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Business History Review, Vol. XLIII, No. 4 (Winter 1969). Copyright ? The President
and Fellows of Harvard College.
* The author wishes to express his debt of gratitude for the useful comments on an earlier
draft of this essay made by his esteemed friend and colleague, the late Warren C. Scoville.
A grant from the American Philosophical Society and a Fulbright Research Grant for Spain
made possible the archival research underlying this essay. The author sincerely thanks the
American Philosophical Society and the Commission for Educational Exchange between
the United States of America and Spain for this generous support.
del Ministerio de Hacienda (hereafter cited as Archivo de Hacienda), legajo 5459; Jos6
Canga Argiielles, Documentos Pertenecientes a los Observaciones Sobre la Historia de la
Guerra de Espaiia que Escribe en Ingls el Teniente Coronel Napier (Madrid, 1836), 254-5.
2 In February 1809, the Junta Suprema promised to pay 100,000 reals to the first boat
528 BUSINESS HISTORY REVIEW
II
number of muskets throughout 1811 and 1812. (Ibid., Estado, Guerra de la Independencia,
legajos 3072, 3110; Lavin, History of Spanish Firearms, 144.)
As mentioned above, the industry at Ripoll in Catalonia continued to produce some
firearms until the third occupation by French soldiers in 1813. Early in 1809, however,
the producers there reportedly were selling their products to the French rather than the Span-
ish. At this time the capacity of the producers at Ripoll was reputedly about 300 muskets a
week; however, with the first French invasion later in 1809, many of the artisans fled to
unoccupied areas, leaving their equipment to be damaged or destroyed by the enemy.
Many returned later but their output never recovered to its former level and suffered anni-
hilation during the third French visitation in 1813. In August 1811, the loyal government
in Catalonia created another nucleus for manufacture of muskets at Berga when it con-
tracted with a group of artisans there. For the remainder of the war, their output never
varied much beyond 25 to 30 firearms a week; the industry at Ripoll and Berga suffered
at all times during the war from penury and poorly-made arms, a large percentage of
which (perhaps j) burst when tested. (Archivo de la Corona de Aragon, Guerra de la
Independencia, Junta Superior, cajas 88, 172; Archivo Nacional, Estado, Junta Suprema,
legajos 35, no. 151; 36, nos. 5, 9, 11; Neal, Spanish Guns and Pistols, 34; Lavin, History
of Spanish Firearms, 218-19.)
Besides these factories at Ceuta, Ripoll, and Berga, a number of others were proposed by
various individuals or juntas but never consumated. Locations of these were, for example,
La Corufia, Isla de Leon, Badajoz, Utrilla de Aragon, and Gijon. (Archivo Nacional,
Estado, Junta Suprema, legajos 35, nos. 109, 139, 162; 36, nos. 14, 15, 17, 328.)
56Archivo Nacional, Ibid., lagajo 36, nos. 40, 42, 47, 306.
56 Ibid., legajos 35, nos. 226; 36, nos. 36, 42, 56, 311, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323,
324,
325, 326, 327.
534 BUSINESS HISTORY REVIEW
III
Had all the factories achieved their maximum production by the
end of 1809, their combined outputs would have surpassed 100,000
muskets a year, a quantity exceeding by at least 300 percent the
pre-war output of the industry in Catalonia, Guipizcoa, and
Asturias. But it was not to be. For, as we have seen, the supply of
essential skills fell far short of the required quantity - even had
peace prevailed, the quantity would have been woefully inadequate;
tools and equipment were also far too scarce, and when shipments
did reach Spain, they arrived late. Though a domestic supply of
metal existed, it was small and costly, and imports from England
were slow in materializing.
In the end the insurmountable problem of the quality, quantity,
and location of resources became largely an academic one. On
November 19, 1809, the forces of King Joseph annihilated a Spanish
army at Ocafia and gained free passage into Andalusia. His legions
swept southward in January 1810, capturing Seville on February 1
without a fight and occupying all southern Spain, except Cadiz, by
mid-March.77 Nearly a year of toil on the factories at Xerez de la
Frontera, Seville, Granada, and Mglaga had been for nothing. The
factories at Murcia and Valencia survived throughout 1810 and
1811. In the latter year, Marchal Suchet vanquished the Spanish
army of Catalonia and moved against Valencia and Murcia, forcing
their defenders to capitulate early in 1812. The production of new
muskets at Murcia and Valencia for 1810 and 1811 and at Cadiz
(never occupied by the French) from 1810 to 1814 appears to have
76 Archivo de Simancas, Estado, legajo 83021 - Pablo Ventades to Apodaca, February 17,
1810; Pablo Ventades to Apodaca, April 2, 1810. Financing the construction and operation
of the factories composed another serious problem. The Junta Suprema, in most cases,
assigned each factory a weekly or monthly sum and directed the administrators of the
Postal Tax (Renta de Correos) to remit the funds to these manufactories. For example,
Cadiz was to receive 200,000 vellon reals each week and Granada 100,000 each month.
Unfortunately, the tax officials frequently delayed the remittances for one reason or another,
thereby placing the factories in constant financial jeopardy. Funds for the creation and
operation of Murcia's factory came from an ecclesiastical tax (Voto de la Santa Apostdlica
y Metropolitana Yglesia del Glorioso Apostal Santiago) collected in 17 cities and villages
throughout Murcia. (Archivo Nacional, Estado, Junta Suprema, legajos 35, nos. 42, 58, 62,
64, 67, 69, 74, 115, 126; 36, nos. 30, 31, 32, 43, 44, 48, 49, 51, 52, 54, 55, 63, 64, 67,
119, 121, 131, 139, 140, 144, 153, 157, 161, 164, 167, 170, 171; Estado, Guerra de la
Independencia, legajo 3072; Archivo de Simancas, Tesoro, Inventario 16, legajo 16.)
7Connelly, Napoleon's Satellite Kingdoms, 248-9; C. Perez Bustamente, Compendio de
Historia de Espafia, sexta ed. (Madrid, 1957), 432. Most of the factory's workmen escaped
to Cadiz, thanks to the assistance of Juan Manuel de Telleria, a functionary of the Govern-
ment. (Archivo General Militar [Segovia], Hojas de Servicios, Inspecci6n General de
Comisarios, Don Manuel de Telleria.)
MUSKETS AND SPAIN'S INDEPENDENCE 589
infantry, cavalry, and artillery. (Ibid., legajo 3527.) Christiansen (Origins of Military
Power in Spain, 18) claims that the regular army grew to about 160,000 men by war's
end- a far cry from the 350,000 to 400,000 men originally planned in late 1808 and
early 1809.