SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISION T.

BAYLON, RAMON
MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE ALDAY, SERGIO ARANETA, PLACIDO
AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO, petitioner,

vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C. PERALEJO, RTC, BRANCH
98, QUEZON CITY, respondents. G.R. No. 85279 July 28, 1989

Facts:

On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of
SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees
from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to
the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused
to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the
defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.

It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included:
implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union
dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or
contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their
entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment
of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees
and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices.

Issue:

Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike.

Held:

The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the
rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities,
including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31].

Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of these
provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would
show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the
right to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike.

Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities,
and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art.
IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are denominated as
"government employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter,
having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos.
69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting
strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.
 MARITES BERNARDO, ET AL, petitioners vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION & FAR EAST
BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, respondents.

FACTS:

Far East Bank (Respondent) entered into employment contracts with deaf-mutes, who were hired as money sorters
under uniform “Employment Contracts for Handicapped Workers.” Every 6 months, these workers renewed their
employment contracts. The complainants here complain that they were regular employees and that they have been
illegally dismissed.

Respondent argued that complainants were not regular employees, but a special class of workers who were hired
because of political and civic accommodation. And that the Bank’s corporate philosophy does not allow the hiring and
regularizing handicapped workers unless it was on a special arrangement basis. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of
respondent bank workers. NLRC affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner workers are regular employees.

HELD:

YES, petitioners are regular employees. The fact that after the expiry of their 6 month contract, respondent bank
renewed their contracts shows that these workers were qualified to perform the responsibilities of their positions.

The Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified disabled employee should be given the same terms
of employment as a qualified able-bodied person. This being so, petitioners are thus covered by Art. 286 of the
Labor Code which defines regular employment to be that the employee has been engaged to perform activities
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The task of counting and sorting bills
is necessary to the business of respondent bank. Except for sixteen of them, the petitioners performed these tasks
for more than six months. Therefore, the 27 petitioners should be deemed regular employees entitled to security of
tenure. Their services may only be terminated for a just and authorized cause. Because respondents failed to show
such cause, these 27 petitioners are deemed illegally dismissed and hence entitled to backwages and separation pay.
 People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
Antonio Nogra, Accused-Appellant

Facts:
Accused Antonio Nogra is the operations manager of Loran International Overseas Recruitment Agency, a duly
licensed overseas employment agency. He was assigned in the Naga City Branch office with the added responsibility
of handling the advertisement as well. The main office of the agency is in Libertad Mandaluyong and owned by Lorna
Orciga and Kataru Tanaka.

Private complainants all applied at the branch office where Nogra is assigned. They paid the placement fee but the
agencywas unable to deploy them. The agency was also unable to return the amount paid upon demand, prompting
the complainants to institute the criminal case of illegal recruitment in a large scale against the agency, its owners
and petitioner. Nogra was the only one arraigned as the others still remained at large. Nogra contends is that he is
just a mere employee and that all the money paid was deposited into the account of Lorna Orciga and he did not
retain any portion of the same.

Issue:
Is the complainant guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale despite being a mere employee?

Laws Applicable:
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code and RA 8042

Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed Nogra’s conviction of life imprisonment and penalty of P500,000.

The Court held that appellant Nogra is guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale even if he is a mere employee. RA
8042 sufficiently broadened the concept of illegal recruitment in adding that a non-licensee or non-holder along with
licensees and holders of authority. The illegal recruitment has been committed against more than three persons
which squarely puts the same under the ambit of the law defining illegal recruitment in large scale. He is
nevertheless guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale because of the provision of Section 6 of RA 8042 providing
that principals, accomplices and accessories are included in those that may be charged and in case of juridical
persons, the officers having control, management or direction of the business. In the case at bar, he is guilty of the
same as his job title of Operations Manager, makes him an active and conscious participant of the recruitment
process.

Opinion:
I concur with the Court’s decision. In my opinion, Nogra, being a mere employee in charge of recruitment and
advertisement, is still an active participant of failure to deploy the applicants. As operations manager, he has the task
of overseeing that the applicants will be successfully deployed to job to which the agency promised them. His duties
and responsibilities are not confined within recruitment alone. His duty extends until the applicants are deployed.
It may be true that the money paid by the applicants were paid to Orciga. His being not able to profit from such act
of failure to deploy the complainant does not exempt him from liability.
Thus, I believe that the Courts rendered the right decision.