CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Political Law Review (8th BATCH)
1. DELA LLANA vs. THE CHAIRPERSON, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY and THE NATIONAL TREASURER
FACTS: The COA issued a Circular which clarified and expanded the total lifting of
pre-audit activities on all financial transactions of NGAs, GOCCs, and LGUs.
Petitioner Dela Llana wrote to the COA regarding the recommendation of the Senate
Committee on Agriculture and Food that the Department of Agriculture set up an
internal pre-audit service. COA replied and informed petitioner of prior issuance of
Circular and required its observance.
Petitioner filed Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and argues that the pre-audit duty
on the part of the COA cannot be lifted by a mere circular, considering that pre-audit
is a constitutional mandate enshrined in Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987
Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether COA is constitutionally mandated to conduct pre-audit.
HELD: No. There is nothing in the said provision that requires the COA to conduct a
pre-audit of all government transactions and for all government agencies. The only
clear reference to a pre-audit requirement is found in Section 2, paragraph 1, which
provides that a post-audit is mandated for certain government or private entities with
state subsidy or equity and only when the internal control system of an audited entity
is inadequate. In such a situation, the COA may adopt measures, including a
temporary or special pre-audit, to correct the deficiencies.
The conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that this Court may compel the
COA to perform. This discretion on its part is in line with the constitutional
pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive authority to define the scope of its
audit and examination. When the language of the law is clear and explicit, there is no
room for interpretation, only application. Neither can the scope of the provision be
unduly enlarged by this Court.
A pre-audit is an examination of financial transactions before their consumption or
payment. It seeks to determine whether the following conditions are present:
(1) the proposed expenditure complies with an appropriation law or other specific
statutory authority;
(2) sufficient funds are available for the purpose;
(3) the proposed expenditure is not unreasonable or extravagant, and the
unexpended balance of appropriations to which it will be charged is sufficient to cover
the entire amount of the expenditure; and
(4) the transaction is approved by the proper authority and the claim is duly supported
by authentic underlying evidence.
2. RODOLFO FARINAS vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 147387. December 10, 2003
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
seeking to declare as unconstitutional Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair
Election Act), insofar as it expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881
(The Omnibus Election Code) which provides:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective official, whether national
or local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent
capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
FACTS: Rodolfo Fariñas, then a Congressman belonging to the minority group,
questioned the constitutionality of Section 14 on the ground that it violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. He averred that the repeal of Section 67 gave
elective officials undue advantage over appointive officials (discrimination). The
petitioners alleged in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it
repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in
violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have
only one subject which should be expressed in its title.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider. They
point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand,
and Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006
primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda
and the elimination of unfair election practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than
the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso
facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of
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Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor
germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.
The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the
Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar
limitation to appointive officials, thus:
SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. – Any person holding a
public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of
his certificate of candidacy.
They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive
officials. By the repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than
the one which he is holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom
upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office even
as they campaign for reelection or election for another elective position. On the other
hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials remains
- they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy.
The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as
irregularities attended its enactment into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof,
should be declared null and void. Even Section 16 of the law which provides that
“[t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval” is a violation of the due process clause
of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law
before it becomes effective.
Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a
good law; hence, should not have been repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of
the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is
based on the constitutional mandate on the “Accountability of Public Officers:”
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times
be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty
and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of
Representatives acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction for not considering those members of the House who ran for a seat in the
Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections as ipso facto resigned therefrom, upon the
filing of their respective certificates of candidacy.
ISSUES:
W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is a Rider.
W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Violative of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Constitution.
W/N Section 16 of the law which provides that “[t]his Act shall take effect upon its
approval” is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as
jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it becomes effective.
HELD: To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional
requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid
down the rule that –
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not
be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The
requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a
reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be
comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute
seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or
convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth.
The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: “An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly,
Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices.”
The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are
comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the
Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its
content.
The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which
imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they
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are holding, to the other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of
the ban on the use of media for election propaganda, does not violate the “one
subject-one title” rule. This Court has held that an act having a single general subject,
indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse
they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject,
and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method
and means of carrying out the general subject.
The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of
harassment or discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed. The
executive department found cause with Congress when the President of the
Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure, some sectors of society and in
government may believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it would
encourage political adventurism. But policy matters are not the concern of the Court.
Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the
government. It is not for this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative
determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based
on sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired
results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should
be exercised in a particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature,
and the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of
judicial cognizance. Congress is not precluded from repealing Section 67 by the ruling
of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra upholding the validity of the provision and by its
pronouncement in the same case that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over
time, Congress may find it imperative to repeal the law on its belief that the election
process is thereby enhanced and the paramount objective of election laws – the fair,
honest and orderly election of truly deserving members of Congress – is achieved.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials.
The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are
elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon
stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue
of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold
their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others
serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Finally, the “Effectivity” clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that
it “shall take effect immediately upon its approval,” is defective. However, the same
does not render the entire law invalid. In Tañada v. Tuvera, this Court laid down the
rule: ... the clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and
not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This
clause does not mean that the legislator may make the law effective immediately upon
approval, or on any other date without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended…. Following
Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine enunciated in Tañada, Rep. Act No. 9006,
notwithstanding its express statement, took effect fifteen days after its publication in
the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation.
In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in
constitutional law is that the courts do not involve themselves with nor delve into the
policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the exclusive concern of the legislative branch
of the government. When the validity of a statute is challenged on constitutional
grounds, the sole function of the court is to determine whether it transcends
constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power. No such transgression has
been shown in this case.
On Equal Protection
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject
to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial
distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated
differently from the other.
In this case, substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and
appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the
electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed
therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold
their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some
appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security
of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Further, appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly
prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in any election
except to vote; while elective officials, or officers or employees holding political
offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.
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3. KABATAAN PARTY LIST vs. COMELEC accessible to the voting public, aside from the COMELEC offices in every local
government unit, it likewise established satellite registration offices in barangays and
GR 221318, DECEMBER 16, 2015 mails.
FACTS: On February 15, 2013, President Benigno S. Aquino III signed into law RA
On April 1, 2014, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9863 which amended certain
10367, which is a consolidation of House Bill No. 3469 and Senate Bill No. 1030,
portions of Resolution No. 9853 dated February 19, 2014, by stating that ERBs shall
passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate on December 11, 2012 and
deactivate the VRRs of those who "failed to submit for validation despite notice on or
December 12, 2012, respectively. Essentially, RA 10367 mandates the COMELEC to
before October 31, 2015," and that the "deactivation for cases falling under this
implement a mandatory biometrics registration system for new voters in order to
ground shall be made during the November 16, 2015 Board hearing."
establish a clean, complete, permanent, and updated list of voters through the
adoption of biometric technology.
A month later, or in May 2014, the COMELEC launched the NoBio-NoBoto public
information campaign which ran concurrently with the period of continuing
RA 10367 likewise directs that "registered voters whose biometrics have not been
registration.
captured shall submit themselves for validation." "Voters who fail to submit for
validation on or before the last day of filing of application for registration for purposes
Petitioners filed the instant petition with application for temporary restraining
of the May 2016 Elections shall be deactivated x x x." Nonetheless, voters may have
order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (WPI) assailing the
their records reactivated after the May 2016 Elections, provided that they comply with
constitutionality of the biometrics validation requirement imposed under RA
the procedure found in Section 28 of RA 8189, also known as "The Voter's
10367, as well as COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, all related
Registration Act of 1996."
thereto. They contend that: (a) biometrics validation rises to the level of an additional,
substantial qualification where there is penalty of deactivation; (b) biometrics
On June 26, 2013, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9721 which serves as the
deactivation is not the disqualification by law contemplated by the 1987
implementing rules and regulations of RA 10367, thus, prescribing the procedure for
Constitution; (c) biometrics validation gravely violates the Constitution, considering
validation, deactivation, and reactivation of voters' registration records (VRRs).
that, applying the strict scrutiny test, it is not poised with a compelling reason for state
Among others, the said Resolution provides that: (a) "the registration records of
regulation and hence, an unreasonable deprivation of the right to suffrage; (d) voters
voters without biometrics data who failed to submit for validation on or before
to be deactivated are not afforded due process; and (e) poor experience with
the last day of filing of applications for registration for the purpose of the May
biometrics should serve as warning against exacting adherence to the system.
9, 2016 National and Local Elections shall be deactivated in the last [Election
Registration Board (ERB)] hearing to be conducted prior to said elections"; (b) "the
ISSUE: Whether or not the policy on biometrics validation, as provided under RA
following registered voters shall have their biometrics data validated: [(1)] Those
10367 and fleshed out in the assailed COMELEC Resolutions are valid.
who do not have BIOMETRICS data appearing in the Voter['s] Registration System
(VRS); and [(2)] Those who have incomplete BIOMETRICS data appearing in the
RULING: Yes. Essentially, the present petition is a constitutional challenge against
VRS"; (c) "[d]eactivated voters shall not be allowed to vote"; and (d) "deactivation
the biometrics validation requirement imposed under RA 10367, including COMELEC
x x x shall comply with the requirements on posting, ERB hearing and service
Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013. As non-compliance with the same results in
of individual notices to the deactivated voters." Resolution No. 9721 further states
the penalty of deactivation, petitioners posit that it has risen to the level of an
that, as of the last day of registration and validation for the 2013 Elections on October
unconstitutional substantive requirement in the exercise of the right of suffrage. They
31, 2012, a total of 9,018,256 registered voters were without biometrics
submit that the statutory requirement of biometric validation is no different from the
data. Accordingly, all Election Officers (EOs) were directed to "conduct an
unconstitutional requirement of literacy and property because mere non-validation
information campaign on the conduct of validation."
already absolutely curtails the exercise of the right of suffrage through
deactivation. Further, they advance the argument that deactivation is not the
The COMELEC, pursuant to the aforesaid Resolution, commenced the mandatory
biometric system of registration. To make biometric registration convenient and

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disqualification by law contemplated as a valid limitation to the exercise of suffrage
under the 1987 Constitution.
Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution delineates the current parameters for the
exercise of suffrage:
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided
in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote
for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or
other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
Dissecting the provision, one must meet the following qualifications in order to
exercise the right of suffrage: first, he must be a Filipino citizen; second, he must not
be disqualified by law; and third, he must have resided in the Philippines for at least
one (1) year and in the place wherein he proposes to vote for at least six (6) months
immediately preceding the election.
The second item more prominently reflects the franchised nature of the right of
suffrage. The State may therefore regulate said right by imposing statutory
disqualifications, with the restriction, however, that the same do not amount to, as per
the second sentence of the provision, a "literacy, property or other substantive
requirement." Based on its genesis, it may be gleaned that the limitation is geared
towards the elimination of irrelevant standards that are purely based on socio-
economic considerations that have no bearing on the right of a citizen to intelligently
cast his vote and to further the public good.
"Biometrics refers to a quantitative analysis that provides a positive identification of
an individual such as voice, photograph, fingerprint, signature, iris, and/or such other
identifiable features.
Sections 3 and 10 of RA 10367 respectively require registered and new voters
to submit themselves for biometrics validation:
Section 3. Who Shall Submit for Validation. - Registered voters whose biometrics
have not been captured shall submit themselves for validation.
Section 10. Mandatory Biometrics Registration. - The Commission shall
implement a mandatory biometrics registration system for new voters.
Under Section 2 (d) of RA 10367, "validation" is defined as "the process of taking the
biometrics of registered voters whose biometrics have not yet been captured."
The consequence of non-compliance is "deactivation" which "refers to the removal of
the registration record of the registered voter from the corresponding precinct book of
voters for failure to comply with the validation process as required by RA
10367." Section 7 states:
Section 7. Deactivation. - Voters who fail to submit for validation on or before the
last day of filing of application for registration for purposes of the May 2016
elections shall be deactivated pursuant to this Act.
Notably, the penalty of deactivation, as well as the requirement of
validation, neutrally applies to all voters. Thus, petitioners' argument that the law
creates artificial class of voters is more imagined than real. There is no favor accorded
to an "obedient group." If anything, non-compliance by the "disobedient" only rightfully
results into prescribed consequences. Surely, this is beyond the intended mantle of
the equal protection of the laws, which only works "against undue favor and individual
or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality."
In AKBAYAN-Youth, wherein the Court held that:
The act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage. For
registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element in the
election process. Thus, contrary to petitioners' argument, registration cannot and
should not be denigrated to the lowly stature of a mere statutory
requirement. Proceeding from the significance of registration as a necessary
requisite to the right to vote, the State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its
inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act
of voter's registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly
and peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-
election activities could be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic
and orderly manner - one which is not indifferent, and so far removed from the
pressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of the times.
That being said, the assailed regulation on the right to suffrage was sufficiently
justified as it was indeed narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling state interest of
establishing a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters, and was
demonstrably the least restrictive means in promoting that interest
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4. MAGDALO PARA SA PAGBABAGO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 190793: June 19, 2012
FACTS: Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for
Registration with the COMELEC, seeking its registration and/or accreditation as a
regional political party based in the National Capital Region (NCR) for participation in
the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections.
COMELEC issued its Resolution denying the Petition for Registration filed by
MAGDALO where it held that Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago should be refused
registration in accordance with Art. IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution. It is common
knowledge that the partys organizer and Chairman, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV,
and some members participated in the take-over of the Oakwood Premier Apartments
in Ayala Center, Makati City on July 27, 2003, wherein several innocent civilian
personnel were held hostage. This and the fact that they were in full battle gear at the
time of the mutiny clearly show their purpose in employing violence and using unlawful
means to achieve their goals in the process defying the laws of organized societies.
MAGDALO filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was elevated to the COMELEC
En Banc for resolution. MAGDALO filed a Manifestation and Motion for Early
Resolution dated 23 December 2009, in which it clarified its intention to participate in
the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections as a party-list group. COMELEC En
Banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by MAGDALO.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the
Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO on the ground that the latter seeks to
achieve its goals through violent or unlawful means?
HELD: COMELECS Resolutions are sustained.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Election
To join electoral contests, a party or organization must undergo the two-step process
of registration and accreditation, as this Court explained in Liberal Party v.
COMELEC:
x x x Registration is the act that bestows juridical personality for purposes of our
election laws; accreditation, on the other hand, relates to the privileged participation
that our election laws grant to qualified registered parties.
x x x Accreditation can only be granted to a registered political party, organization or
coalition; stated otherwise, a registration must first take place before a request for
accreditation can be made. Once registration has been carried out, accreditation is
the next natural step to follow.
Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and
coalitions that "seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means" shall
be denied registration. This disqualification is reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881,
which provides that "no political party which seeks to achieve its goal through violence
shall be entitled to accreditation."
Violence is the unjust or unwarranted exercise of force, usually with the
accompaniment of vehemence, outrage or fury. It also denotes physical force
unlawfully exercised; abuse of force; that force which is employed against common
right, against the laws, and against public liberty. On the other hand, an unlawful act
is one that is contrary to law and need not be a crime, considering that the latter must
still unite with evil intent for it to exist.
The power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution and Section 61 of
BP 881 in the COMELEC to register political parties and ascertain the eligibility of
groups to participate in the elections is purely administrative in character. In exercising
this authority, the COMELEC only has to assess whether the party or organization
seeking registration or accreditation pursues its goals by employing acts considered
as violent or unlawful, and not necessarily criminal in nature. Although this process
does not entail any determination of administrative liability, as it is only limited to the
evaluation of qualifications for registration, the ruling of this Court in Quarto v. Marcelo
is nonetheless analogously applicable.
DISMISSED
5. JALOSJOS vs. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 192474]
FACTS: While serving as Mayor of Tampilasan Zamboanga del Norte, Petitioner,
Romeo Jalosjos sought the transfer of his voter's registration record to Precint 0051F
of Barangay Veterans Village, Zamboanga Sibugay. Dan Erasmo filed a petition with
the MCTC which rendered judgement excluding Jalosjos from the list of voters in
question on the ground that he did not abandon his domicile in Tampilasan and is still
the incumbent mayor.
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Jalosjos appealed the decision to the RTC but the MCTC ruling was affirmed.
Through a petition for certiorari with an application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, Jalosjos elevated the case to the CA. His application was
granted and his name was reinstated in the voter's list pending resolution of the
petition.
Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the
Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay for the May 2010 national elections. This
prompted Erasmo to file a petition with the COMELEC to deny or cancel said COC.
His petition was denied by the COMELEC for insufficiency in form and substance.
Pending Erasmo's motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc, Jalosjos
won the elections and was proclaimed representative.
Meanwhile, CA rendered in his favor judgement on the pending petition. Erasmo filed
a petition for review of the CA's decision before the Supreme Court.
Thereafter, COMELEC en banc granted Erasmo's motion anf declared Jalosjos
ineligible to seek election as representative for not satisfying the residency
requirement because of his incumbency as mayor of Tampilisan.
Thus, the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to pass upon the question
of Jalosjos’ residency qualification considering that he has been proclaimed winner in
the election and has assumed the discharge of that office.
RULING: While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to decide all
questions affecting elections, such power is not without limitation. It does not extend
to contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the
House of Representatives and the Senate. The Constitution vests the resolution of
these contests solely upon the appropriate Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the
House of Representatives.
The proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests
COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the proclaimed Representative in favor of the HRET.
After Jalosjos' proclamation, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction when it still
passed upon the issue of his qualification and declared him ineligible for the office of
Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay.
On election day of 2010 the COMELEC En Banc had as yet to resolve Erasmo’s
appeal from the Second Division’s dismissal of the disqualification case against
Jalosjos. Thus, there then existed no final judgment deleting Jalosjos’ name from the
list of candidates for the congressional seat he sought. The last standing official
action in his case before election day was the ruling of the COMELEC’s Second
Division that allowed his name to stay on that list. Meantime, the COMELEC En Banc
did not issue any order suspending his proclamation pending its final resolution of his
case.
With the fact of his proclamation and assumption of office, any issue regarding his
qualification for the same, like his alleged lack of the required residence, was solely
for the HRET to consider and decide.
Consequently, the Court holds in G.R. 192474 that the COMELEC En Banc exceeded
its jurisdiction in declaring Jalosjos ineligible for the position of representative for the
Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay, which he won in the elections, since it had
ceased to have jurisdiction over his case. Necessarily, Erasmo’s petitions (G.R.
192704 and G.R. 193566) questioning the validity of the registration of Jalosjos as a
voter and the COMELEC’s failure to annul his proclamation also fail. The Court
cannot usurp the power vested by the Constitution solely on the HRET.
Court GRANTED the petition, REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the respondent
COMELEC En Banc’s order, and REINSTATES the Commission’s Second Division
resolution.
6. JALOSJOS vs. COMELEC
GR 193237; 9 October 2012
FACTS: Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City on October 26, 1973. He migrated
to Australia in 1981 when he was eight years old and there acquired Australian
citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he decided to return to the Philippines
and lived with his brother in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Four days upon his return, he
took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, hence, he was issued a
Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. On
September 1, 2009 he renounced his Australian citizenship, executing a sworn
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renunciation of the same in compliance with Republic Act (R.A.) 9225. From the time
of his return, Jalosjos acquired a residential property in the same village where he
lived. He applied for registration as a voter in the Municipality of Ipil but respondent
Erasmo, the Barangay Captain, opposed the said act. Election Registration Board
approved it and included Jalosjos’ name in the COMELEC voters list.
Erasmo filed before the MTC a petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos’ name from the
official voters list. MTC denied Erasmo’s petition. He appealed to RTC but RTC ruled
same as MTC’s. On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy
(COC) for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay Province for the May 10, 2010 elections.
Erasmo filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel Jalosjos’ COC on the ground
that Jalosjos made material misrepresentation in the same since he failed to comply
with (1) the requirements of R.A. 9225 and (2) the one-year residency requirement of
the Local Government Code. COMELEC ruled against Jalosjos, because it failed to
comply with the 1-year residency ruequirement. Jalosjos won the elections
ISSUE: Whether Jalosjos failed to comply with the 1-year residency requirement
HELD: Yes. It is clear from the facts that Quezon City was Jalosjos’ domicile of origin,
the place of his birth. His domicile was changed from Quezon City to Australia when
he migrated there at the age of eight, acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that
country for 26 years. Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by choice.
But, when he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in
Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his
domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced
his allegiance to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by taking
an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued
a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration.
By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he
gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay.
7. JALOSJOS vs. COMELEC
GR 205033, 18 June 2013
FACTS: On November 16, 2001 the court convicted Romeo G. Jalosjos by final
judgment of two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness.
Consequently, he was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion
perpetua and reclusion temporal for each count, respectively, which carried the
accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification pursuant to Article 41 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC).
On April 30, 2007, then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued an order
commuting his prison term to sixteen (16) years, three (3) months and three (3)
days. After serving the same, he was issued a Certificate of Discharge From Prison
on March 18, 2009.
On April 26, 2012, petitioner applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga City.
However, because of his previous conviction, his application was denied by the Acting
City Election Officer, prompting him to file a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent
List of Voters before the MTC.
Pending resolution of the same, he filed a CoC on October 5, 2012, seeking to run as
mayor for Zamboanga City.
On October 18, 2012, the MTCC denied his Petition for Inclusion on account of his
perpetual absolute disqualification which in effect, deprived him of the right to vote in
any election.
Meanwhile, five (5) petitions were lodged before the COMELEC praying for the denial
of due course to and/or cancellation of petitioner’s CoC. Pending resolution, the
COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution No. 9613 on January 15, 2013, resolving
“to CANCEL and DENY due course the Certificate of Candidacy filed by Romeo G.
Jalosjos as Mayor of Zamboanga City in the May 13, 2013 National and Local
Elections”
ISSUE: Whether petitioner’s perpetual absolute disqualification to run for elective
office had already been removed by Section 40(a) of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the “Local Government Code of 1991”
HELD: The petition is bereft of merit.
In Jalosjos, Jr. and Cardino, 683 SCRA 1 (2012), the Court held that the COMELEC’s
denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC in view of a candidate’s
disqualification to run for elective office based on a final conviction is subsumed
under its mandate to enforce and administer all laws relating to the conduct of
elections. Accordingly, in such a situation, it is the COMELEC’s duty to cancel motu
proprio the candidate’s CoC, notwithstanding the absence of any petition initiating a
quasi-judicial proceeding for the resolution of the same.
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In this light, there is also no violation of procedural due process since the
COMELEC En Banc would be acting in a purely administrative manner.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing
orders as determined by proper governmental organs. As petitioner’s disqualification
to run for public office had already been settled in a previous case and now stands
beyond dispute, it is incumbent upon the COMELEC En Banc to cancel his CoC as a
matter of course, else it be remiss in fulfilling its duty to enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. Equally compelling is the
fact that the denial of petitioner’s Petition for Inclusion as a registered voter in
Zamboanga City had already attained finality by virtue of the RTC’s Order dated
October 31, 2012. In this accord, petitioner’s non-compliance with the voter
registration requirement under Section 39(a) of the LGC is already beyond question
and likewise provides a sufficient ground for the cancellation of his CoC altogether.
Section 40(a) of the LGC, applicable as it is to local elective candidates, provides:
SEC. 40. Disqualifications.—The following persons are disqualified from running for
any elective local position: (a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense
involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;) And on the other hand,
Article 30 of the RPC reads: ART. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or
temporary absolute disqualification.—The penalties of perpetual or temporary
absolute disqualification for public office shall produce the following effects: 1. The
deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may have held,
even if conferred by popular election. 2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any
election for any popular office or to be elected to such office. 3. The
disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of any of
the rights mentioned. In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is
comprised in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article shall last during the term of the
sentence. 4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office
formerly held. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Keeping with the above-
mentioned statutory construction principle, the Court observes that the conflict
between these provisions of law may be properly reconciled. In particular, while
Section 40(a) of the LGC allows a prior convict to run for local elective office after the
lapse of two (2) years from the time he serves his sentence, the said provision should
not be deemed to cover cases wherein the law imposes a penalty, either as
principal or accessory, which has the effect of disqualifying the convict to run
for elective office. An example of this would be Article 41 of the RPC, which imposes
the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification as an accessory to the principal
penalties of reclusion perpetuaand reclusion temporal: ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua
and reclusion temporal―Their accessory penalties.―The penalties of reclusion
perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life
or during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual
absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as
to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the
pardon. In this relation, Article 30 of the RPC, as earlier cited, provides that the penalty
of perpetual absolute disqualification has the effect of depriving the convicted felon of
the privilege to run for elective office. To note, this penalty, as well as other penalties
of similar import, is based on the presumptive rule that one who is rendered
infamous by conviction of a felony, or other base offense indicative of moral
turpitude, is unfit to hold public office, as the same partakes of a privilege which
the State grants only to such classes of persons which are most likely to exercise it
for the common good.
Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code should be considered as a law of
general application and therefore, must yield to the more definitive Revised Penal
Code provisions in line with the principle of lex specialis derogat generali
Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code expressly states that one who is previously
convicted of a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal continues
to suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification even though
pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the said accessory penalty shall have
been expressly remitted in the pardon
8. SVETLANA P. JALOSJOS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS et al.
FACTS: Private respondents come before this Court on the sole issue of who
between the vice-mayor and the second placer shall assume office pursuant to the
final determination of petitioner's ineligibility to run for office and the lifting of the 07
September 2010 Status Quo Order.
Petitioner, on the other hand, questions the Decision, by raising the following
arguments:
1. This Court erred in concluding that there are inconsistencies in the Joint Affidavit
of the witnesses presented by petitioner.
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2. Petitioners stay in Brgy. Punta Miray should be considered in determining the one-
year residency requirement in the same municipality.
3. Petitioners registration as a voter presupposes she has stayed in the municipality
at least six months prior to the registration.
4. Petitioners certificate of candidacy (COC) should not be cancelled, absent any
finding of a deliberate attempt to deceive the electorate.
5. COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction to decide on the question of the
qualification of petitioner after she was proclaimed as winner.
The court denied the motion of petitioner and granted the partial motion for
reconsideration of private respondents.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner was residing in the area where she ran for public office
for the purposes for fulfilling the candidacy requirements.
HELD: Petitioners motion for reconsideration is denied.
POLITICAL LAW: residence; temporary stay in a strangers house is not
residence
The claim of actual and physical residence in Brgy. Tugas since 2008 is contradicted
by the statements that petitioner was staying in Mrs. Lourdes Yaps house while her
residential unit was being constructed; and that by December 2009, the construction
was still ongoing.
Petitioner questions the inconsistencies noted by the court in the affidavit of her
witnesses who, while claiming that they personally know her to have been an actual
and physical resident of Brgy. Tugas since 2008, declared in the same affidavit that
while her house was being constructed, she used to stay at the residence of Mrs.
Lourdes Yap (Mrs. Yap) in Brgy. Punta Miray.
The declaration of petitioners witnesses that they know petitioner to be "an actual and
physical resident of Brgy. Tugas since 2008" contradicts their statements that (1) they
have "started the construction of the residential house of the owner and other
infrastructures of the resort since January 2009"; (2) "until the present (meaning until
December 2009 when they executed their affidavit), the construction and
development projects are still on-going"; and (3) "at times when Ms. Jalosjos is in
Baliangao, she used to stay in the house of Mrs. Lourdes Yap at Sitio Balas Diut,
Brgy. Punta Miray, Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, while her residential house was
still being constructed."
Petitioner asserts that there are no inconsistencies in the statements of her witnesses,
and that the statements are in fact consistent with her claim that she had been
residing in Baliangao, Misamis Occidental for at least one year prior to the 10 May
2010 elections. She argues as follows:
The fact that some of these witnesses knew that petitioner lived in the house of Mrs.
Lourdes Yap in a different barangay, particularly Brgy. Punta Miray, is not at all
inconsistent or contradictory with petitioners assertion and the witnesses statements
that petitioner resides in Brgy. Tugas, because petitioner obviously needed a place to
stay while her residence in Brgy. Tugas was being constructed. This does not negate
the fact that petitioner was establishing her residence in Brgy. Tugas since the latter
part of 2008, or at the very latest during the first few months (sic) of January 2009.
Her assertion that she "was establishing her residence in Brgy. Tugas since the latter
part of 2008, or at the very latest during the first few months [sic] of January 2009"
shows that she herself cannot pinpoint the particular date when she established her
legal residence in Brgy. Tugas. This fact is contradictory to the declaration of the
witnesses that "we have personal knowledge that Ms. Svetlana P. Jalosjos has been
an actual and physical resident of Sunrise Tugas, Baliangao, Misamis Occidental,
after she bought the properties thereat from the Heirs of Agapita Yap, Jr. on 9
December 2008."
To be an actual and physical resident of a locality, one must have a dwelling place
where one resides no matter how modest and regardless of ownership. The mere
purchase of a parcel of land does not make it ones residence. The fact that the
residential structure where petitioner intends to reside was still under construction on
the lot she purchased means that she has not yet established actual and physical
residence in the barangay, contrary to the declaration of her witnesses that she has
been an actual and physical resident of Brgy. Tugas since 2008.
Petitioner wants this Court to believe that the ongoing construction referred to by her
witnesses in their joint affidavit does not refer to the residential structure, but to the
other structures in the resort that petitioner was then establishing. She does not
assert, however, that her residential unit had already been completed by that time. In
fact, she has failed to present any proof as to when her claimed residential unit was
completed, or when she transferred to the unit.
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It must be pointed out that the second statement in paragraph 1 of the Joint Affidavit
states: "We have started the construction of the residential house of the owner and
the other infrastructures of the resort since January, 2009." This was immediately
followed by paragraph 2 which reads:
2. Until the present, the construction and development projects are still ongoing. To
establish the fact of the on-going construction work, we are attaching herewith as part
hereof, pictures we have taken on December 20 and 29, 2009 marked Annexes "1",
"2", "3", "4", "5", and "6" hereof, respectively.
Without any qualification as to what is being referred to by the construction and
development projects in paragraph 2, it follows that it refers to the "construction of the
residential house of the owner and the other infrastructures of the resort" found in the
prior statement.
In the affidavit, there is no mention whatsoever of completion of the residential house
as of 30 December 2009. Neither has any occupancy permit been presented by
petitioner to definitely establish the date she started occupying what she claims to be
her residential unit in the resort.
Petitioner takes pains to present photographs of other structures in the resort, but fails
to present any photograph of a completed residential structure, which is more relevant
in proving her claimed residence in Brgy. Tugas. If the residential unit was already
completed by December 2009, her witnesses could have easily testified to that fact
and presented photographs of the structure.
This absence of any photograph proving the alleged residence of petitioner in the
resort bolsters the courts conclusion that at the time the witnesses signed their
affidavits in December 2009, or six months prior to the May 2010 elections, her
residential unit had not yet been built.
A temporary stay in a strangers house cannot amount to residence.
Petitioner wants this Court to credit her stay in Mrs. Yaps house as proof that she had
been a resident of the Municipality of Baliangao for more than one year prior to the
10 May 2010 elections. In her words:
7. More importantly, if this Honorable Court would consider the circumstance that
petitioner was staying in Brgy. Punta Miray as true so as to render the statements of
her witnesses inconsistent, then such a consideration should not have led this
Honorable Court to the conclusion that petitioner was not a resident of Baliangao,
Misamis Occidental since Brgy. Punta Miray is located in the municipality of Baliangao
like Brgy. Tugas. In other words, the fact that petitioner was staying in a house in
Brgy. Punta Miray while her residence in Brgy. Tugas was being constructed during
the early part of 2009 would STILL LEAD to the conclusion that petitioner has been
residing in Baliangao, Misamis Occidental for at least one (1) year prior to the 10 May
2010 elections since Brgy. Punta Miray is a part of Baliangao.
Petitioner relies on Mitra v. COMELEC and Sabili v. COMELEC in claiming that "the
series of events whereby petitioner first had her residence constructed ... after she
purchased in 2008 the property where her residence was eventually established, and
while she lived in another barangay of the same municipality, and then eventually
moved in to her residence in Brgy. Tugas amounted to an incremental process of
transferring residence."
Petitioners case must be differentiated from Mitra in that petitioner therein presented
not only the notarized lease contract over the property where he claimed to be
residing, but also "a residence certificate ... and an identification card of the House of
Representatives showing Aborlan as his residence."
In Sabili, the Court declared that "the existence of a house and lot apparently owned
by petitioners common-law wife, with whom he has been living for over two decades,
makes plausible petitioners allegation of bodily presence and intent to reside in the
area."
Petitioners stay in the house of Mrs. Yap in Brgy. Punta Miray, on the other hand, was
only a temporary and intermittent stay that does not amount to residence. It was never
the intention of petitioner to reside in that barangay, as she only stayed there at times
when she was in Baliangao while her house was being constructed. Her temporary
stay in Brgy. Punta Miray cannot be counted as residence in Baliangao.
Petitioner failed to show by what right she stayed in Mrs. Yaps house. Except for the
declarations of her witnesses that she stayed there while her residential unit in the
resort was being built, she presented no other evidence to show any basis of her right
to stay in that particular house as a resident.
POLITICAL LAW: approval of voter registration does not presuppose residency
in the place
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Approval of voter registration does not presuppose six-month residency in the place
prior to registration.
It appears on record that petitioner, in filing her application for registration as a voter
on 7 May 2009, claimed "that she has been a resident of Brgy. Tugas, Baliangao,
Misamis Occidental for six (6) months prior to the filing of the said registration."For
her claim to be true, she must have resided in Brgy. Tugas on or before 8 November
2008. The records, however, show that she purchased property in Brgy. Tugas only
on December 2008. Thus, her claim that she had been a resident of Brgy. Tugas for
at least six (6) months prior to her application for registration as a voter on 7 May
2009 is an utter falsity.
The approval of the registration of petitioner as a voter does not and cannot carry with
it an affirmation of the falsehood and misrepresentation as to the period of her
residence in Brgy. Tugas. At best, the approval of her registration as a voter carries
a presumption that the registrant will be able to meet the six-month residency
requirement for the elections in which the registrant intends to vote.It does not prove
that the registrant has resided in the locality for more than one year prior to the
elections.
Representation that one is qualified to run for public office when proven false
constitutes a deliberate attempt to deceive the electorate.
Petitioner contends that the Court erred in upholding the cancellation of her COC
despite the glaring absence of any finding made by the respondent COMELEC in its
assailed Resolution that petitioner committed a false material representation in said
COC.
The finding of the COMELEC that petitioner lacks the one year residency requirement
to run for local elective position in the municipality of Baliangao directly contradicts
her sworn declaration that she is eligible to run for public office. The fact that petitioner
failed to prove that she has been a resident of the locality for at least one year prior
to the elections reveals the falsity of her assertion in her COC that she is qualified to
run for a local elective position. This false material representation justifies the
cancellation of her COC.
When the candidates claim of eligibility is proven false, as when the candidate failed
to substantiate meeting the required residency in the locality, the representation of
eligibility in the COC constitutes a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide
the fact"of ineligibility.
COMELEC is not ousted of jurisdiction to decide a petition for cancellation of the
certificate of candidacy after the winner is proclaimed.
The COMELEC, in its Resolution dated 19 August 2010, citing Aquino v. COMELEC,
has amply discussed this matter, thus:
Petitioners contention that "after the conduct of the election and (petitioner) has been
established the winner of the electoral exercise from the moment of election, the
COMELEC is automatically divested of authority to pass upon the question of
qualification" finds no basis in law, because even after the elections the COMELEC
is empowered by Section 6 (in relation to Section 7) of R.A. 6646 to continue to hear
and decide questions relating to qualifications of candidates. Section 6 states: Effect
of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to
be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted.
If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to
be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.
Under the above-quoted provision, not only is a disqualification case against a
candidate allowed to continue after the election (and does not oust the COMELEC of
its jurisdiction), but his obtaining the highest number of votes will not result in the
suspension or termination of the proceedings against him when the evidence of guilt
is strong. While the phrase "when the evidence of guilt is strong" seems to suggest
that the provisions of Section 6 ought to be applicable only to disqualification cases
under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, Section 7 of R.A. 6646 allows the
application of the provisions of Section 6 to cases involving disqualification based on
ineligibility under Section 78 of B.P. 881. Section 7 states:
SECTION 7. Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy.
The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petition to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy based on Sec. 78 of Batas Pambansa 881.
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POLITICAL LAW: de facto officer; who assumes position in case of
disqualification of officer
The cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of an ineligible candidate who has
assumed office renders the officer a de facto officer.
This Court has ruled in Aratea v. COMELEC and Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC that the
cancellation of the COC based on an ineligibility that existed at the time of its filing
means that the candidate was never a valid candidate from the very beginning.
On the question of who should assume the post vacated by the ineligible candidate,
this Court amply explained in Jalosjos, Jr. that:
Decisions of this Court holding that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if
the first-placer is disqualified or declared ineligible should be limited to situations
where the certificate of candidacy of the first placer was valid at the time of filing but
subsequently had to be cancelled because of a violation of law that took place, or a
legal impediment that took effect, after the filing of the certificate of candidacy. If the
certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then legally the person who filed such void
certificate of candidacy was never a candidate in the elections at any time. All votes
for such non-candidate are stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such non-
candidate can never be a first-placer in the elections. If a certificate of candidacy void
ab initio is cancelled on the day, or before the day, of the election, prevailing
jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are stray votes. If a certificate of
candidacy void ab initio is cancelled one day or more after the elections, all votes for
such candidate should also be stray votes because the certificate of candidacy is void
from the very beginning.
There is another more compelling reason why the eligible candidate who garnered
the highest number of votes must assume the office. The ineligible candidate who
was proclaimed and who already assumed office is a de facto officer by virtue of the
ineligibility.
The rule on succession in Section 44 of the Local Government Code cannot apply in
instances when a de facto officer is ousted from office and the de jure officer takes
over. The ouster of a de facto officer cannot create a permanent vacancy as
contemplated in the Local Government Code. There is no vacancy to speak of as the
de jure officer, the rightful winner in the elections, has the legal right to assume the
position.
9. ROGELIO BATIN CABALLERO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND
JONATHAN ENRIQUE V. NANUD, JR.
G.R. No. 209835, September 22, 2015, PERALTA, J.
Naturalization in a foreign country may result in an abandonment of domicile in the
Philippines.
FACTS: Enrique Nanud filed a petition to cancel Rogelio Caballero’s certificate of
candidacy (COC) on the ground of false representation. It was alleged that Caballero
was actually a Canadian citizen, hence ineligible to run for mayor. Caballero argued
that he already took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and has renounced his
Canadian citizenship.
Comelec nevertheless cancelled the Caballero’s COC for failure to comply with the
one year residency requirement, reasoning that Caballero’s naturalization as a
Canadian citizen resulted in the abandonment of his domicile of origin in Uyugan,
Batanes. Caballero insisted that the requirement of the law in fixing the residence
qualification of a candidate running for public office is not strictly on the period of
residence in the place where he seeks to be elected but on the acquaintance by the
candidate on his constituents' vital needs for their common welfare; and that his nine
months of actual stay in Uyugan, Batanes prior to his election is a substantial
compliance with the law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Caballero abandoned his domicile.
RULING: Yes. The term “residence” is to be understood not in its common
acceptation as referring to “dwelling” or “habitation,” but rather to “domicile” or legal
residence, that is, the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent
home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually
intends to return and remain (animus manendi). A domicile of origin is acquired by
every person at birth. It is usually the place where the child's parents reside and
continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of
choice). It consists not only in the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
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In this case, Caballero was a natural born Filipino who was born and raised in Uyugan,
Batanes. Thus, it could be said that he had his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes.
However, he later worked in Canada and became a Canadian citizen. Naturalization
in a foreign country may result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. This
holds true in Caballero's case as permanent resident status in Canada is required for
the acquisition of Canadian citizenship. Hence, Caballero had effectively abandoned
his domicile in the Philippines and transferred his domicile of choice in Canada. His
frequent visits to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacation from work in Canada cannot
be considered as waiver of such abandonment.
Moreover, it was held that Caballero’s retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA
9225 did not automatically make him regain his residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He
must still prove that after becoming a Philippine citizen on September 13, 2012, he
had reestablished Uyugan, Batanes as his new domicile of choice which is reckoned
from the time he made it as such.
10. AGAPITO CARDINO vs. COMELEC EN BANC
FACTS: The petitioner and rosalina jalosjos both ran for the position of mayor of
dapitan city. Jalosjos was the one proclaimed as the winner with 18k votes. This
resulted to petitioner filing a petition for quo warranto before COMELEC to nullify the
candidacy of jalosjos on the ground of ineligibility on the ground of citizenship.
Cardino alleged that Jalosjos was a former natural-born Filipino citizen who
subsequently became a naturalized citizen of the United States of America (USA).
Jalosjos later applied for the reacquisition of her Filipino citizenship under Republic
Act No. 92255 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in Los Angeles,
California, USA. On August 2, 2009, Jalosjos took her Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and an Order of Approval of citizenship retention and
reacquisition was issued in her favor. However, when Jalosjos filed her Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) for Mayor of Dapitan City on October 1, 2012, she attached
therein an Affidavit of Renunciation of her American citizenship that was
subscribed and sworn to on July 16, 2012 before Judge Veronica C. De
Guzman-Laput of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Manukan, Zamboanga del
Norte.
Cardino averred that based on the certification from the Bureau of Immigration,
Jalosjos left the Philippines for the USA on May 30, 2012 and she presented her
US passport to the immigration authorities. Jalosjos then arrived back in the
Philippines via Delta Airlines Flight No. 173 on July 17, 2012 at around 10:45
p.m. using her US passport. he alleged that there is a physical impossibility and
alleged that Jalosjos' Affidavit of Renunciation was a falsified document that had no
legal effect. As such, when Jalosjos filed her COC for Mayor of Dapitan City, she still
possessed both Philippine and American citizenships and was therefore disqualified
from running for any elective local position.
As a defense, Jalosjos answered that the date of "16th day of July, 2012" was
mistakenly indicated in the Affidavit of Renunciation instead of its actual
execution date of July 19, 2012. Jalosjos claimed that it was on the latter date
that she appeared before Judge De Guzman-Laput to execute a personal and
sworn renunciation of her American citizenship. Jalosjos further contended that
Cardino failed to show that Judge De Guzman-Laput denied having administered the
oath that Jalosjos took as she renounced said citizenship.
The COMELEC ruled for the dismissal of the petition for quo warranto, since, the
affidavit of renunciation cannot be considered falsified but only one containing clerical
error in the date of execution.
ISSUE: Won the COMELEC is liable for grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction for dismissing the petition for quo warranto.
HELD: The case at bar has already been rendered as moot and academic. Since, the
mayorship of Dapitan City following the May 13, 2013 Elections, already expired on
June 30, 2016. However, we deem it appropriate to resolve the petition on the
merits considering that litigation on the question of Jalosjos' citizenship is
capable of repetition in that it is likely to recur if she would run again for public
office.
The present case arose from a petition for quo warranto filed by Cardino under
Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code, which pertinently reads:
Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. - Any voter contesting the election of any
Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the
ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall
file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the [COMELEC] within ten days after
the proclamation of the results of the election.
According to Cardino, the ineligibility of Jalosjos stemmed from the fact that she was
a dual citizen of the Philippines and the USA when she submitted her COC for Mayor
in the May 13, 2013 elections.
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In Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, the Court explained in detail the
requirements that must be complied with under Republic Act No. 9225 before a
person with dual citizenship can be qualified to run for any elective public office, to
wit:
[Republic Act] No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship
for natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic, thus:
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. - Any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost
their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship
upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship
upon taking the aforesaid oath.
The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores one's Filipino citizenship
and all civil and political rights and obligations concomitant therewith, subject to
certain conditions imposed in Section 5, viz:
Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and
be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of
the Philippines and the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements
under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known
as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make
a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath;
xxxx
In this case, the crux of the controversy involves the validity of Jalosjos' Affidavit of
Renunciation. Cardino asserts the spuriousness of the affidavit based on the date of
its supposed execution on July 16, 2012; whereas Jalosjos claims otherwise, insisting
that while the affidavit was so dated, the same was merely an error as the affidavit
was executed and subscribed to on July 19, 2012.
The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the ruling of the Second Division that the date
of July 16, 2012 in the Affidavit of Renunciation was indeed a clerical error. The
COMELEC Second Division gave greater weight to the evidence offered by
Jalosjos, particularly the testimony of Judge De Guzman-Laput, who
unequivocally stated that Jalosjos personally appeared before her sala "n July
19, 2012 to subscribe to the Affidavit of Renunciation.
After carefully reviewing the evidence on hand, the Court finds no proper reason to
disturb the factual findings of the COMELEC. We reiterate our ruling in Typoco v.
Commission on Elections that:
The findings of fact of administrative bodies, when supported by substantial
evidence, are final and nonreviewable by courts of justice. This principle is
applied with greater force when the case concerns the COMELEC, because the
framers of the Constitution intended to place the poll body - created and
explicitly made independent by the Constitution itself- on a level higher than
statutory administrative organs.
To repeat, the Court is not a trier of facts. The Court's function, as mandated by
the Constitution, is merely to check whether or not the governmental branch or
agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it
simply erred or has a different view. Time and again, the Court has held that a
petition for certiorari against actions of the COMELEC is confined only to
instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent and substantial
denial of due process, because the COMELEC is presumed to be most
competent in matters falling within its domain.
Notably, the Court arrived at a similar conclusion in resolving the administrative case
filed by Cardino against Judge De Guzman-Laput relative to the incidents of this case.
Thus, in our Resolution24 dated June 18, 2014 in OCA IPI No. 13-2627-MTJ, we
adopted and approved the following conclusions of law and recommendations of the
OCA:
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EVALUATION: On the issue of falsification, this Office finds for respondent
Judge. There was really no reason why respondent Judge would have to falsify
the date of the notarization of the Affidavit of Renunciation when indicating the
actual date of notarization, 19 July 2012, would not have affected the validity of
the affidavit. There was no deadline to reckon with since the Affidavit of
Renunciation was required to be executed, at the latest, on the day of the filing
of the Certificate of Candidacy and Jalosjos filed it later or on 1 October 2012.
In sum, the facts surrounding this particular issue lead to the conclusion that
the date appearing in the Affidavit of Renunciation is the result of an honest
mistake. Furthermore, respondent Judge could not have falsified the Affidavit of
Renunciation just to do Jalosjos a favor. Respondent Judge was correct in saying that
if there was anybody who benefited from her inadvertence, it was complainant since
the mistake gave him a ground to question the validity of the election of Jalosjos as
mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga [d]el Norte.
11. JOEL G. MIRANDA vs. ANTONIO M. ABAYA and the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
FACTS: The aforementioned resolution dated December 8, 1998 reversed and set
aside the earlier resolution of the First Division of the Comelec dated May 16, 1998,
dismissing private respondents petition to declare the substitution of Jose Pempe
Miranda by petitioner as candidate for the City of Santiagos mayoralty post void.
Briefly, the pertinent factual backdrop is summarized as follows:
On March 24, 1998, Jose Pempe Miranda, then incumbent mayor of Santiago City,
Isabela, filed his certificate of candidacy for the same mayoralty post for the
synchronized May 11, 1998 elections.
On March 27, 1998, private respondent Antonio M. Abaya filed a Petition to Deny Due
Course to and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy (pp. 26-33, Rollo), which was
docketed as SPA No. 98-019. The petition was GRANTED by the Comelec in its
resolution dated May 5, 1998 (pp. 36-43, Rollo). The Comelec further ruled to
DISQUALIFY Jose Pempe Miranda.
On May 6, 1998, way beyond the deadline for filing a certificate of candidacy,
petitioner Joel G. Miranda filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty post,
supposedly as a substitute for his father, Jose Pempe Miranda.
During the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner and private respondent vied for the
mayoralty seat, with petitioner garnering 22,002 votes, 1,666 more votes than private
respondent who got only 20, 336 votes.
On May 13, 1998, private respondent filed a Petition to Declare Null and Void
Substitution with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order, which was docketed as SPA No. 98-288. He prayed
for the nullification of petitioners certificate of candidacy for being void ab initio
because the certificate of candidacy of Jose Pempe Miranda, whom petitioner was
supposed to substitute, had already been cancelled and denied due course.
On May 16, 1998, Comelecs First Division dismissed SPA No. 98-288 motu proprio
(pp. 57-61, Rollo). Private respondent moved for reconsideration (pp. 62-72, Rollo).
On December 8, 1998, the Comelec En Banc rendered the assailed decision
aforequoted, resolving to GRANT the motion for reconsideration, thus nullifying the
substitution by petitioner Joel G. Miranda of his father as candidate for the mayoralty
post of Santiago City.
On December 9, 1998, petitioner sought this Courts intercession via a petition for
certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. On December 11, 1998, the Court resolved to issue a
temporary restraining order and to require respondents to comment on the petition.
On December 14, 1998, private respondent filed his Comment (pp. 140-187 and 188-
234, Rollo) and on February 16, 1999, the Comelec, through its counsel, the Solicitor
General, filed its Comment (pp. 254-265, Rollo). The Court required petitioner to file
a consolidated reply within 10 days from notice, but petitioner twice asked for an
extension of the period. Without granting the motions for extension of time to file
consolidated reply, the Court decided to resolve the controversy in favor of petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether the annulment of petitioners substitution and proclamation was
issued without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction
RULING:
SEC. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal. If after the last
day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or
accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person
belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of
candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The
substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate
of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later
than mid-day of the day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification
should occur between the day before the election and mid-day of election day, said
certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision
where he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire
electorate of the country, with the Commission.
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Petitioner capitalizes on the fact that the Comelec ruled to disqualify Jose Pempe
Miranda in the May 5, 1998 resolution and he heavily relies upon the above-quoted
provision allowing substitution of a candidate who has been disqualified for any cause.
While there is no dispute as to whether or not a nominee of a registered or accredited
political party may substitute for a candidate of the same party who had been
disqualified for any cause, this does not include those cases where the certificate of
candidacy of the person to be substituted had been denied due course and cancelled
under Section 78 of the Code.
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. While the law enumerated the occasions where
a candidate may be validly substituted, there is no mention of the case where a
candidate is excluded not only by disqualification but also by denial and cancellation
of his certificate of candidacy. Under the foregoing rule, there can be no valid
substitution for the latter case, much in the same way that a nuisance candidate
whose certificate of candidacy is denied due course and/or cancelled may not be
substituted. If the intent of the lawmakers were otherwise, they could have so easily
and conveniently included those persons whose certificates of candidacy have been
denied due course and/or cancelled under the provisions of Section 78 of the Code.
More importantly, under the express provisions of Section 77 of the Code, not just
any person, but only an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party
may be substituted. In Bautista vs. Comelec (G.R. No. 133840, November 13, 1998)
this Court explicitly ruled that a cancelled certificate does not give rise to a valid
candidacy (p.13).
A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considered a candidate in
much the same way as any person who has not filed any certificate of candidacy at
all cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be a candidate at all.
The law clearly provides:
SEC. 73. Certificate of candidacy No person shall be eligible for any elective public
office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.
By its express language, the foregoing provision of law is absolutely mandatory. It is
but logical to say that any person who attempts to run for an elective office but does
not file a certificate of candidacy, is not a candidate at all. No amount of votes would
catapult him into office. In Gador vs. Comelec (95 SCRA 431 [1980]), the Court held
that a certificate of candidacy filed beyond the period fixed by law is void, and the
person who filed it is not, in law, a candidate. Much in the same manner as a person
who filed no certificate of candidacy at all and a person who filed it out of time, a
person whose certificate of candidacy is cancelled or denied due course is no
candidate at all. No amount of votes should entitle him to the elective office aspired
for.
12. ALROBEN J. GOH vs. HON. LUCILO R. BAYRON and COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 212584 November 25, 2014
FACTS: On 17 March 2014, Goh filed before the COMELEC a recall petition,
docketed as SPA EM No. 14-004 (RCL),7 against Mayor Bayron due to loss of trust
and confidence brought about by "gross violation of pertinent provisions of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, gross violation of pertinent provisions of the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials, Incompetence, and other related
gross inexcusable negligence/dereliction of duty, intellectual dishonesty and
emotional immaturity as Mayor of Puerto Princesa City."
On 28 April 2014, Mayor Bayron filed with the COMELEC an Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and for Clarification9 which prayed for the dismissal of the recall
petition for lack of merit.
On 19 May 2014, Goh filed a Comment/Opposition (To the 27 April 2014 Omnibus
Motion for Reconsideration and for Clarification) with Motion to Lift Suspension10
which prayed for the COMELEC's denial of Mayor Bayron's 27 April 2014 Omnibus
Motion, as well as to direct COMELEC's authorized representative to immediately
carry out the publication of the recall petition against Mayor Bayron, the verification
process, and the recall election of Mayor Bayron. On 27 May 2014, COMELEC
promulgated Resolution No. 9882, as follows:
This refers to the petition for recall against Mayor Lucilo Bayron of the City of Puerto
Princesa, Province of Palawan. In Resolution No. 9864, while the Commission en
bane affirmed the recommendation of the Office of the Deputy Executive Director for
Operations (ODEDO) as to the sufficiency of the Recall Petition, it suspended further
proceedings on recall until the funding issue raised by the Finance Services
Department shall have been resolved.
The power of recall for loss of confidence is exercised by the registered voters of a
local government unit to which the local elective official subject to such recall belongs
[Footnote 1 -Sec. 69 of the Local Government Code]. The exercise of this power is
subject to the following limitations provided for by law: (a) any elective local official
may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of
confidence; and (b) [n]o recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the
official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular election
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[Footnote 2 - Section 74 of the Local Government Code]. Because of the cost
implications involved, the achievability of pursuing a recall proceeding to its
conclusion will depend on the availability of funds at the disposal of the Commission
on Elections (the Commission).
ISSUE: WON COMELEC IS CORRECT WHEN IT SAID THAT THERE IS NO
BUDGET IN THE 2014 GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT FOR THE CONDUCT
OF RECALL ELECTION AND THEREFORE THEY CANNOT CONDUCT RECALL
ELECTIONS.
RULING: NO. THE 2014 GAA PROVIDES THE LINE ITEM APPROPRIATION TO
ALLOW COMELEC TO CONDUCT RECALL ELECTIONS.
“We grant the petition. We hold that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing Resolution Nos. 9864 and 9882. The 2014 GAA provides the line
item appropriation to allow the COMELEC to perform its constitutional mandate of
conducting recall elections. There is no need for supplemental legislation to authorize
the COMELEC to conduct recall elections for 2014.”
TO BE VALID AN APPROPRIATION MUST INDICATE A SPECIFIC AMOUNT AND
A SPECIFIC PURPOSE. DOES THE PURPOSE ‘TO CONDUCT ELECTIONS’
COVER RECALL ELECTIONS”?
YES. THE PURPOSE MAY BE BROKEN DOWN INTO DIFFERENT RELATED SUB-
CATEGORIES. THEREFORE THE PURPOSE “TO CONDUCT ELECTIONS”
COVERS, EVEN IF NOT EXPRESSLY SPELLED OUT, REGULAR, SPECIAL AND
RECALL ELECTIONS.
“Under these· factual circumstances, we find it difficult to justify the COMELEC ‘s
reasons why it is unable to conduct recall elections in 2014 when the COMELEC was
able to conduct recall elections in 2002 despite lack of the specific words “Conduct
and supervision of x x x recall votes x x x” in the 2002 GAA. In the 2002 GAA, the
phrase “Conduct and supervision of elections and other political exercises” was
sufficient to fund the conduct of recall elections. In the 2014 GAA, there is a specific
line item appropriation for the “Conduct and supervision of x x x recall votes x x x.”
More importantly, the COMELEC admits in its Resolution No. 9882 that the
COMELEC has “a line item for the ‘Conduct and supervision of elections, referenda,
recall votes and plebiscites.”‘ This admission of the COMELEC is a correct
interpretation of this specific budgetary appropriation.· To be valid, an appropriation
must indicate a specific amount and a specific purpose. However, the purpose may
be specific even if it is broken down into different related sub-categories of the same
nature. For example, the purpose can be to “conduct elections,” which even if not
expressly spelled out covers regular, special, or recall elections. The purpose of the
appropriation is still specific -to fund elections, which naturally and logically include,
even if not expressly stated, not only regular but also special or recall elections.
CAN COMELEC TAP ITS SAVINGS TO FUND THE CONDUCT OF RECALL
ELECTIONS?
YES. IT CAN AUGMENT FROM SAVINGS ITS APPROPRIATIONS FOR
PERSONNEL SERVICES, MAINTENANCE AND OTHER OPERATING EXPENSES.
RECALL ELECTIONS ONLY NEED OPERATING EXEPENSES BECAUSE THE
EXISTING PERSONNEL ARE THE SAME PERSONNEL WHO WILL EVALUATE
THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE RECALL PETITIONS.
However, contrary to the COMELEC’s assertion, the appropriations for personnel
services and maintenance and other operating expenses falling under “Conduct and
supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes and plebiscites” constitute a line item
which can be augmented from the COMELEC’s savings to fund the conduct of recall
elections in 2014. The conduct of recall elections requires only operating expenses,
not capital outlays. The COMELEC’s existing personnel in Puerto Princesa are the
same personnel who will evaluate the sufficiency of the recall petitions. and conduct
the recall elections.
13. ALVAREZ vs. GUINGONA
GR 118303, 31 January 1996
FACTS:
1. Petitioners assail the validity of Republic Act No. 7720, entitled, "An Act Converting
the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an Independent Component City to be
known as the City of Santiago BECAUSE:
- the Act allegedly did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as
mandated by Section 24, Article VI of the 1987Constitution;
- the Municipality of Santiago has not met the minimum average annual income
required under Section 450 of the Local Government Code of 1991 in order to be
converted into a component city.
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2. The Act converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent compnent city
(to be known as City of Santiago) was filed in the HOR with Rep. Abaya as principal
author.
- Public hearings were conducted by the House committee on Local Gov. Committee
submitted to the a house a favorable report;
- HB was passed by HOR on 2nd reading, approved on 3rd reading, then passed to
Senate.
3. A counterpart of the HB 8817 was passed - Senate Bill 1243, filed by the Senate
by Vicente Sotto III.Public hearings were conducted for this too.
4. Committee Report No. 378 was passed by the Senate on Second Reading and
was approved on Third Reading. House of Representatives, upon being apprised of
the action of the Senate, approved the amendments proposed by the Senate. The
enrolled bill, submitted to the President was signed by the Chief Executive. A great
majority voted for conversion of Santiago into a city.
ISSUES:
The validity of RA7720 hinges on the following:
(I) Whether or not the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) are to be included in the
computation of the average annual income of a municipality for purposes of its
conversion;
(II) Whether or not, considering that the Senate passed SB No. 1243, its own version
of HB No. 8817, Republic Act No. 7720 can be said to have originated in the House
of Representatives.
RULING:
IRA'S ARE TO BE INCLUDED.
1. Petitioners claim that Santiago could not qualify into a component city because its
average annual income for the last two consecutive years based on 1991 constant
prices falls below the required annual income of 20 million pesos - how computed: By
dividing the total income of Santiago for calendar years 1991 and 1992, after
deducting the IRAs, the average annual income arrived at would only be
P13,109,560.47 based on the 1991 constant prices.
- they also say the certification issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of
the Department of Finance, which indicates Santiago's average annual income to be
P20,974,581.97, is not accurate as the Internal Revenue Allotments were not
excluded from the computation;
- the IRAs are not actually income but transfers and/or budgetary aid from the national
government and that they fluctuate, increase or decrease, depending on factors like
population, land and equal sharing.
SC: No. Internal Revenue Allotments form PART OF the income of Local Government
Units. [Requirement: for a municipality to be converted into a component city, it must
have an average annual income of at least 20M for the last two consecutive years
based on 1991 constant prices. Such income must be duly certified by the Department
of Finance.]
PRINCPLES: THE IRA VIS A VISA INCOME OF AN LGU AND PRINCIPLES OF
LOCAL AUTONOMY AND DECENTRALIZATION
- A Local Government Unit is a political subdivision of the State which is constituted
by law and possessed of substantial control over its own affairs.
- The practical side to development through a decentralized local government system
certainly concerns the matter of financial resources.
- Availment of such resources is effectuated through the vesting in every local
government unit of
(1) the right to create and broaden its own source of revenue;
(2) the right to be allocated a just share in national taxes, such share being in the form
of internal revenue allotments (IRAs); and
(3) the right to be given its equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and
development of the national wealth, if any, within its territorial boundaries.
FIRST REASON WHY IT FORMS PART: the FUNDS -> these are generated from:
local taxes, IRAs and national wealth utilization proceeds
- these accrue to the general fund of the local government and are used to finance its
operations subject to specified modes of
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spending the same as provided for in the Local Government Code and its
implementing rules and regulations.
- For instance, not less than twenty percent (20%) of the IRAs must be set aside for
local development projects.
- So for purposes of budget preparation, which budget should reflect the estimates of
the income of the local government unit, among others, the IRAs and the share in the
national wealth utilization proceeds are considered ITEMS OF INCOME --> since
income is defined in the lgc to be all revenues and receipts collected or received
forming the gross accretions of funds of the local government unit.
THEREFORE:
- The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the
funds of the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to
the local treasury without need of any further action on the part of the local
government unit.
IN THIS CASE:
- For purposes of converting the Municipality of Santiago into a city, the Department
of Finance certified that it had an average annual income of at least 20m Pesos for
the last two consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices.
- This, the Department of Finance did after including the IRAs in its computation of
said average annual income.
SECOND REASON: Section 450 (c) of the LGC provides that "the average annual
income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special
funds, transfers, and non-recurring income." T
- IRAs are a REGULAR, recurring item of income; there's no basis to classify the
same as a SPECIAL fund or transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition and
meaning all its own as used in the lgc that unequivocally makes it distinct from special
funds or transfers referred to when the Code speaks of "funding support from the
national government, its instrumentalities and government owned-or-controlled
corporations".
Thus, Department of Finance Order No. 35-9313 is correct when it defined ANNUAL
INCOME to be "revenues and receipts realized by provinces, cities and municipalities
from regular sources of the Local General Fund including the internal revenue
allotment and other shares provided for in Sections 284, 290 and 291 of the Code,
BUT exclusive of non-recurring receipts, such as other national aids, grants, financial
assistance, loan proceeds, sales of fixed assets, and similar others"
- Such order, constituting executive or contemporaneous construction of a statute by
an administrative agency charged with the task of interpreting and applying the same,
is entitled to full respect and should be accorded great weight unless such
construction is clearly shown to be in sharp conflict with the Constitution, the
governing statute, or other laws.
2. SC SAYS In the enactment of RA No. 7720,there was compliance with Section
24,Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
- the claim of petitioners that Republic Act No. 7720 did not originate exclusively in
the House of Representatives because a bill of the same import, SB No. 1243, was
passed in the Senate, is untenable because it cannot be denied that HB No. 8817
was filed in the House of Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the
Senate. Petitioners themselves cannot disavow their own admission that HB No. 8817
was filed on April 18, 1993 while SB No. 1243 was filed on May 19, 1993. The filing
of HB No. 8817 was thus precursive not only of the said Act in question but also of
SB No. 1243.
- Thus, HB No. 8817, was the bill that initiated the legislative process that culminated
in the enactment of Republic Act No. 7720. No violation of Section 24, Article VI, of
the 1987 Constitution is perceptible under the circumstances attending the instant
controversy.
- The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from
the House, does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local
application should originate in the House of Representatives, for as long as the
Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill.
- TOLENTINO vs Sec of Finance: it is not the law — but the revenue bill — which is
required by the Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives.
Every law, including RA No. 7720, has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality.
For RA No. 7720 to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one; in other words,
the grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. The Court stands
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on the holding that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal
of this petition is, therefore, inevitable.
14. AURELIO M. UMALI vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JULIUS CESAR
V. VERGARA, and THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CABANATUAN
FACTS: On July 11, 2011, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City
passed Resolution No. 183-2011, requesting the President to declare the conversion
of Cabanatuan City from a component city of the province of Nueva Ecija into a highly
urbanized city (HUC). The President issued Presidential Proclamation No. 418,
Series of 2012, proclaiming the City of Cabanatuan as an HUC subject to "ratification
in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein, as provided for in Section 453 of the
Local Government Code of 1991."
Respondent COMELEC, acting on the proclamation, issued the assailed Minute
Resolution No. 12-0797 resolves that for purposes of the plebiscite for the conversion
of Cabanatuan City from component city to highly-urbanized city, only those
registered residents of Cabanatuan City should participate in the said plebiscite; citing
conversion cases involving Puerto Princesa City in Palawan, Tacloban City in
Southern Leyte, and Lapu-Lapu City in Cebu, where only the residents of the city
proposed to be converted were allowed to vote in the corresponding plebiscite.
Petitioner Aurelio M. Umali, Governor of Nueva Ecija, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, maintaining that the proposed conversion in question will
necessarily and directly affect the mother province of Nueva Ecija; that Section 453
of the LGC should be interpreted in conjunction with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution;
and argues that while the conversion in question does not involve the creation of a
new or the dissolution of an existing city, the spirit of the Constitutional provision calls
for the people of the local government unit (LGU) directly affected to vote in a
plebiscite whenever there is a material change in their rights and responsibilities. The
phrase "qualified voters therein" used in Sec. 453 of the LGC should then be
interpreted to refer to the qualified voters of the units directly affected by the
conversion and not just those in the component city proposed to be upgraded.
Private respondent Julius Cesar Vergara, city mayor of Cabanatuan, interposed an
opposition on the ground that Sec. 10, Art. X does not apply to conversions, which is
the meat of the matter; that a specific provision of the LGC, Sec. 453, allows only the
qualified voters of Cabanatuan City to vote in the plebiscite. Futher, when Santiago
City was converted from a municipality to an independent component city pursuant to
Republic Act No. (RA) 7720, the plebiscite held was limited to the registered voters of
the then municipality of Santiago.
The COMELEC En Banc on October 16, 2012, in E.M No. 12-045 (PLEB), by a vote
of 5-24 ruled in favor of Vergara; To SCHEDULE the conduct of Plebiscite for the
conversion of Cabanatuan City from component city into highly-urbanized city with
registered residents only of Cabanatuan City to participate in said plebiscite.
SOLGEN, maintained that Cabanatuan City is merely being converted from a
component city into an HUC and that the political unit directly affected by the
conversion will only be the city itself. It argues that no political unit will be created,
merged with another, or will be removed from another LGU, and that no boundaries
will be altered. Thus, the participation of the voters of the entire province in the
plebiscite will not be necessary.
The trial court decreed that all qualified voters of the province of Nueva Ecija be
included in the plebiscite, and that a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) be issued
enjoining public respondent from implementing the questioned resolution. The
plebiscite was once again rescheduled to give way to the May 13, 2013 national, local
and ARMM regional elections as per Resolution No. 9563.
Bautista filed a case and alleged that the delay in holding the plebiscite is inexcusable
given the requirement that it should be held within a period of 120 days form the date
of the President’s declaration. COMELEC likewise relied on Sec. 5 of the Omnibus
Election Code to justify the postponements, citing incidents of violence that ensued
in the locality during the plebiscite period.
After the 2013 elections, public respondent issued Resolution No. 1353 scheduling
the plebiscite to January 25, 2014. However, a TRO was issued by this Court on
January 15, 2014 in G.R. No. 203974 to suspend the conduct of the plebiscite for
Cabanatuan City’s conversion. Given the intertwining factual milieu of the two
petitions before the Court, both cases were consolidated on March 18, 2014.
ISSUE: Whether the qualified registered voters of the entire province of Nueva Ecija
or only those in Cabanatuan City can participate in the plebiscite called for the
conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city into an HUC.
RULING: The petition has merit. Sec. 453 of the LGC should be interpreted in
accordance with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution
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First of all, we have to restate the general principle that legislative power cannot be
delegated subject to certain exceptions.
The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries of
provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, which is pertinent in the case at bar, is
essentially legislative in nature.5 The framers of the Constitution have, however,
allowed for the delegation of such power in Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution as long
as (1) the criteria prescribed in the LGC is met and (2) the creation, division, merger,
abolition or the substantial alteration of the boundaries is subject to the approval by a
majority vote in a plebiscite.
True enough, Congress delegated such power to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or
Sangguniang Panlungsod to create barangays pursuant to Sec. 6 of the LGC, which
provides: Section 6. Authority to Create Local Government Units. - A local government
unit may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundaries substantially
altered either by law enacted by Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality,
or any other political subdivision, or by ordinance passed by the sangguniang
panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod concerned in the case of a barangay
located within its territorial jurisdiction, subject to such limitations and requirements
prescribed in this Code."
The guidelines for the exercise of this authority have sufficiently been outlined by the
various LGC provisions detailing the requirements for the creation of barangays6,
municipalities7, cities8, and provinces9. Moreover, compliance with the plebiscite
requirement under the Constitution has also been directed by the LGC under its Sec.
10, which reads: Section 10. Plebiscite Requirement. – No creation, division, merger,
abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take
effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the
purpose in the political unit or units directly affected."
With the twin criteria of standard and plebiscite satisfied, the delegation to LGUs of
the power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries has
become a recognized exception to the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative
powers.
Likewise, legislative power was delegated to the President under Sec. 453 of the LGC
quoted earlier, which states: Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status. –
It shall be the duty of the President to declare a city as highly urbanized within thirty
(30) days after it shall have met the minimum requirements prescribed in the
immediately preceding Section, upon proper application therefor and ratification in a
plebiscite by the qualified voters therein.
In this case, the provision merely authorized the President to make a determination
on whether or not the requirements under Sec. 45210 of the LGC are complied with.
The provision makes it ministerial for the President, upon proper application, to
declare a component city as highly urbanized once the minimum requirements, which
are based on certifiable and measurable indices under Sec. 452, are satisfied. The
mandatory language "shall" used in the provision leaves the President with no room
for discretion.
In so doing, Sec. 453, in effect, automatically calls for the conduct of a plebiscite for
purposes of conversions once the requirements are met. No further legislation is
necessary before the city proposed to be converted becomes eligible to become an
HUC through ratification, as the basis for the delegation of the legislative authority is
the very LGC.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court concludes that the source of the
delegation of power to the LGUs under Sec. 6 of the LGC and to the President under
Sec. 453 of the same code is none other than Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
Further, the Court’s in Miranda vs. Aguirre11 is apropos and may be applied by
analogy. While Miranda involves the downgrading, instead of upgrading, as here, of
an independent component city into a component city, its application to the case at
bar is nonetheless material in ascertaining the proper treatment of conversions. In
that seminal case, the Court held that the downgrading of an independent component
city into a component city comes within the purview of Sec. 10, Art. X of the
Constitution.
A close analysis of the said constitutional provision will reveal that the creation,
division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government
units involve a common denominator - - - material change in the political and
economic rights of the local government units directly affected as well as the people
therein. It is precisely for this reason that the Constitution requires the approval of the
people "in the political units directly affected." It is not difficult to appreciate the
rationale of this constitutional requirement. The 1987 Constitution, more than any of
our previous Constitutions, gave more reality to the sovereignty of our people for it
was borne out of the people power in the 1986 EDSA revolution. Its Section 10, Article
X addressed the undesirable practice in the past whereby local government units
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were created, abolished, merged or divided on the basis of the vagaries of politics
and not of the welfare of the people. Thus, the consent of the people of the local
government unit directly affected was required to serve as a checking mechanism to
any exercise of legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing, merging or altering the
boundaries of local government units. It is one instance where the people in their
sovereign capacity decide on a matter that affects them - - - direct democracy of the
people as opposed to democracy thru people’s representatives. This plebiscite
requirement is also in accord with the philosophy of the Constitution granting more
autonomy to local government units.12
It was determined in the case that the changes that will result from the conversion are
too substantial that there is a necessity for the plurality of those that will be affected
to approve it. Similar to the enumerated acts in the constitutional provision,
conversions were found to result in material changes in the economic and political
rights of the people and LGUs affected. Given the far-reaching ramifications of
converting the status of a city, we held that the plebiscite requirement under the
constitutional provision should equally apply to conversions as well. Thus, RA
852813 was declared unconstitutional in Miranda on the ground that the law
downgraded Santiago City in Isabela without submitting it for ratification in a
plebiscite, in contravention of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
Second, while conversion to an HUC is not explicitly provided in Sec. 10, Art. X of the
Constitution we nevertheless observe that the conversion of a component city into an
HUC is substantial alteration of boundaries.
We now take the bull by the horns and resolve the issue whether Sec. 453 of the LGC
trenches on Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution. Hornbook doctrine is that neither the
legislative, the executive, nor the judiciary has the power to act beyond the
Constitution’s mandate. The Constitution is supreme; any exercise of power beyond
what is circumscribed by the Constitution is ultra vires and a nullity. As elucidated by
former Chief Justice Enrique Fernando in Fernandez v. Cuerva:14 Where the assailed
legislative or executive act is found by the judiciary to be contrary to the Constitution,
it is null and void. As the new Civil Code puts it: "When the courts declare a law to be
inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern."
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they
are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. The above provision of the civil Code
reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, whether legislative or
executive, is not a law, confers no rights, imposes no duties, and affords no protection.
xxx
Clear as crystal is that the province of Nueva Ecija will suffer a substantial reduction
of its share in IRA once Cabanatuan City attains autonomy. In view of the economic
impact of Cabanatuan City’s conversion, petitioner Umali’s contention, that its effect
on the province is not only direct but also adverse, deserves merit.
A component city’s conversion into an HUC and its resultant autonomy from the
province is a threat to the latter’s economic viability. The ensuing reduction in income
upon separation would clearly leave a crippling effect on the province’s operations as
there would be less funding to finance infrastructure projects and to defray overhead
costs. Moreover, the quality of services being offered by the province may suffer
because of looming austerity measures. The political rights of Nueva Ecija and those
of its residents will also be affected by Cabanatuan’s conversion into an HUC.
Notably, the administrative supervision of the province over the city will effectively be
revoked upon conversion.
Duties, privileges and obligations appertaining to HUCs will attach to Cabanatuan City
if it is converted into an HUC. This includes the right to be outside the general
supervision of the province and be under the direct supervision of the President. An
HUC is not subject to provincial oversight because the complex and varied problems
in an HUC due to a bigger population and greater economic activity require greater
autonomy.29 The provincial government stands to lose the power to ensure that the
local government officials of Cabanatuan City act within the scope of its prescribed
powers and functions,30 to review executive orders issued by the city mayor, and to
approve resolutions and ordinances enacted by the city council.31 The province will
also be divested of jurisdiction over disciplinary cases concerning the elected city
officials of the new HUC, and the appeal process for administrative case decisions
against barangay officials of the city will also be modified accordingly.32 Likewise, the
registered voters of the city will no longer be entitled to vote for and be voted upon as
provincial officials.33
In cutting the umbilical cord between Cabanatuan City and the province of Nueva
Ecija, the city will be separated from the territorial jurisdiction of the province, as
earlier explained. The provincial government will no longer be responsible for
delivering basic services for the city residents’ benefit. Ordinances and resolutions
passed by the provincial council will no longer cover the city. Projects queued by the
provincial government to be executed in the city will also be suspended if not
scrapped to prevent the LGU from performing functions outside the bounds of its
territorial jurisdiction, and from expending its limited resources for ventures that do
not cater to its constituents.1âwphi1
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In view of these changes in the economic and political rights of the province of
Nueva Ecija and its residents, the entire province certainly stands to be directly
affected by the conversion of Cabanatuan City into an HUC. Following the
doctrines in Tan and Padilla, all the qualified registered voters of Nueva Ecija
should then be allowed to participate in the plebiscite called for that purpose.It
is unfathomable how the province can be deprived of the opportunity to exercise the
right of suffrage in a matter that is potentially deleterious to its economic viability and
could diminish the rights of its constituents. To limit the plebiscite to only the voters of
the areas to be partitioned and seceded from the province is as absurd and illogical
as allowing only the secessionists to vote for the secession that they demanded
against the wishes of the majority and to nullify the basic principle of majority rule.
With the foregoing, petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. COMELEC Minute Resolution
No. 12-0797 dated September 11, 2012 and Minute Resolution No. 12-0925 dated
October 16, 2012 are hereby declared NULL and VOID. Public respondent
COMELEC is hereby enjoined from implementing the said Resolutions. Additionally,
COMELEC is hereby ordered to conduct a plebiscite for the purpose of converting
Cabanatuan City into a Highly Urbanized City to be participated in by the qualified
registered voters of Nueva Ecij a within 120 days from the finality of this Decision.
15. RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA
v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, representing the
President of the Philippines; Senate of the Philippines, represented by
the SENATE PRESIDENT, et. al.
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to
nullify Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355, otherwise known as An Act Creating the Province
of Dinagat Islands, for being unconstitutional.
Petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro served the Province of Surigao del Norte once as
Vice- Governor and members of the Provincial Board, respectively.
They allege that the creation of the Dinagat Islands as a new province, if uncorrected,
perpetuates an illegal act of Congress, and unjustly deprives the people of Surigao
del Norte of a large chunk of its territory, Internal Revenue Allocation and rich
resources from the area.
The mother province of Surigao del Norte was created and established under R.A.
No. 2786 on June 19, 1960. The province is composed of three main groups of
islands: (1) the Mainland and Surigao City; (2) Siargao Island and Bucas Grande; and
(3) Dinagat Island, which is composed of seven municipalities, namely, Basilisa,
Cagdianao, Dinagat, Libjo, Loreto, San Jose, and Tubajon.
Based on the official 2000 Census of Population and Housing conducted by the
National Statistics Office (NSO),2 the population of the Province of Surigao del Norte
as of May 1, 2000 was 481,416, broken down as follows:
Mainland 281,111
Surigao City 118,534
Siargao Island & Bucas Grande 93,354
Dinagat Island 106,951
Under Section 461 of R.A. No. 7610, otherwise known as The Local Government
Code, a province may be created if it has an average annual income of not less than
₱20 million based on 1991 constant prices as certified by the Department of Finance,
and a population of not less than 250,000 inhabitants as certified by the NSO, or a
contiguous territory of at least 2,000 square kilometers as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more
islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities, which do not contribute to the
income of the province.
The special census yielded a population count of 371,576 inhabitants in the proposed
province. The NSO, however, did not certify the result of the special census
Surigao del Norte Provincial Governor Robert Lyndon S. Barbers issued Proclamation
No. 01, which declared as official, for all purposes, the 2003 Special Census in
Dinagat Islands showing a population of 371,576.4
The Bureau of Local Government Finance certified that the average annual income
of the proposed Province of Dinagat Islands for calendar year 2002 to 2003 based on
the 1991 constant prices was ₱82,696,433.23. The land area of the proposed
province is 802.12 square kilometers.
The Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, passed the bill creating
the Province of Dinagat Islands. It was approved and enacted into law as R.A. No.
9355 on October 2, 2006 by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. a plebiscite was held
in the mother Province of Surigao del Norte to determine whether the local
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government units directly affected approved of the creation of the Province of Dinagat
Islands into a distinct and independent province comprising the municipalities of
Basilisa, Cagdianao, Dinagat, Libjo (Albor), Loreto, San Jose, and Tubajon.
The result of the plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative
votes. The Plebiscite Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed that the creation of
Dinagat Islands into a separate and distinct province was ratified and approved by
the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite
A new set of provincial officials took their oath of office following their appointment by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. hence, the Province of Dinagat Islands began its
corporate existence.
Petitioners contended that the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands under R.A.
No. 9355 is not valid because it failed to comply with either the population or land
area requirement prescribed by the Local Government Code.
Petitioners prayed that R.A. No. 9355 be declared unconstitutional, and that all
subsequent appointments and elections to the new vacant positions in the newly
created Province of Dinagat Islands be declared null and void. They also prayed for
the return of the municipalities of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the return of the
former districts to the mother Province of Surigao del Norte.
1) Whether RA 9355, creating the new province of Dinagat islands, complied
with the Constitution and Statutory requirements under section 461 of ra
7160
2) Whether the creation of Dinagat as a new province by the respondents is
an act of gerrymandering
3) Whether the creation of Dinagat as a new province by the respondents is
an act of gerrymandering
HELD:
1) No. Petitioners contend that the proposed Province of Dinagat Islands is not
qualified to become a province because it failed to comply with the land area or the
population requirement, despite its compliance with the income requirement. It has a
total land area of only 802.12 square kilometers, which falls short of the statutory
requirement of at least 2,000 square kilometers. Moreover, based on the NSO 2000
Census of Population, the total population of the proposed Province of Dinagat
Islands is only 106,951, while the statutory requirement is a population of at least
250,000 inhabitants.
Petitioners allege that in enacting R.A. No. 9355 into law, the House of
Representatives and the Senate erroneously relied on paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, which
states that "[t]he land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province
is composed of one (1) or more islands."13 The preceding italicized provision
contained in the Implementing Rules and Regulations is not expressly or impliedly
stated as an exemption to the land area requirement in Section 461 of the Local
Government Code. Petitioners assert that when the Implementing Rules and
Regulations conflict with the law that they seek to implement, the law prevails.
On the other hand, respondents contend in their respective Memoranda that the
Province of Dinagat Islands met the legal standard for its creation
The constitutional provision on the creation of a province in Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution states:
SEC. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with
the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected."
Pursuant to the Constitution, the Local Government Code of 1991 prescribed the
criteria for the creation of a province, thus:
SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. -- (a) A province may be created if it has an
average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than
Twenty million pesos (₱20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of
the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as
certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as
certified by the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and
income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum
requirements prescribed herein.
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(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is
separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the
province.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,
exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
As a clarification of the territorial requirement, the Local Government Code requires
a contiguous territory of at least 2,000 square kilometers, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau. However, the territory need not be contiguous if it comprises
two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities that do not
contribute to the income of the province.
what need not be "contiguous" is the "territory" — the physical mass of land area.
There would arise no need for the legislators to use the word contiguous if they had
intended that the term "territory" embrace not only land area but also territorial waters.
It can be safely concluded that the word territory in the first paragraph of Section 197
is meant to be synonymous with "land area" only.
The territorial requirement in the Local Government Code is adopted in the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (IRR),20 thus:
ART. 9. Provinces.—(a) Requisites for creation—A province shall not be created
unless the following requisites on income and either population or land area are
present:
(1) Income — An average annual income of not less than Twenty Million Pesos
(₱20,000,000.00) for the immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years based on
1991 constant prices, as certified by DOF. The average annual income shall include
the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, special accounts,
transfers, and nonrecurring income; and
(2) Population or land area - Population which shall not be less than two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) inhabitants, as certified by National Statistics Office; or land area
which must be contiguous with an area of at least two thousand (2,000) square
kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises
two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not
contribute to the income of the province. The land area requirement shall not apply
where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial
jurisdiction of a province sought to be created shall be properly identified by metes
and bounds.
However, the IRR went beyond the criteria prescribed by Section 461 of the Local
Government Code when it added the italicized portion above stating that "[t]he land
area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one
(1) or more islands." Nowhere in the Local Government Code is the said provision
stated or implied. Under Section 461 of the Local Government Code, the only instance
when the territorial or land area requirement need not be complied with is when there
is already compliance with the population requirement. The Constitution requires that
the criteria for the creation of a province, including any exemption from such criteria,
must all be written in the Local Government Code.21 There is no dispute that in case
of discrepancy between the basic law and the rules and regulations implementing the
said law, the basic law prevails, because the rules and regulations cannot go beyond
the terms and provisions of the basic law.
Hence, the Court holds that the provision in Sec. 2, Art. 9 of the IRR stating that "[t]he
land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of
one (1) or more islands" is null and void.
In this case, the requirements for the creation of a province contained in Sec. 461 of
the Local Government Code are clear, plain and unambiguous, and its literal
application does not result in absurdity or injustice. Hence, the provision in Art. 9(2)
of the IRR exempting a proposed province composed of one or more islands from the
land-area requirement cannot be considered an executive construction of the criteria
prescribed by the Local Government Code. It is an extraneous provision not intended
by the Local Government Code and, therefore, is null and void.
2)No. It is undisputed that R.A. No. 9355 complied with the income requirement
specified by the Local Government Code. What is disputed is its compliance with the
land area or population requirement.
R.A. No. 9355 expressly states that the Province of Dinagat Islands "contains an
approximate land area of eighty thousand two hundred twelve hectares (80,212 has.)
or 802.12 sq. km., more or less, including Hibuson Island and approximately forty-
seven (47) islets x x x."33 R.A. No. 9355, therefore, failed to comply with the land
area requirement of 2,000 square kilometers.
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The Province of Dinagat Islands also failed to comply with the population requirement
of not less than 250,000 inhabitants as certified by the NSO. Based on the 2000
Census of Population conducted by the NSO, the population of the Province of
Dinagat Islands as of May 1, 2000 was only 106,951.
Although the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte conducted a special census
of population in Dinagat Islands in 2003, which yielded a population count of 371,000,
the result was not certified by the NSO as required by the Local Government Code.34
Moreover, respondents failed to prove that with the population count of 371,000, the
population of the original unit (mother Province of Surigao del Norte) would not be
reduced to less than the minimum requirement prescribed by law at the time of the
creation of the new province.
In fine, R.A. No. 9355 failed to comply with either the territorial or the population
requirement for the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands.
The Constitution clearly mandates that the creation of local government units must
follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code.39 Any derogation of or
deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Sec. 10,
Art. X of the Constitution.40
Hence, R.A. No. 9355 is unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the criteria for
the creation of a province prescribed in Sec. 461 of the Local Government Code.
3)No.The argument of petitioners is unsubstantiated. Gerrymandering" is a term
employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so contrived as to
give an unfair advantage to the party in power.
As stated by the Office of the Solicitor General, the Province of Dinagat Islands
consists of one island and about 47 islets closely situated together, without the
inclusion of separate territories. It is an unsubstantiated allegation that the province
was created to favor Congresswoman Glenda Ecleo-Villaroman.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Republic Act No. 9355, otherwise known
as [An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands], is hereby declared
unconstitutional. The proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election
of the officials thereof are declared NULL and VOID. The provision in Article 9 (2) of
the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 stating,
"The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed
of one (1) or more islands," is declared NULL and VOID.
16. NAVARRO vs. ERMITA
FACTS: This case finds its roots from the two Motions for Reconsideration of the
Decision dated February 10, 2010. The assailed decision declared R.A. 9355,
otherwise known as An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, as
unconstitutional. The proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election
of the officials thereof are declared NULL and VOID. The provision in Article 9 (2) of
the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 stating,
"The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed
of one (1) or more islands," is declared NULL and VOID.
The arguments of the movants are similar. The grounds for reconsideration of
Governor Villaroman can be subsumed under the grounds for reconsideration of the
OSG, which are as follows:
I.
The Province of Dinagat Islands was created in accordance with the provisions of the
1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991. Article 9 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations is merely interpretative of Section 461 of the
Local Government Code.
RULING: The arguments are unmeritorious and have already been passed upon by
the Court in its Decision, ruling that R.A. No. 9355 is unconstitutional, since it failed
to comply with either the territorial or population requirement contained in Section 461
of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991.
POPULATION REQUIREMENT. When the Dinagat Islands was proclaimed a new
province on December 3, 2006, it had an official population of only 106,951 based on
the 2000 Census of Population conducted by the NSO which population is short of
the statutory requirement of 250,000 inhabitants.
Although the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte conducted a special census
of population in Dinagat Islands in 2003, which yielded a population count of 371,000,
the result was not certified by the NSO as required by the Local Government Code.
Moreover, respondents failed to prove that with the population count of 371,000, the
population of the original unit (mother Province of Surigao del Norte) would not be
reduced to less than the minimum requirement prescribed by law at the time of the
creation of the new province.
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Less than a year after the proclamation of the new province, the NSO conducted
the 2007 Census of Population. The NSO certified that as of August 1, 2007,
Dinagat Islands had a total population of only 120,813, which was still below
the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants.
LAND AREA. Moreover, the land area of the province failed to comply with the
statutory requirement of 2,000 square kilometers. R.A. No. 9355 specifically states
that the Province of Dinagat Islands contains an approximate land area of 802.12
square kilometers. This was not disputed by the respondent Governor of the Province
of Dinagat Islands in her Comment. She and the other respondents instead asserted
that the province, which is composed of more than one island, is exempted from the
land area requirement based on the provision in the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (IRR), specifically paragraph 2 of
Article 9 which states that "[t]he land area requirement shall not apply where the
proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands." The certificate of
compliance issued by the Lands Management Bureau was also based on the
exemption under paragraph 2, Article 9 of the IRR.
requirement, lest such exemption would not make sense. The OSG argues that in
stating that a "territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands,"
the law could not have meant to define the obvious. The land mass of two or more
islands will never be contiguous as it is covered by bodies of water. It is then but
logical that the territory of a proposed province that is composed of one or more
islands need not be contiguous or be at least 2,000 sq. kms.
RULING: The Court is not persuaded.
SEC. 7. Creation and Conversion. — As a general rule, the creation of a local
government unit or its conversion from one level to another level shall be based
on verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit:
(c) Land area. — It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2) or more islands,
or is separated by a local government unit independent of the others; properly
identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions; and sufficient to provide
for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.

However, the Court held that paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the IRR is null and void,
It must be emphasized that Section 7 above, which provides for the general rule
because the exemption is not found in Section 461 of the Local Government
in the creation of a local government unit, states in paragraph (c) thereof that
Code. There is no dispute that in case of discrepancy between the basic law
the land area must be contiguous and sufficient to provide for such basic
and the rules and regulations implementing the said law, the basic law prevails,
services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.
because the rules and regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions
of the basic law.
Therefore, there are two requirements for land area: (1) the land area must be
contiguous; and (2) the land area must be sufficient to provide for such basic
The movants now argue that the correct interpretation of Section 461 of the Local
services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace. A sufficient
Government Code is the one stated in the Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice
land area in the creation of a province is at least 2,000 square kilometers, as
Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura.
provided by Section 461 of the Local Government Code .

In his Dissenting Opinion, Justice Nachura agrees that R.A. No. 9355 failed to comply
Hence, contrary to the arguments of both movants, the requirement of a contiguous
with the population requirement. However, he contends that the Province of
territory and the requirement of a land area of at least 2,000 square kilometers are
Dinagat Islands did not fail to comply with the territorial requirement because
distinct and separate requirements for land area under paragraph (a) (i) of Section
it is composed of a group of islands; hence, it is exempt from compliance not
461 and Section 7 (c) of the Local Government Code.
only with the territorial contiguity requirement, but also with the 2,000-square-
kilometer land area criterion in Section 461 of the Local Government Code
II.
Similarly, the OSG contends that when paragraph (b) of Section 461 of the Local
Government Code provides that the "territory need not be contiguous if it comprises The power to create a local government unit is vested with the Legislature. The acts
two (2) or more islands," it necessarily dispenses the 2,000-sq.-km. land area of the Legislature and Executive in enacting into law RA 9355 should be respected
as petitioners failed to overcome the presumption of validity or constitutionality.

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RULING: The contention lacks merit.
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution states: No province, city, municipality,
or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected."
As the law-making branch of the government, indeed, it was the Legislature that
imposed the criteria for the creation of a province as contained in Section 461 of the
Local Government Code. No law has yet been passed amending Section 461 of the
Local Government Code, so only the criteria stated therein are the bases for the
creation of a province. The Constitution clearly mandates that the criteria in the Local
Government Code must be followed in the creation of a province; hence, any
derogation of or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code
violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
Contrary to the contention of the movants, the evidence on record proved that R.A.
No. 9355 failed to comply with either the population or territorial requirement
prescribed in Section 461 of the Local Government Code for the creation of the
Province of Dinagat Islands; hence, the Court declared R.A. No. 9355
unconstitutional.
In Fariñas v. The Executive Secretary, the Court held: It is equally well-established
that the courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to
determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit
imposed by the fundamental law. And where the acts of the other branches of
government run afoul of the Constitution, it is the judiciary’s solemn and sacred
duty to nullify the same.
III.
Recent and prevailing jurisprudence considers the operative fact doctrine as a reason
for upholding the validity and constitutionality of laws involving the creation of a new
local government unit as in the instant case.
Citing League of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, the movants
further contend that under the operative fact doctrine, the constitutionality of R.A No.
9355, creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, should be upheld.
RULING: The Court is not persuaded. In League of Cities of the Philippines v.
Commission on Elections, the Court held that the 16 cityhood laws, whose validity
were questioned therein, were constitutional mainly because it found that the said
cityhood laws merely carried out the intent of R.A. No. 9009, now Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, to exempt therein respondents local government units
(LGUs) from the ₱100 million income requirement, since the said LGUs had pending
cityhood bills long before the enactment of R.A. No. 9009. Each one of the 16 cityhood
laws contained a provision exempting the municipality covered from the ₱100 million
income requirement.
In this case, R.A. No. 9355 was declared unconstitutional because there was utter
failure to comply with either the population or territorial requirement for the creation of
a province under Section 461 of the Local Government Code.1avvphi1
The Court, while respecting the doctrine of separation of powers, cannot renege on
its duty to determine whether the other branches of the government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution, and determine whether illegality
attached to the creation of the province in question. To abandon this duty only
because the Province of Dinagat Islands has began its existence is to consent to the
passage of a law that is violative of the provisions of the Constitution and the Local
Government Code, rendering the law and the province created null and void. The
Court cannot tolerate such nullity to be in existence. Where the acts of other branches
of the government go beyond the limit imposed by the Constitution, it is the sacred
duty of the judiciary to nullify the same.
17. NAVARRO vs. ERMITA
G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011, NACHURA, J.
The exemption from the land area requirement of local government units composed
of one or more islands, as expressly stated under Sections 442 and 450 of the LGC.
FACTS: The President of the Republic approved into law Republic Act No. 9355 (An
Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands). After complying with the required
plebiscite, the President appointed the interim set of provincial officials who took their
oath of office on January 26, 2007. Later, during the May 14, 2007 synchronized
elections, the Dinagatnons elected their new set of provincial officials who assumed
office on July 1, 2007. The former political leaders of Surigao del Norte, filed before
this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition challenging the constitutionality of
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R.A. No. 9355 arguing that Dinagat failed to comply with the required land area based
on Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and of Section 461 of the LGC.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9355 is valid and constitutional.
RULING: Yes. The exemption from the land area requirement of local government
units composed of one or more islands, as expressly stated under Sections 442 and
450 of the LGC, with respect to the creation of municipalities and cities, but
inadvertently omitted from Section 461 with respect to the creation of provinces.
Hence, the void or missing detail was filled in by the Oversight Committee in the LGC-
IRR. With the formulation of the LGC-IRR, which amounted to both executive and
legislative construction of the LGC, the many details to implement the LGC had
already been put in place, which Congress understood to be impractical and not too
urgent to immediately translate into direct amendments to the LGC. But Congress,
recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a full-fledged province,
enacted R.A. No. 9355, following the exemption from the land area requirement,
which, with respect to the creation of provinces, can only be found as an express
provision in the LGC-IRR. In effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative powers,
Congress breathed flesh and blood into that exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR
and transformed it into law when it enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island Province
of Dinagat.
18. CORDILLERA BOARD COALITION vs. COA
FACTS: In these consolidated petitions, the constitutionality of Executive Order No.
220, dated July 15, 1987, which created the Cordillera Administrative Region, is
assailed on the primary ground that it pre-empts the enactment of an organic act by
the Congress and the creation of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras conditional
on the approval of the act through a plebiscite.
ISSUE: Whether E.O 220 created a new political subdivision
FACTS: In these consolidated petitions, the constitutionality of Executive Order No.
220, dated July 15, 1987, which created the Cordillera Administrative Region, is
assailed on the primary ground that it pre-empts the enactment of an organic act by
the Congress and the creation of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras conditional
on the approval of the act through a plebiscite. ISSUE: Whether E.O 220 created a
new political subdivision
19. KIDA vs. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR 196271, 18 October 2011
Doctrine: Autonomy is never equated with independence and cannot be invoked to
defeat national policies and concerns. ARMM is required to operate with the larger
framework of the state.
Nature: Multiple petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, injunction and
preliminary injunction assailing the validity of RA 10153.
Facts: RA 10153 was enacted on June 2011 which resets the ARMM elections from
August 2011 to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and local elections.
The law also granted the President power to appoint OICs to the posts of Governor,
Vice Governor and Legislative Assembly until the officials have been duly elected in
2013. RA 9333 mandated the conduct of ARMM regional elections on August 2011,
prompting COMELEC to prepare and open the submission of COCs. However, RA
10153 was enacted which reset the elections to May 2013. Noteworthy to mention
that various cases were filed against the precursor house bill and senate bill for
noncompliance and invalidity. When the law took effect, COMELEC stopped its
preparations and the spawn of cases against the Executive Secretary Ochoa and
COMELEC continued to multiply. The Court consolidated these cases and issued a
TRO.
Petitioners’ contention:
 RAs 9140, 9333, and 10153 amend RA 9054 and thus have to comply with
the supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements under Secs. 1 and 3,
Art. XVII of RA 9094.
 RA 10153 is unconstitutional for noncompliance with the 3-reading
requirement of Sec. 26(2), Art.VI of the Constitution
 Violation to right of suffrage
 Failure to adhere to the elective and representative character of the
executive and legislative departments of ARMM
 Power of the president to appoint OICs, which violates Sec. 16, Art. X of
the Constitution
Issues:
 Whether RA 10153 violates the autonomy of the ARMM.
 Whether the grant of the power to appoint OICs violates the Constitution.
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Ruling:
 No. Secs. 15 to 21 of Art. X provides express limitations to Congress’
legislative powers. All powers and functions not granted to the regions shall
be vested in the national government. Although the Constitution provides
for the idea of self-rule or self-government, the principles of national
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the republic are likewise clear. The
interim measures done by the State was dictated by necessity, and was
thus left to the wisdom of congressional discretion. The Court has no power
to shorten the terms of elective officials; such are fixed by the Constitution.
Admittedly, the synchronization will only temporarily disrupt the electoral
process but this is done under a situation of necessity and as an interim
measure only.
Synchronization of elections does not violate ARMM’s autonomy.
Autonomy is never equated with independence and cannot be invoked to
defeat national policies and concerns. ARMM is required to operate with
the larger framework of the state.
 No. The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature (Sec. 16, Art.
VII), and such appointments fall under the third kind (those whom the
President may be authorized by law to appoint). Since the authority
emanates from RA 10153, the president’s power facially rests on a clear
constitutional basis.
Fallo: SC dismissed the petitions and upheld the validity of RA 10153 in toto.
Other related matters:
 ARMM was created by virtue of Secs. 15 to 22, Art. X of the Constitution.
Congress enacted: RA 6734 as the organic law
RA 9054 which further refined the ARMM structure and reset the
elections to September 2001
RA 9140, which reset the elections to November 2001 and which
was ratified thru a plebiscite
RA 9333 which reset the elections to August 2005, but which was
not ratified in a plebiscite.
 Congress has the power to synchronize national and local elections by
virtue of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution. Local elections
include regional elections.
 President may certify the necessity of the bill’s immediate enactment to
exempt it from the three-readings-on-separate-days rule.
 RA 9333 and RA 10153 are not amendments to RA 9054, as these did not
change or revise ay provision of the law; they merely filled in a gap in RA
9054 by providing the date of subsequent regular elections.
 The supermajority (2/3) voting requirement in RA 9054 is unconstitutional
for giving a requirement higher than what the Constitution requires for the
passage of bills, and serves to restrain the plenary powers of Congress to
amend, revise, or repeal the laws it had passed; hence, giving the law the
character of an irrepealable law.
 To achieve synchronization, the Court identified three options: 1) Allow
ARMM officials to remain in office in a hold-over capacity—unconstitutional,
because local officials are bound by the 3-year term limit. 2) hold special
elections for the remaining term—unconstitutional, as COMELEC has no
authority to order special elections, except when there is force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes, or because of
unexpected and unforeseen circumstances. or 3) authorize the President
to appoint OICs thru RA 10153. Congress chose the correct option.
20. DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA vs. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 196271 February 28, 2012
FACTS: The Court resolve the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Datu
Michael Abas Kida, et al. which assailed the Court decision dated October 18, 2011,
where it upheld the constitutionality of Republic Act (RA) No. 10153.
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate of synchronization, RA No. 10153 postponed
the regional elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) (which
were scheduled to be held on the second Monday of August 2011) to the second
Monday of May 2013 and recognized the President’s power to appoint officers-in-
charge (OICs) to temporarily assume these positions upon the expiration of the terms
of the elected officials.
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ISSUE: Whether the Constitution mandate the synchronization of ARMM regional
elections with national and local elections.
HELD: Yes, the Court was unanimous in holding that the Constitution mandates the
synchronization of national and local elections. While the Constitution does not
expressly instruct Congress to synchronize the national and local elections, the
intention can be inferred from the provisions of the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII)
of the Constitution
Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution shall
be held on the second Monday of May, 1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President,
which may be simultaneous with the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall
include the election of all Members of the city or municipal councils in the Metropolitan
Manila area.
Though the ARMM elections are not expressly mentioned in the Transitory Provisions
of the Constitution on synchronization cannot be interpreted to mean that the ARMM
elections are not covered by the constitutional mandate of synchronization since
ARMM had not yet been officially organized at the time the Constitution was enacted
and ratified by the people.
The constitution is not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few years
but is to endure through time, the constitution should be construed in the light of what
actually is a continuing instrument to govern not only the present but also the
unfolding events of the indefinite future.
Article X of the Constitution, entitled "Local Government," clearly shows the intention
of the Constitution to classify autonomous regions, such as the ARMM, as local
governments. Section 1 of this Article, provides:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines
are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
The inclusion of autonomous regions in the enumeration of political subdivisions of
the State under the heading "Local Government" indicates quite clearly the
constitutional intent to consider autonomous regions as one of the forms of local
governments.
That the Constitution mentions only the "national government" and the "local
governments," and does not make a distinction between the "local government" and
the "regional government," it does the intention of the framers of the Constitution to
consider the autonomous regions not as separate forms of government, but as
political units which, while having more powers and attributes than other local
government units, still remain under the category of local governments. Since
autonomous regions are classified as local governments, it follows that elections held
in autonomous regions are also considered as local elections.
The petitioners further argue that even assuming that the Constitution mandates the
synchronization of elections, the ARMM elections are not covered by this mandate
since they are regional elections and not local elections.
In construing the provisions of the Constitution, the first rule to be applied is verba
legis, "that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed."
Applying this principle to determine the scope of "local elections," the Court refer to
the meaning of the word "local,” should be defined in its ordinary sense. As defined,
"local" refers to something "that primarily serves the needs of a particular limited
district, often a community or minor political subdivision." Obviously, the ARMM
elections, which are held within the confines of the autonomous region of Muslim
Mindanao, fall within this definition.
The fact that the ARMM possesses more powers than other provinces, cities, or
municipalities is not enough reason to treat the ARMM regional elections differently
from the other local elections. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire
debemus. When the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish.
21. LIMBONA vs. MANGELIN
Gr. No. 8039128 | 28 Feb 1989
FACTS: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional
Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On
October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee
on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity
as Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local
government officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly
members through the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session in November
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as his presence was needed in the house committee hearing of Congress. However,
on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance of the Limbona's
advice, where he was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the session's
proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that he was still the Speaker
of the Assembly.
Pending further proceedings, this Court, on January 19, 1988, received a resolution
filed by the Sangguniang Pampook, "EXPECTING ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA FROM
MEMBERSHIP OF THE SANGGUNIANG PAMPOOK AUTONOMOUS REGION XII,"
3 on the grounds, among other things, that the petitioner "had caused to be prepared
and signed by him paying [sic] the salaries and emoluments of Odin Abdula, who was
considered resigned after filing his Certificate of Candidacy for Congressmen for the
First District of Maguindanao in the last May 11, elections. . . and nothing in the record
of the Assembly will show that any request for reinstatement by Abdula was ever
made . . ." 4 and that "such action of Mr. Lim bona in paying Abdula his salaries and
emoluments without authority from the Assembly . . . constituted a usurpation of the
power of the Assembly," 5 that the petitioner "had recently caused withdrawal of so
much amount of cash from the Assembly resulting to the non-payment of the salaries
and emoluments of some Assembly [sic]," 6 and that he had "filed a case before the
Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on question which should
have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," 7 for which the respondents
now submit that the petition had become "moot and academic".
ISSUE: Whether the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous governments
or regions. What is the extent of self-government given to the autonomous
governments of Region XII?
HELD: We do not agree that the case has been rendered moot and academic by
reason simply of the expulsion resolution so issued. For, if the petitioner's expulsion
was done purposely to make this petition moot and academic, and to preempt the
Court, it will not make it academic.
Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of
power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government
delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base
of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive
and accountable," 23 "and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national
development and social progress." 24 At the same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on
national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" 25 over them, but
only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." 26 He has no
control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
27
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power
in the favor of local governments units declare to be autonomous . In that case, the
autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with
minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author,
decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the
autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency.
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST.
(1987), art. X, sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and
accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an
autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision
of the national government acting through the President (and the Department of Local
Government). 32 If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous
in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps
the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are
beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes
unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree
creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were
never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense, that is, in which the central
government commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the
first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision
and control over Autonomous Regions."33 In the second place, the Sangguniang
Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly administrative services.
Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the
expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as
Speaker.
Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were
invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions
shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang
Pampook". But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still
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invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the
"recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he could do so. In the second
place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of
Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Also,
assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does not appear that the
respondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead, they
opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under
the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess"
called on the ground of good faith.
22. CITY OF LAPU-LAPU v. PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 184203, November 26, 2014, LEONEN, J.
FACTS: In the exercise of his legislative powers, President Ferdinand E. Marcos
issued Presidential Decree No. 66 in 1972, declaring as government policy the
establishment of export processing zones in strategic locations in the Philippines. To
carry out this policy, the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) was created. The
said decree declared that EPZA will be a non-profit entity, and was also declared to
be exempt from taxes.
In 1995, the PEZA was created by virtue of Republic Act No. 7916 or "the Special
Economic Zone Act of 1995"13 to operate, administer, manage, and develop
economic zones in the country.14 As for the EPZA, the law required it to "evolve into
the PEZA in accordance with the guidelines and regulations set forth in an executive
order issued for [the] purpose."
On October 30, 1995, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 282,
directing the PEZA to assume and exercise all of the EPZA’s powers, functions, and
responsibilities "as provided in Presidential Decree No. 66, as amended, insofar as
they are not inconsistent with the powers, functions, and responsibilities of the PEZA,
as mandated under [the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995]."19 All of EPZA’s
properties, equipment, and assets, among others, were ordered transferred to the
PEZA.20
In the letter dated March 25, 1998, the City of Lapu-Lapu, through the Office of
the Treasurer, demanded from the PEZA 32,912,350.08 in real property taxes for
the period from 1992 to 1998 on the PEZA’s properties located in the Mactan
Economic Zone. The City pointed out that no provision in the Special Economic Zone
Act of 1995 specifically exempted PEZA from payment of real property taxes, unlike
Section 21 of PD 66 that explicitly provided for EPZA's exemption.Since no legal
provision explicitly exempted PEZA. The City argued that it can tax the PEZA.
ISSUES: 1. is the PEZA a Government Instrumentality, hence exempt from
payment of real property taxes?
2. Distinguish Government Instrumentality from a G-OCC.
3.What are Real Property Taxes? What are the Exemptions from Real
Property Tax under the Local Govt Code?
1.YES. The PEZA is exempt from payment of real property taxes
LAW: Under the law, provinces, cities, and municipalities within the Metropolitan
Manila Area have the power to levy real property taxes within their respective...
territories.
LAW: Under Section 133(o) of the Local Govt Code, LGUs have no power to levy
taxes of any kind on the national government, its agencies and instrumentalities
and local government units.
In this case, the PEZA is an instrumentality of the national government. It is not
integrated within the department framework but is an agency attached to the
Department of Trade and Industry. As an instrumentality of the national government,
the PEZA is vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law. Congress created the
PEZA to operate, administer, manage and develop special economic zones in the
Philippines.
Being an instrumentality of the national government, the PEZA cannot be taxed by
local government units.Although a body corporate vested with some corporate
powers,... the PEZA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation taxable for
real property taxes.
2. Government Instrumentality vs. G-OCC.
(A) Instrumentality
An instrumentality is "any agency of the National Government, not integrated within
the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law,
endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and
enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter."245
Examples of instrumentalities of the national government are the Manila International
Airport Authority,246 the Philippine Fisheries Development Authority,247 the
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Government Service Insurance System,248 and the Philippine Reclamation
Authority.249 These entities are not integrated within the department framework but
are nevertheless vested with special functions to carry out a declared policy of the
national government.
Similarly, the PEZA is an instrumentality of the national government. It is not
integrated within the department framework but is an agency attached to the
Department of Trade and Industry.250 Book IV, Chapter 7, Section 38(3)(a) of the
Administrative Code of 1987 defines "attachment": SEC. 38. Definition of
Administrative Relationship.– Unless otherwise expressly stated in the Code or in
other laws defining the special relationships of particular agencies, administrative
relationships shall be categorized and defined as follows:
....
(3) Attachment.– (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the department or
its equivalent and the attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and
program coordination. The coordination may be accomplished by having the
department represented in the governing board of the attached agency or corporation,
either as chairman or as a member, with or without voting rights, if this is permitted
by the charter; having the attached corporation or agency comply with a system of
periodic reporting which shall reflect the progress of the programs and projects; and
having the department or its equivalent provide general policies through its
representative in the board, which shall serve as the framework for the internal
policies of the attached corporation or agency[.]
Attachment, which enjoys "a larger measure of independence"251 compared with
other administrative relationships such as supervision and control, is further explained
in Beja, Sr. v. Court of Appeals:252
An attached agency has a larger measure of independence from the Department to
which it is attached than one which is under departmental supervision and control or
administrative supervision. This is borne out by the "lateral relationship" between the
Department and the attached agency. The attachment is merely for "policy and
program coordination." With respect to administrative matters, the independence of
an attached agency from Departmental control and supervision is further reinforced
by the fact that even an agency under a Department’s administrative supervision is
free from Departmental interference with respect to appointments and other
personnel actions "in accordance with the decentralization of personnel functions"
under the Administrative Code of 1987. Moreover, the Administrative Code explicitly
provides that Chapter 8 of Book IV on supervision and control shall not apply to
chartered institutions attached to a Department.253
With the PEZA as an attached agency to the Department of Trade and Industry, the
13-person PEZA Board is chaired by the Department Secretary.254 Among the powers
and functions of the PEZA is its ability to coordinate with the Department of Trade and
Industry for policy and program formulation and implementation.255 In strategizing and
prioritizing the development of special economic zones, the PEZA coordinates with
the Department of Trade and Industry.256
The PEZA also administers its own funds and operates autonomously, with the PEZA
Board formulating and approving the PEZA’s annual budget. 257 Appointments and
other personnel actions in the PEZA are also free from departmental interference,
with the PEZA Board having the exclusive and final authority to promote, transfer,
assign and reassign officers of the PEZA.258
(B) G-OCC
LAW: Section 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987
defines the term "government-owned or controlled corporation":
SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. – Unless the specific words of the text, or the context
as a whole, or a particular statute, shall require a different meaning:
-xxxx--------xxxx-------xxxx-
(13) Government-Owned Or Controlled Corporation refers to any agency
organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public
needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government
directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the
case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) per cent of its capital
stock: Provided, That G-OCCs may be further categorized by the Department of the
Budget, the Civil Service Commission, and the Commission on Audit for purposes of
the exercise and discharge of their respective powers, functions and responsibilities
with respect to such corporations.
Government entities are created by the Constitution or by law. In the case of
government-owned or controlled corporations, they are incorporated by virtue of
special charters263 to participate in the market for special reasons which may be
related to dysfunctions or inefficiencies of the market structure. This is to adjust reality
as against the concept of full competition where all market players are price takers.
Thus, under the Constitution, government-owned or controlled corporations are
created in the interest of the common good and should satisfy the test of economic
viability.264 Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution provides:
-xxxx--------xxxx-------xxxx-
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Section 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation,
organization, or regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled
corporations may be created or established by special charters in the interest of the
common good and subject to the test of economic viability.
Economic viability is "the capacity to function efficiently in business."265 To be
economically viable, the entity "should not go into activities which the private sector
can do better."266
To be considered a government-owned or controlled corporation, the entity must have
been organized as a stock or non-stock corporation.267
Government instrumentalities, on the other hand, are also created by law but
partake of sovereign functions. When a government entity performs sovereign
functions, it need not meet the test of economic viability. In Manila International Airport
Authority v. Court of Appeals,268 this court explained:
In contrast, Government Instrumentalities vested with corporate powers and
performing governmental orpublic functions need not meet the test of economic
viability. These instrumentalities perform essential public services for the common
good, services that every modern State must provide its citizens. These
instrumentalities need not be economically viable since the government may even
subsidize their entire operations. These instrumentalities are not the "government-
owned or controlled corporations" referred to in Section 16, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.
Thus, the Constitution imposes no limitation when the legislature creates government
instrumentalities vested with corporate powers but performing essential governmental
or public functions. Congress has plenary authority to create government
instrumentalities vested with corporate powers provided these instrumentalities
perform essential government functions or public services. However, when the
legislature creates through special charters corporations that perform economic or
commercial activities, such entities — known as "government-owned or controlled
corporations" — must meetthe test of economic viability because they compete in the
market place.
In this case, the law created the PEZA's charter. Under the Special Economic Zone
Act of 1995, the PEZA was established primarily to perform the governmental
function of operating, administering, managing, and developing special economic
zones to attract investments and provide opportunities... for preferential use of Filipino
labor. Under its charter, the PEZA was created a body corporate endowed with some
corporate powers. However, it was not organized as a... stock... or non-stock...
corporation. Nothing in the PEZA's charter provides that the PEZA's capital is divided
into shares.[272] The PEZA also has no members who shall share in the PEZA's
profits.
The PEZA does not compete with other economic zone authorities in the country. The
government may even subsidize the PEZA's operations. Under Section 47 of the
Special Economic Zone Act of 1995, "any sum necessary to augment [the PEZA's]
capital outlay shall be... included in the General Appropriations Act to be treated as
an equity of the national government."
Being a Govt Instrumentality the PEZA need not be economically viable and It is
not liable for real property taxes.
The PEZA assumed the non-profit character, including the tax exempt status, of the
EPZA
The PEZA's predecessor, the EPZA, was declared non-profit in character with all its
revenues devoted for its development, improvement, and maintenance. Consistent
with this non-profit character, the EPZA was explicitly declared exempt from real
property taxes under its... charter.
Nevertheless, we rule that the PEZA is exempt from real property taxes by virtue of
its charter.
The PEZA assumed the real property exemption of the EPZA under
Presidential Decree No. 66.
3. Real property taxes are annual taxes levied on real property such as lands,
buildings, machinery, and other improvements not otherwise specifically exempted
under the Local Government Code.
Real property taxes are ad valorem, with the... amount charged based on a fixed
proportion of the value of the property.
The person liable for real property taxes is the "taxable person who had actual or
beneficial use and possession [of the real property for the taxable period,] whether or
not [the person owned the property for the period he or she is being taxed]."
The general rule is that real properties are subject to real property taxes. This is true
especially since the Local Government Code has withdrawn exemptions from real
property taxes of all persons, whether natural or juridical:
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SEC. 234. Of LGC. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. – The following are
exempted from payment of real property tax:
(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political
subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for
consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person;
(b) Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto,
mosques, nonprofit or religious cemeteries and all lands, buildings, and
improvements actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable or
educational purposes;
(c) All machineries and equipment that are actually, directly and exclusively used by
local water districts and government-owned or – controlled corporations engaged in
the supply and distribution of water and/or generation and transmission of electric
power;
(d) All real property owned by duly registered cooperatives as provided under R.A.
No. 6938; and
(e) Machinery and equipment usedfor pollution control and environmental protection.
23. MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY vs. CITY OF
LAPU-LAPU
FACTS: Petitioner, Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) was created
by Congress under Republic Act No. 6958. Upon its creation, petitioner enjoyed
exemption from realty taxes imposed by the National Government or any of its political
subdivision. However, upon the effectivity of the LGC the Supreme Court rendered a
decision that the petitioner is no longer exempt from realty estate taxes.
Respondent City issued to petitioner a Statement of Real Estate Tax assessing the
lots comprising the Mactan International Airport which included the airfield, runway,
taxi way and the lots on which these are built. Petitioner contends that these lots, and
the lots to which they are built, are utilized solely and exclusively for public purposes
and are exempt from real property tax. Petitioner based its claim for exemption on
DOJ Opinion No. 50.
Respondent issued notices of levy on 18 sets of real properties of
petitioners. Petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition, TRO, and a writ of preliminary
injunction with RTC Lapulapu which sought to enjoin respondent City from issuing the
warrant of levy against petitioner’s properties from selling them at public auction for
delinquency in realty tax obligations.
Petitioner claimed before the RTC that it had discovered that respondent City did not
pass any ordinance authorizing the collection of real property tax, a tax for the special
education fund (SEF), and a penalty interest for its nonpayment. Petitioner argued
that without the corresponding tax ordinances, respondent City could not impose and
collect real property tax, an additional tax for the SEF, and penalty interest from
petitioner.
RTC granted the writ of preliminary which was later on lifted upon motion by the
respondents.
CA: Court of Appeals held that petitioner’s airport terminal building, airfield, runway,
taxiway, and the lots on which they are situated are not exempt from real estate tax
reasoning as follows: Under the Local Government Code (LGC for brevity), enacted
pursuant to the constitutional mandate of local autonomy, all natural and juridical
persons, including government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs),
instrumentalities and agencies, are no longer exempt from local taxes even if
previously granted an exemption. The only exemptions from local taxes are those
specifically provided under the Code itself, or those enacted through subsequent
legislation.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered by us as
follows:
a. We DECLARE the airport terminal building, the airfield, runway, taxiway
and the lots on which they are situatedNOT EXEMPT from the real estate
tax imposed by the respondent City of Lapu-Lapu;
b. We DECLARE the imposition and collection of the real estate tax, the
additional levy for the Special Education Fund and the penalty interest
as VALID and LEGAL. However, pursuant to Section 255 of the Local
Government Code, respondent city can only collect an interest of 2% per
month on the unpaid tax which total interest shall, in no case, exceed thirty-
six (36) months;
We DECLARE the sale in public auction of the aforesaid properties and the eventual
forfeiture and purchase of the subject property by the respondent City of Lapu-Lapu
as NULL and VOID. However, petitioner MCIAA’s property is encumbered only by a
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limited lien possessed by the respondent City of Lapu-Lapu in accord with Section
257 of the Local Government Code.
RULING:
MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation under Section 2(13) of the
Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code because it is not organized as a
stock or non-stock corporation. Neither is MIAA a government-owned or controlled
corporation under Section 16, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution because MIAA is
not required to meet the test of economic viability. MIAA is a government
instrumentality vested with corporate powers and performing essential public
services pursuant to Section 2(10) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative
Code. As a government instrumentality, MIAA is not subject to any kind of tax by local
governments under Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code. The exception to
the exemption in Section 234(a) does not apply to MIAA because MIAA is not a
taxable entity under the Local Government Code. Such exception applies only if the
beneficial use of real property owned by the Republic is given to a taxable entity.
Finally, the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are properties devoted to public use
and thus are properties of public dominion. Properties of public dominion are owned
by the State or the Republic.
As properties of public dominion owned by the Republic, there is no doubt whatsoever
that the Airport Lands and Buildings are expressly exempt from real estate tax under
Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code. This Court has also repeatedly
ruled that properties of public dominion are not subject to execution or
foreclosure sale.
1. Petitioner’s properties that are actually, solely and exclusively used for
public purpose, consisting of the airport terminal building, airfield, runway,
taxiway and the lots on which they are situated, EXEMPT from real property
tax imposed by the City of Lapu-Lapu.
2. VOID all the real property tax assessments, including the additional tax for
the special education fund and the penalty interest, as well as the final
notices of real property tax delinquencies, issued by the City of Lapu-Lapu
on petitioner’s properties, except the assessment covering the portions that
petitioner has leased to private parties.
3. NULL and VOID the sale in public auction of 27 of petitioner’s properties
and the eventual forfeiture and purchase of the said properties by
respondent City of Lapu-Lapu. We likewise declare VOID the
corresponding Certificates of Sale of Delinquent Property issued to
respondent City of Lapu-Lapu.
24. BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC. v. THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN,
REPRESENTED BY GOVERNOR CARLITO S. MARQUEZ, THE
PHILIPPINE RECLAMATION AUTHORITY, AND THE DENR-EMB
(REGION VI)
G.R. No. 196870, June 26, 2012, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
Two requisites must be met before a national project that affects the environmental
and ecological balance of local communities can be implemented: prior consultation
with the affected local communities, and prior approval of the project by the
appropriate sanggunian.
FACTS: Respondent Province decided to build a Jetty Port and Passenger Terminal
at Barangay Caticlan to be the main gateway to Boracay in the Malay Municipality.
However, Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan, Malay Municipality, issued a
Resolution manifesting its strong opposition to said application. Consequently,
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of respondent Province approved a resolution formally
authorizing Governor Marquez to represent the renovation/rehabilitation of the
Caticlan/Cagban Passenger Terminal Buildings and Jetty Ports; and (b) reclamation
of a portion of Caticlan foreshore for commercial purposes.
During the course of the negotiation, respondent Province deliberated on the possible
expansion from its original proposed reclamation area of 2.64 hectares to forty (40)
hectares in order to maximize the utilization of its resources and as a response to the
findings of the Preliminary Geohazard Assessment study which showed that the
recession and retreat of the shoreline caused by coastal erosion and scouring should
be the first major concern in the project site and nearby coastal area. But still, the
Sangguniang Bayan of Malay refused to give the favourable endorsement to the
Province of Aklan. As a result, the petitioner contends that the respondent province
failed to conduct the required consultation procedures as required by the Local
Government Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prior consultation is a requirement before a national
project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities
can be implemented.
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RULING: Yes. Two requisites must be met before a national project that affects the
environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be implemented: prior
consultation with the affected local communities, and prior approval of the project by
the appropriate sanggunian. Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the
projects implementation is illegal. Based on the above, therefore, prior consultations
and prior approval are required by law to have been conducted and secured by the
respondent Province.
The project in this case can be classified as a national project that affects the
environmental and ecological balance of local communities, because the commercial
establishments to be built on phase 1, as described in the EPRMP quoted above,
could cause pollution as it could generate garbage, sewage, and possible toxic fuel
discharge. Hence, it is covered by the requirements found in Sections 26 and 27 of
the Local Government Code
25. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO,
and BONIFACIO S. TUMBOKON vs. HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his
capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila
G.R. No. 156052 March 7, 2007
FACTS: On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted
Ordinance No. 8027. Respondent mayor approved the ordinance on November 28,
2001. It became effective on December 28, 2001, after its publication.
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted pursuant to the police power delegated to local
government units.
Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the Pandacan area from industrial to commercial and
directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease
and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of
effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-
called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron
Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.
However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE)
entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in which
they agreed that "the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable
and practicable option."
This means that the Pandacan Oil Depot will stay as long as the three major oil
companies will reduce the number of LPG storage tanks in the area as well as to
provide for the safety and maintenance of the depot as well as the creation of green
buffer zones surrounding Pandacan community.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97. In the same
resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective only for a period of
six months starting July 25, 2002. Thereafter, on January 30, 2003,
the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 13 extending the validity of Resolution No.
97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special business permits
to the oil companies. Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also called for a reassessment of the
ordinance.
Meanwhile, petitioners filed this original action for mandamus on December 4, 2002
praying that Mayor Atienza be compelled to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order
the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies.
ISSUES:
1. Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027
and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals, and
2. Whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it can amend or
repeal Ordinance No. 8027.
RULING:
1. Yes. The Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city
mayor, to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city.” One
of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or
annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so.
In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., the Court stated the reason for this:
These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged
invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might
seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be
permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances
imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared
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unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are
creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.
2. The Court finds no need to resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the MOU
were inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made
it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April
30, 2003. Thus, at present, there is nothing that legally hinders respondent from
enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines, along with the rest of the
world, witnessed the horror of the September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers of
the World Trade Center in New York City. The objective of the ordinance is to protect
the residents of Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case
of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists why such a
protective measure should be delayed.
26. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY SJS vs. ATIENZA
G.R. No. 156052 March 7, 2007
FACTS: On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted
Ordinance No. 8027.2 Respondent mayor approved the ordinance on November 28,
2001.3 It became effective on December 28, 2001, after its publication.4
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted pursuant to the police power delegated to local
government units, a principle described as the power inherent in a government to
enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals
and general welfare of the society.5 This is evident from Sections 1 and 3 thereof
which state:
SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning and ensuring health,
public safety, and general welfare of the residents of Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well
as its adjoining areas, the land use of [those] portions of land bounded by the Pasig
River in the north, PNR Railroad Track in the east, Beata St. in the south, Palumpong
St. in the southwest, and Estero de Pancacan in the west[,] PNR Railroad in the
northwest area, Estero de Pandacan in the [n]ortheast, Pasig River in the southeast
and Dr. M.L. Carreon in the southwest. The area of Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the
Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo 28 St., and F. Manalo Street, are hereby
reclassified from Industrial II to Commercial I.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other businesses, the operation of
which are no longer permitted under Section 1 hereof, are hereby given a period of
six (6) months from the date of effectivity of this Ordinance within which to cease and
desist from the operation of businesses which are hereby in consequence,
disallowed.
Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to
commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under
Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from
the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are
the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc.,
Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.
However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE)
entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU)6 with the oil companies in which
they agreed that "the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable
and practicable option." Under the MOU, the oil companies agreed to perform the
following:
Section 1. - Consistent with the objectives stated above, the OIL COMPANIES shall,
upon signing of this MOU, undertake a program to scale down the Pandacan
Terminals which shall include, among others, the immediate
removal/decommissioning process of TWENTY EIGHT (28) tanks starting with the
LPG spheres and the commencing of works for the creation of safety buffer and green
zones surrounding the Pandacan Terminals. xxx
Section 2. – Consistent with the scale-down program mentioned above, the OIL
COMPANIES shall establish joint operations and management, including the
operation of common, integrated and/or shared facilities, consistent with international
and domestic technical, safety, environmental and economic considerations and
standards. Consequently, the joint operations of the OIL COMPANIES in the
Pandacan Terminals shall be limited to the common and integrated areas/facilities. A
separate agreement covering the commercial and operational terms and conditions
of the joint operations, shall be entered into by the OIL COMPANIES.
Section 3. - The development and maintenance of the safety and green buffer zones
mentioned therein, which shall be taken from the properties of the OIL COMPANIES
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and not from the surrounding communities, shall be the sole responsibility of the OIL
COMPANIES.
The City of Manila and the DOE, on the other hand, committed to do the following:
Section 1. - The City Mayor shall endorse to the City Council this MOU for its
appropriate action with the view of implementing the spirit and intent thereof.
Section 2. - The City Mayor and the DOE shall, consistent with the spirit and intent
of this MOU, enable the OIL COMPANIES to continuously operate in compliance with
legal requirements, within the limited area resulting from the joint operations and the
scale down program.
Section 3. - The DOE and the City Mayor shall monitor the OIL COMPANIES’
compliance with the provisions of this MOU.
Section 4. - The CITY OF MANILA and the national government shall protect the
safety buffer and green zones and shall exert all efforts at preventing future
occupation or encroachment into these areas by illegal settlers and other
unauthorized parties.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97.7 In the same
resolution, the Sangguniandeclared that the MOU was effective only for a period of
six months starting July 25, 2002.8 Thereafter, on January 30, 2003,
the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 139 extending the validity of Resolution No.
97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special business permits
to the oil companies. Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also called for a reassessment of the
ordinance.10
Meanwhile, petitioners filed this original action for mandamus on December 4, 2002
praying that Mayor Atienza be compelled to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order
the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies.11
ISSUES:
1. whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance
No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals, and
2. whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it can
amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.12
RULING:
Petitioners contend that respondent has the mandatory legal duty, under Section 455
(b) (2) of the Local Government Code (RA 7160),13 to enforce Ordinance No. 8027
and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies. Instead, he
has allowed them to stay.
Respondent’s defense is that Ordinance No. 8027 has been superseded by the MOU
and the resolutions.14However, he also confusingly argues that the ordinance and
MOU are not inconsistent with each other and that the latter has not amended the
former. He insists that the ordinance remains valid and in full force and effect and that
the MOU did not in any way prevent him from enforcing and implementing it. He
maintains that the MOU should be considered as a mere guideline for its full
implementation.15
Under Rule 65, Section 316 of the Rules of Court, a petition for mandamus may be
filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust or station. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that is employed to compel
the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty that is already imposed on the
respondent and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. The petitioner should have a well-defined, clear and certain legal right
to the performance of the act and it must be the clear and imperative duty of
respondent to do the act required to be done.17
Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty, which
is questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. The principal function of the
writ of mandamus is to command and to expedite, not to inquire and to adjudicate;
thus, it is neither the office nor the aim of the writ to secure a legal right but to
implement that which is already established. Unless the right to the relief sought is
unclouded, mandamus will not issue.18
To support the assertion that petitioners have a clear legal right to the enforcement of
the ordinance, petitioner SJS states that it is a political party registered with the
Commission on Elections and has its offices in Manila. It claims to have many
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members who are residents of Manila. The other petitioners, Cabigao and Tumbokon,
are allegedly residents of Manila.
We need not belabor this point. We have ruled in previous cases that when
a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to compel a public
duty, the people who are interested in the execution of the laws are regarded as the
real parties in interest and they need not show any specific interest. 19 Besides, as
residents of Manila, petitioners have a direct interest in the enforcement of the city’s
ordinances. Respondent never questioned the right of petitioners to institute this
proceeding.
On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty,
as city mayor, to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the
city.">20 One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he
has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by
the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts.21 He has no other choice. It is his
ministerial duty to do so. In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,22 we stated the reason for this:
These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged
invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might
seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be
permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances
imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared
unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are
creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.23
The question now is whether the MOU entered into by respondent with the oil
companies and the subsequent resolutions passed by the Sanggunian have made
the respondent’s duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 doubtful, unclear or uncertain.
This is also connected to the second issue raised by petitioners, that is, whether the
MOU and Resolution Nos. 97, s. 2002 and 13, s. 2003 of the Sanggunian can
amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.
We need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were
inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it
binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30,
2003. Thus, at present, there is nothing that legally hinders respondent from
enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.24
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines, along with the rest of
the world, witnessed the horror of the September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin
Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. The objective of the ordinance
is to protect the residents of Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely
occur in case of a terrorist attack25 on the Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists
why such a protective measure should be delayed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza,
Jr., as mayor of the City of Manila, is directed to immediately enforce Ordinance No.
8027.
27. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) OFFICERS, NAMELY, SAMSON S.
ALCANTARA, and VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO vs. ALFREDO
S. LIM, in his capacity as mayor of the City of Manila
G.R. No. 187836, November 25, 2014, PEREZ, J.
There is truly no such thing as “the will of Manila” insofar as the general welfare of the
people is concerned.
FACTS: The present case is a sequel of the Social Justice Society v. Atienza, Jr.
(2008). During the incumbency of former Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim), who
succeeded Mayor Atienza, the Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Ordinance No.
8187 which repealed Ordinance No. 8027, thus allowing, once again, the operation
of the oil companies in the Pandacan area.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 8187 is valid and constitutional.
RULING: No. Notwithstanding that the conditions with respect to the operations of
the oil depots existing prior to the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 do not
substantially differ to this day, as would later be discussed, the position of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod on the matter has thrice changed, largely depending on the
new composition of the council and/or political affiliations.
The foregoing, thus, shows that its determination of the “general welfare” of the city
does not after all gear towards the protection of the people in its true sense and
meaning, but is, one way or another, dependent on the personal preference of the
members who sit in the council as to which particular sector among its constituents it
wishes to favor. Now that the City of Manila, through the mayor and the city councilors,
has changed its view on the matter, favoring the city’s economic related benefits,
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through the continued stay of the oil terminals, over the protection of the very lives
and safety of its constituents, it is imperative for this Court to make a final
determination on the basis of the facts on the table as to which specific right of the
inhabitants of Manila should prevail. For, in this present controversy, history reveals
that there is truly no such thing as “the will of Manila” insofar as the general welfare
of the people is concerned.
If in sacrilege, in free translation of Angara by Justice Laurel, we say when the
judiciary mediates we do not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the Manila
Sangguniang Panlungsod, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to the Court by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority
under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the
rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.
In a later case (Social Justice Society v. Lim, G.R. No. 187836, March 10, 2015), the
Supreme Court denied the oil companies’ motion for reconsideration, ruling in this
wise: “There are overwhelming reasons stated in the Decision to support the Court’s
pronouncement that the very nature of depots has no place in a densely populated
area, among others, the very history of the Pandacan terminals where flames spread
over the entire City of Manila when fuel storage dumps were set on fire in December
194114 and the other incident of explosion, which were both considered in G.R. No.
156052.”
28. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY vs. LIM
GR NO. 187836 MARCH 10, 2015
FACTS: These petitions are a sequel to the case of Social Justice Society v. Mayor
Atienza, Jr. (hereinafter referred to as G.R. No. 156052), where the Court found: (1)
that the ordinance subject thereof – Ordinance No. 8027 – was enacted "to safeguard
the rights to life, security and safety of the inhabitants of Manila;" (2) that it had passed
the tests of a valid ordinance; and (3) that it is not superseded by Ordinance No.
8119. Declaring that it is constitutional and valid, the Court accordingly ordered its
immediate enforcement with a specific directive on the relocation and transfer of the
Pandacan oil terminals.
Highlighting that the Court has so ruled that the Pandacan oil depots should leave,
herein petitioners now seek the nullification of Ordinance No. 8187, which contains
provisions contrary to those embodied in Ordinance No. 8027. Allegations of violation
of the right to health and the right to a healthful and balanced environment are also
included.
Pandacan (one of the districts of the City of Manila) is situated along the banks of the
Pasig River. Atthe turn of the twentieth century, Pandacan was unofficially designated
as the industrial center of Manila. The area, then largely uninhabited, was ideal for
various emerging industries as the nearby river facilitated the transportation of goods
and products. In the 1920s, it was classified as an industrial zone. Among its early
industrial settlers werethe oil companies. x x x On December 8, 1941, the Second
World War reached the shores of the Philippine Islands. x x x [I]n their zealous attempt
to fend off the Japanese Imperial Army, the United States Army took control of the
Pandacan Terminals and hastily made plans to destroy the storage facilities to deprive
the advancing Japanese Army of a valuable logistics weapon. The U.S. Army burned
unused petroleum, causing a frightening conflagration. Historian Nick Joaquin
recounted the events as follows:
The fire consequently destroyed the Pandacan Terminals and rendered its network
of depots and service stations inoperative.
On 20 November 2001, during the incumbency of former Mayor Jose L. Atienza, Jr.
(Mayor Atienza) – nowone of the petitioners in G.R. No. 187916 – the Sangguniang
Panlungsod enacted Ordinance No. 8027 reclassifying the use of the land in
Pandacan, Sta. Ana, and its adjoining areas from Industrial II to Commercial I.
The owners and operators of the businesses thus affected by the reclassification were
given six months from the date of effectivity of the Ordinance within which to stop the
operation of their businesses.
The petitioners sought to compel former Mayor Atienza to enforce Ordinance No.
8027 and cause the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies.
On 14 May 2009, during the incumbency of former Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor
Lim), who succeeded Mayor Atienza, the Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted
Ordinance No. 8187.
The new Ordinance repealed, amended, rescinded or otherwise modified
Ordinance No. 8027, Section 23 of Ordinance No. 8119, and all other Ordinances
or provisions inconsistent therewith thereby allowing, once again, the
operation of "Pollutive/Non-Hazardous and Pollutive/Hazardous manufacturing
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and processing establishments" and "Highly Pollutive/Non-Hazardous,
Pollutive/Hazardous, Highly Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous, Non-
Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous; and Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous; and
Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous manufacturing and processing establishments"
within the newly created Medium Industrial Zone (1-2) and Heavy Industrial
Zone (1-3) in the Pandacan area.
Thus, where the Industrial Zone under Ordinance No. 8119 was limited to Light
Industrial Zone (I-1), Ordinance No. 8187 appended to the list a Medium
Industrial Zone (I-2) and a Heavy Industrial Zone (I-3), where petroleum
refineries and oil depots are now among those expressly allowed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the enactment of the assailed Ordinance allowing the
continued stay of the oil companies in the depots is, indeed, invalid and
unconstitutional.
RULING: No. The Local Government Code of 1991 expressly provides that the
Sangguniang Panlungsod is vested with the power to "reclassify land within the
jurisdiction of the city" subject to the pertinent provisions of the Code. It is also settled
that an ordinance may be modified or repealed by another ordinance.
The Court was convinced that the threat of terrorism is imminent. It remains so
convinced.
Even assuming that the respondents and intervenors were correct, the very nature of
the depots where millions of liters of highly flammable and highly volatile products,
regardless of whether or not the composition may cause explosions, has no place in
a densely populated area. Surely, any untoward incident in the oil depots, beit related
to terrorism of whatever origin or otherwise, would definitely cause not only
destruction to properties within and among the neighboring communities but certainly
mass deaths and injuries.
With regard to the scaling down of the operations in the Pandacan Terminals, which
the oil companies continue to insist to have been validated and recognized by the
MOU, the Court,in G.R. No. 156052, has already put this issue to rest. It specifically
declared that even assuming that the terms of the MOU and Ordinance No. 8027
were inconsistent, the resolutions ratifying the MOU gave it full force and effect only
until 30 April 2003.
The steps taken by the oil companies, therefore, remain insufficient to convince the
Court that the dangers posed by the presence of the terminals in a thickly populated
area have already been completely removed.
For, given that the threat sought to be prevented may strike at one point or another,
no matter how remote it is as perceived by one or some, we cannot allow the right to
life to bedependent on the unlikelihood of an event. Statistics and theories of
probability have no place in situations where the very life of not just an individual but
of residents of big neighborhoods is at stake.
It is the removal of the danger to life not the mere subdual of risk of catastrophe, that
we saw in and made us favor Ordinance No. 8027. That reason, unaffected by
Ordinance No. 8187, compels the affirmance of our Decision in G.R. No. 156052.
In striking down the contrary provisions of the assailed Ordinance relative to the
continued stay of the oil depots, we follow the same line of reasoning used in G.R.
No. 156052, to wit: Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted "for the purpose of promoting
sound urban planning, ensuring health, public safety and general welfare" of the
residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled to take measures to protect the
residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the
Pandacan Terminals. Towards this objective, the Sanggunian reclassified the area
defined in the ordinance from industrial to commercial.
Ordinance No. 8187 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and INVALID with
respect to the continued stay of the Pandacan Oil Terminals.
29. ARNOLD D. VICENCIO VS. HON. REYNALDO A. VILLAR AND HON.
JUANITO G. ESPINO JR.
G.R. No. 182069, July 3, 2012, SERENO, J.
There is no inherent authority on the part of the city vice-mayor to enter into contracts
on behalf of the local government unit, unlike that provided for the city mayor.
FACTS: A city ordinance Ordinance No. 15-2003 was passed granting the Vice
Mayor of Malabon, Jay Jay Yambao, to negotiate and enter into contract for
consultancy services for consultants in the Sanggunian Secretariat tasked to function
in their respective areas of concern. Later on, petitioner Arnold Vicencio was elected
as Vice Mayor of Malabon, and he deemed it necessary to hire the services of
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consultants with the end view of augmenting and upgrading its performance capability
for the effective operation of the legislative machinery of the city. After the funds were
appropriated, an Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) was issued disallowing the
amount of three hundred eighty-four thousand nine hundred eighty pesos (₱384,980)
for being an improper disbursement. The Petitioner appealed to the Adjudication and
Settlement Board (ASB) of the COA, but the latter denied the petition. The COA
affirmed the decision of the ASB.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contracts entered into by Vice Mayor Arnold Vicencio are
valid.
RULING: No. Under Section 456 of the Local Government Code, there is no inherent
authority on the part of the city vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the local
government unit, unlike that provided for the city mayor. Thus, the authority of the
vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the city was strictly circumscribed by
the ordinance granting it. Ordinance No. 15-2003 specifically authorized Vice-Mayor
Yambao to enter into contracts for consultancy services. As this is not a power or duty
given under the law to the Office of the Vice-Mayor, Ordinance No. 15-2003 cannot
be construed as a “continuing authority” for any person who enters the Office of the
Vice- Mayor to enter into subsequent, albeit similar, contracts.
30. GAMBOA vs. AGUIRRE AND ARANETA
FACTS: In the 1995 elections, Rafael Coscolluela, petitioner Romeo J. Gamboa, Jr.
and respondents Marcelo Aguirre, Jr., and Juan Y. Araneta were elected Negros
Occidental Governor, Vice-Governor and SP members, respectively. Sometime in
August of 1995, the governor designated petitioner as Acting Governor for the
duration of the former’s official trip abroad until his return. When the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan held its regular session, respondents questioned the authority of
petitioner to preside therein in view of his designation as Acting Governor and asked
him to vacate the Chair. The latter, however, refused to do so. In another session, 7
members of the SP voted to allow petitioner to continue presiding while 4 others voted
against with 1 abstention. Respondents filed before the lower court a petition for
declaratory relief and prohibition. In the meantime, the Governor re-assumed his
office. Later, the trial court rendered a decision and declared petitioner as “temporarily
legally incapacitated to preside over the sessions of the SP during the period that he
is the Acting Governor.” Petitioner filed a petition for review raising the issue earlier
mentioned. Although this case is dismissible for having become moot and academic
considering the expiration in 1998 of the terms of office of the local officials involved
herein, the Court nonetheless proceeds to resolve this common controversy but novel
issue under the existing laws on local government.
ISSUE: WON Gamboa, while serving as the Acting Governor, temporarily
relinquished the powers, functions, duties and responsibilities of the Vice-Governor,
including the power to preside over the sessions of the SP
HELD: YES.
RATIO DECIDENDI: What the LGC provides: The LGC provides that the Vice-
Governor shall be the presiding officer of the SP. In addition to such function, he
becomes the Governor and assumes the higher office for the unexpired term of his
predecessor, in case of “permanent vacancy” therei n. When the vacancy, however,
is merely temporary, the Vice-Governor “shall automatically exercise the powers
(subject to certain limitations) and perform the duties and functions” of the Governor.
But, no such contingency is provided in case of temporary vacancy in the office of the
Vice-Governor. Vice-Governor as Acting Governor: When the Vice-Governor
exercises the “powers and duties” of the Governor, he does not assume the latter
office. He only “acts” as the Governor but does not “become” the Governor. His
assumption of the powers, duties and functions of the provincial Chief Executive does
not create a permanent vacuum or vacancy in his position as the Vice-Governor.
Necessarily, he does not relinquish nor abandon his position and title as Vice-
Governor by merely becoming an Acting Governor or by merely exercising the powers
and duties of the higher office. A Vice-Governor who is concurrently an Acting
Governor is actually a quasi-Governor. This means, that for purposes of exercising
his legislative prerogatives and powers, he is deemed as a non-member of the SP for
the time being.
By tradition, the offices of the provincial Governor and Vice-Governor are essentially
executive in nature, whereas plain members of the provincial board perform functions
partaking of a legislative character. This is because the authority vested by law in the
provincial boards involves primarily a delegation of some legislative powers of
Congress. This is clear from the law, when it provides that “local legislative po wer
shall be vested in the SP,” which is “the legislative body of the province,” and
enumerates therein its membership consisting of the: 1) Vice Governor as presiding
officer 2) regular elective SP members 3) 3 elective sectoral representatives 4) ex-
officio members namely:
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a) president of the provincial chapter of the liga ng mga barangay

b) president of the panlalawigang pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan

c) president of the provincial federation of sanggunian members of municipalities and

component cities

Not being included in the enumeration, the Governor is deemed excluded and thus,
local executive power in the province is vested alone in the Governor.

Consequently, the union of legislative-executive powers in the office of the local chief
executive under the former Code has been disbanded. Being the Acting Governor,
the Vice-Governor cannot continue to simultaneously exercise the duties of the latter
office, since the nature of the duties of the provincial Governor call for a full-time
occupant to discharge them. Conclusion: To repeat, the creation of a temporary
vacancy in the office of the Governor creates a corresponding temporary vacancy in
the office of the Vice-Governor whenever the latter acts as Governor by virtue of such
temporary vacancy. This event constitutes an “inability” on the part of the regular
presiding officer (Vice Governor) to preside during the SP sessions, which thus calls
for the operation of the remedy set in Article 49(b) of the Local Government Code –
concerning the election of a temporary presiding officer. The continuity of the Acting
Governor’s (Vice-Governor) powers as presiding officer of the SP is suspended so
long as he is in such capacity. Under Section 49(b), “(i)n the event of the inability of
the regular presiding officer to preside at the sanggunian session, the members
present and constituting a quorum shall elect from among themselves a temporary
presiding officer.”

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