Medical Plaza versus Cullen

Facts:

Respondent Robert H. Cullen purchased from MLHI condominium Unit No. 1201 of the Medical Plaza
Makati covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 45808 of the Register of Deeds of Makati. Said
title was later cancelled and Condominium Certificate of Title No. 64218 was issued in the name of
respondent. On September 19, 2002, petitioner, through its corporate secretary, Dr. Jose Giovanni E.
Dimayuga, demanded from respondent payment for alleged unpaid association dues and assessments
amounting to ₱145,567.42. Respondent disputed this demand claiming that he had been religiously
paying his dues shown by the fact that he was previously elected president and director of petitioner.
Petitioner, on the other hand, claimed that respondent’s obligation was a carry-over of that of
MLHI. Consequently, respondent was prevented from exercising his right to vote and be voted for
during the 2002 election of petitioner’s Board of Directors. Respondent thus clarified from MLHI the
veracity of petitioner’s claim, but MLHI allegedly claimed that the same had already been settled. This
prompted respondent to demand from petitioner an explanation why he was considered a delinquent
payer despite the settlement of the obligation. Petitioner failed to make such explanation. Petitioner
and MLHI filed their separate motions to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
MLHI claims that it is the Whether or not the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) which is
vested with the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Petitioner, on the other hand, raises
the following specific grounds for the dismissal of the complaint: (1) estoppel as respondent himself
approved the assessment when he was the president; (2) lack of jurisdiction as the case involves an
intra-corporate controversy; (3) prematurity for failure of respondent to exhaust all intra-corporate
remedies; and (4) the case is already moot and academic, the obligation having been settled between
petitioner and MLHI.

Issue: Whether HLURB has jurisdiction.

Held:
No. Republic Act No. 9904, or the Magna Carta for Homeowners and Homeowners’ Associations, approved on
January7, 2010 and became effective on July 10, 2010, empowers the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) to hear and decide inter-association and/or intra-association controversies or conflicts concerning
homeowners’ associations. However, we cannot apply the same in the present case as it involves a controversy
between a condominium unit owner and a condominium corporation.
―Republic Act (RA) No. 9904, or the Magna Carta for Homeowners and Homeowners’ Associations, approved on
January 7, 2010 and became effective on July 10, 2010, empowers the HLURB to hear and decide inter-association
and/or intra-association controversies or conflicts concerning homeowners’ associations. However, we cannot apply
the same in the present case as it involves a controversy between a condominium unit owner and a condominium
corporation. While the term association as defined in the law covers homeowners’ associations of other residential
real property which is broad enough to cover a condominium corporation, it does not seem to be the legislative
intent. A thorough review of the deliberations of the bicameral conference commitee would show that the
lawmakers did not intend to extend the coverage of the law to such kind of association.

Condominium Act (R.A. No. 4726); The rights and obligations of the condominium unit owners and the condominium
corporation are set forth in the Condominium Act.
—To be sure ,RA 4726 or the Condominium Act was enacted to specifically govern a condominium. Said law
sanctions the creation of the condominium corporation which is especially formed for the purpose of holding title to
the common area, in which the holders of separate interests shall automatically be members or Share holders, to
the exclusion of others, in proportion to the appurtenant interest of their respective units. The rights and obligations
of the condominium unit owners and the condominium corporation are set forth in the above Act.

WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition and REVERSE the Court of Appeals Decision dated July 10,
2007 and Resolution dated January 25, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86614.

Kalipunan versus Robredo

Facts:

The members of petitioners Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap, Inc. and Corazon de Jesus Homeowners’
Association as well as the individual petitioners, Fernando Sevilla, Estrelieta Bagasbas, Jocy Lopez, Elvira
Vidol and Delia Frayres, were/are occupying parcels of land owned by and located in the cities of San
Juan, Navotas and Quezon (collectively, the LGUs1). These LGUs sent the petitioners notices of eviction
and demolition pursuant to Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 in order to give way to the implementation
and construction of infrastructure projects2 in the areas illegally occupied by the petitioners. On March
23, 2012, the petitioners directly filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus before the Court, seeking
to compel the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, et al. (the public respondents)to first secure
an eviction and/or demolition order from the court prior to their implementation of Section 28 (a) and (b)
of RA 7279. The Mayor of Navotas prays for the outright dismissal of the petition for its serious
procedural defects. First, the petitioners ignored the hierarchy of courts when they directly filed a Rule 65
petition before the Court.7 Second, the petitioners incorrectly availed themselves of a petition for
prohibition and mandamus in assailing the constitutionality of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279.
According to the Mayor of Navotas, the office of a writ of prohibition is merely to prevent the public
respondent’s usurpation of power or improper assumption of jurisdiction. On the other hand, a writ of
mandamus only commands the public respondent to perform his ministerial functions. Third, the
petitioners failed to particularly state the grave abuse of discretion that the Mayor of Navotas allegedly
committed. Fourth, the petition does not present any justiciable controversy since the City of Navotas
had already successfully evicted the petitioners in San Roque, Navotas on November 28, 2011. Fifth, the
petition was filed out of time since the petitioners were personally notified of the intended eviction and
demolition on September 23, 2011.

Issue: Whether or not public respondent has validly exercised its power of eviction and demolition
without prior court order.

Held: Yes. In the present case, the petitioners seek to prohibit the respondents from implementing Section 28
(a) and (b) of RA 7279 without a prior court order of eviction and/or demolition. In relation to this, paragraph
1, Section 28 of RA 7279 provides:

Sec. 28. Eviction and Demolition. — Eviction or demolition as a practice shall be discouraged. Eviction or
demolition, however, maybe allowed under the following situations:

(a) When persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps,
riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public placessuch as sidewalks, roads, parks, and
playgrounds;

(b) When government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented;or
 (c) When there is a court order for eviction and demolition. (emphasis and underline ours)

A reading of this provision clearly shows that the acts complained of are beyond the scope of a petition for
prohibition and mandamus. The use of the permissive word "may" implies that the public respondents have
discretion when their duty to execute evictions and/or demolitions shall be performed. Where the words of a
statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. To ensure that evictions and demolitions are conducted in a just and humane
manner, paragraph 2, Section 28 of RA 7279 commands the public respondents to comply with the following
prescribed procedure in executing eviction and/or demolition orders:

In the execution of eviction or demolition orders involving underprivileged and homeless citizens, the following
shall be mandatory:

(1) Notice upon the effected persons orentities at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of eviction or
demolition;

(2) Adequate consultations on the matter of settlement with the duly designated representatives of
the families to be resettled and the affected communities in the areas where they are to be relocated;

(3) Presence of local government officials or their representatives during eviction or demolition;

(4) Proper identification of all persons taking part in the demolition;

(5) Execution of eviction or demolition only during regular office hours from Mondays to Fridays and
during good weather, unless the affected families consent otherwise;

(6) No use of heavy equipment for demolition except for structures that are permanent and of
concrete materials;

(7) Proper uniforms for members ofthe Philippine National Police who shall occupy the first line of law
enforcement and observe proper disturbance control procedures; and

(8) Adequate relocation, whether temporary or permanent: Provided, however, That in cases of eviction and
demolition pursuant to a court order involving underprivileged and homeless citizens, relocation shall be
undertaken by the local government unit concerned and the National Housing Authority with the assistance of
other government agencies within forty-five (45) days from service of notice of final judgment by the court,
after which period the said order shall be executed: Provided, further, That should relocation not be possible
within the said period, financial assistance in the amount equivalent to the prevailing minimum daily wage
multiplied by sixty (60) days shall be extended to the affected families by the local government unit concerned.
Lastly, the petitioners failed to substantiate their allegations that the public respondents gravely abused their
discretion in implementing Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279. Instead, they merely imputed jurisdictional abuse
to the public respondents through general averments in their pleading, but without any basis to support their
claim.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the petition for its serious procedural defects.
Reyes versus NHA

Facts:

National Housing Authority (NHA) filed separate complaints for the expropriation of sugarcane lands,
particularly Lot Nos. 6450, 6448-E, 6198-A and 6199 of the cadastral survey of Dasmarias, Cavite
belonging to the petitioners, before the then Court of First Instance of Cavite, and docketed as Civil Case
Nos. T.G.-392, T.G.-396 and T.G.-417. The stated public purpose of the expropriation was the expansion
of the Dasmarias Resettlement Project to accommodate the squatters who were relocated from the
Metropolitan Manila area. The trial court rendered judgment ordering the expropriation of these lots and
the payment of just compensation. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court in a decision rendered on
October 29, 1987 in the case of NHA vs. Zaballero[2] and which became final on November 26, 1987. For
the alleged failure of respondent NHA to comply with the above order, petitioners filed on April 28, 1992
a complaint[5] for forfeiture of rights before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 79, in Civil
Case No. Q-92-12093. They alleged that respondent NHA had not relocated squatters from the
Metropolitan Manila area on the expropriated lands in violation of the stated public purpose for
expropriation and had not paid the just compensation fixed by the court. They prayed that respondent
NHA be enjoined from disposing and alienating the expropriated properties and that judgment be
rendered forfeiting all its rights and interests under the expropriation judgment. In its
Answer,[6] respondent NHA averred that it had already paid a substantial amount to herein petitioners
and that the expropriation judgment could not be executed in view of several issues raised by respondent
NHA before the expropriation court (now Branch 18, RTC, Tagaytay City) concerning capital gains tax,
registration fees and other expenses for the transfer of title to respondent NHA, as well as the claims for
attorneys fees of Atty. Joaquin Yuseco, Jr., collaborating counsel for petitioners.

Issue: whether such payment can still be made and, if so, in what amount.

Held:

It was held that actual payment to the owner of the condemned property was a condition precedent
to the investment of the title to the property in the State albeit not to the appropriation of it to public
use. In Rexford v. Knight, the Court of Appeals of New York said that the construction upon the statutes
was that the fee did not vest in the State until the payment of the compensation although the authority
to enter upon and appropriate the land was complete prior to the payment. Kennedy further said that
both on principle and authority the rule is that the right to enter on and use the property is complete, as
soon as the property is actually appropriated under the authority of law for a public use, but that the title
does not pass from the owner without his consent, until just compensation has been made to him. With
respect to the amount of the just compensation still due and demandable from respondent NHA, the
lower courts erred in not awarding interest computed from the time the property is actually taken to the
time when compensation is actually paid or deposited in court. In Republic, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et
al.,the Court imposed interest at 12% per annum in order to help eliminate the issue of the constant
fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over time, thus:

The constitutional limitation of just compensation is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market
value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual
and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as between one who
receives, and one who desires to sell, it being fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government.
Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having
jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interests on its just value to be computed
from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the
court. In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interests accrue in order
to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking
occurred. WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is modified.