1. Ofilada vs. Andal 748 SCRA 211 compensation’ in exchange for the renunciation of his tenurial rights.
compensation’ in exchange for the renunciation of his tenurial rights. The severance of the tenancy
Facts: Petitioner Irene Olafida purchased a parcel of land from the heirs of Teresita Liwag, as
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute sale, wherein respondent Miraflor Andal brokered the sale and signed
as “tenant”. Apparently, ten days prior to the sale, Miraflor appeared before the Barangay Agrarian
Reform Council (BARC) and executed a Pagpapatunay, stating that there was no tenant over the land
of Liwag (currently the land in question).
Two weeks after the sale, Miraflor executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay, where she acknowledged Irene
and her husband Carlos as the new owners of the property. The Sinumpaang Salaysay also stated that
while she will continue to take care of the property, she nevertheless waived any tenancy rights over
the land. Eventually, the land was registered in the names of Irene and Carlos.
Eight years later, Irene filed an ejectment suit against the spouses Andal before the MTC of San
Antonio, Quezon, contending that
(1) she purchased the land on the condition that there would be no tenants, and
(2) Miraflor executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay waiving any tenancy she rights she might have.
Spouses Andal denied Irene’s allegations, stating that they were tenants of Liwag, Irene’s predecessor-
in- interest, and continued to be such despite the transfer of ownership of the land to Irene. They
likewise claim that since there is a landlord-tenant relationship, it is not the MTC who has jurisdiction
but the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
After hearing for a preliminary determination of the existence of tenancy, the MTC found no prima facie
showing of tenancy relations between the parties, and proceeded with the case. In 2007, the MTC held
that spouses Andal failed to adduce proof that they are tenants, hence judgment was held in favor of
Irene.
The RTC affirmed in toto the MTC ruling.
However, on appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. It reasoned that since the existence of
the tenancy relations between the previous owners and spouses Andal is undisputed, the case
constitutes an agrarian dispute despite the severance of such relations. Invoking the rulings of
[2] [3]
Rivera and Amurao , the severance of the tenurial arrangement does not render the action beyond
the ambit of an agrarian dispute, hence jurisdiction remains with the DARAB.
Issue: Whether the severance of the landlord-tenant relationship of a predecessor-in-interest
constitutes an agrarian dispute cognizable by the DARAB. - Qualified NO.
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that Rivera and Amurao is not at all fours with the case at bar, hence
jurisdiction over the ejectment case is lodged with the MTC.
In Rivera, it was held that DARAB acquired jurisdiction over the ejectment case because Rivera was
originally a registered tenant but subsequently became owner of the land as ‘disturbance
relations did not matter because the prior agricultural tenancy served as a juridical tie which
characterized the case as an agrarian dispute.
In Amurao, the Kasulatan, where the spouses-tenants promised to surrender possession over the lot
should Amurao need it, was deemed a continuance of the tenancy relationship. Even if the Kasulatan
effectively terminated the tenancy relationship, the case was still an agrarian dispute because the
action involves an incident arising from the landlord-tenant relationship.
In the case at bar, however, is different from Rivera and Amurao.
The tenancy relationship between the former owners of the property and spouses Andal was clearly
severed prior to the purchase of Irene, as evidenced by the Pagpapatunay and the Sinumpaang
Salaysay, which the spouses Andal never disputed.
As to whether a new tenancy relationship between Irene and spouses Andal was subsequently formed,
the same was not sufficiently proven with evidence.
The fact alone of working on another’s landholding does not raise a presumption of the existence of
agricultural tenancy. For tenancy to be proven, all indispensable elements must be established, the
absence of one or more requisites will not make the alleged tenant a de facto one. These are:
1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant;
2) the subject is agricultural land;
3) there is consent by the landowner;
4) the purpose is agricultural production;
5) there is personal cultivation; and
6) there is sharing of the harvests.
Mere allegation of tenancy before the MTC does not automatically deprive the court of jurisdiction,
since what determines jurisdiction of the court is the material averments in the complaint. Evidence is
necessary to prove the allegation of tenancy, and during the preliminary hearing for the determination
of the existence of the tenancy relationship, it was concluded that there was none. Therefore, the MTC
correctly assumed jurisdiction over the ejectment case.
2. Stronghold Insurance v. Stroem – 746 SCRA 598
Jurisdiction of CIAC
FACTS: Sps Stroem entered into an Owners-Contractor agreement with Asis-Leiff & Company for the
construction of a two-storey house on the lot owned by the spouses. Pursuant to the agreement, Asis-
Leif secured a performance bond from Stronghold in the amount of P4.5M, thereby Stronghold and
Asis-Leif, through Ms. Asis-Leif, bound themselves jointly and severally to pay the Sps in case the
construction project is not completed. Asis-Leif failed to finish the project despite repeated demands.
The Sps filed a complaint for breach of contract and sum of money with damages against Asis-Leif, Ms.
Asis-Leif, and Stronghold. Only Stronghold was served with summons, Ms. Asis-Leif allegedly
absconded and moved out of the country.
RTC: ruled in favor of the Sps and ordered Stronghold to pay the Sps the amount of P4.5M with 6%
legal interest.
CA: affirmed with modification.
Stronghold’s argument: the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case. The lower
courts should have dismissed the case in view of the arbitration clause in the agreement and
considering that RA No. 876] explicitly confines the court’s authority only to pass upon the
issue of whether there is [an] agreement . . . providing for arbitration. In any case, Stronghold’s
liability under the performance bond is limited only to additional costs for the completion of the
project.
Sps argument: Owners-Contractor Agreement is "separate and distinct from the Bond. The
parties to the Agreement and the parties to the Bond are different. The considerations for the
two contracts are likewise distinct. Thus, the arbitration clause in the Agreement is binding only
on the parties thereto.
ISSUE: whether the dispute — liability of a surety under a performance bond — is connected to a
construction contract and, therefore, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the CIAC (Construction
Industry Arbitration Committee).
RULING: Stronghold cannot invoke the jurisdiction of CIAC. In a case, the court held that there are two
acts which may vest the CIAC with jurisdiction over a construction dispute. One is the presence of an
arbitration clause in a construction contract, and the other is the agreement by the parties to submit the
dispute to the CIAC. This court has ruled that when a dispute arises from a construction contract, the
CIAC has exclusive and original jurisdiction.
This court has previously held that a performance bond, which is meant "to guarantee the supply of
labor, materials, tools, equipment, and necessary supervision to complete the project[,]" is significantly
and substantially connected to the construction contract and, therefore, falls under the jurisdiction of the
CIAC.
In the case at bar, the performance bond was silent with regard to arbitration. On the other hand, the
construction contract was clear as to arbitration in the event of disputes. Applying the said doctrine, we
rule that the silence of the accessory contract in this case could only be construed as acquiescence to
the main contract.
To be clear, it is in the Owners-Contractor Agreement that the arbitration clause is found. It is basic that
"[c]ontracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs[.]" Not being a party to
the construction agreement, petitioner cannot invoke the arbitration clause. Petitioner, thus, cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of the CIAC.
Moreover, petitioner’s invocation of the arbitration clause defeats the purpose of arbitration in relation to
the construction business. Where a surety in a construction contract actively participates in a
collection suit, it is estopped from raising jurisdiction later. Assuming that petitioner is privy to the
construction agreement, we cannot allow petitioner to invoke arbitration at this late stage of the
proceedings since to do so would go against the law's goal of prompt resolution of cases in the
construction industry.
SC:
3. Fareast bank v. Chua 762 SCRA 128 - PIMENTEL
FACTS: Chua was employed as a bank executive by Far East Bank, rising through the latter’s ranks
and holding the position of Assistant Vice President from October 1, 1997 until the termination of her
employment.
Respondent Lilia S. Chua (Chua) was dismissed by petitioner Far East Bank and Trust Co. (Far East
Bank) due to a finding that she engaged in multiple kiting transactions which was a serious violation of
Far East Bank's Code of Conduct.
The Labor Arbiter ruled that there was illegal dismissal. This was reversed by the National Labor
Relations Commission. Chua participated in the appeal proceedings before the National Labor
Relations Commission.
The Court of Appeals reversed the National Labor Relations Commission’s ruling, stating that Far East
Bank’s appeal before the National Labor Relations Commission was not perfected. Assailing Far East
Bank’s basis for terminating her employment, Chua filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal and monetary
claims before the Regional Arbitration Branch XII, Cotabato City of the National Labor Relations
Commission.
In the course of the proceedings before the Regional Arbitration Branch, the parties were ordered to
submit their respective Position Papers. Despite an extension having been given to Far East Bank, it
failed to timely file its Position Paper.
On April 25, 2000, Executive Labor Arbiter Quintin B. Cueto III (Executive Labor Arbiter Cueto)
rendered a Decision finding Chua to have been illegally dismissed. On May 25, 2000, Far East Bank
directly filed its Notice of Appeal and Memorandum of Appeal before the National Labor Relations
Commission.
On April 30, 2001, the National Labor Relations Commission Fifth Division issued a Resolution 10
reversing and setting aside the April 25, 2000 Decision of Executive Labor Arbiter Cueto. It held that
Far East Bank’s delay of "a few days" in filing its Position Paper was excusable, especially considering
that it and its counsel were based in different cities, Cotabato City and General Santos City,
respectively.
ISSUE: Whether Executive Labor Arbiter Quintin B. Cueto III’s April 25, 2000 Decision attained finality
in light of petitioner Far East Bank and Trust Co.’s direct filing of its appeal before the National Labor
Relations Commission, rather than before the Regional Arbitration Branch XII, Cotabato City.
RULING: Yes. A mere procedural lapse in the venue where petitioner filed its Memorandum of Appeal
is not fatal to its cause. This is especially so in light of how respondent estopped herself in failing to
raise the issue of jurisdiction while petitioner’s appeal was pending before the National Labor Relations
Commission. Respondent is bound by her inaction and cannot belatedly invoke this issue on
certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
Not only did the National Labor Relations Commission acquiesce to the direct filing of an appeal before
it, so did respondent. The matter of the propriety of the National Labor Relations Commission's
assumption of jurisdiction was never raised by respondent before the Commission. Even after
petitioner's appeal had been initially decided against her and she filed her Motion for Reconsideration,
respondent totally overlooked this matter. As was evident from the recital of grounds invoked in her
Motion for Reconsideration, respondent's contentions centered merely on the National Labor Relations
Commission's supposedly erroneous reliance on petitioner's Position Paper.
The Court of Appeals thus failed to account for the crucial fact that the issue of jurisdiction was invoked
by respondent only upon her elevation to it of the case. It failed to recognize that respondent had all the
opportunity to raise this issue before the very tribunal whom she claims to have had no competence to
rule on the appeal, but that it was only after the same tribunal ruled against her twice - first, in its initial
Resolution and second, in denying her reconsideration - that she saw it fit to assail its jurisdiction. The
Court of Appeals failed to see through respondent's own failure to seasonably act and failed to realize
that she was guilty of estoppel by laches, taking "an unreasonable ... length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier[. ]"
In a long line of cases, this court has held that "[a]lthough the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings as the same is conferred by law, it is nonetheless settled that a party may be
barred from raising it on ground of laches or estoppel."
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons.
Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, of estopped by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to
do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for
the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a
mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or
claim to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against
his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction. The rationale that animates the rule on estoppel vis-à-vis jurisdiction applies with equal
force to quasi-judicial agencies as it does to courts.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The June 30, 2008 Decision and the
March 20, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69361-MIN are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The April 30, 2001 Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission is
REINSTATED.
4. National petroleum gas incorporated vs. RCBC 766 scra 653 -
FACTS: This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure (Rules) seeks to reverse and set aside the December 12, 2007 Decision and June 17, 2008
Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 98787, which affirmed the March 29, 2007
Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 66, Makati City, in Civil Case No. 06-882, denying
petitioners' Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss for alleged improper service of summons.
On October 16, 2006, respondent Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation filed against petitioner
corporation and its directors/officers a Complaint for civil damages arising from estafa in
relation to violations of the Trust Receipts Law.
On October 26, 2006, after an ex parte hearing was conducted, respondent's prayer for a writ of
preliminary attachment was granted and the corresponding writ was issued. Thereafter, Sheriff Leodel
N. Roxas served upon petitioners a copy of the summons, complaint, application for attachment,
respondent's affidavit and bond, and the order and writ of attachment. Petitioners filed through counsel
a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss [8] on November 15, 2006. They asserted that the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the corporation since the summons was improperly served
upon Claudia Abante (Abante), who is a mere liaison officer and not one of the corporate
officers specifically enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules. Likewise, the individual
petitioners argued that the sheriff and/or process server did not personally approach them at their
respective address as stated in the Complaint. Neither did he resort to substituted service of summons,
and that, even if he did, there was no strict compliance with Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules. The
Court's pronouncements in Spouses Mason v. Court of Appeals, E. B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. v.
Judge Benito, Laus v. Court of Appeals, and Samartino v. Raon were invoked in praying for the
dismissal of the complaint and the discharge of the writ of attachment.
Respondent countered in its Opposition with Motion to Declare Defendants in Default that there was
valid service of summons upon petitioners. With respect to the corporation, Abante received the
summons upon the express authority and instruction of the corporate secretary, petitioner Melinda Ang
(Ang). As regards the individual petitioners, the Sheriffs Report reflects that they were served "at their
given addresses, but they refused to acknowledge receipt thereof." Respondent stressed that said
Report is prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein and that the sheriff enjoys the presumption of
regularity in the performance of his official functions. In any case, it averred that, according to Oaminal
v. Castillo, petitioners already voluntarily submitted to the court's jurisdiction when they prayed for the
discharge of the writ of attachment, which is an affirmative relief apart from the dismissal of the case.
ISSUES and RULING:
(1) WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF
THE DEFENDANT CORPORATION BY SERVICE OF SUMMONS UPON ITS MERE EMPLOYEE.
(YES) SERVE SUMMONS PERSONALLY. (NO)

(1) Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him or her. Its
purpose is two-fold:
1. to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and
2. to notify the defendant that an action has been commenced so that he may be given an
opportunity to be heard on the claim against him.
" [C]ompliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as much an issue of due process as
of jurisdiction. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and
submit any evidence one may have in support of his defense. It is elementary that before a person can
be deprived of his property, he should first be informed of the claim against him and the theory on
which such claim is premised." Service of summons on domestic corporation, partnership or other
juridical entity is governed by Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules, which states:
SECTION 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. - When the defendant is a
corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a
juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner, general
manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or inhouse counsel. When the defendant is a
domestic corporation like herein petitioner, service of summons may be made only upon the
persons enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules. The enumeration of persons to whom
summons may be served is restricted, limited and exclusive following the rule on
statutory construction expressio unios est exclusio alterius. Substantial compliance
cannot be invoked. Service of summons upon persons other than those officers specifically
mentioned in Section 11, Rule 14 is void, defective and not binding to said corporation.
(2) The same conclusion, however, could not be said with respect to the service of summons upon the
individual petitioners.
Section 7, in relation to Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules, provides for substituted service of summons:
Section 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by
handling a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by
tendering it to him.
Section 7. Substituted service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected
(a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or
(b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof.
Manotoc v. Court of Appeals painstakingly elucidated the requirements of the Rules as follows:
We can break down this section into the following requirements to effect a valid substituted service:
1.Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service

2.Specific Details in the Return

The foregoing notwithstanding, we agree with the CA that there was a valid and effective service of
summons upon petitioner corporation through its liaison officer who acted as the agent of the corporate 3.A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion
secretary.
4.A Competent Person in Charge
Abante proceeded to receive the summons and accompanying documents only after receiving
instructions to do so from Melinda Ang, an individual petitioner herein and the petitioner corporation's
In resorting to the substituted service, the sheriff in this case pithily declared in his Report that he "also
corporate secretary. It is clear, therefore, that Abante, in so receiving the summons, did so in
served copies to other defendants at their given addresses, but they refused to acknowledge receipt
representation of Ang who, as corporate secretary, is one of the officers competent under the Rules of
thereof." Obviously, the Sheriffs Report dated November 13, 2006 does not particularize why
Court to receive summons on behalf of a private juridical person. Thus, while it may be true that there substituted service was resorted to and the precise manner by which the summons was served upon
was no direct, physical handing of the summons to Ang, the latter could at least be charged with having
the individual petitioners. The disputable presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed
constructively received the same, which in Our view, amounts to a valid service of summons.
will not apply where it is patent from the sheriffs or server's return that it is defective.
It is well to note that the certificate of service of the process server is prima facie evidence of the facts
To avail themselves of substituted service of summons, courts must rely on a detailed enumeration of
as set out therein. This is fortified by the presumption of the regularity of performance of official duty. To
the sheriffs actions and a showing that the defendant cannot be served despite diligent and reasonable
overcome the presumption of regularity of official functions in favor of such sheriffs return, the evidence
efforts. The Court requires that the Sheriffs Return clearly and convincingly show the impracticability or
against it must be clear and convincing. Sans the requisite quantum of proof to the contrary, the hopelessness of personal service. The impossibility of personal service justifying availment of
presumption stands deserving of faith and credit.
substituted service should be explained in the proof of service; why efforts exerted towards personal
service failed. The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be
(2) WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSONS OF stated in the proof of service or Officer's Return; otherwise, the substituted service cannot be upheld.
THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS BY RESORTING TO SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF SUMMONS
DESPITE ABSENCE OF EARNEST EFFORTS ON THE PART OF THE SERVING OFFICER TO
Under exceptional terms, the circumstances warranting substituted service of summons may be
proved by evidence aliunde. Substituted service will still be considered as regular if other evidence of
the efforts to serve summons was presented. BPI v. Spouses Evangelista teaches us that a defect in
the service of summons, which is apparent on the face of the return, does not necessarily constitute
conclusive proof that the actual service has in fact been improperly made. In the interest of speedy
justice, the trial court has to immediately ascertain whether the patent defect is real and, if so, to fully
determine whether prior attempts at personal service have in fact been done and resort to the
substituted service was justified. Should the returns not show compliance with the Rules on substituted
service, actual and correct service may still be proven by evidence extraneous to it. If substituted
service is indeed improper, the trial court must issue new summons and in the instant case, it appears
that the sheriff hastily and capriciously resorted to substituted service of summons without actually
exerting any genuine effort to locate the individual petitioners. The "reasonable time" within which to
personally serve the summons - 7 days for the plaintiff or 15-30 days for the sheriff as stated in
Manotoc - has not yet elapsed at the time the substituted service was opted to.
Remarkably, based on the Sheriffs Report and the narration of petitioners, the personal service of
summons upon the corporation and the individual petitioners as well as the levy of their personal and
real properties were all done in just one day. Manotoc stresses that for substituted service of summons
to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a
reasonable period which eventually resulted in failure in order to prove impossibility of prompt service.
To reiterate, "several attempts" means at least three (3) tries, preferrably on at least two different dates.
Despite improper service of summons upon their persons, the individual petitioners are deemed to
have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court through their voluntary appearance. The second sentence
of Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules that "[t]he inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside
from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance"
clearly refers to affirmative defenses, not affirmative reliefs.
RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The December 12, 2007
Decision and June 17, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98787, which
sustained the March 29, 2007 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati City, in Civil Case
No. 06-882, are hereby AFFIRMED.
5. San Miguel Properties Inc v. BF HOMES incorporated 765 S 131
FACTS: Petitioner San Miguel Properties Inc., a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate
business, purchased from B.F. Homes, Inc., represented by Atty. Florencio B. Orendain (rehabilitation
receiver appointed by the SEC), 130 residential lots situated in its subdivision BF Homes Parañaque.
The transactions were embodied in three separate deeds of sale. The TCTs covering the lots bought
under the first and second deeds were fully delivered to San Miguel Properties, but 20 TCTs covering
20 of the 41 parcels of land purchased under the third deed of sale were not delivered to San Miguel
Properties.
On its part, BF Homes claimed that it withheld the delivery of the 20 TCTs for parcels of land purchased
under the third deed of sale because Atty. Orendain had ceased to be its rehabilitation receiver at the
time of the transactions after being meanwhile replaced as receiver by FBO Network Management, Inc.
On May 17, 1989 pursuant to an order from the SEC, BF Homes refused to deliver the 20 TCTs despite
demands. Thus San Miguel Properties filed a complaint-affidavit in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Las Piñas City (OCP Las Piñas) charging respondent directors and officers of BF Homes with non-
delivery of titles in violation of Section 25, in relation to Section 39, both of Presidential Decree No. 957.
At the same time, San Miguel Properties sued BF Homes for specific performance in the HLURB
praying to compel BF Homes to release the 20 TCTs in its favor.
The OCP Las Piñas dismissed San Miguel Properties’ criminal complaint for violation of Presidential
Decree No. 957 on the ground that:
1. no action could be filed by or against a receiver without leave from the SEC that had appointed
him;
2. that the implementation of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 957 exclusively pertained
under the jurisdiction of the HLURB;
3. that there existed a prejudicial question necessitating the suspension of the criminal action until
after the issue on the liability of the distressed BF Homes was first determined by the SEC en banc
or by the HLURB;
4. and that no prior resort to administrative jurisdiction had been made; that there appeared to be no
probable cause to indict respondents for not being the actual signatories in the three deeds of
sale.
OCP Las Piñas denied San Miguel Properties’ motion for reconsideration holding that BF Homes’
directors and officers could not be held liable for the non-delivery of the TCTs under Presidential
Decree No. 957 without a definite ruling on the legality of Atty. Orendain’s actions; and that the criminal
liability would attach only after BF Homes did not comply with a directive of the HLURB directing it to
deliver the titles.
San Miguel Properties appealed the resolutions of the OCP Las Piñas to the Department of Justice
(DOJ), but the DOJ Secretary denied the appeal holding:
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling
of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City. Established jurisprudence supports the position taken
by the City Prosecutor concerned. There is no dispute that aside from the instant complaint for
violation of PD 957, there is still pending with HLURB, a complaint for specific performance
where the HLURB is called upon to inquire into, and rule on, the validity of the sales
transactions involving the lots in question and entered into by Atty. Orendain for and in behalf
of BF Homes.
As early as in the case of Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, the Supreme Court had ruled
that the HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving real estate business and practices
under PD 957. This is reiterated in the subsequent cases of Union Bank of the Philippines versus
HLURB, G.R. [No.] 953364, June 29, 1992 and C.T. Torres Enterprises vs. Hilionada, 191 SCRA 286.
The said ruling means that unless and until the HLURB rules on the validity of the transactions
involving the lands in question with specific reference to the capacity of Atty. Orendain to bind BF
Homes in the said transactions, there is as yet no basis to charge criminally respondents for non-
delivery of the subject land titles. In other words, complainant cannot invoke the penal provision of
PD 957 until such time that the HLURB shall have ruled and decided on the validity of the
transactions involving the lots in question. Thus the DOJ eventually denied San Miguel
Properties’ appeal and subsequent motion for reconsideration.
The CA dismissed San Miguel Properties’ petition, holding and ruling as follows:
All told, to sustain the petitioner’s theory that the result of the HLURB proceedings is not
determinative of the criminal liability of private respondents under PD 957 would be to espouse
an absurdity. If we were to assume that the HLURB finds BFHI under no obligation to delve the
subject titles, it would be highly irregular and contrary to the ends of justice to pursue a criminal
case against private respondents for the non-delivery of certificates of title which they are not
under any legal obligation to turn over in the first place. On a final note, absent grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the prosecutorial arm of the government as represented by herein
public respondent, courts will not interfere with the discretion of a public prosecutor in
prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before him. A public prosecutor, by the nature of his
office, is under no compulsion to file a criminal information where no clear legal justification has
been shown, and no sufficient evidence of guilt nor prima facie case has been established by
the complaining party.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus is hereby
DENIED. The Resolutions dated 15 October 2001 and 12 July 2002 of the Department of Justice are
AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. The CA denied San Miguel Properties’ motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE Whether the Doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable?
RULING: YES. Doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable. That the action for specific performance
was an administrative case pending in the HLURB, instead of in a court of law, was of no consequence
at all. As earlier mentioned, the action for specific performance, although civil in nature, could be
brought only in the HLURB. This situation conforms to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. There has
been of late a proliferation of administrative agencies, mostly regulatory in function. It is in favor of
these agencies that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is frequently invoked, not to defeat the resort to
the judicial adjudication of controversies but to rely on the expertise, specialized skills, and knowledge
of such agencies in their resolution. The Court has observed that one thrust of the proliferation is that
the interpretation of contracts and the determination of private rights under contracts are no longer a
uniquely judicial function exercisable only by the regular courts.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction has been increasingly called into play on matters demanding the
special competence of administrative agencies even if such matters are at the same time within the
jurisdiction of the courts. A case that requires for its determination the expertise, specialized skills, and
knowledge of some administrative board or commission because it involves technical matters or
intricate questions of fact, relief must first be obtained in an appropriate administrative proceeding
before a remedy will be supplied by the courts although the matter comes within the jurisdiction of the
courts. The application of the doctrine does not call for the dismissal of the case in the court but
only for its suspension until after the matters within the competence of the administrative body
are threshed out and determined.
To accord with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts cannot and will not determine a
controversy involving a question within the competence of an administrative tribunal, the controversy
having been so placed within the special competence of the administrative tribunal under a regulatory
scheme.
In that instance, the judicial process is suspended pending referral to the administrative body for its
view on the matter in dispute. Consequently, if the courts cannot resolve a question that is within the
legal competence of an administrative body prior to the resolution of that question by the latter,
especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the
special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative agency to ascertain technical and
intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the
regulatory statute administered, suspension or dismissal of the action is proper.
6. Supapo v. De jesus 756 scra 211
FACTS: The Spouses Supapo filed a complaint for accion publiciana against Roberto and Susan de
Jesus (Spouses de Jesus), Macario Bernardo (Macario), and persons claiming rights under them
(collectively, the respondents), with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Caloocan City.
The complaint sought to compel the respondents to vacate a piece of land. The subject lot is covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-28441 registered and titled under the Spouses Supapo’s
names. The land has an assessed value of thirty-nine thousand nine hundred eighty pesos
(P39,980.00) as shown in the Declaration of Real Property Value (tax declaration)
The Spouses Supapo did not reside on the subject lot. They also did not employ an overseer but they
made sure to visit at least twice a year. During one of their visits in 1992, they saw two (2) houses built
on the subject lot. They later learned that the Spouses de Jesus occupied one house while Macario
occupied the other one. The Spouses Supapo demanded from the respondents the immediate
surrender of the subject lot by bringing the dispute before the appropriate Lupong Tagapamayapa. The
Lupon issued a Katibayan Upang Makadulog sa Hukuman (certificate to file action) for failure of the
parties to settle amicably.
The Spouses Supapo then filed a criminal case against the respondents for violation of Presidential
Decree No. 772 or the Anti- Squatting Law. The trial court convicted the respondents. While the appeal
was pending in the CA, Congress enacted Republic Act (RA) No. 8368, otherwise known as “An Act
Repealing Presidential Decree No. 772,” which resulted to the dismissal of the criminal case.
Notwithstanding the dismissal, the Spouses Supapo moved for the execution of the respondents’ civil
liability, praying that the latter vacate the subject lot.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the motion and issued the writ of execution.
The respondents moved for the quashal of the writ but the RTC denied the same. The RTC also denied
the respondents’ motion for reconsideration.
The respondents thus filed with the CA a petition for certiorari to challenge the RTC’s orders denying
the quashal of the writ and the respondent’s motion for reconsideration.
The CA granted the petition and held that with the repeal of the Anti-Squatting Law, the respondents’
criminal and civil liabilities were extinguished.
The CA, however, underscored that the repeal of the Anti-Squatting Law does not mean that people
now have unbridled license to illegally occupy lands they do not own, and that it was not intended to
compromise the property rights of legitimate landowners. In cases of violation of their property rights,
the CA noted that recourse may be had in court by filing the proper action for recovery of possession.
The Spouses Supapo thus filed the complaint for accion publiciana. After filing their Answer, the
respondents moved to set their affirmative defenses for preliminary hearing.
METC denied the motion to set the affirmative defenses for preliminary hearing (The issues herein). In
a petition for certiorari, RTC REVERSED METC DECISION. CA affirmed RTC and dismissed the
appeal. Hence this petition.
ISSUES and RULING:
 1. Whether the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction; (YES)
Accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty
independent of title. It refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual
of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo filed an action for the recovery of possession of the subject
lot but they based their better right of possession on a claim of ownership. This Court has held that the
objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership. However,
where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to determine who
between the parties has the right to possess the property.
This adjudication is not a final determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the
purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably
linked to the issue of possession.
The adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the
same parties involving title to the property. The adjudication, in short, is not conclusive on the issue
of ownership.
Thus, while we will dissect the Spouses Supapo’s claim of ownership over the subject property, we will
only do so to determine if they or the respondents should have the right of possession.
Jurisdiction over actions involving title to or possession of real property is now determined by its
assessed value.
The assessed value of real property is its fair market value multiplied by the assessment level. It
is synonymous to taxable value.
In Quinagoran v. Court
 explained:[D]oes the RTC have jurisdiction over all cases of recovery of
possession regardless of the value of the property involved?
The answer is no. The doctrine on which the RTC anchored its denial of petitioner's Motion to Dismiss,
as affirmed by the CA -- that all cases of recovery of possession or accion publiciana lies with the
regional trial courts regardless of the value of the property -- no longer holds true. As things now stand,
a distinction must be made between those properties the assessed value of which is below P20,000.00,
if outside Metro Manila; and P50,000.00, if within.
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo alleged that the assessed value of the subject lot, located in
Metro Manila, is P39,980.00. This is proven by the tax declaration issued by the Office of the City
Assessor of Caloocan. The respondents do not deny the genuineness and authenticity of this tax
declaration.
Given that the Spouses Supapo duly complied with the jurisdictional requirements, we hold that the
MeTC of Caloocan properly acquired jurisdiction over the complaint for accion publiciana.
2. Whether the cause of action has prescribed; (NO)
The respondents point out that the Spouses Supapo filed the complaint for accion publiciana on March
7, 2008 or more than ten (10) years after the certificate to file action was issued on November 25,
1992. The respondents contend that the Spouses Supapo may no longer recover possession of the
subject property, the complaint having been filed beyond the period provided by law.
Under the undisputed facts of this case, we find that the respondents’ contentions have no legal basis.
In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that lands covered by a title cannot be acquired
by prescription or adverse possession. We have also held that a claim of acquisitive prescription is
baseless when the land involved is a registered land because of Article 112649 of the Civil Code in
relation to Act 496 [now, Section 47 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 152950].
In addition to the imprescriptibility, the person who holds a Torrens Title over a land is also entitled to
the possession thereof. The right to possess and occupy the land is an attribute and a logical
consequence of ownership. Corollary to this rule is the right of the holder of the Torrens Title to eject
any person illegally occupying their property. Again, this right is imprescriptible.
With respect to the respondents’ defense of laches, suffice it to say that the same is evidentiary in
nature and cannot be established by mere allegations in the pleadings. In other words, the party
alleging laches must adduce in court evidence proving such allegation. This Court not being a trier of
facts cannot rule on this issue; especially so since the lower courts did not pass upon the same.
Thus, without solid evidentiary basis, laches cannot be a valid ground to deny the Spouses Supapo's
petition. On the contrary, the facts as culled from the records show the clear intent of the Spouses
Supapo to exercise their right over and recover possession of the subject lot, viz.: (1) they brought the
dispute to the appropriate Lupon; (2) they initiated the criminal complaint for squatting; and (3) finally,
they filed the accion publiciana. To our mind, these acts negate the allegation of laches.
With these as premises, we cannot but rule that the Spouses Supapo’s right to recover possession of
the subject lot is not barred by prescription. The action is not barred
3. Whether the complaint for accion publiciana is barred by res judicata. (NO)
As a last-ditch effort to save their case, the respondents invoke res judicata. They contend that the
decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 78649 barred the filing of the accion publiciana.
To recall, CA-G.R. SP No. 78649 is the petition for certiorari filed by the respondents to challenge the
RTC’s issuance of the writ enforcing their civil liability (i.e., to vacate the subject property) arising from
their conviction under the Anti-Squatting Law. The CA granted the petition and permanently enjoined
the execution of the respondents’ conviction because their criminal liability had been extinguished by
the repeal of the law under which they were tried and convicted. It follows that their civil liability arising
from the crime had also been erased.
The respondents’ reliance on the principle of res judicata is misplaced.
Res judicata embraces two concepts:
(1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47
(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and
(2) conclusiveness of judgment in Rule 39, Section 47(c).
“Bar by prior judgment” means that when a right or fact had already been judicially tried on the
merits and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, the final judgment or order shall be
conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them and constitutes an absolute bar to
subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand or cause of action.
The requisites for res judicata under the concept of bar by prior judgment are:
 Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that there is identity of parties, "conclusiveness of
(1) The former judgment or order must be final;
 whether the respondents (accused therein) committed the crime alleged in the information, while the
(2) It must be a judgment on the merits;
(3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
and
(4) There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of
action.
Res judicata is not present in this case.
While requisites one to three may be present, it is obvious that the there is no identity of subject matter,
parties and causes of action between the criminal case prosecuted under the Anti-Squatting Law and
the civil action for the recovery of the subject property.
First, there is no identity of parties. The criminal complaint, although initiated by the Spouses Supapo,
was prosecuted in the name of the people of the Philippines. The accion publiciana, on the other hand,
was filed by and in the name of the Spouses Supapo.
Second, there is no identity of subject matter. The criminal case involves the prosecution of a crime
under the Anti-Squatting Law while the accion publiciana is an action to recover possession of the
subject property.
And third, there is no identity of causes of action. The people of the Philippines filed the criminal case to
protect and preserve governmental interests by prosecuting persons who violated the statute. The
Spouses Supapo filed the accion publiciana to protect their proprietary interests over the subject
property and recover its possession.
Even casting aside the requirement of identity of causes of action, the defense of res judicata has still
no basis.
The concept of “conclusiveness of judgment” does not require that there is identity of causes
of action provided that there is identity of issue and identity of parties.
Under this particular concept of res judicata, any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or
necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is
rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated
between the parties and their privies, whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter
ofthe two actions is the same.
As already explained, there is no identity of parties between the criminal complaint under the Anti-
Squatting law and the civil action for accion publiciana. For this reason alone, "conclusiveness of
judgment" does not apply.
judgment" still does not apply because there is no identity of issues. The issue in the criminal case is
only issue in accion publiciana is whether the Spouses Supapo have a better right than the
respondents to possess and occupy the subject property.

7. Toledo v CA 765 SCRA 104
Facts: In 1958, Del Rosario Realty, as represented by Pedro Del Rosario, entered into a Contract to
Sell with spouses Leonardo Faustino and Angelina Lim (spouses Faustino) over a piece of land. In
January 1959, the Faustino spouses sold their rights to spouses Padiernos, and such transfer was
registered and annotated on the TCT as an adverse claim as early as 1960.
In May 1959, Pedro Del Rosario executed a deed assigning all of his rights and interests in the contract
to sell to Socorro Ramos, who in the same deed acknowledged and approved the transfer or
assignment of rights made by spouses Faustino over the property.
In 1962, Vicente Padiernos sold one-half of the property to petitioner Jose Toledo and wife Elisa
Padierno (spouses Toledo), and the latter have already commenced payment since 1961. In 1967,
Padiernos sold the remaining half to spouses Virgilio and Leticia Padiernos, who later assigned their
rights over the property to their children, herein petitioners, Glenn and Danilo Padiernos. Full payment
was made sometime in 1971, and when petitioners requested the release of the owner’s duplicate
certificate of title, respondent Ramos issued a Certification stating that the property while fully paid
could not be released pending final decision of the SC in another case. In 1974, petitioners constructed
their houses on the said property.
However, the SC in the other case ruled against the respondents, and consequently property including
the land in question was sold in auction to Guillermo Pablo, who thereafter sold it to ARC Marketing.
In 1977, respondents filed a Complaint for Nullity of Execution Sale against ARC Marketing, and in
1993, the parties entered into a Final Compromise Agreement, which was approved by the Court.
On 1997, Petitioners filed a complaint for reconveyance and damages. Respondent Ramos moved to
dismiss the case on the ground that petitioners failed to state a cause of action. ARC Marketing, on the
other hand, sought dismissal on the following grounds: (1) the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the claim because it is essentially an action to annul the judicially approved
Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No. Q-22850; (2) petitioners failed to pay the correct docket fees;
(3) the action was barred by the statute of limitations; (4) the action is barred by a prior judgment; (5)
the complaint shows that petitioners failed to comply with the conditions of the contract to sell and (6)
laches, among others.
The RTC denied respondent’s motion to dismiss. Upon petitioner’s motion, first judge inhibited, and the
case was re-raffled to the second judge, who likewise denied ARC’s motion to dismiss. ARC filed a
motion for reconsideration, which the Court granted, and held that petitioner’s action is really one for
annulment of judgment.
Petitioners filed a petition for Certiorari before the CA, which ruled that the judge did not act with grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner’s complaint due to lack of jurisdiction. An action for
annulment of judgment cannot be filed in the RTC, a co-equal branch from which the original decision
was made.
Issue: Whether the action is one of annulment of judgment, and subsequently the RTC has no
jurisdiction, or action for reconveyance, which the RTC does have jurisdiction.
Ruling: The action is an action for reconveyance, hence under the jurisdiction of the RTC.
It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of the action, and which court has jurisdiction over it,
are the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought. After perusal of the
complaint, the SC ruled that the action filed by petitioners is one for reconveyance because: (1) the
complaint never prayed for annulment of the compromise judgment; and (2) petitioners allegations that
they were owners of the land in question, and that respondents illegally dispossessed them of said
land, clearly make out a case for reconveyance.
ARC alleges that petitioner’s action is one for annulment of judgment, albeit disguised as an action for
reconveyance, citing Rone and Cultura. ARC’s reliance on these cases is misplaced. Both cases
involve an action for annulment of fraudulent deeds of sale, which is clearly different from the case at
bar, and dismissal in both cases were mainly due to prescription, not lack of jurisdiction.
ARC’s allegation further fails when we consider that petitioners, not being parties to the case, cannot
file such action to annul the judgment. Even assuming that it is allowed, they will not derive any real
benefit from a favorable ruling. The SC agrees with the CA’s suggestion that petitioner’s proper
recourse was either an action for quieting of title, or an action for reconveyance of property, and
petitioner chose the latter.
Considering that remanding the case back to the RTC would cause undue hardship, the SC proceeded
to resolve the merits and decide the issue of ownership.
ARC argues petitioner’s action is barred on the ground of (1) res judicata, (2) prescription, and (3)
laches. It errs.
While a judicially approved compromise agreement indeed has the effect of res judicata, the same is
conclusive and binding only upon the parties and their successors-in-interest by title after the
commencement of the action in court.
The presence of fraud in this case as shown by the disposition of property to ARC by respondent
Ramos despite knowledge of petitioner’s title creates an implied trust, and the Civil Code provides a
prescriptive period of 10 years for actions based on implied trust. However, prescription does not run
against plaintiff in action possession of the disputed land because he has a right to wait until his
possession is disturbed or his title questioned before initiating an action to vindicate his right. In the
case at bar, petitioner’s undisturbed possession of property is uncontroverted, hence petitioners are not
barred from seeking relief from the court.
Neither can petitioners be considered to have slept on their rights for laches to operate against them.
Petitioners have clearly taken steps to protect their interests in the property. Moreover, petitioners were
not made parties to the case between respondents Ramos and ARC in 1993. They cannot be
presumed to be aware of the 1993 decision for their action for reconveyance filed in 1997 to be barred
by laches.
ARC again alleges that the transfer between Faustino spouses were made without written consent of
Del Rosario, resulting to an ipso facto cancellation of the contract to sell. This again fails.
While the contract to sell indeed provided for the ipso facto cancellation, jurisprudence requires, for
cancellation to be effective, that there be written notice sent to the defaulter informing him of said
cancellation or rescission. Even with the well-settled rule that judicial action for rescission is not
necessary when the contract itself provides for revocation, there must still be written notice to the
defaulter.
Neither can it be said that ARC is an innocent purchaser for value, since petitioner’s predecessor-in-
interest Padiemos caused the annotation on the title of his adverse claim as early as 1960. Thus, when
ARC agreed by way of the compromise agreement to purchase the land, it already had constructive
notice as to the adverse claim registered earlier.
Hence, the petition is granted, the decision of the CA set aside, and judgment is rendered declaring
petitioners owners of the disputed lot.
8. Unduran v. Aberas Turi 773 scra 114
Jurisdiction of NCIP
FACTS: Petitioners are members of the Miarayon, Lapok, Lirongan, Talaandig Tribal Association
(MILALITTRA), or Talaandig tribe, who claimed to have been living since birth on the land located at
Talakag, Bukidnon, which they inherited from their forefathers. Respondents claimed to be the owners
and possessor of an unregistered parcel of agricultural land, with 105.7361 hectares, located within the
ancestral domain of the tribe.
Respondents filed a Petition for Accion Reivindicatoria, with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order or Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction with Damages[4] (original complaint for accion
reivindicatoria) against petitioners before the RTC Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon.
Petitioners filed their motion to dismiss alleging that the RTC has no jurisdiction.
In view of RA No. 8371 (IPRA), petitioners alleged that the tribe members assisted the NCIP in
processing, validation and delineation of their Ancestral Domain claim. A CADT was issued in favor of
the Tribe, containing an area of 11,105.5657 hectares. Then Pres. Arroyo awarded the CADT to the
Talaandig Tribe. As awardees of a CADT, petitioners argued that NCIP has exclusive and original
jurisdiction over the case, as the subject matter concerns a dispute and controversy over an ancestral
land/domain of Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs)/Indigenous Peoples (IPs).
RTC: the motion to refer the case to the RHO-NCIP and its manifestation for an ocular inspection were
denied for being bereft of merit. The injuctive writ prayed for by respondents were granted.
CA: Affirmed. Based on the allegations of both original complaint [accion reivindicatoria] and amended
complaint [injunction], the CA found that the subject matter of both complaints is well within the
jurisdiction of the RTC
SC Decision: CA decision affirmed. Contrary to petitioners' contention, the mere fact that this case
involves members of ICCs/IPs and their ancestral land is not enough to for it to fall under the
jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA, to wit:
A careful review of Section 66 shows that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and
disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties
belonging to the same ICC/IP.
The qualifying provision requires two conditions before such disputes may be brought before the NCIP,
namely:
(1) exhaustion of remedies under customary laws of the parties, and
(2) compliance with condition precedent through the said certification by the Council of Elders/Leaders.
In this case, while most of the petitioners belong to Talaandig Tribe, respondents do not belong
to the same ICC/IP. Thus, even if the real issue involves a dispute over land which appear to be
located within the ancestral domain of the Talaandig Tribe, it is not the NCIP but the RTC which shall
have the power to hear, try and decide this case. The Court declares Rule IX, Section 1 of the IPRA-
IRR,[23] Rule III, Section 5[24] and Rule IV, Sections 13 and 14 of the NCIP Rules[25] as null and void
insofar as they expand the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA to include such
disputes where the parties do not belong to the same ICC/IP.
SC Resolution: In there MR, petitioners maintain that the NCIP and not the regular courts has
jurisdiction over disputes and controversies involving ancestral domain of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities (JCCs) and Indigenous Peoples (IPs) regardless of the parties involved.
ISSUE: WON NCIP has jurisdiction over the claims.
RULING on the MR: CA correctly ruled that the subject matter of the original and amended complaint
based on the allegations therein is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
It is well settled that the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend on the defenses
raised by the defendant in the answer or a motion to dismiss;
Otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant. Both original and
amended complaints, accion reivindicatoria and injunction, respectively, are incapable of pecuniary
estimation; thus falling within the jurisdiction of the RTC. As correctly pointed out by the ponencia,
''jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in
the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause
of action."
In sum, the Court finds no substantial argument in petitioners' motions for reconsideration to justify a
reversal of its ruling that jurisdiction over the subject matter of respondents' original and amended
complaint based on the allegations therein lies with the RTC.
The ponencia has held that pursuant to Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over
claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties
belonging to the same ICC/IP group.
When such claims and disputes arise between or among parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP
group, the case shall fall under the jurisdiction of the regular courts, instead of the NCIP. Thus, even if
the real issue involves dispute over a land which appear to be located within the ancestral domain of an
ICC/IP, it is not the NCIP but the RTC which has the power to hear, try and decide the case.
In exceptional cases1 under Sections 52, 54 and 62 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall still have jurisdiction
over such claims and disputes even if the parties involved do not belong to the same ICC/IP group.
Jurisdiction of NCIP (whether the NCIP's jurisdiction is limited to cases where both parties are
ICCs/IPs, or primary and concurrent with regular courts, and/or original and exclusive to the exclusion
of said courts, on all matters involving the rights of ICCs/IPs)
NCIP's quasi-judicial jurisdiction is limited. The Court maintains that the jurisdiction of the NCIP
under Section 66 of the IPRA is limited to claims and disputes involving rights of IPs/ICCs where both
parties belong to the same ICC/IP group, but if such claims and disputes arise between or among
parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP group, the proper regular courts shall have jurisdiction.
Section 66 of the IPRA which, to reiterate: (1) did not use the words "primary" and/or "original
and exclusive" to describe the jurisdiction of the NCIP over "all claims and disputes involving
rights of ICCs/IPs"and (2) contained a proviso requiring certification that the parties have exhausted
their remedies provided under customary laws.
The Court will now expound on the NCIP's primary jurisdiction over claims regardless of whether the
parties are non-ICCs/IPs, or members of different ICCs/IP groups, namely:(I) adverse claims and
border disputes arising from the delineation of ancestral domains/lands,(2) cancellation of fraudulently
issued CADTs, and (3) disputes and violations of ICCs/IPs rights between members of the same
ICC/IP.
Provisions of the IPRA which invest primary jurisdiction to NCIP over claims and disputes involving
rights of ICCs/IP groups:
 1. Section 52(h) of the IPRA anent the power of the NCIP Ancestral Domain
Office (ADO) to deny application for CADTs, in relation to Section 62, regarding the power of the NCIP
to hear and decide unresolved adverse claims
2. Section 53 on the NCIP-ADO's power to deny applications for CALTs and on the NCIP's power to
grant meritorious claims and resolve conflicting claims
 3. Section 54 as to the power of the NCIP to
resolve fraudulent claims over ancestral domains and lands
NCIP has primary jurisdiction over these cases even if one of the parties is a non-CC/IP, or where the
opposing parties are members of different ICCs/IPs groups. Indeed, the questions involved in said
cases demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring special knowledge, experience,
and services of the NCIP to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
The Court thus rules that the NCIP shall have primary jurisdiction over violations of IPRA provisions
only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP group. When the parties
belong to different ICC/IP group or where one of the parties is a non- ICC/IP, jurisdiction over such
violations shall fall under the proper Regional Trial Court. A recourse under customary laws does not
take away the right of ICCs/IPs to secure punishment under existing national laws.
Most customary laws are not written, much less published. Hence, it is highly unlikely that the NCIP or
even the regular courts have the power to penalize non- ICCs/IPs with these penalties under customary
laws. Similarly, an ICC/IP cannot be punished under the customary law of another. Otherwise, the
former would be forced to observe a nonbinding customary law.
Therefore, while the NCIP has jurisdiction over violations of ICC/IP rights, its jurisdiction is limited to
those committed by and against members of the same ICC/IP. When one of the parties to a dispute is
a nonmember of an indigenous group, or when the indigenous peoples involved belong to different
groups, the application of customary law is not required.
Indeed, non-ICCs/IPs cannot be subjected to the special and limited jurisdiction of the NCIP
even if the dispute involves rights of ICCs/IPs since the NCIP has no power and authority to
decide on a controversy involving as well rights of non-ICCs/IPs which may be brought before
a· court of general jurisdiction within the legal bounds of rights and remedies.
In short, the NCIP is only vested with jurisdiction to determine the rights of ICCs/IPs based on customs
and customary law in a given controversy against another ICC/IP, but not the applicable law for each
and every kind of ICC/IP controversy even against an opposing non-ICC/IP.
9. Ce Casecnan Water And Energy Corpo Inc. v Province of Nueva Ecija 759 scra 180
FACTS: Petitioner and the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) entered into a build-operate-transfer
(BOT) contract known as the "Amended and Restated Casecnan Project Agreement" 5 (Casecnan
Contract) relative to the construction and development of the Casecnan Multi-Purpose Irrigation and
Power Project (Casecnan Project). The Casecnan Project is a combined irrigation and hydroelectric
power generation facility using the Pantabangan Dam in Nueva Ecija. Petitioner and NIA executed a
Supplemental Agreement 6 amending Article II of the Casecnan Contract which pertains to payment of
taxes. Article 2.2 thereof states that NIA must reimburse petitioner for real property taxes (RPT)
provided the same was paid upon NIA’s directive and with the concurrence of the Department of
Finance.
On September 6, 2005, petitioner received from the Office of the Provincial Assessor a Notice of
Assessment of Real Property dated August 2, 2005, which indicates that for the years 2002 to 2005, its
RPT due was 248,676,349.60. Petitioner paid the assessed RPT under protest; it also initiated
proceedings questioning the validity of the collection with respect to the years 2006 up to the second
quarter of 2008. Petitioner filed with the RTC of San Jose City, Nueva Ecija a Complaint 9 for injunction
and damages with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction 10
praying to restrain the collection of the 2008 RPT Reassessment. Petitioner emphasized, among
others, that it was not the one which should pay the taxes but NIA.
RTC issued a 20-day TRO enjoining respondents from collecting from petitioner the RPT covered by
the 2008 RPT Reassessment amounting to ₱1,279,997,722.70, including surcharges and penalties.
Subsequently, however, the RTC denied petitioner’s application for writ of preliminary injunction in its
Order of October 24, 2008.It also denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration thereof in an Order
dated January 30, 2009.
On April 24, 2009, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari 16 under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court seeking to annul and set aside the aforementioned October 24, 2008 and January 30, 2009 RTC
Orders.
The CA observed that the Petition for Certiorari before it was actually an offshoot of the 2008 RPT
Reassessment. And since in resolving the issue of whether the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioner’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction, the issue of the validity
of the assessment and the collection of the RPT against petitioner must also be resolved, thus
jurisdiction over the case lies within the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).
Petitioner argues that it is the CA, not the CTA, which has jurisdiction over the subject matter of its
Petition for Certiorari. Petitioner maintains that its petition relates to an ordinary civil action for injunction
and not to a local tax case. It insists that in both the RTC injunction case and the Petition for Certiorari
before the CA, petitioner was not protesting respondents’ assessment of RPT against it; what it was
seeking was respondents’ enjoinment from committing or continuing to commit acts that would probably
violate its right. Petitioner explains that the said injunction case was filed with the RTC because the
LBAA has no injunctive power.
Respondents argue that in resolving the issue on the propriety of issuing a writ of injunction, the CA will
have to inevitably pass upon the propriety of the assessment of RPT on the Casecnan Project, a local
tax matter which is within the jurisdiction of the CTA. Respondents also echo the CA pronouncement
that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies with respect to the assessment and collection
of RPT.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CTA which has the power to rule on a Petition for Certiorari assailing an
interlocutory order of the RTC relating to a local tax case.
RULING: Yes, it is the CTA which has the power to rule on a Petition for Certiorari assailing an
interlocutory order of the RTC relating to a local tax case.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is required for a court to act on any controversy. It is conferred by
law and not by the consent or waiver upon a court. As such, if a court lacks jurisdiction over an action, it
cannot decide the case on the merits and must dismiss it.
With respect to the CTA, its jurisdiction was expanded and its rank elevated to that of a collegiate court
with special jurisdiction by virtue of Republic Act No. 9282. This expanded jurisdiction of the CTA
includes its exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal the decisions, orders or resolutions of
the RTC in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by the RTC in the exercise of its original or
appellate jurisdiction.
In the recent case of City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo, the Court ruled that the CTA likewise has the
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari or to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in
cases falling within the CTA’s exclusive appellate jurisdiction.
Anent petitioner’s contention that it is the CA which has jurisdiction over a certiorari petition assailing an
interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case, the Court had this to say:
If this Court were to sustain petitioners’ contention that jurisdiction over their certiorari petition
lies with the CA, this Court would be confirming the exercise by two judicial bodies, the CA and
the CTA, of jurisdiction over basically the same subject matter – precisely the split-jurisdiction
situation which is anathema to the orderly administration of justice. Thus, the Court agrees with
the ruling of the CA that since appellate jurisdiction over private respondents’ complaint
for tax refund is vested in the CTA, it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking
nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed
with the same court. To rule otherwise would lead to an absurd situation where one court
decides an appeal in the main case while another court rules on an incident in the very same
case.
A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power necessary to exercise it
effectively, to make all orders that will preserve the subject of the action, and to give effect to the final
determination of the appeal. It carries with it the power to protect that jurisdiction and to make the
decisions of the court thereunder effective. The court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has authority to
control all auxiliary and incidental matters necessary to the efficient and proper exercise of that
jurisdiction. For this purpose, it may, when necessary, prohibit or restrain the performance of any act
which might interfere with the proper exercise of its rightful jurisdiction in cases pending before it.
Given these, it is settled that it is the CTA which has exclusive jurisdiction over a special civil action for
certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case.
The Court finds, however, that in praying to restrain the collection of RPT, petitioner also implicitly
questions the propriety of the assessment of such RPT. This is because in ruling as to whether to
restrain the collection, the RTC must first necessarily rule on the propriety of the assessment. In other
words, in filing an action for injunction to restrain collection, petitioner was in effect also
challenging the validity of the RPT assessment.
[T]he original action filed with the RTC is one for Injunction, with an application for Temporary
Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the province of Nueva Ecija from further
collecting the alleged real property tax liability assessed against it. Simply because the action is an
application for injunctive relief does not necessarily mean that it may no longer be considered
as a local tax case. The subject matter and the issues, not the name or designation of the remedy,
should control. While an ancillary action for injunction may not be a main case, the court [still has] to
determine, even in a preliminary matter, the applicable tax laws, rules and jurisprudence.
10. Oribello v. CA 765 scra 18 
 ISSUES and RULING:
 (1)Whether or not the CA correctly held that the validity of the adoption
FACTS: The assailed Decision of the CA summarized the factual and procedural antecedents of the
case, as follows: Before the Regional Trial Court of La Union (Branch 31) was an action for partition
and damages involving twelve parcels of land. Eight of said parcels are declared for taxation purposes
in the name of Toribio Oribello xxx, two in the names of Toribio and Rosenda Oribello, one in the
names of Toribio and and Berlinda Padilla Oribello xxx, and one in the names of Toribio and Ma. Emilia
Oribello x x x.
Toribio was twice married. His first wife was Emilia. On September 10, 1981, Toribio's marriage to
Emilia was dissolved pursuant to the decision of the Superior Court of California, County of
Sacramento, U.S.A.
On March 10, 1982, Toribio married appellee before the municipal mayor of Agoo, La Union. He died
intestate on August 18, 1993.
Instituted on May 27, 1997 by Remedios Oribello xxx, represented by her natural father Alfredo Selga
xxx, against appellee, the action was anchored on the theory that appellant is an adopted daughter of
Toribio per decision dated March 26, 1974 xxx of the then Court of First Instance x x x of Occidental
Mindoro (Branch II) in Sp. Proc. No. R-94 x x x granting the petition of Toribio and Emilia, who were
childless, for adoption of appellant, then eight years old.
Denying that appellant is an adopted daughter of Toribio, appellee averred in her answer that the
decree of adoption was fraudulently secured by Alfredo; that the proceedings in the first adoption case
and the decree of adoption are void ab initio, etc.
the RTC rendered its Judgment after trial, ruling as follows:
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby DISMISSED.
Plaintiff Remedios Selga is not a co-owner of the properties enumerated in paragraph 5 of the
Complaint, which defendant inherited from Toribio Oribello except those described in subparagraphs 8,
11 and 12 of said paragraph 5.
the CA promulgated its Decision, viz.:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is VACATED and SET ASIDE and the case REMANDED to the
lower court for the second phase of a partition suit without prejudice to the filing, if still available, of
either a petition for relief from the decree of adoption rendered in Sp. Proc. No. R- 94 of the then Court
of First Instance of Occidental Mindoro (Branch II) or an action for annulment thereof.
The CA pointed out that even if the adoption proceedings had suffered from infirmities, the RTC did not
have the authority to annul the adoption decree and to dismiss the complaint for partition for that
reason; and
that at any rate the petitioner still had the option either to file a petition for relief or an action for the
annulment of the adoption decree in the appropriate court.
decree in favor of the respondent should not be assailed in an action for partition. (YES)
(1) The petitioner insists that the complaint for partition must be dismissed based on her allegations
that the adoption decree issued by the CFI, Branch II, of Occidental Mindoro was void; and that her
attack against the adoption decree was akin to the counterclaim allowed in Heirs of Simplicio Santiago
v. Heirs of Mariano E. Santiago, an action for the nullification of a certificate of title, because the
counterclaim constituted a direct attack on the title.
The petitioner's position is untenable. In 1981, the Legislature enacted Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
(Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980). Among several innovations of this legislative enactment was
the formal establishment of the annulment of a judgment or final order as an action independent from
the generic classification of litigations in which the subject matter was not capable of pecuniary
estimation, and expressly vested the exclusive original jurisdiction over such action in the CA. The
action in which the subject of the litigation was incapable of pecuniary estimation continued to be under
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC, which replaced the CFI as the court of general jurisdiction.
Since then, the RTC no longer had jurisdiction over an action to annul the judgment of the RTC,
eliminating all concerns about judicial stability. To implement this change, the Court introduced a new
procedure to govern the action to annul the judgment of the RTC in the 1997 revision of
the Rules of Court under Rule 47, directing in Section 2 thereof that "[t]he annulment may be based
only on the grounds of
1. extrinsic fraud and
2. lack of jurisdiction."
Based on the foregoing, the RTC did not have the jurisdiction to determine or to review the validity of
the decree of adoption issued by the erstwhile CFI of Occidental Mindoro by virtue of the equal rank
and category between the RTC and the CFI. The proper court with jurisdiction to do so was the CA,
which has been vested by Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 with the exclusive original jurisdiction
over actions for the annulment of the judgments of the RTC, to wit:
Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. - The [Court of Appeals] shall exercise:
 xxxx
 (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction
over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and
xxxx
Conformably with the foregoing, therefore, we join the CA's following exposition, to wit:
Even supposing that the first adoption case suffers from infirmities, the lower court is bereft of authority
to annul the decree of adoption which was rendered by the CFI of Occidental Mindoro, a court of equal
rank. Indeed, no court has the authority to nullify the judgments or processes of another court of
equal rank and category, having the equal power to grant the reliefs sought. Such power
devolves exclusively upon the proper appellate court. The raison d'etre for the rule is to avoid conflict of
power between different courts of equal or coordinate jurisdiction which would surely lead to confusion
and seriously hinder the proper administration of justice (Gallardo-Corro vs. Gallardo, 350 SCRA 568).
(Emphasis supplied)
It is also relevant to mention that the judgment or final order of a court of law can be set aside only
through a direct attack commenced in the court of competent jurisdiction. For this reason, any attack in
this action for partition against the validity of the adoption decree issued by the CFI of Occidental
Mindoro cannot be permitted because such would constitute a collateral attack against the judgment in
the adoption case.
(2)Whether nor not Remedios Oribello discharge her burden of proof to show that she is entitled
to the partition. (NO)
(2) In this case, the CA has declared that Remedios Oribello, being the adopted daughter of the late
Toribio Oribello, was entitled to the judicial partition she hereby demanded by virtue of the decree of
adoption of the the declaration of the CA in favor of Remedios Oribello was factually unwarranted. As
the plaintiff, she had the burden of proof, as the party demanding the partition of property, to establish
her right to a share in the property by preponderance of evidence, but she failed to provide the factual
basis of her right to the partition warranted the dismissal of her claim for judicial partition.
In its assailed judgment, the RTC found that Remedios Oribello did not satisfactorily establish her co-
ownership of the properties left by the late Toribio Oribello. The foregoing findings by the RTC, that the
Tomas Orivillo who had legally adopted Remedios Oribello under the CFI's decree of adoption was not
the same person as the Tomas Oribello whose property was the subject of her demand for judicial
partition, were supported by the records. In finding so, the RTC did not interfere with the jurisdiction of
the CFI as a court of equal rank and category, and did not negate the adoption decree, but simply
determined whether or not the claim of Remedios Oribello to the partition of the property of Tomas
Oribello was competently substantiated by preponderance of evidence. What the RTC thereby settled
was only whether Remedios Oribello was a co-owner of the property with Berlinda Oribello, the widow
of Tomas Oribello. The RTC, being the trial court with jurisdiction over the action for partition,
undeniably possessed the fullest authority to hear and settle the conflicting claims of the parties.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision promulgated on July
31, 2003 by the Court of Appeals; REINSTATES the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court rendered on
March 30, 1998 dismissing Civil Case No. A-1757 entitled Remedios Oribello, represented by her Atty.-
in-Fact Alfredo Selga v. Berlinda P. Oribello; and ORDERS respondent Remedios Oribello to pay the
costs of suit.
11. Consolidated bank and trust corporation v ca 773 scra 1
Facts: This is a petition for review on the decision of CA finding petitioner Consolidated Bank (aka
Solidbank) liable to respondent United Pacific Leasing and Finance Corp (UNAM) for excess payments
received under a loan obligation. Solidbank extended loans to UNAM evidenced by nine promissory
notes. As security for the loans, UNAM executed Deeds of Assignment in Solidbank’s favor. It also
furnished Solidbank a “Certified List of Assigned Receivables.” Eventually, UNAM’s majority
shareholder, Pacific Bank, was forbidden to do business and placed under liquidation proceedings
commenced before Branch 31 of the RTC assigned as a “Liquidation Court”. Thus resulted to UNAM’s
inability to comply with its loan obligations.
Upon learning that UNAM had already collected on some of the credits assigned, Solidbank sent letters
to UNAM demanding for the turnover of the collected
amounts. Unsuccessful, Solidbank, on January 21, 1987, filed a Complaint for Sum of Money (with
Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Attachment) against UNAM, its executive vice-president
Antonio Andal ("Andal") and his wife before Branch 46 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila ("Trial
Court"). On said complaint, Solidbank claimed payment for the amount of P16,381,889.53 as UNAM's
outstanding principal loan obligation
Solidbank filed a Manifestation dated June 2, 1987 informing the Trial Court that it had earlier filed a
claim before the Office of the Pacific Bank Liquidator ("Liquidator") representing the eight (8)
receivables assigned by UNAM to Solidbank under the List of Assigned Receivables and which appear
to be due from Pacific Bank.
UNAM stated in its answer with special affirmative defense that the Liquidation Court adjudged
P24,158,263.10 in Solidbank's favor ("loan award"). In addition, the Liquidation Court also awarded
Solidbank an additional P17,620,659.60 representing unpaid rentals for, and value of, computer
machines allegedly leased by Solidbank to Pacific Bank for the period of November 1988 to June 1990
("lease award").
UNAM claims that Solidbank, by virtue of an agreement submitted to (and thereafter approved by) the
Liquidation Court without UNAM's knowledge and consent, compromised the loan award
P24,158,263.10 to the much lower amount of P10,722,704.83. The Liquidator made a partial payment
of 1,206,495.17, consequently reducing the outstanding loan balance to P9,516,209.66. Thereafter, on
October 4, 1989, 2 PNB checks representing the remaining balance were delivered to Solidbank.
In view of the foregoing, UNAM pleaded that (1) all amounts awarded to Solidbank by the Liquidation
Court be credited by the Trial Court to UNAM's outstanding loan obligation; and, by way of
counterclaim, (2) it be awarded the difference between the loan award P24,158,263.10 and the
compromised amount of PI0,722,704.83.
RTC:
 Trial Court ruled in favor of UNAM. Finding that Solidbank had no authority to enter into the
Compromise Agreement, the Trial Court deemed Solidbank to have received the entire sum of the
initial loan award and deducted the same from its computation of the total amount owing to Solidbank.
Considering that the Compromise Agreement was entered into without UNAM's knowledge and
consent, for purposes of this case, SOLIDBANK will be deemed to have received the entire sum of
P24,158,263.10. It ruled that the correct total amount owing to SOLIDBANK as of Oct. 4, 1989 is
P9,051,694.85. Thus, when the P24,158,263.10 was deemed paid as of October 4, 1989, the total
obligation of UNAM to the tune of P9,051,694.85 as of October 4, 1989 was deemed FULLY PAID and
the obligation was extinguished. Considering its ruling that the compromise judgment had fully
extinguished UNAM's loan obligation, the Trial Court also ordered Solidbank to return to UNAM the
amount it received as lease award.
RTC MR: In Solidbank’s motion for reconsideration, the Trial Court, reversed itself.
With respect to the claim of the plaintiff in the amounts prayed for in the complaint, the Court believes
that this Court does not possess the competence to rule on the said claims, the same properly falling
within the jurisdiction of the Liquidation Court and we strongly feel that we cannot substitute our
judgment for that of the liquidation court. Moreover, the records are in the possession of the said
liquidation court and the latter Court can properly rule on the evidence adduced before it.
Thus, the complaint and respective counterclaims were dismissed "without prejudice to said parties
litigating their respective claims before the Liquidation Court which has jurisdiction over the subject
matter in the complaint.
CA: reversed RTC.
Issue: Whether or not the CA was correct in ruling that Trial Court had jurisdiction to decide over the
award and findings of the Liquidation Court in favor of Solidbank.
Held: No.
This case concerns actions of two courts over two different types of actions: one is a liquidation
proceeding involving Pacific Bank (a shareholder of UNAM) and the other, an action for collection of
sum of money filed by Solidbank against UNAM.
An action for collection or recovery of sum of money falls under the general classification of actions
capable of pecuniary estimation. Depending on the amount of money in issue, such action may be filed
with either the Municipal Trial Courts or the Regional Trial Courts. Since the collection suit filed by
Solidbank against UNAM involved millions of pesos, the case was filed with the Regional Trial Court
(Branch 46 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila). A liquidation proceeding, on the other hand, is a
special proceeding involving the administration and disposition, with judicial intervention, of an
insolvent's assets for the benefit of its creditors. Under the Central Bank Act, this proceeding is
cognizable by the Regional Trial Courts.
Pursuant to Central Bank of the Philippines Memorandum dated July 6, 1985, Pacific Bank was
forbidden to do business. It was subsequently placed under liquidation proceedings. While both cases
were properly cognizable by the Regional Trial Courts, the Trial Court in this case had no jurisdiction to
make a ruling on the amount awarded by the Liquidation Court in Solidbank's favor. The judicial
liquidation is intended to prevent multiplicity of actions against the insolvent bank. The lawmaking body
contemplated that for convenience only one court, if possible, should pass upon the claims against the
insolvent bank and that the liquidation court should assist the Superintendent of Banks and control his
operations.
In the course of the liquidation, contentious cases might arise wherein a full-dress hearing would be
required and legal issues would have to be resolved. Hence, it would be necessary in justice to all
concerned that a Court of First Instance should assist and supervise the liquidation and should act as
umpire and arbitrator in the allowance and disallowance of claims.
The judicial liquidation is a pragmatic arrangement designed to establish due process and orderliness
in the liquidation of the bank, to obviate the proliferation of litigations and to avoid injustice and
arbitrariness. Accordingly, the Liquidation Court in SP No. 86-35313 had special jurisdiction to receive
and adjudicate all claims against Pacific Bank, including the claim for the unpaid rentals for, and value
of, computers allegedly leased by Solidbank to Pacific Bank. Its findings relative thereto cannot be
disturbed, much less overturned, by the Trial Court
12. Department of finance v. Dela cruz jr 768 scra 73
FACTS: On Sept 2 2013, EO 140 was issued. EO 140 states that the Customs Policy Research Office
(CPRO) "shall be responsible for reviewing the customs administration policies, rules and procedures,
and thereafter providing sound recommendations for the improvement of the same."
Section 3 of EO 140 provides that "CPRO shall be composed of its organic personnel, as approved by
the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) upon recommendation of the DOF Secretary,
augmented and reinforced by DOF and BOC personnel as well as those detailed or seconded from
other agencies, whether attached to the DOF or not. x x x."
Bureau of Customs (BOC) Commissioner Rozzano Rufino B. Biazon (Commissioner Biazon) issued
Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 (CPO 189- 2013) detailing 27 BOC personnel holding the
positions of Collector of Customs V and VI, including respondents in this case, to CPRO "effective
immediately and valid until sooner revoked.
Respondents filed an action for Declaratory Relief with Application for Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. A TRO was
issued in their favor for 72 hours. And this 72 hour TRO was extended for 20 days.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before this Court, with prayer for the issuance of
a TRO or a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
ISSUES and RULING:
 1. Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the action for declaratory relief
filed by respondents;
(YES)
A reading of the petition filed before the RTC shows that respondents were questioning their mass
detail and reassignment to CPRO. According to respondents, their detail was carried out in bad faith
and was meant to remove them from their permanent positions in the BOC. The action appears to be a
personnel action under the jurisdiction of the CSC.
However, the petition went beyond questioning the detail of respondents. Respondents further assailed
the validity and constitutionality of CPO 189-2013. Respondents alleged that CPO 189-2013 was
issued even before EO 140, pursuant to which CPO 189-2013 was issued, became effective.
Respondents alleged that CPO 189-2013 was issued to beat the deadline of the Commission on
Elections' ban on personnel movement from 28 September 2013 to 20 October 2013 due to the
scheduled barangay elections. When respondents raised the issue of validity and constitutionality of
CPO 189- 2013, the issue took the case beyond the scope of the CSC's jurisdiction because the matter
is no longer limited to personnel action. Thus, the RTC did not abuse its discretion in taking cognizance
of the action.
2. Whether respondents failed to exhaust administrative remedies in filing the action before the
RTC; (NO)
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies allows administrative agencies to carry out
their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective
competence. The doctrine entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of
controversies. Therefore, direct recourse to the trial court, when administrative remedies are available,
is a ground for dismissal of the action.
In this case, respondents allege that CPO 189-2013 is contrary to law and unconstitutional.
Respondents assail CPO 189-2013 as patently illegal, arbitrary, and oppressive. This case clearly falls
within the exceptions where exhaustion of administrative remedies need not be resorted to by
respondents.
3. Whether EO 140 violated Article 2 of the Civil Code when it became effective immediately
after its publication; and (NO)
Respondents allege that EO 140 took effect only on 2 October 2013, fifteen days after its publication in
two newspapers of general circulation. Hence, respondents argue that when CPO 189-2013 was
issued, EO 140 was not yet effective.
Here, Section 9 of EO 140 provides that the "order shall take effect immediately upon publication in two
(2) newspapers of general circulation." EO 140 was published in Manila Bulletin and Philippine Star on
17 September 2013. As such, EO 140 took effect on 17 September 2013.
In addition, the Court already ruled that "[interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature,
that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be
published." EO 140 is an internal regulation that affects primarily the personnel of the DOF and the
BOC. It remains valid even without publication.
4. Whether CPO 189-2013 was validly issued. (NO)
Respondents assail the validity of CPO 189-2013. Respondents allege that under EO 140, CPRO shall
be composed of its organic personnel, as approved by the DBM upon recommendation of the DOF
Secretary. The organic personnel was supposed to be augmented and reinforced by DOF and BOC
personnel. Respondents allege that they were detailed to CPRO even before its organic personnel
could be constituted.
Respondents were supposed to augment and reinforce the existing organic personnel of CPRO. Yet, at
the time of respondents' detail, CPRO had not been formally organized. CPRO had no organic
personnel that had been approved by the DBM upon recommendation of the DOF Secretary. The DOF
Secretary had yet to promulgate rules and regulations and to prescribe procedures and processes to
enable CPRO to effectively exercise its powers and duties, as required by Section 4 of EO 140.
Under Section 8, Rule VII of the Omnibus Rules, a detail is temporary in nature. In fact, detail of
employees is only allowed for a maximum, period for those occupying professional, technical, and
scientific positions.
In this case, CPO 189-2013 did not provide for the period of respondents' detail. It only provided that
the order "shall be effective immediately and valid until sooner revoked," making the detail of
respondents indefinite. In this case, CPO 189-2013 did not provide for the period of respondents' detail.
It only provided that the order "shall be effective immediately and valid until sooner revoked," making
the detail of respondents indefinite respondents were occupying professional, technical, and scientific
positions that would have allowed their detail for the maximum period provided under Section 8, Rule
VII of the Omnibus Rules. Further, CSC Resolution No. 021181 did not distinguish between an ordinary
employee and an employee occupying professional, technical, and scientific position. Hence, it should
have been specified that the maximum period of respondents' detail should not exceed one year.
RULING: We sustain the validity of Executive Order No. 140. We rule that the Regional Trial Court has
jurisdiction over the action for declaratory relief filed by respondents. We further rule that Customs
Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 was not validly issued.
13. Butiong v. Plazo 765 SCRA 227 and Spouses Maria Butiong v Ma. Gracia Plazo
Facts: In 1989, Pedro Rinoza died intestate, leaving several heirs, including children from his first wife,
herein respondents, and his second wife and their children. Rinoza also left several properties,
including a resort, which is the property under dispute.
In March 1991, Benita, the second wife, sold the resort to petitioners, spouses Villafria and Butiong,
deceased, and represented by their son Dr. Villafria. Subsequently, on July 1991, a notice of
extrajudicial settlement of their late father was published, to the surprise of respondents. This caused
respondents to annotate of their adverse claims over the subject properties before the Registry of
Deeds, and thereafter in 1993, filed an Amended Complaint for Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title
and Recovery of Possession, praying, among others, that the annulment of all documents conveying
the properties to petitioners and certificates of title issued pursuant thereto. They likewise alleged that
their signatures on the settlement document were forgeries.
Petitioners denied the allegations of the complaint. They presented an Extrajudicial Settlement with
Renunciation, Repudiation, and Waiver of Rights and Sale, including the Deed of Sale whereby by
Benita sold the resort to petitioners.
In 2002, the trial court nullified the transfer of property due to irregularities in the documents of
conveyance, particularly:
(1) Extrajudicial Settlement was notarized by a notary public not commissioned on the date it was
executed;
(2) Deed of Sale was undated, date of acknowledgment was left blank, and the document was not
signed by the deceased;
(3) the documents were never presented to the Register of Deeds for registration and titles of the
properties were still in the names of Pedro and Benita; and
(4) the supposed buyers were never presented as witnesses to the signing and execution of the sale.
The trial court therefore declared void the Extra-Judicial Settlement and Deed of Sale, ordered the
delivery of the land and forfeiture of any and all improvements introduced by petitioners, and declaring
plaintiffs and defendants to be legitimate heirs of the decedent.
The CA affirmed the trial court’s judgment.
In 2006, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration raising lack of jurisdiction, stating that when the
complaint of judicial partition was filed, there was yet to be a settlement of Pedro’s estate,
determination as to the nature thereof, and identification of the number of legitimate heirs. They further
contend that the trial court, sitting as a probate court, exceeded its jurisdiction when it ruled upon the
issues of forgery and ownership. This MR was denied on 2007.
On appeal, the SC denied the Petition for Review on Certiorari for submitting a verification of the
petition, certificate of non-forum shopping, and an affidavit of service that failed to comply with the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice.
The subsequent MR was also denied.
This judgment became final and executory as certified by the Entry of Judgment on October 2007.
The SC also denied petitioner’s subsequent motion for leave of court to file a second motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner’s letter dated 2008 to Chief Justice Puno praying the decision be rendered on merits and not
on the formal requirements was likewise noted without action.
On 2008, the RTC issued an order issuing a Part Writ of Execution with respect to the portions
disposing petitioner’s claims pursuant to its 2001 decision.
Petitioner filed a Petition for annulment of judgment assailing both the 2001 decision and the 2008
order, on the grounds of external fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the rulings of the trial court. MR was likewise denied.
Issue: Whether the RTC was indeed without jurisdiction to entertain the special proceeding for the
settlement of estate of Rinoza and the civil action for annulment of title of the heirs and third persons in
one proceeding.
Ruling: NO. The petition is bereft of merit.
Petitioner maintains that respondents’ complaint is actually one for settlement of estate and not of
judicial partition. Petitioner is mistaken. A complete reading of the complaint would readily show that
based on:
1. the nature of the suit,
2. the allegations therein, and
3. the reliefs prayed for,
,the action is clearly one of judicial partition with annulment of title and recovery of possession,
pursuant to Rule 74 Section 1[1], in relation to Rule 69 Section 1[2], of the Rules of Court.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that Pedro died intestate. Contrary to petitioner’s contention,
respondents were under no legal obligation to submit the subject properties of the estate of a special
proceeding for settlement of estate, and are in fact, encouraged to have the same partitioned, whether
judicially or extrajudicially.
Moreover, the fact that respondent’s complaint also prayed for the annulment of title does not
strip the trial court of its jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Asking for annulment of certain
transfers could very well be achieved in an action for partition, since the action is premised on the
existence or non-existence of co- ownership. Unless and until the issue of co-ownership is definitely
resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the estate.
Thus, petitioner’s argument that the trial court acted without jurisdiction in entertaining both the action
of settlement of estate and annulment of title is clearly erroneous. Since the action was not merely
for partition and recovery of ownership but also for annulment of title and documents, the action
is incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus cognizable by the RTC.
Note that even if the action was one for annulment of title alone, without prayer for partition, it has been
held in Portugal v Portugal-Beltran that there being no compelling reason to still subject Portugal’s
estate to administration proceedings since the determination of status as heirs could be achieved in the
already filed, the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence and render a decision upon the
issues presented.
In fine, the SC agree that due to the irregularities in the documents presented, petitioners failed to
adequately substantiate the claim that they had in fact purchased the subject properties. A judgment
therefore which has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, save exceptions which are
allowed only under the most extraordinary circumstances.