Republic of the Philippines That sometime in the year 2005 at XXX City, Philippines
SUPREME COURT and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 208469 August 13, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
SAMUEL "TIW-TIW" SANICO, Accused-Appellant.
R E S O L U T I O N
REYES, J.:
For review is the Decision rendered by the Court of
Appeals (CA) on November 19, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
00769-MIN affirming, but with modifications as to the
penalties, damages and interests imposed, the conviction
by the Regional Trial Court (R TC) of Butuan City, Branch
1, of Samuel "Tiw-Tiw" Sanico (accused-appellant) for one
count of rape under paragraph 1(a) of Article 266-A of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 8353, and lascivious conduct under Article
336 of the same code, in relation to R.A. No. 7610,
otherwise known as "The Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Act."
Antecedents
Two separate Informations were filed against the accused-
appellant before the RTC, viz:
In Criminal Case No. 12021 for Acts of Lasciviousness
That at more or less 1:00 P.M. of April 19, 2006 at XXX
City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with lewd
design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commit acts of lasciviousness upon the person
of AAA, a twelve (12) year [old] minor, by touching her
breast against her will, to the damage and prejudice of
the latter in such amount as may be proven in Court.
CONTRARY TO LAW: (Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended in relation to R.A. [No.] 7610) (Citation
omitted)
In Criminal Case No. 12022 for Rape
above-named accused, by means of force, threat or
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one AAA, a
twelve (12) year old minor, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW: (Article 266-A, par. (1)(a), in relation
to Article 266-B, par. 6(10) of R.A. [No.] 8353 in
relation toR[.]A[.] [No.] 7610) (Citation omitted)
The accused-appellant went into hiding but was
subsequently arresJted in his hometown in Leyte on May
13, 2008. He was arraigned on August 26, 2008, during
which heentered a not guilty plea.
During the pre-trial, the prosecution and the defense
stipulated on the following: (a) the identity of the
accused-appellant and the fact of his arrest in Leyte;
(b) AAA was more than 12 but less than 13 years of age at
the time the acts complained of were allegedly committed
by the accused-appellant; and (c) the incident on April
19, 2006 occurred in AAA’s residence.
In the joint trial that ensued, the prosecution offered
the testimonies of AAA, her mother BBB, and Dr. Roslyn
D.Orais (Dr. Orais), medico-legal officer of the National
Bureau of Investigation, Caraga Region. On the other
hand, the accused-appellant was the defense’s lone
witness. Version of the Prosecution
As indicated in her birth certificate, AAA was born on
June 14, 1993. Her mother BBB works as a cook, while her
father is a "trisikad" driver. AAA was 12 years old when
the acts complained of were allegedly committed by the
accused-appellant, but was already 15 years of age at the
time she testified in court.
The accused-appellant was a pig butcher and ice cream
vendor. He and his children rented a room for about ten
(10) to eleven (11) years in the house where AAA lives
with her family. Thereafter, the accused-appellant’s
family moved to their own house built near AAA’s
residence.
AAA claimed that the accused-appellant raped her in 2005,
but she could not recall the exact month and date. She
remembered though that she was raped at around 2:00
p.m.while she was washing dishes in the kitchen. There
was nobody else in the house except her and the accused-
appellant. He approached and held her hands tightly. She
boxed the accused-appellant, but he pushed her.
Thereafter, he threatened to kill her if she would shout.
Knowing that the accused-appellant was a pig butcher, AAA
was overcome by fear. He then succeeded in removing her
clothes and undergarments and pushing her against the
wall. He took off his short pants and briefs and inserted
his penis into her vagina for two to three minutes. She
felt pain. The accused-appellant then pulled up his short
pants and laid down in the sofa.
AAA alleged that she was again raped for six or seven
times, but she endured the harrowing experiences in
silence due to the accused-appellant’s threat to kill
her. She also dreaded the possibilities of quarrels and
deaths, which would ensue if her parents find out.
On April 19, 2006, at around 1:00 p.m., AAA was napping
in a room with her niece. AAA woke up when she felt that
the accused-appellant was touching her. AAA rose and
repeatedly boxed the accused-appellant, but the latter
held her tightly, pulled up her clothes and mashed her
breast. Her father, CCC, was just in another room atthat
time, but out of fear, AAA kept quiet. When the accused-
appellant took off his short pants and inserted his penis
into AAA’s vagina, the latter resisted. Being merely
built out of wood, the house shook, which caused CCC
towake up. CCC lost consciousness for a short period of
time when he caught the accused-appellant performing
lascivious acts on AAA. The accused-appellant then seized
the opportunity to flee.
At around 4:00 p.m. on the same day, Dr. Orais performed
a medico- genital examination on AAA and found the latter
to have suffered from sexual abuse. AAA’s hymen was
"coaptated" or slightly open and bore "old healed
laceration at 3 and 9 o’clock positions". The hymenal
laceration was possibly caused by "an injury secondary to
intravaginal penetration by a blunt object". No human
spermatozoa was found in AAA’s vagina. Dr. Orais,
however, explained that even in the presence of seminal
fluid, there are cases whenno sperm can be found. Dr.
Orais likewise noted no physical or extra-genital
injurieson AAA, but found ample evidence of sexual
intercourse having occurred more than one but less than
four month/s ago. Dr. Orais also testified that AAA was
at times uncooperative, timid, and emotionally
restrained.
BBB testified that it was CCC who saw the accused-
appellant touching AAA’s breast. BBB sought payment of
moral damages.
Version of the Defense
The accused-appellant was the lone witness for the
defense. At the time he testified in court, he was 53
years old. He stated that for years, he had lived in the
house of AAA’s family, but was no longer a resident
therein when the acts complained ofwere allegedly
committed.
On April 19, 2006, the accused-appellant had a drinking
spree with CCC in the latter’s house lasting from 8:00
a.m. to 12:00 p.m. As the two were both drunk, the
accused-appellant slept in the salawhile CCC did so in
his room. The accused-appellant woke up from slumber when
AAA touched the former’s pocket to search for money.She
got some coins and bills. The accused-appellant, in turn,
touched AAA’s chest and asked the latter to remove her
short pants. AAA complied. As the accused-appellant was
touching AAA’s breast, CCC woke up. Upon seeing what was
taking place, CCC got a boloto hack the accused-
appellant, but the latter escaped.
The accused-appellant testified that he had never
inserted his penis in AAA’s vagina. He admitted touching
AAA on April 19, 2006 but he did so only because the
latter initiated it. He also claimed that he was very
close to AAA and he treated her as if she were his own
child.
The Ruling of the RTC
On October 13, 2009, the RTC rendered an Omnibus
Judgment convicting the accused-appellant of one count of
rapeand of acts of lasciviousness. The RTC found AAA’s
testimony of what had transpired as sincere and truthful,
noting though that a specific allegation as to the exact
date and month of the commission of rape in 2005 was
absent. The trial court thus pointed out the settled
doctrine that in a prosecution for rape, the material
fact or circumstance to be considered is the occurrence
of rape, not the time of its commission, the latter not
being an element of the crime. Further, the accused-
appellant cannotascribe any ill-motive against AAA which
could have induced the latter to fabricate such grave
charges. The accused-appellant’s flight after he learned
that charges were filed against him likewise worked to
disfavor him. If he were indeed innocent, he would have
stayed to vindicate himself from the accusations.
The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt in the offenses as
charge[d], in criminal case no. 12022 for rape[,] he is
sentenced to reclusion perpetua, to pay [AAA][,] through
her father[,] the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos
([P]50,000.00) as civil indemnity and another Fifty
Thousand Pesos ([P]50,000.00) as moral damages. In
criminal case no 12021 for acts of lasciviousness, he is
sentenced tosuffer imprisonment of 4 years, 2 months and
1 day to 6 years. He isfurther ordered to pay [AAA] the
sum of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos ([P]25,000.00) as moral
damages and another Twenty Five Thousand Pesos
([P]25,000.00) as exemplary damages.
He shall serve his sentence at Davao Prison and Penal
Farms, Panabo City, Davao del Norte.In the service of his
sentence[,] he shall be credited with the full time
benefit of his preventive imprisonment provided he agrees
in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules
imposed upon convicted prisoners[,] otherwise[,] if he
does not[,] he shall be entitled with only four-fifths
(4/5) of his preventive imprisonment pursuant to Article
29 as amended of the [RPC].
SO ORDERED.
The Parties’ Arguments Before the CA
The accused-appellant challenged the above disquisition
before the CA. He argued that while the time of the
commission of the crime is not an essential element of
rape, a complainant’s inability to give the exact dates,
during which she was allegedly raped, puts her
credibility in question.
AAA alleged that she was raped on April 19, 2006, at
around 1:00 p.m. However, Dr. Orais, who conducted a
medical examination on AAA three hours after the
incident, testified that human spermatozoa was absent in
AAA’s vagina and the hymenal lacerations found were
possibly inflicted more than a month ago.
The accused-appellant admitted though that he could be
held liable for acts of lasciviousness for touching AAA’s
breast and asking her to remove her short pants.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on its part,
sought the dismissal of the appeal. It contended that the
accused-appellant’s denial of the charges against him
cannot prevail over AAA’s positive testimony. Further,
the date of the commission ofrape becomes relevant only
when the accuracy and truthfulness of the complainant’s
narration practically hinge thereon. Such circumstance
does not obtain in the case under review.
The accused-appellant was also nonchalant in admitting
that he touched AAA’s breast and asked her toremove her
short pants. The accused-appellant’s behavior exhibited
no less than his lewd designs on AAA.
The Ruling of the CA
On November 19, 2012, the CA rendered the herein assailed
decision, the decretal portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby
DISMISSED. The October 13, 2009 Omnibus Judgment of the
[RTC] of Butuan City, Branch 1, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION as follows:
1) In Criminal Case No. 12021, [the accused-appellant] is
sentenced to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayoras minimum
to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas
maximum. The moral and exemplary damages of [P]25,000.00
each awarded by the court a quoare reduce[d] to
[P]15,000.00 each. He is further ordered to pay civil
indemnity of [P]20,000.00 and a fine of [P]15,000.00.
2) In Criminal Case No. 12022, being in accordance with
the law and the evidence, [the accused-appellant] is
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. In addition to the
awards of civil indemnity of [P]50,000.00 and moral
damages of [P]50,000.00, [the accused-appellant] is
further ordered to pay AAA exemplary damages in the
amount of [P]30,000.00.
3) [The accused-appellant] is further ordered to pay
interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annumon
all the damages awarded in this case fromdate of finality
of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
In additionally directing the payment of fine and civil
indemnity, and modifying both the penalty imposed upon
the accused-appellant and the award of damages to AAA as
regards Criminal Case No. 12021 for lascivious conduct,
the CA explained that:
[A]n assiduous review of the arguments [the accused-
appellant] proffered reveals that what was questioned by
him was his conviction for the crime of rape only. In
fact, in his appellant’s brief, he emphasized that he is
liable only for the charge of acts of lasciviousness
after having admitted that he merely touched the breast
of AAA and asked the latter to remove her short pants for
him to see her private part. Apparently, [the]
accusedappellant no longer assailed his conviction [for]
the crime of acts of lasciviousness.
This notwithstanding, we are constrained to review the
entire records of the case pursuant to the settled rule
that when an accused appeals from the sentence of the
trial court, he waives his constitutional safeguard
against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to
the review of the appellate court, which is then called
upon to render such judgment as the law and justice
dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to them, and
whether they are assigned as errors or not. x x x
x x x x
While we sustain [the] accused-appellant’s conviction of
acts of lasciviousness, yet, we nonetheless modify the
penalty imposed and the damages awarded by the court a
quo. x x x [W]e find that the court a quo erroneously
imposed the penalty [for] the crime of acts of
lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in relation
to RA 7610. It is important to note that [the] accused-
appellant was charged [with] acts of lasciviousness under
Article 336 of the RPC in relation to RA 7610 which
defines sexual abuse of children and prescribes the
penalty therefore under Article III, Section 5 thereof.
Certainly, [the] accused-appellant was sufficiently
informed of the accusation against him and he can thus be
convicted of the crime of acts of lasciviousness under RA
7610 based on the evidence presented against him. Article
III, Section 5, of RA 7610 reads:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse.-
Children, whether male or female, who for money or
profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion
or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to
be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual
abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporalin its medium period to
reclusion perpetuashall be imposed upon the following:
(a) x x x
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution
orsubject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the
victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the
perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335,
paragraph 3 for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as
amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rapeor lascivious
conduct, as the case may be; Provided, That the penalty
for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve
(12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its
medium period, x x x.
x x x x
Paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct not only with a child exploited in prostitution,
but alsowith a child subjected to other sexual abuses. It
covers not only a situation where a child is abused for
profit, but also where one – through coercion,
intimidation or influence – engages in sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct with a child.
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III
of RA 7610 are the following:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct;
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years
of age.
[T]here is no doubt that [the] accused-appellant is
guilty of acts of lasciviousness under Section 5(b),
Article XIII of RA 7610 after having admitted the
lascivious conduct he made with AAA. It is undisputed
that AAA was still 12 years old when the crime happened
and as admitted by [the] accused-appellant himself, hewas
touching AAA because AAA was looking for money inside his
pocket and he told AAA to remove her short pants for him
to see her private part. x x x.
It is important to note however that a child is deemed
subjected to other sexual abuse when the child indulges
in lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of
any adult. x x x
x x x x
Undoubtedly, [the] accused-appellant’s acts were covered
by the definitions of sexual abuse and lascivious conduct
under Section 2(g) and (h) of the Rules and Regulations
on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases
promulgated to implement the provisions of RA 7610,
particularly on child abuse:
(g) "Sexual abuse"includes the employment, use,
persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child
to engage in, or assist another person to engage in,
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the
molestation, prostitution, or incest with children;
(h) "Lascivious conduct" means the intentional touching,
either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia,
anus, groin,breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the
introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or
mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite
sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade,
or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person,
bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the
genitals or [pubic] area of a person. x x x Indubitably,
AAA was deemed to be [a] "child subjected to other sexual
abuse" as defined above. Accordingly, the imposable
penalty should be the penalty prescribed under RA 7610
and not the penalty under Article 336 of the RPC as
imposed by the court a quo. In People v. Leonardo, the
Supreme Court ruled that the penalty to be imposed for
violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 is as
follows:
For acts of lasciviousness performed on a child under
Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610, the
penalty prescribed is reclusion temporalin its medium
period to reclusion perpetua. Notwithstanding that
Republic Act No. 7610 is a special law, the [accused-]
appellant may enjoy the benefits of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
[accused-]appellant shall be entitled to a minimum term
to be taken within the range of the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by Republic Act No. 7610. The penalty
next lower in degree is prision mayor medium to reclusion
temporalminimum, the range of which is from 8 years and 1
day to 14 years and 8 months. On the other hand, the
maximum term of the penalty should be taken from the
penalty prescribed under Section 5(b), Article III of
Republic Act No. 7610, which is reclusion temporalin its
medium period to reclusion perpetua, the range of which
is from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to reclusion
perpetua. The minimum, medium and maximum term of the
same is as follows: minimum – 14 years, 8 months and 1
day to 17 years and 4 months; medium – 17 years, 4 months
and 1 day to 20years; and maximum – reclusion perpetua.
Thus, in this case, we imposed on [the] accused-appellant
the indeterminate sentence of 8 years and 1 day of
prision mayoras minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day
of reclusion temporalas maximum.
Corollarily, in view of recent jurisprudence,we deem it
proper to reduce the amount of moral and exemplary
damages awarded by the court a quofrom [P]25,000.00 each
to [P]15,000.00 each. [The] accusedappellant is however
ordered to pay civil indemnity of [P]20,000.00 and a fine
of [P]15,000.00. (Citations omitted)
On the other hand, in Criminal Case No. 12022, the CA
affirmed the accused-appellant’s conviction for rapeand
the award by the RTC of civil indemnity and moral damages
in favor of AAA. Additionally, the CA ordered the payment
of ₱30,000.00 asexemplary damages. In both Criminal Case
Nos. 12021 and 12022, the CA likewise directed the
accusedappellant to pay AAA the legal interest of twelve
percent (12%) per annum on all damages awarded to be
computedfrom the date of finality of the decision until
full payment. The CA cited the following as reasons:
Indubitably, it is unimaginable for a young girl like AAA
to concoct a tale of defloration, drag herself and the
rest of her family to a lifetime of shame, and make them
the object of gossip among their neighbors and friends if
the accusation was indeed untrue. x x x.
x x x x
The contention of [the] accused-appellant that the rape
allegedly committed on April 19, 2006 was highly
implausible because of the absence of fresh lacerations
and spermatozoa in AAA’s vagina is untenable. It should
be emphasizedthat [the] accused-appellant was charged
[with] rape that occurred sometime in 2005 and not on
April 19, 2006. The fact that only old healed lacerations
were found does not negate rape. x x x:
x x x In People v. Espinoza, it was held that healed
lacerations do not negate rape. In fact, lacerations,
whether healed or fresh, are the best physical evidence
of forcible defloration.x x x. Moreover, in the present
case, Dr. Orais clarified to the court that even if the
alleged sexual assault took place in the year 2005 or a
year after AAA was examined, the old healed lacerations
could still be found.
x x x x
[T]he absence of spermatozoa does not disprove rape, In
fact, in People v. Perez, it was held that:
x x x The absence of spermatozoa is not a negation of
rape. The presence or absence of spermatozoa isimmaterial
since it is penetration, not ejaculation, which
constitutes the crime of rape. x x x.
x x x x
As to the award of damages, x x x the victim shall
likewise be entitled to exemplary damages in the amount
of Thirty Thousand Pesos ([P]30,000.00) as justified
under Article 2229 of the Civil Code to set a public
example and serve as a deterrent against the elders who
abuse and corrupt the youth. (Citations omitted)
Issue
The accused-appellant now comes before the court for
relief insisting anew on the alleged failure of the
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he had,
in fact, raped AAA.
Both the accused-appellant and the OSG did not file
supplemental briefs, adopting instead their respective
arguments raised before the CA.
The Ruling of the Court
We affirm the CA’s verdict convicting the accused-
appellant of the charges against him, but modify the
sameby (a) reinstating the penalty and damages for
lascivious conduct imposed by the RTC in Criminal Case
No. 12021; and (b) reducing to six percent the interests
imposed upon the damages awarded to AAA in both Criminal
Case Nos. 12021 and 12022.
Criminal Case No. 12021
As aptly stated by the CA, it would be a superfluity to
exhaustively re-evaluate the accused-appellant’s
conviction in Criminal Case No. 12021 for lasciviousness
conduct committed on April 19, 2006. First. The RTC and
the CA uniformly found the accused-appellant guilty as
charged. Second. The accused-appellant himself admitted
touching AAA’s breast and directing the latter totake off
her short pants. Third. In the appeal filed before the CA
and this court, no error was ascribed on the part of the
RTC in convicting the accused-appellant for lascivious
conduct.
The RTC and the CA, were however, not in agreement as to
the proper imposable penalty for the accused-appellant’s
lascivious conduct. The RTC applied the provisions of
Article 336 of the RPC and sentenced the accused-
appellant to 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years of
imprisonment. The CA, on the other hand, invoking Section
5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, which punishes sexual abuses
committed against minors, imposed upon the accused-
appellant the indeterminate penalty of 8 years and 1 day
of prision mayoras minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1
day of reclusion temporalas maximum.
In the instant appeal, the Information relative to
Criminal Case No. 12021 bears the caption "for acts of
lasciviousness." It is, however, indicated that the acts
are being prosecuted pursuant to the provisions of
"Article 336 of the RPC, in relation to R.A. No. 7610."
In the herein assailed decision, the CA explained that
during the trial, the prosecution was able to prove the
existence of the requisites of sexual abuse under Section
5(b), R.A. No. 7610. The CA thus modified the penalty and
imposed instead the one provided for in R.A. No. 7610.
In Flordeliz v. People, we allowed the imposition of a
penalty provided for in R.A. No. 7610 despite the absence
in the Information filed of any explicit reference to the
saidstatute. We declared that:
We are aware that the Information specifically charged
petitioner with Acts of Lasciviousness under the RPC,
without stating therein that it was in relation to R.A.
No. 7610. However, the failure to designate the offense
by statute or to mention the specific provision
penalizing the act, or an erroneous specification of the
law violated, does not vitiate the information if the
facts alleged therein clearly recite the facts
constituting the crime charged. The character of the
crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the
information nor by the specification of the provision of
law alleged to have beenviolated, but by the recital of
the ultimate facts and circumstances inthe complaint or
information.
In the instant case, the body of the Information contains
an averment of the acts alleged to have been committed by
petitioner and unmistakably describes acts punishable
under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No.
7610. (Citation omitted)
In the accused-appellant’s case beforethe Court, the
Information even specifically mentions R.A. No. 7610. The
accused-appellant, therefore, was fairly apprised that he
was being charged with violation of R.A. No. 7610 as
well. Further, it was shown that the requisites of
Section 5(b) of the statute are present. The CA thus
inferred that it could not be precluded from imposing the
proper penalty provided for in R.A. No. 7610.
The CA aptly declared that when an appeal isfiled in a
criminal action, it opens the entire matter for review
and that the requisites of sexual abuse under Section
5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 are present in the accused-
appellant’s case. However, grounds exist compelling us to
reinstate the penalty and damages imposed by the RTC in
Criminal Case No. 12021.
It bears stressing that the case before the Court
involves two separate Informations filed – one for rape
and another for lascivious conduct.
People v. Francisco involved the issue ofunder which
appellate jurisdiction the crimes of rape and lascivious
conduct fall. The court, however, had the occasion to
explain that:
Nor can we widen the scope of our appellate jurisdiction
on the basis of the fact that the trial court heard two
(2) distinct and separate cases simultaneously. Such
procedure [referring to the conduct of a joint trial]
adopted by the trial court cannot and did not result in
the merger of the two (2) offenses. In fact, a cursory
reading of the assailed decision of the court a
quoreveals with pristine clarity that each case was
separately determined by the trial judge, as each should
be separately reviewed on appeal. x x x.
In the case at bench, the commission of lascivious
conduct was admitted by the accused-appellant in his
testimony. No issue regarding his conviction for
lascivious conduct had been raised in his appeal before
the CA as well. Despite the fact that the appeal filed
was captioned as one with reference to Criminal Case Nos.
12021 and 12022, the body stated in no uncertain terms
that what was being assailed was merely the conviction
for rape. Effectively then, it was as if no appeal was
filed relative to Criminal Case No. 12021. Hence, the
penalty imposed by the RTC for lascivious conduct should
not be disturbed anymore.Necessarily then, the CA cannot
impose upon the accused-appellant a graverpenalty and
increase the amount of damages awarded to AAA at least
relative to Criminal Case No. 12021. This is the path
more in accord with the general rule that penal laws are
to be construed liberally in favor of the
accused. Criminal Case No. 12022
The court finds no reversible error committed by the RTC
and the CA anent the accused-appellant’sconviction for
rape in Criminal Case No. 12022.
In People of the Philippines v. Hermenigildo Delen y Esco
Billa, the court emphatically stated that:
It is a fundamental rule that the trial court’s factual
findings, especially its assessment of the credibility of
witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect and
binding upon this Court, particularly when affirmed by
the Court of Appeals. This Court has repeatedly
recognized that the trial court is in the bestposition to
assess the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies
because of its unique position of having observed that
elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses’
deportment on the stand while testifying, which
opportunity is denied to the appellate courts. Only the
trial judge can observe the furtive glance, blush of
conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone,
calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an
oath. These are significant factors in evaluating the
sincerity of witnesses, in the process of unearthing the
truth. The appellate courts will generally not disturb
such findings unless it plainly overlooked certain facts
of substance and value that, if considered, might affect
the result of the case.
Moreover, "[w]e have repeatedly held that when the
offended parties are young and immature girls, as in this
case, courts are inclined to lend credence to their
version of what transpired, considering not only their
relative vulnerability, but also the shame and
embarrassment to which they would be exposed if the
matter about which they testified were not true."
The foregoing doctrines apply with greater force in the
instant case where the accused-appellant cannot ascribe
any ill-motive against AAA in accusing him of the
offenses charged,and where the factual findings of the
RTC coincide with those of the CA.
"For conviction to be had in the crime of rape, the
following elements must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of the
victim; and (2) that said act was accomplished (a)
through the use of force or intimidation, or (b) when the
victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or
(c) when the victim is twelve years of age, or is
demented."
In the instant appeal, the RTC and the CA both found
AAA’s testimony that she was raped in 2005 as credible.
AAA did not specifically refer to an exact month and date
when the sordid act was committed. Nonetheless, her the date of the finality of this judgment until fully
testimony that the accused-appellant threatened to kill paid.
her, pushed her to the wall and inserted his penis in her IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Decision dated November 19,
vagina at around 2:00 p.m., while she was alone washing 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00769-
dishes at home, was positive, clear and categorical. MIN, is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (a) In
To exculpate him from liability, the accused-appellant Criminal Case No. 12021, the indeterminate penalty of 4
invokes Dr. Orais’ medical findings that human years, 2 months and 1 day of imprisonment as minimum to 6
spermatozoa was absent in AAA’s vagina, and that her years as maximum imposed by the R TC upon the accused-
hymen bore old healed and not fresh lacerations possibly appellant, and the award in favor of AAA of Twenty Five
sustained more than one but less than four month/s ago. Thousand Pesos (₱25,000.00) as moral damages and Twenty
These, however, are not compelling reasons to warrant the Five Thousand Pesos (₱25,000.00) as exemplary damages,
reversal of the assailed decision. are reinstated; and
The Information in Criminal Case No. 12022 charged the (b) An interest at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per
accused-appellant for raping AAA in 2005.On the other annum on all the damages awarded to AAA in Criminal Case
hand, in Criminal Case No. 12021, the accused- Nos. 12021 to 12022 is likewise imposed upon the accused-
appellantwas indicted for committing lascivious conduct appellant to be computed from the date of the finality of
on April 19, 2006. The results of the medical examination this judgment until fully paid.
conducted on April 19, 2006 by Dr. Orais, finding that SO ORDERED.
there was no human spermatozoa found in AAA’s vagina and
that the latter’s hymen bore old healed and not fresh
lacerations, are not inconsistent with the conclusion
that the latter was raped in 2005. Repetitive as it may Republic of the Philippines
be, the rape was committed in 2005 and not shortly before SUPREME COURT
the medical examination conducted upon AAA on April 19, Manila
2006.
Interests on all the damages imposed upon the accused SECOND DIVISION
appellant reduced from 12% to 6% Prescinding from the
above, the Court finds no grounds to reverse the herein G.R. No. 198732 June 10, 2013
assailed decision convicting the accused-appellant of one
count of rape and of lascivious conduct. The Court CHRISTIAN CABALLO, Petitioner,
likewise finds no error in the penalty, civil indemnity, vs.
and damages ordered by the CA relative to Criminal Case PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
No. 12022. However, inCriminal Case No. 12021, the lesser
penalty and damages imposed by the RTC are reinstated. D E C I S I O N
Lastly, to conform to prevailing jurisprudence, an
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annumshall PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
be imposed on all the damages awarded to AAA in both
Criminal Case Nos. 12021 and 12022, to be computed from Before the Court is a petition for review on
certiorari assailing the January 28, 2011 Decision and
September 26, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 27399-MIN which affirmed with
modification the April 1, 2003 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Surigao City, Branch 30 (RTC), finding
petitioner Christian Caballo (Caballo) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 10(a), Article VI
of Republic Act No. 7610 (RA 7610), otherwise known as
the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act," in relation to
Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting
and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases (Rules on Child
Abuse Cases).
The Facts
On March 16, 1999, an Information was filed charging
Caballo of violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of RA
7610 which was later amended on May 28, 1999, to include
statements pertaining to the delivery of private
compJlainant AAA’s baby. The Amended Information reads:
That undersigned Second Assistant City Prosecutor hereby
accuses Christian Caballo of the crime of Violation of
Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610, committed as
follows:
That in or about the last week of March 1998, and on
different dates subsequent thereto, until June 1998, in
the City of Surigao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, a 23 year old man, in utter disregard of the
prohibition of the provisions of Republic Act No. 7610
and taking advantage of the innocence and lack of worldly
experience of AAA who was only 17 years old at that time,
having been born on November 3, 1980, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit sexual abuse
upon said AAA, by persuading and inducing the latter to
have sexual intercourse with him, which ultimately
resulted to her untimely pregnancy and delivery of a baby
on March 8, 1999, a condition prejudicial to her
development, to the damage and prejudice of AAA in such
amount as may be allowed by law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Surigao City, Philippines, May 28, 1999.
Upon arraignment, Caballo pleaded not guilty to the
aforesaid charges.
Based on the records, the undisputed facts are as
follows:
AAA, then 17 years old, met Caballo, then 23 years old,
in her uncle’s place in Surigao City. Her uncle was a
choreographer and Caballo was one of his dancers. During
that time, AAA was a sophomore college student at the
University of San Carlos and resided at a boarding house
in Cebu City. On January 17, 1998, Caballo went to Cebu
City to attend the Sinulog Festival and there, visited
AAA. After spending time together, they eventually became
sweethearts. Sometime during the third week of March
1998, AAA went home to Surigao City and stayed with her
uncle. In the last week of March of the same year,
Caballo persuaded AAA to have sexual intercourse with
him. This was followed by several more of the same in
April 1998, in the first and second weeks of May 1998, on
August 31, 1998 and in November 1998, all of which
happened in Surigao City, except the one in August which
occurred in Cebu. In June 1998, AAA becamepregnant and
later gave birth on March 8, 1999.
During the trial, the prosecution asserted that Caballo
was only able to induce AAA to lose her virginity due to
promises of marriage and his assurance that he would not
get her pregnant due to the use of the "withdrawal
method." Moreover, it claimed that Caballo was shocked
upon hearing the news of AAA’s pregnancy and
consequently, advised her to have an abortion. She heeded
Caballo’s advice; however, her efforts were unsuccessful.
Further, the prosecution averred that when AAA’s mother
confronted Caballo to find out what his plans were for
AAA, he assured her that he would marry her daughter.
Opposed to the foregoing, Caballo claimed that during
their first sexual intercourse, AAA was no longer a
virgin as he found it easy to penetrate her and that
there was no bleeding. He also maintained that AAA had
(3) three boyfriends prior to him. Further, he posited
that he and AAA were sweethearts who lived-in together,
for one (1) week in a certain Litang Hotel and another
week in the residence of AAA’s uncle. Eventually, they
broke up due to the intervention of AAA’s parents. At a
certain time, AAA’s mother even told Caballo that he was
not deserving of AAA because he was poor. Lastly, he
alleged that he repeatedly proposed marriage to AAA but
was always rejected because she was still studying.
The RTC’s Ruling
In a Decision dated April 1, 2003, the RTC found Caballo
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section
10(a), Article VI of RA 7610, in relation to Section 2 of
the Rules on Child Abuse Cases. Accordingly, it sentenced
Caballo to suffer imprisonment for an indeterminate
period ranging from prision correccional, in its maximum
period of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day,
as minimum, to prision mayor in its minimum period of six
(6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as maximum.
It also ordered Caballo to pay AAA moral damages in the
amount of ₱50,000.00.
Aggrieved, Caballo elevated the case to the CA.
The CA’s Ruling
In a Decision dated January 28, 2011, the CA dismissed
the appeal and affirmed with modification the RTC’s
ruling, finding Caballo guilty of violating Section 5(b),
Article III of RA 7610.
It ruled that while the Amended Information denominated
the crime charged as violation of Section 10(a), Article
VI of RA 7610, the statements in its body actually
support a charge of violation of Section 5(b), Article
III of RA 7610.
On the merits of the case, it found that the evidence
adduced by the prosecution clearly showed that Caballo
persuaded, induced and enticed AAA, then a minor, to have
carnal knowledge with him. Towards this end, Caballo
repeatedly assured AAA of his love and even went on to
promise marriage to her. He also assured AAA that she
would not get pregnant because he would be using the
"withdrawal method." Thus, it was upon these repeated
coaxing and assuring words that AAA succumbed to
Caballo’s evil desires which deflowered and got her
pregnant. On this score, it observed that consent is
immaterial in child abuse cases involving sexual
intercourse and lascivious conduct and therefore, the
sweetheart defense remains unacceptable. It also found
basis to sustain the award of moral damages.
Caballo filed a motion for reconsideration which was,
however, denied on September 26, 2011.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue
The core of the present controversy revolves around the
interpretation of the phrase "due to the coercion or
influence of any adult" which would thereby classify the
victim as a "child exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse" as found in Section 5, Article III of RA
7610. Consequently, the interpretation which the Court
accords herein would determine whether or not the CA
erred in finding Caballo guilty of violating paragraph
(b) of the same proviso.
In his petition, Caballo essentially argues that his
promise to marry or his use of the "withdrawal method"
should not be considered as "persuasion" or "inducement"
sufficient to convict him for the aforementioned offense,
asserting that these should be coupled with some form of
coercion or intimidation to constitute child abuse. He
further alleges that he and AAA were sweethearts which
thus, made the sexual intercourse consensual.
In its Comment, respondent advances the argument that
there was "sexual abuse" within the purview of RA 7610 as
well as the Rules on Child Abuse Cases since it was only
upon Caballo’s repeated assurances and persuasion that
AAA gave in to his worldly desires. Likewise, it points
out that the sweetheart theory, as relied on by Caballo,
deserves scant consideration in view of the Court’s
ruling in Malto v. People (Malto).
The Court’s Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 pertinently reads:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. -
Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit,
or any other consideration or due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to
be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual
abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following: x
x x x
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution
or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the
victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the
perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335,
paragraph 3 for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as
amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious
conduct, as the case may be; Provided, That the penalty
for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve
(12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its
medium period x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
As determined in the case of Olivarez v. CA (Olivarez),
the elements of the foregoing offense are the following:
(a) The accused commits the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct;
(b) The said act is performed with a child exploited
in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse;
and
(c) The child, whether male or female, is below 18
years of age.
In this case, the existence of the first and third
elements remains undisputed. Records disclose that
Caballo had succeeded in repeatedly having sexual
intercourse with AAA who, during all those instances, was
still a minor. Thus, the only bone of contention lies in
the presence of the second element. On this note, the
defense submits that AAA could not be considered as a
"child exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse"
since the incidents to do not point to any form of
"coercion" or "influence" on Caballo’s part.
The argument is untenable.
To put things in proper perspective, it must be pointed
out that RA 7610 was meant to advance the state policy of
affording "special protection to children from all forms
of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and
discrimination and other conditions prejudicial to their
development" and in such regard, "provide sanctions for
their commission." It also furthers the "best interests
of children" and as such, its provisions are guided by
this standard.
Driven by the foregoing considerations, Congress crafted
Article III of the same law in order to penalize child
prostitution and other forms of sexual abuse. Section 5
thereof provides a definition of who is considered a
"child exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse."
As illumined in Olivarez, citing People v. Larin and
Amployo v. People, the final version of the aforesaid
provision was a product of various deliberations to
expand its original coverage to cases where the minor may
have been coerced or intimidated into sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct, not necessarily for money or
profit, viz:
The second element, i.e., that the act is performed with
a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse, is likewise present. As succinctly
explained in People v. Larin:
A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected
to other sexual abuse, when the child indulges in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit,
or any other consideration; or (b) under the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group...
It must be noted that the law covers not only a situation
in which a child is abused for profit, but also one in
which a child, through coercion or intimidation, engages
in lascivious conduct.
We reiterated this ruling in Amployo v. People:
... As we observed in People v. Larin, Section 5 of Rep.
Act No. 7610 does not merely cover a situation of a child
being abused for profit, but also one in which a child
engages in any lascivious conduct through coercion or
intimidation...
Thus, a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse
when the child indulges in lascivious conduct under the
coercion or influence of any adult. In this case,
Cristina was sexually abused because she was coerced or
intimidated by petitioner to indulge in a lascivious
conduct. Furthermore, it is inconsequential that the
sexual abuse occurred only once. As expressly provided in
Section 3(b) of R.A. 7610, the abuse may be habitual or
not. It must be observed that Article III of R.A. 7610 is
captioned as "Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse"
because Congress really intended to cover a situation
where the minor may have been coerced or intimidated into
lascivious conduct, not necessarily for money or profit.
The law covers not only child prostitution but also other
forms of sexual abuse. This is clear from the
deliberations of the Senate:
Senator Angara. I refer to line 9, ‘who for money or
profit.’ I would like to amend this, Mr. President, to
cover a situation where the minor may have been coerced
or intimidated into this lascivious conduct, not
necessarily for money or profit, so that we can cover
those situations and not leave loophole in this section.
The proposal I have is something like this: WHO FOR
MONEY, PROFIT, OR ANY OTHER CONSIDERATION OR DUE TO THE
COERCION OR INFLUENCE OF ANY ADULT, SYNDICATE OR GROUP
INDULGE, et cetera.
The President Pro Tempore. I see. That would mean also
changing the subtitle of Section 4. Will it no longer be
child prostitution?
Senator Angara. No, no. Not necessarily, Mr. President,
because we are still talking of the child who is being
misused for sexual purposes either for money or for
consideration. What I am trying to cover is the other
consideration. Because, here, it is limited only to the
child being abused or misused for sexual purposes, only
for money or profit.
I am contending, Mr. President, that there may be
situations where the child may not have been used for
profit or ...
The President Pro Tempore. So, it is no longer
prostitution. Because the essence of prostitution is
profit.
Senator Angara. Well, the Gentleman is right. Maybe the
heading ought to be expanded. But, still, the President
will agree that that is a form or manner of child abuse.
The President Pro Tempore. What does the Sponsor say?
Will the Gentleman kindly restate the amendment?
ANGARA AMENDMENT
Senator Angara. The new section will read something like
this, Mr. President: MINORS, WHETHER MALE OR FEMALE, WHO
FOR MONEY, PROFIT, OR ANY OTHER CONSIDERATION OR
INFLUENCE OF ANY ADULT, SYNDICATE OR GROUP INDULGE IN
SEXUAL INTERCOURSE, et cetera.
Senator Lina. It is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?
[Silence] Hearing none, the amendment is approved.
How about the title, ‘Child Prostitution,’ shall we
change that too?
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, to cover the expanded
scope.
The President Pro Tempore. Is that not what we would call
probable ‘child abuse’?
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Subject to rewording. Is there
any objection? [Silence] Hearing none, the amendment is
approved. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As it is presently worded, Section 5, Article III of RA
7610 provides that when a child indulges in sexual
intercourse or any lascivious conduct due to the coercion
or influence of any adult, the child is deemed to be a
"child exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse."
In this manner, the law is able to act as an effective
deterrent to quell all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation and discrimination against children,
prejudicial as they are to their development.
In this relation, case law further clarifies that sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct under the coercion or
influence of any adult exists when there is some form of
compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the
free exercise of the offended party’s free will.
Corollary thereto, Section 2(g) of the Rules on Child
Abuse Cases conveys that sexual abuse involves the
element of influence which manifests in a variety of
forms. It is defined as:
The employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement
or coercion of a child to engage in or assist another
person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with
children.
To note, the term "influence" means the "improper use of
power or trust in any way that deprives a person of free
will and substitutes another’s objective." Meanwhile,
"coercion" is the "improper use of x x x power to compel
another to submit to the wishes of one who wields it."
In view of the foregoing, the Court observes that
Caballo’s actuations may be classified as "coercion" and
"influence" within the purview of Section 5, Article III
of RA 7610:
First, the most crucial element is AAA’s minority. It is
undisputed that AAA was only 17 years old at the time of
the commission of the crime and is hence, considered a
child under the law. In this respect, AAA was not capable
of fully understanding or knowing the import of her
actions and in consequence, remained vulnerable to the
cajolery and deception of adults, as in this case.
Based on this premise, jurisprudence settles that consent
is immaterial in cases involving a violation of Section
5, Article III of RA 7610; as such, the argument that AAA
and Caballo were sweethearts remains irrelevant. The
Malto ruling is largely instructive on this point:
For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct
in child abuse cases under RA 7610, the sweetheart
defense is unacceptable. A child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse cannot
validly give consent to sexual intercourse with another
person.
The language of the law is clear: it seeks to punish
"those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution
or subjected to other sexual abuse."
Unlike rape, therefore, consent is immaterial in cases
involving violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610.
The mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing
lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited in
prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the
offense. It is a malum prohibitum, an evil that is
proscribed.
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil
laws. This is on the rationale that she can easily be the
victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully
understanding or knowing the nature or import of her
actions. The State, as parens patriae, is under the
obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who,
because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care
of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its
protection.
The harm which results from a child’s bad decision in a
sexual encounter may be infinitely more damaging to her
than a bad business deal. Thus, the law should protect
her from the harmful consequences of her attempts at
adult sexual behavior. For this reason, a child should
not be deemed to have validly consented to adult sexual
activity and to surrender herself in the act of ultimate
physical intimacy under a law which seeks to afford her
special protection against abuse, exploitation and
discrimination. (Otherwise, sexual predators like
petitioner will be justified, or even unwittingly tempted
by the law, to view her as fair game and vulnerable
prey.) In other words, a child is presumed by law to be
incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious
act or sexual intercourse. x x x x (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
Second, coupled with AAA’s minority is Caballo’s In fine, finding all elements to be present, the Court
seniority. Records indicate that Caballo was 23 years old hereby sustains Caballo's conviction for violation of
at the time of the commission of the offense and Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610.
therefore, 6 years older than AAA, more or less. The age
disparity between an adult and a minor placed Caballo in WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The January 28, 2011
a stronger position over AAA so as to enable him to force Decision and September 26, 2011 Resolution of the Court
his will upon the latter. of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 27399-MIN are hereby
AFFIRMED.
Third, Caballo's actions effectively constitute overt
acts of coercion and influence. Records reveal that SO ORDERED .
Caballo repeatedly assured AAA of his love for her, and
even, promised to marry her. In addition, he also
guaranteed that she would not get pregnant since he would
be using the "withdrawal method" for safety.
Irrefragably, these were meant to influence AAA to set
aside her reservations and eventually give into having
sex with him, with which he succeeded.

Fourth, at least, with respect to the parties' first

sexual encounter, it is observed that the brash and
unexpected manner in which Caballo pursued AAA to her
room and pressed on her to have sex with him, effectively
placed her in, to a certain extent, a position of
duress .. An important factor is that AAA refused
Caballo's incipient advances and in fact, asked him to
leave. However, AAA eventually yielded. Thus, it stands
to reason that she was put in a situation deprived of the
benefit of clear thought and choice. In any case, the
Court observes that any other choice would, nonetheless,
remain tarnished due to AAA's minority as above-
discussed.

Hence, considering that Caballo's acts constitute

"coercion" and "influence" within the context of the law,
and that AAA indulged in sexual intercourse and/or
lascivious conduct with Caballo due to the same, she is
deemed as a "child exploited in prostitution and other SECOND DIVISION
sexual abuse"; as such, the second element of the subject JOJIT GARINGARAO, G.R. No. 192760
offense exists. Petitioner,
 Present: that same morning to attend to their store
CARPIO, J., at Urbiztondo, Pangasinan, leaving AAA alone in her room.
Chairperson, When BBB returned to the hospital, AAA told him that she
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,* wanted to go home. Dr. Morante advised against it but due
BRION, to AAAs insistence, he allowed AAA to be discharged from
PERALTA,** and the hospital with instructions that she should continue
PEREZ, JJ. her medications. When AAA and her parents arrived at
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated: their house around 11:30 a.m., AAA cried and told her
Respondent. July 20, 2011 parents that Garingaraosexually abused her. They all went
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - back to the hospital and reported the incident to
- - - - x Dr. Morante. They inquired from the nurses station and
D E C I S I O N learned that Garingarao was the nurse on duty on that
CARPIO, J.: day.
The Case On 20 January 2004, the City Prosecutor filed an
Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the Information against Garingarao for acts of lasciviousness
26 November 2009 Decision and 22 June 2010 Resolution of in relation to RA 7610, as follows:
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31354. The Court That on or about the 29th day of October 2003,
of Appeals affirmed with modifications the decision of at Virgen Milagrosa University Hospital, San Carlos
the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, City, Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of
Branch 56 (trial court), this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
finding Jojit Garingarao (Garingarao) guilty beyond lewd designs, did then and there, willfully,
reasonable doubt of the crime of acts of lasciviousness unlawfully and feloniously touched the breast of
in relation to Republic Act No. 7610 (RA 7610). AAA, 16 years of age, touched her genitalia, and
The Antecedent Facts inserted his finger into her vagina, to the damage
The facts of the case, as can be gleaned from the and prejudice of said AAA who suffered psychological
decision of the Court of Appeals, are as follows: and emotional disturbance, anxiety, sleeplessness
On 28 October 2003, AAA was brought to and humiliation.
the Virgen Milagrosa Medical Center by her father BBB and Contrary to Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code in
mother CCC due to fever and abdominal pain. Dr. relation to RA 7610.
George Morante (Dr. Morante), the attending physician, During the trial, AAA testified that on 29 October 2003,
recommended that AAA be confined at the hospital for between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m., Garingarao, who was
further observation. AAA was admitted at the hospital and wearing a white uniform, entered her room and asked if
confined at a private room where she and her parents she already took her medicines and if she was still
stayed for the night. experiencing pains. AAA replied that her stomach was no
On 29 October 2003, BBB left the hospital to go to longer painful. Garingarao then lifted AAAs bra and
Lingayen, Pangasinan to process his daughters Medicare touched her left breast. Embarrassed, AAA
papers. He arrived at Lingayen at around 8:00 a.m. and asked Garingarao what he was doing. Garingarao replied
left the place an hour later. CCC also left the hospital that he was just examining her. Garingarao then left the
room and returned 15 to 30 minutes later with a
stethoscope. Garingarao told AAA that he would examine administrative action should be filed against him in
her again. Garingarao lifted AAAs shirt, pressed the view of the incident.
stethoscope to her stomach and touched her two For the defense, Garingarao gave a different version of
nipples. Garingarao then lifted AAAs pajama and underwear the incident. Garingarao alleged that on 29 October 2003,
and pressed the lower part of her he and his nursing aide Edmundo Tamayo (Tamayo) went
abdomen. Garingarao then slid his finger inside AAAs inside AAAs room to administer her medicines and check
private part. AAA instinctively crossed her legs and her vital signs. BBB then accused them of not
again asked Garingarao what he was doing. She asked him administering the medicines properly and on
to stop and informed him she had her monthly time. Garingarao told BBB that they should not be told
period. Garingarao ignored AAA and continued to insert how to administer the medicines because they knew what
his finger inside her private part. Garingarao only they were doing and that they would be accountable should
stopped when he saw that AAA really had her monthly anything happen to AAA. A heated argument ensued between
period. He went inside the bathroom of the private room, BBB and Garingarao. BBB told Garingarao he was an
washed his hands, applied alcohol and left. When BBB arrogant nurse. Garingarao replied that if BBB had any
arrived at the hospital, AAA insisted on going home. She complaint, he could report the matter to the
only narrated the incident to her parents when they got hospital. Garingaraodenied that he inserted his finger
home and they went back to the hospital to report the into AAAs private part and that he fondled her
incident to Dr. Morante. breasts. Garingarao alleged that the filing of the case
Dr. Morante testified on AAAs confinement to and was motivated by the argument he had with BBB.
discharge from the hospital. Tamayo testified that he was with Garingarao when they
The prosecution presented the following documents before went to AAAs room between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. of 29
the trial court: October 2003. He alleged that BBB was present and he
(a) AAAs birth certificate to establish that she was accused Garingarao of not administering the medications
16 years old at the time of the incident; properly. Tamayo alleged that Garingarao and BBB had an
(b) AAAs medical records establishing her argument. Tamayo stated that he would always
confinement to and discharge accompany Garingaraowhenever the latter would visit the
from Virgen Milagrosa Medical Center; rooms of the patients.
(c) the schedule of duties of the nurses at the The Decision of the Trial Court
hospital showing that Garingarao was on duty from In its Decision dated 5 November 2007, the trial court
12:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. on 29 October 2003; found Garingarao guilty as charged. The trial court gave
(d) a certificate from the Department of Education credence to the testimony of AAA over Garingaraos denial.
Division Office showing that BBB was present at the The trial court ruled that Garingarao was positively
office from 8:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. on 29 October identified by AAA as the person who entered her room,
2003; touched her breasts and inserted his finger into her
(e) AAAs Medical Payment Notice; private part. The trial court also found that the
(f) the incident report filed by AAAs parents with prosecution was able to establish that BBB and CCC were
the police; and not in the room when Garingarao went inside.
(g) a letter from the hospital administrator The trial court found as baseless Garingaraos defense
requiring Garingarao to explain why no that the case was only motivated by the argument he had
with BBB. The trial court ruled that it was illogical for
BBB to convince his daughter to fabricate a story of
sexual abuse just to get even at Garingarao over a heated
argument.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered finding the
accused Jojit Garingarao GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of acts of lasciviousness in
relation to Republic Act 7610, and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from 12
years to 1 day of Reclusion Temporal as minimum to
14 years and 8 months of Reclusion Temporal as
maximum.
The accused is ordered to pay to the minor victim
[AAA] P20,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as
fine.
SO ORDERED.
Garingarao appealed from the trial courts Decision.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 26 November 2009 Decision, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial courts decision with modifications.
The Court of Appeals ruled that while Garingarao was
charged for acts of lasciviousness in relation to RA
7610, he should be convicted under RA 7610 because AAA
was 16 years old when the crime was committed. The Court
of Appeals ruled that under Section 5(b) of RA 7610, the
offender shall be charged with rape or lascivious conduct
under the Revised Penal Code (RPC) only if the victim is
below 12 years old; otherwise, the provisions of RA 7610
shall prevail.
The Court of Appeals ruled that based on the evidence on
record and the testimony of AAA, the decision of the
trial court has to be affirmed. The Court of Appeals
ruled that under Section 2(h) of the Rules and
Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child
Abuse Cases, the introduction of any object into the
genitalia of the offended party as well as the
intentional touching of her breasts when done with the
intent to sexually gratify the offender qualify as a
lascivious act. AAAs testimony established
that Garingarao committed the lascivious acts.
The Court of Appeals found no reason for AAA or her
family to fabricate the charges against Garingarao. The
Court of Appeals ruled that Garingaraos claim that the
case was filed so that BBB could get even with him
because of the argument they had was too shallow to be
given consideration. The Court of Appeals likewise
rejected Garingaraos defense of denial which could not
prevail over the positive testimony of AAA.
The Court of Appeals modified the penalty imposed by the
trial court. The Court of Appeals ruled that the duration
of reclusion temporal in its maximum period should be 17
years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years and not 14 years
and 8 months as imposed by the trial court. The Court of
Appeals also raised the award of moral damages and fine,
which was deemed as civil indemnity, to
conform with recent jurisprudence.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision
dated November 5, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court
of San Carlos City, Pangasinan in Criminal Case No.
SCC-4167 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
1. The penalty imposed on the accused-
appellant is 14 years and 8 months of
reclusion temporal as minimum to 20 years
of reclusion temporal as maximum[;]
2. The award of moral damages is raised
from P20,000.00 to P50,000.00; and
3. The award of indemnity is raised
from P10,000.00 to P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED
Garingarao filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22
June 2010 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the
motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court. over the manner Garingarao was giving AAAs medications.
The Issue It is hard to believe that AAAs parents would expose her
The only issue in this case is whether the Court of to a public trial if the charges were not true. In
Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming with addition, the prosecution was able to establish that,
modifications the trial courts decision. contrary to Garingaraos allegation, both BBB and CCC were
The Ruling of this Court not in AAAs room at the time of the incident.
The petition has no merit. Violation of RA 7610
Garingarao alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provides:
affirming the trial courts decision finding him guilty of Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual
acts of lasciviousness in relation to RA Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for
7610. Garingarao insists that it was physically money, profit, or any other consideration or due to
impossible for him to commit the acts charged against him the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or
because there were many patients and hospital employees group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
around. He alleges that AAAs room was well lighted and conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
that he had an assistant when the incident allegedly prostitution and other sexual abuse.
occurred. Garingarao further alleges that, assuming the The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium
charges were correct, there was only one incident when he period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon
allegedly touched AAA and as such, he should have been the following:
convicted only of acts of lasciviousness and not of (a) x x x
violation of RA 7610. (b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse
We do not agree. or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
Credibility of Witnesses prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse;
The Court has ruled that in case of acts of Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12)
lasciviousness, the lone testimony of the offended party, years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted
if credible, is sufficient to establish the guilt of the under Article 335, paragraph 3 for rape and Article
accused. In this case, both the trial court and the Court 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal
of Appeals found the testimony of AAA credible Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case
over Garingaraos defense of denial and alibi. It is a may be; Provided, That the penalty for lascivious
settled rule that denial is a weak defense as against the conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) yeas of
positive identification by the victim. Both denial and age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium
alibi are inherently weak defenses and constitute self- period, x x x
serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded (c) x x x
greater evidentiary weight than the positive declaration The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III
by a credible witness.Garingaraos defense of denial and of RA 7610 are the following:
alibi must fail over the positive and straightforward 1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or
testimony of AAA on the incident. Further, like the trial lascivious conduct;
court and the Court of Appeals, we find 2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in
incredible Garingaraos defense that the case was an prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and
offshoot of a heated argument he had with AAAs father
 3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years Garingaraos argument has no legal basis.
of age. The Court has already ruled that it is inconsequential
Under Section 32, Article XIII of the Implementing Rules that sexual abuse under RA 7610 occurred only once.
and Regulations of RA 7610, lascivious conduct is defined Section 3(b) of RA 7610 provides that the abuse may be
as follows: habitual or not. Hence, the fact that the offense
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or occurred only once is enough to hold Garingarao liable
through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, for acts of lasciviousness under RA 7610.
groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the Indemnity and Moral Damages
introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus In view of recent jurisprudence, we deem it proper to
or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or reduce the amount of indemnity to P20,000 and moral
opposite sex, with the intent to abuse, humiliate, damages awarded by the Court of Appeals to P15,000. We
harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual also impose on Garingarao a fine of P15,000.
desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 26
lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area November 2009 Decision and 22 June 2010 Resolution of the
of a person. Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31354
In this case, the prosecution established with MODIFICATIONS. The Court
that Garingarao touched AAAs breasts and inserted his finds Jojit Garingarao GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
finger into her private part for his sexual acts of lasciviousness in relation to Republic Act No.
gratification. Garingarao used his influence as a nurse 7610. He is sentenced to suffer the penalty of 14 years
by pretending that his actions were part of the physical and 8 months of reclusion temporal as minimum to 20 years
examination he was doing. Garingarao persisted on what he of reclusion temporal as maximum and ordered to pay
was doing despite AAAs objections. AAA twice AAA P20,000 as civil indemnity, P15,000 as moral damages
asked Garingarao what he was doing and he answered that and a fine of P15,000.
he was just examining her. SO ORDERED.
The Court has ruled that a child is deemed subject to
other sexual abuse when the child is the victim of
lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any
adult. In lascivious conduct under the coercion or
influence of any adult, there must be some form of
compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the
free exercise of the offended partys free will. In this
case, Garingarao coerced AAA into submitting to his
lascivious acts by pretending that he was examining her.
Garingarao insists that, assuming that the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses were true, he should not be
convicted of violation of RA 7610 because the incident
happened only once. Garingarao alleges that the single
incident would not suffice to hold him liable under RA EN BANC
7610.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 169641 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and the
Plaintiff-Appellee, cost of the suit. However, the CA modified the penalties
imposed by the RTC by imposing the death penalty,
Present: increasing the award of civil indemnity to P75,000.00,
PUNO, C.J., and awarding P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, aside from
QUISUMBING, the P50,000.00 for moral damages.
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO, The crime of rape was allegedly committed sometime
CORONA, in 1996 against AAA, a five (5) year old girl. After
CARPIO MORALES, almost four (4) years, AAAs father filed a complaint for
CHICO-NAZARIO, acts of lasciviousness against herein accused-appellant
VELASCO, JR., on July 7, 2000. Upon review of the evidence, the Office
- versus - NACHURA, of the Provincial Prosecutor at Ligao, Albay upgraded the
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, charge to rape. The Information dated September 5, 2000
BRION, reads:
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN, That sometime in 1996 at Barangay Doa
DEL CASTILLO, and Tomasa, Municipality of Guinobatan, Province of
ABAD, JJ. Albay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with lewd and unchaste design, and by
Promulgated: means of force, threats and intimidation, did
RICHARD O. SARCIA, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
Accused-Appellant. September 10, 2009 feloniously have sexual intercourse with [AAA],
x----------------------------------------------x who was then 6 years of age, against her will
and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
D E C I S I O N
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
At his arraignment on October 25, 2000, accused-
On automatic review is the decision dated July 14, appellant, with the assistance of his counsel, entered a
2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits
00717 which affirmed, with modifications, an earlier ensued.
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ligao City,
Branch 13, in Criminal Case No. 4134, finding herein The prosecution presented the oral testimonies of
accused-appellant Richard O. Sarcia alias Nogi guilty the victim AAA; her minor cousin; her father; and Dr.
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed Joana Manatlao, the Municipal Health Officer of
against AAA, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty Guinobatan, Albay. The defense presented the accused-
of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the amount of P50,000.00 appellant himself, who vehemently denied committing the
crimes imputed to him and Manuel Casimiro, Clerk of Court (2) P50,000.00 as moral damages, and
II of the Municipal Trial Court at Guinobatan, Albay. (3) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Let the entire records of this case be elevated
On January 17, 2003, the trial court rendered its to the Supreme Court for review, pursuant to
Decision finding the accused-appellant guilty of the A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC (Amendments to the Revised
crime of rape and imposed the penalty mentioned above. Rules of Criminal Procedure to Govern Death
Penalty Cases), which took effect on October
The record of this case was forwarded to this Court 15, 2004.
in view of the Notice of Appeal filed by the accused-
appellant. SO ORDERED.

Accused-appellant filed his Appellants Brief on July 15, On September 30, 2005, the case was elevated to this
2004, while the People, through the Office of the Court for further review.
Solicitor General, filed its Appellees Brief on December
15, 2004. In our Resolution of November 15, 2005, we required the
parties to simultaneously submit their respective
Pursuant to our pronouncement in People v. supplemental briefs. Accused-appellant filed his
Mateo, modifying the pertinent provisions of the Revised Supplemental Brief on April 7, 2006. Having failed to
Rules on Criminal Procedure insofar as they provide for submit one, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was
direct appeals from the RTC to this Court in cases in deemed to have waived the filing of its supplemental
which the penalty imposed by the trial court is brief.
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the
Resolution dated September 19, 1995 in Internal Rules of In his Brief filed before the CA, accused-appellant
the Supreme Court, the case was transferred, for raised the following assignment of errors:
appropriate action and disposition, to the CA where it
was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00717. I
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING
As stated at the beginning hereof, the CA, in its CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF [AAA], [her
decision of July 14, 2005, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 000717, cousin] and [her father].
affirmed with modification the judgment of conviction
pronounced by the trial court. We quote the fallo of the II
CA decision:
THE LOWER COURT GLARINGLY ERRED IN REJECTING
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI INTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSED
is AFFIRMED. The accused, Richard Sarcia y WHICH IS MORE CREDIBLE.
Olivera, is ordered to suffer the penalty of
DEATH, and to pay the victim, [AAA], the amount III
of (1) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity;
 THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING
THE ACCUSED RICHARD SARCIA.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by
the OSG in the Appellee's Brief, as follows:
On December 16, 1996, five-year-old [AAA],
together with her [cousin and two other
playmates], was playing in the yard of Saling
Crisologo near a mango tree.
Suddenly, appellant appeared and invited
[AAA] to go with him to the backyard of Saling
Crisologos house. She agreed. Unknown to
appellant, [AAAs cousin] followed them.
Upon reaching the place, appellant removed
[AAAs] shorts and underwear. He also removed
his trousers and brief. Thereafter, he ordered
[AAA] to lie down on her back. Then, he lay on
top of her and inserted his penis into [AAAs]
private organ. Appellant made an up-and-down
movement (Nagdapadapa tabi). [AAA] felt severe
pain inside her private part and said aray. She
also felt an intense pain inside her stomach.
[AAAs cousin], who positioned herself
around five (5) meters away from them,
witnessed appellants dastardly act. Horrified,
[AAAs cousin] instinctively rushed to the house
of [AAAs] mother, her aunt Emily, and told the
latter what she had seen. [AAAs] mother
answered that they (referring to {AAA and her
cousin} were still very young to be talking
about such matters.
Meanwhile, after satisfying his lust,
appellant stood up and ordered [AAA] to put on
her clothes. Appellant then left.
Perplexed, [AAAs cousin] immediately
returned to the backyard of Saling Crisologo
where she found [AAA] crying. Appellant,
however, was gone. [AAAs cousin] approached
[AAA] and asked her what appellant had done to
her. When [AAA] did not answer, [her cousin]
did not ask her any further question and just
accompanied her home.
At home, [AAA] did not tell her mother
what appellant had done to her because she
feared that her mother might slap her. Later,
when her mother washed her body, she felt a
grating sensation in her private
part. Thereafter, [AAA] called for [her
cousin]. [AAAs cousin] came to their house and
told [AAAs] mother again that appellant had
earlier made an up-and-down movement on top of
[AAA]. [AAAs mother], however did not say
anything. At that time, [AAAs] father was
working in Manila.
Dr. Joana Manatloa is the Municipal Health
Officer of Guinobatan, Albay. She testified
that: (1) it was the rural health officer, Dr.
Reantaso, who conducted a physical examination
on [AAA]; (2) Dr. Reantaso prepared and signed
a medico-legal certificate containing the
result of [AAA]s examination; (3) Dr. Reantaso,
however, had already resigned as rural health
officer of Guinobatan, Albay; (4) as a medical
doctor, she can interpret, the findings in said
medico-legal certificate issued to [AAA]; (5)
[AAA]s medical findings are as follows:
negative for introital vulvar laceration nor
scars, perforated hymen, complete, pinkish
vaginal mucosa, vaginal admits little finger
with resistance; (6) the finding negative for
 introital bulvar laceration nor scars means, in
laymans language, that there was no showing of
any scar or wound, and (7) there is a complete
perforation of the hymen which means that it
could have been subjected to a certain trauma
or pressure such as strenuous exercise or the
entry of an object like a medical instrument or
penis.
On the other hand, the trial court summarized the
version of the defense as follows:
Richard Sarcia, 24 years old, single,
student and a resident of Doa Tomasa,
Guinobatan, Albay denied he raped [AAA]. While
he knows [AAAs] parents, because sometimes they
go to their house looking for his father to
borrow money, he does not know [AAA]
herself. His father retired as a fireman from
Crispa in 1991 while his mother worked as an
agriculturist in the Municipality of Teresa,
Antipolo, Rizal. As an agriculturist of the
Department of Agriculture, his mother would
bring seedlings and attend seminars in Batangas
and Baguio. They were residing in Cainta, Rizal
when sometime in 1992 they transferred
residence to Guinobatan, Albay. His father is
from barangay Masarawag while his mother is
from barangay Doa Tomasa both of Guinobatan,
Albay. After their transfer in Guinobatan, his
mother continued to be an agriculturist while
his father tended to his 1-hectare coconut
land. Richard testified he was between fourteen
(14) and fifteen (15) years old in 1992 when
they transferred to Guinobatan. Between 1992
and 1994 he was out of school. But from 1994 to
1998 he took his high school at Masarawag High
School. His daily routine was at about 4:00
oclock in the afternoon after school before
proceeding home he would usually play
basketball at the basketball court near the
church in Doa Tomasa about 1 kilometer away
from their house. When her mother suffered a
stroke in 1999 he and his father took turns
taking care of his mother. Richard denied
molesting other girls ... and was most
surprised when he was accused of raping
[AAA]. He knows Saling Crisologo and the
latters place which is more than half kilometer
to their house. Richard claimed Salvacion
Bobier, grandmother of Mae Christine Camu,
whose death on May 7, 2000 was imputed to him
and for which a case for Murder under Criminal
Case No. 4087 was filed against him with the
docile cooperation of [AAAs] parents who are
related to Salvacion, concocted and instigated
[AAAs] rape charge against him to make the case
for Murder against him stronger and life for
him miserable. He was incarcerated on May 10,
2000 for the Murder charge and two (2) months
later while he already in detention, the rape
case supposedly committed in 1996 was filed
against him in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
of Guinobatan, Albay. He was to learn about it
from his sister, Marivic, on a Sunday afternoon
sometime on July 20, 2000 when his sister
visited him in jail. He naturally got angry
when he heard of this rape charge because he
did not do such thing and recalled telling his
sister they can go to a doctor and have the
child examine to prove he did not rape
her. Subsequently, from his sister again he was
to learn that the rape case was ordered
dismissed.
On cross-examination, Richard admitted
[AAAs] mother, is also related to his father,
[AAA mothers] father, being a second cousin of
 his father. Richard is convinced it is not the
lending of money by his father to the AAAs
family as the motive for the latter to file the
rape case against him but the instigation of
Salvacion Bobier.
Manuel A. Casimiro, Clerk of Court II of
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Guinobatan,
Albay, testified on the records of Criminal
Case No. 7078 filed in MTC Guinobatan, Albay
against Richard Sarcia for Rape in relation to
RA 7610 relative to the alleged withdrawal of
said rape case but the accused through counsel
failed to formally offer the marked exhibits
relative to said case.
Accused-appellant alleges that the trial court erred
in convicting him, as the prosecution was not able to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He assailed the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses, AAA, her cousin
and her father on the following grounds: (1) the
testimonies of AAA and her cousin were inconsistent with
each other; (2) the victim was confused as to the date
and time of the commission of the offense; (3) there was
a four-year delay in filing the criminal case, and the
only reason why they filed the said case was to help
Salvacion Bobier get a conviction of this same accused in
a murder case filed by said Salvacion Bobier for the
death of her granddaughter Mae Christine Camu on May 7,
2000. Accused-appellant stressed that the same Salvacion
Bobier helped AAAs father in filing the said case for
rape. Accused-appellant also claimed that the prosecution
failed to prove that he employed force, threats or
intimidation to achieve his end. Finally, accused-
appellant harped on the finding in the medical
certificate issued by Dr. Reantaso and interpreted by Dr.
Joana Manatlao, stating negative for introital bulvar
laceration nor scar which means that there was no showing
of any scar or wound.
In his Appellee's Brief accused-appellant pointed
out the inconsistencies between AAAs and her cousins
testimonies as follows: (1) the cousin testified that she
played with AAA at the time of the incident, while AAA
testified that she was doing nothing before accused-
appellant invited her to the back of the house of a
certain Saling; (2) the cousin testified that when she
saw accused-appellant doing the push-and-pull motion
while on top of AAA, the latter shouted in a loud voice
contrary to AAAs testimony that when accused-appellant
was inside her and started the up-and-down motion, she
said aray; (3) when the cousin returned to AAA after
telling the latters mother what accused-appellant had
done to AAA, she found AAA crying. AAA however testified
that, after putting on her clothes, she invited the
cousin to their house; and (4) the cousin testified that
other children were playing at the time of the incident,
but AAA testified that there were only four of them who
were playing at that time.
As it is oft-repeated, inconsistencies in the
testimonies of witnesses, which refer only to minor
details and collateral matters, do not affect the
veracity and weight of their testimonies where there is
consistency in relating the principal occurrence and the
positive identification of the accused. Slight
contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the
credibility of the witnesses and prove that their
testimonies are not rehearsed. Nor are such
inconsistencies, and even improbabilities, unusual, for
there is no person with perfect faculties or senses. The
alleged inconsistencies in this case are too
inconsequential to overturn the findings of the court a
quo. It is important that the two prosecution witnesses
were one in saying that it was accused-appellant who
sexually abused AAA. Their positive, candid and
straightforward narrations of how AAA was sexually abused
by accused-appellant evidently deserve full faith and
credence. When the rape incident happened, AAA was only
five (5) years old; and when she and her cousin
testified, they were barely 9 and 11 years old,
respectively. This Court has had occasion to rule that
the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
witnesses can be explained by their age and their
inexperience with court proceedings, and that even the
most candid of witnesses commit mistakes and make
confused and inconsistent statements. This is especially
true of young witnesses, who could be overwhelmed by the
atmosphere of the courtroom. Hence, there is more reason
to accord them ample space for inaccuracy.
Accused-appellant capitalizes on AAAs inability to
recall the exact date when the incident in 1996 was
committed. Failure to recall the exact date of the crime,
however, is not an indication of false testimony, for
even discrepancies regarding exact dates of rapes are
inconsequential and immaterial and cannot discredit the
credibility of the victim as a witness. In People v.
Purazo, We ruled:
We have ruled, time and again that the
date is not an essential element of the crime
of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is
carnal knowledge of a woman. As such, the time
or place of commission in rape cases need not
be accurately stated. As early as 1908, we
already held that where the time or place or
any other fact alleged is not an essential
element of the crime charged, conviction may be
had on proof of the commission of the crime,
even if it appears that the crime was not
committed at the precise time or place alleged,
or if the proof fails to sustain the existence
of some immaterial fact set out in the
complaint, provided it appears that the
specific crime charged was in fact committed
prior to the date of the filing of the
complaint or information within the period of
the statute of limitations and at a place
within the jurisdiction of the court.
Also in People v. Salalima, the Court held:
Failure to specify the exact dates or time
when the rapes occurred does not ipso
facto make the information defective on its
face. The reason is obvious. The precise date
or time when the victim was raped is not an
element of the offense. The gravamen of the
crime is the fact of carnal knowledge under any
of the circumstances enumerated under Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code. As long as it is
alleged that the offense was committed at any
time as near to the actual date when the
offense was committed an information is
sufficient. In previous cases, we ruled that
allegations that rapes were committed before
and until October 15, 1994, sometime in the
year 1991 and the days thereafter, sometime in
November 1995 and some occasions prior and/or
subsequent thereto and on or about and sometime
in the year 1988 constitute sufficient
compliance with Section 11, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
In this case, AAAs declaration that the rape
incident took place on December 15, 1996 was explained by
the trial court, and we quote:
The rape took place in 1996. As earlier
noted by the Court the date December 15, 1996
mentioned by [AAA] may have been arbitrarily
chosen by the latter due to the intense cross-
examination she was subjected but the Court
believes it could have been in any month and
date in the year 1996 as in fact neither the
 information nor [AAAs] sworn statement mention
the month and date but only the year.
Likewise, witnesses credibility is not affected by
the delay in the filing of the case against accused-
appellant. Neither does the delay bolster accused-
appellants claim that the only reason why this case was
filed against him was to help Salvacion Bobier get a
conviction of this same accused-appellant in the case of
murder filed by Salvacion Bobier for the death of her
granddaughter Mae Christine Camu on May 7, 2000.
The rape victims delay or hesitation in reporting
the crime does not destroy the truth of the charge nor is
it an indication of deceit. It is common for a rape
victim to prefer silence for fear of her aggressor and
the lack of courage to face the public stigma of having
been sexually abused. In People v. Coloma we even
considered an 8-year delay in reporting the long history
of rape by the victims father as understandable and not
enough to render incredible the complaint of a 13-year-
old daughter. Thus, in the absence of other circumstances
that show that the charge was a mere concoction and
impelled by some ill motive, delay in the filing of the
complainant is not sufficient to defeat the charge.Here,
the failure of AAAs parents to immediately file this case
was sufficiently justified by the complainants father in
the latters testimony, thus:
Q But, did you not say, please correct me if I
am wrong, you got angry when your wife told
you that something happened to Hazel way
back in 1996?
A Yes, sir.
Q Yet, despite your anger you were telling us
that you waited until June to file this
case?
A After I heard about the incident, I and my
wife had a talk for which reason that
during that time we had no money yet to use
in filing the case, so we waited. When we
were able to save enough amounts, we filed
the case.
Accused-appellant also contends that he could not be
liable for rape because there is no proof that he
employed force, threats or intimidation in having carnal
knowledge of AAA. Where the girl is below 12 years old,
as in this case, the only subject of inquiry is whether
carnal knowledge took place. Proof of force, intimidation
or consent is unnecessary, since none of these is an
element of statutory rape. There is a conclusive
presumption of absence of free consent when the rape
victim is below the age of twelve.
Accused-appellant harps on the medical report,
particularly the conclusion quoted as follows: negative
for introital bulvar laceration nor scars, which means,
in layman language, that there was no showing of any scar
or wound. The Court has consistently ruled that the
presence of lacerations in the victims sexual organ is
not necessary to prove the crime of rape and its absence
does not negate the fact of rape. A medical report is not
indispensable in a prosecution for rape. What is
important is that AAAs testimony meets the test of
credibility, and that is sufficient to convict the
accused.
Accused-appellants defense of denial was properly
rejected. Time and time again, we have ruled that denial
like alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is
easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. Furthermore,
it cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal
identification of appellant by the offended party and
other witnesses. Categorical and consistent positive
identification, absent any showing of ill motive on the
part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails
over the appellants defense of denial and alibi. The
shallow hypothesis put forward by accused-appellant that
he was accused of raping AAA due to the instigation of
Salvacion Bobier hardly convinces this Court. On this
score, the trial court aptly reached the following
conclusion:
True, Salvacion Bobier actively assisted
AAAs family file the instant case against the
accused, but the Court believes [AAAs] parents
finally decided to file the rape case because
after they have come to realize after what
happened to Mae Christine Camu that what
previously [AAA and her cousin] told her mother
and which the latter had continually ignored is
after all true.
AAA was barely 9 years of age when she testified. It has
been stressed often enough that the testimony of rape
victims who are young and immature deserve full
credence. It is improbable for a girl of complainants age
to fabricate a charge so humiliating to herself and her
family had she not been truly subjected to the painful
experience of sexual abuse.At any rate, a girl of tender
years, innocent and guileless, cannot be expected to
brazenly impute a crime so serious as rape to any man if
it were not true. Parents would not sacrifice their own
daughter, a child of tender years at that, and subject
her to the rigors and humiliation of public trial for
rape, if they were not motivated by an honest desire to
have their daughters transgressor punished
accordingly. Hence, the logical conclusion is that no
such improper motive exists and that her testimony is
worthy of full faith and credence.
The guilt of accused-appellant having been established
beyond reasonable doubt, we discuss now the proper
penalty to be imposed on him.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, was the governing law at the time
the accused-appellant committed the rape in
question.Under the said law, the penalty of death shall
be imposed when the victim of rape is a child below seven
years of age. In this case, as the age of AAA, who was
five (5) years old at the time the rape was committed,
was alleged in the information and proven during trial by
the presentation of her birth certificate, which showed
her date of birth as January 16, 1991, the death penalty
should be imposed.
However, this Court finds ground for modifying the
penalty imposed by the CA. We cannot agree with the CAs
conclusion that the accused-appellant cannot be deemed a
minor at the time of the commission of the offense to
entitle him to the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority pursuant to Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal
Code. When accused appellant testified on March 14, 2002,
he admitted that he was 24 years old, which means that in
1996, he was 18 years of age. As found by the trial
court, the rape incident could have taken place in any
month and date in the year 1996. Since the prosecution
was not able to prove the exact date and time when the
rape was committed, it is not certain that the crime of
rape was committed on or after he reached 18 years of age
in 1996. In assessing the attendance of the mitigating
circumstance of minority, all doubts should be resolved
in favor of the accused, it being more beneficial to the
latter. In fact, in several cases, this Court has
appreciated this circumstance on the basis of a lone
declaration of the accused regarding his age.
Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the
offender is a minor under 18 years, the penalty next
lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but
always in the proper period. However, for purposes of
determining the proper penalty because of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death itself equivalent to actual or compensatory
is still the penalty to be reckoned with. Thus, the damages in civil law. It is not to be
proper imposable penalty for the accused-appellant considered as moral damages thereunder, the
is reclusion perpetua. latter being based on different jural
foundations and assessed by the court in the
It is noted that the Court is granted discretion in exercise of sound discretion.
awarding damages provided in the Civil Code, in case a
crime is committed. Specifically, Article 2204 of the One other point of concern has to be
Civil Code provides that in crimes, the damages to be addressed. Indictments for rape continue
adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened unabated and the legislative response has been
according to the aggravating or mitigating in the form of higher penalties. The Court
circumstances. The issue now is whether the award of` believes that, on like considerations, the
damages should be reduced in view of the presence here of jurisprudential path on the civil aspect should
the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of the follow the same direction. Hence, starting with
accused at the time of the commission of the offense. the case at bar, if the crime of rape is
committed or effectively qualified by any of
A review of the nature and purpose of the damages the circumstances under which the death penalty
imposed on the convicted offender is in order. Article is authorized by the present amended law, the
107 of the Revised Penal Code defines the term indemnity for the victim shall be in the
indemnification, which is included in the civil liability increased amount of not less
prescribed by Article 104 of the same Code, as follows: than P75,000.00. This is not only a reaction to
Art. 107. Indemnification-What is the apathetic societal perception of the penal
included. Indemnification for consequential law, and the financial fluctuations over time,
damages shall include not only those caused the but also an expression of the displeasure of
injured party, but also those suffered by his the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes
family or by a third person by reason of the against chastity. (Emphasis Supplied)
crime.
The Court has had the occasion to rule that moral damages
Relative to civil indemnity, People v. are likewise compensatory in nature. In San Andres v.
Victor ratiocinated as follows: Court of Appeals, we held:
The lower court, however, erred in
categorizing the award of P50,000.00 to the x x x Moral damages, though incapable of
offended party as being in the nature of moral pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an
damages. We have heretofore explained in People award designed to compensate the claimant for
v. Gementiza that the indemnity authorized by actual injury suffered and not to impose a
our criminal law as civil liability ex penalty on the wrongdoer. (Emphasis Supplied)
delicto for the offended party, in the amount
authorized by the prevailing judicial policy In another case, this Court also explained:
and aside from other proven actual damages, is
 What we call moral damages are treated in
American jurisprudence as compensatory
damages awarded for mental pain and suffering
or mental anguish resulting from a wrong (25
C.J.S. 815). (Emphasis Supplied)
The principal consideration for the award of
damages, under the ruling in People v. Salome and People
v. Quiachon is the penalty provided by law or imposable
for the offense because of its heinousness, not the
public penalty actually imposed on the offender.

Thus, according to law and jurisprudence, civil Regarding the civil indemnity and moral
indemnity is in the nature of actual and compensatory damages, People v. Salome explained the basis for
damages for the injury caused to the offended party and increasing the amount of said civil damages as follows:
that suffered by her family, and moral damages are
likewise compensatory in nature. The fact of minority of The Court, likewise, affirms the civil
the offender at the time of the commission of the offense indemnity awarded by the Court of Appeals to
has no bearing on the gravity and extent of injury caused Sally in accordance with the ruling in People
to the victim and her family, particularly considering v. Sambrano which states:
the circumstances attending this case. Here, the accused-
appelant could have been eighteen at the time of the As to damages, we have held that if the rape is
commission of the rape. He was accorded the benefit of perpetrated with any of the attending
the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority qualifying circumstances that require the
because of a lack of proof regarding his actual age and imposition of the death penalty, the civil
the date of the rape rather than a moral or evidentiary indemnity for the victim shall P75,000.00 Also,
certainty of his minority. in rape cases, moral damages are awarded
without the need proof other than the fact of
In any event, notwithstanding the presence of the rape because it is assumed that the victim has
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, which suffered moral injuries entitling her to such
warrants the lowering of the public penalty by one an award.However, the trial courts award
degree, there is no justifiable ground to depart from the of P50,000.00 as moral damages should also be
jurisprudential trend in the award of damages in the case increased to P75,000 pursuant to current
of qualified rape, considering the compensatory nature of jurisprudence on qualified rape.
the award of civil indemnity and moral damages. This was
the same stance this Court took in People v. It should be noted that while the new law
Candelario, a case decided on July 28, 1999, which did prohibits the imposition of the death
not reduce the award of damages. At that time, the penalty, the penalty provided for by law for a
damages amounted to P75,000.00 for civil indemnity heinous offense is still death and the offense
and P50,000.00 for moral damages, even if the public is still heinous.Consequently, the civil
penalty imposed on the accused was lowered by one degree, indemnity for the victim is still P75,000.00.
because of the presence of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority. People v. Quiachon also ratiocinates as follows:
With respect to the award of damages, the
appellate court, following prevailing
 jurisprudence, correctly awarded the following
amounts; P75,000.00 as civil indemnity which is
awarded if the crime is qualified by
circumstances warranting the imposition of the
death penalty; P75,000.00.00 as moral damages
because the victim is assumed to have suffered
moral injuries, hence, entitling her to an
award of moral damages even without proof
thereof, x x x
Even if the penalty of death is not to be
imposed on the appellant because of the
prohibition in R.A. No. 9346, the civil
indemnity of P75,000.00 is still
proper because, following the ratiocination
in People v. Victor, the said award is not
dependent on the actual imposition of the death
penalty but on the fact that qualifying
circumstances warranting the imposition of the
death penalty attended the commission of the
offense. The Court declared that the award
of P75,000.00 shows not only a reaction to the
apathetic societal perception of the penal law
and the financial fluctuations over time but
also the expression of the displeasure of the
court of the incidence of heinous crimes
against chastity.
The litmus test therefore, in the determination of the
civil indemnity is the heinous character of the crime
committed, which would have warranted the imposition of
the death penalty, regardless of whether the penalty
actually imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua.
As to the award of exemplary damages, Article 2229
of the Civil Code provides that exemplary or corrective
damages are imposed in addition to the moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages. Exemplary damages are
not recoverable as a matter of right. The requirements of
an award of exemplary damagees are: (1) they may be
imposed by way of example in addition to compensatory
damages, and only after the claimants right to them has
been established; (2) they cannot be recovered as a
matter of right, their determination depending upon the
amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the
claimant; (3) the act must be accompanied by bad faith or
done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent
manner. Since the compensatory damages, such as the civil
indemnity and moral damages, are increased when qualified
rape is committed, the exemplary damages should likewise
be increased in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.
In sum, the increased amount of P75,000.00 each as
civil indemnity and moral damages should be
maintained. It is also proper and appropriate that the
award of exemplary damages be likewise increased to the
amount of P30,000.00 based on the latest jurisprudence on
the award of damages on qualified rape. Thus, the CA
correctly awarded P75,000.00 as civil indemnity. However
the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages is increased
to P75,000.00 and that of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages
is likewise increased to P30,000.00.
Meanwhile, when accused-appellant was detained at
the New Bilibid Prison pending the outcome of his appeal
before this Court, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344,
the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 took effect
on May 20, 2006. The RTC decision and CA decision were
promulgated on January 17, 2003 and July 14, 2005,
respectively.The promulgation of the sentence of
conviction of accused-appellant handed down by the RTC
was not suspended as he was about 25 years of age at that
time, in accordance with Article 192 of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare
Code and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on
Juveniles in Conflict with the Law. Accused-appellant is
now approximately 31 years of age. He was previously
detained at the Albay Provincial Jail at Legaspi City and
transferred to the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City on
October 13, 2003.
R.A. No. 9344 provides for its retroactive
application as follows:
Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted
and are Serving Sentence. Persons who have been
convicted and are serving sentence at the time
of the effectivity of this Act, and who were
below the age of eighteen (18) years at the
time of the commission of the offense for which
they were convicted and are serving sentence,
shall likewise benefit from the retroactive
application of this Act. x x x
The aforequoted provision allows the retroactive
application of the Act to those who have been convicted
and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity
of this said Act, and who were below the age of 18 years
at the time of the commission of the offense. With more
reason, the Act should apply to this case wherein the
conviction by the lower court is still under
review. Hence, it is necessary to examine which
provisions of R.A. No. 9344 shall apply to accused-
appellant, who was below 18 years old at the time of the
commission of the offense.
Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides for the automatic
suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the
law, even if he/she is already 18 years of age or more at
the time he/she is found guilty of the offense
charged. It reads:
Sec. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. Once
the child who is under eighteen (18) years of
age at the time of the commission of the
offense is found guilty of the offense charged,
the court shall determine and ascertain any
civil liability which may have resulted from
the offense committed. However, instead of
pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the
court shall place the child in conflict with
the law under suspended sentence, without need
of application: Provided, however, That
suspension of sentence shall still be applied
even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18)
of age or more at the time of the pronouncement
of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after
considering the various circumstances of the
child, the court shall impose the appropriate
disposition measures as provided in the Supreme
Court on Juvenile in Conflict with the Law.
The above-quoted provision makes no distinction as to the
nature of the offense committed by the child in conflict
with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-
SC. The said P.D. and Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide
that the benefit of suspended sentence would not apply to
a child in conflict with the law if, among others, he/she
has been convicted of an offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In
construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is guided
by the basic principle of statutory construction that
when the law does not distinguish, we should not
distinguish. Since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish
between a minor who has been convicted of a capital
offense and another who has been convicted of a lesser
offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should
apply the automatic suspension of sentence to a child in
conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a
heinous crime.
Moreover, the legislative intent, to apply to heinous
crimes the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in
conflict with the law can be gleaned from the Senate
deliberations on Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005), the pertinent
portion of which is quoted below:
If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below
18 years old is charged, accused with, or may
have committed a serious offense, and may have
acted with discernment, then the child could be
recommended by the Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD), by the Local Council
for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or by my
proposed Office of Juvenile Welfare and
Restoration to go through a judicial
proceeding; but the welfare, best interests,
and restoration of the child should still be a
primordial or primary consideration. Even in
heinous crimes, the intention should still be
the childs restoration, rehabilitation and
reintegration. xxx (Italics supplied)
Nonetheless, while Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that
suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the
child in conflict with the law is already eighteen (18)
years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of
his/her guilt, Sec. 40 of the same law limits the said
suspension of sentence until the said child reaches the
maximum age of 21, thus:
Sec. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with
the Law to Court. If the court finds that the
objective of the disposition measures imposed
upon the child in conflict with the law have
not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict
with the law has willfully failed to comply
with the condition of his/her disposition or
rehabilitation program, the child in conflict
with the law shall be brought before the court
for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has
reached eighteen (18) years of age while under
suspended sentence, the court shall determine
whether to discharge the child in accordance
with this Act, to order execution of
sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence
for a certain specified period or until the
child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one
(21) years. (emphasis ours)
To date, accused-appellant is about 31 years of age, and
the judgment of the RTC had been promulgated, even before
the effectivity of R.A. No. 9344. Thus, the application
of Secs. 38 and 40 to the suspension of sentence is now
moot and academic. However, accused-appellant shall be
entitled to appropriate disposition under Sec. 51 of R.A.
No. 9344, which provides for the confinement of convicted
children as follows:
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in
Agricultural Camps and Other Training
Facilities. A child in conflict with the
law may, after conviction and upon order of the
court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in
lieu of confinement in a regular penal
institution, in an agricultural camp and other
training facilities that may be established,
maintained, supervised and controlled by the
BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
The civil liability resulting from the commission of the
offense is not affected by the appropriate disposition
measures and shall be enforced in accordance with law.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the CA dated July 14, 2005
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00717 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the penalty of death imposed
on accused-appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua;
[53]
and (2) accused-appellant is ordered to pay the victim
the amount of P75,000.00 and P30,000.00 as moral damages
and exemplary damages, respectively. The award of civil
indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 is
maintained. However, the case shall be REMANDED to the
court a quo for appropriate disposition in accordance
with Sec. 51 of R.A. 9344.

SO ORDERED.