caution,
therefore, is necessary in applying precedents in one State to cases arising in another.

In Massachusetts the owner of the upland is the owner in fee to the low-water mark if not beyond 100 rods. In other
States he is the owner in fee only to high-water mark. In Minnesota the owner of the upland has the exclusive right to
occupy the shore in front of his land, not only to low-water mark but even into the water to the point of navigability, and
to occupy it for purely private purposes. And he is so far the owner of the land under water to the point of navigability
that he can sell portions thereof and retain himself the shore line. ( Hanford vs. St. Paul & D.R. Co., 43 Minn., 104.) It will
be observed that some of the cases cited in support of the decision in the case at bar arose in Massachusetts and
Minnesota. The result is that when the Supreme Court of the United States decides a case relating to such lands it
necessarily decides it according to the law of the State from which it comes. So that if any law of American origin is to be
applied here it can not be a national law of waters for none exists. It must be necessarily be the law of some one of the
different States. This would require a selection of the jurisprudence of one of those States which this court should not
attempt to make.

At the cession of the Islands to the United States there was in force here a body of laws relating to this subject. These
laws are still in force. They are found in the Law of Waters of 1866 and in articles 407 to 425 of the Civil Code. Cases
which have heretofore arisen in this court have been decided with reference to these laws and not with reference to the
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States relating to cases arising there. Among others are the cases of Ker &
Co. vs. Cuden (6 Phil. Rep., 732), and Jover vs. Insular Government1 (No. 2674, decided March 25, 1908). That questions
relating to tidal lands should continue to be so decided seems to me free from doubt. It may be said that the decision
does not intend to announce a contrary doctrine. If it does not, I see no purpose, for example, in the long citation from
the case of Illinois Central R. Co. vs. Illinois (146 U.S., 387), nor in the declaration that the purpose of the citation of
these decisions is to show in the second place that the rights in tidal lands are not under the legislation of Congress the
subject of private property.

2. The second question relates to the meaning which should be given to the phrase "public lands" in the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902. In the concurring opinion in the Mapa case it was stated, as has been seen, that it has the same
meaning here as in the United States. This doctrine seems to be reiterated in the opinion in this case. After announcing
it in equivocal terms, it is said, to be sure that the result would be the same if the words were to be construed with
reference to the local law. This would be true if the laws of the other two jurisdictions were the same. But it is easily
demonstrated that they are not.

10
With reference to tidal lands, we have seen that in some of the States private persons are the owners of the land
between high and low water mark. By the Law of Waters of 1866, and article 339 of the Civil Code, the shore or beach is
public property. It not only does not belong to private persons, but it is not even the private property of the State.

The difference between the two systems is more marked when we consider public roads and streets and the beds of
non-navigable rivers. By the common law of England, which has been followed by and is now in force in a great many of
the States, the beds of such rivers belong to the owners of the adjoining land. But by the law here in force (arts. 339 and
407, Civil Code) they are public property and can not be considered even as the private property of the State. The same
is true of streets and roads. (Arts. 339 and 344, Civil Code.) When the United States issues a patent for public land
owned by it situated in the State of Minnesota, for example, and bounded by a non-navigable river. the patentee
becomes the owner of one-half of the bed of the river. When the Spanish Government issued a patent for land in the
Philippines bounded by river, the patentee did not become the owner of the bed of the river. His ownership extended
only to low-water mark.

What has been said of rivers is true of roads. If the phrase "public lands" be given the meaning here that it has in the
United States, whenever the Director of Public Lands grants a patent for land bounded by a non-navigable river or road
the patentee will become the owner of one-half of the bed of the river and one-half of the road. This result would be in
direct conflict with the articles of the Civil Code above cited, and would amount to a repeal thereof. Such a result
Congress never could have intended. Prior to the treaty of Paris the Spanish Government was the owner of the roads
and the beds of streams in the Philippines in trust for the benefit of the people. The treaty itself did not change this
status. On the contrary, it preserved rights of property as they then existed. By the treaty, the United States acquired
interest which the Spanish Government had in roads and the beds of streams. It did not become the absolute owner
thereof.

The laws of Spain relating to this matter were continued in force by the proclamation of General Merritt. This would
have been the result even without any proclamation.(American Ins. Co. vs. Canter, 1 Pet., 511.) They are in force now,
and the Government is still the owner of roads and the beds of rivers unless Congress by the use of the phrase "public
lands" in the Act of July 1, 1902, has repealed the articles of the Civil Code above cited. I do not think that such an
intention can be attributed to it . It is more reasonable to say that it is intended to give to the phrase the meaning which
was given to it by the laws in force in the territory where the Act was to take effect. And this intention is more apparent
when we consider that there then existed article 340 of the Civil Code, which contained a complete definition of these
lands belonging to the Government, which it had the right to dispose of as private property. It had no intention of
disposing of property which it held in trust. The property which the Commission intended to dispose of by Act No. 926
was undoubtedly the private property of the State as defined by article 340.

To say that Congress had a different purpose would be to attribute to it an intention to discriminate against the
Philippines and to impose upon the Islands laws other than those there in force, a thing which it has never done when
legislating in regard to its land situated within a particular State. As we have seen, it has always allowed each State to
determine for itself the laws which shall govern real State to determine for itself the laws which shall govern real estate
within its borders. When this court is called upon to define the phrase "public lands" as used in the Act of Congress and
in Act No. 926, it should in my opinion say that it includes the property described in article 340 of the Civil Code.

For the reasons above stated, I agree with the result in this case, but I dissent from those parts of the opinion which I
have discussed.

11
PEDRO LEE HONG HOK, SIMEON LEE HONG HOK, ROSITA LEE HONG HOK and LEONCIO LEE HONG HOK, petitioners, vs.
ANIANO DAVID, THE HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. G.R. No. L-30389 December 27, 1972

FERNANDO, J.:p

Petitioners 1 in this appeal by certiorari would have us reverse a decision of respondent Court of Appeals affirming a
lower court judgment dismissing their complaint to have the Torrens Title 2 of respondent Aniano David declared null
and void. What makes the task for petitioners quite difficult is that their factual support for their pretension to
ownership of such disputed lot through accretion was rejected by respondent Court of Appeals. Without such
underpinning, they must perforce rely on a legal theory, which, to put it mildly, is distinguished by unorthodoxy and is
therefore far from persuasive. A grant by the government through the appropriate public officials 3 exercising the
competence duly vested in them by law is not to be set at naught on the premise, unexpressed but implied, that land
not otherwise passing into private ownership may not be disposed of by the state. Such an assumption is at war with
settled principles of constitutional law. It cannot receive our assent. We affirm.

The decision of respondent Court of Appeals following that of the lower court makes clear that there is no legal
justification for nullifying the right of respondent Aniano David to the disputed lot arising from the grant made in his
favor by respondent officials. As noted in the decision under review, he "acquired lawful title thereby pursuant to his
miscellaneous sales application in accordance with which an order of award and for issuance of a sales patent was made
by the Director of Lands on June 18, 1958, covering Lot 2892 containing an area of 226 square meters, which is a portion
of Lot 2863 of the Naga Cadastre. On the basis of the order of award of the Director of Lands the Undersecretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources issued on August 26, 1959, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209 pursuant to which
OCT No. 510 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Naga City to defendant-appellee Aniano David on October 21, 1959.
According to the Stipulation of Facts, since the filing of the sales application of Aniano David and during all the
proceedings in connection with said application, up to the actual issuance of the sales patent in his favor, the plaintiffs-
appellants did not put up any opposition or adverse claim thereto. This is fatal to them because after the registration
and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title based on a public land patent, the land covered thereby
automatically comes under the operation of Republic Act 496 subject to all the safeguards provided therein.... Under
Section 38 of Act 496 any question concerning the validity of the certificate of title based on fraud should be raised
within one year from the date of the issuance of the patent. Thereafter the certificate of title based thereon becomes
indefeasible.... In this case the land in question is not a private property as the Director of Lands and the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources have always sustained the public character thereof for having been formed by
reclamation.... The only remedy therefore, available to the appellants is an action for reconveyance on the ground of
fraud. In this case we do not see any fraud committed by defendant-appellant Aniano David in applying for the purchase
of the land involved through his Miscellaneous Sales Application No. MSA-V-26747, entered in the records of the Bureau
of Lands [Miscellaneous Sales] Entry No. V-9033, because everything was done in the open. The notices regarding the
auction sale of the land were published, the actual sale and award thereof to Aniano David were not clandestine but
open and public official acts of an officer of the Government. The application was merely a renewal of his deceased
wife's application, and the said deceased occupied the land since 1938." 4

On such finding of facts, the attempt of petitioners to elicit a different conclusion is likely to be attended with
frustration. The first error assigned predicated an accretion having taken place, notwithstanding its rejection by
respondent Court of Appeals, would seek to disregard what was accepted by respondent Court as to how the disputed
lot came into being, namely by reclamation. It does not therefore call for any further consideration. Neither of the other
two errors imputed to respondent Court, as to its holding that authoritative doctrines preclude a party other than the

12
government to dispute the validity of a grant and the recognition of the indefeasible character of a public land patent
after one year, is possessed of merit. Consequently, as set forth at the outset, there is no justification for reversal.

1. More specifically, the shaft of criticism was let loose by petitioner aimed at this legal proposition set forth in the
exhaustive opinion of then Justice Salvador Esguerra of the Court of Appeals, now a member of this Court: "There is,
furthermore, a fatal defect of parties to this action. Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands, or the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to
a void patent (Lucas vs. Durian, 102 Phil. 1157; Director of Lands vs. Heirs of Ciriaco Carlo, G.R. No. L-12485, July 31,
1959). This was not done by said officers but by private parties like the plaintiffs, who cannot claim that the patent and
title issued for the land involved are void since they are not the registered owners thereof nor had they been declared as
owners in the cadastral proceedings of Naga Cadastre after claiming it as their private property. The cases cited by
appellants are not in point as they refer to private registered lands or public lands over which vested rights have been
acquired but notwithstanding such fact the Land Department subsequently granted patents to public land applicants."5
Petitioner ought to have known better. The above excerpt is invulnerable to attack. It is a restatement of a principle that
dates back to Maninang v. Consolacion, 6 a 1908 decision. As was there categorically stated: "The fact that the grant was
made by the government is undisputed. Whether the grant was in conformity with the law or not is a question which the
government may raise, but until it is raised by the government and set aside, the defendant can not question it. The
legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and the government."7 The above citation was repeated
ipsissimis verbis in Salazar v. Court of Appeals.8 Bereft as petitioners were of the right of ownership in accordance with
the findings of the Court of Appeals, they cannot, in the language of Reyes v. Rodriguez, 9 "question the [title] legally
issued." 10 The second assignment of error is thus disposed of.

2. As there are overtones indicative of skepticism, if not of outright rejection, of the well-known distinction in
public law between the government authority possessed by the state which is appropriately embraced in the concept of
sovereignty, and its capacity to own or acquire property, it is not inappropriate to pursue the matter further. The former
comes under the heading of imperium and the latter of dominium. The use of this term is appropriate with reference to
lands held by the state in its proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide for the exploitation and use of lands
and other natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution. Dean Pound did speak of
the confusion that existed during the medieval era between such two concepts, but did note the existence of res
publicae as a corollary to dominium." 11 As far as the Philippines was concerned, there was a recognition by Justice
Holmes in Cariño v. Insular Government, 12 a case of Philippine origin, that "Spain in its earlier decrees embodied the
universal feudal theory that all lands were held from the Crown...." 13 That was a manifestation of the concept of jura
regalia, 14 which was adopted by the present Constitution, ownership however being vested in the state as such rather
than the head thereof. What was stated by Holmes served to confirm a much more extensive discussion of the matter in
the leading case of Valenton v. Murciano, 15 decided in 1904. One of the royal decrees cited was incorporated in the
Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias 16 in these words: "We having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies and all lands,
territories, and possessions not heretofore ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still
pertaining to the royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that all lands which are held without proper and true deeds of
grant be restored to us according as they belong to us, in order that after reserving before all what to us or to our
viceroys audiences, and governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways, pastures, and commons in those places
which are peopled, taking into consideration not only their present condition, but also their future and their probable
increase, and after distributing to the natives what may be necessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming them in what
they now have and giving them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to
dispose of as we may wish." 17

13
It could therefore be affirmed in Montano v. Insular Government" 18 that "as to the unappropriated public lands
constituting the public domain the sole power of legislation is vested in Congress, ..." 19 They continue to possess that
character until severed therefrom by state grant. 20 Where, as in this case, it was found by the Court of Appeals that the
disputed lot was the result of reclamation, its being correctly categorized as public land is undeniable. 21 What was held
in Heirs of Datu Pendatun v. Director of Lands 22 finds application. Thus: "There being no evidence whatever that the
property in question was ever acquired by the applicants or their ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish
Government or by possessory information title or by any other means for the acquisition of public lands, the property
must be held to be public domain." 23 For it is well-settled "that no public land can be acquired by private persons
without any grant, express or implied, from the government." 24 It is indispensable then that there be a showing of a
title from the state or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law. 25 The most recent restatement of the doctrine,
found in an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, follows: 26 "The applicant, having failed to establish his right or title over the
northern portion of Lot No. 463 involved in the present controversy, and there being no showing that the same has been
acquired by any private person from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, the property is and remains part
of the public domain." 27 To repeat, the second assignment of error is devoid of merit.

3. The last error assigned would take issue with this portion of the opinion of Justice Esguerra: "According to the
Stipulation of Facts, since the filing of the sales application of Aniano David and during all the proceedings in connection
with said application, up to the actual issuance of the sales patent in his favor, the

plaintiffs-appellants did not put up any opposition or adverse claim thereto. This is fatal to them because after the
registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title based on a public land patent, the land
covered thereby automatically comes under the operation of Republic Act 496 subject to all the safeguards provided
therein ... Under Section 38 of Act 496 any question concerning the validity of the certificate of title based on fraud
should be raised within one year from the date of the issuance of the patent. Thereafter the certificate of title based
thereon becomes indefeasible ..." 28 Petitioners cannot reconcile themselves to the view that respondent David's title is
impressed with the quality of indefeasibility. In thus manifesting such an attitude, they railed to accord deference to
controlling precedents. As far back as 1919, in Aquino v. Director of

Lands, 29 Justice Malcolm, speaking for the Court, stated: "The proceedings under the Land Registration Law and under
the provisions of Chapter VI of the Public Land Law are the same in that both are against the whole world, both take the
nature of judicial proceedings, and for both the decree of registration issued is conclusive and final." 30 Such a view has
been followed since then. 31 The latest case in point is Cabacug v. Lao. 32 There is this revealing excerpt appearing in
that decision: "It is said, and with reason, that a holder of a land acquired under a free patent is more favorably situated
than that of an owner of registered property. Not only does a free patent have a force and effect of a Torrens Title, but
in addition the person to whom it is granted has likewise in his favor the right to repurchase within a period of five
years." 33 It is quite apparent, therefore, that petitioners' stand is legally indefensible.

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of January 31, 1969 and its resolution of March 14, 1969 are
affirmed. With costs against petitioners-appellants.

14
DIRECTOR OF LANDS and DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO
VALERIANO, GABRIELA VALERIANO VDA. DE LA CRUZ, LETICIA A. VALERIANO and MARISSA VALERIANO DE LA ROSA,
respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioners.

Carlos C. Serapio for private respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Petitioners-public officials, through the Solicitor General, seek a review of the Decision and Resolution of the then Court
of Appeals affirming the judgment of the former Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III, decreeing registration of a
parcel of land in private respondents' favor. The land in question, Identified as Lot 2347, Cad-302-D, Case 3, Obando
Cadastre, under Plan Ap-03-000535, is situated in Obando, Bulacan, and has an area of approximately 9.3 hectares. It
adjoins the Kailogan River and private respondents have converted it into a fishpond.

In their application for registration filed on May 10, 1976, private respondents (Applicants, for brevity) claimed that they
are the co-owners in fee simple of the land applied for partly through inheritance in 1918 and partly by purchase on May
2, 1958; that it is not within any forest zone or military reservation; and that the same is assessed for taxation purposes
in their names.

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development opposed the
application on the principal ground that the land applied for is within the unclassified region of Obando, Bulacan, per BF
Map LC No. 637 dated March 1, 1927; and that areas within the unclassified region are denominated as forest lands and
do not form part of the disposable and alienable portion of the public domain.

After hearing, the Trial Court ordered registration of the subject land in favor of the Applicants. This was affirmed on
appeal by respondent Appellate Court, which found that "through indubitable evidence (Applicants) and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public, continuous, peaceful and adverse possession of the subject parcel of
land under a bona fide claim of ownership for more than 30 years prior to the filing of the application" and are,
therefore, entitled to registration. It further opined that "since the subject property is entirely devoted to fishpond
purposes, it cannot be categorized as part of forest lands. "

Before this instance, the principal issues posed are: (1) whether or not Courts can reclassify the subject public land; and
(2) whether or not applicants are entitled to judicial confirmation of title.

The parties, through their respective counsel, stipulated that the land is within an unclassified region of Obando,
Bulacan, as shown by BF Map LC No. 637, dated March 1, 1927. 1 No evidence has been submitted that the land has
been released or subsequently classified despite an Indorsement, dated November 17, 1976, of the District Forester, to
the Director of Forest Development, containing the following recommendation:

Subject area requested for release was verified and found to be within the Unclassified Region of Obando, Bulacan per
BF LC Map No. 637, certified March 1, 1927. However, on-the-spot inspection conducted by a representative of this

15
Office, it disclosed that the same was devoid of any forest growth and forms part of a well-developed and 100 percent
producing fishponds. Two houses of light materials were erected within the area for the caretakers temporary dwelling.

In view thereof, and in fairness to the applicant considering the investment introduced therein this Office believes that
the release is in order,

Recommended for approval and be disposed of in accordance with the Public Land Law.2

The Government's case is meritorious.

In effect, what the Courts a quo have done is to release the subject property from the unclassified category, which is
beyond their competence and jurisdiction. The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive
Department of the Government and not of the Courts. In the absence of such classification, the land remains as
unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. 3 This should be so under time-honored
Constitutional precepts. This is also in consonance with the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong
to the State, 4 and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony. 5

The recommendation of the District Forester for release of subject property from the unclassified region is not the
ultimate word on the matter. And the fact that BF Map LC No. 637 dated March 1, 1927 showing subject property to be
within the unclassified region was not presented in evidence will not operate against the State considering the
stipulation between the parties and under the well-settled rule that the State cannot be estopped by the omission,
mistake or error of its officials or agents, 6 if omission there was, in fact.

While it may be that the Municipality of Obando has been cadastrally surveyed in 1961, it does not follow that a lands
comprised therein are automatically released as alienable. A survey made in a cadastral proceeding merely Identifies
each lot preparatory to a judicial proceeding for adjudication of title to any of the lands upon claim of interested parties.
Besides, if land is within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development, it would be beyond the jurisdiction of the
Cadastral Court to register it under the Torrens System.

Since the subject property is still unclassified, whatever possession Applicants may have had, and, however long, cannot
ripen into private ownership. 7

The conversion of subject property into a fishpond by Applicants, or the alleged titling of properties around it, does not
automatically render the property as alienable and disposable. Applicants' remedy lies in the release of the property
from its present classification. In fairness to Applicants, and it appearing that there are titled lands around the subject
property, petitioners-officials should give serious consideration to the matter of classification of the land in question.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is reversed and the application for registration in Land Registration Case No. N299-
V-76 of the former Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III, is hereby dismissed, without prejudice to the availment
by the applicants of the proper administrative remedy. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

16
SUSANA MENGUITO, EMELITA MENGUITO-MANALILI, HELEN MARTA MENGUITO-LUNA, RENATO MENGUITO,
BERSAMIN MENGUITO, FROILAN MENGUITO and GENEROSO MENGUITO, petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Unless a piece of public land is shown to have been classified as alienable and disposable, it remains part of the
inalienable public domain. Even assuming that such land has been classified as alienable, title thereto can be registered
only upon presentation of incontrovertible proof of adverse, notorious and open possession in the concept of owner for
a period of thirty years.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the September 30, 1997 Decision[1] and
the June 23, 1998 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 39638. The decretal portion of said
Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the appellees application for
registration is hereby DISMISSED.[3]

The Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City (Branch 157),[4] which was reversed by the appellate court,
granted petitioners application for registration in this wise:[5]

WHEREFORE, the order of general default against the whole world heretofore entered in this case is affirmed, and
judgment is hereby rendered confirming the registerable title of the applicants to the land described in their application
under plan Swo-13-000227 and its technical descriptions, situated in the Barrio of Ususan, Municipality of Taguig, Metro
Manila, and containing an aggregate area of 2,112 square meters; and individual and separate certificates of titles to the
lots comprising the said land are hereby ordered registered in the names of the applicants, as follows:

1. For lots 6045-A, 6045-B, 6045-C, and 6045-D in the name of Susana Menguito, of legal age, widow, Filipino citizen,
with residence and postal address at T. Sulit, St., Pater[o]s, Metro Manila;

2. For Lot 6045-E -- in the name of Renato Menguito, of legal age, married to Irene Toledo, Filipino citizen, with
residence and postal address at T. Sulit, St., Pateros, Metro Manila;

17
3. For Lot 6045-F -- in the name of Bersamin Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen, single, with residence and postal
address at T. Sulit, St., Pateros, Metro Manila;

4. For Lot 6045-G -- in the name of Generoso Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen, single, with residence and postal
address at T. Sulit, St., Pateros, Metro Manila;

5. For Lot 6045-H -- in the name of Helen Marta Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen, single, with residence and postal
address at T. Sulit, St., Pateros, Metro Manila;

6. For Lot 6046-I -- in the name of Froilan Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Zenaida Carag, with
residence and postal address at T.Sulit St., Pateros, Metro Manila;

7. For Lot 6045-J -- in the name of Emelita Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Luciano Manalili, with
residence and postal address at T. Sulit, St., Pateros, Metro Manila; and

8. For Lot 6045-K -- in the name of Generoso Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Luciano Manalili; and
Froilan Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Zenaida Carag, all with residence and postal address at T. Sulit
St., Pateros, Metro Manila.

Upon the finality of this Decision, let an Order be issued to the Commissioner of Land Registration Authority for the
issuance of the decree of registration and the corresponding certificates of title in favor of the applicants pursuant to
Section 39 of PD No. 1529.

SO ORDERED.

The Facts

The antecedents of the case are adequately summarized by the Court of Appeals as follows:

On November 10, 1987, in the Regional Trial Court at Pasig, Metro Manila an Application for Registration of Title was
filed by the following successors-in-interest of the deceased spouses Cirilo Menguito and Juana Manalo-Menguito,
namely: SUSANA MENGUITO, EMELITA MENGUITO-MANALILI, HELEN MARTA MENGUITO-LUNA, RENATO MENGUITO,
BERSAMIN MENGUITO, FROILAN MENGUITO and GENEROSO MENGUITO. Docketed in the said court as LRC Case No. N-
10938, the application reads:

APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE

18
The above-named applicants hereby apply to have the land hereinafter described brought under the operation of the
Land Registration Act as amended by the Property Registration Decree No. 1529 and to have their title thereto
registered and confirmed,

AND DECLARE:

1. That the applicants are the owners in fee simple of eleven (11) parcels of land situated in the Barrio of Ususan,
Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, and are bounded and described as shown on plan Swo-13-000227 (lot Nos. 6045-
A, 6045-B, 6045-C, 6045-D, 6045-E, 6045-F, 6045-G, 6045-H, 6045-I, 6045-J and 6045-K) and corresponding technical
descriptions, x x x;

2. That said parcels of land are assessed for taxation for the current year at P5,910.00 as per Tax Declaration No. B-11-
01351 of the land record of Taguig, Metro Manila;

3. That to the best of applicants knowledge and belief, there is no mortgage or encumbrance of any kind whatsoever
affecting the said land nor any other persons having any estate or interest therein, legal or equitable, in possession,
remainder, reversion or expectancy;

4. That the applicants acquired the said parcels of land by inheritance;

5. That said parcels of land are occupied by the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, open,
peaceful, continuous, and adverse possession, in the concept of owners, of said parcels of land for more than thirty
years;

6. That the names in full and addresses as far known to the undersigned, of the owners of all adjoining properties are as
follows:

(a) Pilar Menguito

Pateros-Taguig Road

Ususan, Taguig

Metro Manila

b) Andres Filemon

Pateros-Taguig Road

Ususan, Taguig

Metro Manila

19
c) Beatriz Dumagat

Pateros-Taguig Road

Ususan, Taguig

Metro Manila

d) Maura Cabanatan

Pateros-Taguig Road

Ususan, Taguig

Metro Manila

e) Pateros-Taguig Road

c/o The District Engineer

Pasig, Metro Manila

7. That the applicants full name, age, citizenship, residence, and postal address, are as follows:

SUSAN MENGUITO, widow; EMELITA M. MANALILI, married to Luciano Manalili; HELEN MARTA M. LUNA, married to
Benjamin Luna, Jr.; RENATO MENGUITO, married to Irene Toledo; BERSAMIN MENGUITO, married to Elvira Salvacion;
FROILAN MENGUITO, married to Zenaida Carag; and GENEROSO MENGUITO, single; all of legal age, Filipinos, and with
residence and postal address at T. Sulit St., Pateros, Metro Manila.

8. That should the Land Registration Act invoked be not applicable in the instant case, the applicants hereby apply for
the benefit of Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended;

9. That the following documents are attached hereto and made part hereof:

(a) Tracing cloth plan of Swo-13-000227

(b) Two (2) print copies of said plan Swo-13-000227

(c) Three (3) copies each of the Technical Description of:

Lot 6045-A

Lot 6045-B

Lot 6045-C

Lot 6045-D

20
Lot 6045-E

Lot 6045-F

Lot 6045-G

Lot 6045-H

Lot 6045-I

Lot 6045-J

Lot 6045-K

(d) Three (3) copies of Engineers Certificate

(e) Four (4) copies of Tax Declaration No. B-011-01351

xxxxxxxxx

(Amended Record on Appeal, pp. 1-5).

Acting on the foregoing application, the lower court issued a Notice of Initial Hearing addressed to: the Solicitor General,
the Director of the Land Management Bureau, the Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways, the
Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development, and the owners of
the adjacent properties as mentioned in the application, informing them that the application is scheduled for initial
hearing on April 25, 1989. The addressees were then ordered to present such claims as you may have to said lands or
any portion thereof, and to submit evidence in support of such claims and unless you appear at said court at the time
and place aforesaid, your default will be recorded and the title to the lands will be adjudicated and determined in
accordance with law and the evidence before the Court, and thereafter, you will forever be barred from contesting said
application or any decree entered thereon (Exhibit A).

Said notice of initial hearing was published in the April 5, 1989 issue of Abante, a daily tabloid (Exhs. C, C-1, C-1-A).

Earlier, or on March 30, 1989, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed its Opposition to the
application for registration contending:

1. That neither the applicant nor his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto (Sec. 48 [b], C.A. 141, as amended
by P.D. 1073).

2. That the muniments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant, if any, attached to or alleged in the application, do
not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the lands applied for or his open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owner, since June 12, 1945, or

21
prior thereto. Said muniments of title do not appear to be genuine and indicate the pretended possession of applicant to
be of recent vintage.

3. That the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of by the
applicant who has failed to file an appropriate application for registration within the period of six (6) months from
February 16, 1976 as required by Presidential Decree No. 892. From the records, it appears that the instant application
was filed on July 31, 1990.

4. That the parcel applied is part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private
appropriation. (Amended Record on Appeal, pp. 5-6).

The Solicitor General therefore prayed for the denial of the application for registration and for the declaration of the
properties subject thereof as part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.

At the scheduled initial hearing of the case on April 25, 1989, a certain Jose Tangco, Jr. appeared and registered a verbal
opposition to the application. On motion of counsel for the applicants, the court issued an Order of General Default
against the whole world, except as against the oppositors Republic of the Philippines and Jose Tangco, Jr., who was
directed to file his written opposition but never did. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

On June 13, 1990, the applicants filed their Formal Offer of Evidence, submitting therewith the following documentary
exhibits: (1) Plan Swo-13-000227 (Exh. F); (2) technical descriptions of Lot Nos. 6045-A to 6045-J, inclusive (Exhs. F to F-
10, inclusive); (3) Engineers Certificate (Exh. G); (4) Extra-judicial Settlement and Partition executed by the applicants
dated December 12, 1985 (Exh. H); (5) description of the land and the apportionment thereof among the applicants
(Exhs.H-1 and H-2, respectively); (6) Tax Declarations (Exhs. I, J, K, L, M, N and O) (7) Tax Receipts (Exhs. O, O-1, P. P-1, Q
and R); (8) Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob dated May 7, 1969 executed by Cirilo Menguito in favor of Pedro Menguito (Exh.
S); and (9) Deed of Partition dated November 7, 1990 executed by the applicants (Exh. T).

On September 12, 1990, the oppositor Republic filed its Manifestation and Opposition to applicants formal offer of
evidence. The said manifestation reads:

It interposes no objection to the admission of Exhibits A, B, C, D, relative to jurisdictional requirements. It has no

objection to Exhibits E, F, F-1, to F-10 relating to the plan and the technical description of the lots being applied for and
Exhibit G which is the Engineers certificate.

It objects to Exhibits H, H-1 to H-2 the extrajudicial settlement and partition dated December 12, 1985 for being self
serving. It objects to Exhibits I, J, K, L, M and N for being incompetent and insufficient proof of possession of the lot in
question by applicants or their predecessors-in interest. In fact the said tax declarations do not date back to at least June
12, 1945. It objects to Exhibits O, P, Q, and R, the same being incompetent and insufficient to prove possession since
June 12, 1945. It objects to Exhibits O, P, Q, and R, the same being incompetent and insufficient to prove possession
since June 12, 1945. It objects to Exhibit S as being self-serving being a mere photocopy of the alleged Kasulatan ng

22
Pagkakaloob dated May 7, 1989 executed by Cirilo Menguito the same cannot be accepted in evidence, applicants not
having first laid the basis for the presentation of secondary evidence. It objects to the first page of Exhibit T, being self-
serving and a mere photocopy. Furthermore, page 2 of said exhibit, where the supposed acknowledgment of the
instrument appears, refers to different parcels of land other than those being applied for.

WHEREFORE, considering that the applicants have failed to prove their title to the lands applied for, it is respectfully
prayed that the application for registration be denied and that the land applied for be declared as part of the public
domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.

Considering the above, oppositor respectfully manifests that there is no need for it to submit evidence in support of its
opposition. (Amended Record on Appeal, pp. 11-13).

On May 15, 1991, the lower court rendered its decision disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the order of general default against the whole world heretofore entered in this case is affirmed, and
judgment is hereby rendered confirming the registerable title of the applicants x x x

On June 11, 1991, the oppositor Republic, through the Solicitor General, moved for a reconsideration of the afore-
quoted decision, to which a written opposition was interposed by the applicants.

On July 8, 1991, the lower court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.[6]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals agreed with respondent that the lower court had failed to consider the legal requirements for
registration of imperfect titles; namely: (1) the land is alienable and disposable; and (2) the applicants and their
predecessors-in-interest have occupied and possessed the land openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely since
June 12, 1945. It was not convinced that the land in question had been classified as alienable or disposable and that
petitioners or their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of it since June 12, 1945.

Hence, this Petition.[7]

The Issue

In their Memorandum, petitioners submit a single issue for our consideration:

Whether or not the court a quo erred in reversing the findings of facts of the trial court.[8]

23
In fine, the Court will resolve whether the CA erred in rejecting petitioners application for the registration of their
respective titles.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is devoid of merit.

Sole Issue: Registration of Petitioners Titles

Section 48 of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141,[9] as amended, provides for the registration of imperfect titles to lands
of the public domain in this wise:

"SECTION 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of public domain or claiming to own
any such lands or an interest thereon, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate
of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxxxxxxxx

(b) those who by themselves or through their predecessor in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except
when prevented by war or force majeure. They shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter.

Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1073[10] clarified paragraph b of the said provision by specifically declaring that it applied
only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.[11]

Hence, as observed by the appellate court, petitioners were duty-bound to prove two legal requirements: (1) the land
applied for was alienable and disposable; and (2) the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest had occupied and
possessed the land openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely since June 12, 1945.

The records show that petitioners failed to establish these two requisites.

Classification of the Land

24
To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, petitioners
relied on the printed words which read: This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B
as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968, appearing on Exhibit E (Survey Plan No.
Swo-13-000227).

This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: All lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)

For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the presumption that the land
sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.[12] Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or
alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, occupation thereof
in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.[13] To overcome
such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant.[14] Absent such evidence, the land
sought to be registered remains inalienable.

In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineers notation in Exhibit E indicating that the survey was
inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government act validly changing the
classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By
relying solely on the said surveyors assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been
declared alienable.

Period of Possession

Even assuming arguendo that petitioners have been able to prove that the land is alienable, their Petition for
confirmation of their imperfect titles and registration thereof under the law will still be denied. The reason is that they
have failed to establish possession of the lots in question -- openly, continuously, exclusively and adversely -- in the
concept of owner for at least 30 years, since June 12, 1945.

Petitioners do not claim that they are the original possessors of the lots in question, which had allegedly belonged to
Cirilo Menguito before he donated it to his son Pedro. When Pedro died in 1978, these lots allegedly passed down to
petitioners.

Although petitioners can trace their possession of the land from as far back as 1968 only, they would tack it to that of
their predecessors, who had supposedly been in possession thereof even before the Second World War. There is not
enough convincing proof, however, to support such claim.

Petitioners presented evidence that they had been paying real estate taxes since 1974.[15] Their predecessors-in-
interest, they claimed, have also been paying taxes on the land for several years before them, and Cirilo Menguito had
declared the land for tax purposes in 1943.[16] However, they did not present any documents or any other satisfactory
proof to substantiate this claim. General statements, which are mere conclusions of law and not proofs of possession,
are unavailing and cannot suffice.[17]

25
Cirilos six children were not presented as witnesses by petitioners during the hearing of their application for registration
of the lots in question. In fact, of the six children, only Pilar Menguito was personally informed of petitioners application.
Still, she was not presented as a witness.

There can be no question that Cirilos children were the best witnesses, because they could have substantiated
petitioners claim that indeed the lots in question had been donated to Pedro Menguito. Moreover, they may even have
in their possession documents that can adequately support their supposed claim. Instead, petitioners presented only
Raymunda Bautista, the alleged tenant of Cirilo Menguito, who had tilled the land before petitioners built their houses
thereon. Neither Cirilos children nor the documents that they might have had in their possession were presented.

Furthermore, serious doubts are cast on petitioners claim that their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and adverse possession and occupation of the land. Because they are of recent vintage, the tax
declarations (Exhs. I to N), tax receipts (Exhs. O. O1, P, and P-1) and the Municipal Treasurers certifications of tax
payments (Exhs. Q and R) presented in evidence are incompetent and insufficient to prove petitioners and their
predecessors-in-interests possession of the lots in question.

Because the factual findings of the trial and the appellate courts were contrary to each other, we waded into the
records,[18] but found no reason to modify the assailed CA Decision. Much as we want to conform to the States policy
of encouraging and promoting the distribution of alienable public lands to spur economic growth and remain true to the
ideal of social justice, our hands are tied by the laws stringent safeguards against registering imperfect titles. In this case,
we agree with the CA that petitioners have not presented sufficient proof of their compliance with the legal
requirements for registration of imperfect titles.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

26
IGNACIO MESINA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. EULALIA PINEDA VDA. DE SONZA, ET AL., defendants.
EULALIA PINEDA VDA. DE SONZA, defendant-appellee. G.R. No. L-14722 May 25, 1960
Agustin C. Bagasao for appellant.
Luis Manalang and Associates for appellee.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Plaintiff brought this action before the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija praying that Original Certificate of Title No.
P-1137 of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija be ordered cancelled and that the registration case pending before the
same court covering the property described therein be given due course and that defendants be ordered to pay plaintiff
P1,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff's action is already barred by the statute of limitations.
The reasons advanced are: the complaint was filed on March 25, 1958. The decree of registration or issuance of patent
over the property was issued "sometime on September 12, 1953 or thereabout", while the transfer certificate of title
covering the same was issued on September 16, 1953. The present action which calls for the cancellation of said decree
and title has, therefore, been filed after the elapse of more than four years, which cannot be done, because the title has
already become indefeasible and incontrovertible. The court sustained this motion and dismissed the complaint. Hence
the present appeal.

Plaintiff claims that he is the owner in fee simple of Lot No. 3259, with improvements thereon, situated in San Antonio,
Nueva Ecija; that he has been in actual possession thereof since 1914, publicly, openly, peacefully and against the whole
world and up to the present time he is the only one who benefits from the produce thereof; that said lot is at present
the subject of registration proceedings pending in the same court known as Registration Case No. N-372, L.R.C. Cad.
Record No. N-12238; that sometime in September 12, 1953, the Director of Lands, without exercising due care, and in
spite of his knowledge that defendants had not complied with the knowledge that defendants had not complied with
the requirements of Commonwealth Act No. 141, issued a homestead patent in their favor as a consequence of which a
certificate of title was issued in their name by the register of deeds; that said title was procured by defendants through
frauds, deception and misrepresentation since they knew that the lot belonged to the plaintiff; and that the Director of
Lands has no authority nor jurisdiction to issue a patent covering said land because it is a private property of plaintiff.
For these reasons, plaintiff prays that said decree and title be cancelled.

Republic Act No. 1942, which took effect on June 22, 1957 (amending Section 48-b of Commonwealth Act 141),
provides:

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceeding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except
when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

In the case of Susi vs. Razon, et al., 48 Phil., 424, it was observed that where all the necessary requirements for a grant
by the Government are complied with through actual physical possession openly, continuously, and publicly, with a right
to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926 (carried
over as Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141), the possessor is deemed to have already acquired by operation of

27
law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in
order that said grant may be sanctioned by the court — an application therefor being sufficient under the provisions of
Section 47 of Act No. 2874 (reproduced as Section 50, Commonwealth Act No. 141). Thus, the following is what this
Court said on the matter:

It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in possession of the land in question openly,
continuously, adversely and publicly, personally and through his predecessors, since the year 1880, that is, for about
forty-five years. ... When on August 15, 1914, Angela Razon applied for the purchase of said land, Valentin Susi had
already been in possession thereof personally and through his predecessors for thirty-forty years. And if it is taken into
account that Nemesio Pinlac had already made said land a fish pond when he sold it on December 13, 1880, it can hardly
be estimated when he began to possess and occupy it, the period of time being so long that it is beyond the reach of
memory. ... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover the presumption juris et de jure established paragraph (b) of
section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government
were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an
agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a
certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the
grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by
the courts, an application therefor is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction,
Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain
and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control, of the Director of
Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which
he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not
thereby acquire any right. (Emphasis supplied)

Such is the situation in which the plaintiff claims to be in his complaint. He alleges that he is the owner in fee simple of
the lot in question, with the improvements thereon, situated in San Antonio, Nueva Ecija, and that he has been in actual
possession thereof since 1914, publicly, openly, peacefully and against the whole world, and that up to the present time
he is the only one who benefits from the produce thereof. He further claims that said lot is present the subject of a
registration proceeding pending in the same court, known as Registration Case No. N-372, L.R.C. Cad. Record No. N-
12238. If by legal fiction, as stated in the Susi case, plaintiff is deemed to have acquired the lot by a grant of the State, it
follows that the same had ceased to be part of the public domain and had become private property and, therefore, is
beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, the homestead patent and the original certificate of title
covering said lot issued by the Director of Lands in favor of the defendants can be said to be null and void, for having
been issued through fraud, deceit and misrepresentation.

Considering that this case was dismissed by the trial court merely on a motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff's
action is already barred by the statute of limitations, which apparently is predicated on the theory that a decree of
registration can no longer be impugned on the ground of fraud one year after the issuance and entry of the decree,1
which theory does not apply here because the property involved is allegedly private in nature and has ceased to be part
of the public domain, we are of the opinion that the trial court erred in dismissing the case outright without giving
plaintiff a chance to prove his claim. It would have been more proper for the court to deny the motion on the ground
that its object does not appear to be indubitable, rather than to have dismissed it, as was done by the trial court.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. No
costs.

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29