Marvi Blaise M.

Coching LLB 1-A

Elvira Agullo vs Sandiganbayan

Facts: Agullo was charged of malversation of public funds on September 30, 1988. She worked
as the Disbursing Officer of the then Ministry of Public Works and Highways (MPWH) in the
Regional Office in Palo, Leyte. The charge against her germinated from an audit conducted,
which resulted in discovering a P26,404.26 cash shortage on petitioner's accountability, on July
14, 1986.
According to Agullo, the money may be lost through a fortuitous event. On October 21,
1985, petitioner encash the checks she received for the payroll of the permanent employees.
After she encashed the money, she felt dizzy and requested the driver to bring her home. The
following day, she still reported to work despite her condition. Upon leaving the house, she put
the money in her bag. As she was walking, she collapsed and the next thing she knew, woke up
in the hospital.
In the course of the pre-trial, petitioner Agullo conceded the fact of audit and admitted
the findings in the Report of Cash Examination and the facts set forth in the Letter of Demand. In
effect, she admitted the fact of shortage in the amount stated in the Information.
Notwithstanding, petitioner Agullo, at all stages of the criminal indictment, persistently
professed her innocence of the charge and categorically denied having malversed or converted
the public funds in question for her own personal use or benefit. Striking down the defense as
"incredible and without basis," the Sandiganbayan rendered its assailed decision, convicting
petitioner Agullo of the crime of malversation of public funds, ratiocinating principally that "no
evidence has been presented linking the loss of the government funds with the alleged sudden
heart attack of the accused (herein petitioner)."
Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan disregarded or overlooked certain evidence of
substance which violates the petitioner’s constitutional right to be presumed innocent until
proven otherwise.
Ruling: The Sandiganbayan did overlook certain evidence. Upon thorough scrutiny of the
evidence adduced by both prosecution and defense, we hold that petitioner Agullo has
satisfactorily overcome and rebutted by competent proof, the prima facie evidence of conversion
so as to exonerate her from the charge of malversation. To this end, petitioner presented evidence
that satisfactorily prove that not a single centavo of the missing funds was used for her own
personal benefit or gain.
Notably, the Sandiganbayan, in convicting petitioner, obviously relied more on the flaws and
deficiencies in the evidence presented by the defense, not on the strength and merit of the
prosecution's evidence. This course of action is impermissible for the evidence of the prosecution
clearly cannot sustain a conviction "in an unprejudiced mind."
Elvira Agullo is acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt.
People of the Philippines vs. Sergio Bato and Abraham Bato
Facts: Sergio and Abraham Bato were charged with murder by killing Ernesto Flores Sr. Based
on the only witness, Ernesto Jr., he saw the appellants tied his father’s hands behind his back
after they drank tuba for two hours. Afraid that he would be next, Ernesto Jr. fled and went
home. The next day, they found the body of Ernesto Sr. He was found 5km away from the house
of Lescabo, where they were drinking the night before. The trial court and appellate court found
the Bato brothers guilty based on the positive identification of Ernesto Jr.
Appellants raised the defense of denial; they maintained that their identification as the
alleged perpetrators of Ernesto’s murder is merely an afterthought, necessitated by a death of
strong evidence on the part of the prosecution.
Issue: Whether or not there is quantum of proof required to overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence.
Ruling: Quantum of proof is required. The conviction of appellant is based on circumstantial
evidence based on the son’s testimony. True, in the absence of direct proof, a conviction may be
based on circumstantial evidence and such circumstances must produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. The circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution fails to evoke moral
certainty that dependants are guilty.
The totality of the prosecution evidence does not constitute an unbroken chain leading
beyond reasonable doubt to the guilt of the accused. The constitution mandates that an accused
shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Where the state
fails to meet the quantum of proof required to overcome the constitutional presumption, the
accused is entitled to an acquittal, regardless of the weakness or even the absence of his defense.
By constitutional fiat, the burden of proof is accordingly vested in the prosecution.
Appellant is acquitted on reasonable doubt.
People of the Philippines vs. Ronaldo De Guzman
Facts: De Guzman was arrested from a buy-bust operation conducted by the team of SPO1
Daniel Llanillo. Llanillo tried to buy P200 worth of shabu from De Guzman. After the
transaction, the rest of the team went in and arrested and frisked the appellant. The team
recovered from De Guzman 2 packs of empty sachets, 3 disposable lighters, and P3,380.00 cash,
including the marked money paid by SPO1 Llanillo. The team then brought De Guzman to the
police station in Alcala, Pangasinan.
Once there, the items seized was turned over to the police investigator, SPO3 Eduardo
Yadao. Yadao then entered the incident in the police blotter and placed his initials on the
evidence. After the trial, RTC rendered a decision, finding De Guzman guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
De Guzman now comes to this Court on a Petition for Review. He argues that the
prosecution failed to show that the police officers complied with the mandatory procedures under
R.A. No. 9165. He was referring to the items seized was not marked during the arrest; the police
officer failed to make an inventory and did not took any photographs. Appellant claims that the
unbroken chain of custody of the evidence was not established.
Issue: Whether the degree of proof has been met?
Ruling: There is a problem in the prosecution's effort to establish the integrity of the corpus
delicti. Even though the prosecution established the first and third element of the crime, the
identity of the prohibited drug must be established with moral certainty.
In this case, it was admitted that it was SPO3 Yadao, the assigned investigator, who marked the
seized items, and only upon seeing the items for the first time at the police station. Moreover,
there was no physical inventory made or photographs of the seized items taken under the
circumstances required by R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR. There was also no mention that
representatives from the media and from the DOJ, and any elected official, were present during
this inventory. The prosecution never explained the reasons for these lapses.
Accordingly, the failure to establish, through convincing proof, that the integrity of the seized
items has been adequately preserved through an unbroken chain of custody is enough to
engender reasonable doubt on the guilt of an accused. Reasonable doubt is that doubt engendered
by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability after such investigation to let the mind
rest upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict
a person charged with a crime, but moral certainty is required as to every proposition of proof
requisite to constitute the offense.
Appellant was acquitted from the crime charged.
People of the Philippines vs. Eloy Magsi et. al., defendants, Teodoro Del Rosario
Facts: This is a mandatory review of a death sentence. That on January 14, 1968, defendants
killed one Jesus Gallardo with aggravating circumstance of: (1) abuse of superior strength; (2)
use of a motor vehicle; (3) the offense was committed in the dwelling place of the offended
party; and (4) that the offense was committed by a band. Records show that soon after
defendant-appellant was apprehended on August 20, 1970, his arraignment was scheduled before
the Criminal Circuit Court of San Fernando, La Union, presided over by Judge Lino Añover.
The case was actually set and rescheduled for six (6) times, first of which was on August
1, 1970. On that date, despite appointment by the court of Atty. Mario Rivera as de officio
counsel for the accused, hearing was re-set to September 8, 1970 on motion of Atty. Rivera, who
was prompted to ask for it because of accused's desire to be represented by a de parte counsel.
Prior to the next hearing, Atty. Rivera moved to withdraw as de officio counsel and it was
favourably acted on by the court on September 7, 1970. At the second hearing on September 8,
1970, for failure of the de officio and de parte counsels to appear, despite a second call of the
case, the hearing was re-set for the next day and the court appointed Atty. Dominador Cariaso de
officio counsel for the accused. On the third hearing date, neither the de parte nor the de officio
counsel was in Court, so Atty. Rivera was reappointed that day as de officio counsel for
arraignment purposes only. The accused del Rosario entered a plea of guilty but qualified it with
the allegation that he committed the crime out of fear of his co-accused Eloy Magsi and the other
co-accused. On the fourth hearing date, the presentation of mitigating circumstances was not
held as scheduled, but de officio counsel Atty. Cariaso's explanation regarding his close ties with
the deceased and his family was heard, and his motion to be relieved as counsel by reason
thereof, and be replaced by one who can attend to the defense of the accused with candor, was
denied by the court. At the fifth hearing, Atty. Cariaso, who appeared in court only after a
warrant for his arrest was issued, informed the Court that those interested in the conviction of the
accused opposed his appearance as de officio counsel, and at the same time, also turned over
another note, the contents of which asked for another resetting. The Court denied the motion of
Atty. Cariaso to withdraw as counsel, but re-set the case for October 19, 1970. At the outset of
the sixth hearing held on October 19, 1970, Atty. Cariaso outrightly informed the Court that the
accused was ready to enter an unqualified plea of guilty.
Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of the rights of the accused.
Ruling: The Court ruled that in cases where defendants are charged with capital offenses. Mere
pro-forma appointment of de officio counsel, who fails to genuinely protect the interests of the
accused, resetting of hearing by the court for alleged reception of evidence when in fact none
was conducted, perfunctory queries addressed to the accused whether he understands the charges
and the gravity of the penalty, are not sufficient compliance.
Wherefore, the judgment convicting accused Teodoro del Rosario is hereby set aside and
the case is hereby remanded to the court a Quo for re-arraignment and further proceedings.
People of the Philippines vs. Rolando Rivera
Facts: Rolando Rivera was found guilty of raping his 13 year old daughter once sometime in
March 1997. Base on the statement given by Erlaine, the victim, that after they arrived from the
hospital wherein her younger sister Zaira was confined, the accused raped her. He even
threatened her that if she told to anyone what happened between the he would kill her mother
and sister.
The accused denied that he raped Erlaine and added that the reason why they are filing
this case is because the family of the mother of the victim hated him for grabbing his father-in-
law’s land from them. Accused-appellant invokes his right to due process of law. He claims that
he was denied the same because: (a) the trial judge disallowed his lawyer from cross-examining
Erlanie Rivera concerning the latter's sworn statements on the ground of irrelevance and
immateriality; (b) the trial court denied the motion made by accused-appellant's counsel de oficio
to postpone the cross-examination of Dr. Barin, the examining physician, because of which the
said counsel consequently waived the cross-examination of Dr. Barin; (c) the judge propounded
numerous questions to accused-appellant during his cross-examination by the prosecutor; and (d)
the trial court's decision was promulgated just one day after accused-appellant submitted his
memorandum.
Issue: Whether or not the accused was denied of due process.
Ruling: The Court finds no merit in accused-appellant's argument that he was denied due process
considering the speed with which the trial court rendered judgment against him, which judgment
was promulgated one day after he filed his memorandum. The decision rendered by the trial
court gives a clear account of the facts and the law on which it is based. It discusses in full the
court's findings on the credibility of both the prosecution and defense witnesses and its
evaluation of the evidence of both parties according to the case of People vs. Mercado. The
Court also found that the evidence proves beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of accused-
appellant. Well-settled is the rule that the lone testimony of a rape victim, by itself, is sufficient
to warrant a judgment of conviction if found to be credible. It has likewise been established that
when a woman declares that she has been raped she says in effect all that is necessary to mean
that she has been raped, and where her testimony passes the test of credibility the accused can be
convicted on the basis thereof. This is because from the nature of the offense, the sole evidence
that can usually be offered to establish the guilt of the accused is the complainant's testimony.
The decision of the RTC was affirmed.
People of the Philippines vs. Oscar Alcanzado
Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the decision dated April 5, 1999 issued by the Regional Trial Court (Branch 66) of Makati City
in Criminal Case No. 98-1634 finding appellant guilty of murder. Appellant pleaded not guilty
during his arraignment on July 30, 1998. Trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution rested its
case on October 13, 1998. Upon motion of appellant, the RTC issued an Order dated November
10, 1998 allowing appellant to file a demurrer to evidence. On November 19, 1998, appellant
filed his Demurrer to Evidence which was opposed by the prosecution. On April 22, 1999, the
RTC promulgated herein assailed decision convicting appellant.
Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional right of the accused to be heard.
Ruling: The RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the demurrer to
evidence but it committed grave abuse of discretion in outrightly convicting appellant of the
crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer reclusion perpetua when appellant has not been
given the opportunity to adduce evidence in his defense, pursuant to Section 15, Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court. Further, the attendant justifying, mitigating or aggravating circumstance such as
self-defense, treachery and voluntary surrender could only be ascertained fully after the defense
evidence, rebuttal and sur-rebuttal, if any, shall have been adduced and evaluated by the RTC in
the rendition of its judgment on the case.
Wherefore, the petition is granted. The decision dated April 5, 1999 of the Regional Trial
Court (Branch 66), Makati City is set aside for being null and void. Let the records of Criminal
Case No. 98-1634 be remanded to said trial court for reception of defense evidence and further
proceedings. The presiding judge is directed to conduct the trial of the case and render judgment
thereon with immediate dispatch.