Table

 of  Contents  
VI.  Interpretation  of  Documents  .............................................................................................  2  
Lambert  vs.  Fox  (1914)  ........................................................................................................................  2  
The  Capital  Insurance  Co.,  Inc.  vs.  Sandang  (1967)  .............................................................................  2  
VII.  Qualifications  of  Witnesses  ..............................................................................................  4  
A.   Mental  Incapacity  or  Immaturity  .............................................................................................  4  
People  vs.  De  Jesus  (1984)  ..................................................................................................................  4  
People  vs.  Salomon  (1994)  ..................................................................................................................  4  
People  vs.  Mendoza  (1996)  .................................................................................................................  5  
B.   Spousal  Immunity  ....................................................................................................................  6  
People  vs.  Castañeda  (1979)  ...............................................................................................................  6  
People  vs.  Francisco  (1947)  .................................................................................................................  6  
Lezama  vs.  Rodriguez  (1968)  ...............................................................................................................  9  
Alvarez  vs.  Ramirez  (2005)  ................................................................................................................  10  
C.   Dead  Man’s  Statute  ...............................................................................................................  11  
Guerrero  vs.  Saint  Clare’s  Realty  Co.,  Ltd.  (1983)  .............................................................................  11  
Abraham  vs.  Recto-­‐Kasten  (1962)  .....................................................................................................  11  
Goñi  vs.  Court  of  Appeals  (1983)  .......................................................................................................  12  
Tongco  vs.  Vianzon  (1927)  ................................................................................................................  12  
Lichauco  vs.  Atlantic,  Gulf  &  Pacific  Co.  (1949)  .................................................................................  13  
Razon  vs.  Intermediate  Appellate  Court  (1992)  ................................................................................  14  
 

  1  
 VI. Interpretation of Documents

Lambert vs. Fox (1914)

1.CONTRACTS; CONSTRUCTION AND ENFORCEMENT.—Contracts should be enforced as

they read. The first duty of courts in enforcing contracts is to give attention to the words
thereof. If from the words the meaning is plain, the contract should be enforced according to its
words.

2.ID.; ID.—It is to be presumed that persons mean what they say; and interpretation and
construction should not be resorted to when the English used is plain. Plain words should not
be discarded or twisted or given fanciful or unusual signification, even though such strained
signification seems to be in the interests of justice or to be necessary to prevent hardship.

The intention of parties to a contract must be determined, in the first instance, from the words
of the contract itself. It is to be presumed that persons mean what they say when they speak
plain English. Interpretation and construction should be the instruments last resorted to by a
court in determining what the parties agreed to. Where the language used by the parties is
plain, then construction and interpretation are unnecessary and, if used, result in making a
contract for the parties.

In the case cited the court said with reference to the construction and interpretation of statutes:
"As for us, we do not construe or interpret this law. It does not need it. We apply it. By applying
the law, we conserve both provisions for the benefit of litigants. The first and fundamental duty
of courts, in our judgment, is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation come only after
it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them. They are
the very last functions which a court should exercise. The majority of the laws need no
interpretation or construction. They require only application, and if there were more application
and less construction, there would be more stability in the law, and more people would know
what the law is."

The Capital Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Sandang (1967)

To point on which the parties disagree is the interpretation of the following stipulation in the
mortgage contract executed by defendants-appellees:

“This mortgage is constituted to indemnify the mortgagee for any damage, cost, expenses and
charges of whatever kind and nature that it may incur or sustain as a consequence of having
acted as surety on the bond referred to above, and or its substitution, modification, alteration,
change and/or renewals. That liability secured by the above properties is limited to the first
P20,000.00 that might be incurred under the bond issued in favor of the Macondray Farms, Inc.”

Appellant lays stress on the general statement of appellees’ liability as it appears in the contract,
to wit; “to indemnify the mortgagee for any damage, cost, expenses and charges of whatever
kind and nature that it may incur or sustain as a consequence of having acted as surety or the
bond x x x.” Similar stress is laid on the fact that because the principal debtor, Mateo Pinto, paid
to Macondray Farms, Inc., the sum of P19,700.00 before he became in default, no liability ever
attached to appellant under its bond for that amount, and hence it should not be considered as

  2  
part of, or applied to, “the first P20,000.00 that might be incurred under the bond x x x,” which
defined the limit of appellees’ obligation.

At first blush the argument seems logical. But the real intention of the parties is revealed by the
testimony of appellee Esteban Sadang concerning the circumstances which led to the inclusion
of the particular stipulation aforequoted.

xxxx

The foregoing testimony is clear enough. Esteban Sadang agreed to be an indemnitor only on
condition that he would answer for the “first P20,000.00 of the total P42,000.00 bond,” and that
“the moment the first P20,000.00 is paid the bonding company automatically releases my
responsibility to them.” The trial court found the said testimony to be uncontradicted. If the
mortgage contract as actually drafted seems to be vague or ambiguous, the   doubt must be
resolved against appellant, whose lawyer prepared the document, and in accordance with the
real intention of the parties as explained by defendants-appellees.

  3  
 VII. Qualifications of Witnesses

A. Mental Incapacity or Immaturity

People vs. De Jesus (1984)

Same; Same; Same; Witnesses; Credibility; Complainant, although feeble-minded, is a

competent witness, as she can perceive and transmit in her own way her own perceptions to
others; Case at bar.—The accused assailed the competence of the complainant as a witness on
the ground that being feeble-minded she is not a competent witness in contemplation of the
rules and therefore her testimony should have been rejected by the lower court. That the
complainant was feeble-minded and had displayed difficulty in   comprehending the questions
propounded on her is an undisputed fact. However, there is no showing that she could not
convey her ideas by words or signs. It appears in the records that complainant gave sufficiently
intelligent answers to the questions propounded by the court and the counsels. The court is
satisfied that the complainant can perceive and transmit in her own way her own perceptions to
others. She is a competent witness.

People vs. Salomon (1994)

Criminal Law; Rape; Witness; A mental retardate is not for this reason alone disqualified from being a
witness.—A mental retardate is not for this reason alone disqualified from being a witness. As in
the  case of other witnesses, acceptance of his testimony depends on its nature and credibility or,
otherwise put, the quality of his perceptions and the manner he can make them known to the
court. Thus, in People v. Gerones, the Court accepted the testimony of a rape victim
notwithstanding that she had the mentality of a nine or ten-year old “because she was able to
communicate her ordeal . . . clearly and consistently.”

In the case of People v. Rondina, this Court declared: “The testimony of the offended party
herself was especially telling and credible despite the fact that she was somewhat mentally
deficient, as the trial court noticed. Although she was really of limited intelligence, the
complainant nevertheless did not forget the harrowing experience she suffered during that
frightful night in the bushes when the three men seared her memory with the lust they forced
upon her. The tale she narrated in court was not woven out of sheer imagination but born in
anguish and remembered with pain and as plain and unembellished as the simple life she led. If
she spoke in forthright language at the trial, it was because she was speaking the truth of that
horrible ravishment she could not push out of her mind.”

Same; Same; Same; Her mental condition did not vitiate her credibility.—In the case before us, the
trial court noted that although Sylvia’s speech was slurred and it was necessary at times to ask
her leading questions, “her testimony was positive, clear, plain, coherent and credible.” Her
mental condition did not vitiate her credibility. We also believe, as we have observed often
enough in many cases that a woman will not expose herself to the humiliation of a rape trial,
with its attendant publicity and the morbid curiosity it will arouse, unless she has been truly
wronged and seeks atonement for her abuse.

  4  
People vs. Mendoza (1996)

Evidence; Witnesses; Children; Any child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can
perceive, and perceiving, can make known his perception to others and of relating truthfully facts
respecting which he is examined.—It is thus clear that any child, regardless of age, can be a
competent witness if he can perceive, and perceiving, can make known his perception to others
and of relating truthfully facts respecting which he is examined. In the 1913   decision in United
States vs. Buncad, this Court stated: Professor Wigmore, after referring to the common-law
precedents upon this point, says: “But this much may be taken as settled, that no rule defines
any particular age as conclusive of incapacity; in each instance the capacity of the particular
child is to be investigated.”

While on the same subject, Underhill declares:

§ 257. Children on the witness stand.—Under the common law, competency of a child under the
age of fourteen years to testify   must be shown to the satisfaction of the court. He is
presumptively incompetent, but if he is shown to be competent it is immaterial how young he
may be when he testifies. He is competent if he possesses mental capacity and memory
sufficient to enable him to give a reasonable and intelligible account of the transaction he has
seen, if he understands and has a just appreciation of the difference between right and wrong,
and comprehends the character, meaning and obligation of an oath. If the witness fulfills these
requirements, it is immaterial as bearing upon his competency that he is unable to define the
oath or to define testimony. In the wise discretion of the court, a child four, five, six and for such
ages as seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen or fifteen years of age may be shown
competent to testify. It may not be said that there is any particular age at which as a matter of
law all children are competent or incompetent . . .

Same; Same; Same; Requirements for a Child’s Competency as a Witness.—The requirements then of a
child’s competency as a witness are the:
(a) capacity of observation,
(b) capacity of recollection, and
(c) capacity of communication.
And in ascertaining whether a child is of sufficient intelligence according to the foregoing
requirements, it is settled that the trial court is called upon to make such determination.

Same; Same; Same; There are certain matters that aid the trial court in assessing the credibility of a
witness which are not available to the appellate court, such as emphasis, gesture, and the inflection of the
voice of the witness.—We defer to such observation and explanation. Indeed, there are certain
matters that aid the trial court in assessing the credibility of a witness which are not available to
the appellate court, such as emphasis, gesture, and the inflection of the voice of the witness. The
trial court had the distinct opportunity to make such observations and to avail of such aids
while Paul Michael was on the witness stand, thusly, we find no reason to disregard the
assessment made by the trial court.

Same; Same; Same; Verily, “from the mouths of children we get the truth.”—We realize how
extremely painful it was for Paul Michael to reveal that it was his father who burned his
mother. He knew that such a revelation could send his father to jail and thus brand him a son of
a killer or a convict. If he did, nevertheless, it was to expose the truth and give justice to his

  5  
mother who met an excruciatingly painful death. Verily, “from the mouths of children we get
the truth.
B. Spousal Immunity

People vs. Castañeda (1979)

This is not the first time that the issue of whether a specific offense may be classified as a crime
committed by one spouse against the other is presented to this Court for resolution. Thus, in the
case of Ordoño v. Daquigan, this Court, through Mr. Justice Ramon C. Aquino, set up the
criterion to be followed in resolving the issue, stating that:

“The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the person is too narrow; and
the rule that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic harmony comes within the
exception is too broad. The better rule is that, WHEN AN OFFENSE DIRECTLY ATTACKS, OR
DIRECTLY AND VITALLY IMPAIRS, THE CONJUGAL RELATION, IT COMES WITHIN THE
EXCEPTION, to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal
prosecution for a crime committed (by) one against the other.”

Applying the foregoing criterion in mid case of Ordoño v. Daquigan, this Court held that the
rape committed by the husband of the witness-wife against their daughter was a crime
committed by the husband against his wife. Although the victim of the crime committed by the
accused in that case was not his wife but their daughter, this Court, nevertheless, applied the
exception for the reason that said criminal act “positively undermine(d) the connubial
relationship.”

Criminal Procedure; Wife may testify against husband for crime of falsification of a deed of sale of
conjugal house and lot where wife was made to appear as having given far consent to the sale.—With
more reason must the exception apply to the instant case where the victim of the crime and the
person who stands to be directly prejudiced by the falsification is not a third person but the wife
herself. And it is undeniable that the criminal act complained of had the effect of directly and
vitally impairing the conjugal relation. This is apparent not only in the act of the wife in
personally lodging her complaint with the office of the Provincial Fiscal, but also in her insistent
efforts in connection with the instant petition, which seeks to set aside the order disqualifying
her from testifying against her husband.

Taken collectively, the actuations of the witness-wife underscore the fact that the martial and
domestic relations between her and the accused-husband have become so strained that there is
no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed. In such a
case, as We have occasion to point out in previous decisions, “identity of interests disappears
and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is nonexistent. Likewise, in such a
situation, the security and confidences of private life which the law aims at protecting will be
nothing but ideals which, through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.”
Thus, there is no reason to apply the marital disqualification rule.

People vs. Francisco (1947)

ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE; HUSBAND AND WIFE; INCOMPETENCY TO TESTIFY FOR OR

AGAINST EACH OTHER; REASONS FOR.—"The reasons given by law text-writers and courts

  6  
why neither a husband nor wife shall in any case be a witness against the other except in a
criminal prosecution for a crime committed by one against the other have been stated thus:
First, identity of interests;
second, the consequent danger of perjury;
third, the policy of the law which deems it necessary to guard the security and
confidences of private life even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and which
rejects such evidence because its admission would lead to domestic disunion and
unhappines; and,
fourth, because, where a want of domestic tranquility exists, there is danger of
punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other." (70 C. J., 119.)

However, as all other general rules, this one has its own exceptions, both in civil actions
between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the other. Like
the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by   sound reasons which, in the excepted cases,
outweigh those in support of the general rule.

For instance, where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more
harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based
upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case identity of interests disappears and the
consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a
situation, the security and confidences of private life which the law aims at protecting will be
nothing but ideals which, through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.

At any rate, in the instant case the wife did not testify in the direct evidence for the prosecution
but under circumstances presently to be stated. It will be noted that the wife only testified
against her husband after the latter, testifying in his own defense, imputed upon her the killing
of their little son. (P. 15, ibid.)

By all rules of justice and reason this gave the prosecution, which had theretofore refrained
from presenting the wife as a witness against her husband, the right to do so, as it did in
rebuttal; and to the wife herself the right to so testify, at least, in self-defense, not, of course,
against being subjected to punishment in that case in which she was not a defendant but against
any or all of various possible consequences which might flow from her silence, namely:
(1) a criminal prosecution against her which might be instituted by the corresponding
authorities upon the basis of her husband's aforesaid testimony;
(2) in the moral and social sense, her being believed by those who heard the testimony
orally given, as well as by those who may read the same, once put in writing, to be the
killer of her infant child.
It has been aptly said that the law of evidence is the law of common sense. Presuming the
husband who so testified against his wife to be endowed with common sense, he must be taken
to have expected that the most natural   reaction which the said testimony would give rise to on
the part of the prosecution, as well as of his wife, was to deny upon rebuttal the new matter
which was involved in the same testimony, namely, the imputation that it was his wife who
killed their little son. x x x x

Feria, Dissenting

  7  
x x x x we dissent from the new theory enunciated in the majority opinion that the appellant's
testimony to the effect that his wife was the one who unintentionally inflicted the wound which
caused the death of the child, capacitated his wife to testify as a witness on rebuttal against her
husband, and "constituted a waiver of all objections to her testimony."

xxxx

The new theory of the majority is evidently untenable, for it is predicated upon the incorrect
premise or assumption that the x x x reasons or grounds of the incapacity of one of the spouses
to testify against the other in a proceeding in which the latter is a party, are also applicable to
testimony of one spouse against the other who is not a party to the cause in which it is offered
or given, as in the present case.

This premise or assumption is incorrect, for said reasons do not apply to the latter case. Were it
applicable, the law would have also disqualified one spouse to give testimony which in any
way disparages or disfavor the other although the latter is not a party to the cause; but the law
does not so. The prohibition contained in section 26 (d) of Rule 123 only relates to cases in
which the testimony of a spouse is offered for or against the other in a proceeding to which the
latter is a party. And the reason is obvious. Although the testimony of the husband against his
wife who is not a party to the case is admissible; yet, as said testimony cannot be used as
evidence against the wife in a civil case or criminal prosecution against her, it would not
effectively strain the marital and domestic relations; lead to domestic disunion and
unhappiness; disturb the peace, harmony, and tranquility of the family, and destroy the identity
of interest.

Such testimony, far from producing said results, might have a different effect. Where one of the
spouses testifies in his defense that the other spouse, who is not a party to the case, is the one
who committed the crime charged, his testimony, if believed by the Court, would result in the
acquittal and release of the defendant spouse and enable the accused, if confined in prison, to
join again his spouse, without placing the latter in danger of being prosecuted and convicted by
his testimony. In the present case, the testimony of the appellant does not require any rebuttal
by his wife, because, according to the clear provisions of law, the latter can not testify against
her husband appellant, and the courts should take it into consideration in determining the
probative force of such a testimony. And it does not call for a denial by the wife in herself or
own defense, because it can not be used or admitted without her consent as evidence in a
criminal case instituted against her for her son's death.

Under the new theory of the majority, the prosecutor of one spouse who, in order to free
himself from liability as defendant in a criminal case would testify, as the appellant has
testified, that his other spouse who is not a party to the case is responsible for their child's
death, may take advantage of such testimony to induce that other spouse to testify in her
defense according to the prosecution, and the latter in so testifying would naturally accuse the
defendant to be the guilty party in order to save himself or herself from criminal liability.

Who may give the assurance that the defendant's wife in the present case did testify the way she
testified against her husband, not because her husband is really guilty, but because she wanted
to defend and save herself, taking into consideration the way the question were propounded to
her by the prosecution and her answers thereto? x x x x

  8  
x x x it is to be borne in mind that the capacity or incapacity of one of the spouses to testify
against the other is governed by the statute in force and the Court should construe the statute
such as it is. and not as it should It is for the law-making power to evolve new theories and
enact law in accordance therewith. The provisions of sec-tion 26 (c), Rule 123, were copied. from
those of section 383 (3) of Act No. 190, as amended, and the latter were in turn taken from
similar provisions of law in force in the   States of the Union, which are based on the common-
law. Under the common-law, husband and wife are absolutely incompetent against each other
except in a civil case instituted by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other; and the consent of a spouse can not render the other spouse
competent But in many states, statutes were enacted granting exceptions upon the common-law
rule and enabling one of them to testify against the other with the consent of the latter in civil
case, or the consent of the other or both in criminal cases. Under such statute, one spouse who
calls the other as a witness thereby consents that the latter shall testify; and if the adverse party
offers one of the spouses against the other and the latter does not object, then he or she is
presumed to have consented to it.

xxxx

The majority's conclusion that the testimony of the appellant to the effect that the cause of the
death of their child was the wound unintentionally inflicted by his wife, constituted a waiver of
all objection to her testimony, is without any foundation in fact and in law; because the
defendant had strongly and persistently objected to his wife taking the witness stand (st. nts., p.
23), and no law, court or authority, from time immemorial up to the present, has ever
recognized such testimony as a waiver. The only cases in which the incapacity of one of the
spouses to testify against the other is considered waived according to law, are those stated in
section 1205, of Wharton on Criminal Evidence, Vol. 3, 11th ed., quoted in the very opinion of
the majority, which says the following:

"SEC. 1205. Waiver of incompetency.—Objections to the competency of a husband or wife to

testify in a criminal prosecution against the other may be waived as in the case of other
witnesses generally. Thus, the accused waives his or her privilege by calling the other spouse as
a witness for him or her, thereby making the spouse subject to cross-examination in the usual
manner. It is well established that where an accused introduces his wife as a witness in his
behalf, the state is entitled to question her as to all matters germane and pertinent to her
testimony on direct examination. It is also true that objection to the spouse's competency must
be made when he or she is first offered as a witness, and that the incompetency may be waived
by the failure of the accused to make timely objection to the admission of the spouse's
testimony, although knowing of such incompetency, and the testimony admitted, especially if
the accused has assented to the admission, either expressly or impliedly."

Lezama vs. Rodriguez (1968)

Evidence; Husband and wife; Rule that a husband cannot be examined for or against his wife; Scope of its
application; Reason for the rule; Case at bar.—A husband cannot be examined for or against his
wife without her consent; nor a wife for or against her husband without his consent, except in a
civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the
other (Sec. 20 [b], Rule 130, Rules of Court). This provision and rule deals with two different

  9  
matters which rest on different grounds of policy: the disqualification of husband and wife to
testify in each other’s behalf, as well as their privilege not to testify against each other. The
fundamental theory of the common law is said to be that relationship of the spouses, not their
pecuniary interest, is the basis of the disqualification. Indeed section 20 of Rule 130 is entitled
“Disqualification by reason of x x x relationship.”
On the other hand, while a welter of emotional reasons has been offered for the privilege, the
true explanation which is after all the simplest and which constitutes the real and sole strength
of the opposition to abolishing the privilege, “is the natural repugnance in every fair-minded
person to compelling a wife or husband to be the means of the other’s condemnation and to
subjecting the culprit to the humiliation of being condemned by the words of his intimate life
partner.

In the case at bar where the wife is a co-defendant in a suit charging fraud against the spouses,
can the wife be compelled to testify as an adverse party witness concerning her participation in
the alleged fraud without violating section 20(b) of Rule 130?

Even in those jurisdictions which allow one spouse to be subjected to examination by the
adverse party as a hostile witness when both spouses are parties to the action, either the
interests of the spouses are separate or separable, or the spouse offered as a witness is merely a
formal or nominal party (97 C.J.S. 477). Section 6 of Rule 132 (Rule on Direct Examination of
unwilling or hostile witnesses) is a mere concession, for the sake of discovery, from the rule
which precludes the husband or the wife from becoming the means of the other’s
condemnation. The said rule of discovery should therefore not be expanded in meaning or
scope as to allow examination of one’s spouse in a situation where this natural repugnance
obtains.

Alvarez vs. Ramirez (2005)

Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; Words and Phrases; Marital Disqualification; During their
marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the
affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed
by one against the other or the latter’s direct descendants or ascendants.—Section 22, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides: “Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage.—During their
marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the
consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal
case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter’s direct descendants or
ascendants.” The reasons given for the rule are: {See People vs. Fransisco, supra]

xxxx

It should be stressed that as shown by the records, prior to the commission of the offense, the
relationship between petitioner and his wife was already strained. In fact, they were separated
de facto almost six months before the incident. Indeed, the evidence and facts presented reveal
that the preservation of the marriage between petitioner and Esperanza is no longer an interest
the State aims to protect.

Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to petitioner, directly impairs the conjugal relation
between him and his wife Esperanza. His act, as embodied in the Information for arson filed

  10  
against him, eradicates all the major aspects of marital life such as trust, confidence, respect and
love by which virtues the conjugal relationship survives and flourishes.

At this point, it bears emphasis that the State, being interested in laying the truth before the
courts so that the guilty may be punished and the innocent exonerated, must have the right to
offer the direct testimony of Esperanza, even against the objection of the accused, because (as
stated by this Court in Francisco), “it was the latter himself who gave rise to its necessity.
C. Dead Man’s Statute

Guerrero vs. Saint Clare’s Realty Co., Ltd. (1983)

Evidence; Witnesses; The “dead-man’s rule” does not apply to a witness who is not a party or assignor of
a party or person in whose behalf a case is being prosecuted.—Upon the facts and under the law, this
Court is fully persuaded that the affirmative rulings of both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals were made in error. The plain truth is that Laura Cervantes and Jose Cervantes are not
parties in the present case, and neither are they assignors of the parties nor “persons in whose
behalf a case is prosecuted.” They are mere witnesses by whose testimonies the plaintiffs aimed
to establish that it was not Cristina Guerrero, but Andres Guerrero, who owned the disputed
land at the time of its alleged sale to Manuel Guerrero; that Cristina Guerrero did not really sell
but merely mortgaged the property to Manuel Guerrero.

“Following this rule of construction, it may be said that incompetency to testify established in
the provision above quoted, affects only the persons therein mentioned, and no others, that is,
only parties plaintiff or their assignors, persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted. Mere
witnesses who are neither parties plaintiff, nor their assignors, nor persons in whose behalf a
case is prosecuted, are not included in the prohibition.”

Same; Same; The “dead man’s rule” does not apply where the case is not a claim or demand against the
estate of a deceased person, but a case where defendant is being sued for allegedly claiming ownership of
plaintiffs lot without basis.—Moreover, the present case is not a claim or demand against the
estate of the deceased Manuel Guerrero. The defendants Guerreros are not the executors or
administrators or representatives of such deceased. They are being sued as claimants of
ownership in their individual capacities of the disputed lot. The lot is not a part of the estate of
Manuel Guerrero. Hence, the inapplicability of the dead man’s rule.

“It has been held that statutes providing that a party in interest is incompetent to testify where
the adverse party is dead or insane, must be applied strictly in accordance with their express
wording, irrespective of their spirit. The law uses the word ‘against an executor or
administrator or other representative of a deceased person.’ It should be noted that after the
mention of an executor or administrator the words or other representative follows, which
means that the word ‘representative’ includes only those who, like the executor or
administrator, are sued in their representative, not personal, capacity. And that is emphasized
by the law by using the words ‘against the estate of such deceased persons’, which convey the
idea of an estate actually owned by the deceased at the time the case was brought and that,
therefore, it is only his rights that are to be asserted and defendant in the litigation by the
person representing him, not the personal rights of such representative.”

Abraham vs. Recto-Kasten (1962)

  11  
Evidence; Examination of witnesses; Prohibition in Section 269 (c), Rule 123, Rules of Court; Waiver;
Reason.—There was a waiver of the prohibition contained in Section 26 (c), Rule 123 of the Rules
of Court, when the counsel for the administratrix extensively cross-examined the witness on the
very matters subject of the prohibition. The reason for the rule apparently is that a litigant
cannot be permitted to speculate as to what his examination of a witness may bring forth.
Having made his selection of one of two courses which he may pursue, he has no right, after he
discovers that the course selected is not to his advantage, and after he has put the opposite
party to the expense, and has consumed the time of the courts in a trial of the case in accordance
with the course selected, to change his position and make another and different selection. Such
course would be unfair both to the opposite party and to the court and should not be
countenanced in any court of justice.

Goñi vs. Court of Appeals (1983)

Evidence; The privilege to invoke the Dead Man’s Statute is waived by the defendant where (a) he cross-
examines the plaintiff; and (b) he files a counterclaim against the plaintiff.—Such protection, however,
was effectively waived when counsel for petitioners crossexamined private respondent Vicente.
“A waiver occurs when plaintiff’s deposition is taken by the representative of the estate or
when counsel for the representative cross-examined the plaintiff as to matters occurring during
deceased’s lifetime.” It must further be observed that petitioners presented a counterclaim
against private respondent Vicente. When Vicente thus took the witness stand, it was in a dual
capacity as plaintiff in the action for recovery of property and as defendant in the counterclaim
for accounting and surrender of fields nos. 4 and 13. Evidently, as defendant in the
counterclaim, he was not disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact occurring before the
death of Praxedes Villanueva, said action not having been brought against, but by the estate or
representatives of the estate/deceased person.

Same; The Survivorship Disqualification Rule cannot be invoke where defendant testifies as to
communications made or contracts entered into with the agent of the decedent while latter was   alive.—
Likewise, under a great majority of statutes, the adverse party is competent to testify to
transactions or communications with the deceased or incompetent person which were made
with an agent of such person in cases in which the agent is still alive and competent to testify.
But the testimony of the adverse party must be confined to those transactions or
communications which were had with the agent. The contract/promise to sell under
consideration was signed by petitioner Goñi as attorney-in-fact (apoderado) of Praxedes
Villanueva. He was privy to the circumstances surrounding the execution of such contract and
therefore could either confirm or deny any allegations made by private respondent Vicente with
respect to said contract. The inequality or injustice sought to be avoided by Section 20(a) of Rule
130, where one of the parties no longer has the opportunity to either confirm or rebut the
testimony of the other because death has permanently sealed the former’s lips, does not actually
exist in the case at bar, for the reason that petitioner Goñi could and did not negate the binding
effect of the contract/promise to sell. Thus, while admitting the existence of the said
contract/promise to sell, petitioner Goñi testified that the same was subsequently novated into
a verbal contract of lease over fields nos. 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria.

Tongco vs. Vianzon (1927)

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Counsel for the appellant, however, asserts that if the testimony of the widow be discarded, as
it should be, then the presumption of the Civil Code, fortified by the unassailable character of
Torrens titles, arises, which means that the entire fabric of appellee's case is punctured. Counsel
relies on that portion of section 383 of the Code of Civil Procedure as provides that "Parties or
assignors of parties to an action or proceeding, or persons in whose behalf an   action or
proceeding is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a
deceased person, * * *, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person * * *,
cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person * * *."
Counsel is eminently correct in emphasizing that the object and purpose of this statute is to
guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on
the part of the surviving party. He has, however, neglected the equally important rule that the
law was designed to aid in arriving at the truth and was not designed to suppress the truth.

The law twice makes use of the word "against." The actions were not brought "against" the
administratrix of the estate, nor were they brought upon claims "against" the estate. In the first
case at bar, the action is one by the administratrix to enforce a demand "by" the estate. In the
second case at bar, the same analogy holds true for the claim was presented in cadastral
proceedings where in one sense there is no plaintiff and there is no defendant. x x x x Moreover,
a waiver was accomplished when the adverse party undertook to cross-examine the interested
person with respect to the prohibited matters.

Lichauco vs. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co. (1949)

The question raised by the first assignment of error is whether or not the officers of a
corporation which is a party to an action against an executor or administrator of a deceased
person are disqualified from testifying as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of
such deceased person, under Rule 123, section 26 (c), of the Rules of Court x x x x

In the case of City Savings Bank vs. Enos, 135 Cal., 167; 67 Pac., 52, 55, the Supreme Court of
California, interpreting said article 1880, said:

"* * * The provision applies only to parties or assignors of parties, and Haslam was neither the
one nor the other. If he was a stockholder, which it is claimed he was, that fact would make no
difference, for interest no longer disqualifies under our law, Civ. Code Proc. sec. 1879.
Appellant cites section 14, Civ. Code, to the effect that the word 'person' includes a corporation;
and claims that, as the corporation can only speak through its officers, the section must be held
to apply to all who are officially related to the corporation. A corporation may be conceded to
be a person, but the concession does not help appellant. To hold that the statute disqualifies all
persons from testifying who are officers or stockholders of a corporation would be equivalent to
materially amending the statute by judicial interpretation. Plainly the law disqualifies only
'parties or assignors of parties,' and does not apply to persons who are merely employed by
such parties or assignors of parties."

xxxx

x x x x At common law interest disqualified any person from being a witness. That rule has been
modified by statute. In this state interest is no longer a disqualification, and the disqualifications
are only such as the law imposes. Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1879. An examination of the authorities

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from other states will disclose that their decisions rest upon the wordings of their statutes, but
that generally, where interest in the litigation or its outcome has ceased to disqualify, officers
and directors of corporations are not considered to be parties within the meaning of the law. x x
xx

xxxx

The weight of authority sustains appellant's first assignment of error. Inasmuch as section 26 (c)
of Rule 123 disqualifies only parties or assignors of parties, we are constrained to hold that the
officers and/or stockholders of a corporation are not disqualified from testifying, for or against
the corporation which is a party to an action upon a claim or demand against the estate of a
deceased person, as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person.

Razon vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (1992)

The purpose of the rule has been explained by this Court in this wise:

“The reason for the rule is that if persons having a claim against the estate of the deceased or his
properties were allowed to testify as to the supposed statements made by him (deceased
person), many would be tempted to falsely impute statements to deceased persons as the latter
can no longer deny or refute them, thus unjustly subjecting their properties or rights to false or
unscrupulous claims or demands. The purpose of the law is to ‘guard against the temptation to
give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party.’

The rule, however, delimits the prohibition it contemplates in that it is applicable to a case
against the administrator or its representative of an estate upon a claim against the estate of the
deceased person.

Evidence; “Dead man’s statute.”—In the instant case, the testimony excluded by the appellate
court is that of the defendant (petitioner herein) to the effect that the late Juan Chuidian, (the
father of private respondent Vicente Chuidian, the administrator of the estate of Juan Chuidian)
and the defendant agreed in the lifetime of Juan Chuidian that the 1,500 shares of stock in E.
Razon, Inc. are actually owned by the defendant unless the deceased Juan Chuidian opted to
pay the same which never happened. The case was filed by the administrator of the estate of the
late Juan Chuidian to recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. allegedly owned by the late Juan
T. Chuidian.

It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is not within the prohibition of the rule.
The case was not filed against the administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims
against the estate. Furthermore, the records show that the private respondent never objected to
the testimony of the petitioner as regards the true nature of his transaction with the late elder
Chuidian. The petitioner’s testimony was subject to cross-examination by the private respon-
dent’s counsel. Hence, granting that the petitioner’s testimony is within the prohibition of
Section 20(a), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the private respondent is deemed to have waived
the rule.

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