Brecher B. Descartes Causal Argument For The Existence of God

Descartes' Causal Argument for the Existence of God
Author(s): Bob Brecher

Source: International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 7, No. 3 (1976), pp. 418-432
Published by: Springer
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DESCARTES' CAUSAL ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE
OF GOD
Not only is Descartes' first causal argument for the existence

God rather different from the more usually discussed argumen
but it is also a somewhat neglected topic in writings on Descart
It may be put as follows: 1
1. "It is manifest by the natural light that there must b
least as much reality in the efficient and total cause as in its effec
(p. 163).
2. Thus, by Principle (B) below, "in order that an idea sho
contain some one certain objective reality rather than anothe
must without doubt derive it from some cause in which there is
at least as much formal reality as this idea contains of objective
reality" (ibid.).
3. And, "if the objective reality of any of my ideas is of such a
nature as clearly to make me recognise that it is not in me either
formally or eminently, and consequently that I cannot myself be
the cause of it, it follows of necessity that I am not alone in the
world, but that there is another being which exists, or which is
the cause of this idea" (ibid.) .
4. Since one of my ideas is that of supreme reality or perfection,
i.e., of supreme substance, or God, it is supremely objectively real
(p. 166); but
5. only God could be sufficiently formally real to be the cause
of such an idea, and therefore, since there is this idea, and since
it must have an efficient and total cause, God exists (p. 165).
Three principles lie behind this argument:
A) There are degrees of reality, or perfection.

B) A cause must be at least as real as its effect.
C) Ideas have an objective reality, corresponding to the formal
reality of those things of which they are the idea.
1 The Philosophical Works of Descartes, trans. Haldane and Ross (Cam-

bridge: University Press, 1970) vol. 1, Meditation III, pp. 159-167. (All
references in the text are to this work.) Viz. also vol. II, p. 57.
DESCARTES' CAUSAL ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 419
The assumption is made that
D) We have a coherent idea of God.
I shall divide the paper into two more or less independent sections,
I dealing with (A) - (C), and II with (D) .
A There are degrees of reality, or perfection.

It seems that Descartes does not distinguish reality from perfection,
and, to avoid unnecessary confusion, I shall for the most part stick
to "reality." 2 At the beginning of his treatment of ideas considered
as images, Descartes writes that "There is no doubt that those [ideas]
which represent to me substances are something more, and contain so
to speak more objective reality within them (that is to say, by re-
presentation participate in a higher degree of being or perfection)
than those that simply represent modes or accidents ..." (p. 162).
The degrees of being in which ideas participate are known "from
contemplation alone of our ideas, of whose existence we are certain,
since they are modes of thought: for we know how much reality or
perfection the idea of the substance affirms of the substance, and
how much the idea of the mode affirms of the mode." 3 That there
are degrees of reality is, it appears, a "very clearly and distinctly"
perceived truth, since nowhere does Descartes seek to justify it
in any detail. Like the Scholastics before him, and Spinoza, among
others, after him, he takes it as axiomatic that some things are more
real than others. 4 His notion of degrees of reality is thus dependent
upon his doctrine of clear and distinct perceptions, if we are to take
seriously his method of systematic doubt. I shall not, however, dis-
cuss that doctrine, noting simply that to question the notion of
reality is, within a Cartesian framework, impossible, for it is one of
its fundamental assumptions. Descartes was, after all, working with
a "conception of the plan and structure of the world which, through
2 'Perfection and reality are identified; and not only is existence assumed to
be itself a perfection, the existent is treated as varying in degrees of reality in
proportion to its degree of perfection/: N. K. Smith, New Studies in the
Philosophy of Descartes (London: Macmillan, 1953), p. 298.
3 Spinoza, Principles of Cartesian Philosophy, trans. H. E. Wedeck (London:
Peter Owen Ltd, 1961), p. 26.
4 Haldane and Ross, op. cit., vol. 11, p. 5b, axiom VI.
420 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
the Middle Ages and down to the late eighteenth century, many
philosophers, most men of science, and, indeed, most educated men
... [accepted] without question - the conception of the universe as a
'Great Chain of Being/ composed of an immense ... or infinite
number of links ranging in hierarchical order from the meagerest
kind of existents, which barely escaped non-existence, through 'every
possible' grade up to the ens perfectissimum ... ." 5 If one thing was
higher up the scale of being than another, then it was more real
than the other. To object that something can be only real, unreal,
or perhaps half-real, and that what is meant by "real" depends on
the particular context in which the word is used, would by-pass
Descartes altogether.
He says, for example, that "substance has more reality than mode" 6
and that what is infinite is more real than what is finite (p. 166).
Reality is an attribute, and moreover, one of which it is possible to
have varying quantities. It is, like height and weight, measurable;
and "real" is what I should call invariable, unlike adjectives such
as "rich," "usefull," or "adequate." If we are told that y is rich, we
know nothing more about y than we did before, unless we already
know what y is - coffee; a Texan oil milionaire; a joke? "Rich"
denotes different qualities when attached to each of these, and we
should be much inclined to say that "real" (or "perfect") also denotes
different things (not necessarily qualities) when attached to different
nouns: a real pink elephant, not an imaginary one; a real footballer,
a good, or skillful one; a real man, one with what are thought to be
characteristically manly attributes; a real fright, one which produces
a considerable amount of fear. 7 None of these share some one quality,
identifiable as reality. For Descartes, however, the position is quite
the reverse. If a is said to be more real than b, then there is some
attribute which both a and b have, and of which a has more than b.
Even without knowing what a or b were, we would, on this account,
be in a position to know something definite about a and b, and
something about how they differed. Both would appear on the on-
tological scale, with a above b. Both would have some degree of
perfection; both would to some extent share in being. While this
may remain both unattractive and unsatisfactory to the modern
5 A.O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (New York: Harper and Row,
1960), p. 59.
6 Haldane and Ross, op. cit., vol. 11, p. 5b, axiom VI.
7 Cl. J.L. Austin, Sense and SensWUia (Uxlord: University Jfress, IWZ).
ch. VII, pp. 62-77.
mind, I do not think I could profitably say more about it, without
going into the entire Scholastic view of the world. And even then,
I rather suspect that it is a question where full understanding is un-
likely without considerable intellectual sympathy.
B A cause must be at least as real as its effect

This again is a Cartesian axiom,8 which he explains thus: if x is
caused by y, then whatever reality x has, must have been derived
from y, which must therefore possess at least that degree of reality.
The principle relies, of course, on the supposition that reality is quan-
tifiable, and on another of Descartes' axioms, namely that "A thing,
and likewise an actually existing perfection belonging to anything,
can never have nothing, or a non-existent thing, as the cause of its _
existence."9 To put this crudely: a thing, p, having 12 units of
reality, cannot have been caused by a thing, q, having, say, only 10
units of reality, since 2 units of p's reality would be without a cause.
Reality, it seems, perhaps rather like energy, or at least potential
energy, is something that can be produced only by a similar or greater
amount of the same. Reality, or perfection, or being, cannot be
brought about by anything other than reality, or perfection, or being;
nor by a smaller amount of the same. There is, moreover, a further
complication. The reality of a thing "exists formally or else eminently
in its first and adequate cause." 10 By the "first and adequate" cause
of a thing, Descartes means very much what Aristotle means by
the "formal" cause, i.e., the essential cause of a thing. This will need
to be borne in mind when discussing Principle (C) . The distinction
between the formal and the eminent cause of a thing must not be
confused with Descartes' distinction between the formal and the
objective existence of objects, which will also come into the dis-
cussion of Principle (C) . To save later confusion, I shall deal with
the former distinction here.
In his comments on Descartes' axioms, Spinoza explains the
distinction thus: "By eminently I understand that the cause contains
all the reality of the effect more perfectly than the effect itself; by
formally, that it contains it with equal perfection." " Reality, there-
8 Haldane and Ross, ibid., axiom IV.

9 Ibid., axiom III.
10 Ibid., axiom IV.
11 Spinoza, op. cit., p. 27, axiom VIII.
fore, may be possessed more or less perfectly (or really; although

Descartes himself does not usually seem to distinguish reality from
perfection, it is interesting to note that Spinoza, at this point, does
at least use the two different words) . It seems, then, that if a is
higher up the ontological scale than b, it is not only more real than
b, but any perfections it happens to share with b, it will possess in
a more real, or more perfect, way: "... any absolute perfection is
formally in God. On the other hand, if the effect be contained in
the cause ... in a higher grade or mode of perfection ... it is said
to be in its cause eminently. In this sense the Divine intellect con-
tains the human, since God knows, but without the imperfections
incident to the exercise of our faculties of cognition." 12 This will
be of importance when examining the notion of God as the cause
of our idea of him. Moreover, it does suggest that there may, after
all, be some distinction in Descartes between perfection and reality.
Let us imagine that A, B, and C are entities, with C higher than B,
and B higher than A, along the ontological scale. B will have certain
perfections (not "realities") which A has not, let us say, the faculty
of reason, and moral sensitivity. B is therefore more perfect, or more
real, than A. Or Descartes might say that B has more perfection,
or more reality, than A. C, which also has the faculty of reason and
moral sensitivity, has these to a greater degree than B. (Its power
of reasoning is more profound, its moral sensitivity both more
acute, and quite unfailing.) C possesses these perfections (not,
"realities") more perfectly, or more really (truly?) than B. C may,
of course, have perfections which B does not have at all. Thus, the
degree of reality, or the degree of perfection, of a thing depends on
the perfections it has, and on the degree to which it has them. Which
attributes are to be accounted perfections is a matter for Scholastic
debate - hence the inconclusiveness of our discussion of degrees of
reality. That existence is one such attribute was of course beyond
question for Descartes, as well as for the Scholastics.
Returning to Descartes' causal principle, we find his own two
examples in the Meditations puzzling, especially the first one. Neither
seem adequately to explain why a given degree of reality cannot be
produced by a lesser degree. He writes: "... the stone which has not
yet existed ... cannot now commence to be unless it has been pro-
12 Descartes, A Discourse on Method, etc., trans. John Veitch (London:

Everyman, 1912), notes, p. 252.
duced by something which possesses within itself, either formally

or eminently, all that enters into the composition of the stone (i.e.,
it must possess the same things or other more excellent things than
those which exist in the stone) . ,."13 (p. 162). It seems straight-
forwardly false to say that whatever produces a stone (say, for
simplicity's sake, small particles of matter, plus heat) should have
in them everything the resulting stone has in it, for the particles are
transformed by the heat. They need not, for example, contain the
same molecules, or be of the same colour, or the same weight or
density, as the stone into which they are made. It is quite unclear
what Descartes means by "things" here. Nor does it help to say
that the particles contain potentially whatever the stone contains,
since he specifies that the cause must contain "formally or eminently"
whatever reality the effect has. The point is, I think, that matter and
heat would in this case be counted as the material cause, or perhaps
material and efficient causes respectively, of the stone, which is
why we could say, I suppose, that they potetially contain it. But Des-
cartes' principle applies to the "primary and adequate," i.e., the formal,
cause of the stone. The trouble is, what would the formal cause of
a stone (or of its coming into existence) be? The second example
may be clearer: "... heat can only be produced in a subject in which
it did not exist by a cause that is of an order (degree or kind) at
least as perfect as heat ..." (p. 162). If I am cold, I cannot make
myself warm merely by sitting longer in the same cold room and
wishing or imagining I were warm; I have to use energy from some
source or other to produce heat. But there is no clear reason, as
far as I can see, why the heat produced by whatever energy-source
is used should necessarily be no more real than the energy-source
concerned, even granting the vocabulary of Descartes' metaphysics
to this example. (If the energy-source of a certain amount of heat
is not its formal cause, then, insofar as I do not understand what
would be its formal cause, this example remains as unclear as the
last.) At least, there is no clear reason unless one at least of Des-
cartes' criteria for saying, for instance, that such-and-such an energy-
source is at least as real as the heat it produces is the possibility of just
such a causal connection. One at least of the criteria - and it may
well be the decisive one - of A's being more real than B is that B is
13 One might question the propriety of Descartes' using as an example a

physical object at this stage of the Meditations, since he is still supposed to be
in doubt regarding the existence of any such.
a member of a class of entities, none of whose members can be the

formal cause of any of the members of the class of entities of which
A is member, but only vice-versa. In the absence of any clear expo-
sition of this principle of causality in Descartes' writings, this con-
clusion is rather tempting. Certainly, it would be a neat way of
filling the lacuna at the end of our discussion of principle (A).
If causal power is the chief criterion of degree of reality, then perhaps
those attributes (a) are deemed by Descartes more perfect than some
other attributes (b), if the former are possessed by entities of type
A, which may, at least in principle, be the formal cause of entities
type B, which have the latter attributes (b) . An entity, P, would
be more real than another entity, Q, if P were a member of the
class of entities which can be the formal cause of members of the
class of entities of which Q is a member, but not vice-versa.
If this is a correct interpretation, then Principles (A) and (B)
gain their sense within the metaphysical system from each other,
and can be understood only in terms of each other. But that is just
what is to be expected of principles in a metaphysical system.
C Ideas have an objective reality, corresponding to the formal

reality of those things of which they are the idea.
Before discussing this principle, let me take up my earlier remarks
about "formal," in order to avoid confusion. In the principle as I
have stated it, "formal" is used in the sense discussed under (B),
where it is contrasted with "eminent." In the following discussion
of the principle, however, it will be used in another of the senses
in which Descartes uses it, to contrast with "objective." 14 By "for-
mally," we should understand "actually," or, as we should be more
inclined to say, although confusingly in the circumstances of this
paper, "in the real world." The sense of "objectively" will, I hope,
come out of the discussion. (To save further confusion, I shall in
this part of the paper talk simply of the reality of entities or objects,
and not distinguish between their possessing it formally or eminently.)
Descartes uses the term "idea" in two quite different ways:
"If ideas are only taken as certain modes of thought, I recognise
amongst them no difference or inequality, and all appear to proceed
from me in the same manner; but when we consider them as images,
one representing one thing, and the other another, it is clear that
14 Viz. Veitch, op. cit.
descartes' causal argument for the existence of god 425
they are very different one from the other" (p. 162). The principle
under discussion concerns primarily the latter sense. 15
An idea, Descartes writes, "... does require a cause to make it
be conceived ... Nor will it suffice to say that the mind itself is
its cause, being the cause of its own acts; for this is not disputed, the
question being the cause of the objective artifice which is in the idea.
For these must be some definite cause of the fact that this idea of a
machine displays this objective artifice rather than another." 16 By the
"cause" of an idea, Descartes seems to have in mind the notion of a
model on which the idea is based, that without which this particular
idea would not have the particular content it has. It is the content of
ideas that must needs have a model other than the mind itself, since,
although ideas "considered in themselves" are products of the mind, the
mind cannot be the model of ideas "considered as images," since it has
no inbuilt content on which they could be modelled: and ideas
without content are of course impossible. It is hard to see how we
could have ideas without there being something which, at least
initially, produces their particular content - what could they be ideas
of? As Descartes puts it, "... in the end we must reach an idea
whose cause shall be so to speak an archetype, in which the whole
reality [or perfection] which is so to speak objectively [or by re-
presentation] in these ideas is contained formally [and really]" (p.
163). Every idea, then, has an "... exemplary cause, standing in re-
lation to the idea as the archetype to the ectype, the principal to the
vicarious." 17 Thus, if I think of something, say X, with attributes P,
Q, and R, then there will be something, x, which is p, q, and r, which
serves as a model for that idea. And if P is such-and-such a perfection,
then it will be modelled upon the actual perfection, p. This will,
of course, be true of whatever idea I have, even if it turns out to
be of something fictional, or imaginary - the content of any idea
must have a model. 18 And the reality of X (dependent upon P, Q,
and R) will have as its model the reality of x (dependent upon p,
q, and r) . This - the reality of X - Descartes calls the objective re-
ality of an idea, and it contrasts with the formal, or actual, reality
is por good discussions of the two senses, and the propriety or otherwise of
using "idea" as Descartes does, viz, L. J. Beck, The Metaphysics of Descartes
(Oxford, 1965), p. 151 ff., and A Kenny, "Descartes on Ideas/' in ed. W. Doney,
Descartes (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1968) .
16 Haldane and Ross, op.cit., vol.11, p. 11.
17 Veitch, op..cit., V.2A1.
18 Fictional ideas turn out to be ones put together by the mind from various
models; viz. Reply to Objections 1, Haldane and Ross, op.cit., p. 20.
of that of which the idea is an idea. By "objective reality/'

"... I mean that in respect of which the thing represented in the idea
is an entity insofar as that exists in the idea; and in the same way
we can talk of objective perfection, objective device, etc. For what-
ever we perceive as being as it were in the objects of our ideas
exists in the ideas themselves objectively." 19
At this point, however, Descartes is not in a position to assume
that the model for, or cause of, the reality to be found in a particular
idea, is the reality of an actual object: he perceives it "as being as
it were in the objects of our ideas," but he cannot assume that these
objects are things in the physical world. He may know that our
ideas must have causes, and that their content, including their re-
ality, must be modelled upon something, but he is in no position
to know what sort of thing that is. The reality of an idea may be said
to correspond to the reality of its cause, and it may be termed
"objective" by way of contrast. What cannot be said is that objective
reality corresponds to actual ("formal") reality, if "actual" refers to
what we should ordinarily call real things, since the existence of
these must, for Descartes, wait upon proof of God's existence and
non-deceptiveness. Granted that "the idea of heat, or of a stone,
cannot exist in me unless it has been placed within me by some
cause which possesses within it at least as much reality as that
which I conceive to exist in the heat or the stone,..." (p. 162).
"For if we imagine that something is found in an idea which is
not found in the cause, it must then have been derived from
nought" (p. 163) (Principle (B)), it is yet not the case that I
must not "imagine that, since the reality that I consider in these
ideas is only objective, it is not essential that this reality should
be formally in the causes of my ideas" (p. 163). This is to assume
that the causes of ideas are of a particular nature (i.e., actual),
and Descartes' justification of the above relies on just that assump-
tion: "For just as this mode of objective existence pertains to
ideas by their proper nature, so does the mode of formal existence
pertain to the causes of those ideas (this is at least true of the
first and principal), by the nature peculiar to them" (p. 163).
This is true only on the assumption that the causes of ideas have
such-and-such a nature, i.e., that they are actual. To some extent,
such a criticism is valid; Descartes, on his own argument, cannot
19 Haldane and Ross, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 52, 53, Definition III.
at this stage of his discussion, have shown that objects or entities

in the real world are the cause of our ideas. However, if he is
right in what he says about the need for the content of our ideas
to have a model, he has at least shown that ideas and their causes
must be different sorts of things: "... although it may be the case
that one idea gives birth to another, that cannot continue to be
so indefinitely; for in the end we must reach an idea whose cause
shall be so to speak an archetype ..." (p. 163). Let us then accept
that the objective reality of an idea must correspond to the formal
reality of its cause, but without assuming that those things possess-
ing formal reality need be more real, higher up the ontological
scale, than those things, i.e., ideas, possessing objective reality.
Although necessarily different, they could nevertheless be equally
real. 20
Descartes does of course assume that ideas are lower along the
ontological scale than their causes; his "ideas" must not be con-
fused with Plato's "Ideas." Whereas Plato moves from the com-
parative unreality of the external world to the full reality of Ideas,
Descartes moves in precisely the opposite direction, from ideas,
via the veracity of God, to the reality (although not the absolute
reality, which is reserved for God) of the external world. He
appears, however, to take it for granted that ideas are less real
than actual entities - as well he might, I suppose. This becomes
clear in his reply to the first set of objections, where, in an attempt
to vindicate his causal theory of the contents of ideas against the
objection that ideas have no strong connection with objects, being
merely mental acts occasioned by " 'modification due to an object,
which is merely an extrinsic appellation and nothing belonging
to the object'",21 he says that "... the idea of the sun will be the
sun itself existing in the mind, not indeed formally, as it exists
in the sky, but objectively, i.e., in the way in which objects are
wont to exist in the mind; and this mode of being is truly much
less perfect than that in which things exist outside the mind, but
it is not on that account mere nothing ,..".22 If the idea of the sun
is the sun itself as it exists in the mind, then I would think it
20 Spinoza, in his comments on this principle, makes the same assumption as

Descartes, that the formal cause of a thing must be more real than the thing
caused; op. cit., pp. 28, 29.
21 Haldane and Ross, vol.11, p. 9.
22 Ibid., p. 10.
reasonable to assume that it is ontologically inferior to the sun as

it actually exists; and if the cause of the idea of the sun is also
the sun itself, then it seems reasonable to assume that the idea
of the sun is ontologically inferior to its cause. Much more could
of course be said about this, and it would involve a lengthy dis-
cussion of Plato. Much more also needs to be said about the coherence
or otherwise of the doctrine that ideas of things are those things
as they exist in the mind, and on whether or not that doctrine can
consistently be maintained in conjunction with Descartes' model-
theory of the origin of ideas. I rather doubt that it can be consis-
tently maintained; but I shall not pursue these questions here.
II
We are now in a position to see how Descartes' causal argument

for the existence of God fits into his metaphysical scheme, and
despite our doubts about the coherence of the scheme, it is in-
teresting, I think, to see how Descartes pursues the argument. Since
an absolute degree of objective reality is perceived in the idea of
God, the cause of this idea must be absolutely real. Only God could
be absolutely real, therefore God exists. I shall not here question
the identification of God with supremely perfect substance, 2a al-
though it is, of course, open to serious criticism, not only as part
of a general criticism of the entire metaphysical scheme of which it is
part, but also as being yet another example of the "God of the
philosophers." It is worth remarking in passing that God is said to
possess eminently the perfections which are found objectively in the
idea of him, for, if he possessed them formally, he would have them
as we understand them to be (in our idea pf him) ; but because our
understanding is imperfect, that would moan that he did not have
all possible perfections perfectly, or in the most real manner possible. 24
D We have a coherent idea of God.

Step (5) of Descartes' argument depends on the recognition that
man is not supremely real. If it is not in fact clear that at least one
of my ideas contains more objecive reality than I possess formal
23 Ibid., p. 53, Def. III.

24 Viz. Spinoza, op. cit., p. 27, axiom VI II: and ct. Anselm, Froslogion, ch. XV.
descartes' causal argument for the existence of god 429
reality, the entire argument collapses. This in turn depends on

whether or not I actually have a clear and distinct idea of God,
for, if I do not have "within me some idea of a Being more perfect
than myself, in comparison with which I ... (should) recognize the
deficiences of my nature" (p. 166), it is likely that I will not
understand these deficiences, if I admit to them at all, as being
of the same ontological significance as Descartes takes them to be.
They will simply be deficiences, perhaps unfortunate ones, like
greed, selfishness, limited intellectual capacity, etc., but not such
as necessarily to detract from my ontological status. I might re-
cognize them as imperfections, relative to the attributes and qua-
lities of other people, or even relative to some ideal, but not as
reality-diminishing attributes, since there would be no superior
standard of reality with whose attributes to compare mine, either
in number or in quality. And I can hardly compare my degree of
reality with that of an ideal. The idea we have of God, is, according
to Descartes, more real than that of finite substance, because it is
an idea of infinite substance; his reason is just that "I see that
there is manifestly more reality in infinite substance than in finite
..." (p. 166) (and thus in the idea of infinite substance than in
the idea of finite) . Indeed, we have the idea of God before the idea
of ourselves - it is in this sense innate - since, in order to know
that "I am not quite perfect" (ibid.), I must already have
"some idea of a being more perfect than myself" (ibid.), For
Descartes, then, the idea of God precedes, in fact but not in ex-
position, even his primary knowledge that he is because he thinks;
since under "thinking" he includes such phenomena as doubting
and desiring, which indicate that "something is lacking to me"
(ibid.), that I am imperfect, or not fully real. The clarity and
distinctness of our idea of God is the guarantee of its not being
materially false, for clear and distinct ideas cannot be false - "we
can imagine that such a Being does not exist, we cannot never-
theless imagine that his idea represents nothing real to me" (ibid.) .
This is the case by definition. If we have a clear and distinct idea of
God, as supreme reality, then it must represent something supremely
real, otherwise the ultimate model of the idea would be less formally
or eminently real than the idea is objectively real. Finally, Descartes
says that he cannot himself be the model for his idea of God, since he
can conceive of his being less imperfect than he is, which, together
with the fragmentary nature of his knowledge, and his doubting,
desiring, etc., precludes his being perfect; and the idea of God
must have a model which is perfect. Even if he (Descartes) were
potentially perfect- if his knowledge could evolve unlimitedly, his
desires be eradicated, etc., - he would still be unable to produce
his idea of God, or to be what he calls "God" in that idea, since
it needs something formal, or actual, to produce the objective re-
ality of an idea, and not something "that exists potentially only"
(p. 167). 25 To have the idea of God, then, I must be conscious of
myself as not fully real: but to be so conscious, to recognize my
attributes as being limited both in number and quality, and to
regard their so being as detracting from my ontological status, I
must know that there is something, i.e., God, to serve as a standard
for ontological comparison. Once again, we find what appears to
be a tautological feature of Descartes' metaphysics.
The objections put forward to the argument by Mersenne, Hobbes,
and Gassendi, are as follows. First, that "God" can be modelled on
man, by simply thinking of what goes to make up the degree of
perfection possessed by man, and increasing it infinitely, or at least,
increasing it as much as we are able to imagine. 26 Descartes replies
that "Nothing that we attribute to God can come from external
objects, as a copy proceeds from its exemplar, because in God there
is nothing similar to what is found in external things, i.e., in cor-
poreal objects." 27 Since Descartes' idea of God is clear and distinct,
he must presumably know at least what he is not like; his perfections
are possessed by him eminently, so that if their exemplar were the
attributes of corporeal objects, these would be fully real (Principle
B) - but they are not. Such a reply, however, invites the question,
just what is God like? Is not God unthinkable? 28 Since God is
25 If we were the model of our idea of God, wq would, in a sense, be God:

we would stand at the summit of the Great Chain of Being, as the model of the
most objectively real idea. This in fact - in a figurative sense, though perhaps
less figurative than one might imagine - is precisely what, from a Scholastic-
Cartesian point of view, humanists may be said to have done, namely to set
man up as the new God. Viz. The Pope, "Man as God no Substitute for Theo-
logy" (edited extracts from Pope Paul's Christmas Day message, Urbi et Orbi)
The Times Higher Education Supplement, no. 117, 11-1-74, p. 24: "It is a
humanism that, with a persistent and falsely logical precipitation of thought,
will dare to affirm that man is his own absolute cause ".
26 Haldane and Ross, vol.11, p. 25; Mersenne, p. 72; Hobbes, pp.158, 159;
Gassendi.
27 Ibid., p. 36. Viz. also pp. 36, 7; pp. 215-217.
28 Ibid., p. 26, Mersenne; p. 67, Hobbes; p. 159, Gassendi.
infinite, Hobbes says, "we have no image, no idea corresponding

... to the most holy name of God/'29 Descartes' reply to all three
critics is the same: that ideas are not to be confused with images.
"... Substance is not perceived by imagination, but by the intellect
alone."30 The idea of God is not "of a nature akin to the images of
material things depicted in the imagination, but . . . something that we
are aware of by an apprehension or judgement or inference of the
understanding alone." 31 To have a clear and distinct idea of God
is to grasp in some purely intellectual way that there is supreme
substance, even if it is not "to comprehend adequately"32 what
this substance is like. The images which Descartes maintains we
can consider as ideas are intellectual, not pictorial: "I take the term
idea to stand for whatever the mind directly perceives." 33 That we
have no adequate image of God does not therefore refute Descartes'
claim that we have a clear and distinct idea of him. Finally, there
is Mersenne's objection that our idea of God is derived "from
reflections previously entertained, from books, from interchange of
converse with your friends, etc.,"34 to which Descartes' reply is
correct, given his view of the nature of, and need for, ultimate
models, or formal causes, of our ideas; that "it is God from whom it
first originates." 35
Descartes' rebuttal of his critics seems to me successful. But he
has failed to show that we actually do have a clear and distinct
idea of God. // we have, then, granted Descartes' metaphysical
principles, it renders the knowledge that God is supremely real; and
if supreme reality must include existence, as it must for Descartes,
since he treats existence as an attribute, and something which is
supremely real must have all possible attributes, as well as having
them all as perfectly as is possible, then God exists. But this is
Descartes' ontological argument; and inasmuch as his causal argument,
even if the difficulties peculiar to its metaphysics could success-
fully be resolved, must eventually cope with precisely those diffi-
culties met by his ontological argument, it would seem that it is
inferior to the latter. Both arguments rely on the supposition that
29 Ibid., p. 67.
30 Ibid., p. 215.
31 Ibid., p. 37.
32 Ibid., p. 74. Viz. opening para., Sec. II.
33 Ibid., pp. 67, 8 (my italics) .
34 Ibid., p. 26.
35 Ibid., p. 35 (my italics) . i
we have a coherent idea of God as supremely real, and on the

supposition that existence is an attribute, one necessarily attaching
to anything supremely real; but the causal argument involves
other difficulties besides. 36
Is the concept of supreme reality coherent? In Descartes' meta-
physical system it is, if it is clearly and distinctly perceived. But
Descartes does little to show that it is so perceived. The fullest
statement he makes on the subject is in a letter to Clerselier 37 :
"... we shall be unable to deny that we have some idea of God,
except by saying we do not understand the words -that thing which
is the most perfect that we can conceive; for that is what all men
call God. But to go so far as to assert that they do not understand
the words which are the commonest in the mouths of men, is to
have recourse to strange extremes in order to find objections.
Besides, it is the most impious confession one can make... for this
is not merely to say that one does not know it by means of natural
reason, but also that neither by faith nor by any other means could
one have any knowledge of it ... ." Exactly; but the assertion in
question is hardly a strange extreme.
Bob Brecher
University of London, Goldsmiths' College
^6 This is of course a simplification: but I think it is a fair outline of what

Descartes' version of the ontological argument amounts to.
37 Haldane and Ross, op. cit., vol. II, p. 129.

Brecher B. Descartes Causal Argument For The Existence of God

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Brecher B. Descartes Causal Argument For The Existence of God

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Descartes' Causal Argument for the Existence of God

Author(s): Bob Brecher

Not only is Descartes' first causal argument for the existence

A) There are degrees of reality, or perfection.

1 The Philosophical Works of Descartes, trans. Haldane and Ross (Cam-

The assumption is made that

D) We have a coherent idea of God.

A There are degrees of reality, or perfection.

B A cause must be at least as real as its effect

8 Haldane and Ross, ibid., axiom IV.

fore, may be possessed more or less perfectly (or really; although

12 Descartes, A Discourse on Method, etc., trans. John Veitch (London:

duced by something which possesses within itself, either formally

13 One might question the propriety of Descartes' using as an example a

a member of a class of entities, none of whose members can be the

C Ideas have an objective reality, corresponding to the formal

14 Viz. Veitch, op. cit.

of that of which the idea is an idea. By "objective reality/'

at this stage of his discussion, have shown that objects or entities

20 Spinoza, in his comments on this principle, makes the same assumption as

reasonable to assume that it is ontologically inferior to the sun as

We are now in a position to see how Descartes' causal argument

D We have a coherent idea of God.

23 Ibid., p. 53, Def. III.

reality, the entire argument collapses. This in turn depends on

25 If we were the model of our idea of God, wq would, in a sense, be God:

infinite, Hobbes says, "we have no image, no idea corresponding

we have a coherent idea of God as supremely real, and on the

University of London, Goldsmiths' College

^6 This is of course a simplification: but I think it is a fair outline of what

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