SHUKUROV, Trebizond and The Seljuks

07_Rustam_Shukurov_071_136 26-11-05 04:46 Page 71
Rustam Shukurov
Trebizond and the Seljuks
(1204-1299) *
On 13 April 1204 the Latins of the Fourth Crusade sacked Cons-

tantinople. The decapitated Byzantine Empire fell to pieces and the
formation of new local state systems began in the Byzantine pro-
vinces outside Latin control. On the furthermost eastern limits of
the Byzantine Empire, in the Pontus and neighboring areas, power
soon passed into the hands of the Grand Comneni, a branch of the
renowned Byzantine royal family of Comneni, which preferred to
call themselves the « Grand Comneni ». In April 1204, possibly 23
April (Saint George’s day), Alexius I Grand Comnenus, the elder
grandson of the Byzantine emperor Andronicus I (1180-1183),
conquered Trebizond, his junior brother David soon subjugated
Paphlagonia up to the eastern limits of Bithynia. Thus began the
history of the so-called Empire of Trebizond, which survived until
1461, when it was conquered by the Ottomans. In the first decade
of its existence, the Empire controlled a rather large and prospe-
rous territory stretching from Byzantine Bithynia up to the Geor-
gian border in Lazica. There is little doubt that the first Grand
Comneni initially intended to break through to Constantinople in
order to restore the « legitimate » power of the Comneni over
Byzantium. However, on the western limits of the Empire David
encountered the fierce resistance of the newly founded state of
Theodore I Lascaris (1206–1222), the so-called Nicaean Empire.
The first clashes between Lascaris and the Grand Comneni started
as early as 1205. By 1208 Lascaris had been able to stop David
* I am indebted to Dr GARY LEISER for his extensive help during the prepara-
tion of this piece.
Mésogeios 25-26 (2005), p. 71-136, © Hêrodotos

72 Rustam Shukurov
Comnenus who tried to capture the main strategic points on the

route leading from inner Anatolia to Constantinople. But Lascaris
failed to drive the Grand Comneni out of Paphlagonia. After 1208
hostilities on the Nicaean-Comnenian front ended with a lull that
lasted until 1214, and during which David Grand Comnenus died
(1212) 1.
From the south, the Empire of Trebizond’s frontier almost enti-
rely adjoined the Seljuk possessions. As soon as the Grand Comne-
ni settled in the Pontus, they faced the necessity of establishing
relations with the Seljuks, their most powerful Muslim neighbors.
The relationship between the Empire of Trebizond and the Seljuk
Sultanate, which the present paper deals with, has been studied —
or only touched upon mostly as a part of general surveys — by
many generations of scholars in Byzantine and Seljuk history, star-
ting with J.F. Fallmerayer 2. But for a very long time this subject
1. The most important studies on the foundation of the Empire of Trebizond

are : A. KUNIK, « Osnovanie Trapezundskoi imperii v 1204 godu » (« The founda-
tion of the Empire of Trebizond in 1204 »), Uchenye zapiski Imperatorskoi Aka-
demii nauk (« Transactions of the Imperial Academy of Sciences »), 1854, vol. II,
p. 705-733 ; A. VASILIEV, « The foundation of the Empire of Trebizond (1204-
1222) », Speculum 11 (1936), p. 3-37 ; F. USPENSKII, « Vydelenie Trapezunta iz
sostava Vizantiiskoi imperii » (« Trebizond’s separation from the Byzantine Empi-
re »), Seminarium Kondakovianum 1 (1927), p. 21-34 ; OD. LAMPSIDES, « ¶ÂÚd ÙcÓ
¥‰Ú˘ÛÈÓ ÙÔÜ ÎÚ¿ÙÔ˘˜ ÙáÓ ÌÂÁ¿ÏˆÓ ∫ÔÌÓËÓáÓ » (« On the foundation of the Empire of
Trebizond »), \∞Ú¯ÂÖÔÓ ¶fiÓÙÔ˘ (« Pontic Archive ») 31 (1971-1972), p. 3-18 ;
A.A.M. BRYER, « David Komnenos and Saint Eleutherios », \∞Ú¯ÂÖÔÓ ¶fiÓÙÔ˘ (« Pon-
tic Archive ») 42 (1988-1989), p. 163-187 ; S.P. KARPOV, « Obrazovanie Trape-
zundskoi imperii (1204-1215) » (« The foundation of the Empire of Trebizond »),
Vizantiiskii Vremennik (« Byzantine Chronicle ») 60 [85] (2001), p. 5-29 (= IDEM,
Srednevekovyi Pont [« The Medieval Pontos »], Lewiston-Queenston-Lampeter,
2001, chapter II). For the supposed day of the capture of Trebizond by Alexius
(the date suggested on the basis of a little known seal of Alexius I), see : S.P. KAR-
POV, « Obrazovanie Trapezundskoi imperii », p. 27 (= IDEM, Srednevekovyi Pont,
op. cit., p. 109-110).
2. See note 1 and — for example — the relevant parts in the following general
surveys : J.F. FALLMERAYER, Geschichte des Kaisertums von Trapezunt, Munich,
1827 ; G. FINLAY, A history of Greece from its conquest by the Romans to the pre-
sent time, vol. IV, Oxford, 1877 ; S. IOANNIDES, ^πÛÙÔÚ›· Î·d ÛÙ·ÙÈÛÙÈÎc ∆Ú·Â˙ÔÜÓÙÔ˜
Î·d ÙÉ˜ ÂÚd Ù·‡ÙËÓ ¯ÒÚ·˜ (« History and statistics of Trebizond and the neighbou-
ring area »), Constantinople, 1870 ; T. EUANGELIDES, ^πÛÙÔÚ›· ÙÉ˜ ÔÓÙÈÎÉ˜ ∆Ú·Â-
˙ÔÜÓÙÔ˜ àe ÙáÓ àÚ¯·ÈÔÙ¿ÙˆÓ ¯ÚfiÓˆÓ Ì¤¯ÚÈ ÙáÓ Î·ı\ ìÌÄ˜ (756 .Ã. - 1897) (« His-
tory of Trebizond in the Pontos from ancient times to the present »), Odessa,
Mésogeios 25-26 (2005)

Trebizond and the Seljuks (1204-1299) 73
was not regarded as important in its own right and, thus, not deser-
ving separate thorough examination. Such a special study was even-
tually published by the late M. Kur≤anskis, who has produced the
most detailed and authoritative picture to date in scholarly litera-
ture of Trapezuntine-Seljuk relations up to the end of the thir-
teenth century 3. The indisputable advantage of M. Kur≤anskis’
study consists of its comprehensively broad and variegated use of
primary sources that include Greek, Latin, Persian, Arabic, Arme-
nian, Georgian and other contemporary documents. Relying upon
such a fundamental basis, I will try in the present article to
demonstrate that the available sources still contain a good deal of
fresh information that can enrich our knowledge of the subject.
One may distinguish the following three major periods in Tra-
pezuntine-Seljuk relations: 1204-1214, 1225-1230 and 1240s-1270s,
during which the rivalry between the two powers was at its height
and often resulted in military clashes and dramatic political chan-
ges. Outside certain phases of mutual hostility and distrust, Pontic
Greeks and Seljuk Turks enjoyed a time of peaceful and perhaps
sometimes friendly coexistence, which equalled almost half the
period under consideration but ironically is very poorly elucidated
by the surviving sources. Therefore, due to this substantial shor-
tage of positive information, the subsequent discussion of the Tra-
pezuntine-Seljuk relationship will structurally follow the aforesaid
three periods of troubles.
1898 ; W. MILLER, Trebizond. The last Greek Empire, London, 1926 ; F. USPENS-
KII, Ocherki iz istorii Trapezundskoi imperii (« Essays on the history of the Empi-
re of Trebizond »), Leningrad, 1929 ; CL. CAHEN, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, London,
1968 ; IDEM, La Turquie pré-ottomane, Istanbul-Paris, 1988 ; E. JANSSENS, Trébi-
zonde en Colchide, Bruxelles, 1969 ; O. TURAN, « Anatolia in the period of the Sel-
juks and the beyliks », in Cambridge history of Islam, Cambridge, 1970, vol. I,
p. 231-263 ; SP. VRYONIS, The decline of medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the
process of Islamization from the eleventh through the fifteenth century, Berkeley,
1971 ; A.G.C. SAVVIDES, Byzantium in the Near East : its relations with the Seljuk
sultanate of Rum in Asia Minor, the Armenians of Cilicia and the Mongols, Thes-
salonika, 1981 ; A.A.M. BRYER - D. WINFIELD, The Byzantine monuments and
topography of the Pontos, Washington, 1985, vol. I-II.
3. M. KUR∞ANSKIS, « L’Empire de Trébizonde et les Turcs au XIIIe siècle »,
Revue des études byzantines 46 (1988), p. 109-124.

74 Rustam Shukurov
Part I:
From Trebizond to Sinop
(1204-1214)
Between 1204 and 1214, the Seljuk strategy towards the Empire
of Trebizond was, in fact, the continuation of those tendencies in
Seljuk geopolitics that had fully matured long before 1204. The
major strategic aim of the Seljuks consisted of gaining access to the
Black Sea coast. In the twelfth century, the elder Comneni realised
in full measure the strategic role in this matter of Trebizond and
Sinop and their adjacent provinces.
In the twelfth century, especially during the reign of John II
Comnenus, the north Anatolian front became the arena of sharp
military clashes. John II attempted to strengthen Byzantine defen-
ces in Paphlagonia and Chaldia, trying to keep the Turks from the
coastline and even to push them away from Neocaesarea. The
emperor found little success in accomplishing the latter task, but he
clearly demonstrated Byzantine resolution in defending the land
linkages with Chaldia as well as the strategic passages from inner
Anatolia to the Black Sea coast. The next emperor Manuel I, cam-
paigning towards Syria, tried to close Anatolia and cut it off from
the Muslim Middle East. During the twelfth century the Comneni
maintained a military balance on that part of the Anatolian front.
For our discussion, the most important fact is that in that balance
Byzantium was never the weaker side 4. Perhaps, the negative after-
math of the defeat at Myriocephalum has been overestimated by
modern scholars. It is true that after this battle and the death of
Manuel I the Turks were able to devastate the Meander valley and
seize the third-class commercial port of Samsun. But this Turkish
success was very soon nullified by the Nicaeans and the Grand
Comneni in the first decade of the thirteenth century.
4. R.-J. LILIE, « Twelfth-century Byzantine and Turkish states », in A.A.M.

BRYER - M. URSINUS (ed.), Manzikert to Lepanto. The Byzantine world and the
Turks (1071–1571), coll. « Byzantinische Forschungen » (vol. XVI), Amsterdam,
1991, p. 35-51 and especially p. 37-41 ; SP. VRYONIS, « Nomadization and Islami-
zation in Asia Minor », Dumbarton Oaks Papers 29 (1975), p. 45-47 ; IDEM, The
decline, op. cit., chapter II ; M. KUR∞ANSKIS, « L’Empire de Trébizonde et les
Turcs », op. cit., p. 111.

The establishment of the Grand Comnenian power in the Pontus

could have changed little in the general strategy of the Seljuk sul-
tans towards the northern Anatolian region including its two main
commercial and coastal trade centers of Trebizond and Sinop.
Moreover, during most of the period between 1204 and the 1210s,
the Seljuks were on good terms with the Nicaean Empire 5, a dead-
ly rival of the Grand Comneni, which gave the Seljuks an opportu-
nity to achieve their strategic aim of making Greeks fight against
Greeks.
First clashes
It seems that the Greeks took the first step towards hostility
when, in 1204, during the victorious campaign of Alexius I Grand
Comnenus, his troops entered Samsun, which, probably with some
other places on the coast, had belonged to the Seljuks since 1194 6.
Ibn al-Athı̄r relates that, in the year 602/1205-1206 the Seljuk sul-
tan Ghiy∆th al-Dı̄n Kai-Khusraw I (first reign 1192-1197 ; second
reign 1205-1211) besieged Trebizond, because its ruler « got out of
hand and annoyed him, and as a result the land and sea routes
from the lands of Byzantium (rūm), Russia (rūs), the Qipch∆qs
and others were interrupted and no one came from there to the
country of Ghiy∆th al-Dı̄n, and [his] people suffered great losses
5. NICETAS CHONIATES, Historia, ed. J.A. VAN DIETEN, Berlin - New York,
1975, vol. I, p. 626 ; NICETAS CHONIATES, Orationes et epistulae, ed. J.A. VAN DIE-
TEN, Berlin, 1972, p. 136 ; P.I. ZHAVORONKOV, « U istokov obrazovanija Nikejskoj
imperii » (« At the genesis of the Empire of Nicaea »), Vizantiiskii Vremennik
(« Byzantine Chronicle ») 38 (1977), p. 33.
6. M. BROSSET, Histoire de la Géorgie, Saint Petersburg, 1850, vol. I, p. 465 ;
S.G. KAUCHISHVILI, Gruzinskie istochniki po istorii Vizantii (« Georgian sources
on the history of Byzantium »), Tbilisi, 1974, vol. I, p. 134, 145 ; S.P. KARPOV,
« Ot femy Khaldia k imperii Velikikh Komninov » (« From the Theme of Chaldia
to the Grand Komnenian Empire »), in Vizantiia i eie provintsii (« Byzantium and
its provinces »), Sverdlovsk, 1982, p. 57 ; CL. CAHEN, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, op.
cit., p. 117 ; A.A.M. BRYER, « David Komnenos », op. cit., p. 177 ; A.A.M. BRYER
suggests that, except for Samsun, the Turks also possessed the Black Sea coastal
towns of Paurai (Bafra) and Oinaion (Ünye), which fell into the hands of the
Greeks in 1204 as well. Cf. M. KUR∞ANSKIS, « L’Empire de Trébizonde et les

76 Rustam Shukurov
from this. » Further on, Ibn al-Athı̄r explains in more detail the
economic aspect of the matter. He maintains that merchants from
Syria, Iraq, Mosul, al-Jazı̄ra and other lands traded with the afo-
rementioned regions, and many merchants « met together in
Sivas » ; because the trade routes were blocked « merchants suffe-
red great losses, and the most fortunate were those who recovered
their money » 7. It is not impossible that the Seljuks acted in accord
with the Nicaeans, whom they helped in this way to beat off the
attack by the Grand Comnenus David in the autumn or winter of
1205 8.
But it appears easier to explain the economic background of the
events to which Ibn al-Athı̄r clearly refers. He believes the only rea-
son for the Seljuk attack against Trebizond to be the interruption
of the main eastern Anatolian trade route, via Sivas to Trebizond,
to the sea port leading to the lands north of the Black Sea. It is diffi-
cult to overestimate the importance of that route for Muslim trade.
A clear, though laconic, estimation of its significance has been left
by a contemporary of these events, an anonymous Persian mer-
chant (probably a native of Khur∆s∆n), who, from 1205-1206 until
the 1210s travelled extensively in Azerbaijan, eastern Anatolia and
the Pontus, and after 1220-1221 wrote his memoirs in the geogra-
>
phical work Aj∆’ib al-duny∆ (« Marvels of the world ») 9. He enthu-
siastically describes Sivas at that time 10 :
7. IBN AL-ATHĪR, Chronicon quod perfectissimum inscribitur, Lugduni Bata-

vorum, 1851, vol. XII, p. 160 ; Recueil des historiens des Croisades. Historiens
orientaux, Paris, 1887, vol. II/I, p. 101-102 ; CL. CAHEN, « Le commerce anatolien
au début du XIIIe siècle », in Melanges Louis Halphen, Paris, 1951, p. 92–93.
8. For the three treaties between the Seljuks and Theodore I Lascaris conclu-
ded between the end of the 1204 and the end of 1206, see P.I. ZHAVORONKOV,
« Dopolneniia k tretiemu tomu “ Regest ” F. Dölger’a perioda Nikeiskoi imperii »
(« A supplement to the third volume of F. Dölger’s “ Regesten ” concerning the time
of the Nicaean Empire »), Vizantiiskii Vremennik (« Byzantine Chronicle ») 41
(1980), p. 183-184 ; S.P. KARPOV, « Obrazovanie Trapezundskoi imperii », op.
cit., p. 17.
>
9. Aj∆’ib ad-duny∆ (Chudesa mira) (« The marvels of the world »), critical
edition, translation, introduction, commentary and indexes L.P. SMIRNOVA, Mos-
cow, 1993, p. 24, 26-27. L.P. SMIRNOVA’s Russian translation of the Persian text
should be used with great caution for in many places it inexcusably deviates from
the Persian original.
>
10. Aj∆’ib ad-duny∆, op. cit., p. 512 of the Persian text.

Sivas is a big city on the border of Rūm [no doubt the border
of the Empire of Trebizond is meant] and place of residence
of the Turks ; there are many bazaars. [The number] of its
buildings and its size are growing day by day. Outside the
city, in the countryside [·sah·r∆’ ], three hundred caravansa-
ries have been constructed. In each caravansary, there are
more than five hundred thousand dinars in cash and goods,
always perfectly safe. There reigns such justice that all these
riches are not even guarded. Every year for three months
the bazaar is flooded by the Turks. It is called the bazaar of
Nı̄lū. Goods arrive from the entire world, including beaver,
Burtas fox, sable, squirrel, Byzantine velvet clothes of gold
embroidery 11, carpets, felt, horses, good mules, sheep, male
and female slaves.
This Persian author noted the economic boom that Sivas expe-
rienced in those years. The signs of economic prosperity were visi-
ble in the growth of the city itself, its bazaars and caravansaries
indicating a rapid increase in trade and the number of the mer-
chants participating in the trade with the north. One might conclu-
de that some time before 1204-1205 the volume of trade in the
region must have been much more modest and that the commercial
boom had started just at the turn of the twelfth century. It is also
interesting that the majority of the goods mentioned in the passage
cited are of « northern » origin : furs, exquisite Byzantine textiles
and slaves, that is, those goods that were imported to the Muslim
world through Trebizond from the entire Black Sea region. There-
fore, Ibn al-Athı̄r’s report, which completely concurs with the evi-
dence of the anonymous Persian merchant, is not a rhetorical exag-
geration : the destruction of the Muslim trade with Trebizond seems
to have caused enormous loses to the commercial economies of Ana-
tolia and Syria.
It is not impossible that the loss of Samsun in 1204 was econo-
mically quite painful for the Seljuks and actually caused them to
attack Trebizond. The anonymous Persian merchant visited Sam-
sun very likely about that time as well : « Samsun is a beautiful and
11. J∆ma-i rūmı̄ ba-zar-u qat· ı̄fa is inexplicably translated by L.P. SMIRNOVA
on p. 213 as « Turkish calico and bath towels ».

78 Rustam Shukurov
green city in Rūm amidst woods on the seacoast. Taxes are levied
there ; the people [of the city] are unworthy. Its goods are flax,
many fruits and squirrel 12. » According to this brief account, one
may understand that Muslim merchants continued to frequent
Samsun, probably while some of them were on their way to the
north, to the Crimea. It is also obvious that in Samsun the attitude
of the Greeks toward the Muslims still remained rather unfriendly.
To sum up, it is difficult to be absolutely certain in determining
the pretext of the first Trapezuntine-Seljuk war in 1205 or 1206 :
whether economic or political causes were at the heart of it. It is not
impossible that both of these compelling motives were closely con-
nected in this conflict. As we shall show later, the economic factor
was extremely important in subsequent Trapezuntine-Seljuk rela-
tions. In any case, although contemporary sources say nothing
about the outcome of the war, it is clear that the Seljuks failed to
capture Trebizond, but apparently managed to open the trade rou-
tes that, judging by the corroborative reports of the Arab and Per-
sian authors, were so important for the Anatolian economy.
The Paphlagonian conflict

of 1214
The next known crisis in Trapezuntine-Seljuk relations occur-

red almost a decade later. In 1214 the Seljuks launched an attack
against the Grand Comneni port of Sinop and captured it, comple-
tely cutting off the Empire of Trebizond from the routes leading to
Constantinople. The Paphlagonian conflict of 1214 was a direct
continuation of the strife that started a decade earlier. Here again,
we see a notable convergence of the military actions of the Seljuks
and Nicaeans. It also seems that the Pontic Greeks again took the
first step towards escalating the hostility with the Seljuks.
The events of 1214 have been described in a number of Greek,
Persian and Arabic sources 13. The most important of them are the
>
12. Aj∆’ib ad-duny∆, op. cit., p. 510-511 of the Persian text ; the Russian
translation on p. 211 again is inaccurate.
13. ACROPOLITES, ed. A. HEISENBERG, Leipzig, 1903, p. 18. Histoire des Seld-
joukides d’Asie Mineure par un anonyme, Persian text published by F.N. UZLUK,
Ankara, 1952, p. 43-44 (hereinafter : Histoire des Seldjoukides, Ankara) ; ANONY-

historical work of Ibn Bı̄bı̄, a Seljuq historiographer who wrote in

the 1270s 14, and a report on ecclesiastical affairs by Mesarites, then
metropolitan of Ephesus 15, who compiled it in 1214. These and
other relevant sources have not yet been combined and compared
with each other, in spite of the continuous interest they have attrac-
MOUS, Ta’rı̄kh-e ∆l-e Saljūq dar Anatoli, ed. N. JALALI, Tehran, 1999, p. 87 ; GRE-
GORY ABŪ AL-FARAJ, The Chronography of Gregory Abû’l-Faraj the son of Aaron,
vol. I, translation from Syriac by E.A.W. BUDGE, London, 1932 (reprint, Ams-
terdam, 1976), p. 369 ; ABŪ ‘L-FIDĀ, Annales muslemici. Arabice et latine, ed.
I.G.C. ADLER, Hafniae, 1792, vol. IV, p. 252-255.
14. The facsimile reproduction of the unique Ankara manuscript : IBN BĪBĪ, El-
Ev∆mirü’l-Al∆’iyye fı̄’l-umūri’l-Al∆’iyye, introduction and index by A.S. ERZI,
Ankara, 1956. The critical edition of the anonymous abridged version (so called
Mukhtas·ar) : Histoire des Seldjoucides d’Asie Mineure d’après l’abrégé du Seld-
jouknameh d’Ibn Bibi, Persian text published by M.TH. HOUTSMA, Leiden, 1902 ;
reliable German translation of the Mukhtas·ar with additions from the complete
Ankara version : H. DUDA, Die Seltschukengeschichte des Ibn Bibi, Copenhagen,
1959. Greek translation with commentary on the passage relating to the events of
1214 : A.G.C. SAVVIDES, « √î ªÂÁ¿ÏÔÈ ∫ÔÌÓËÓÔd ÙÔÜ ¶fiÓÙÔ˘ Î·d Ôî ™ÂÏÙ˙ÔÜÎÔÈ ÙÔÜ
Rûm (\πÎÔÓ›Ô˘) ÙcÓ ÂÚ›Ô‰Ô 1205/1206–1222 » (« The Pontic Grand Comneni and
the Seljuks of Rum (Iconium) in 1205/1206-1222 »), \∞Ú¯ÂÖÔÓ ¶fiÓÙÔ˘ (« Pontic
Archive ») 39 (1988), p. 169-193. Russian translations of extensive extracts with
commentary : A.YU. YAKUBOVSKY, « Rasskaz Ibn al-Bibi o pokhode maloazijskikh
turok na Sudak, polovtsev i russkikh v nachale XIII v. » (« Ibn Bı̄bı̄’s account of
the campaign of the Anatolian Turks against Sudak, the Cumans and Russians at
the beginning of the 13th century »), Vizantiiskii Vremennik (« Byzantine Chroni-
cle ») 25 (1927), p. 53-77 ; V.G. TIZENGAUZEN, Sbornik materialov, otnos’aschikh-
s’a k istorii Zolotoj Ordy (« Collection of sources relating to the history of the Gol-
den Horde »), Saint Petersburg - Moscow - Leningrad, 1884-1941, vol. II (excerpts
from Persian sources), p. 25-26. A Russian translation of the late Turkish para-
phrase (Yazıjı-oghlu’s Saljūq-n∆me) : P.I. MELIORANSKY, « Seldzhuk-name kak
istochnik dl’a istorii Vizantii v XII–XIII vv. » Vizantiiskii Vremennik (« Byzantine
Chronicle ») 1 (1892), p. 613-640.
15. For a critical edition of MESARITES’s report based on three extant manus-
cripts, see : A. HEISENBERG, « Neue Quellen zur Geschichte des lateinischen Kai-
sertums und der Kirchenunion », in Sitzungsberichte Bayerischen Akademie der
Wissenschaften, Philos.-philol. und hist. Klasse, vol. III, Munich, 1923 ; another
edition based on an incomplete manuscript in Moscow and accompanied by a Rus-
sian translation : ARKHIMANDRIT ARSENIJ, Nekoego mitropolita Efesskogo, XIII
veka, ne izdannoe dosele proizvedenie, Moscow, 1893. For MESARITES’ accounts
and travels see : C. FOSS (with the collaboration of J. TULCHIN), Nicaea : a Byzan-
tine capital and its praises, with the speeches of Theodore Lascaris « In praise of
the Great City of Nicaea » and Theodore Metochites « Nicene oration », Brookline,
1996, p. 59-63. A useful examination of the testimony of Mesarites : A. VASILIEV,

80 Rustam Shukurov
ted 16. Ibn Bı̄bı̄ gives the most detailed and reliable version of the
course of events, although he almost completely omits their dates.
In contrast, Mesarites gives only a few allusions to the relevant
events, but provides us with the exact dates for them. Thus, a
parallel reading of these two basic sources allows us to reconstruct
the Trapezuntine-Seljuk war of 1214 quite accurately.
According to a plausible suggestion of M. Kur≤anskis, Alexius I
Grand Comnenus interfered in the internal dynastic strife in the
>
sultanat of Konya 17. Prince Al∆’ al-Dı̄n (sultan in 1219-1237),
during the lifetime of his father sultan Ghiy∆th al-Dı̄n Kai-Khus-
raw I, held the position of the vicegerent in Tokat in the province
of D∆nishmandiyya, which bordered on the north the lands of the
>
Grand Comneni. After the death of Kai-Khusraw I, Al∆’ al-Dı̄n
revolted and refused to acknowledge the supreme authority of his
>
brother Izz al-Dı̄n Kai-K∆’ūs I, who had ascended the throne on 28
June 1211 18.
>
According to Oriental and Armenian sources, Al∆’ al-Dı̄n enlis-
ted the support of parw∆na Z·ahı̄r al-Dı̄n Īlı̄, a descendant of the
« Mesarites as a source », Speculum 13 (1938), p. 180-182 ; S.P. KARPOV, « Trape-

zundskaja imperija v vizantijskoj istoricheskoj literature XIII–XV vv. », Vizan-
tiiskii Vremennik (« Byzantine Chronicle ») 35 (1973), p. 155.
16. See the latest publications on the subject : A.A.M. BRYER, « David Komne-
nos », \∞Ú¯ÂÖÔÓ ¶fiÓÙÔ˘ (« Pontic Archive ») 42 (1988/1989), p. 163-187 ; M. KUR-
∞ANSKIS, « L’Empire de Trébizonde et les Turcs », op. cit., p. 109-124 ; S.P. KAR-
POV, L’impero di Trebisonda, Venezia, Genova e Roma (1204–1461), Rome, 1986,
p. 230-234 ; A.G.C. SAVVIDES, Byzantium in the Near East, op. cit., p. 68–69 ;
OD. LAMPSIDIS, « La rivalité entre l’État des Grands Comnènes et celui de Nicée à
propos de l’héritage de l’idée byzantine », in Actes du XVe congrès international
d’études byzantines, vol. IV : Histoire, Athens, 1980, p. 186-191 ; IDEM, « ^√ àÓÙ·-
ÁˆÓÈÛÌe˜ ÌÂÙ·Íf ÙáÓ ÎÚ·ÙáÓ ÙÉ˜ ¡ÈÎ·›·˜ Î·d ÙáÓ ªÂÁ¿ÏˆÓ ∫ÔÌÓËÓáÓ ‰Èa ÙcÓ ÎÏËÚÔÓÔ-
Ì›·Ó ÙÉ˜ ‚˘˙·ÓÙÈÓÉ˜ å‰¤·˜ » (« The contest between the Empires of Nicaea and the
Grand Comneni for the heritage of Byzantinism »), \∞Ú¯ÂÖÔÓ ¶fiÓÙÔ˘ (« Pontic
Archive ») 34 (1977/1978), p. 3-19 ; P.I. ZHAVORONKOV, « U istokov obrazovanija
Nikejskoj imperii », p. 30-37 ; IDEM, « Nikeysko-latinskie i nikeysko-seldzhukskie
otnoshenija v 1211–1216 gg. » (« The Nicaean-Latin and Nicaean-Seljuk relations-
hips »), Vizantiiskii Vremennik (« Byzantine Chronicle ») 37 (1976), p. 48-61.
A. VASILIEV, « The foundation of the Empire of Trebizond (1204–1222) », op. cit.,
p. 21-27.
17. M. KUR∞ANSKIS, « L’Empire de Trébizonde et les Turcs », op. cit., p. 112 ;
see also CL. CAHEN, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, op. cit., p. 120-122.
18. 14 Muh·arram 608 H : Histoire des Seldjoukides (Ankara), op. cit., p. 43 ;
ANONYMOUS, Ta’rı̄kh-e ∆l-e Saljūq, op. cit., p. 86-87.

D∆nishmandid lineage, who apparently was an influential person in

the Tokat region, the former domain of the D∆nishmandids, as well
as his uncle Mughı̄th al-Dı̄n Tughrul b. Qılıch Arslan, the powerful
>
ruler of Erzurum (1201 or 1203 until 1225). In addition, Al∆’ al-
Dı̄n was supported by a Christian, the king of Cilician Armenia
Levon II (1187-1219) 19.
>
The allied forces blockaded Sultan Izz al-Dı̄n Kai-K∆’ūs I in
Kayseri sometime in 1211 20. However, the besiegers achieved no
decisive success, and soon the alliance disintegrated. First, king
Levon II led his army back to Armenia and soon after that Tugh-
>
rul-Sh∆h left Kayseri for Erzurum. As a result, Al∆’ al-Dı̄n, aban-
doned by his allies, escaped to Ankara but finally surrendered and
was imprisoned at Malatya by his brother 21. The siege of Ankara by
>
the sultan lasted for approximately a year, and Al∆’ al-Dı̄n sur-
rendered soon after the vernal equinox (21 March) of 1214 22.
It is possible, as M. Kur≤anskis suggests, that Alexius I Grand
>
Comnenus also rendered support to the revolt of Prince Al∆’ al-
>
Dı̄n. According to the account of Ibn Bı̄bı̄, when Sultan Izz al-Dı̄n
Kai-K∆’ūs I, after suppressing his brother’s revolt, stayed in Sivas,
« envoys came from the guards of the Sinop border and brought a
sealed message, according to which the crime and infringement of
kyr Alexius (kı̄r Aliks), the emperor (takwar) of Janı̄t, in the lands
[of Rūm] surpassed the borders of his realm, and his intrusions
into the reaches of the Sultan’s possessions exceeded all the
bounds » 23. The Ta’rı̄kh-i ∆l-i Saljūq also describes the invasion of
>
19. For close friendly relations between Al∆’ al-Dı̄n and Tughrul-Sh∆h, see :
IBN BĪBĪ (Mukhtas·ar), op. cit., p. 4018-4019 : « miy∆n-i ı̄sh∆n paywandı̄ rafta ».
20. Thus is dated the campaign of king Levon II by Smbat Sparapet (SMBAT
SPARAPET, Letopis’ [« Chronicle »], translation, introduction and commentary
A.G. GALSTIAN, Yerevan, 1974, p. 122 ; CHR. M. BARTIKIAN, ∆e µ˘˙¿ÓÙÈÔÓ Âå˜ Ùa˜
àÚÌÂÓÈÎa˜ ËÁ¿˜ [«Byzantium in Armenian sources»], Thessalonika, 1981, p. 125).
21. IBN BĪBĪ (Mukhtas·ar), op. cit., p. 40-44 and 50 ; ABŪ ‘L-FIDĀ, p. 248-250 ;
SMBAT SPARAPET, Letopis’, op. cit., p. 122 ; ABŪ AL-FARAJ, Mukhtas·ar ta’rı̄kh al-
duwal (« An abrigded history of dynasties »), Beirut, 1890, p. 364.
>
22. The date of Al∆’ al-Dı̄n’s surrender is found in the chronicle of ABŪ ‘L-
FIDĀ, 610 H, that is, 1213-1214 ; for the duration of the siege and the month, see :
IBN BĪBĪ (Mukhtas·ar), op. cit., p. 491–492, 499-510.
23. IBN BĪBĪ (Ankara), op. cit., p. 147 ; IBN BĪBĪ (Mukhtas·ar), op. cit., p. 54 ;
H. DUDA, Die Seltschukengeschichte, op. cit., p. 64.

82 Rustam Shukurov
« the large army » of Alexius I « from the direction of Sinop » 24. In

the context of the preceding events, there could be little doubt that
the Trapezuntines tried to take advantage of the internal strife in
the sultanate. It is not clear when the Greek forces invaded the sul-
tan’s possessions : during the allied siege of Kayseri or later during
>
the struggle for Ankara in order to help the besieged Al∆’ al-Dı̄n.
Nonetheless, it is very likely that the Greeks were on the side of the
allies, at least one of whom, Tughrul-Sh∆h, was on good terms with
the Grand Comneni, as the subsequent events of the 1220s would
clearly show 25.
The location of the sultan’s camp at that moment is also note-
>
worthy : Izz al-Dı̄n Kai-K∆’ūs I and his army stood close to the sul-
tanate’s northern borders with the Empire of Trebizond and the
lands of Tughrul-Sh∆h. Consequently, one may think, the threat
from the north was no surprise to the Seljuks.
>
Izz al-Dı̄n Kai-K∆’ūs I, having received such alarming news,
marched towards Sinop, famous as an impregnable stronghold that
could only be taken by a combined attack from land and sea. By
chance, at that moment Alexius I was hunting in the vicinity of
Sinop. A Seljuk detachment suddenly attacked Alexius I during a
royal banquet. After a short battle, the emperor was captured and
brought to the sultan’s camp 26.
When the sultan demanded from Alexius I the surrender of
Sinop, the emperor sent to the city « one of his grand amı̄rs » 27, who
was captured with him, with a letter written in Greek ordering capi-
tulation. The defenders of Sinop refused to surrender saying that
« even if kyr Alexius has been captured, he has worthy sons growing
24. However, according to Ta’rı̄kh-i ∆l-i Saljūq, the sultan was staying at that
moment at Kayseri : Histoire des Seldjoukides (Ankara), op. cit., p. 43-44 ; ANO-
NYMOUS, Ta’rı̄kh-e ∆l-e Saljūq, op. cit., p. 87.
25. See below section II.
26. IBN BĪBĪ (Ankara), op. cit., p. 147-149 ; IBN BĪBĪ (Mukhtas·ar), op. cit.,
p. 54-55 ; H. DUDA, Die Seltschukengeschichte, op. cit., p. 64-65. ABŪ AL-FARAJ
errs maintaining that kyr Alexius was killed by the sultan (The Chronography of
Gregory Abû’l-Faraj, op. cit., p. 369).
27. In the text : amı̄r-i buzurg ; the Persian author might have meant a Trape-
zuntine court title with the first element Ì¤Á·˜ (see : PSEUDO-KODINOS, Traité des
offices, introduction, texte et traduction par J. VERPEAUX, Paris, 1966, p. 344-
349).

up in Janı̄t. We shall enthrone one of them but shall never give up

this land to the Muslims 28. »
Mesarites gives us the approximate date of Alexius’ captivity 29.
In two passages, he mentions the coming of a « Divine messenger »,
who brought good news about a sudden dramatic failure on the part
of « the arrogant » Alexius I Grand Comnenus 30, which, as I sug-
gest, could have been nothing else than his capture by the Seljuks.
As a result of this failure, « the lands located to the North [i.e.,
Paphlagonia] then passed under the sole dominion of our emperor
[i.e., Theodore Lascaris] 31. » This happened shortly before the
death of patriarch Michael IV Autorianus on 26 August 1214. The-
refore, the terminus ante quem for the Seljuk attack against Sinop
and Alexius I’s captivity was the end of August 1214.
Although, according to Mesarites’ report, some lands in Paphla-
gonia had fallen into the hands of the Nicaeans around August
1214, emperor Theodore Lascaris wished to lead the army to « the
land of the Paphlagonians » himself, probably aiming at the main
Grand Comnenian strongholds in the area of Heraclea and Amas-
tris. However, the immediate task of the election of a new patriarch
prevented him from setting out for Paphlagonia. On 28 September
1214, the new patriarch Theodore Irenicus was finally elected.
« Immediately after that », Theodore I Lascaris « impetuously attac-
ked the land of the Paphlagonians, which he subjected to his invin-
cible hand in seven days of conquest with only his war-cry » 32. The-
refore, sometime in October 1214 Theodore I Lascaris launched his
offensive against the Grand Comneni, which lasted until the end of
28. IBN BĪBĪ (Ankara), op. cit., p. 150 ; IBN BĪBĪ (Mukhtas·ar), op. cit., p. 56 ;
H. DUDA, Die Seltschukengeschichte, op. cit., p. 66. The people of Sinop meant
John Axoukhos (elder son of Alexius who ruled as emperor in 1235-1238) and
Ioannikios, who in 1238 was sent to a monastery (MICHAEL PANARETOS, op. cit.,
p. 6117 ; for more details on this see : R. SHUKUROV, « The enigma of David Grand
Komnenos », Mésogeios 12 [2001], p. 125-136).
29. For a more extensive textual analyses of MESARITES narration in connec-
tion with IBN BĪBĪ’s evidence see in my Russian book : R. SHUKUROV, Velikie Kom-
niny i Vostok (1204-1461), Saint Petersburg, 2001, p. 94, 98-99.
30. A. HEISENBERG, « Neue Quellen », op. cit., p. 117-116.
31. Ibid., p. 1814–1822 ; ARKHIMANDRIT ARSENII, op. cit., p. 15-16 ; see also the
commentaries in : A. HEISENBERG, « Neue Quellen », op. cit., p. 66 ; A. VASILIEV,
« Mesarites as a Source », op. cit., p. 181.
32. A. HEISENBERG, « Neue Quellen », op. cit., p. 191-194.

84 Rustam Shukurov
October when he returned from Paphlagonia 33. In mid-November

1214, Mesarites reported to the Latin cardinal Pelagius of Albano
about the Nicaean military « success during this year » (« Ù‹ÙÈÓÔÓ
Î·ÙfiÚıˆÌ· ») 34, as a result of which Theodore I Lascaris, « with the
aid of God, subdued by his irresistible power and hand the entire
land of the Paphlagonians along with its fortified cities » 35. Seemin-
gly, the seaports and fortresses of Heraclea and Amastris were
conquered by the Nicaeans during that campaign of October 1214.
Meanwhile, during September and October 1214, the Seljuks
had been besieging Sinop. According to the anonymous Ta’rı̄kh, a
certain Seljuk commander Bahr∆m Taranblūsı̄ ( ? ) burned to
ashes the Greek fleet in the Sinop harbour, thus completely cutting
>
the city’s connection with the outside world 36. Izz al-Dı̄n Kai-K∆’ūs
I finally resorted to extreme measures : he ordered the torturing of
Alexius I in sight of the defenders of Sinop. Having seen their empe-
ror’s agony, the Sinopitans surrendered on condition that the sul-
tan would grant the emperor life and freedom, and would allow the
Sinopitans to leave the city with their families and belongings 37.
This occurred on 1 November 1214 (26 Jum∆d∆ II 611), according
to commemorative Arabic and Greek inscriptions on a tower in
Sinop built the following year (1215) 38.
33. A. HEISENBERG, « Neue Quellen », op. cit., p. 198-113, and « Commenta-

ries » on p. 68 and 74.
34. That is, the year 6723 of the Byzantine era, starting 1 September 1214.
35. A. HEISENBERG, « Neue Quellen », op. cit., p. 2518–19, 263–6 ; ARKHIMANDRIT
ARSENII, op. cit., p. 31-32. Cf. with the suggestion of P.I. ZHAVORONKOV, « Nikeis-
ko-trapezundskie otnosheniia v 1213-1223 gg. » (« The relations between Nicaea
and Trebizond in 1213-1223 »), in Vizaniiskie ocherki (« Essays on the history of
Byzantium »), Moscow, 1982, p. 184-186, according to whom Lascaris, in October
and November 1214, not once but twice invaded Paphlagonia, but this assumption
has no basis in MESARITES’ text.
36. Histoire de seldjoukides (Ankara), op. cit., p. 44 ; ANONYMOUS, Ta’rı̄kh-e
∆l-e Saljūq, op. cit., p. 87.
37. IBN BĪBĪ (Mukhtas·ar), op. cit., p. 56-57 ; H. DUDA, Die Seltschukenge-
schichte, op. cit., p. 66. Exhibiting the torture of noble captives was a known tac-
tic for taking fortresses ; for instance, cf. the Seljuk siege of Dadybra in 1196,
which surrendered as soon as the Turks made some Greek strategoi walk along the
city walls in chains (NICETAS CHONIATES, op. cit., vol. I, p. 474).
38. A. HEISENBERG, « Neue Quelle », op. cit., p. 70-71 ; IBN BĪBĪ (Mukhtas·ar),
op. cit., p. 56-57 ; H. DUDA, Die Seltschukengeschichte, op. cit., p. 66-67 ; A.A.M.
BRYER - D. WINFIELD, The Byzantine monuments, op. cit., vol. I, p. 71-72, 88.

The anonymous Ta’rı̄kh adds that, in Sinop, the Seljuks captu-

red and executed 30 Constantinopolitan Francs (farang∆n) with
their commander (amı̄r) 39. It remains unclear, however, who these
Francs were (mercenaries or allied forces of the Latins of Constan-
tinople) and why the terms of the capitulation did not protect that
Latin detachment. The fact is that between 1206 and 1208 the
Latins of Constantinople fought on the Trapezuntine side against
Theodore Lascaris, therefore it is not impossible that in 1214 the
Latin allies of Alexios also participated in the defense of Sinop.
In Sinop, the sultan and Alexius I concluded a peace treaty 40.
Ibn Bı̄bı̄ probably cites the Persian original of it, according to
which, as the emperor promised, « if the sultan grants me, kyr
Alexius, life and turns over to me and my scions Janı̄t 41 outside the
fortress of Sinop and its vicinities, I will give annually [to the sul-
tan] ten thousand dinars, five hundred horses, two thousand catt-
le, ten thousand sheep, fifty pack-loads of diverse goods, and also
if the sultan asks for aid, I will help with all my army, as many [sol-
39. Histoire de seldjoukides (Ankara), op. cit., p. 44 ; ANONYMOUS, Ta’rı̄kh-e

∆l-e Saljūq, op. cit., p. 87. The Persian text refers to the Latins with the obscure
phrase « farang∆n-i rūmiy∆n », which probably has to be corrected to « farang∆n-
i rūmı̄ » (« the Roman », i.e., Constantinopolitan Francs), as on the page 85 of the
same chronicle. See : CL. CAHEN, « Seldjoukides de Rûm, byzantins et francs d’a-
près le “ Seljuknameh ” anonyme », in Mélanges Henri Grégoire, Brussels, 1951,
vol. III, p. 102 ; M. KUR∞ANSKIS, « L’Empire de Trébizonde et les Turcs », op. cit.,
p. 113.
40. According to IBN BĪBĪ, the text of the treaty was compiled by the sultan’s
nūt·∆r∆n (from Grec ÓÔÙ¿ÚÈÔÈ, « scribes »). H. DUDA suggests that IBN BĪBĪ meant
« the Greek bureau » in the sultan’s chancery (Die Seltschukengeschichte, op. cit.,
p. 67 and note b). For Greek secretaries at the Seljuk royal chancery, see :
SP. VRYONIS, The decline, op. cit., p. 233 (with valuable bibliographic referen-
ces), p. 470 ; CL. CAHEN, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, op. cit., p. 227.
41. For the semantic content of the place-name Janı̄t, see : A.A.M. BRYER,
« Some notes on the Laz and Tzan (II) », Bedi Kartlisa XXIII-XXIV [52-53]
(1967), p. 161-169 and especially p. 163-164 (IDEM, Peoples and settlement in
Anatolia and the Caucasus, 800–1900, Variorum collected studies series, London,
1988, n˚ XIVb) ; E. ZHORDANIA, « Etnicheskii sostav naseleniia Ponta v XIII-XV
vv. Chast’ I : lazy » (« The ethnic composition of the Pontic population in the 13th-
15th centuries. Part I : The Lazs »), Byzantinoslavica 58 (1997), p. 125-139 ; IDEM,
« Etnicheskii sostav naseleniia Ponta v XIII-XV vv. i nekotorye voprosy toponimi-
ki Ponta. Chast’ II : chany » (« The ethnic composition of the Pontic population in
the 13th-15th centuries and some questions of Pontic toponyms. Part II : The
Tzans »], Byzantinoslavica 60 (1999), p. 71-86.

86 Rustam Shukurov
diers] as will be [at my disposal] » 42. After that, Alexius I and his
entourage set off aboard ship to Janı̄t, by which Ibn Bı̄bı̄ appears
to mean the Byzantine province of Chaldia or the city of Trebizond
itself.
Despite the shattering defeat in November 1214, the Grand
Comnenus Alexius I appears to have tried to save the situation in
Paphlagonia. In the second half of November Theodore I Lascaris
carried out his second campaign to the area, because, according to
Mesarites, « the viper’s offspring, the dragon’s progeny [i.e.,
Alexius I Grand Comnenus] is yet stirring his tail » 43. Lascaris did
not, however, meet any serious resistance. Mesarites, who had visi-
ted the Nicaean emperor in the recently conquered Heraclea in
early December 1214, reports that he found Lascaris being in the
mood, and not too proud, to take control over « so many large cities
full of riches » « without shedding blood or murder » at all 44.
This Nicaean campaign in November 1214 was the last episode
in the Paphlagonian drama. Thus, Theodore and the sultan com-
pleted the partition of the former Comnenian Paphlagonia. The
major part of the province passed to the Nicaean Greeks, while the
city of Sinop, perhaps the most valuable part of the northern Ana-
tolian coast, fell to the Turks. It is not impossible that the Seljuks
recovered Samsun in addition to Sinop 45.
Greek-Turkish coalitions
The events of 1205-1208 had clearly demonstrated the real

extent of the military capabilities of the Grand Comneni. They suc-
42. IBN BĪBĪ (Ankara), op. cit., p. 153 ; IBN BĪBĪ (Mukhtas·ar), op. cit., p. 57-
58 ; H. DUDA, Die Seltschukengeschichte, op. cit., p. 67. The authenticity of IBN
BĪBĪ’s version of Alexius I’s obligations is confirmed by the narration of JOHN LAZA-
ROPOULOS concerning the events of the 1230 (see : J.O. ROSENQVIST, The hagiogra-
phic dossier of St. Eugenios of Trebizond. A critical edition with introduction,
translation, commentary and indexes, Uppsala, 1996, line 1578 and below sec-
tion II).
43. A. HEISENBERG, « Neue Quellen », op. cit., p. 3315–17 ; P.I. ZHAVORONKOV,
« Nikeisko-trapezundskie otnosheniia », op. cit., p. 186 and n. 19.
44. A. HEISENBERG, « Neue Quellen », op. cit., p. 3326-31 ; ARKHIMANDRIT ARSE-
NII, op. cit., p. 50.
45. M. KUR∞ANSKIS, « L’Empire de Trébizonde et les Turcs », op. cit., p. 114.

cessfully beat back the attacks of Theodore I Lascaris against

Paphlagonia and repulsed the Seljuk offensive against Trebizond.
Although it is true that they failed to defeat Lascaris and reach
Constantinople, they did defend their own territories quite effecti-
vely. This was why, after 1208 and until 1214, Lascaris dared not
start hostilities on the Paphlagonian front. There can be little
doubt that, in the autumn of 1214, the Grand Comneni still had at
their disposal considerable military, financial and man-power
resources for more persistent and successful resistance on two
fronts. The victory of the Seljuks and Nicaeans seems to be even
more incredible if one recalls that Sinop and all of Paphlagonia had
been lost without serious clashes, except for the two-month siege of
Sinop, which had certainly not been especially bloody.
In order to explain that sudden failure of the Grand Comneni,
as a result of which they had quickly abandoned almost half their
possessions, one may put forward at least two hypotheses. First, it
is obvious that the success of the Seljuks and Nicaeans was quite
paradoxically predestined by the absurd carelessness of Alexius I,
who, amusing himself with hunting, happened to be at the wrong
place at the wrong time. Second, as I have suggested elsewhere, it is
not impossible that Alexius I lacked the real support of his subjects,
at least in Paphlagonia, owing to his conflict with his junior brother
David, the former ruler of Paphlagonia, who was probably arres-
ted and sent to Athos before 1212. This was why Mesarites noted no
serious resistance in Paphlagonia during the two campaigns of the
Nicaeans in 1214 46.
However, there is one more factor, probably of no less impor-
tance, that influenced the war’s effects. A parallel analysis of the
course of hostilities on both anti-Comnenian fronts leaves no doubt
that Lascaris and the sultan had acted in close collusion against the
Comneni. The logic of these events itself testifies to the existence of
some agreement between the Nicaean and Turkish military actions.
Theodore and the Seljuq sultan most likely had made a bargain in
regard to the details of their joint attack against the Comneni,
agreeing beforehand on the partition of Paphlagonia. Otherwise,
the war against the Comneni would inevitably have developed into
a Nicaean-Seljuk war for supremacy in the region.
46. R. SHUKUROV, « The enigma », op. cit.

88 Rustam Shukurov
Some years before the Paphlagonian war, there occurred an

acute crises in Nicaean-Seljuk relations, which ended with a large-
scale clash on the Meander river (1211). In the course of that batt-
le, sultan Ghiy∆th al-Dı̄n, former ally of Theodore I, was killed by
the sword of either a Frankish mercenary or Theodore Lascaris
>
himself 47. However, immediately after Izz al-Dı̄n Kai-K∆’ūs I
ascended the throne in June 1211, Theodore did everything possi-
ble to restore the former friendly relations with the Seljuks. First,
he sent to Konya an embassy of reconciliation bearing fabulously
rich gifts. Afterwards the sultan and the emperor exchanged oaths
of fidelity. Strengthening the renewed alliance, Theodore I also sent
an additional twenty thousand dinars to be distributed as alms to
the poor on the occasion of the interment of the remains of Ghiy∆th
al-Dı̄n at the dynastic burial vault at Konya 48.
Keeping in mind the subsequent events in Paphlagonia, one may
safely propose that one of the motives of the rapid Nicaean-Seljuk
rapprochement was the common goal of neutralizing the Grand
Comneni who were equally dangerous to both Nicaeans and Sel-
juks. Furthermore, it is not impossible that Byzantine Sinop (let us
forget for a moment the « party » divisions among the Byzantine
Greeks) served as Lascaris’ payment to the sultan for his aid in
defeating the Grand Comneni. The latter circumstance predestined
the really catastrophic aftermath of the Paphlagonian war for the
future of Byzantinism and Hellenism.
The split
in the Anatolian front
During the Paphlagonian war, there were no bloody battles, no

hundreds falling in action. Yet, its historical significance can be
compared with that of the crucial battle of Mantzikert (1071).
47. For Nicaean-Seljuk relations at that time, see : CL. CAHEN, Pre-Ottoman
Turkey, op. cit., p. 120.
48. IBN BĪBĪ (Mukhtas·ar), op. cit., p. 45-47 ; H. DUDA, Die Seltschukenges-
chichte, op. cit., p. 57-58 ; Histoire de seldjoucides (Ankara), op. cit., p. 43 ;
CL. CAHEN, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, op. cit., p. 120-122 ; M. KUR∞ANSKIS, « L’Empi-
re de Trébizonde et les Turcs », op. cit., p. 111-112.

From the standpoint of the future of Hellenism in Asia Minor in

general, the loss of Sinop by the Byzantines (no matter whether
« Nicaean » or « Trapezuntine » Byzantines) meant in fact that the
Byzantine Greeks lost forever the possibility of a strategic initiati-
ve in the northern part of the Byzantine-Turkish front.
The fact is that, at the time of Lascaris, all the former advan-
tages of the Paphlagonian linkage between Bithynia and Chaldia
from the Nicaean point of view suddenly turned into a dangerous
disadvantage. Paphlagonia now represented a danger to the exis-
tence of the Nicaean state itself because it served as a foothold for
the attempts of the Grand Comneni to break through to Constanti-
nople. This danger prompted Theodore to accept the Seljuk occu-
pation of Sinop as the lesser of two evils.
As a result, for the first time in Byzantine history, the sphere of
Byzantine control in the western and northern parts of the Anato-
lian front was split into two parts. Each enclave was tightly blocka-
ded by the ujs (marches) of the nomadic Turkmen. By the begin-
ning of the fourteenth century, the western Anatolian enclave had
been destroyed and almost entirely assimilated by the Turks, while
the eastern enclave, consolidated by the Empire of Trebizond,
fought more effectively for its survival until 1461. The fall of Sinop
opened a new stage in the Turkification of Anatolia that was cha-
racterized by confining and then gradually reducing the Greek and
Armenian enclaves. The year 1214 raised the question of the survi-
val of the Greek Byzantine element in Anatolia.
If we look at the same events from the Turkish side, it is evident
that before the Fourth Crusade the Turko-Muslim element in Ana-
tolian politics had been strictly confined to inner Anatolia by the
Byzantines from the west and north and by the Armenians from the
south. In the twelfth century, the Turks, despite all their military
strength and belligerence, were never the predominant power in
Anatolia. At the beginning of the thirteenth century, it was still pos-
sible for the Byzantines to continue blockading the Turks within
the inner regions and to push them back from strategic points along
the Meander and in Pisidia, Phrigia, inner Paphlagonia and Helle-
nopontos.
In the twelfth century, the absence of strategic access to the sea,
and especially to the Black Sea, was of constant concern to the Sel-
juk sultans. The blockade of the trade routes leading to the Black
Sea and the Mediterranean and the ruination of the usual course of

90 Rustam Shukurov
trade inevitably provoked strong reactions from the Seljuks 49. In

1197, a similar motive underlay the quarrel between Alexius III
Angelus and Ghiy∆th al-Dı̄n Kai-Khusraw I. A few years later (ca.
1200), Byzantine piracy in the Black Sea, sanctioned by Alexius III,
led to a new Byzantine-Seljuk conflict. Finally, in 1205-1206, a
sharp clash once again occurred owing to the severing of trade rou-
tes. In 1207, Ghiy∆th al-Dı̄n heard complaints of resentful mer-
chants and ordered the storming of Antalya on the Mediterranean
shore 50. This success was expanded in 1221 with the capture of
Kolonoros on the eastern coast of the bay of Antalya ; between 1221
and 1225 the Seljuks continued their expansion, seizing the coastli-
ne as far as Seleucia 51.
Thus, having conquered the Mediterranean coastline at Anta-
lya, the Seljuks finally destroyed the bridge between the Nicaean
Greeks and Cilician Armenia. But the importance of Sinop was pro-
bably even greater in this regard. It must be emphasised that after
the conquest of Sinop there appeared a potential for a Turkish
attack on Constantinople itself along the main strategic route lea-
ding from Paphlagonia to Nicomedeia-Scoutari, which would
remain a reality as late as the rise of the Ottoman sultanate in the
fourteenth century.
The fall of Sinop signalled one more future direction of Turkish
expansion, which would only be fully developed during Ottoman
times : the Crimea and south Russian steppes. The Seljuks took the
first step sometime in the 1220s when the Seljuk governor of Kasta-
monu, the beglerbeg H · us∆m al-Dı̄n Choban, crossed the sea, inva-
ded the Crimea, and captured Sougdaia (Sudak). The Seljuks pro-
bably controlled Sougdaia until the Mongol conquest in 1239 52.
49. CL. CAHEN, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, op. cit., p. 121-123, 167 ; IDEM, « Le
commerce anatolien au début du XIIIe siècle », op. cit., p. 91–101 ; SP. VRYONIS,
The decline, op. cit., p. 132-133.
50. NICETAS CHONIATES, Historia, op. cit., vol. I, p. 528-529 ; IBN BĪBĪ (Mukh-
tas·ar), op. cit., p. 33 ; IBN AL-ATHĪR, op. cit., vol. XII, p. 160 ; C.M. BRAND,
Byzantium confronts the West (1180-1204), Cambridge (Mass.), 1968, p. 137-
138 ; CL. CAHEN, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, op. cit., p. 116-117, 119-120, 164-165 ;
M. KUR∞ANSKIS, « L’Empire de Trébizonde et les Turcs », op. cit., p. 111.
51. CL. CAHEN, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, op. cit., p. 124.
52. IBN BĪBĪ (Ankara), op. cit., p. 300-333 ; H. DUDA, Die Seltschukenges-
chichte, op. cit., p. 130-139. CL. CAHEN dated Choban’s attack to 1225 : Pre-Otto-
man Turkey, op. cit., p. 125-126, 166-167 (for Choban, see also : p. 229, 243-244).

Thus, the events of 1214 fundamentally changed the strategic

balance in northern Anatolia to the advantage of the Turks and
with the fall of Antalya in 1207 marked the end of the continental
blockade of the Seljuqs 53. The Turks had now gained indisputable
leadership in Anatolian politics.
R.-J. Lilie wrote : « The first conquerors of Constantinople had
not been the Turks but the Venetians and the knights of the crusa-
de [...]. And who knows, if without the Fourth Crusade the sack of
1453 would ever have taken place 54 ? » Indeed, without the Fourth
Crusade the dramatic situation of 1214 would not have been possi-
ble and two equally legitimate, or equally illegitimate, Roman
emperors, Theodore I Lascaris and Alexius I Comnenus, would
hardly have become rivals. On the other hand, I would argue that
Theodore, who undoubtedly possessed a minor state’s view of the
world, did not and surely could not possess an all-Byzantine world
view. In 1214, his bargain with the Seljuks over Sinop resulted in
his brilliant victory over the Grand Comneni. But that victory,
which had a local and therefore restricted positive meaning, in the
context of the general strategy of the survival of Byzantine civiliza-
tion, may be evaluated only as a decisive defeat. This defeat is com-
parable with the Manzikert catastrophe in 1071. If the Byzantine
defeat at Manzikert opened the doors of Anatolia to the Seljuqs, the
Byzantine victory of Lascaris closed the doors of Anatolia to the
Greeks forever. The process of Turkification of the peninsula had
acquired an irreversible character.
For a different dating (1221 or 1222), see : A. KUNIK, « O sviazi trapezundsko-

sel’ddzhukskoi voiny s pervym nashestviem tatar na Severnoe Prichernomorie »
(« On the connection between the Trepezuntine-Seljuk war with the first Tatar
attack aginst the northern Black Sea region »), Uchenye zapiski Imperatorskoi
Akademii nauk (« Transactions of the Imperial Academy of Sciences »), 1854,
vol. II, p. 734-746 ; A.YU. YAKUBOVSKY, « Rasskaz Ibn al-Bibi », p. 53-77 (A.YU.
YAKUBOVSKY suggested that the Seljuks used the Trapezuntine fleet for crossing the
Black Sea) ; N.M. BOGDANOVA, « Kherson v X-XV vv. Problemy istorii vizanyiis-
kogo goroda » (« Cherson in the 10th-15th centuries. Problems of the history of a
Byzantine city »), in Prichernomorie v srednie veka (« The Black Sea region in the
Middle Ages »), Moscow, 1991, vol. I, p. 95.
53. See A. VASILIEV, The Goths in the Crimea, Cambridge (Mass.), 1936,
p. 158-159.
54. R.-J. LILIE, « Twelfth-century Byzantine and Turkish states », op. cit.,
p. 36.

92 Rustam Shukurov
In any case, after 1214, the lands of the Grand Comneni were
confined to approximately the borders of the former province of
Chaldia. Thus the Empire of Trebizond was drastically reduced to
a marginal regional power incomparable in importance to the Sel-
juks and Nicaeans.
Part II :
The Trapezuntine-Seljuk wars
of 1223-1230
The Grand Comneni did not resign themselves to either the loss
of Sinop or the humiliating terms of the Trapezuntine-Seljuk trea-
ty of 1214. They entered a long period of rivalry with the Seljuks.
Emperor Andronicus I Gidus (1222-1235), successor and son-in-
law of Alexius I, probably took part in anti-Seljuk alliances, which
often were structurally quite complex but not effective enough to
defend the vital interests of the Empire of Trebizond.
The enigma
of John Lazaropoulos
The relations between the Empire of Trebizond and the Seljuks

in the 1220s are mentioned in a number of Greek sources (those of
Constantine Loukites, John Lazaropoulos, Michael Panaretos,
Bessarion) that describe the attack of a Seljuk malik (ªÂÏ›Î) on
Trebizond and his defeat 55. The earliest accounts belong to Cons-
55. A new edition of the Saint Eugenios’ miracles by CONSTANTINE LOUKITES

and JOHN LAZAROPOULOS with an English translation and commentary : J.O.
ROSENQVIST, The hagiographic dossier, op. cit., p. 164-165 (Lk) and p. 308-335
(LzS) ; JOHN LAZAROPOULOS’ « Logos » contains a brief and less informative
account of the Seljuk attack : p. 244 (LzL). See also an old edition of the relevant
texts of CONSTANTINE LOUKITES and JOHN LAZAROPOULOS : A. PAPADOPOLOS-KERA-
MEUS, Sbornik istochnikov po istorii Trapezundskoi imperii, Saint Petersburg,
1897, p. 30-31 (CONSTANTINE LOUKITES’ « Enkomion », p. 76 and 116-136 [JOHN
LAZAROPOULOS] ; for further bibliographical references see : J.O. ROSENQVIST, The
hagiographic dossier, op. cit., p. 434-457).
BESSARION’s account of the Seljuk attack : BESSARION, « ^√ “ Âå˜ ∆Ú·Â˙ÔÜÓÙ· ”
ÏfiÁÔ˜ ÙÔÜ µËÛÛ·Ú›ˆÓÔ˜ » (« “ The praise of Trebizond ” of Bessarion »), ed. OD.

tantine Loukites (probably compiled at the end of the thirteenth or

beginning of the fourteenth century) and John Lazaropoulos (pro-
bably compiled before 1364). But the most detailed and reliable
version of this event is that of John Lazaropoulos’ « Synopsis » of
the Miracles of Saint Eugenius 56. The story concerning the full-
scale Trapezuntine-Seljuk war on land and sea has been given,
paraphrased and commented on more than once 57. However, as the
recent scholar of the « Synopsis », J.O. Rosenqvist 58, has clearly
shown, the hagiographical narration of John Lazaropoulos repre-
sents a very complex text, presumably containing authentic and
reliable historical material from several other sources of different
genres and periods, but restructured and completely rewritten by
the hagiographer ; and this genetic complexity of the text is the main
LAMPSIDES, \∞Ú¯ÂÖÔÓ ¶fiÓÙÔ˘ (« Pontic Archive ») 39 (1984), p. 67-69 ; MICHAEL

PANARETOS’ reference : ªÈ¯·cÏ ÙÔÜ ¶·Ó·Ú¤ÙÔ˘, ¶ÂÚd ÙáÓ ªÂÁ¿ÏˆÓ ∫ÔÌÓËÓáÓ
(« Michael Panaretos’ History of the Grand Comneni »), ed. OD. LAMPSIDES,
Athens, 1958, p. 618-10.
These Greek accounts have been collected and translated into English by
A.G.C. SAVVIDES : « The Trapezuntine sources of the Seljuq attack on Trebizond
in A.D. 1222–1223. English translation and commentary », \∞Ú¯ÂÖÔÓ ¶fiÓÙÔ˘ (« Pon-
tic Archive ») 43 (1991), p. 102-129 ; see also : IDEM, Byzantium in the Near East :
its relations with the Seljuk sultanate of Rum in Asia Minor, the Armenians of Cili-
cia and the Mongols, Thessalonika, 1981, p. 156-171. A.G.C. SAVVIDES’ identifica-
tion of a passage from JOHN LAZAROPOULOS’ « Logos » and two passages from BES-
SARION’s « Enkomion » as relating to the Seljuk attack is not convincing (« The Tra-
pezuntine sources », op. cit., p. 120, § 1, p. 124–126, § 1–2).
56. For the date of the compilation of these texts see : J.O. ROSENQVIST, The
hagiographic dossier, op. cit., p. 25, 41.
57. German translation : J.F. FALLMERAYER, Original Fragmente, Chroniken,
Inschriften und anderes Materiale zur Geschichte des Kaisertums Trapezunt,
part I, in Abhandlungen der hist. Klasse der bayerischen Akademie der Wissen-
schaften, 1843, vol. I, p. 17-33, 107-109 ; Russian rendition and commentaries :
A. KUNIK, « O sviazi trapezundsko-sel’ddzhukskoi voiny », op. cit., p. 734-746 ;
F. USPENSKII, Ocherki iz istorii Trapezundskoi imperii, op. cit., p. 48-58 ; French
rendition and analyses : E. JANSSENS, Trébizonde en Colchide, op. cit., p. 72-76 ;
on the English translation by A.G.C. SAVVIDES, see note 62 ; A.A.M. BRYER -
D. WINFIELD, The Byzantine monuments, op. cit., vol. I, p. 182-183, 353-355 ;
M. KUR∞ANSKIS, « L’Empire de Trébizonde et les Turcs », op. cit., p. 115-117. For
additional bibliographical references, see : A.G.C. SAVVIDES, « The Trapezuntine
sources », op. cit., p. 129.
58. J.O. ROSENQVIST, The hagiographic dossier, op. cit., p. 50-63, and espe-
cially conclusive remarks on p. 63.

94 Rustam Shukurov
obstacle to its proper understanding. To be sure, J.O. Rosenqvist,

in his introductory study to the new edition of John Lazaropoulos’
text, has summed up the previous attempts to interpret the Melik
story. Yet it remains unclear when the Trapezuntine-Seljuk war
occurred and who was this Melik attacking Trebizond.
As I have attempted to show elsewhere, the failure to solve the
enigma of this Melik lies in the fact that scholars have tried to inter-
pret this story as an inclusive piece of evidence relating to events all
dated to 1223 (according to the introductory passage of John Laza-
ropoulos’ narration). However, John Lazaropoulos himself, having
indicated 1223 as the starting point of the entire sequence of addu-
ced facts, nowhere states that all the events he describes occurred
in the same year. In fact, a textual analysis of the « Synopsis »
allows one to distinguish its different layers, and, with the aid of
parallel evidence from Arabic and Persian sources, to divide conve-
niently the historical content of the Melik story into separate infor-
mational units each concerning a separate event relating to a diffe-
rent time, and possibly, going back to different source texts 59.
One may distinguish the following major episodes in the histori-
cal content of the « Synopsis » :
— Episode A describes the renewal of the peace treaty (the trea-
ty of 1214 is obviously meant) between Andronicus I Gidus and
« the sultan Melik », son of « the great sultan Al∆’ al-Dı̄n » (\∞Ï·Ù›-
>
ÓË˜ ™···Ù›ÓË˜) 60, « in the second year of the reign » of the emperor
59. For a textual and historical analyses of JOHN LAZAROPOULOS’ Malik story,
see : R. SHUKUROV, Velikie Komniny i Vostok, op. cit., p. 126-138.
>
60. Apparently, Ghiy∆th al-Dı̄n Kai-Khusraw, son of Al∆’ al-Dı̄n Kai-Qub∆dh,
is meant, who probably bore the title of malik during the reign of his father. Other
>
identifications seem less plausible : a) with Al∆’ al-Dı̄n Kai-Qub∆dh himself (J.F.
FALLMERAYER, Original Fragmente, op. cit., p. 107-109 ; A. KUNIK, « O sviazi tra-
pezundsko-sel’ddzhukskoi voiny », op. cit., p. 736 ; E. JANSSENS, Trébizonde, op.
cit., p. 72, note 2 ; A.G.C. SAVVIDES, « °È· ÙËÓ Ù·˘ÙfiÙËÙ· ÙÔ˘ “ ªÂÏ›Î ” ÛÙËÓ ÛÂÏ-
Ù˙Ô˘ÎÈÎ‹ ÂÎÛÙÚ·ÙÂ›· ÙÔ˘ 1222-1223 Î·Ù¿ ÙË˜ ∆Ú·Â˙Ô‡ÓÙ·˜ », in ¶Ú·ÎÙÈÎ¿ π¢ã ¶·ÓÂÏ-
ÏËÓ›Ô˘ πÛÙÔÚÈÎÔ‡ ™˘ÓÂ‰Ú›Ô˘, Thessalonika, 1994, p. 79-88) ; b) with Tughrul-Sh∆h
of Erzurum (CL. CAHEN, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, op. cit., p. 125 ; A.A.M. BRYER,
« Greeks and Turkmens : the Pontic exception », Dumbarton Oaks Papers 29
[1975] [IDEM, The Empire of Trebizond and the Pontos, Collected studies series,
London, 1980, n˚ V], p. 123 ; A.A.M. BRYER - D. WINFIELD, The Byzantine monu-
ments, op. cit., vol. I, p. 182). For further discussion of the existing points of view
on the identity of Melik, see : R. SHUKUROV, Velikie Komniny i Vostok, op. cit.,

(6731/1223) ; the two sides exchange oaths and promise not to

attack each other 61.
— Episode B1 concerns the seizure, in the port of Sinop, of a
Trapezuntine vessel with the taxes from Cherson and Gotthia 62 by
the sultan’s governor of Sinop, \∂ÙÔ‡ÌË˜ ï ^ƒ·˝ÛË˜ by name 63 ; there
is on board among other archons Alexius Paktiares 64, a high ran-
king officer in the fiscal administration of Trebizond ; moreover,
\∂ÙÔ‡ÌË˜ ï ^ƒ·˝ÛË˜ of Sinop sends ships to Cherson and plunders the
area (undated).
>
p. 129-133. On the interpretation of the enigmatic addition to the name of Al∆’ al-
Dı̄n ™···Ù›ÓË˜, see below.
61. J.O. ROSENQVIST, The hagiographic dossier, op. cit., lines 1152-1157 : star-
ting with « âd Ù ÷á ‰Â˘Ù¤Ú ÷ˆ öÙÂÈ » and up to « tÛÈÓ àÙ¿Ú·¯ÔÈ ».
62. The Crimean possessions of Trebizond are meant here (A. VASILIEV, The
Goths in the Crimea, op. cit., p. 160-169).
63. J.O. ROSENQVIST, The hagiographic dossier, op. cit., lines 1159f, 1304-
1305. No doubt, ®·˝ÛË˜ here stands for the standard Seljuk title for the governor
of Sinop ra’ı̄s al-bah·r (commander of the sea) attested by IBN BĪBĪ, see : IBN BĪBĪ
(Mukhtas·ar), op. cit., p. 271 ; cf. G. MORAVCSIK, Byzantinoturcica, Leiden, 1983,
vol. II, p. 259. A more complicated problem is represented by \∂ÙÔ‡ÌË˜, which is
usually understood as the Armenian Het’um (CL. CAHEN, Pre-Ottoman Turkey,
op. cit., p. 123 ; SP. VRYONIS, The decline, op. cit., p. 230, note 512 ; cf. J.O.
ROSENQVIST, The hagiographic dossier, op. cit., p. 435). The Armenian etymology
seems to me highly unlikely. A « Muslim » (Arabic, Persian or Turkic) etymology
may also be suggested, though from a linguistic point of view it is not much more
convincing than the Armenian one : âÙÔ‡ÌË˜ < Persian kh∆dim or Turkic hadım <
Arabic kh∆dim, « servant, lackey » ; cf. Pontic Greek ¯·ÙÔ‡ÌË˜ < Ottoman Turkish
hadım (A. PAPADOPOULOS, ^πÛÙÔÚÈÎeÓ ÏÂÍÈÎeÓ ÔÓÙÈÎÉ˜ ‰È·Ï¤ÎÙÔ˘ [« Historical lexicon
of the Pontic dialect »], Athens, 1961, vol. II, p. 504). If so, should « \∂ÙÔ‡ÌË˜ ï
^ƒ·˝ÛË˜ » be understood as a Hellenised and corrupted rendering of the Persian or
Turkic kh∆dim-i ra’ı̄s [al-bah·r], that is, the servant of the Ra’ı̄s al-Bah·r, gover-
nor of Sinop ?
64. Alexius Paktiares (\∞Ï¤ÍÈÔ˜ ¶·ÎÙÈ¿ÚË˜), judging by his second name (very
likely ·ÎÙÈ¿ÚË˜ < Pers. bakhtiy∆r, « fortunate », « rich ») might have been an Ira-
nian (Persian or Kurdish) by blood. MARIA G. NYSTAZOPOULOU (^∏ âÓ Ù÷É ∆·˘ÚÈÎ÷É
¯ÂÚÛÔÓ‹Û ÷ˆ fiÏÈ˜ ™Ô˘Á‰·›· [« The city of Sudak in the Crimean peninsula »],
Athens, 1965, p. 18-19, note 52 ) and J.O. ROSENQVIST (The hagiographic dossier,
op. cit., p. 436) have derived ¶·ÎÙÈ¿ÚË˜ from ¿ÎÙÔÓ which is hardly lilkely from a
linguistic point of view. For more details on the etymology of the name see :
R. SHUKUROV, « The Byzantine Turks of the Pontos », Mésogeios 6 (1999), p. 19,
note 27.

96 Rustam Shukurov
— Episode B2 describes the Greek counter-attack against

Sinop ; the Greeks land at Karousa (Gerze) 65, plunder the area,
and advance as far as Sinop’s market. In the Sinop harbour they
kill or capture the crews of the Turkish ships found there (in other
words they take the city) ; the ra’ı̄s asks to negotiate and as a result
the Trapezuntine ship, its crew, and the taxes are recovered (unda-
ted) 66.
— Episode C is the most extensive and detailed fragment. It
deals with the campaign of Melik against the city of Trebizond,
which, thanks to the miraculous intervention of the patron saint of
Trebizond Saint Eugenius, ends with the disastrous defeat of the
invaders and the capture of Melik himself ; a new treaty is conclu-
ded with Melik, according to which Trebizond no longer performs
military service nor sends money and other gifts to the sultan ;
afterwards Melik is sent back to Konya via Sinop, to which he is
escorted by the Greeks (undated) 67.
As I suggest, these four distinct episodes, which no doubt had a
firm historical basis, describe events separated in reality by more
or less prolonged periods. John Lazaropoulos, editing the entire
story according to the stylistic rules of hagiographical narration,
deliberately ignored the temporal gaps between the different episo-
des, placing them in nonlinear hagiographical time.
If we admit the existence of the temporal gaps, some parallel
references in Oriental sources may hypothetically date the episodes
John Lazaropoulos left undated. Episode B1 may be dated by quite
interesting, albeit no less obscure, evidence from the Arab historian
Muh·ammad al-H · amawı̄. This Arab author, who is known as a relia-
ble historian, reports the following among the events of the year
622/1225-1226 68:
65. For the identification, see : A.A.M. BRYER - D. WINFIELD, The Byzantine
monuments, op. cit., vol. I, p. 89.
66. J.O. ROSENQVIST, The hagiographic dossier, op. cit., lines 1157-1182 :
beginning with the words : « àÏÏ\ âÏ‡ıËÛ·Ó ·î ÛÔÓ‰·d ·sÙ·È ».
67. J.O. ROSENQVIST, The hagiographic dossier, op. cit., line 1183 ff : begin-
ning with the words : « Ùe ‰b \πÎfiÓÈÔÓ ï ÛÔ˘ÏÙ¿ÓÔ˜ ªÂÏ›Î ».
68. A facsimile edition of the original ms : AL-H · AMAWĪ, Al-Ta’rı̄kh mans·ūrı̄
(Mansurova khronika) (« Mans·ūr’s Chronicle »), edited with introduction and
commentary P.A. GRIAZNEVICH, Moscow, 1960 (reprint, 1963), f. 150v-151r. Cf.


>
In this year Sultan Al∆’ al-Dı̄n defeated the sultan of Rūm al-
Ashkarı̄ 69 and seized some of his fortresses, and [defeated ]
the malik [?] Kyr [kı̄r ?] Alexius, a Roman as well, and took
him prisoner.
I am inclined to interpret al-H· amawı̄’s words that a certain « kyr

Alexius », « a Roman », had been captured as an indication of the
capture of kyr Alexius Paktiares by the Seljuks and, thus the ra’ı̄s’
attack on the Trapezuntine vessel. It is obvious that al-H · amawı̄
himself was not perfectly sure of the details of this event and the
identity of kyr Alexius. This is probably why he added to the name
of Alexius the hesitant remark « a Roman as well » (al-rūmı̄ ayd·an).
If so, one must admit that al-H · amawı̄ probably attached the title
malik (though the reading of the manuscript is not certain) 70 to the
name Alexius mistakenly, or used it in the general sense of « gover-
nor ». Therefore, I suggest that episode B1 dates to 1225.
The Greek counter-attack and their temporary occupation of
Sinop (episode B2) is reflected indirectly in two Arab sources. The
key evidence is given by Ibn al-Athı̄r. He states that after the con-
with the French translation of CL. CAHEN, which appears to be less precise
(« Questions d’histoire de la province de Kastamonu au XIIIe siècle », Selçuklu
Ara∑tırmaları Dergisi [« Journal of Seljuk Studies »] [reprint, IDEM, Turcobyzan-
tina et Oriens Christianus, London, 1974, n˚ X] 3 [1971], p. 147). For palaeogra-
phic and textual analyses of the passage see : R. SHUKUROV - D. KOROBEINIKOV,
« Velikie Komniny, Sinop i Rum v 1223-1230 gg. (zagadka teksta Lazaropula) »
(« The Great Komnenoi, Sinop and Rum in 1223-1230. Enigma of John Lazaro-
poulos’s text »), in Prichernomorie v srednie veka (« The Black Sea region in the
Middle Ages »), Moscow, 1998, p. 192-193.
69. The Lascarid emperor John III Ducas Vatatzes (1222-1254) is meant. On
the Eastern policy of John III Vatatzes, see the comprehensive study : J.S. LANG-
DON, Byzantium’s last imperial offensive in Asia Minor. The documentary eviden-
ce for the hagiographical lore about John III Ducas Vatatzes’ crusade against the
Turks, 1222 or 1225 to 1231, New York, 1992. J.S. LANGDON makes extensive use
of AL-H· AMAWĪ’s text, but his interpretation of Trapezuntine-Seljuk relations in the
1220s closely follows the preceding scholarly tradition (see, especially : p. 11-12).
70. The word that I read as malik represents a certain palaeographic difficul-
ty. CL. CAHEN preferred to see in it ka-dhalik « like that, likewise, in the same
way », and rendered the passage as « il fit de même d’Aliks/Alexis, et le fit prison-
nier » (CL. CAHEN, « Questions d’histoire de la province de Kastamonu », op. cit.,
p. 147).

98 Rustam Shukurov
quest of Erzincan and an unsuccessful assault against Erzurum

>
(summer 1228) the news came to Al∆’ al-Dı̄n Kai-Qub∆dh
that infidel Romans, neighboring his land, seized his fortress,

called Sinop, which is among the most impregnable stron-
gholds dominating the Black Sea. As he came back to his
country, he sent an army to it, and besieged it on land and
sea, and recovered it from the Romans, and set off for Anta-
lya in order to spend the winter there according to his cus-
tom 71.
Ibn Bı̄bı̄ confirms that after the conquest of Erzincan the sultan
went to « Antalya and Alanya » and stayed there « from the begin-
ning of autumn until the month of April » (nı̄s∆n) 72.
>
The conquest of Sinop is probably referred to in Al∆’ al-Dı̄n
Kai-Qub∆dh’s letter to the Khw∆razm-Sh∆h Jal∆l al-Dı̄n (received
at the end of 1228), which reported that this year the Seljuk sultan
« was preoccupied with [the struggle] against neighboring infidels
and conquered some of their fortresses » 73. Consequently, the reco-
very of Sinop by the Seljuks most likely occurred in the autumn of
1228. These remarkable references, even if they do not coincide
with John Lazaropoulos’ episode B2, none the less repeat its basic
logic : the Greeks, who had captured the city, were eventually for-
ced to withdraw from Sinop by a local governor.
One more important hypothesis can be made : between 1225
(episode B1) and 1228 (episode B2), Sinop passed under the con-
trol of the Greeks. John Lazaropoulos says that the Greeks, during
their counter-attack against the ra’ı̄s, took control of the city, and
there is no hint in his text indicating the time of their withdrawal.
It seems that in fact, after 1225, Sinop was occupied for some time
(months, years ?) by the Greeks, and in the autumn of 1228 was
retaken by the Seljuks.
It appears to be easier to date the last episode C. According to
John Lazaropoulos : a) Melik, preparing for his attack against Tre-
71. IBN AL-ATHĪR, op. cit., vol. XII, p. 312-313. On this passage see also :
M. KUR∞ANSKIS, « L’Empire de Trébizonde », op. cit., p. 119.
72. IBN BĪBĪ (Mukhtas·ar), op. cit., p. 153.
73. AL-NASAWĪ, op. cit., p. 209.

bizond, gathered his troops at Erzurum ; b) during the subsequent

clashes with the Greeks some notables from Erzincan fell in batt-
le 74. Erzincan and Erzurum were conquered by the Seljuks only in
the spring/summer of 1228 and in August 1230 respectively (see
below). Consequently, episode C should be dated to the time after
August 1230.
I admit that the three passages extracted from Oriental sources
do not coincide in detail with episodes A, B1 and B2 of John Laza-
ropoulos ; moreover, the factual content of episode C seems to have
been completely passed over in silence in the surviving Oriental
chronicles. Still, Oriental sources confirm the general logic of John
Lazaropoulos’ narration on three key points : a) the Seljuk assault
against the Greeks ; b) the temporary Greek control of Sinop ; and
c) the recovery of Sinop by the Seljuks.
The obvious contradictions and inconsistencies between the evi-
dence of John Lazaropoulos and the Arabic sources could be
explained in three ways : a) by the fact that the Arabs were less
informed about events occurring in lands located almost beyond the
horizon of their scholarly interest ; b) by the genre features of the
« Synopsis », which undoubtedly did much to transform the sour-
ce’s historical material ; c) and by the conflicting political biases of
the Greek and Arab authors. However, in order to verify this hypo-
thesis, one should try to assess it in the broader context of the inter-
national politics of eastern Anatolia at that time.
The eastern Anatolian

alliances
The political climate in eastern Anatolia depended on three

major regional forces : the Seljuks, the Georgian kingdom and the
Ayyūbid sultanate. Although the different Ayyūbid dynastic bran-
ches, ruling in Damascus, Aleppo, Mayy∆f∆riqı̄n and Amid, com-
peted with each other, nonetheless they preserved administrative
links with Cairo and a sort of a common policy towards foreign
threats. The Syrian Ayyūbid rulers (maliks) withstood both the
74. J.O. ROSENQVIST, The hagiographic dossier, op. cit., lines 1185 and 1307-
1308.

100 Rustam Shukurov
Georgian expansion to the south and the Seljuk attempts to con-

quer eastern Anatolia and penetrate Syria. However, by the second
decade of the thirteenth century, because of increasing pressure
from the Seljuks, the tactical interests of the Ayyūbid maliks and
the Georgian queen Rusudani converged : both powers found com-
mon anti-Seljuk ground. Tamta, the daughter of ishkhan Ivane
from the powerful Armenian family of the Mhargrdzeli in Georgian
service, was married to the Ayyūbid Najm al-Dı̄n, the ruler of Akh-
l∆t·. After the death of Najm al-Dı̄n, his brother al-Malik al-Ashraf,
the ruler of Diy∆rbakr and Damascus (1210-1237) married Tamta
and inherited control of Akhl∆t· 75.
Also involved in the rivalry among the Seljuks, Ayyūbids and
Georgians were the petty Pontic amı̄rates of Erzurum, Erzincan,
Kūghūniya, Koyulhisar and Niksar, bordering on the possessions
of the Grand Comneni. At the beginning of the thirteenth century
the Seljuks of Rūm established control over Erzurum, which from
ca. 1103 had belonged to the Saltuqids who were known for their
close relations with Georgia. The city passed to the hands of the
aforesaid Mughı̄th al-Dı̄n Tughrul-Sh∆h, the son of the Seljuk sul-
tan Qılıch Arsl∆n II (1156-1192). The possessions of Tughrul-Sh∆h
included also Bayburt, where, in 1213, he rebuilt the city walls 76.
As Cl. Cahen has noted, despite the expulsion of the Saltuqids from
Erzurum, the traditional links of that territory with western Iran
and neighboring Christians (Georgians, Armenians and, probably,
Pontic Greeks) were still operative during the first third of the thir-
teenth century 77.
In the first decade of the thirteenth century, « the sultan of
Erzurum » paid tribute to ishkhans Zakare and Ivane 78. In 1211-
75. KIRAKOS GANDZAKETZI, Istoria Armenii (« The history of Armenia »), trans-
lation L.A. KANLARIAN, Moscow, 1976, p. 119, 182. On the Mhargrdzeli-Zakarian
family, see also : B. LIMPER, « Die Mongolen und die christlichen Völker des Kau-
kasus. Eine Untersuchung zur politischen Geschichte Kaukasiens im 13. und
beginnenden 14. Jahrhundert », diss., Köln, 1980, section : « Die Mhargrdzelis ».
76. A.A. KHACHATRIAN, Korpus arabskikh nadpisei Armenii, VIII–XVI vv.,
vyp. I, Yerevan, 1987, p. 91-95, n˚ 117-124.
77. IBN AL-ATHĪR, op. cit., vol. XII, p. 111 ; ABŪ ‘L-FIDĀ, op. cit., vol. IV,
p. 192 ; IBN BĪBĪ (Mukhtas·ar), op. cit., p. 22 ; CL. CAHEN, Pre-Ottoman Turkey,
op. cit., p. 115, 118, 239.
78. KIRAKOS GANDZAKETZI, Istoria Armenii, op. cit., p. 118.

1213, as we have noted above, Tughrul-Sh∆h together with the Cili-

>
cian Armenians supported the revolt of Al∆’ al-Dı̄n. In 1213, sul-
>
tan Izz al-Dı̄n retaliated by attacking Tughrul-Sh∆h’s possessions.
>
However, when Tughrul-Sh∆h’s former ally Al∆’ al-Dı̄n Kai-
Qub∆dh ascended the throne in 1219 as the next sultan (1219-
1237), relations between Konya and Erzurum greatly deteriorated.
>
The hegemonic policy of Al∆’ al-Dı̄n I prompted Tughrul-Sh∆h to
enter into an alliance with the Ayyūbid al-Malik al-Ashraf 79. Some-
time in 620/1223-1224 Tughrul-Sh∆h married his son D∆’ūd to
Queen Rusudani, having baptised his son on demand of the bride 80.
It is not impossible also, as Cl. Cahen and A.A.M. Bryer propose,
that Tughrul-Sh∆h was a sort of vassal of Andronicus I Gidus 81.
After the death of Tughrul-Sh∆h, his son Rukn al-Dı̄n Jah∆n-Sh∆h
confirmed his alliance with the Ayyūbid al-Malik al-Ashraf and
>
finally broke off relations with Al∆’ al-Dı̄n Kai-Qub∆dh I 82.
Erzincan, Divri∏i and Kemah belonged at that time to the Men-
güjekid amı̄r Fakhr al-Dı̄n Bahr∆m-Sh∆h b. D∆’ūd (1163-1225),
who was the grandson of Gh∆zı̄ Mengüjek, the founder of the
dynasty first mentioned in 1118 83. The Mengüjekids had establis-
79. IBN AL-ATHĪR, op. cit., vol. XII, p. 134.

80. IBN AL-ATHĪR, op. cit., vol. XII, p. 270-271 ; ABŪ ‘L-FIDĀ, op. cit., vol. IV,
p. 318-320 ; Ibn BĪBĪ (Ankara), op. cit., p. 167 ; K. SALIA, Histoire de la nation
géorgienne, Paris, 1980, p. 218 ; CL. CAHEN, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, op. cit.,
p. 127 ; M. BALIVET, Romanie byzantine et pays de Rûm turc : histoire d’un espa-
ce d’imbrication gréco-turque, Istanbul, 1994, p. 71. The baptism of a Muslim
prince was unprecedented in the entire history of anatolian Islam. This matrimo-
nial alliance gave birth to Thamar (who was married in 1237 to the Seljuk sultan
Kai-Khusraw II) and David, the Georgian king David IV Narin. Rather soon
Queen Rusudani divorced D∆’ūd and imprisoned him ; he was released only by the
Khw∆razm-Shah Jal∆l al-Dı̄n. However, D∆’ūd again escaped to Georgia, although
his former wife had already married another man. See : SHIHĀB AL-DĪN MUH· AMMAD
AL-NASAWĪ, Sı̄rat al-Sult·∆n Jal∆l al-Dı̄n Mankburny (« A biography of sultan Jal∆l
al-Dı̄n Mankburnı̄ »], critical editon and translation from Arabic, with introduc-
tion, commentary, notes and indexes Z.M. BUNIYATOV, Moscow, 1996 (hereinaf-
ter : AL-NASAWĪ), p. 165, 341-342. A French translation of al-Nasawı̄’s « Biogra-
phy » : MOHAMMED EN-NESAWI, Histoire du sultan Djelal ed-Din Mankobirti prince
du Kharezm, vol. II, traduit de l’arabe par O. HOUDAS, Paris, 1895.
81. CL. CAHEN, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, op. cit., p. 125 ; A.A.M. BRYER - D. WIN-
FIELD, The Byzantine monuments, op. cit., vol. I, p. 354.
82. AL-H· AMAWĪ, op. cit., f. 150v.
83. CL. CAHEN, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, op. cit., p. 108-109, 239 ; A.A. KHACHA-
TRIAN, Korpus, op. cit., p. 108, n˚ 154 ; R.H. ÜNAL, « Monuments sal∏ukides de

102 Rustam Shukurov
hed friendly relations with the neighboring Pontic Greeks as early

as in 1119-1120, when Gh∆zı̄ Mengüjek fought in alliance with
Constantine Gabras, the governor of the province of Chaldia (ca.
1119-1140), against the D∆nishmandid Gümüshtegin Gh∆zı̄. The
allies suffered defeat and were taken captive. The amı̄r Gh∆zı̄ Men-
güjek was finally released without any ransom, while 30 thousand
dinars were paid for Constantine’s liberation 84. During the long
rule of Fakhr al-Dı̄n Bahr∆m-Sh∆h, Erzincan became a notable
center of Anatolian Muslim culture 85.
Bahr∆m-Sh∆h, though acknowledging the supreme power of the
Seljuks of Konya and being related to them 86, was far from being a
sincere supporter of Seljuk expansionist plans in the region.
According to a Georgian source, in the 1200s, he joined the Seljuk
campaigns against Georgia « not of his own will and only from
fear » 87. During one of these campaigns, in 601/1204-1205, he was
taken prisoner by the Georgians, and as a result Erzincan paid tri-
bute to Georgia for some time 88. Erzurum and Erzincan were lin-
Kemah (Anatolie orientale) », REI 35 (1967), p. 159 (undated inscription on the

tomb of Gh∆zı̄ Mengüjek).
84. CL. CAHEN, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, op. cit., p. 93 ; A.A.M. BRYER, « A
Byzantine family : the Gabrades, c. 979 – c. 1653 », University of Birmingham His-
torical Journal 12 (1970), p. 177 (= IDEM, The Empire of Trebizond and the Pon-
tos, Variorum collected studies series, London, 1980, n˚ IIIa).
85. The name of Bahr∆m-Sh∆h was perpetuated by the famous Persian poet
Niz·∆mı̄ Ganjawı̄ (1141 - after 1203), who ca. 1166 dedicated to the Mengüjekid
amı̄r his mystical poem « Makhzan al-asr∆r ». Bahr∆m-Sh∆h also met another
renowned Persian poet Afd· al al-Dı̄n Kh∆q∆nı̄ (1120-1199). Around 1221-1223, in
the Mengüjekid amı̄rate, at Ak∑ehir and Erzincan, lived Bah∆’ al-Dı̄n, the famous
Muslim intellectual from Balkh and the father of Mawl∆n∆ Jal∆l al-Dı̄n Rūmı̄. One
more prominent person, who enjoyed the hospitality of the Mengüjekids, was the
>
physician and philosopher Abd al-Lat·ı̄f al-Baghd∆dı̄ (in the 1220s). See : IBN BĪBĪ
(Mukhtas·ar), op. cit., p. 21-22 ; SP. VRYONIS, The decline, op. cit., p. 382 ;
CL. CAHEN, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, op. cit., p. 252, 258 ; A.E. KRYMSKI, Nizami i
ego sovremenniki (« Niz·∆mı̄ and his contemporaries »), Baku, 1981, p. 142-143.
86. Bahr∆m-Sh∆h married the daughter of Qılıch Arslan II, while his own
>
daughter Seljuki-kh∆tūn married Izz al-Dı̄n Kai-K∆’ūs I (IBN BĪBĪ [Mukhtas·ar],
op. cit., p. 67-70 ; V.G. GORDLEVSKII, Gosudarstvo selddzhukidov maloi azii, Mos-
cow-Leningrad, 1941, p. 32).
87. BASILI, Zhizn’tsaritsy tsarist Tamar, translation V. DONDUA, in Pamiatni-
ki epokhi Rustaveli, Leningrad, 1938, p. 62.
88. IBN BĪBĪ (Mukhtas·ar), op. cit., p. 22 ; BASILI, Zhizn’tsaritsy tsarist Tamar,
op. cit., p. 66-67 ; M. BROSSET, Histoire de la Géorgie, op. cit., p. 463. On the kha-

ked by old friendship. Bahr∆m-Sh∆h’s daughter had been given in

marriage to Tughrul-Sh∆h before 1213 89. After the death of Bah-
>
r∆m-Sh∆h, the Erzincan amı̄rate passed to his son Al∆’ al-Dı̄n
D∆’ūd-Sh∆h (1225-1228). D∆’ūd-Sh∆h had joined the coalition of
Ayyūbid Syria and Erzurum before 1227. Moreover, D∆’ūd-Sh∆h
out of fear of the Seljuks tried to secure the support of the Assas-
sins of Alamut. To all his potential allies D∆’ūd-Sh∆h promised
control over Kemah, a strategic point controlling the routes to cen-
tral Anatolia 90.
It is worth noting one more Turkmen state bordering the Empi-
re of Trebizond : the lands of the D∆nishmandid malik Muz·affar al-
Dı̄n Muh·ammad, who, ca. 1205, had been given Niksar, Koyulhisar
and, probably, Kūghūniya (Karahisar, later Şebinkarahisar,
Byzantine Koloneia) by Ghiy∆th al-Dı̄n Kai-Khusraw I for his aid
during the latter’s struggle for the Seljuk crown. Muz·affar al-Dı̄n
joined the alliance of the Mengüjekids and Rukn al-Dı̄n Jah∆n-
Sh∆h of Erzurum 91.
To sum up, in the first decades of the thirteenth century, in nor-
theastern Anatolia, with the growth of the expansionist claims of
the Seljuks of Konya, a coalition of the local Muslim states, headed
by the Ayyūbids and Georgia, gradually took shape ; the fulcrum of
the coalition was Erzurum — an apple of discord between the Sel-
juks of Konya and the Ayyūbids that controlled the strategic routes
to and from the Anatolian plateau 92.
It is not impossible that the conflict between the Seljuks of
Konya and the Grand Comneni over Sinop and the installation of
raj levied by the Queen Thamar on Erzincan : M. BROSSET, Histoire de la Géorgie,

op. cit., p. 466.
89. Ş. BEYGU, Erzurum tarihi, anıtları, kitabeleri, Istanbul, 1936, vol. I,
p. 242 ; A.A. KHACHATRIAN, Korpus, op. cit., p. 183-184, n˚ 124.
90. CL. CAHEN, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, op. cit., p. 126-127.
91. IBN BĪBĪ (Mukhtas·ar), op. cit., p. 152 ; V.G. GORDLEVSKII, Gosudarstvo
Selddzhukidov, op. cit., p. 29. A.A.M. BRYER suggested that Muz·affar al-Dı̄n was
given these lands as early as in 1201-1202 : A.A.M. BRYER - D. WINFIELD, The
Byzantine monuments, op. cit., vol. I, p. 146. For the future fate of the Karahisar
amı̄rate in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, see : A.A.M. BRYER - D. WIN-
FIELD, The Byzantine monuments, op. cit., vol. I, p. 146-148 ; R. SHUKUROV, « Bet-
ween peace and hostility : Trebizond and the Pontic Turkish periphery in the four-
teenth century », Mediterranean Historical Review 9/1 (1994), p. 28-32.
92. IBN AL-ATHĪR, op. cit., vol. XII, p. 312-313.

104 Rustam Shukurov
the Greeks in Sinop after 1225 was a part of a major anti-Konyan

movement in the eastern Anatolian region. Additional allusions
supporting this idea can be traced in the subsequent events.
The king
of a nonexistent realm
The political structure of eastern Anatolia survived a significant

upheaval when the Khw∆razm-Sh∆h Jal∆l al-Dı̄n invaded in 1224,
having travelled with his army more than three thousand km on his
way from India to the Mediterranean. First, the Khw∆razm-Sh∆h,
wishing to establish a new sultanate in the region of the southern
Caucasus, Armenia and Iraq, encountered resistance from the uni-
ted front of the Ayyūbids, Georgia, Erzurum and Erzincan. In
March 1226, the Khw∆razmian army captured Tiflis, proceeding as
far as the regions of Tao and Samtzkhe, bordering the lands of the
Grand Comneni ; two years later (1228), it inflicted a disastrous
defeat on Georgian troops at Bolnisi and occupied all of eastern
Georgia 93. Simultaneously, the Khw∆razm-Sh∆h attacked the
Ayyūbids and Pontic Muslim amı̄rates. In 1226, the Khw∆razmians
raided the Mengüjekid centers of Kemah and Erzincan ; in the same
year, they twice besieged Ayyūbid Akhl∆t· 94. In the autumn of 1228,
the Khw∆razm-Sh∆h devastated the environs of Erzurum avenging
Rukn al-Dı̄n Jah∆n-Sh∆h’s aid to the Ayyūbids 95.
There is a little doubt that the Grand Comneni took the side of
Georgia and their Pontic allies. Quite demonstrative of this was the
battle at Bolnisi where on the side of the Georgians, according to
93. AL-NASAWĪ, op. cit., p. 161-162, 164-166, 338-339 ; K. SALIA, Histoire de la

nation géorgienne, op. cit., p. 220-221 ; M. KUR∞ANSKIS, « L’Empire de Trébizon-
de et les Turcs », op. cit., p. 118.
94. IBN AL-ATHĪR, op. cit., vol. XII, p. 297-298 ; AL-NASAWĪ, op. cit., p. 341,
note 4 ; A.G. GALSTIAN, Armianskie istochniki o mongolakh (« Armenian sources
on the Mongols »), Moscow, 1962, p. 24 ; Z.M. BUNIYATOV, Gosudarstvo Kho-
rezmshakhov-Anushteginov (1097-1231) (« The state of Khw∆razm-Sh∆h-Anush-
tegins »), Moscow, 1986, p. 170 ; M. KUR∞ANSKIS, « L’Empire de Trébizonde et les
95. AL-NASAWĪ, op. cit., p. 209, 225.

Oriental sources 96 fought the troops of lakziy∆n/al-lakzı̄ (i.e., the

Lazes), who lived in the eastern provinces of the Empire of Trebi-
zond, and j∆nı̄t, (i.e., probably the Pontic Greeks themselves) 97. It
seems that in the battle at Bolnisi there participated those Lazes
who, in John Lazaropoulos’ narration, are described as Androni-
cus I Gidus’ « allies [Û‡ÌÌ·¯ÔÈ] from Soteropolis 98 and Lazica » and
praised as « warlike » (ı˘ÌÔÌ·¯ÔÜÓÙÂ˜) 99. However, neither the
Greeks and Lazes nor the Qipch∆q (Cuman) army 100 saved the
Georgians from a stunning defeat.
>
96. AL-NASAWĪ, op. cit., p. 224 ; RASHĪD AL-DĪN, Dj∆mi at-taw∆rı̄kh (« A col-
lection of histories »), critical edition, introduction and indexes A.A. ALI-ZADE,
>
Moscow, 1980, vol. II, pt. 1, p. 83-84 ; The Ta’rı̄kh-i-Jah∆n-Gush∆ of Al∆’u’d-Dı̄n
‘At∆-Malik-i-Juwaynı̄, edited with an introduction, notes and indices MIRZA
MUHAMMAD QAZVINI, London, 1916, vol. I, p. 170-171 (hereinafter : JUWAYNĪ [QAZ-
> >
VINI]) ; ALA-AD-DIN ATA-MALIK JUVAINI, The history of the world-conqueror,
translation J.A. BOYLE, Manchester, 1958, vol. II, p. 438 (hereinafter : JUVAINI
[J. BOYLE]), p. 438–439 and note 7 on p. 439.
97. The place-name J∆nı̄t derives from the ethnic name Tzan, a Kartvelan peo-
ple living in the eastern Pontos. However, in contemporary Oriental sources, the
term J∆nı̄t was exclusively attached to the Pontic Greeks (see above note 41).
98. A town on the river Çoruh (Akampsis), probably the Ottoman Borçka,
probably on the eastern frontier of Lazia (A.A.M. BRYER - D. WINFIELD, The
Byzantine monuments, op. cit., vol. I, p. 347.
99. J.O. ROSENQVIST, The hagiographic dossier, op. cit., lines 1190-1191 and
1333-1334.
100. In the eve of the battle, Queen Rusudani called for Qipch∆q reinforce-
ment, as the unpublished Persian chronicle of MUH· AMMAD SHABĀNKĀRA’ Ī relates
>
(SHABĀNKĀRA’ Ī, Majma al-ans∆b (« Collection of genealogies »), MS Department
of Saint Petersburg Branch of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Aca-
demy of Sciences, C372, f. 181r) : « wa ahl-i Gurj madad az lashkar-i Qifch∆q
khw∆stand wa lashkarı̄ buzurg biy∆wardand. Sult·∆n p∆ra-i n∆n wa p∆ra-i namak
pı̄sh-i ı̄sh∆n firist∆d-u guft : “ As·l-i shum∆ turk ast wa m∆ nı̄z turk wa d·arūratı̄ nı̄st
ki madad-i gurjiy∆n kunı̄d. ” Malik-i Qifch∆q b∆z gasht. » Translation : « The Geor-
gians asked for help from the army of the Qipch∆qs, and [they] brought a large
army. The sultan [Jal∆l al-Dı̄n Khw∆razm-Sh∆h] sent them a morsel of bread and
a pinch of salt saying : “ You are Turks by origin, we are also of Turkish [origin],
there is no necessity to help the Georgians. ” The Qipch∆q king went away. »
According to AL-NASAWĪ, later many Qipch∆qs went over to the service of the
Khw∆razm-Sh∆h (AL-NASAWĪ, op. cit., p. 213, and the relevant commentaries of
Z.M. BUNIYATOV on p. 338 with the references to IBN AL-ATHĪR). This makes
understandable the Qipch∆q presence in the population of the Empire of Trebi-
zond. A derivative from the root kouman is found in the Pontic Greek sources of
the second half of the fourteenth century as a family name or nickname. It is not

106 Rustam Shukurov

>
The Seljuk Al∆’ al-Dı̄n Kai-Qub∆dh saw in the Khw∆razm-Sh∆h
an effective tool to weaken his rivals in the region. He concluded
with the Khw∆razm-Sh∆h a peace treaty and skilfully instigated his
conflict with the Ayyūbids and their supporters 101. The Seljuk sul-
tan was not, however, an idle spectator. He took the opportunity,
presented by the Khw∆rzmian offensive, to neutralize completely
his weakened and demoralised enemies in northern Anatolia. In
1227, some powerful amı̄rs of D∆’ūd-Sh∆h of Erzincan rebelled and
>
fled to Konya. Al∆’ al-Dı̄n used this as a pretext to make prepara-
tions for a raid on Erzincan. D∆’ūd-Sh∆h tried to organize the
defence of his possessions, urgently asking Rukn al-Dı̄n Jah∆n-
Sh∆h and al-Malik al-Ashraf to gather their troops during the win-
>
ter of 1227-1228 and come to Erzincan. However, Al∆’ al-Dı̄n Kai-
Qub∆dh anticipated the arrival of assistance from Erzurum and the
Ayyūbids and seized Erzurum and Kemah in the spring or summer
of 1228. Next came the turn of Kūghūniya belonging to the D∆nish-
>
mandid Muz·affar al-Dı̄n, which Al∆’ al-Dı̄n Kai-Qub∆dh conque-
red in the same year immediately after his successful campaign
>
against the Mengüjekids. Al∆’ al-Dı̄n even hoped to kill one more
bird with one stone and approached Erzurum, his main rival in the
region. However, receiving news that strong Ayyūbid reinforce-
ments were entering the city, he had to retreat 102.
impossible that the name ∫Ô˘Ì¿ÓÔ˜ belonged to the descendants of the Khw∆raz-
mian soldiers, who, in 1230 had found shelter in the Empire of Trebizond (see
below) and later in the 1230s had been settled by the Seljuks in the regions of
Erzincan, Amasya, Larende-Ni∏de (see also : CL. CAHEN, Pre-Ottoman Turkey,
op. cit., p. 128, 246 ; R. SHUKUROV, « The Byzantine Turks of the Pontos », op.
cit., n˚ 20 ; cf. J.S. LANGDON, Byzantium’s last imperial offensive, op. cit., p. 19 :
on the Cumans and Lascarids).
It is also worth noting that in the region Şebinkarahisar there still exists a place
called Koman, which probably goes back to the thirteenth century (F. TEKIN,
« Giresun a∏ızlarının Anadolu a∏ızlar içindeki yeri » [« The place of the dialects of
Giresun among the dialects of Anatolia »], Giresun kültür sempozyumu. Bildiriler
[« Symposium on Giresun Culture. Communications »], Istanbul, 1998, p. 269).
>
101. The coalition of Al∆’ al-Dı̄n and the Khw∆razm-Sh∆h was established by
>
an exchange of embassies and confirmed in 1225 by the marriage of Al∆’ al-Dı̄n’s
son Ghiy∆th al-Dı̄n to a lady from the family of the Khw∆razm-Sh∆h (AL-NASAWĪ,
op. cit., p. 332, note 3).
102. IBN BĪBĪ (Mukhtas·ar), op. cit., p. 142-153 ; IBN AL-ATHĪR, op. cit.,
vol. XII, p. 312 ; AL-H · AMAWĪ, op. cit., f. 170r and 171r ; CL. CAHEN, Pre-Ottoman
Turkey, op. cit., p. 126-127.


>
Just at that moment, in the autumn of 1228, Al∆’ al-Dı̄n, after
finishing his campaign in the Muslim Pontus, sent an army to reco-
ver Sinop from the Greeks of Trebizond (see above). Andronicus
Gidus, judging by the general logic of the events that occurred, had
very likely taken part in the Pontic coalition and was attacked by
>
Al∆’ al-Dı̄n in the same year as his Muslim allies 103.
However, the growing power and success of the Khw∆razm-Sh∆h
>
rather quickly made him much more dangerous to Al∆’ al-Dı̄n than
any other of his rivals. As early as 1227 peace negotiations started
>
between Al∆’ al-Dı̄n and the main figures of the anti-Khw∆razmian
alliance, including the Ayyūbids, Georgia and Cilician Armenia.
But at that time the Seljuk-Ayyūbid rapprochement was undermi-
ned by the question of Erzurum, the independence of which the
Ayyūbids stubbornly defended 104. Nonetheless, political reality
compelled the former rivals to make concessions. In August 1229,
the army of the Khw∆razm-Sh∆h besieged Ayyūbid Akhl∆t·, the key
stronghold controlling the routes to the south to Syria and to the
>
west to central Anatolia. Al∆’ al-Dı̄n sent an embassy to Jal∆l al-
Dı̄n the Khw∆razm-Sh∆h with a request to raise the siege of Akh-
l∆t· and leave it in the hands of the Ayyūbids. However, Jal∆l al-
>
Dı̄n, despite the displeasure and increasing suspicions of Al∆’ al-
Dı̄n, took control of the city in April 1230 105. Thus, the Khw∆razm-
Sh∆h opened the door to Syria and Anatolia. This was the last straw
that accelerated the formation of the anti-Khw∆razmian coalition.

M. KUR∞ANSKIS suggests that in the same year the Seljuks lunched an attack against
Trebizond, as reflected in JOHN LAZAROPOULOS and other Pontic Greek sources
(ibid., note 31). O. TURAN (« Anatolia in the period of the Seljuks and the bey-
liks », op. cit., p. 247) suggested that, in 1228, Sinop was attacked by the Trape-
zuntines in accord with the anti-Seljuk policy of the Khw∆razm-Sh∆h and then was
recovered by the Seljuks.
> >
104. AL- AYNĪ, Iqd al-jum∆n (« Pearl necklace »), MS Department of Saint
Petersburg Branch of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of
Sciences, C350, f. 19v ; AL-H · AMAWĪ, op. cit., f. 158v ; JUWAYNĪ (QAZVINI), op. cit.,
p. 170 ; JUVAINI (J. BOYLE), op. cit., vol. II, p. 438 ; RASHĪD AL-DĪN, op. cit., p. 83-
84. See also AL-NASAWĪ, op. cit., p. 359-360 and note 23 with further bibliographi-
cal references.
105. JUVAINI (J. BOYLE), op. cit., vol. II, p. 445-449 ; AL-NASAWĪ, op. cit.,
p. 223, 238-239, 240-243 and commentaries of Z.M. BUNIYATOV on p. 359-360 ;
CL. CAHEN, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, op. cit., p. 129.

108 Rustam Shukurov
The fate of Erzurum was sealed : as early as 1229, Rukn al-Dı̄n

Jah∆n-Sh∆h of Erzurum, witnessing the growing accord between al-
>
Malik al-Ashraf and Al∆’ al-Dı̄n and realizing that there would be
no place for him in the new coalition, sent messengers to Jal∆l al-
Dı̄n with oaths of allegiance. At the beginning of 1230, Rukn al-Dı̄n
Jah∆n-Sh∆h arrived in the camp of the Khw∆raz-Sh∆h in person 106.
>
Al∆’ al-Dı̄n’s ambassadors, who demanded that Rukn al-Dı̄n be
handed over, were received by the Khw∆razm-Sh∆h with unaccep-
>
table arrogance. In response, Al∆’ al-Dı̄n hastened the formation
of a coalition comprised of the Ayyūbids, Cilician Armenians and
chieftains of the nomadic Turkmen clans 107.
Between 6 and 9 August 1230, the allies gave battle to the Khw∆-
razmian army in the valley of Yasıçimen 108. On the Khw∆razmian
side fought Rukn al-Dı̄n Jah∆n-Sh∆h, who acted like a guide and
chose the battle-field of Yasıçimen himself. The result of the battle
is well known : Jal∆l al-Dı̄n was defeated and soon after that disap-
peared somewhere in Kurdistan, fleeing from the Mongols 109. As
for Rukn al-Dı̄n Jah∆n-Sh∆h, he and his brother were captured ;
Erzurum, according to the bargain with the Ayyūbids, passed into
>
the hands of Al∆’ al-Dı̄n. That was the end of the Pontic coalition.
Melik’s
attack on Trebizond
About 1229, Andronicus Gidus, apparently following Rukn al-

Dı̄n Jah∆n-Sh∆h of Erzurum, took the side of Jal∆l al-Dı̄n the
Khw∆razm-Sh∆h. This hypothesis was first formulated by J.F.
106. AL-NASAWĪ, op. cit., p. 225-226 ; JUWAYNĪ (QAZVINI), op. cit., p. 181 ;
JUVAINI (J. BOYLE), op. cit., vol. II, p. 450.
107. AL-H · AMAWĪ, op. cit., f. 197r4–6 ; ABŪ ‘L-FIDĀ, op. cit., vol. IV, p. 366 ;
KIRAKOS GANDZAKETZI, Istoria Armenii, op. cit., p. 151 ; A.G. GALSTIAN, Armians-
kie istochniki, op. cit., p. 24 ; CL. CAHEN, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, op. cit., p. 129.
108. For the location of Yasıçimen see : ABŪ BAKR-I TIHRĀNĪ, Kit∆b-i Diy∆rba-
kriyya (« The book of Diy∆rbakr »), ed. N. LUGAL - F. SÜMER, Ankara, 1962,
vol. I, p. 94, note 1 (contemporary Mecidiye). Cf. A.A.M. BRYER - D. WINFIELD,
The Byzantine monuments, op. cit., vol. I, p. 61-63.
109. AL-NASAWĪ, op. cit., p. 246-247, 363 and note 7 to the chapter 89 ; IBN BĪBĪ
(Mukhtas·ar), op. cit., p. 167 ; H.L. GOTTSCHALK, « Bericht des Ibn Nazif al-Hama-
wi über die Schlacht von Jasyçimen (25–28. Ramadan 627 / 7–10. August 1230) »,

Fallmerayer 110. The more we study the known sources, the more
certain we can be of the correctness of J.F. Fallmerayer’s assertion.
After the defeat of August 1230, the remnants of the Khw∆raz-
mian army sought refuge in the lands of emperor Andronicus
Gidus. Al-H · amawı̄ and Abū al-Faraj, in both Arabic and Syriac
versions of his chronicle, state that the Khw∆razmians fled to Tre-
bizond and many of the fugitives fell from high rocks 111. Ibn Bı̄bı̄
>
provides confirmation of this, writing that, on Al∆’ al-Dı̄n’s
approach to Erzurum, many Khw∆razmians perished by falling in
a gorge 112. Abū al-Faraj in his Syriac chronicle further mentions
that the Khw∆razmians also fled « to the country of the Ibe-
rians » 113. This is not a surprise because, according to al-H· amawı̄
and Ibn Bı̄bı̄, the Armenian-Georgian ruler of Olti in the province
of Tao participated in the battle at Yasıçimen on the side of Jal∆l al-
Dı̄n 114. By « the country of the Iberians », Abū al-Faraj probably
means the territory of the principality of Olti. It is curious to note
that the defeated Khw∆razmians considered the Christian Greek
and Armenian/Georgian territories to have been the safest places.
No doubt, Trebizond, like Erzurum and Olti, especially after it lost
Sinop, had no choice but to rely on the fortunes of the Khw∆razm-
Sh∆h 115.
Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes 56 (1960), p. 55-67 ; Z.M.
BUNIYATOV, Gosudarstvo Khorezmshakhov-Anushteginov, op. cit., p. 179-185 ;
A.G.C. SAVVIDES, Byzantium in the Near East, op. cit., p. 178-181 ; SP. VRYONIS,
The decline, op. cit., p. 134.
110. J.F. FALLMERAYER, Geschichte des Kaisertums von Trapezunt, op. cit.,
p. 107. J.F. FALLMERAYER’s suggetion has also been supported by subsequent scho-
larly tradition (see for instance : F. USPENSKII, Ocherki iz istorii Trapezundskoi
imperii, op. cit., p. 61 ; E. JANSSENS, Trébizonde, op. cit., p. 76-77 ; M. KUR∞ANS-
KIS, « L’Empire de Trébizonde et les Turcs », op. cit., p. 120).
111. AL-H · AMAWĪ, op. cit., f. 198r7–9, 198v ; H.L. GOTTSCHALK, « Bericht des Ibn
Nazif al-Hamawi », op. cit., p. 64-65 ; ABŪ AL-FARAJ, Mukhtas·ar, op. cit., p. 429-
430 ; The Chronography of Gregory Abû’l-Faraj, op. cit., p. 395.
113. The Chronography of Gregory Abû’l-Faraj, op. cit., p. 395.
114. IBN BĪBĪ (Mukhtas·ar), op. cit., p. 177-178 ; H.L. GOTTSCHALK, « Bericht
des Ibn Nazif al-Hamawi », op. cit., p. 64, 67.
115. For additional information on the Olti and Panaskert principalities and
their relations with the Khw∆razm-Sh∆h, see : R. SHUKUROV - D. KOROBEINIKOV,
« Velikie Komniny, Sinop i Rum v 1223-1230 gg. », op. cit., p. 196-197.

110 Rustam Shukurov
I suggest that the Seljuk attack on Trebizond occurred in the

autumn of 1230, immediately after the battle at Yasıçimen and the
occupation of Erzurum. The Seljuks seem to have invaded Trebi-
zond pursuing the Khw∆razmians. We also know that Ayyūbid
>
troops chased the Khw∆razmians as far as Olti, which Al∆’ al-Dı̄n
had granted to al-Malik al-Ashraf 116.
John Lazaropoulos’ « melik », the leader of the invading army,
was probably identical with the then crown-prince (malik) Ghiy∆th
>
al-Dı̄n Kai-Khusraw, the son of Al∆’ al-Dı̄n. Since 1228 Ghiy∆th al-
Dı̄n Kai-Khusraw had been acting as the vicegerent of Erzincan
and, obviously, of the entire region bordering upon the Empire of
Trebizond 117. Thus, since that time Ghiy∆th al-Dı̄n Kai-Khusraw
had been formally responsible for military affaires in the region
and led the army against Trebizond in accordance with his formal
duties. It is also noteworthy that Ibn Bı̄bı̄, who writes about this
appointment, calls Ghiy∆th al-Dı̄n sult·∆n and designates his office
as p∆dsh∆hı̄ « royal ». This probably explains the puzzling mixture
of the two titles in Lazaropolos’ text « the sultan melik » (ÌÂÏdÎ ï
ÛÔ˘ÏÙ¿ÓÔ˜) 118. In some sense the Greeks followed the usage of the
Seljuks themselves.
There are also two other indirect indications that the date of
Ghiy∆th al-Dı̄n’s campaign fell in 1230. First, John Lazaropoulos
maintains that the Seljuk sultan, preparing for the attack, brought,
in particular, some detachments from Malatya, while al-H · amawı̄
says that the sultan summoned the troops from Malatya just before
the battle of Yasıçimen in 1230 119. Second, the enigmatic addition
>
of ™···Ù›ÓË˜ to Al∆’ al-Dı̄n’s name in the « Synopsis » may be ano-
ther allusion to the events of 1230. The fact is that ™···Ù›ÓË˜ lin-
116. H.L. GOTTSCHALK, op. cit.

>
118. On the titles of the Seljuks, see : MUNTAJAB AL-DĪN BADĪ ATĀBEK AL-
>
JUWAYNĪ, Kit∆b atabat al-kataba. Mur∆sil∆t-i dı̄w∆n-i sult·∆n Sanjar (« The book
of the rules of correspondence. The correspondence of the dı̄w∆n of the sultan
Sanjar »), ed. M. QAZWĪNĪ, Tehran, 1329/1951 ; H. HORST, Die Staatsverwaltung
der Grosseljuqen und Horazmsahs (1038-1231), Wiesbaden, 1964 ; for pertinent
discussion of the titles « malik » and « sultan » in JOHN LAZAROPOULOS’ text see :
A. KUNIK, « O sviazi trapezundsko-sel’ddzhukskoi voiny », op. cit., p. 736.
119. J.O. ROSENQVIST, The hagiographic dossier, op. cit., lines 1183-1185 ; AL-
· AMAWĪ, f. 198. See for more details and further references : R. SHUKUROV, Veli-
H
kie Komniny i Vostok, op. cit., p. 142.

guistically is an exact counterpart for the Muslim name Shih∆b al-

Dı̄n. The only known Shih∆b al-Dı̄n who played any remarkable
role in eastern Anatolian events in the first decades of the thir-
teenth century was al-Malik Shih∆b al-Dı̄n Gh∆zı̄, one of the bro-
thers of al-Malik al-Ashraf, being at the time the ruler of Mayy∆f∆-
riqı̄n. The malik Shih∆b al-Dı̄n Gh∆zı̄ took part in the battle of
Yasıçimen among the Ayyūbids 120. After the battle, according to
>
Ibn Bı̄bı̄ and al-H· amawı̄, Al∆’ al-Dı̄n remained with al-Malik al-
Ashraf and his brothers in Erzurum. Thus, Shih∆b al-Dı̄n Gh∆zı̄
was most likely among them 121.
Keeping in mind that the Ayyūbids took possession of Olti near
the Trapezuntine border, one may propose that al-Malik Shih∆b al-
Dı̄n Gh∆zı̄ might well have joined Ghiy∆th al-Dı̄n’s attack against
Trebizond. It is not impossible that the source text of John Lazaro-
poulos’ narration mentioned him in a certain connection as « ÌÂÏdÎ
ï ™···Ù›ÓË˜ », but in John Lazaropoulos’ edition the original
information on Shih∆b al-Dı̄n has been completely lost except for
>
his name, which turned into an odd addition to the name of Al∆’ al-
Dı̄n. In any case, as we know from the « Synopsis », the Muslim
attack completely failed in its objective and the humiliating treaty
of 1214 was abolished.
ììì
From the Trapezuntine position, the results of the turbulent

events of the 1220s and 1230s were mixed. On the one hand, Trebi-
zond succeeded in maintaining its independence. On the other
hand, the Grand Comneni failed to retain Sinop, although they did
not abandon hope of recovering it.
The Seljuks apparently lost all expansionist interest in the
Greek Pontus and the city of Trebizond, being content with their
major Black Sea base at Sinop. The commercial and military
advantages of Sinop perfectly met the essential requirements of the
Seljuks in the region. Their initial objective of conquering Trebi-
zond, which they had attempted in 1205-1206, eventually proved to
be unattainable after the conflict of 1230.
120. AL-NASAWĪ, op. cit., p. 248 and note 6 ; AL-H · AMAWĪ, op. cit., f. 197v.
121. IBN BĪBĪ (Mukhtas·ar), op. cit., p. 176 ; AL-H
· AMAWĪ, op. cit., f. 199r-199v.

112 Rustam Shukurov
After 1230, Trapezuntine-Seljuk relations appear to have nor-

malized and there was a long period of peace on the southern fron-
tier of the Empire of Trebizond. This is probably the context in
which we should interpret the obscure information in Saint Atha-
nasius’ « Synaxarion » concerning the wife of an amı̄r of Sivas who,
possibly during the reign of the emperor Manuel I Grand Comne-
nus (1238-1263), sought relief at the tomb of Saint Athanasius in
Trebizond from the demons pursuing her 122. The southern border
of the Empire of Trebizond was open to Seljuk visitors.
In the 1230s, according to Simon de Saint-Quentin, the Grand
Comneni were obliged to send to the Seljuk sultan on demand « 200
lances » (that is, an army of about one thousand men) 123. It would
be too hasty, however, based on Saint-Quentin’s evidence, to con-
clude that the Grand Comneni were some sort of vassals of the Sel-
juks at that time (the result of the war of 1230 should not be for-
gotten). Those « 200 lances » might instead have been a gesture of
respect and friendship addressed to a « senior » king and partner.
This was a new paradigm in the relations between Trebizond and
Konya, which lasted until the Mongol invasion in the 1240s.
Part III:
The Sinop issue during
the Mongol invasion (1240s-1313)
Catastrophe struck in the 1240s. In 1241 (639 H) the Mongol

commander Chūrm∆ghūn (Chormaghun) carried out a probing
attack against the Seljuk city of Erzurum. In the course of captu-
ring the city, his troops killed many Seljuk military officers 124.
122. For comprehensive discussion of the evidence, see : A.A.M. BRYER,

« Greeks and Turkmens », op. cit., p. 124, note 32. See also : F.W. HASLUCK,
Christianity and Islam under the sultans, Oxford, 1929, vol. I, p. 66 ; J.F. FALL-
MERAYER, Fragmente aus dem Orient, Stuttgart, 1877, p. 121 ; SP. VRYONIS, The
decline, op. cit., p. 489.
123. SIMON DE SAINT-QUENTIN, Histoire des Tartares, ed. J. RICHARD, Paris,
1965, p. 70 ; A.A.M. BRYER, « The Grand Komnenos and the Great Khan at Kara-
korum in 1246 », Res Orientales 6 (1994) (volume : Itinéraires d’Orient. Homma-
ges à Claude Cahen), p. 258 ; CL. CAHEN, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, op. cit., p. 135.
124. ABŪ AL-FARAJ, Mukhtas·ar, op. cit., p. 440.

Soon after that, on 26-27 June 1243 (6-7 Muh·arram 641), the Sel-
juk army, the most powerful military force in the region, suffered
a dramatic defeat at the hands of the Mongol general nūy∆n B∆yjū
at the battle of Köseda∏ 125.
The battle of Köseda∏ opened a new page in the history of Ana-
tolia. On the one hand, it shattered the power of the Seljuk sulta-
nate, which then entered a prolonged period of troubles — political
and economic upheaval and instability — that ended with the dis-
appearance of the Seljuk state altogether. This structural crisis of
the Muslim Seljuk state did not mean, however, that the Christian
Greek, Armenian and Georgian rivals of the Turks managed to gain
any tangible advantage from it, nor did it change in their favor the
course of the contest with the Turks for cultural supremacy in Ana-
tolia. As Cl. Cahen has noted, « on the whole the Mongol conquest
made the conquered territories Turkish, not Mongol » 126. As a mat-
ter of fact, the Mongol invasion laid the foundation for the next
round of the Turkification of the region and led to the eventual eth-
nic, political and cultural disappearance of the aboriginal peoples
in the most of Asia Minor.
As a result of the Mongol invasion, new political entities and
relationships, ultimately centered on the Mongol axis, took shape in
Anatolia and Caucasia. I will now present a preliminary approach
to that structurally complex political situation which deserves more
detailed investigation.
The Mongols of Iran and

the Golden Horde
In reality, the Mongols never fully subjugated Anatolia, neigh-

boring Greater and Lesser Armenia and Georgia. The fate of these
countries differed considerably from those areas that found them-
selves under direct Mongol rule, such as Central Asia, Iran, Iraq,
125. IBN BĪBĪ (Mukhtas·ar), op. cit., p. 236-241 ; SP. VRYONIS, The decline, op.
cit., p. 134 ; CL. CAHEN, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, op. cit., p. 138 ; M. KUR∞ANSKIS,
« L’Empire de Trébizonde et les Turcs au XIIIe siècle », op. cit., p. 121 ; A.A.M.
BRYER - D. WINFIELD, The Byzantine monuments, op. cit., vol. I, p. 61 ; J. BOYLE,
The successors of Cenghis Khan, New York - London, 1971, p. 304.

114 Rustam Shukurov
the Crimea and Russian steppes. The Mongols abolished the old
political systems in these latter areas and then incorporated them
into a new state formation (ūlūs). In contrast to this, in Anatolia,
Armenia and Georgia, the Mongols preserved the traditional politi-
cal structures, being content with the formal acknowledgement of
their supreme power. These states were, of course, under the strict
fiscal and military control of the Mongols. Nevertheless, the Turks,
Greeks, Armenians and Georgians preserved some degree of sove-
reignty and, therefore, some room for political maneuvering, as
well as their social and cultural traditions.
One of the most important features of political life in Anatolia,
Armenia and the Caucasus, which ensured to a considerable extent
the survival there of the traditional states, was the rivalry between
the two hostile branches of the Mongol ruling elite. Anatolia and the
Caucasus happened to be part of a border region, the control of
which was disputed by the Golden Horde and the Great Kh∆ns.
According to Chı̄ngı̄z-Kh∆n’s testament, the lands to the west of the
Amu Darya and the Aral Sea, including Rūm (that is, Seljuk,
Byzantine and Armenian Anatolia), Syria and Iran, were part of
the ūlūs of Jūchı̄, the elder son of Chı̄ngı̄z-Kh∆n 127. But in 1227,
Jūchı̄ and Chı̄ngı̄z-Kh∆n died, and as soon as the western ūlūs (the
so called Golden Horde) passed to Jūchı̄’s son B∆tū Kh∆n (1227-
1255), there began a contest between the latter and the Great
Kh∆ns for control over Iran and Anatolia that lasted for many
decades. Indeed, the claims of the descendants of B∆tū for the
« southern territories » were heard from time to time as late as the
first half of the fourteenth century. In 1335, Shab∆nk∆ra’ı̄ mocked
the rulers of the Golden Horde who regarded Arr∆n and Azerbai-
jan as their hereditary possessions 128.
127. JUWAYNĪ (QAZVINI), op. cit., p. 222-223 ; V.G. TIZENGAUZEN, Sbornik

materialov, op. cit., vol. I (excerpts from Arabic sources), p. 188 ; I.P. PETRUS-
HEVSKII, « Iran i Azerbaidzhan pod vlast’iu Khulaguidov (1256–1353) » (« Iran and
Azerbaijan under the Hülegüids »), in Tataro-mongoly v Azii i Evrope (« The
Mongols in Asia and Europe »), Moscow, 1970, p. 232.
128. SHABĀNKĀRA’ Ī, f. 229r : « Ūzbak kh∆n ki kh∆n-i Qifch∆q ast az farzand∆n-
>
i B∆tū da wı̄ dar sar d∆rad ki [...] zamı̄n-i Arr∆n wa Ādharb∆yj∆n qadı̄man
d∆khil-i mam∆lik-i B∆tū būd, b∆yad ki p∆dsh∆h ba-m∆ arz∆nı̄ d∆rad. » Transla-
tion : « Ūzbak Kh∆n, who is the kh∆n of Qipch∆q and from the lineage of B∆tū,
claims that the land of Arr∆n and Azerbaijan since olden days was a part of B∆tū’s
>
possessions. The King [i.e., the Ilkh∆nid Abū Sa ı̄d] ought to give it back to us. »

Anatolia and the Caucasus had become an apple of discord bet-

ween the Kh∆n B∆tū and the nūy∆n B∆yjū, an officer of the Great
Kh∆n in Iran, as early as in the 1240s 129. No doubt, this internal
strife considerably weakened the Mongol capability to administer
the region. The Seljuk sultanate, Empire of Trebizond, Cilician
Armenia and Georgia maintained their traditional pre-Mongol stra-
tegic priorities and attempted to use the Mongols to their own
advantage in their traditional struggles with their rivals. Moreover,
in the entire region the Mongol factor became an important element
in the internal strife of local societies, factions of which appealed
for support to either the Iranian or Golden Horde branches of the
Mongol Empire. As I will show, the latter factor, which was critical
in the Seljuk sultanate, Georgia and later in Trebizond, undermi-
ned the local societies and resulted in major upheavals and widesp-
read decline. From this standpoint, we can distinguish two basic
types of relations between the Mongols and the local states : first,
the Seljuk and Georgian, and second, the Armenian.
The Seljuk and Georgian

paradigm
After the defeat at Köseda∏, the Seljuk vizier Muhadhdhab al-

Dı̄n concluded a peace treaty with B∆yjū’s lord Chūrm∆ghūn,
Karakorum’s vicegerent in Iran, in the Mūgh∆n steppe. Neverthe-
less, the Seljuks soon switched their support to B∆tū (better known
in Anatolia as S·∆’ı̄n Kh∆n) 130, whose sovereignty was acknowledged
>
129. According to al- Aynı̄ (V.G. TIZENGAUZEN, Sbornik materialov, op. cit.,
vol. I, p. 503-505) and al-Nuwayrı̄ (ibid., p. 153-154), B∆yjū « was one of the great
figures [of the Mongols] [...] on the side of B∆tū-Kh∆n ». On the conquest of Ana-
tolia by the Mongols in the 1243, al-Nuwayrı̄ also wrote : « This mob [i.e., the Mon-
gols] came from B∆tū-Kh∆n » (ibid., p. 153, note 2 ; p. 133, note 1). But it seems
that the statements of the Arab authors had no real basis : B∆yjū appears to have
been an officer of the Great Kh∆n’s vicegerent Chūrm∆ghūn.
130. That is, « The Good Kh∆n », see : G. DOERFER, Türkische und Mongoli-
sche Elemente in Neupersischen, Wiesbaden, 1963, vol. I, p. 371 (n˚ 248) ; and
J. BOYLE, « The posthumous title of Batu Khan », Proceedings of the 9th Meeting
of the Permanent International Altaistic Conference, Naples, 1970, p. 67-70
(= IDEM, The Mongol World Empire, 1206–1370, London, 1977, n˚ XVIII).

116 Rustam Shukurov
after 1243 by Ghiy∆th al-Dı̄n Kai-Khusraw II (1237-1245) and in

>
1246 by his son Izz al-Dı̄n Kai-K∆’ūs II (1246-1259) 131.
However, in his struggle for the throne, Kai-K∆’ūs II’s brother
Rukn al-Dı̄n Qılıch Arslan IV (1249-1266) sought support in Iran
and Karakorum and in 1249 received from the Great Kh∆n Güyük,
the enemy of B∆tū, a yarlı̄gh (an official diploma) granting him the
Seljuk crown and deposing Kai-K∆’ūs II 132. The internal political
crisis was eventually resolved by a compromise : the Seljuk realm
was divided between the two sultans. But when Rukn al-Dı̄n orde-
red the killing of B∆tū’s representative in Anatolia, S·∆h·ib Shams al-
Dı̄n by name, the enraged B∆tū sent a special commission to Asia
Minor to conduct an investigation. In 1250, the ambassadors of
both sultans confirmed their allegiance to B∆tū, and the assassins of
S·∆h·ib Shams al-Dı̄n were surrendered to the Golden Horde. It is
noteworthy that B∆tū even controlled the appointments to high
court offices, issuing yarlı̄ghs for high-ranking Seljuk officials.
Such yarlı̄ghs were brought from the Golden Horde by the Seljuk
embassy in 1253 133.
In 1254, on B∆tū’s order, three brothers Kai-K∆’ūs II, Qılıch
>
Arslan IV and Al∆’ al-Dı̄n Kai-Qub∆dh went to the Golden Horde
>
in person. Fearing that B∆tū might favor Al∆’ al-Dı̄n as the supre-
me ruler of the sultanate, Kai-K∆’ūs II and Qılıch Arslan IV mur-
dered him on their way to B∆tū 134.
131. IBN BĪBĪ (Mukhtas·ar), op. cit., p. 247-249, 264 ; Histoire des Seldjouki-
des (Ankara), op. cit., p. 49-50 ; ANONYMOUS, Ta’rı̄kh-e ∆l-e Saljūq, op. cit.,
p. 93 ; JUVAINI (J. BOYLE), op. cit., vol. II, p. 250 ; CL. CAHEN, Pre-Ottoman Tur-
key, op. cit., p. 269-270. See also : G. ALTUNIAN, Die Mongolen und ihre Erobe-
rungen in Kaukasischen und Kleinasiatischen Ländern im XIII Jahrhundert, Ber-
lin, 1911.
132. IBN BĪBĪ (Mukhtas·ar), op. cit., p. 264 ; ABŪ AL-FARAJ, Mukhtas·ar, op.
cit., p. 449-450. On this see also : R.P. LINDER, « The challenge of Qilich
Arslan IV », Near Eastern numismatics, iconography, epigraphy and history. Stu-
dies in honour of George C. Miles, ed. D.K. KOUYMJIAN, Beirut, 1974, p. 411-417.
133. IBN BĪBĪ (Mukhtas·ar), op. cit., p. 270-272 ; H. DUDA, Die Seltschuken-
geschichte, op. cit., p. 253-258, note 298 ; ABŪ AL-FARAJ, Mukhtas·ar, op. cit.,
p. 451 ; CL. CAHEN, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, op. cit., p. 272–273.
134. IBN BĪBĪ (Mukhtas·ar), op. cit., p. 275 ff ; H. DUDA, Die Seltschukenge-
schichte, op. cit., p. 262 ; KARĪM AL-DĪN MUH· AMMAD AL-AQSARĀYĪ, Müsâmeret ül-
ahbâr. Mo∏ollar zamanında Türkiye Selçukluları tarihi (« The history of the ana-
tolian Seljuks in the Mongol times »), Ankara, 1944, p. 38–39 ; F. IŞILTAN, Die
Seldschukengeschichte des Aksarayi, Breslau, 1943, p. 251.

Apparently because of the intrigues of B∆yjū who supported

Qılıch Arslan IV, the latter and Kai-K∆’ūs II quarrelled and began
hostilities. As a result, Qılıch Arslan IV found himself imprisoned
in his brother’s stronghold at Buru∏lu 135, while Kai-K∆’ūs II sent
an embassy to B∆tū complaining of the Mongols of Iran : « the mes-
sengers of the nūy∆n B∆yjū and other nūy∆ns come too frequently
to Rūm, and every year unaccountable sums are spent covering
their needs ». B∆yjū threatened the embassy, which had been kind-
ly received by B∆tū and visited B∆yjū’s camp on its way back home :
« No doubt, my loss will bring you misfortune 136. »
B∆yjū kept his promise : in October 1256, he defeated Kai-
K∆’ūs II, who escaped to the Nicaean Empire, and installed Qılıch
Arslan IV as the sole ruler 137. This assault by the Iranian Mongols
was apparently connected with the death of B∆tū in 1255. After-
wards, the influence of the Golden Horde in Anatolia rapidly decli-
ned, coinciding with the consolidation of the Iranian Mongols under
the rule of the Kh∆n Hūl∆gū. Anatolia then passed under the tight
control of Mongolian Iran. In 1257 Kai-K∆’ūs II, invaded from
Nicaea with a Greek army but suffered defeat and, in 1261, fled to
Byzantium forever 138.
135. IBN BĪBĪ (Mukhtas·ar), op. cit., p. 277-283 ; AL-AQSARĀYĪ, op. cit., p. 40 ;
CL. CAHEN, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, op. cit., p. 274-275.
136. IBN BĪBĪ (Mukhtas·ar), op. cit., p. 283–284.
137. IBN BĪBĪ (Mukhtas·ar), op. cit., p. 287, 292-293 ; H. DUDA, Die Seltschu-
kengeschichte, op. cit., p. 273 ; ABŪ AL-FARAJ, Mukhtas·ar, op. cit., p. 461-462 ; AL-
AQSARĀYĪ, op. cit., p. 40 ; CL. CAHEN, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, op. cit., p. 275-276.
The paternal grandmother of Kai-K∆’ūs II (the mother of Kai-Khusraw II) was a
>
Greek, a certain Khw∆nd Kh∆tūn ( AZĪZ IBN ARDASHĪR ASTARĀBĀDĪ, Bazm-u razm
[« Banquet and battle »], with introduction on the author and his text by M.F.
KÖPRÜLÜ-ZADE, Istanbul, 1928, p. 45). The mother of Kai-K∆’ūs II himself was
also a noble Greek lady, a certain Bardūliya (¶·Ú·‰Ô‡ÏÈ· ?) (IBN BĪBĪ [Mukhta-
·sar], op. cit., p. 213). Therefore, Kai-K∆’ūs II was more Greek than Turk by
blood. The same was true of his brother Qılıch Arslan IV : his mother was a Greek
slave (j∆riya-i rūmiya) (IBN BĪBĪ [Mukhtas·ar], op. cit., p. 213 ; ABŪ AL-FARAJ,
Mukhtas·ar, op. cit., p. 447). On Nicaean-Seljuk political relations at that time
see : CL. CAHEN, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, op. cit., p. 274-275 ; P.I. ZHAVORONKOV,
« Nikeiskaia imperiia i Vostok » (« The Nicaean Empire and the East »), Vizantiis-
kii Vremennik (« Byzantine Chronicle ») 39 (1978), p. 93-101.
geschichte, op. cit., p. 283 ; AL-AQSARĀYĪ, op. cit., p. 48-50 ; CL. CAHEN, Pre-Otto-
man Turkey, op. cit., p. 277-279.

118 Rustam Shukurov
The Seljuks had been trying to play on the clash of interests bet-
ween the Mongols of Iran and the Golden Horde. The Golden
Horde had continuously interferred in Anatolian affairs, while
B∆yjū, merely a nūy∆n, dared not openly withstand B∆tū, a grand-
son of Chı̄ngı̄z himself. All this ended with the death of B∆tū.
The very same logic may be observed in the fate of Georgia at
that time. B∆yjū planned to end the sovereignty of the Georgian
kingdom and incorporate it into the Mongol Empire. But Queen
Rusudani appealed to B∆tū and, thanks to his support, in 1242-
1243, recovered Tiflis with her son and co-ruler David Narin
(1245-1292). In response, B∆yjū proclaimed his protégé David Ulu
(1245-1269) the true king of Georgia 139. As a result, Georgia split
into two hostile kingdoms.
The Armenian model
The fate of both Armenias represents a quite different model of

diplomatic strategy towards the Mongol issue. Armenia happily
avoided internal upheavals because from the very beginning king
Het’um made the right choice by concluding a peace treaty with
B∆yjū in Kayseri as early as 1243. Demonstrating his allegiance,
Het’um took a step, uncommonly perfidious and thus quite rare in
contemporary diplomatic of surrendering to the Mongols on B∆y-
jū’s demand the mother, wife and daughter of Ghiy∆th al-Dı̄n Kai-
Khusraw II, who, after the battle of Köseda∏, had sent his family to
Cilician Armenia under the protection of the king 140. This unpre-
cedented measure set the future course of the foreign policy of Cili-
cian Armenia by firmly tying it to the Mongols 141. In 1246, B∆yjū
139. W. ALLEN, A history of the Georgian people, London, 1932 (reprint, New
York, 1971), p. 114 ; K. SALIA, Histoire de la nation géorgienne, Paris, 1980,
p. 224-228 ; M. KUR∞ANSKIS, « L’Empire de Trébizonde et la Géorgie », Revue des
études byzantines 35 (1977), p. 248.
140. CL. CAHEN, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, op. cit., p. 271. For the reaction of
contemporary writers to this see : IBN BĪBĪ (Mukhtas·ar), op. cit., p. 250 ; KIRAKOS
GANDZAKETZI, Istoria Armenii, op. cit., p. 222 ; SMBAT SPARAPET, Letopis’, op. cit.,
p. 129-131.
141. On Het’um’s relations with the Great Kh∆ns in 1247-1253, see : SMBAT
SPARAPET, Letopis’, op. cit., p. 134, 138, 144-145 ; KIRAKOS GANDZAKETZI, Istoria
Armenii, op. cit., p. 178, 196 ; J. BOYLE, « The journey of Het’um I, king of little

offered military aid to the Armenians when B∆tū’s vassal Kai-Khus-

raw II besieged Tarsus. Later, Mongol military forces were quarte-
red in Cilicia in order to defend the country from the Seljuks. And
the presence of Armenian detachments in the Mongol army is fre-
quently mentioned in connection with Syrian affairs 142.
Relying on Mongol patronage, the Armenians managed to regain
some territories conquered by the Seljuks 143. The territorial acqui-
sitions of Cilician Armenia were no doubt made with Mongol per-
mission and support. In 1253, Het’um, visiting the Great Kh∆n
Mengü, asked him to give back « all the countries subject to the
Armenian kingdom, those captured by the Saracens, and those that
had fallen under Mongol control ». The Kh∆n granted Het’um his
wish 144. It is worthy of note that Greater Armenia followed the same
policy. The famous nobleman Ivane Zakarian abandoned Queen
Rusudani and entered Mongol service as early as in 1235 145. The
supremacy of the Mongols was acknowledged by H · asan Jal∆l (the
prince of Khachen, the nephew of the aforementioned Ivane and
Zakare Zakarian), Sargis the prince of Ani (son of Zakare Zaka-
rian), and the atabek Avag (son of Ivane Zakarian). The Mongols
gave back to Vagram the prince of Shamkhor and his sons the lands
seized by the Muslims 146.
It must be pointed out that, at first, the Mongol attitude towards
Christians was generally better than that towards Muslims. Arme-
nian authors frequently state that the Mongols treated Christians
Armenia, to the court of the Grand Khan Möngke », Central Asiatic Journal 9
(1964), p. 175-189 (= IDEM, The Mongol World Empire, 1206–1370, London, 1977,
n˚ X) ; A.G. GALSTIAN, Armianskie istochniki, op. cit., p. 9, 67-70, 104 ; ABŪ AL-
FARAJ, Mukhtas·ar, op. cit., p. 459-460 ; IBN BĪBĪ (Mukhtas·ar), op. cit., p. 241 ;
G.G. MIKAELIAN, Istoria Kilikiiskogo armianskogo gosudarstva (« A history of the
Armenian Cilician state »), Yerevan, 1952, p. 302–308. For the extremely interes-
ting and informative treaty between Het’um and Mengü, see : C. D’OHSSON, Histoi-
re des Mongols depuis Tchingiz-Khan jusqu’à Timour Beg ou Tamerlan, La Haye -
Amsterdam, 1834, vol. III, p. 313.
143. SMBAT SPARAPET, Letopis’, op. cit., p. 129-130 ; G.G. MIKAELIAN, Istoria
Kilikiiskogo armianskogo gosudarstva, op. cit., p. 302 ; A.G. GALSTIAN, Armians-
kie istochniki, op. cit., p. 48, 64.
144. A.G. GALSTIAN, Armianskie istochniki, op. cit., p. 68.
145. W. ALLEN, A history of the Georgian people, op. cit., p. 113.
146. A.G. GALSTIAN, Armianskie istochniki, op. cit., p. 15-16 ; KIRAKOS GAND-
ZAKETZI, Istoria Armenii, op. cit., p. 164-165.

120 Rustam Shukurov
relatively well 147. The Syriac Christian Abū al-Faraj noted the
high prestige of Christian officials at the court of Güyük, during
whose reign the Christian « Francs, Russians, [...] Armenians »
held important posts 148. Christians were in favor at the courts of
the Iranian IĪlkh∆ns until the time of Gh∆z∆n (1295-1304) as well. It
suffices to mention that the Christian sacred formula « In the name
of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit » (« bism al-ab wa al-ibn
wa rūh· al-quds ») and the representation of the Cross were used as
the Īlkh∆ns’ state symbols on the coins of Āb∆q∆ (1265-1282) and
Arghūn (1284-1291) 149.
To sum up, the Armenians, unlike the Seljuks and Georgians,
consistently and faithfully cultivated friendly relations with the Ira-
nian Mongols and, due to this, avoided devastating invasions and,
moreover, managed to regain control of lost lands.
The second Greek recapture

of Sinop
Only fragmentary direct evidence of Trapezuntine-Mongol rela-

tions survives 150. At first, unlike the Armenians, the Greeks coun-
ted on the good fortune of the Seljuks. Apparently, detachments of
the Grand Comnenus Manuel I (1238-1263) took part in the battle
of Köseda∏ on the side of the Seljuks. Ibn Bı̄bı̄ says that the empe-
ror (takwar) came to the Seljuk camp in person at the head of three
thousand « Francs » 151. A Syriac historian mentions the presence of
147. KIRAKOS GANDZAKETZI, Istoria Armenii, op. cit., p. 174-175 ; SMBAT SPA-
RAPET, Letopis’, op. cit., p. 134, 144-145.
148. ABŪ AL-FARAJ, Mukhtas·ar, op. cit., p. 450, 505-506 (on the Christian
sympathies of Āb∆q∆ and Ah·mad [1282-1284]).
149. M.E. DROUIN, « Notice sur les monnaies mongoles », Journal Asiatique 7
(1896), p. 514 (Āb∆q∆) ; M. SIOUFFI, « Notice sur le cachet du sultan Mongol Old-
jaïtou Khodabendèh », Journal Asiatique 8 (1896), p. 334 (Arghūn).
150. For comprehensive surveys of Trapezuntine and Mongol relations, see :
W. MILLER, Trebizond, op. cit., p. 24 ff ; E. JANSSENS, Trébizonde en Colchide,
op. cit., p. 80 ff, with the bibliographical references to the preceding historiogra-
phy.
151. IBN BĪBĪ (Mukhtas·ar), op. cit., p. 238. Seljuk authors widely used the
term « Francs » for designating Nicaean and Trapezuntine armies (see also below).

« Greeks and Francs » 152. The Seljuk army also included some
Greek or Latin detachments sent by John III Vatatzes 153. Perhaps
Trapezuntine and/or Nicaean forces are meant by « three thousand
Francs and Romans », who were exterminated by the Mongols on 25
June during the battle for a mountain pass leading to the valley of
Köseda∏ 154. Judging from the sources, there could have been no
other Christians in the Seljuk army : the Armenians refused to join
the Seljuks ; Georgia, having been defeated and devastated, was in
no position to participate in the conflict.
The emperor Manuel I at first followed the path of the Seljuks
and Georgians but stopped just in time. As A.A.M. Bryer has
shown, he visited in person the court of the Great Kh∆n Güyük as
early as 1246 155. In general, the personal visit of a vassal ruler to
the Kh∆n’s camp was highly desirable, because the Mongols regar-
ded it politically as an indispensable ceremony of bringing such
persons into the « family » of the Great Kh∆n 156. In ca. 1253, Wil-
liam of Rubruck confirmed that the emperor of Trebizond ackno-
wledged the sovereignty of the Great Kh∆n 157.
On 24 June 1254, Manuel I conquered Sinop. We know almost
nothing about that important event. The only specific reference to
it is a line in a marginal note in the Sougdaian Synaxarion : « that
152. ABŪ AL-FARAJ, Mukhtas·ar, op. cit., p. 440.

153. J.S. LANGDON, Byzantium’s last imperial offensive, op. cit., p. 65-66
(note 103), 17-21 ; P.I. ZHAVORONKOV, « Nikeiskaia imperiia i Vostok », op. cit.,
p. 93-101.
155. JUVAINI (J. BOYLE), op. cit., p. 250 ; A.A.M. BRYER, « The Grand Kom-
nenos and the Great Khan at Karakorum », op. cit., p. 257–261 ; IDEM, « The fate
of George Komnenos ruler of Trebizond (1266–1280) », Byzantinische Zeits-
chrift 66 (1973) (= IDEM, The Empire of Trebizond and the Pontos, Variorum col-
lected studies series, London, 1980, n˚ IV), p. 346. See also additional discussion
in : M. KUR∞ANSKIS, « L’Empire de Trébizonde et les Turcs », op. cit., p. 121,
note 42.
156. E. VOEGELIN, « The Mongol orders of submission to European powers
(1245–1255) », Byzantion 15 (1940-1941), p. 378-413 ; cf. also with an interesting
analysis of Mongol « political theory » : TH. ALLSEN, Mongol imperialism : the poli-
cies of the Grand Qan Mongke in China, Russia and the Islamic lands (1251-
1259), Berkley, 1987, p. 70.
157. C. DAWSON, The Mongol mission. Narratives and letters of the Franciscan
missionaries in Mongolia and China in the thirteenth and fourteenth century, Lon-
don, 1955, p. 91.

122 Rustam Shukurov
day kyr Manuel Comnenus took Sinop, in the year 6762 » 158. Only
a few details can be added from Oriental authors : on recapturing
the city, Manuel I converted Sinop’s mosques into churches 159.
One may guess that the triumphal return of the Greeks to Sinop
was made possible by the Iranian Mongols or rather the Great
Kh∆n himself 160. The fact is that Sinop was governed at that time
>
by the Seljuk naval commander-in-chief ra’ı̄s al-bah·r 161 Shuj∆ al-
>
Dı̄n Abd al-Rah·m∆n, who, having taken part in the aforementio-
ned Seljuk embassy to B∆tū in 1253, obtained B∆tū’s yarlı̄gh inves-
ting him with the office of n∆’ı̄b. According to Ibn Bı̄bı̄, on retur-
> >
ning from the Golden Horde, Shuj∆ al-Dı̄n Abd al-Rah·m∆n went
to his domain in Sinop 162. Thus, in 1254, Sinop was under the pro-
tection of the Golden Horde.
Seljuk Anatolia was under tight Mongol control. Any serious
change in social and political life (including appointments to key
offices) required Mongol approval and sanction, which was embo-
died, in particular, in yarlı̄ghs. B∆tū’s yarlı̄gh on Sinop could have
been abrogated only by another yarlı̄gh of a higher official status.
As a matter of fact, in 1265/1266 when the Seljuks besieged Sinop
again, they produced a Mongol yarlı̄gh delegating to them the right
to the city (see below). Consequently, as M. Kur≤anskis suggests,
Manuel I might well have received such a sanction from the Great
Kh∆n, probably in 1253, when Möngke ascended the throne and all
the vassals of the Mongol Empire sent their embassies to the new
Kh∆n 163.
158. MARIA G. NYSTAZOPOULOU, ^∏ âÓ Ù÷É ∆·˘ÚÈÎ÷É ¯ÂÚÛÔÓ‹Û ÷ˆ fiÏÈ˜ ™Ô˘Á‰·›·, op.

cit., p. 120, n˚ 16 (f. 154v) ; IDEM, « La dernière reconquête de Sinop par les Grecs
de Trébizonde (1254–1265) », Revue des études byzantines 22 (1964), p. 241-249 ;
M. KUR∞ANSKIS, « L’Empire de Trébizonde et les Turcs », op. cit., p. 121-122 ;
A.A.M. BRYER - D. WINFIELD, The Byzantine monuments, op. cit., vol. I, p. 72.
159. Ibn Shadd∆d, in CL. CAHEN, « Quelques textes négligés concernant les
Turcomans de Roum au moment de l’invasion mongole » Byzantion 14 (1939),
p. 138 (se also below).
160. Such a suggestion was first formulated in ELISABETH ZACHARIADOU, « Tre-
bizond and the Turks (1352–1402) », \∞Ú¯ÂÖÔÓ ¶fiÓÙÔ˘ (« Pontic Archive ») 35
(1979) (= ÆDEM, Romania and the Turks, c. 1300 - c. 1500, Variorum Reprints,
London, 1985, n˚ III), p. 334, note 3.
161. On the title, see also above, footnote 63.
162. IBN BĪBĪ (Mukhtas·ar), op. cit., p. 271-272.

Furthermore it is not impossible that the journey of the three

>
sultanal brothers Kai-K∆’ūs II, Qılıch Arslan IV and Al∆’ al-Dı̄n
Kai-Qub∆dh to B∆tū in 1254 was caused by the fall of Sinop. Al-
Aqsar∆yı̄ maintains that the brothers went to B∆tū because of « the
intrigues (muf∆sid) of B∆yjū » 164. This is the only evidence from the
Oriental sources that might be connected with the Greek recon-
quest of Sinop. It is very likely that, by « the intrigues of B∆yjū »,
al-Aqsar∆yı̄ refers to help the latter rendered to Manuel I in the
conquest of Sinop. The capture of Sinop must have provoked an
acute crisis in relations between Trebizond and the Golden Horde.
In any case, Manuel I, unlike the Seljuks, chose the « Arme-
nian » model in his relations with the Mongols. Like the Armenians,
he apparently tried to recover territories lost to the Muslims by his
swift submission to the Mongols of Iran and Karakorum. Indirect
evidence supporting this idea may be found in the well-known epi-
sode of the contacts between Manuel I and king Louis IX, which
began on the eve of the Greek recapture of Sinop. Around 1253,
Manuel I’s ambassador brought to Louis splendid gifts and con-
veyed his lord’s request for a dynastic alliance via marriage with a
girl from the French royal family 165. In this story, one may find a
widespread illusion of the time, shared by many Christians inclu-
ding Louis himself, according to which the Mongols, with their
Christian sentiments and explicit anti-Muslim bias, paved the way
for the historic revenge of Christianity, by means of exterminating
Islam and recovering the lost lands and souls. Perhaps it was within
the context of these hopes awakened by the Mongols that Manuel I
took an interest in the figure of Louis, the undisputed head of the
crusader movement and indefatigable warrior against Islam.
One more parallel to the Armenian situation. The court histo-
rian Michael Panaretos rather surprisingly characterizes the reign
of Manuel I as one of the most prosperous periods in the history of
the Empire of Trebizond : he says that Manuel I was « the most war-
like and successful » and « ruled in a good way and pleasingly to
God » 166. Michael Panaretos’ optimistic appraisal of this period,
which was full of catastrophic events, thousands of deaths, hund-
164. AL-AQSARĀYĪ, op. cit., p. 38.

165. JEAN JOINVILLE, Histoire de Saint Louis, ed. N. DE WAILLY Paris, 1882,
p. 249-250, 591-592 ; E. JANSSENS, Trébizonde en Colchide, op. cit., p. 81.
166. MICHAEL PANARETOS, op. cit., p. 6119–121.

124 Rustam Shukurov
reds of cities burned to ashes, and tens of kingdoms razed to the

ground, contrasts sharply with the Iranian, Arab, Seljuk and Geor-
gian views of the time. Yet Michael Panaretos’ appraisal is in com-
plete accord with that of Armenian historiographers, as I have
noted above.
Like Armenia, in the 1240s and 1250s, the Empire of Trebizond
managed to avoid devastating invasions and even managed to
expand its territory. The most surprising thing is that, to my kno-
wledge, we have neither direct nor even indirect information about
contemporary contacts between Trebizond and Cilicia. In view of
the political policies of both kingdoms and their common fate, close
relations must have existed and should to be sought in contempora-
ry sources.
The time of troubles
In the decade after the Greeks retook Sinop, there occurred a

drastic change in Trapezuntine-Mongol relations, and the Empire
of Trebizond entered a long period of internal unrest accompanied
by territorial losses. Disaster first occurred in the reign of Andro-
nicus II Grand Comnenus (1263-1266), the elder son of Manuel I.
>
Mu ı̄n al-Dı̄n Parw∆na, the Seljuk vizier and de facto ruler of
the sultanate, besieged and captured Sinop a few months before the
death of sultan Qılıch Arslan IV in February 1266 167. Ibn Shadd∆d
>
states that Mu ı̄n al-Dı̄n Parw∆na took the city from a certain
Gabras (Ghad· r∆s), who was killed in battle. Before hostilities
167. The sources (three Persian and one Arabic) on the Seljuk attack are as
follows : IBN BĪBĪ (Mukhtas·ar), op. cit., p. 299 ; H. DUDA, Die Seltschukenges-
chichte, op. cit., p. 285-286 ; IBN BĪBĪ (Ankara), op. cit., p. 643 ; Histoire des Seld-
joukides (Ankara), op. cit., p. 55 ; ANONYMOUS, Ta’rı̄kh-e ∆l-e Saljūq, op. cit.,
p. 99-100 ; AL-AQSARĀYĪ, op. cit., p. 83 ; F. IŞILTAN, Die Seldschukengeschichte des
Aksarayi, op. cit., p. 60-62. Ibn Shadd∆d’s account : CL. CAHEN, « Quelques tex-
tes », op. cit., p. 138.
The basic study of the relevant events is : MARIA G. NYSTAZOPOULOU, « La der-
nière reconquête de Sinop », op. cit. ; some important additions : M. KUR∞ANSKIS,
« L’Empire de Trébizonde et les Turcs », op. cit., p. 121-122. See also : CL. CAHEN,
Pre-Ottoman Turkey, op. cit., p. 284 ; A.A.M. BRYER - D. WINFIELD, The Byzan-
tine monuments, op. cit., p. 72.


>
began, Mu ı̄n al-Dı̄n Parw∆na showed Gabras the Mongol yarlı̄gh
granting him possession of the city 168.
Al-Aqsar∆yı̄ adds that mounted troops from the province of
D∆nishmandiyya participated in the siege, probably meaning the
local Chepni Turkmen, as will be shown below, while Andronicus II
(malik-i J∆nı̄t) sent to Sinop a large reinforcement of « Francs ».
The besiegers burned the Greek fleet in the harbour. Al-Aqsar∆yı̄
gives the name of the governor in the form « Gidus » (ghı̄d∆n <
Greek °›‰ˆÓ) 169.
Ibn Bı̄bı̄ confirms Ibn Shadd∆d’s information about the yarlı̄gh
>
adding that Mu ı̄n al-Dı̄n Parw∆na went to the Īlkh∆ns and « recei-
ved the imperial yarlı̄gh for the conquest of the land of Sinop and
its liberation from the hands of Tr∆bzūnı̄ » (i.e., the emperor of
Trebizond). This probably occurred in the autumn of 1264, when
the presence of Parw∆na at the Īlkh∆nid court is attested by the
sources and some favors were bestowed upon him by the Īlkh∆n
Hūl∆gū 170. Ibn Bı̄bı̄ also maintains that the siege of the city lasted
two years 171, that is, approximately from the end of 662 H (autumn
1264) until the beginning of 664 (winter 1265/1266) 172. Thus,
>
Sinop was probably captured by Mu ı̄n al-Dı̄n Parw∆na in the win-
ter in the interval between the end of 1265 and February 1266.
This is an obvious indication of Trebizond’s being out of favor
with the Iranian Mongols. The coolness in relations between Trebi-
zond and the Īlkh∆ns is quite understandable : as the Īlkh∆ns pla-
ced the Seljuk sultanate under their full control, the Grand Com-
neni, offering little strategic potential, lost their attractiveness to
the Iranian Mongols, who, facing the Mamlūk threat in the 1260s,
168. On the Pontic Greek family of Gabrades and, in particular, the hypothe-
tical defender of Sinop see : A.A.M. BRYER, « A Byzantine family : the Gabrades »,
op. cit., p. 181, n˚ 15.
169. AL-AQSARĀYĪ, op. cit., p. 83.
>
170. RASHĪD AL-DĪN, Dj∆mi at-taw∆rı̄kh (« A collection of histories »), critical
edition A.A. ALI-ZADE, translation A.K. ARENDS, Baku, 1957, vol. III, p. 91 (p. 62
of translation), 102 (p. 67 of translation), 199 (p. 155 of translation) ; B. SPULER,
Die Mongolen in Iran. Politik, Verwaltung und Kultur der Ilchanzeit (1220–1350),
Berlin, 31968, p. 66-67.
171. IBN BĪBĪ (Ankara), op. cit., p. 643 ; IBN BĪBĪ (Mukhtas·ar), op. cit.,
p. 299 ; H. DUDA, Die Seltschukengeschichte, op. cit., p. 285-286.
172. Cf. M. KUR∞ANSKIS, « L’Empire de Trébizonde et les Turcs », op. cit.,
p. 122.

126 Rustam Shukurov
preferred to support the stronger side in the Trapezuntine-Seljuk

dispute over Sinop. As A.A.M. Bryer and M. Kur≤anskis have
shown, starting with the reign of George Grand Comnenus (1266-
1280) and then in the 1270s, Trebizond allied itself with the Mam-
lūks and Charles of Anjou, thus opposing the powerful anti-Mam-
lūk coalition, which included the Īlkh∆ns, Papacy, Palaeologan
Byzantium, Imeretia and, we should add, the Seljuk sultanate 173.
Indeed, it is not surprising that Trebizond sought support in
Egypt. A quite interesting source, which has so far attracted little
attention, helps to date the actual rapprochement between Trebi-
173. For Trebizond and the anti-Mamlūk coalition see : A.A.M. BRYER, « The
fate of George Komnenos », op. cit., p. 332-350 and especially p. 342–343 ; M. KUR-
∞ANSKIS, « The coinage of the Grand Komnenos Manuel I », \∞Ú¯ÂÖÔÓ ¶fiÓÙÔ˘ (« Pon-
tic Archive ») 35 (1979), p. 22-35 ; IDEM, « L’Empire de Trébizonde et les Turcs »,
>
op. cit., p. 123. For the Mongol-Mamlūk wars, see : J.M. SMITH, « Ayn J∆lūt :
Mamluk success or Mongol failure ? », Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 44/2
(1984), p. 307-346 ; D.O. MORGAN, « The Mongols and the eastern Mediterra-
nean », in B. ARBEL - B. HAMILTON - D. JACOBY (ed.), Latins and Greeks in the eas-
tern Mediterranen after 1202, London, 1989, p. 202-203 ; E. SCHÜTZ, « The deci-
sive motives of Tatar failure in the Ilkhanid-Mamluk fights in the Holy Land »,
Acta orientalia 45/1 (1991), p. 3-22. For the position of the Papacy and Palaeolo-
gan Byzantium in international affairs at that time, see : G. VERNADSKII, « Zolotaia
Orda, Egipet i Vizantiia v ikh vzaimootnosheniiak v tsarstvovanie Mikhaila Paleo-
loga » (« Relations among the Golden Horde, Egypt and Byzantium during the
reign of Michael Palaiologos »), Seminarium Kondakovianum, vol. I, 1927, p. 61-
83 ; F. USPENSKII, « Vizantiiskie istoriki o mongolakh i egipetskikh mamliukakh »
(« Byzantine historians on the Mongols and Egyptian Mamluks »), Vizantiiskii
Vremennik (« Byzantine Chronicle ») 24 (1926), p. 1-16 ; N. LEBEDEV, « Vizantiia
i mongoly v XIII v. (po izvestiiam Georgiia Pakhimera) » (« Byzantium and the
Mongols in the 13th century (according to George Pachymeres »), Istoricheskii
Zhurnal (« Journal of Historical Studies ») 1 (1944), p. 91-94 ; D.A. KOROBEINI-
KOV, « Vizantiia i gosudarstvo Il’khanov v XIII - nachale XIV v » (« Byzantium
and the Īlkh∆n state at the end of the 13th and the beginning of the 14th century »),
in Vizantiia mezhdu Vostokom i Zapadom (« Byzantium between the East and
West »), Saint Petersburg, 1999, p. 428-473 ; P. PELLIOT, Les Mongols et la papau-
té, Paris, 1923 ; I. RACHEWILTZ, DE, Papal envoys to the Great Khan, London,
1971 ; A.G.C. SAVVIDES, « Byzantium’s Oriental front in the first part of the 13th
century », Diptycha 3 (1982-1983), p. 160-175 ; D.J. GEANAKOPLOS, Emperor
Michael Palaeologus and the West (1258-1282), Cambridge, 1959, p. 288-289. For
a recent general survey with good bibliography, see : F. SCHMIEDER, Europa und
die Fremden. Die Mongolen im Urteil des Abenlandes vom 13. bis in das 15. Jahr-
hundert, Sigmaringen, 1994, p. 73-197 (chap. III : « Abendländische Mongolenpo-
litik vom 13. bis ins 15. Jahrhundert »), especially p. 90-117.

zond and the Mamlūks. This source is an example of official for-

matted correspondence from the Mamlūks to the emperor of Trebi-
zond found in the composition manuals of the Mamlūk chancery
>
and preserved by Ibn Fad· l All∆h al- Umarı̄ (1301-1348) 174 and
>
Abū al- Abb∆s al-Qalqashandı̄ (d. 1418) 175. This correspondence
>
first appeared in al- Umarı̄’s work and then was borrowed by al-
Qalqashadı̄ either directly or from another source. The edition of
al-Qalqashadı̄ contains an important historical commentary that is
>
not found in the published version of al- Umarı̄’s work. But al-Qal-
>
qashandı̄ omits an important final phrase present in al- Umarı̄’s
version. The following translation is based on al-Qalqashandı̄’s
version with the addition, in braces, of the final phrase from al-
>
Umarı̄.
Letters to the Lord (·s∆h·ib) of Sinop, [located] on the coast of

the land of Rūm, [which] had been written before it was cap-
>
tured and seized by the Turkmen 176. It is said in Ta rı̄f :
« This is a city on the coast of the Constantinople Straits, its
king (malik) is a Roman from an old royal house, a relative
>
of the Lord (·s∆h·ib) of Constantinople. » [Ta rı̄f also] says :
« And it is said that his father is a hereditary sovereign 177. »
>
[Ta rı̄f also] says : « However, his kingdom is not large, the
number [of subjects] is not large, and there occur wars bet-
ween him and the amı̄rs of the Turks, in most of which he suf-
>
fers defeat. » [Ta rı̄f also] mentions that the format of the let-
ters to him is the same as that for the ruler (mutamallik) of
Sı̄s 178, which is, as has been mentioned, about letters to the
ruler of Sı̄s :
> >
174. IBN FAD· L ALLĀH AL- UMARĪ, Al-Ta rı̄f bi ‘l-mus··talah· al-sharı̄f (« Instruc-
tion in noble usage »), Cairo, 1312-1894/1895, p. 58.
> >
175. SHAYKH ABŪ AL- ABBĀS AH· MAD AL-QALQASHANDĪ, Kit∆b ·subh· al-a sh∆ fı̄
>
s·in∆ at al-insh∆’ (« Enlightenment of the blind in writing a letter »), Cairo, 1915,
vol. VIII, p. 48-49. For a detailed discussion of the al-Qalqashandı̄’s work see :
N. BJÖRKMAN, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Staatskanzelei im Islamischen Ägypten,
Hamburg, 1928, p. 73-86.
176. The aforesaid events of 1265/1266 are meant. This confirms al-Aqsar∆yı̄’s
report that a Turkmen army took part in the Seljuk siege of Sinop.
177. Litteraly : « his father is deeply rooted through his forefathers in the royal
dignity » (·sult·∆n).
178. I.e., the king of Cilician Armenian.

128 Rustam Shukurov
This letter is addressed to His Majesty the King, the

Great, Brave, Lion, Magnanimous, Hero, Bold, Champion,
so-and-so, the Fame of the Christian Creed, Treasure of
Christian People, Pillar of the Baptised Nation, Comrade of
Kings and Sultans.
⁄⁄ [al-Qalqashandı̄, op. cit., p. 49] This prayer befits him,
>
it is mentioned in Ta rı̄f :
« [God] save him from the approaching evil, appease his
soul in the North by a fragrant breeze blowing from the
South, keep him safe from misdeed that brings regret, and
make clear what brings misfortune to Sinop. {May [God] be
merciful to him in possessing wealth and instruct him in aver-
ting the dashing of hopes, and make obedient to him the party
(h·izb) of the Southerners, if Providence make them akin to
the Northerners 179. »}
The addressee is called « the Lord (·s∆h·ib) of Sinop », who has

been identified by N. Oikonomides as an emperor of the Grand
Comneni 180. Obviously, the format of the letter was established by
>
al- Umarı̄ in the course of compiling the manual, or by his prede-
cessor, on the basis of a real letter sent from the Mamlūk royal
chancery to Trebizond. The editing work apparently consisted of
distinguishing and preserving typical phrases such as the salutation
(inscriptio) and closing prayer, and in omitting all non-standard
and variable parts such as the names of the addressee and sender,
narratio (that is, the content of every individual letter) and datum.
On the other hand, the historical commentary, originally compiled,
it seems, in the thirteenth century 181, and the closing prayer con-
179. The translation of al-Qalqashandı̄’s edition by H. LAMMENS is outdated,

owing to some important oversights and inaccuracies (H. LAMMENS, « Correspon-
dances diplomatiques entre les sultans Mamlouks d’Égypte et les puissances chré-
tiennes », Revue de l’Orient chrétien 9/2 [1904], p. 179-180).
180. N. OIKONOMIDES, « The chancery of the Grand Komnenoi : imperial tradi-
tion and political reality », \∞Ú¯ÂÖÔÓ ¶fiÓÙÔ˘ (« Pontic Archive ») 35 (1979), p. 322
(note 2), p. 326. For discussion of the genesis of such a title see : R. SHUKUROV,
Velikie Komniny i Vostok, op. cit., p. 178-180.
181. For the date of the historical commentary, see : R. SHUKUROV, Velikie
Komniny i Vostok, op. cit., p. 177-178.

tain some information that allows us to date the original letter and
to infer to some degree the contents of the original’s narratio.
Judging from the historical commentary, the original letter was
compiled before the fall of Sinop in 1265/1266. Therefore, some
relations between Trebizond and Cairo already existed by that
date. A unique note from an Arab chronicle may perhaps assign a
more precise date to the original letter. The Mamlūk historian Ibn
>
Abd al-Z·∆hir (d. 1293), in his account of the Mamlūk embassy to
Constantinople and the Golden Horde in Ramad· ∆n 662 H / June-
July 1264, describes a very unusual itinerary that the ambassadors
followed on their way from Constantinople to the Crimea 182 :
[the messengers] travelled to Constantinople during 20 days,

from there [they set off] for Istanbul [sic !], from there they
[proceeded] to Daphnous (dafnusy∆) located on the coast
[opposite] to Sudak on the side of the possessions of al-Ash-
karı̄ 183, then crossed the sea to the opposite coast (this [jour-
ney] usually takes from 2 to 10 days), then climbed the
mountain known as Sudak.
There can be little doubt that by « Istanbul » Trebizond is

meant : the key modifier is « Daphnous », a harbour on the eastern
outskirts of the city of Trebizond 184, which in fact « was opposite »
Crimean Sudak (Sougdaia) 185. It must be noted that the usual
route from Constantinople to the Crimea required sailing along the
Anatolian shore as far as Sinop and then heading the north towards
the Crimea. Visiting Trebizond in July 1264, the Mamlūk messen-
gers had gone a long way round. This deviation from the usual
182. V.G. TIZENGAUZEN, Sbornik materialov, op. cit., vol. I (excerpts from
Arabic sources), p. 54/63 (see also a similar account from the chronicle of al-
Mufad· d· al on p. 180/192).
183. I.e., the Palaeologan emperor.
184. A.A.M. BRYER, « Shipping in the Empire of Trebizond », Mariner’s Mir-
ror 52 (1966) (= IDEM, The Empire of Trebizond, op. cit., n˚ VIII), p. 8, 10-11 ;
A.A.M. BRYER - D. WINFIELD, The Byzantine monuments, op. cit., vol. I, p. 197.
185. There was another Daphnous in the Black Sea located on an island 52
miles from the Bosphorus, but it could hardly have been described as « opposite
Sudak » (G.P. MAJESKA, Russian travelers to Constantinople in the 14th and 15th
centuries, Washington, 1984, p. 99, note 135).

130 Rustam Shukurov
route was hardly accidental. They probably brought with them one
of the original formatted letters discussed above. I suggest, therefo-
re, that the original was probably issued in 1264 by the Mamlūk
sultan Baybars I (1260-1277) and was addressed to Andronicus II
Grand Comnenus.
>
The closing prayer (du ∆), especially the part preserved in al-
>
Umarı̄’s text, refers to some specific circumstances, which seem
typically to have belonged to the narratio. The main subject of this
part is the issue of Sinop, which is in danger. The clear concern
about the fate of Sinop indicates the historical context in which the
original letter was written : some diplomatic maneuvering unknown
to us that apparently concerned Trebizond, the Golden Horde and
Iranian Mongols. Further on, the Grand Comnenus has an enemy
designated as « the Northerners », while « the Southerners » were
about to become hostile. If one proceeds from the known facts of
the time, « the Northerners » must be understood as the Mongols of
the Golden Horde. It is worth noting that such a usage was common
for, at least, the Byzantine world 186. If so, by analogy, « the Sou-
therners » designated the Īlkh∆ns, who, as it follows from this pas-
sage, and as we know from other sources, were about to change
their favorable policy towards the Grand Comneni.
It is worth adding that precisely in 1264 the Georgian king David
Narin cut his ties with the Iranian Mongols and appealed for pro-
tection to the Golden Horde. In 1264-1265 and in 1268, there
occurred an exchange of embassies between Georgia and Egypt. A
186. For an idea of basic difference between the « northern » and « southern »
nations, where the population of the northern part of the Black Sea region is iden-
tified with the Northerners, see : GEORGII PACHYMERIS, De Michaele et Andronico
Palaeologis libri XIII, rec. I. BEKKER, vol. I-II, Bonnae, 1835, vol. I : p. 175–176
(GEORGES PACHYMÉRÈS, Relations historiques, éd. A. FAILLER, Paris, 1984, vol. I,
p. 235 ff) ; ‚fiÚÂÈ· öıÓË on the Mongols of the Golden Horde : GEORGII PACHYMERIS
(ed. I. BEKKER), vol. I, p. 34418 ; ‚fiÚÂÈÔÈ on the Mongols of Nogay : GEORGII PACHY-
MERIS (ed. I. BEKKER), vol. II, p. 262. For the Black Sea region in the History of
PACHYMERIS, see : A.E. LAIOU, « The Black Sea of Pachymeres », in The making of
Byzantine history. Studies dedicated to D.M. Nicol, London, 1993, p. 94-121,
especially p. 100, 109-111. See also similar places in NICEPHORI GREGORAE, Byzan-
tina historia, ed. L. SCHOPEN, Bonn, 1829, vol. I, p. 3024-312). In the Horoscope
for Trebizond (1336) : Ùa àÚÎÙÈÎa Ì¤ÚË for the northern Black sea (« ∆Ú·Â˙Ô˘ÓÙÈ·-
ÎeÓ óÚÔÛÎfiÈÔÓ ÙÔÜ öÙÔ˘˜ 1336 », ed. SP. LAMPROS, ¡¤Ô˜ ^∂ÏÏËÓÔÌÓ‹ÌˆÓ 13 [1916],
p. 4320). Such usage was common for the region.

certain parallelism between the political policies of Trebizond and

Georgia at that time may show that both countries acted in
accord 187. Later, in 1282, when Trebizond restored its good rela-
tions with the Īlkh∆ns, David Narin attacked the Empire, probably
wishing to bring it back to the anti-Iranian camp 188.
If my interpretation is correct, we have unique evidence in the
aforesaid formatted letter concerning relations between the Empire
of Trebizond and the Golden Horde in 1264, which apparently
were far from friendly. This is understandable in the light of the
Greek capture of Sinop in 1254 from the hands of B∆tū’s protégé.
How that relationship subsequently developed we do not know ;
available sources are silent in this regard. For now the letter is the
only direct indication of a diplomatic rapprochement between the
Grand Comneni and the Mamlūks, who, evidently, wished to
exploit the Trapezuntine-Īlkh∆n conflict over Sinop. As for the
Grand Comneni, they perhaps used the Mamlūks to improve their
relations with the Golden Horde.
To sum up, in the face of such a powerful coalition, the Mamlūks
tried to mobilize the Īlkh∆ns’ enemies in the region including the
Golden Horde, Georgia, dissident nobility in the Seljuk sultanate,
and, as we have just seen, probably the Grand Comneni 189. First
Syria and then southeastern Anatolia became a scene of fierce
struggle between the Mamlūks and Mongols. In light of the prece-
ding discussion, I am inclined to explain the coincidence in the
Mamlūk attack against Anatolia with another Greek onslaught
against Sinop in 1277 as a planned and concerted offensive against
the Īlkh∆ns and their Seljuk clients.
187. K. SALIA, Histoire de la nation géorgienne, op. cit., p. 234-235 ; W. ALLEN,

A history of the Georgian people, op. cit., p. 116-117.
188. MICHAEL PANARETOS, op. cit., p. 6219-21 ; M. KUR∞ANSKIS, « L’usurpation
de Théodora Grande Comnène », Revue des études byzantines 33 (1975), p. 187-
190 ; A.A.M. BRYER - D. WINFIELD, The Byzantine monuments, op. cit., vol. I,
p. 335 ; K. SALIA, Histoire de la nation géorgienne, op. cit., p. 235-236.
189. D.O. MORGAN, « The Mongols and the eastern Mediterranean », op. cit.,
p. 203-204 ; G. VERNADSKII, « Zolotaia Orda, Egipet i Vizantiia », op. cit., p. 77-
79 ; E. SIVAN, L’islam et la croisade : idéologie et propagande dans les réactions
musulmanes aux croisades, Paris, 1968, p. 164-189 ; and C. ZAKIROV, Diplomati-
cheskie otnosheniia Zolotoi Ordy s Egiptom (XIII-XIV vv.) (« Diplomatic rela-
tions between the Goden Horde and Egypt, 13th-14th centuries »), Moscow, 1966,
p. 34-97.

132 Rustam Shukurov
In April 1277, the Mamlūk sultan Baybars defeated the Mongols

in Albist∆n. In May 1277 he entered Kayseri and proclaimed him-
>
self the Seljuk sultan. Mu ı̄n al-Dı̄n Parw∆na, who had first promi-
sed support, fled to Erzincan which was under Mongol protec-
tion 190. Baybars, not having received critical help from his suppor-
ters, retreated from Anatolia. In June he arrived at Damascus,
where he suddenly died on 20 June 191. According to Ibn Bı̄bı̄, in
late June (Muh·arram 676), the Seljuk governor of Sinop T∆ybūgh∆
came to sultan Ghiy∆th al-Dı̄n Kai-Khusraw III (1266-1282) with
the news that « the J∆nı̄tı̄ 192 in katergas attacked Sinop », but the
Chepni Turkmen burned the Greek fleet 193.
It seems that the military actions of Baybars I and George I
Grand Comnenus, which occurred at almost if not exactly the same
time, could hardly have been an accident 194. George Grand Com-
nenus’ action had an expressed anti-Īlkh∆n and pro-Mamlūk cha-
racter. Therefore, it is highly likely that this action was coordina-
ted with Baybars. In any case, George’s arrest in the « mountain of
Tabriz », (the Īlkh∆n’s imperial camp) three years later in June
1280, and his sentencing by the y∆rgū, the Mongol law-court, were
190. IBN BĪBĪ (Mukhtas·ar), op. cit., p. 317 ; CL. CAHEN, Pre-Ottoman Turkey,
op. cit., p. 287-289 ; R. AMITAI, « Mongol raids into Palestine (A.D. 1260 and
1300) », Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1987), p. 236 ff ; L. ILISCH, « Ges-
chichte der Artuqidenherrschaft von Mardin zwischen Mamluken und Mongolen,
1260–1410 AD », inagural-dissertation..., Münster, 1984, p. 55.
On the fate of Parw∆na, who was sentenced to death by the Mongols, see : AL-
AQSARĀYĪ, op. cit., p. 93-94 ; IBN BĪBĪ (Mukhtas·ar), op. cit., p. 320 ; CL. CAHEN,
Pre-Ottoman Turkey, op. cit., p. 291 ; A.A.M. BRYER, « The fate of George Kom-
nenos », op. cit., p. 346.
191. CL. CAHEN, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, op. cit., p. 291 ; R. IRWIN, The Middle
East in the Middle Ages : the early Mamluk sultanate (1250-1382), London, 1986,
p. 57–58. For a detailed biography of Baybars, see : P. THORAU, Sultan Baibars I
von Ägypten. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Vorderen Orients im 13 Jarhundert,
Wiesbaden, 1987.
192. I.e., a Grand Comnenus, the ruler of Trebizond, namely the emperor
George I.
geschichte, op. cit., p. 319-321 ; CL. CAHEN, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, op. cit., p. 292.
194. Cf. A.A.M. BRYER, « The fate of George Komnenos », op. cit., p. 346 ;
M. KUR∞ANSKIS, « L’Empire de Trébizonde et les Turcs », op. cit., p. 123 : neither
scholar sees any cooperation between Trebizond and Cairo in the events of 1277.

probably the result, as A.A.M. Bryer has shown, of his pro-Mam-

lūk sentiments 195.
The reference to the Chepni Turkmen in Ibn Bı̄bı̄’s account has
been traditionally regarded as the first reference to that Turkmen
clan in historical writings 196. However, the aforesaid evidence from
al-Aqsar∆yı̄ and al-Qalqashandı̄ concerning the participation of
some Turkmen in the siege of Sinop in 1265/1266 allows us to sug-
gest that the Chepni had already appeared in that region by 1265
and were actively involved in strife with the local Greeks. To sum
up, beginning with the Mongol invasion, Trapezuntine-Seljuk rela-
tions focused exclusively on the issue of Sinop. It appears that both
sides resolved this key problem in their relations by means of the
Mongols.
Longing for Sinop
The Grand Comneni spent almost the entire thirteenth century

in the struggle for Sinop. In 1204, 1225-1228 and 1254, the Greeks
managed to capture the city ; in 1214, 1228 and 1265, they were dri-
ven out of Sinop. In 1277 the Grand Comneni attacked the city once
again but were beaten off. It is not impossible that the Greeks cap-
tured Sinop once more in 1299, but this time not for their own sake
but for the sake of the Īlkh∆ns or their Muslim allies. Al-Aqsar∆yı̄
says that one of the Seljuk grandees, Rukn al-Dı̄n R∆h·at Sı̄w∆sı̄,
>
governor of Samsun, was expelled from the city by Mas ūd Bek (the
>
grandson of Mu ı̄n al-Dı̄n Parw∆na) who ruled in Sinop in ca. 1296-
1301. Rukn al-Dı̄n R∆h·at Sı̄w∆sı̄ escaped to J∆nı̄t, that is, either to
the Empire of Trebizond or some place in the Muslim part of the
195. A.A.M. BRYER, « The fate of George Komnenos », op. cit., p. 332-350.
196. K. INAN, « Giresun ve havalisinde türkmenler » (« The Turkmen of Gire-
sun and its environs »), in Giresun tarihi sempozyumu 24–25 Mayis 1996. Bildiri-
ler (« Conference on the History of Giresun »), Istanbul, 1997, p. 59-60, 63-64 ;
F. SÜMER, O∏uzlar (Türkmenler). Tarihleri, Boy te∑kilatı, Destanları (« The
Oghuz [Turkmen] : their history, clan organisation, epics »), Istanbul, 1992,
p. 242 (mistakenly dated to 1279) ; A.A.M. BRYER, « The fate of George Komne-
nos », op. cit., p. 346 ; M. KUR∞ANSKIS, « L’Empire de Trébizonde et les Turcs »,
op. cit., p. 123. CL. CAHEN erroneously dated this event to ca. 1280 (CL. CAHEN,
Pre-Ottoman Turkey, op. cit., p. 311).

134 Rustam Shukurov
Pontus. In any case, in 1299, Rukn al-Dı̄n and Amı̄r-Sh∆h, an offi-

cial in the Īlkh∆n fiscal administration, along with one thousand
« Francs encased in armour » entered Sinop under the guise of grain
>
traders and took Mas ūd Bek prisoner. According to al-Aqsar∆yı̄,
Rukn al-Dı̄n and Amı̄r-Sh∆h achieved their main goal of compelling
> >
Mas ūd Bek to become their ally. After the Frankish raid, Mas ūd
Bek agreed to marry Amı̄r-Sh∆h’s daughter, and thus the conflict
was settled 197. Sp. Vryonis has shown that the Saljuqs often called
Greeks by the more general term « Francs ». Therefore, the thou-
sand men in armour might well have been Pontic Greeks, partici-
pating in the raid on the Emperor’s orders or as mercenaries 198.
Cl. Cahen, who mistakenly dates this event to 1298 and more
recently S.P. Karpov have suggested that these were Genoese mer-
cenaries 199. However, it suffices to say that the Genoese in the
Black Sea, at the end of the thirteenth century and even later,
could hardly have raised an army of one thousand men. Their
Greek identity as supporters of Amı̄r-Sh∆h seems more plausible to
me. In any case, during the thirteenth century, the Grand Comne-
ni fought for Sinop at least seven times ! The issue of Sinop seems to
have been the most burning military and diplomatic question for
them. There were two principal reasons for such a persistent strug-
gle.
1. As we have noted, Sinop was the best trading port and naval
base in the southern Black Sea 200. From Sinop began the shortest
and most convenient route to the Crimea and, in particular, the
Crimean possessions of the Grand Comneni. It is not by accident
that we know about Manuel I Grand Comnenus’ recapture of Sinop
on 1254 from unique direct evidence of that period (apart from
later vague and imprecise references in Oriental sources) left by
Crimean Greeks from Sougdaia : this victory was of outstanding
197. AL-AQSARĀYĪ, op. cit., p. 256-257 ; CL. CAHEN, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, op.
>
cit., p. 296, 332-333 (for Amı̄r-Sh∆h), p. 312 (for Mas ūd Bek).
198. SP. VRYONIS, The decline, op. cit., p. 234, note 550.
199. CL. CAHEN, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, op. cit., p. 323 ; S.P. KARPOV, Ita-
lianskie morskie respubliki i Juzhnoe Prichernomorie v XIII–XV vv. : problemy
torgovli (« The Italian maritime republics and the southern Black Sea region in the
13th-15th centuries : the problems of trade »), Moscow, 1990, p. 79-80.
200. A.A.M. BRYER - D. WINFIELD, The Byzantine monuments, op. cit., vol. I,
p. 69-88 ; S.P. KARPOV, Italianskie morskie respubliki, op. cit., p. 77-79.

importance to the local Greeks who were connected with Trebi-

zond.
2. On the other hand, it is obvious that the Grand Comneni,
during most of the thirteenth century, it seems, had not lost hope of
returning to Constantinople and to restoring the Empire of the
Comneni. This objective might have been achieved if they had
taken control of Sinop, as they had done in 1204, and then directed
their armies towards Constantinople. Sinop was not only the best
harbour on the southern Black Sea coast, but also a strategic foo-
thold for advancing into Paphlagonia and then Bithynia, through
which passed the main road to Constantinople.
The radical change in the foreign policy of the Grand Comneni
began in the reign of John II Grand Comnenus (1280-1297), who
restored friendly contacts with the Īlkh∆ns and Palaeologan Byzan-
tium. John II renounced the claim of the Grand Comneni to the
Byzantine imperial title the Emperor of the Romans in favor of the
Palaeologan rulers in Constantinople 201. This was not by chance
since by that time the Grand Comneni had lost their ability to reco-
ver Sinop. That city was of vital importance chiefly in the context
of the claim of the Grand Comneni to the throne of Constantinopo-
le. As the emperors of Trebizond abandoned their grandiose plans,
Sinop no longer attracted their attention as a goal of military
expansion.
The final step was taken by Alexius II (1297-1330), the elder son
of John II, who seems to have been a true pragmatist in his foreign
policy. In ca. 1313, he formed an anti-Genoese alliance with the
Muslim ruler of Sinop Gh∆zı̄ Chelebi, probably the son of the afo-
>
resaid Mas ūd Bek 202 which confirmed in fact that the Grand Com-
neni had abandoned their old universal pretensions and resigned
themselves to the changed reality.
Trébizonde et les Seldjoukides (1204-1299) (résumé). — Cet article traite des

relations politiques et diplomatiques entre l’Empire de Trébizonde et le sultanat
201. S.P. KARPOV, « Trapezundskaia imperiia v vizantiiskoi istoricheskoi lite-

rature » (« The Empire of Trebizond in the Byzantine historiogrphy »), Vizantiis-
kii Vremennik (« Byzantine Chronicle ») 35 (1973), p. 157-158 ; cf. N. OIKONOMI-
DES, « The chancery of the Grand Komnenoi », op. cit., p. 324 ff.
202. E. JANSSENS, Trébizonde, op. cit., p. 94-95 ; S.P. KARPOV, L’impero di
Trebisonda, Venezia, Genova e Roma (1204-1461), Rome, 1986, p. 146.

136 Rustam Shukurov
seldjoukide de Rūm de 1204 à 1299. Basé sur des sources chrétiennes orientales et
musulmanes, il essaie de reconstruire autant que possible la structure et la signifi-
cation des relations trébizondines-seldjoukides. De nouveau matériaux venant de
ces sources mènent à une révision de la vue traditionnelle des buts stratégiques de
Trébizonde et des Seldjoukides et aussi de la politique internationale en Anatolie
au XIIIe siècle en général.

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07_Rustam_Shukurov_071_136 26-11-05 04:46 Page 71

On 13 April 1204 the Latins of the Fourth Crusade sacked Cons-

Mésogeios 25-26 (2005), p. 71-136, © Hêrodotos

Comnenus who tried to capture the main strategic points on the

1. The most important studies on the foundation of the Empire of Trebizond

Mésogeios 25-26 (2005)

Trebizond and the Seljuks (1204-1299) 73

Mésogeios 25-26 (2005)

4. R.-J. LILIE, « Twelfth-century Byzantine and Turkish states », in A.A.M.

Mésogeios 25-26 (2005)

Trebizond and the Seljuks (1204-1299) 75

The establishment of the Grand Comnenian power in the Pontus

Mésogeios 25-26 (2005)

7. IBN AL-ATHĪR, Chronicon quod perfectissimum inscribitur, Lugduni Bata-

Mésogeios 25-26 (2005)

Trebizond and the Seljuks (1204-1299) 77

Mésogeios 25-26 (2005)

The Paphlagonian conflict

The next known crisis in Trapezuntine-Seljuk relations occur-

Mésogeios 25-26 (2005)

Trebizond and the Seljuks (1204-1299) 79

historical work of Ibn Bı̄bı̄, a Seljuq historiographer who wrote in

Mésogeios 25-26 (2005)

« Mesarites as a source », Speculum 13 (1938), p. 180-182 ; S.P. KARPOV, « Trape-

Mésogeios 25-26 (2005)

Trebizond and the Seljuks (1204-1299) 81

D∆nishmandid lineage, who apparently was an influential person in

Mésogeios 25-26 (2005)

« the large army » of Alexius I « from the direction of Sinop » 24. In

Mésogeios 25-26 (2005)

Trebizond and the Seljuks (1204-1299) 83

up in Janı̄t. We shall enthrone one of them but shall never give up

Mésogeios 25-26 (2005)

October when he returned from Paphlagonia 33. In mid-November

33. A. HEISENBERG, « Neue Quellen », op. cit., p. 198-113, and « Commenta-

Mésogeios 25-26 (2005)

Trebizond and the Seljuks (1204-1299) 85

The anonymous Ta’rı̄kh adds that, in Sinop, the Seljuks captu-

39. Histoire de seldjoukides (Ankara), op. cit., p. 44 ; ANONYMOUS, Ta’rı̄kh-e

Mésogeios 25-26 (2005)

The events of 1205-1208 had clearly demonstrated the real

Mésogeios 25-26 (2005)

Trebizond and the Seljuks (1204-1299) 87

cessfully beat back the attacks of Theodore I Lascaris against

46. R. SHUKUROV, « The enigma », op. cit.

Mésogeios 25-26 (2005)

Some years before the Paphlagonian war, there occurred an

During the Paphlagonian war, there were no bloody battles, no

Mésogeios 25-26 (2005)

Trebizond and the Seljuks (1204-1299) 89

From the standpoint of the future of Hellenism in Asia Minor in

Mésogeios 25-26 (2005)

trade inevitably provoked strong reactions from the Seljuks 49. In

Mésogeios 25-26 (2005)

Trebizond and the Seljuks (1204-1299) 91

Thus, the events of 1214 fundamentally changed the strategic

For a different dating (1221 or 1222), see : A. KUNIK, « O sviazi trapezundsko-

Mésogeios 25-26 (2005)

The relations between the Empire of Trebizond and the Seljuks

55. A new edition of the Saint Eugenios’ miracles by CONSTANTINE LOUKITES

Mésogeios 25-26 (2005)

Trebizond and the Seljuks (1204-1299) 93

tantine Loukites (probably compiled at the end of the thirteenth or