Introduction to African Security Issues

Seminar Hosted by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies

National Defense University
International Perspectives: Involvement of Non-Western States
30 September 2010

Remarks by David H. Shinn

Adjunct Professor, Elliott School of International Affairs
George Washington University

Introduction

China is the most important non-western actor in Africa today. For that matter,
China has become the principal non-African presence—western or non-western—in a
number of Africa’s fifty-three countries. Other non-western countries are also rapidly
expanding their activities on the continent. Most notable in this regard is India, which
has long-standing ties to eastern Africa and South Africa. A growing economic power in
Latin America—Brazil—is coming on strong in Africa. Russia, better described as a
developed country, is returning to Africa following its much reduced activity after the
collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War. Iran has increased its engagement
with a number of countries and Israel recently revived its attention. Turkey and several
Gulf States are showing significant interest in Africa, especially the northeastern
quadrant. Cuba, following major Cold War military involvement in Angola and Ethiopia,
virtually absented itself from the continent but is slowly returning. Even countries like
North Korea and Vietnam, which were never much involved in Africa, are beginning to
make their presence known. Other non-western countries in Asia, the Middle East and
Latin America are giving Africa a closer look. I will limit my remarks to China, India,
Brazil, Russia, Iran, Turkey and Vietnam.

China

China has a long history in Africa; modern China shifted its focus from support
for African liberation movements and ideologically like-minded governments that began
in the mid-1950s to an emphasis by the mid-1990s on commercial ties and practical
political collaboration. China has four principal interests in Africa:
• Maintaining and/or increasing access to oil, minerals, timber and agricultural
products.
• Developing good relations with all African countries so that China can count on
their support in regional and international forums.
• Ending Taiwan’s official diplomatic presence and replacing it with recognition of
Beijing.
• Increasing significantly China’s exports as African economies become stronger
and Africans become wealthier.
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Looking at these four interests in sequence, China imports about one-third of its
total oil imports from Africa. It is important, however, to keep this statistic in
perspective. China’s imports constitute only about 13 percent of total African oil exports
while the United States and Europe each import about one-third of Africa’s total oil
exports because of their much higher total demand. China is, however, interested in more
than African oil. It imports about 90 percent of its cobalt, 35 percent of its manganese,
30 percent of its tantalum, and 5 percent of its hard wood timber from Africa. These
imports of raw materials and those from other parts of the world sustain China’s rapidly
growing economy. Without strong continuing economic growth, the current leadership
of the Chinese Communist Party would be hard pressed to remain in power. China has a
long-term strategic interest in African natural resources.
Africa’s fifty-three countries constitute well over one-quarter of the United
Nations’ 192 members. While China holds a veto power in the Security Council, Africa
has three non-permanent seats on the Council. Africa is also well represented in
organizations of interest to China like the UN Human Rights Council and the World
Trade Organization. The Africans do not, of course, vote as a block, but China makes
every effort to cultivate the maximum number of African countries on all issues of
interest to Beijing that arise in international forums. In some cases like-minded African
governments use the Chinese just as the Chinese use them, for example when contentious
issues affecting China or a particular African nation arise in the Human Rights Council.
When Tibet became an issue in 2008, China leaned on the Africans to remain silent or
even make supportive statements. They did. African countries can depend on China to
avoid raising controversial African human rights issues in the UN Human Rights Council
and perhaps even to support them when they are criticized by western countries.
The position of Taiwan in Africa is more important to China than most observers
appreciate. Beijing has never retreated from the overwhelming attention it has given over
the years to the “One China” policy. Equally important, China has never forgotten the
fact that African states were instrumental in 1971 in replacing Taiwan with the People’s
Republic of China on the United Nations Security Council. Since then, Taiwan has
witnessed a sharp decline in the number of African countries that recognize it. When
Malawi switched in December 2007 from Taipei to Beijing, this left only four African
countries that still have relations with Taiwan—Swaziland, Burkina Faso, Gambia, and
Säo Tomé and Principe. Near the end of 2008, following the election of a new President
in Taiwan, Taipei and Beijing reached an unofficial truce whereby they agreed not to
actively solicit countries that recognize one country to switch to the other.
In 2009, due to the decline in the price of oil, total China-Africa trade fell back to
$96 billion from $107 billion in 2008. As the decline in the price of oil had an even
greater impact on U.S.-Africa trade, however, China became in 2009 Africa’s most
important trade partner for the first time. Nevertheless, only about 4 percent of China’s
global trade is with Africa while more than 10 percent of Africa’s total trade is with
China. Until 2009, Africa maintained a small trade surplus with China; in 2009, it
experienced a huge trade deficit. More importantly, there are large country-by-country
disparities. Some fifteen African oil and mineral exporters have large surpluses with
China, while thirty-two African countries have significant deficits. The poorest African
countries tend to have the largest trade deficits. Five African oil and mineral exporting
nations account for about 85 percent of Africa’s exports to China.
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While these are China’s principal interests in Africa, they are not the only ones.
Foreign investment is becoming more important. The West still accounts for about 90
percent of all foreign direct investment in Africa, but China has been more aggressive
than western countries in recent years. It now has at least $20 billion in investment on
the continent, most of it in oil and extractive industries. This figure constitutes, however,
only about 4 percent of China’s global FDI. The main recipients of Chinese investment
are South Africa, Nigeria, Zambia, Algeria and Sudan. Chinese companies have also
demonstrated a greater willingness than western companies to take risks in Africa. This
may be explained by the fact that most of China’s larger companies are state-controlled.
One of the tactics for increasing its influence in Africa is a growing assistance
program. China is not transparent with its aid statistics, and it is difficult to equate
Chinese assistance to the OECD definition. By most estimates, however, Chinese
OECD-type aid has been running at about $1.5 billion in recent years. One particularly
successful program dating back to 1963 is the sending of medical teams to African
countries. By 2009, China had sent 17,000 medical personnel to forty-seven different
countries and treated, it says, 240 million patients. China has also started a program that
looks a little like the U.S. Peace Corps; it is sending some 300 volunteers to a half dozen
African countries.
While China’s grant aid to Africa is growing modestly, the headline grabbing
deals are largely low interest loans tied to infrastructure projects implemented by large
Chinese companies. African governments welcome China’s unconditional low interest
loans that are used to build infrastructure. Of course, the recipients must accept the One
China policy and implementation of the projects by Chinese companies. Except for the
concessionary nature of the loans, however, they are really commercial transactions
rather than aid projects. In recent years, China has provided Angola with $13 billion, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) $9 billion, Niger $5 billion and Ethiopia $2.5
billion in low interest loans. The Angolan government pays back the loans as it ships oil
to China. The DRC loan will function similarly with minerals. The loan for Niger is
based on the development of its oil fields. It is not clear how Ethiopia will pay off the
loan as it exports to China only sesame seeds, hides and skins and a little coffee. It will
take a lot of sesame seeds and goat skins to repay $2.5 billion. There is always the
possibility, of course, that China will eventually write off some of the debt. It has
previously cancelled substantial debt in the case of the poorest African countries. China
also has a close assistance relationship with countries like Sudan and Zimbabwe that are
treated as pariahs by many western nations.
The hallmark of China’s relations with African countries is its excellent state-to-
state ties. China has an embassy in forty-eight of the forty-nine countries that recognize
Beijing. The only exception is Somalia where security conditions do not allow an
embassy. Of the forty-nine, only the Comoro Islands does not have an embassy in
Beijing. China relies heavily on high-level personal contact to consolidate its relations
with African leaders. President Hu Jintao has made six trips—two as vice president and
four as president—to Africa visiting multiple countries. Premier Wen Jiabao has been
equally visible in Africa. Beginning in 1991, China’s foreign minister has made his first
overseas visit every year to Africa, a practice that has been noted and appreciated by
African governments. All elements of Chinese leadership are frequent visitors to Africa.
In turn, Beijing often invites African leaders to China. During the period from 2002 to
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2005, Chinese Communist Party officials made sixty-four visits to Africa while African
political party officials made sixty-nine visits to China.
China and Africa have formalized their relationship in the Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation (FOCAC), which meets at the summit level every three years, alternating
between Beijing and an African capital, and ministerial level in other years. The last
meeting took place in 2009 in Egypt. This has become an important and seemingly
effective mechanism for coordinating the China-Africa relationship. The dilemma is that
China can speak with one voice while the African countries still tend to speak with fifty-
three voices.
China also uses a range of soft power techniques for expanding ties with Africa.
The official news service, Xinhua, has more than twenty bureaus in Africa. There are
twenty-two Confucius Institutes. China is stepping up its radio transmission to Africa in
various languages, has a transmitting facility in Kenya and various rebroadcast
arrangements. It trains a variety of Africans, including diplomats and journalists, and
increased to 4,000 in 2009 the number of scholarships that it offers to African students.
Compared to countries on its periphery, Europe and North America, Africa
occupies a low security priority for China. Nevertheless, Africa is increasing in
importance because of China’s growing reliance on the import of raw materials from the
continent. China has a policy of no military bases in Africa but has some security
interaction, however modest, with all forty-nine African countries that recognize Beijing.
There is a loose correlation between Chinese military cooperation and resource rich
African countries. China’s share of the conventional African arms market in Sub-
Saharan Africa is about 15 percent. It is higher for small arms and light weapons. High
level exchange military visits are an important part of the security relationship.
Twenty-eight African countries have defense attachés in Beijing while sixteen
Chinese defense attaché offices in Africa are accredited to some thirty African countries.
China is playing a growing and constructive role in UN peacekeeping operations in
Africa. It currently has more UN peacekeepers in Africa than any other permanent
member of the UN Security Council—about 1,600 compared to about thirty for the
United States. China continues to send two frigates and a supply ship to the international
naval force that is combating Somali piracy in the Gulf of Aden. As China expands its
presence into African conflict zones like the Niger Delta, western Sudan and Ethiopia’s
Ogaden, it is beginning to experience the same kinds of attacks on its nationals that
western countries encounter.
China also faces some challenges in Africa. Although it has developed excellent
relations with governments and done well with most of the business community, it has
been much less successful with civil society, opposition political parties and labor unions.
Areas where China’s engagement in Africa draws criticism include:
• Democracy and good governance.
• Human rights practices.
• Transparency and corruption.
• Questionable environmental practices.
• Purchase of illegally harvested African timber, ivory and endangered species.
• Poor worker safety and fair labor practices.
• Export to Africa of harmful and counterfeit products.
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• Reluctance to provide training and support to African manufacturing so that it

can compete more effectively in the global market.
• Inadequate control over arms sales to Africa.

India

In some respects, India, the world’s largest democracy, is more of a direct

challenge to China in Africa than is the United States. There is a long history of Indian
communities in parts of Africa. The eastern side of the continent borders the Indian
Ocean, which India perceives within its sphere of influence. India has a common
colonial experience with many African countries and has long ties with those that are
members of the British Commonwealth. Like China, India was a strong advocate for the
struggle against colonialism and a leader of the non-aligned movement. India’s primary
interest in Africa today, like China, is access to energy and minerals. Its most important
trade relationship is with Nigeria where India-Nigeria trade is almost twice that of
China’s trade. India imports about 15 percent of its oil from Africa but its trade with
Africa constitutes only about 8 percent of total Indian trade. It exports cheap
manufactured goods to Africa, resulting in some of the same criticism that China
experiences. India also seeks African support in international forums and maintains
cordial relations with pariah states such as Sudan and Zimbabwe.
India has some advantages over China. It is physically closer to Africa. Its form
of government is more appealing to aspiring democracies on the continent. Indians speak
a common language with English-speaking African countries. Indian culture, especially
movies, are understood and appreciated in much of Africa. India’s important private
sector, which accounts for about 70 percent of its GDP, is an attractive feature in some
African countries. Like China, India has an impressive GDP growth rate—about 8
percent—that is viewed with envy by many Africans. Indian communities in Africa have
both plusses and minuses. While they are well-established, they have not always been
well-received and are often accused by Africans of isolating themselves. India has a long
standing policy of engaging people of Indian origin in Africa; China’s policy towards
people of Chinese origin is more ambivalent.
India has begun to formalize its collaboration with Africa, although not to the
extent that China has done. The first India-Africa summit took place in New Delhi in
April 2008. Attended by thirteen African leaders, this was well under the forty-eight who
attended the 2006 FOCAC in Beijing. India’s trade with Africa soared to $37 billion in
2008, but still remains only about one-third the level of Chinese trade with Africa. India
anticipates that its trade with Africa will reach $100 billion in five years. The size of
India’s economy is well behind that of China, and it does not have the capacity to
compete effectively with China because of the greater resources that Beijing can bring to
the table. India has twenty-six embassies in Africa vs. forty-eight for China.
Some of India’s policies towards Africa are similar to China’s; others are
different. India follows a “no strings attached” policy in its relations with Africa but does
not highlight the policy as China does. Both countries have instituted a duty-free tariff
preference scheme for exports from poorer African countries. India has extended a line
of credit to African countries over the last five years valued at more than $2 billion and
has promised to increase the amount to $5.4 billion over the next five years. New Delhi
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hosted in 2009 the Fifth EXIM Bank of India Conclave on India Africa Project
Partnership. The Export-Import Bank of India has offices in Dakar, Durban and Addis
Ababa to monitor its projects throughout the continent. Indian investment in Africa
targets Indian businessmen and joint ventures rather than tying the loans to large, state-
owned companies as with China. Indian firms integrate into African domestic markets
and tend to draw on local resources while Chinese firms tend to source imports from
China. Africans have expressed some concern with plans by India to purchase large
tracts of land to grow good to feed Indians.
Indian aid emphasizes training for 1,000 Africans annually through its Indian
Technical and Economic Cooperation program. An additional 15,000 African students
attend colleges and technical schools in India each year. India sends an impressive
number of teachers to Africa. India has also become an important location where African
elites obtain medical care. India plans to provide $500 million in aid to Africa over the
next five years.
Although selectively focused on Africa’s Indian Ocean islands and countries
bordering the Indian Ocean, India has a more aggressive security relationship with Africa
than China. India has superior naval capacity in the Indian Ocean and is sensitive to
Chinese naval expansion in the region. India has signed defense agreements with Kenya,
Madagascar and Mozambique and has initiated joint training programs with Kenya,
Mozambique, Tanzania and South Africa. Madagascar, Mauritius and the Seychelles
cooperate on maritime surveillance and intelligence gathering. India provides training for
African military personnel in Indian military academies and seeks to expand arms sales to
Africa. India has developed a particularly close alliance with South Africa that also
includes Brazil. Naval vessels from the three countries take part in joint exercises off
South Africa, most recently in September 2010. Indian ships have also joined the anti-
piracy effort in the Gulf of Aden. India has almost 7,500 military and police personnel
assigned to four of the seven UN peacekeeping missions in Africa.

Brazil

Brazil is home to at least seventy million people of African descent. Many

Brazilians trace their ancestry to Nigeria and Benin; African culture has survived in
Brazil and helps strengthen ties to Africa. Nigeria is home to Brazilian communities
concentrated in Lagos formed by the descendents of former slaves who returned during
the 19th century. Although Brazil has a natural affinity with Africa’s Lusophone
countries—Angola, Mozambique, Säo Tomé and Principe, Guinea-Bissau, and Cape
Verde—, it has in recent years significantly expanded its involvement in Africa.
Brazil maintains embassies in thirty-four African countries across the continent.
It is a member of the twenty-four-state South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone
established in 1986 to encourage regional cooperation in the areas of development, peace
and security. Twenty-one countries in west and southern Africa belong to the
organization. Brazilian President da Silva has made ten trips to Africa since he took
office in 2003, visiting twenty-five of Africa’s fifty-three countries. His most recent visit
took place in July 2010, when he also attended the Brazil-Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) summit in Cape Verde. ECOWAS is becoming an important
partner for Brazil in Africa.
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India, Brazil and South Africa created in 2004 a strategic alliance known as the
India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum that has potentially important
implications for Africa. This association of three middle powers seeks to take advantage
of existing international rules to promote a more just, representative and equitable
distribution of power in the international system. The three IBSA chiefs of state held
their third summit meeting in Delhi in 2008.
Brazil’s trade with Africa reached $26 billion in 2008. Brazil seeks African
markets for its exports and investment opportunities for its companies. It depends
heavily on Africa for minerals and energy to supply its expanding economy. Nigeria,
which supplied Brazil with $8 billion of oil in 2008, is Brazil’s major African trade
partner in Africa. The two countries have developed an important economic and political
relationship. Nigeria even sailed two navy vessels to Rio de Janeiro in 2007. Brazil is
developing a surprisingly strong relationship with Sudan and has a small number of
peacekeepers assigned to the UN mission in southern Sudan.
Brazil looks to Africa for help in obtaining a permanent UN Security Council
seat. It solicits support from African countries, which, for example, strongly backed it in
the World Trade Organization on a generic medicine dispute. The Brazilian Agricultural
Research Corporation (EMBRAPA), Brazil’s premier agriculture and bio-tech research
agency, has opened four offices in Africa. African countries are turning increasingly to
Brazil for technical and scientific assistance. Brazil is positioning itself as a major
African partner to help insure its food security and energy needs.

Russia

The Cold War witnessed major competition between the Soviet Union and both
the United States and China in Africa. The collapse of the Soviet Union and decline of
Russia’s economy led to a sharp decline in Russian-African relations beginning in the
late 1980s. At the end of the Cold War, Russia did maintain its diplomatic presence in
most African countries and today still has embassies in forty of them. It has only been in
the last several years, however, with the revival of the Russian economy that Moscow has
returned to Africa as a major player. Former President Putin’s September 2006 visit to
South Africa, the first by a Russian leader, signaled new attention for the continent. The
Russian prime minister followed Putin in March 2007 with visits to Angola, Namibia and
South Africa. President Medvedev traveled to Egypt, Nigeria, Namibia and Angola with
a 100-strong business delegation in 2009 to consummate energy, mining, construction
and telecommunication deals.
In terms of engagement with Africa, Russia is well behind both the United States
and China. Its trade with the continent is only about $9 billion. In 2008, Russia
announced a preferential tariff regime for developing countries, which grants duty-free
access for African products. Since 2000, Russia has purchased more than $5 billion in
African assets. In addition, Russian oil companies have signed exploration deals in
Algeria, Nigeria, Angola and Egypt worth more than $3 billion. Lukoil purchased 63
percent of a field off the Ivory Coast in a production-sharing agreement with Nigerian
owners. Russia’s Gazprom is pushing for control of the Nigerian gas market.
Business has become the central focus of Russian interest in Africa. In 2009,
Egypt signed a ten-year strategic cooperation agreement that includes a proposal to build
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Egypt’s first nuclear power plant. Russia tends to emphasize minerals such as nickel and
gold in South Africa; aluminum in Guinea, Nigeria, and the DRC; and diamonds in
Guinea, Sierra Leone, South Africa and the DRC. In 2010, Russia agreed to invest $1
billion in uranium exploration in Namibia. South African President Jacob Zuma visited
Moscow in 2010 when he signed an agreement for the supply by Russia of low-enriched
uranium. Russia is pursuing cooperative banking arrangements in Angola, Namibia and
South Africa. It signed an agreement with South Africa to establish a command and
control center for the Russian Space Agency, to train South African space personnel and
to build communications satellites. It will launch a satellite for Angola.
Russian aid to Africa remains exceedingly modest although it did increase from
$50 million in 2003 to $210 million in 2007. Moscow has cancelled $20 billion in
African debt. Russia announced that it has committed more than $1 billion to aid the
poorest African countries during 2010-2011 to fight infectious diseases and poverty and
improve energy and education. Russia says it will try to provide $400-500 million of aid
annually to Africa in the near future.
Russia has resumed large scale arms sales to African countries, much of it outside
official channels, including charges that it is supplying arms to protagonists in the Great
Lakes region. Between 2000 and 2007, Russia sold more than $1 billion of arms to
African countries. Recent energy deals with Algeria included a $7.5 billion Russian arms
sale. Russia is the largest arms supplier to Sudan, including a sale of twelve MiG 29s.
Not surprisingly, Sudan publicly supported Russia’s “legitimate” right to defend its
citizens in Georgia. In 2009, Russia significantly increased the attention that it gave to
Sudan and has named a special envoy for Sudan’s conflicts. Ethiopia signed several
military cooperation agreements with Russia in 2002 and continues to rely heavily on
Russia for the supply of weapons.
Russia has not been a significant contributor of peacekeepers to UN missions in
Africa, but its 350 personnel are still ten times the American contribution. Russia has
concentrated its peacekeeping engagement in southern Sudan, where it has a team with
four MI-8 helicopters. A Russian Air Force helicopter group supported a peacekeeping
mission to Chad to sustain a force along the Chad-Darfur border. Russia is training
hundreds of African civilian policemen and law enforcement personnel for peacekeeping
operations. Russian naval vessels are part of the anti-piracy campaign in the Gulf of
Aden. Russia also expressed interest in 2009 in renewing its political, military and
cultural ties with the Seychelles.
Russia’s director for the Center of Russian-African Relations at the Russian
Academy of Sciences Africa Institute commented in 2008 that Russia must expand
relations with Africa. He explained that Russia is experiencing a shortage of manganese,
chromium, silicon and other minerals that are too costly to mine in Russia. Former
President Putin concluded in mid-2007: “Russia’s cooperation with Africa has taken on a
new dynamic in recent times. The level and intensity of contacts is increasing. We are
carrying out ongoing work to expand and deepen our mutually beneficial cooperation in
trade and the economy, science and technology, humanitarian and other areas.” Russia
seems committed to regaining its influence in Africa.

Iran
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While Iran has had an interest in Africa for many years, it stepped up its
engagement about six years ago. Isolation by the West and a desire to undercut Israel in
Africa probably account for much of this recent activity. Africa’s one billion inhabitants
are almost half Muslim, but they are virtually all Sunni Muslim. Iranian Shiites do not
have any inherent advantage in wooing Africa’s Sunnis. For that matter, Iran has not
limited its efforts to predominantly Muslim African countries. Iran has an embassy in
twenty-four African countries.
Iran established the Iran-Africa Cooperation Headquarters in 2004, which agreed
to create four free trade zones in Africa, to develop banking ties with African countries,
to form an Iranian-African Merchants Council and an Africa Research Center affiliated
with Iran’s Teacher Training University. Although it appears that Iran never followed up
in creating these institutions, it still pursued African countries vigorously on a bilateral
basis. President Khatami visited Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, Sierra Leone, Benin, Zimbabwe
and Uganda in 2005. There have been numerous exchange visits between African and
Iranian leaders ever since. Sudan has been the centerpiece of Iran’s effort in Africa with
cooperation at all levels, including the possibility of sharing nuclear technology and
assistance to the military sector. Senegalese President Wade visited Iran in 2006 and
2008. He announced that Iran would build an oil refinery, chemical plant and an $80
million taxi assembly plant in Senegal. Iran has held talks with Nigeria, South Africa and
Tanzania on defense cooperation and in 2009 sent warships to the Gulf of Aden to join
the anti-piracy coalition.
In recent years, Iran has made a special effort to build ties with countries in
northeast Africa in addition to Sudan. Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda,
Tanzania and the Comoro Islands have been the subject of considerable Iranian attention.
Eritrean President Isaias visited Tehran in 2008, when the two countries signed four
agreements. According to one unconfirmed report, Iran will renovate Eritrea’s oil
refinery at the Red Sea port of Assab in exchange for the deployment of Iranian forces
there. Zimbabwe has been another focus of Iran’s interest. Iran has also been active
recently in Libya, Algeria, Cote d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Mauritania, Guinea and Malawi. In
2009, Iran and Gabon agreed to reopen their respective embassies. Iran’s foreign
minister went to Addis Ababa in 2010 to meet with African counterparts on the sidelines
of the African Union summit, where Iran has observer status.
Most of this interaction with African countries has concerned trade and
investment. In 2008, Iran exported $4.6 billion worth of goods, mostly oil, to Africa but
imported only $376 million from Africa. South Africa was by far the most important
trading partner. While there may be more rhetoric than substance to Iran-Africa ties, it is
a relationship worth watching. Underscoring this point, President Mahmoud
Ahmedinejad visited Kenya, Djibouti and the Comoro Islands in 2009 when he signed
five agreements in Djibouti, two in Nairobi and four in Moroni. In 2010, he visited Mali,
Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Kenya, the Comoro Islands and Uganda. He also hosted the Iran-
Africa summit in Tehran, which was attended by representatives of forty African
countries, including the presidents of Malawi and Senegal. Ahmedinejad offered to host
a summit in Tehran for all the African Union states. Iran regularly requests and often
obtains from its African interlocutors public statements supporting its nuclear program.

Turkey
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Turkey has been quietly following developments in Africa for many years but
stepped up its engagement in 2005 when Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan
proclaimed a year of Africa and then became the first Turkish head of government to visit
Africa south of the equator. Turkey subsequently accredited its ambassador in Addis
Ababa to the African Union. Erdogan visited Sudan the following year and addressed the
African Union summit in 2007. President Abdullah Gül went to Egypt, Kenya and
Tanzania in 2009 and Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2010.
Turkey held its first Turkey-Africa Cooperation summit in 2008 and now has twenty
embassies in Africa. In 2010, Turkey and the United Nations co-hosted a three-day
conference on Somalia in Istanbul and the Turks agreed to help train forces for the
Somali Transitional Federal Government.
Turkey’s trade with Africa reached an impressive $17 billion in 2008. It supports
development projects in thirty-seven African countries from regional offices in Addis
Ababa, Khartoum and Dakar. Some 400 Turkish companies have invested more than
$500 million in different African countries. Turkey is currently deploying more than 100
soldiers, police or experts to six of the United Nations’ seven peacekeeping missions in
Africa. Since 2009, Turkey has deployed half dozen frigates as part of the U.S.-led
Combined Task Force 151 that is conducting anti-piracy operations off Somalia.

Vietnam

The government of Vietnam laid out its national program for promoting better
relations with Africa at the first Vietnam-Africa International Forum in Hanoi in 2003.
South Africa and Vietnam signed three agreements in 2004 aimed at establishing a Bi-
National Commission. South African President Thabo Mbeki visited Vietnam in 2007
when he heaped praise on the country and its past and present leaders. Vietnam has
diplomatic relations with all African countries except Liberia, Malawi and the Comoro
Islands and expects to establish ties with them. It has opened embassies or offices in nine
African countries. The presidents of Nigeria and the Central African Republic and prime
minister of Tanzania and premier of Morocco recently visited Vietnam. In 2010, the
president of Vietnam went to Algeria and Tunisia. Vietnam hosted the second Vietnam-
Africa International Forum in 2010.
Although Vietnamese trade with Africa remains modest, it increased from $360
million in 2003 to $2 billion in 2009, most of it Vietnamese exports to Africa.
Investment is on the rise, especially in countries with an early history of socialist
principles such as Angola, Congo-Brazzaville, Mozambique and Namibia. PetroVietnam
has a 40 percent share in a consortium with Algeria’s Sonatrach for oil and gas
exploration and signed an agreement with Sudan’s state oil company to jointly invest in
oil and gas. Vietnam sent agricultural specialists to Benin and Congo-Brazzaville and
340 physicians and teachers to Angola.

Conclusion

The diplomatic playing field in Africa has become much more crowded. A
growing number of non-western nations are intensifying their contact with African
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countries. As the United States and the West generally pursue their own agendas on the
continent, they will have to take account of this significant new development.