Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Jose Angara vs The Electoral Commission, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio
Mayor
63 Phil. 139 – Political Law – Judicial Review – Electoral Commission
In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates voted
for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. On
Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the said district. On November 15,
1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8
confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far
been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a “Motion of Protest” against the
election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last
day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA,
notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that
by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that EC
proclamation governs and that the EC can take cognizance of the election protest and that the EC cannot
be subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC.
Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election protest.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in cases of conflict between the several
departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the SC as the final arbiter, is the only
constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.
That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and
controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government
transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and
functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the
other two departments of the government.
That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
2. Aquino vs Minister of
Defense Juan Ponce Enrile
Martial Law – Habeas Corpus – Power of the President to Order Arrests
Enrile (then Minister of National Defense), pursuant to the order of Marcos issued and ordered
the arrest of a number of individuals including Benigno Aquino Jr even without any charge
against them. Hence, Aquino and some others filed for habeas corpus against Juan Ponce
Enrile. Enrile’s answer contained a common and special affirmative defense that the arrest is
valid pursuant to Marcos’ declaration of Martial Law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Aquino’s detention is legal in accordance to the declaration of Martial
Law.
HELD: The Constitution provides that in case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or
imminent danger against the state, when public safety requires it, the President may suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part therein under
Martial Law. In the case at bar, the state of rebellion plaguing the country has not yet
disappeared, therefore, there is a clear and imminent danger against the state. The arrest is
then a valid exercise pursuant to the President’s order.
FACTS:
In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the
NP were candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga.
Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justices of the SC
and the remaining 6 are members of the House of Representatives (5 members belong to the
LDP and 1 member is from the NP). Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc
won over Pineda. Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and
Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.
On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura received a
letter informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to
organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in
Davao Del Sur to join said political party. On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the
Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from
the LDP, the House of Representatives decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the
election of Congressman Camasura to the HRET.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political
party therein, may change that party’s representation in the HRET to thwart the
promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending
therein.
RULING:
The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to
provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative
office, devoid of partisan consideration.
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their
functions with complete detachment, impartiality and independence even independence from
the political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party
discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling
Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a “conscience vote” in favor of Bondoc,
based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the
recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse
of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion
against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is
that it violates Congressman Camasura’s right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as
sole judge of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as
members of the Judiciary enjoy security of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore,
membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the
expiration of the member’s congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability,
resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with
another political party or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by
the House of Representatives for party disloyalty, short of proof that he has formally
affiliated with another.
4. Ynot V. Intermediate Appellate Court , 148 SCRA 659 Consti Law 1 Atty. Camille Remoraza .
There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the
law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but
as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from
Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional
for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO
626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court
ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare
so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.
HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A ctreated a
presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the
other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend
himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC found
that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to
conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to
be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is,
finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted
unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.
FactsIn
, SC overruled Court of Tax Appeals decision that caterer’s tax under RA6110 is illegal because it was
vetoed by Former President Marcos and Congress had not taken steps to override the veto. SC ruled in
this case that the law has always imposed a 3% caterer’s tax, as provided in Par 1, Sec 206 of the Tax Code.
Presently, Manila Golf and Country Club, a non-stock corporation claims that it is exempt from the 3% on
gross receipts because President Marcos vetoed Sec 191-A of RA 6110 (Omnibus Tax Law).President
Marcos vetoed Sec 191-A because according to him it would1) shift the burden of taxation to the
consuming public and 2) restrain the development of hotels which are essential to the tourist
industry. The protestation of the club was denied by petitioners saying that Sec42 was not entirely vetoed
but merely the words “hotels, motels, resthouses.” House of Ways and Means concurred with petitioners
stating that veto message only seems to object with certain portions of 191-A and that can be gleaned by
the reasons given by the President.
Issue: WON veto referred to the entire section or merely the 20% tax ongross receipts of operators and
proprietors of eating places within hotels, motels and resthouses.
Held and Ratio: President does not have the power to repeal an existing tax. Therefore, he could not have
repealed the 2% caterer’s tax. CTA agreed with respondent club that president vetoed only a certain part.
CTA mentioned that President can veto only an entire item, and not just words. The President
intentionally only vetoed a few words inSec 191-A. Assuming that the veto could not apply to just one
provision but all would render the Presidential veto void and still in favor of petitioner. Inclusion of “hotels,
motels, resthouses” in the 20% caterer’s tax bracket are items. President has the right to veto such item,
that which is subject to tax and tax rate. It does not refer to an entiresection. To construe item as an entire
section would be to tie his hands to either completely agree with a section he has objectionswith or to
disagree with an entire section where he only has a portionhe disagrees with.
7. SALONGA vs PAÑO
G.R. No. L-59524 February 18, 1985
Facts: The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life and liberty guaranteed by
the due process clause, alleging that no prima facie case has been established to warrant the filing of
an information for subversion against him. Petitioner asks the Court to prohibit and prevent the
respondents from using the iron arm of the law to harass, oppress, and persecute him, a member of
the democratic opposition in the Philippines.
The case roots backs to the rash of bombings which occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months
of August, September and October of 1980. Victor Burns Lovely, Jr, one of the victims of the bombing,
implicated petitioner Salonga as one of those responsible.
On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the petitioner a “Notice of Preliminary
Investigation” in People v. Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included petitioner as a co-accused),
stating that “the preliminary investigation of the above-entitled case has been set at 2:30 o’clock p.m.
on December 12, 1980” and that petitioner was given ten (10) days from receipt of the charge sheet
and the supporting evidence within which to file his counter-evidence. The petitioner states that up
to the time martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981, and despite assurance to the contrary, he has
not received any copies of the charges against him nor any copies of the so-called supporting
evidence.
The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an amended complaint signed by Gen. Prospero
Olivas, dated 12 March 1981, charging Salonga, along with 39 other accused with the violation of RA
1700, as amended by PD 885, BP 31 and PD 1736. On 15 October 1981, the counsel for Salonga filed
a motion to dismiss the charges against Salonga for failure of the prosecution to establish a prima
facie case against him. On 2 December 1981, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano (Presiding Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII, Quezon City) denied the motion. On 4 January 1982, he (Pano)
issued a resolution ordering the filing of an information for violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion
Act, as amended, against 40 people, including Salonga. The resolutions of the said judge dated 2
December 1981 and 4 January 1982 are the subject of the present petition for certiorari. It is the
contention of Salonga that no prima facie case has been established by the prosecution to justify the
filing of an information against him. He states that to sanction his further prosecution despite the lack
of evidence against him would be to admit that no rule of law exists in the Philippines today.
Issues:
1. Whether the above case still falls under an actual case
2. Whether the above case dropped by the lower court still deserves a decision from the Supreme
Court
Held: 1. No. The Court had already deliberated on this case, a consensus on the Court’s judgment
had been arrived at, and a draft ponencia was circulating for concurrences and separate opinions, if
any, when on January 18, 1985, respondent Judge Rodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of respondent
City Fiscal Sergio Apostol to drop the subversion case against the petitioner. Pursuant to instructions
of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution restudied its evidence and decided to seek the exclusion of
petitioner Jovito Salonga as one of the accused in the information filed under the questioned
resolution.
The court is constrained by this action of the prosecution and the respondent Judge to withdraw the
draft ponencia from circulating for concurrences and signatures and to place it once again in the
Court’s crowded agenda for further deliberations.
Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of subversion charges is concerned,
this decision has been rendered moot and academic by the action of the prosecution.
2. Yes. Despite the SC’s dismissal of the petition due to the case’s moot and academic nature, it has on
several occasions rendered elaborate decisions in similar cases where mootness was clearly
apparent.
The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts,
doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection
given by constitutional guarantees.
In dela Camara vs Enage (41 SCRA 1), the court ruled that:
“The fact that the case is moot and academic should not preclude this Tribunal from setting forth in
language clear and unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the
unequivocal command of the Constitution that excessive bail shall not be required.”
In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural Center of the Philippines could
validly be created through an executive order was mooted by Presidential Decree No. 15, the Center’s
new charter pursuant to the President’s legislative powers under martial law. Nevertheless, the Court
discussed the constitutional mandate on the preservation and development of Filipino culture for
national Identity. (Article XV, Section 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution).
In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183), the fact that the petition was moot
and academic did not prevent this Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from promulgating
one of the most voluminous decisions ever printed in the Reports.
Facts: During March 13, 1992, Republic Act 7227 were enacted. The R.A. 7227 is also known as “ Bases
Conversion and Development Act of 1992” . This grants Subic SEZ incentives which provides tax and duty
free importations, exemption of business therein from local and national taxes, to other hallmarks of
liberated financial and bhsiness climate. This also gave authority to the President to create through
executive proclamation, subject to the concurrence of local government units directly affected, other
Special Economic Zones in the areas covered respectively by the Clark Military reservation, the Wallace
Air Station in San Fernando, La Union and Camp John Hay.
July 5, 1994, President Ramos issued proclamation no. 420 which established a SEZ on a portion of Camp
John Hay.
In maintaning the validity of proclamation no. 420, respondents contend that by extending the John Hay
SEZ economic incentives similar to those enjoyed by the Subic SEZ, which was established under R.A.
7227, the proclamation is merely implementing the legislative intent of said law to turb the U.S. Military
bases into hubs of business activity or investment.
Issue: Whether Proclamation no. 420 is constitutional by providing for national and local tax exemption
within and granting other economic incentives to the John Hay SEZ?
Held/Ruling: No. It is settled that when questions of constituional signifance are raised, the court can
exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) existence of actual
and appropriate case; (2) person challenging the act must have the standing to question or have
personal/substantial interest in the case; (3) question of constitutionality must be raised at earliest
opportunit; (4) issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. There is none that have
been mentioned in R.A 7227, a grant of tax exemption to SEZ yet to be established in base areas, unlike
the grant under Section 12 which provides for tax exemption to the established Subic SEZ. The tax
exemption grant to John Hay SEZ contravenes Articles VI, Section 28 (4) of the 1987 constitution which
provides that “No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority
of all the members of Congress. Furthermore, it is the Legislature, unless limited by a provision has the
full power to exempt any person or corporation or class of property from taxation, its powerto exempt
being as broad as its powerto tax. Thegrant by Proclamation No. 420 of tax exemption and other
privileges to the John Hay SEZ is VOID for being violative of the Constitution.
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines
and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, [calling-out power] by virtue of
the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states
that: “The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to
prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,― and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby
command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or
rebellion ["take care" power] and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders
and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and [power to take over] as
provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.
On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing the members of the
AFP and PNP "to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to
suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence."
David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of
Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of
martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and
of assembly. They alleged “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search”
committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5 have
factual basis, and contended that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers
to the President in determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. The petitioners did
not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor General.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.
RULING:
The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:
First provision: “by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII … do hereby
command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or
rebellion”
Second provision: “and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;”
Third provision: “as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a
State of National Emergency.”
PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first provision of the decree.
First Provision: Calling Out Power.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes
necessary,” the President may call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion.” (Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora)
President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act declaring a status or
condition of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4, Chap 2, Bk II of the
Revised Administration Code. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without
legal significance, and deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring
a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the State’s extraordinary power
to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP
1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed
harmless.
To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of President
Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless
violence.
As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP
should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to
suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence.” Considering that “acts of terrorism” have not yet
been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is
declared unconstitutional.
Facts: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men of
the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders have seized
the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP and declared
their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the resignation of the President, Secretary
of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal
Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared
under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers went back to their barracks in
the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General Orders were
lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued.
In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG
MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the
Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that there
is no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al,
petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under the
same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours
from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the presidential issuances cannot be
construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the
President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo,
petitioners contending that there was usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a
state of rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the
crime of rebellion.
Issue:
Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional?
Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit?
Held: The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are
constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The
President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive
powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces
and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may examine whether
the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the
President acted without factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as
there was no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military authorities have
taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation of the legislative power of the
Congress is of no moment since the President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the
armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief
powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII,
as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear
on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person may be subject to this whether there is
rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid
warrantless arrest is present.
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of Issue upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
Based on the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members have no legal
standing to sue. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress,
have standing to challenge the subject issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine Constitution
Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each
member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that
institution.
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power
by issuing E.O. 464 “Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence
to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in
Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes”.
Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate
Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the
attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including
those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department
for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the
issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military
in the so-called “Gloriagate Scandal”.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O.
464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.
ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b)
to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and
constitutional?
RULING:
To determine the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the Supreme Court discussed the two
different functions of the Legislature: The power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation and the
power to conduct inquiry during question hour.
Question Hour:
The power to conduct inquiry during question hours is recognized in Article 6, Section 22 of the
1987 Constitution, which reads:
“The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or
upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be
heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be
submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least
three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written
questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public
interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in
executive session.”
The Supreme Court construed Section 1 of E.O. 464 as those in relation to the appearance of
department heads during question hour as it explicitly referred to Section 22, Article 6 of the 1987
Constitution.
In aid of Legislation:
The Legislature’s power to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation is expressly recognized in Article
6, section21 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
“The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights
of persons appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.”
The power of inquiry in aid of legislation is inherent in the power to legislate. A legislative body
cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which
the legislation is intended to affect or change. And where the legislative body does not itself
possess the requisite information, recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
But even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the
power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of “executive privilege”. This is the
power of the government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress.
This is recognized only to certain types of information of a sensitive character. When Congress
exercise its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom
is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department
heads. Only one official may be exempted from this power -- the President.
Section 2 & 3 of E.O. 464 requires that all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) should
secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The
enumeration is broad. In view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O.464 to justify the failure
to be present, such invocation must be construed as a declaration to Congress that the President,
or a head of office authorized by the President, has determined that the requested information is
privileged.
The letter sent by the Executive Secretary to Senator Drilon does not explicitly invoke executive
privilege or that the matter on which these officials are being requested to be resource persons falls
under the recognized grounds of the privilege to justify their absence. Nor does it expressly state
that in view of the lack of consent from the President under E.O. 464, they cannot attend the
hearing. The letter assumes that the invited official possesses information that is covered by the
executive privilege. Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the
requested information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an
authorized head of office, has determined that it is so.
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per
se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the
claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given
her consent.
When an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment, might
be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or
the Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary to provide
the President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whether the matter
indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither
the President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to
respect the failure of the official to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the
necessary legal means to compel his appearance.
Wherefore, the petitions are partly granted. Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464 are declared void.
Section 1(a) are however valid.
17. Automotive Industry Workers Alliance (AIWA) vs. Romulo G.R. No. 157509 January 18, 2005 A
Case Digest By Ruth Angelica S. Gella
FACTS: The petitioners, having invoked their status as labor unions and as taxpayers whose rights and
interests are allegedly violated and prejudiced by Executive Order No. 185, whereby authorizing the
Secretary of Labor to exercise administrative supervision over the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), its regional branches and all its personnel including the executive labor arbiters and labor arbiters,
of which said authority was first under the NLRC Chairperson as provided under R.A. 6715. Thus, the
petitioners call upon the Court for a judicial review to declare EO No. 185 as unconstitutional having been
assailed to be in derogation of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, and that the issue must
be decided as it involves an act of the Chief Executive amending a provision of the law. The respondents
opposed the petition on procedural and substantive grounds. Procedurally, the petitioners have not
specified how E.O. 185 has prejudiced or has threatened to prejudice their rights and existence as labor
unions and as taxpayers, and thus it is alleged that the petition does not impose an actual case or
controversy upon which judicial review may be exercised. Additionally, the respondents further argue that
the petitioners have no locus standi to assail the validity of E.O. 185, not even their capacity as taxpayers
considering that labor unions are exempt from paying taxes.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have the requisite standing to file for a judicial review.
HELD:
1. No, the petitioners do not have the requisite standing to file for a judicial review. The petitioners have
not shown that they have sustained or are in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the
enactment of E.O. No. 185. Legal standing or locus standi is defined as a "personal and substantial interest
in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental
act that is being challenged." For a citizen to have standing, he must establish that he has suffered some
actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
2. No, a judicial review cannot be exercised. The hornbook doctrine stated that the exercise of the power
of judicial review requires the concurrence of the following requisites, namely: (1) the existence of an
appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question;
(3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the
constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide a case. As correctly pointed out by respondents,
judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. The function of the courts is to determine controversies
between litigants and not to give advisory opinions. The power of judicial review can only be exercised in
connection with a bona fide case or controversy which involves statute sought to be reviewed.
3. No, Executive Order No. 185 is not unconstitutional. As labor unions representing their members, it
cannot be said that E.O. No. 185 will prejudice their rights and interests considering that the scope of the
authority conferred upon the Secretary of Labor does not extend to the power to review, reverse, revise
or modify the decisions of the NLRC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. The subject matter of
E.O. No. 185 is the grant of authority by the President to the Secretary of Labor to exercise administrative
supervision over the NLRC, its regional branches and all its personnel, including the Executive Labor
Arbiters and Labor Arbiters. Its impact, sans the challenge to its constitutionality, is thereby limited to the
departments to which it is addressed. It has for its object simply the efficient and economical
administration of the affairs of the department to which it is issued in accordance with the law governing
the subject matter. Thus, only NLRC personnel who may find themselves the subject of the Secretary of
Labor’s disciplinary authority, conferred by Section 1(d) of the subject executive order, may be said to
have a direct and specific interest in raising the substantive issue herein. Moreover, and if at all, only
Congress, and not petitioners, can claim any injury from the alleged executive encroachment of the
legislative function to amend, modify and/or repeal laws.
18. KILOSBAYAN vs TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR
G.R. No. 113375 May 5, 1994
Facts:
This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction, which seeks to prohibit and restrain the implementation of the
"Contract of Lease" executed by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine
Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) in connection with the on- line lottery system, also known
as "lotto."
Petitioners assailed that the PCSO cannot validly enter into the Contract of Lease with the PGMC
because it is an arrangement wherein the PCSO would hold and conduct the on-line lottery system in
"collaboration" or "association" with the PGMC, in violation of Section 1(B) of R.A. No. 1169, as
amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting charity sweepstakes
races, lotteries, and other similar activities "in collaboration, association or joint venture with any
person, association, company or entity, foreign or domestic. They also claimed that PGMC is not
authorized by its charter and under the Foreign Investment Act (R.A No. 7042) to install, establish and
operate the on-line lotto and telecommunications systems.
Respondents contended that the contract does not violate the Foreign Investment Act of 1991; that
the Articles of Incorporation of PGMC authorize it to enter into the Contract of Lease; and that the
issues of "wisdom, morality and propriety of acts of the executive department are beyond the ambit of
judicial review."
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners have the locus standi to file the instant petition.
Ruling:
As to the issue on the locus standi of the petitioners, the Court resolved to set aside procedural
technicality in view of the importance of the issues raised. The Court brushed aside this technicality
because "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled
promptly and definitely, brushing aside, technicalities of procedure.
Insofar as taxpayers' suits are concerned, this Court had declared that it "is not devoid of discretion
as to whether or not it should be entertained," 30 or that it "enjoys an open discretion to entertain the
same or not.”The Court adopted the liberal policy on locus standi to allow ordinary taxpayers, members
of Congress, and even association of planters, and non-profit civic organization to initiate and
prosecute actions before this Court to question the constitutionality or validity of laws, acts, decisions,
rulings, or orders of various government agencies or instrumentalities.
The Court find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public and the issues are
of paramount public interest. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social,
economic, and moral well-being of the people. Hence, the legal standing then of the petitioners
deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the
procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of.
FACTS:
In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC
as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.
Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow
the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each.
Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents)
simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that
petitioner has questioned in this petition. it should mean one representative each from
both Houses which comprise the entire Congress. Respondent contends that the phrase
“ a representative of congress” refers that both houses of congress should have one
representative each, and that these two houses are permanent and mandatory
components of “congress” as part of the bicameral system of legislature. Both houses
have their respective powers in performance of their duties. Art VIII Sec 8 of the
constitution provides for the component of the JBC to be 7 members only with only one
representative from congress.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the
House of Representatives making 8 instead of 7 sitting members to be
unconstitutional as provided in Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution.
2. What is the effect of the Court's finding that the current composition of the JBC is
unconstitutional?
HELD:
1. Yes. The practice is unconstitutional; the court held that the phrase “a
representative of congress” should be construed as to having only one
representative that would come from either house, not both. That the framers of
the constitution only intended for one seat of the JBC to be allotted for the
legislative.
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies
as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional
law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot
always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an
undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to
a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in
double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance
upon a law creating it.
Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and holds
that notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the
JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid.
FACTS:
On February 1999, petitioner Matibag was appointed Acting Director IV of the COMELEC’s EID by then
COMELEC Chairperson Harriet Demetriou in a temporary capacity. On March 2001, respondent Benipayo
was appointed COMELEC Chairman together with other Commissioners in an ad interim appointment.
While on such ad interim appointment, respondent Benipayo in his capacity as Chairman issued a
Memorandum transferring petitioner to the Law Department. Petitioner requested Benipayo to
reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law Department. She cited Civil
Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated April 10,2001, reminding Heads of Government
offices that transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the election period. Benipayo denied
her request for reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated November
6, 2000, exempting COMELEC from the coverage of the said Memorandum Circular.
Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc. She also filed
an administrative and criminal complaint with the Law Department against Benipayo, alleging that her
reassignment violated Section 261(h) of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil
Service Memorandum Circular No. 07, s .001, and other pertinent administrative and Civil Service laws,
rules, and regulations.
During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed the instant petition
questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra, and Tuason as Chairman
and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of
Benipayo, Borra, and Tuason violate the Constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra, and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim
appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2),
Article IX-C of the Constitution.
RULING:
We find the petitioner’s argument without merit.
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no
longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is
subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The
Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.
In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the vacancies in the
COMELEC, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason
were extended permanent appointments during the recess of the Congress. They were not appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity, unlike Commissioner Haydee Yorac in Brillantes vs. Yorac
and Solicitor General Felix Bautista in Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista. The ad interim appointments of
Benipayo, Borra, and, Tuason are expressly allowed by the Constitution which authorizes the President,
during the recess of Congress, to make appointments that take effect immediately.
While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC “shall be independent”, this provision should be
harmonized with the President’s power to extend ad interim appointments. To hold that the
independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim
appointees before the appointees can assume office will negate the President’s power to make ad interim
appointments. This is contrary to the rule on statutory construction to give meaning and effect to every
provision of the law. It will also run counter to the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution.
FACTS:
Petitioner PPI and private respondent Fertiphil are private corporations incorporated under
Philippine laws. They are both engaged in the importation and distribution of fertilizers, pesticides and
agricultural chemicals.
On June 3, 1985, then President Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his legislative powers, issued LOI
No. 1465 which provided, among others, for the imposition of a capital recovery component (CRC) on the
domestic sale of all grades of fertilizers in the Philippines.
Pursuant to the LOI, Fertiphil paid P10 for every bag of fertilizer it sold in the domestic market to
the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA). FPA then remitted the amount collected to the Far East Bank
and Trust Company, the depositary bank of PPI. Fertiphil paid P6,689,144 to FPA from July 8,
1985 to January 24, 1986.
After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10 levy. With the
return of democracy, Fertiphil demanded from PPI a refund of the amounts it paid under LOI No. 1465, but
PPI refused to accede to the demand.
Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages against FPA and PPI with the RTC
in Makati. It questioned the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 for being unjust, unreasonable, oppressive,
invalid and an unlawful imposition that amounted to a denial of due process of law. Fertiphil alleged that
the LOI solely favored PPI, a privately owned corporation, which used the proceeds to maintain its
monopoly of the fertilizer industry.
In its Answer, FPA, through the Solicitor General, countered that the issuance of LOI No. 1465
was a valid exercise of the police power of the State in ensuring the stability of the fertilizer industry in the
country. It also averred that Fertiphil did not sustain any damage from the LOI because the burden imposed
by the levy fell on the ultimate consumer, not the seller.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it was proper for the trial court to exercise its power to judicially determine
the constitutionality of the subject statute in the instant case?
RULING:
Yes, the requisite that the constitutionality of the law in question be the very lis mota of
the case is present, making it proper for the trial court to rule on the constitutionality of
LOI 1465. As a rule, where the controversy can be settled on other grounds, the courts will
not resolve the constitutionality of a law. The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on
constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of political departments are valid,
absent a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary.
However, the courts are not precluded from exercising such power when the following
requisites are obtaining in a controversy before it: First, there must be before the court an
actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second, the question must be ripe for
adjudication. Third, the person challenging the validity of the act must have standing to
challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest
opportunity; and lastly, the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Indisputably, the present case was primarily instituted for collection and
damages. However, a perusal of the complaint also reveals
that the instant action is founded on the claim that the levy imposed was an unlawful and
unconstitutional special assessment. Consequently, the requisite that the constitutionality
of the law in question be the very lis mota of the case is present, making it proper for the
trial court to rule on the constitutionality of LOI 1465.
The CA held that even on the assumption that LOI No. 1465 was issued under the police power of the state,
it is still unconstitutional because it did not promote public welfare. The CA explained:
In declaring LOI 1465 unconstitutional, the trial court held that the levy imposed
under the said law was an invalid exercise of the States power of taxation inasmuch as it
violated the inherent and constitutional prescription that taxes be levied only for public
purposes. It reasoned out that the amount collected under the levy was remitted to the
depository bank of PPI, which the latter used to advance its private interest.
Facts:
Gabriel C. Singson was appointed Governor of the Bangko Sentral by President Fidel V. Ramos in 1993.
Jesus Armando Tarrosa, as a "taxpayer", filed a petition for prohibition questioning the appointment of
Singson for not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments as required by the provisions
of Section 6 of R.A. No. 7653, which established the Bangko Sentral as the Central Monetary Authority of
the Philippines. The Secretary of Budget and Management was impleaded for disbursing public funds in
payment of the salaries and emoluments of respondent Singson. In their comment, respondents claim
that Congress exceeded its legislative powers in requiring the confirmation by the CA of the appointment
of the Governor of the Bangko Sentral. They contend that an appointment to the said position is not
among the appointments which have to be confirmed by the CA, citing Section 16 of Article VI of the
Constitution.
Issue:
Held:
No. Congress exceeded its legislative powers in requiring the confirmation by the COA of the appointment
of the Governor of the BSP. An appointment to the said position is not among the appointments which
have to be confirmed by the COA under Section 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution. Congress cannot by
law expand the confirmation powers of the Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of
appointment of other government officials not expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of
Article 7 of the Constitution.
Facts:
The principal petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective
parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc.
(PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose
of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment
and natural resources. The petitioners alleged the respondent, Honorable Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), continued approval of the Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to numerous
commercial logging companies to cut and deforest the remaining forests of the country.
Petitioners request the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting
in his behalf to:
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and
deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be
submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This act of defendant constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust for
the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations. Plaintiff have exhausted all
administrative remedies with the defendant’s office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served
upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country. Defendant,
however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA’s to the continuing serious damage
and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
Issues:
Whether or not the petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power
of the Court.
Whether or not the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal
right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law.
Whether or not petitioners’ proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately
cancelled without the requisite hearing violates the requirements of due process.
Rulings:
The petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the Court.
1. The case at bar is subject to judicial review by the Court. Justice Davide,
Jr. precisely identified in his opinion the requisites for a case to be subjected
for the judicial review by the Court. According to him, the subject matter of
the complaint is of common interest, making this civil case a class suit and
proving the existence of an actual controversy. He strengthens this
conclusion by citing in the decision Section 1, Article 7 of the 1987
Constitution.
2. The petitioners can file a class suit because they represent their generation
as well as generations yet unborn. Their personality to sue in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded,
considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature.” Nature means the created
world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter
alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the
present as well as future generations.
3. Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm
and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology.
Put a little differently, the minors’ assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
The Court does not agree with the trial court’s conclusions that the plaintiffs failed
to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal
wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and
conclusions based on unverified data. (abundant) (unclear)
1. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right
to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation’s
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.
Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
1. This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding
section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill
health consciousness among them.
1. While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does
not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights
altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation
— aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may
even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact,
these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are
assumed to exist from the inception of humankind.
Hence, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent
Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 was set aside. The petitioners
amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned
timber license agreements.
27. Defensor-Santiago vs. Guingona G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998
Facts: During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress, Senator Fernan was
declared the duly elected President of the Senate by a vote of 20 to 2. Senator Tatad
manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other
member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He
explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority, while
only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the minority.
Senator Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP
Party numbering 7 and, thus, also a minority had chosen Senator Guingona as the
minority leader. Thereafter, the majority leader informed the body that he was in
receipt of a letter signed by the 7 Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had
elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate
President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate.
Senators Santiago and Tatad filed a petition for quo warranto, alleging that Senator
Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate
minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator
Tatad.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition
(2) Whether or not there is an actual violation of the Constitution
Held: Regarding the first issue, jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition, regardless of whether the
petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted. In light of the allegations of the petitioners,
it is clear that the Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power
and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials
committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the
exercise of their functions and prerogatives.
However, the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the
Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper
House. The term “majority,” when referring to a certain number out of a total or
aggregate, it simply means the number greater than half or more than half of any
total. In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate
must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members
thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso
facto constitute the minority, who could thereby elect the minority leader. No law or
regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority
leader.
While the Constitution is explicit in the manner of electing a Senate President and a
House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other
officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says under Art. VI, Sec.
16(1) is that “each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.”
The method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the
exercise of the prerogative conferred by the said constitutional provision. Therefore,
such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by the Courts.
FACTS: In January 1955, Maria Cerdeira died in Tangier, Morocco (an international zone
[foreign country] in North Africa). At the time of her death, she was a Spanish citizen and
was a resident of Tangier. She however left some personal properties (shares of stocks
and other intangibles) in the Philippines. The designated administrator of her estate here
is Antonio Campos Rueda. In the same year, the Collector of Internal Revenue (CIR)
assessed the estate for deficiency tax amounting to about P161k. Campos Rueda refused
to pay the assessed tax as he claimed that the estate is exempt from the payment of said
taxes pursuant to section 122 of the Tax Code which provides: That no tax shall be
collected under this Title in respect of intangible personal property (a) if the decedent at
the time of his death was a resident of a foreign country which at the time of his death did
not impose a transfer tax or death tax of any character in respect of intangible person
property of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country, or (b) if the laws of the
foreign country of which the decedent was a resident at the time of his death allow a
similar exemption from transfer taxes or death taxes of every character in respect of
intangible personal property owned by citizens of the Philippines not residing in that
foreign country. Campos Rueda was able to prove that there is reciprocity between
Tangier and the Philippines. However, the CIR still denied any tax exemption in favor of
the estate as it averred that Tangier is not a “state” as contemplated by Section 22 of the
Tax Code and that the Philippines does not recognize Tangier as a foreign country.
HELD: Yes. For purposes of the Tax Code, Tangier is a foreign country. A foreign country
to be identified as a state must be a politically organized sovereign community
independent of outside control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally supreme within
its territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime of law. The stress is
on its being a nation, its people occupying a definite territory, politically organized,
exercising by means of its government its sovereign will over the individuals within it and
maintaining its separate international personality.
Further, the Supreme Court noted that there is already an existing jurisprudence
(Collector vs De Lara) which provides that even a tiny principality, that of Liechtenstein,
hardly an international personality in the sense, did fall under the exempt category
provided for in Section 22 of the Tax Code. Thus, recognition is not necessary. Hence,
since it was proven that Tangier provides such exemption to personal properties of
Filipinos found therein so must the Philippines honor the exemption as provided for by
our tax law with respect to the doctrine of reciprocity.
FACTS:
Petitioner, Conchita Romualdez-Yap, was appointed Senior VP assigned to Fund Transfer
Department (FTD) in the Philippine National Bank (PNB) on September 20, 1972. Between
1986 and 1987, she filed applications for leave of absence which were approved. Due to the
critical financial situation of the bank, departments, positions and functions were abolished
or merged. While on leave, EO 80 (Revised Charter of PNB) was approved in Dec 1986. The
EO authorized the reorganization and rehab of PNB. Pursuant to the EO, the Fund Transfer
Department was abolished. Consequently, petitioner was notified of her separation which said
to be effective Feb 16, “1986.”
In 1989, petitioner appealed to CSC. CSC chairman sustained the separation. Ms. Romualdez-
Yap said her separation was done in bad faith because it was made effective before the EO
was passed in Dec 3, 1986 and because of the restoration of the FTD in 1987.
ISSUE:
Is the reorganization of PNB, a government-owned or controlled corporation performing
ministrant functions, valid?
HELD:
Yes. Ministrant functions are those undertaken by way of advancing the general interests of
society and are merely optional. Commercial or universal banking is, ideally, not a
governmental but a private sector endeavor, an optional function of the government. There
are functions of the government which it may exercise to promote merely the welfare,
progress, and prosperity of the people. Thus, reorganization of such corporations like PNB is
valid so long as they are done in good faith as prescribed in the Dario v. Mison doctrine.
Accordingly, the reorganization of PNB is found to be done in good faith by the Court since
it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient; and that no dismissal
(in case of dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist.
Facts: The petitioner filed a certiorari with the CA containing the requisite certification on
non-forum shopping but failed to attach proof that the person signing the certification was
authorized to do so. The CA dismissed the petition. The petitioner submits a motion for
reconsideration which attached a secretary’s certificate attesting to the signatory’s authority
to sign certificates against forum shopping on behalf of the petitioner. When the court of CA
denied the motion, the petitioner sought relief with the SC.
Ruling: Yes, the CA erred in the dismissal of the petition. The SC revised the decision of CA
recognizing the belated filing of the certifications against forum shopping as permitted in
exceptional circumstances. It further held that with more reason should a petition be given
due course when this incorporates a certification on non-forum shopping without evidence
that the person signing the certifications was an authorized signatory and the petitioner
subsequently submits a secretary’s certificate attesting to the signatory’s authority in its
motion for consideration.
The court allows belated submission of certifications showing proof of the signatory’s
authority in signing the certification of forum shopping.