Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Copyright 1988 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.

1988. Vol. 55, No. 6,893-905 0022-351 <t/88/$00.75

Racial Ambivalence and American Value Conflict: Correlational and

Priming Studies of Dual Cognitive Structures

Irwin Katz R. Glen Hass

Graduate School and University Center Brooklyn College
of the City University of New \fork and
Graduate School and University Center
of the City University of New York
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Whites' racial attitudes have become complex, with feelings of friendliness and rejection toward
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Black people often existing side by side. We believe these conflicting sentiments are rooted in two
largely independent, core value orientations of American culture, hutnanitarianism-egalitarianism
and the Protestant work ethic. We devised four scales, Pro-Black, Anti-Black, Protestant Ethic (PE),
and Humanitarianism-Egalitarianism (HE). In Study 1, the scales were given to White students at
eight colleges. As predicted, significant positive correlations were usually found between Pro-Black
and HE scores and between Anti-Black and PE scores, whereas other correlations tended to be much
lower. In Study 2, we used a priming technique with White students to test for causality. As predicted,
priming a given value raised scores on the theoretically corresponding attitude but did not affect
scores on the other attitude; priming a single attitude influenced scores on the corresponding value,
but not on the other value. Implications are discussed.

The main finding from 40 years of survey research is that
racial attitudes currently expressed by White Americans are far
more liberal than the views they once held (Lipset & Schneider,
1978; Schuman, Steeh, & Bobo, 1985; Smith & Sheatsley,
1984). Public opinion has shifted from widespread acceptance
of segregation and discrimination in the 1940s to a broad na-
tional consensus in support of racial equality and integration.
The favorable temporal trends are more apparent for survey
items that deal with civil rights principles than for items about
concrete policies for implementing the principles. Nonetheless,
many important remedies have received popular support.
Some experts take the position that White people's opposi-
tion to policies such as mandatory school busing and use of job
quotas is proof that their commitment to change in the status
quo is superficial and conceals a fundamental prejudice against
Blacks (see, e.g., Feagin, 1980; Hsu, 1972; Jackman, 1978;
F. C. Jones, 1977; J. M. Jones, 1972). A similar perspective is
implied in the theory of symbolic racism proposed by Sears and
others (e.g., McConahay, 1986; Sears & Allen, 1984). However,
Schuman et al. (1985) have pointed out that the mounting en-
dorsement of integration principles and policies accords with
observable changes in White people's public behavior toward
Blacks and with the substantial progress in race relations that
has taken place since World War II, so that even allowing for
some faking of opinions on the part of respondents, it is reason-
able to conclude that most White adults now have a genuine
commitment to many civil rights goals.
On the other hand, one should not infer that discriminatory
attitudes are rare. Support for residential integration, for exam-
ple, tends to be ambiguous. Furthermore, anti-Black feelings
have been revealed in social psychological experiments involv-
ing unobtrusive measures of intergroup affect and preference
(reviewed by Crosby, Bromley, & Saxe, 1980). Although these
studies have used relatively small samples (usually college stu-
dents), the findings suggest that, at least at an unconscious level,
some amount of racial bias is still commonplace.

The authors wish to acknowledge the helpful comments of the editor

and anonymous reviewers. We also wish to acknowledge the contribu-
tions of Joan Bailey and Nina Parisi Rizzo, who assisted in the research.
Andrea Martin carried out much of the data analysis. In addition,
thanks are due the following colleagues for arranging to have question-
naires administered at their institutions: Stuart Albert, Sidney Calla-
han, Sheldon Cohen, Katherine Ellison, Samuel Gaertner, Ronna Ka-
batznick, Miriam Lewin, Sharon Presley, Mary Anne Sedney, Christina
Taylor, Abraham Tesser, Raymond Toledo, Suzanne Tumelty, and Ste-
phen Worchel.
The research was supported by National Science Foundation Grant
No. BNS-83166303 to Irwin Katz and R. Glen Hass.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Irwin
Katz, Social/Personality Psychology Program, Graduate School and
University Center of CUNY, 3 3 West 42nd Street, New York, New York
10036, or to R. Glen Hass, Department of Psychology, Brooklyn Col-
lege of CUNY, Brooklyn, New York 11210.
Present Research Aims
Reasoning from evidence such as the foregoing, Katz and as-
sociates (cf. I. Katz, 1981) have concluded that ambivalence is
a pervasive feature of White America's racial attitudes. They
have incorporated this notion in a theory used to predict
Whites' extreme behavior, both favorable and unfavorable, to-
ward Black individuals in certain types of interactions. Suppos-
edly, if there are cues present that activate the conflicted atti-
tude, the White actor will experience psychological tension and
discomfort. Efforts at tension reduction may polarize reactions
to members of the target group.
As yet, the assumption that the cross-racial polarization phe-
nomenon is mediated by ambivalence has not been adequately
tested. An important aim of this research was to facilitate this

893
 894 IRWIN KATZ AND R. GLEN HASS
task by identifying and scaling conflicting components of racial
attitude that (a) are prevalent among White college students, (b)
appear to be of some importance, and (c) are largely unrelated,
so that an index of ambivalence could be derived from the com-
ponent scores. These scales could then be used in future investi-
gations of the relation between individual differences in one
type of racial ambivalence and extremity of reactions to Blacks.
Previous studies using factor analysis have documented the
multidimensionality of racial attitudes. Most notably, the au-
thors of the Multifactor Racial Attitude Inventory (Brigham,
Woodmansee, & Cook, 1976; Woodmansee & Cook, 1967)
have devised 13 subscales that measure distinctive pro and anti
dimensions. However, the subscales tend to be substantially in-
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tercorrelated (rs above .30). Our aim is to construct two coun-
tervailing scales with the empirical property of virtual indepen-
dence.
Assumptions About Pro and Anti Attitudes
If Whites appear to have conflicted attitudes about Blacks,
what might be the specific content of important pro and anti
components that are only weakly or not at all related? Part of
the answer, we believe, resides in the fact that Blacks, having a
history of exclusion from the main society, are often perceived
by the majority as both deviant in the sense of possessing certain
disqualifying attributes of mind or body and disadvantaged, ei-
ther by the attributes themselves or by the social and economic
discrimination that having them entails. The dual perception
of deviance and disadvantage likely generates in the observer
conflicted feelings of aversion and sympathy. Accordingly, anti-
Black attitudes would include beliefs about deviant characteris-
tics and associated negative affect, and pro-Black attitudes
would reflect sympathetic beliefs and feelings about the minor-
ity group as underdog.
Today, relatively few Whites openly express the old racist
belief that Blacks are inherently inferior (cf. T. W. Smith &
Sheatsley, 1984). However, Blacks are often criticized for not
doing enough to help themselves. In a survey conducted some
years ago, Campbell (1971) observed that many of the same
White respondents who felt there was job discrimination in
their communities and favored enactment of laws to abolish it
were ready to blame the economic woes of Blacks on their own
"lack of ambition, laziness, and failure to take advantage of op-
portunities" (p. 14). More than half of the sample voiced this
judgment. More recently, the National Opinion Research Cen-
ter (NORQ reported 59 percent of a nationwide sample agree-
ing with the statement that Blacks are worse off economically
than Whites because most of them just "don't have the motiva-
tion or will power to pull themselves out of poverty" (cited in
Lipset, 1987, p. 5).
At the same time, however, Blacks apparently are often per-
ceived sympathetically. After reviewing the research literature,
Lipset and Schneider (1978) concluded that most Americans
"view race as a categorical disability deserving of special aid.
. . . Blacks should be helped because they have been down so
long" (p. 41). Surveys conducted in the 1980s by NORC show
substantial majorities expressing the view that Blacks continue
to be held back by Whites, that further progress toward com-
plete equality is necessary (Public Opinion, 1983; T. W. Smith
& Sheatsley, 1984).
It seems, then, that Blacks are perceived as deserving help,
yet as not doing enough to help themselves; and both attitudes
may exist side by side within an individual. One is reminded of a
conceptual distinction made by Brickman et al. (1982) between
perceptions of responsibility for the origin of a problem involv-
ing deprivation or suffering (e.g., illness, addiction, poverty) and
perceptions of responsibility for the solution of the problem.
They noted that each type of responsibility can be assigned by
observers either to the victims or to external factors beyond the
control of victims, and that perceptions of causes and cures can
be largely unrelated. The Brickman et al. perspective implies
that having sympathy for Blacks as innocent targets of discrimi-
nation does not necessarily determine how one thinks about
what Blacks can and should be doing to help themselves and
how well they are doing it. Also relevant is Schuman's (1969)
observation that a naive belief in tree will, although rarely men-
tioned as such, seems to lead many Whites to blame Blacks for
their disadvantages.
American Core Values
One can probably learn much about racial attitudes by study-
ing their relation to the values that are held in common by
members of the society. Our assumption is that values—con-
ceived as generalized standards of the goals and goal-directed
behaviors of human existence—are more central and funda-
mental components of a person's makeup than attitudes and,
moreover, are determinants of attitudes as well as behavior. This
conception of values has been held by many theorists, including
Allport (1954), Lipset (1967), Parsons (1960), Rofceach (1973),
and Williams (1979). Similarly, the functional approach to atti-
tudes that was introduced by D. Katz (1968) and M. B. Smith,
Bruner, and White (1956), and recently extended by Herek
(1986), accords primary importance to the value-expressive
function of attitudes.
A common theme in sociological descriptions of the Ameri-
can system is that there are two core value orientations: individ-
ualism, with its emphasis on personal freedom, self-reliance,
devotion to work, and achievement; and communalism, which
embraces egalitarian and humanitarian precepts (see, e.g., Hsu,
1972; Lipset, 1967; Williams, 1979). Drawing on historical,
economic, political, and sociological sources, Williams (1979)
described some 15 major American value themes, most of
which clearly fall within the categories of individualism and
communalism.
In our study, the focus with respect to the individualistic
value orientation is on those components, embodied in the
Protestant ethic (Weber, 1904-1905/1958), that emphasize de-
votion to work, individual achievement, and discipline. The
Protestant ethic appears to be strongly implicated in people's
judgments and feelings about some minority groups. Scores on
the Mirels and Garrett (1971) Protestant Ethic Scale have been
found to be related to conservatism and racial attitudes
(Feather, 1984), attitudes toward the poor and public assistance
programs (MacDonald, 1972), and reactions to equity norms
in competition (Greenberg, 1978). Regarding our conception
of communalism, we emphasize adherence to the democratic
ideals of equality, social justice, and concern for the others' well-
being. We refer to this orientation as humanitarianism-egali-
tarianism.
 RACIAL ATTITUDES AND VALUES
As to how the two value orientations are related as individual
difference variables, we expect that they will prove to be largely
independent of each other. This position is compatible with
Kerlinger's (1984) finding that liberalism (made up largely of
egalitarian and humanitarian attitudes) and conservatism (atti-
tudes reflecting the Protestant ethic, and traditional beliefs
about religion, authority, etc.) are essentially orthogonal dimen-
Relations Between Values and Attitudes
Earlier we proposed that White people tend to regard Blacks
as both deviant and disadvantaged. We now suggest that the
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Protestant ethic outlook strengthens the perception of deviancy,
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whereas the humanitarian-egalitarian perspective strengthens
the perception of disadvantage. Adherence to the Protestant
ethic should sensitize the observer to behavior patterns that de-
viate from and thereby threaten its tenets. It is well known that
Black rates of unemployment, welfare dependency, school fail-
ure, illegitimate births, and crime are higher than White rates.
Given the element of Puritanism in the Protestant ethic, adher-
ents should be inclined to attribute Blacks' problems to short-
comings of Blacks themselves—such as lack of drive and disci-
pline—rather than to poor job opportunities and other external
factors. On the other hand, people who have a humanitarian
outlook should respond empathically to the needs and aspira-
tions of Blacks, feel sympathy for them, and support public
efforts to improve their lot. There should be a tendency to see
the minority group in a favorable light, perhaps emphasizing
the contributions it could make to the larger society if allowed.
That is, the Protestant ethic outlook should be related to anti-
Black attitude, and humam'tarianism to pro-Black attitude.
However, given our assumptions of low interdependence be-
tween the two value orientations and between the two types of
attitude, associations should be relatively weak between the
Protestant ethic variable and pro-Black attitude, and between
humanitarianism and anti-Black attitude.
To summarize, we propose a theoretical model consisting of
dual cognitive (i.e., value-attitude) structures. In the present
research, we undertook to measure individual differences in the
respective value orientations and attitudes, and then to investi-
gate their linkages using both correlational and experimental
methods.
Study 1
Method
Construction of Pro-Black and Anti-Black Scales
We made up 60 sentence stubs for the purpose of eliciting impressions
concerning Black people in various domains such as work, education,
family roles, and civil rights. A sample of 84 White college students in
the New York City area completed the items. Content analysis of the
responses revealed a number of themes that were favorable or unfavor-
able to Blacks. From this material we generated 40 statements, half in-
tended to be pro-Black and consistent with the humanitarian-egalitar-
ian outlook, and the other half anti-Black with a Protestant ethic flavor.
We used a 6-point response format (strongly agree to strongly disagree,
with no neutral point), and scored from 0 to 5. We administered the
randomly ordered items to several samples of White college students in
the New York City area, with ns ranging from 50 to 80. After each test-
895
ing, we performed an item analysis, using two criteria of acceptability:
An item had to show a significant correlation with the total score on
other items of the same type, and a low or zero correlation with total
score on items of the opposite type. Items that did not meet these cri-
teria were either discarded or rewritten.
Thus, in selecting items our purpose was not to tap all important
areas of racial attitude or to cover a theoretically or empirically defined
domain completely, but rather to focus on two widely held, conflicting
sets of beliefs that turn up repeatedly in opinion surveys of the past 20
years, keeping in mind conceptual linkages with two value orientations,
and seeking to build in dimensional orthogonality. This procedure
yielded 10 pro-Black and 10 anti-Black statements, with two of each
type being keyed in reverse. The revised questionnaire was administered
to 115 White students at Brooklyn College. (See Appendix for the
items.)
The Pearson correlations between scores on individual Anti-Black
Scale items and on all other Anti-Black items ranged from .27 to .66,
all significant beyond the .01 level.1 Correlations between individual
Anti-Black items and the total Pro-Black Scale ranged from -. 14 to .03,
all nonsignificant. Cronbach's coefficient alpha for the Anti-Black Scale
was .80.
Correlations between individual Pro-Black items and all other Pro-
Black items combined ranged from .41 to .57 (ps < .01), except for the
two reversal items (Pro-Black Items 4 and 5 in the Appendix), which
were not clearly related to the scale as a whole. Because these two items
had functioned adequately in prior tryouts, we decided to retain them
until further data were available. Correlations between individual Pro-
Black items and the total Anti-Black Scale ranged from .03 to -.22.
Cronbach's coefficient alpha for the Pro-Black Scale was .73.
Next, we performed a principal-components factor analysis with vari-
max rotation on the sample's responses to the 20 attitude items. A three-
factor solution accounted for 45% of the total explained variance. (We
tried other factor solutions, but they did not provide additional inter-
pretable information.) Using a loading criterion of .35 or higher, we
found that all Pro-Black items, except the reversal items (Pro-Black
Items 4 and 5), loaded on only one factor (Factor 2). The two exceptions
loaded only on Factor 3. The Anti-Black items all loaded only on Factor
1, except for Anti-Black Item 8, which also loaded (negatively) on Factor
3. Thus, the factor loadings were consistent with the item-total corre-
lations in showing that, except for Pro-Black Items 4 and 5, which stood
by themselves as a separate factor, Pro- and Anti-Black items consti-
tuted two essentially unrelated dimensions.2 The independence of the
two scales was further indicated by their low, nonsignificant correlation,
r(l 13) = .12. (As regards Pro-Black Items 4 and 5, in subsequent test-
ings of six out of seven other college samples, scores on both items were
significantly related to Pro-Black scale scores, p < .05, but not to Anti-
Black Scale scores.)
To assess the influence on the racial attitude scores of a tendency to
give socially desirable responses, a sample of 59 White undergraduates
at Brooklyn College were given the racial attitude questionnaire and also
the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (SDS). For the SDS and
the Pro-Black Scale, r(57) = .11, and for the SDS and the Anti-Black
Scale, r(57) = . 10. Thus, social desirability apparently did not influence
subjects' responses to the racial attitude items.
Next, the Pro-Black and Anti-Black scales were administered along
with parts of the Woodmansee and Cook (1967; Brigham et al., 1976)
Multifactor Racial Attitude Inventory (MRAI) to 59 White students at
Lehman College (in New Irbrk City). Because of changes in Black-
White relations over the past 20 years, many of the MRAI items seem
less appropriate now for assessing racial attitudes than they were when
constructed in the mid-1960s. However, two of the subscales, Deroga-
1
All p levels reported in this article are two-tailed.
2
A factor analysis with oblique rotation (three-factor solution) gave
similar results. The factor intercorrelations were all close to zero.
 896 IRWIN KATZ AND R. GLEN HASS

tory Beliefs and Ease in Interracial Contacts, appear to be relevant for Table 1
evaluating the construct validity of our scales.3 Comparison of Racial Attitude Scores
We expected the Anti-Black Scale and the Derogatory Beliefs sub- of Black and White Subjects
scale of the MRAI to correlate highly. Although some of the Anti-Black
items refer to economic behavior, the scale as a whole reflects the Subjects
broader view that Blacks lack the inner resources—such as self-respect,
discipline, and concern for one another—needed to improve their lot. Measure White Black Difference
By comparison, the Derogatory Beliefs subscale depicts Blacks as defi-
Brooklyn College
cient in self-control, pushy, hypersensitive to racial slights, and inclined
to blame Whites for their problems. Thus, the two measures seem to Pro-Black Scale
tap a common set of beliefs that Blacks are unready to meet the moral M 27.42 36.88 9.46 9.32 .001
responsibilities that go with full equality. SD 8.38 5.91
In addition, we expected to find a strong relation between the Pro- Anti-Black Scale
Black Scale and the MRAI's Ease in Interracial Contacts subscale, M 5.74
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27.72 21.00 -6.72 .001

which is concerned with willingness to associate publicly with individ- SD 7.50
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ual Blacks and to accept them in close relationships such as friendship
and marriage. Our assumption was that the Pro-Black Scale measures
not only egalitarianism on civil rights issues, but also empathic sympa-
thy and liking for the minority group underdog, sentiments in accord
with the social acceptance found in the Ease in Interracial Contacts
subscale. Furthermore, if Pro-Black and Ease are similar measures, we
should expect to see little if any relation between Anti-Black and Ease,
inasmuch as we conceptualize the Pro-Black and Anti-Black scales as
being only weakly related, if at all.
As predicted for Anti-Black and Derogatory Beliefs, r(57) = .64, p <
.001, and for Anti-Black and Ease, rf 57) = -.02, ns. These correlations
provide evidence of both convergent and discriminant validity for the
Anti-Black Scale. Also as expected, for Pro-Black and Ease, r(57) - .55,
p< .001, indicating convergent validity for the Pro-Black Scale.
Turning to the correlation to be expected between Pro-Black and De-
rogatory Beliefs, we note first that in the latter subscale there is, in addi-
tion to moral criticism, a tendency to minimize the extent to which
Black people are still discriminated against. For example, one item
reads, "The problem of racial prejudice has been greatly exaggerated
by a few Black agitators." By contrast, the persistence of racism is a
major theme in the Pro-Black Scale. Because Derogatory Beliefs con-
tains the two elements, the obtained r(57) = -.49 between Pro-Black
and Derogatory Beliefs is ambiguous as regards the convergent or dis-
criminant validity of the Pro-Black Scale. In all, there are five Deroga-
tory Beliefs items that explicitly minimize or defend the persistence of
discrimination, stating that Blacks sometimes see discrimination where
it does not exist, are too touchy and impatient about getting their rights,
and should be more willing to accept exclusion. When these items were
dropped from the 10-item scale the correlation between Pro-Black and
the remaining Derogatory Beliefs items was nonsignificant (r = —.18).
However, the correlation between Anti-Black and the shortened Derog-
atory Beliefs subscale remained virtually unchanged (r = .63). Thus,
the new analysis supports the discriminant validity of the Pro-Black
Scale without weakening the evidence of Anti-Black validity.
We then compared the racial attitude scores of Black and White stu-
dents. Table 1 shows the results at Brooklyn College (n = 115 for Whites
and 69 for Blacks) and at four other northern campuses: Carnegie-Mel-
lon University, Iowa State University, Providence College, and Manhat-
tanville College (located near New York City). We combined the latter
four samples because of the small number of Black subjects (total n =
484 for Whites and 63 for Blacks). As expected, all four racial compari-
sons resulted in significant differences. Both at Brooklyn College and at
the other northern colleges, Black students had higher Pro-Black scores
than White students, and lower Anti-Black scores.
We also compared White regional samples, because it is known that
southern Whites are less supportive of equality than nonsouthern whites
(cf. Schuman et al., 1985). We compared attitude scores of White stu-
dents at three southern state universities—Delaware, Georgia, and
Texas A&M (total n = 166)—with those of students from the five north-
ern institutions previously mentioned (total n = 611).* Pro-Black scores
8.59
Four other northern colleges
Pro-Black Scale
M 29.34 36.60 7.26 9.25 .001
SD 6.71 5.74
Anti-Black Scale
M 23.39 20.60 -2.79 2.70 .01
SD 7.40 7.61
Note. For Brooklyn College, « = 115 for Whites and 69 for Blacks; at
four other northern colleges,n = 484 for Whites and 63 for Blacks. The
names of the other northern colleges and the ns for their respective
White samples can be found in Table 2. The ns for Blacks at these
institutions ranged from 12 to 20. Items were scored from 0 to 5, with
5 always representing high pro-Black or high anti-Black.
of the southern sample (M = 27.01) were significantly lower than those
of the northern sample (M= 29.34); ((781) = 3.88, p < .001.
However, the two sample means for the Anti-Black Scale were not
significantly different from one another (Ms = 24.48 in the South and
23.76 in the North). One possibility is that the beliefs tapped by the
Anti-Black Scale are indeed similar in both regions, with the usual
North-South differences in racial attitudes being confined to the kinds
of favorable sentiments that are reflected in the Pro-Black items. How-
ever, one should note that the samples were not systematically selected
to be representative of the two regions.
Construction of Value Scales
To measure the Protestant ethic value orientation we used 11 items
from the 19-item Mirels and Garrett (1971) Protestant Ethic Scale. The
short version had a correlation of .93 with the full scale (and an alpha
coefficient of .76) in a sample of 59 students at Lehman College. Data
supporting the validity of the Protestant Ethic Scale have been reported
by Mirels and Garrett (1971), Feather (1984), and other investigators.
In addition, we obtained a nonsignificant correlation of .14 between the
short version and the SDS in a sample of 50 undergraduates at Brooklyn
College. (The 11 Protestant Ethic Scale items are presented in the Ap-
pendix.)
Next we generated 20 statements whose endorsement could be con-
sidered consistent with a humanitarian-egalitarian value outlook. Us-
3
Schuman and Harding's (1963) measure of sympathetic identifica-
tion with the minority underdog was also considered somewhat out-
dated and therefore not used for validation.
4
The U.S. Census lists Delaware as a southern state, and this designa-
tion is used by three major opinion survey organizations: NORC, Gal-
lup, and the Institute of Social Research at the University of Michigan.
 RACIAL ATTITUDES AND VALUES
ing a Likert 6-point response format, we administered the items to 75
students at Mercy College (located near New York City) and retained the
10 items showing the highest correlations with the total test. Coefficient
alpha for the 10 items was .83. We combined these items in random
order with the 11 items of the Protestant Ethic (PE) Scale, and adminis-
tered them together with Rubin and Peplau's (1975) Just World Scale
to another sample of Mercy College students (n = 83).
Discriminant validity for the Humanitarianism-Egalitarianism (HE)
Scale would require that HE scores be largely independent of scores on
both the PE and Just World scales. That is, to be conceptually distinc-
tive, the humanitarian-egalitarian perspective would have to be more
than just an inverse expression of the need to believe that people deserve
their misfortunes (Just World), or that poverty and failure give proof of
laziness and moral inadequacy (PE). Similarly, PE should not be closely
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related to Just World. As expected, the correlations were low: for HE
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and PE, r(81) = .09, ns; for HE and Just World, r(81) = . 16, ns; and for
PE and Just World, r(48) = .24, p <. 10. Also, HE scores were unrelated
to scores on the SDS, r(39) = .13, in a sample of Brooklyn College
undergraduates.
Subsequent administrations of the value scales revealed some insta-
bility in correlations of four HE items with the PE Scale, which seemed
attributable to ambiguous wording. These items were revised, and the
new version of the value questionnaire was presented to 67 students at
Manhattanville College. (The HE items are presented in the Appendix.)
With one exception, all item-test correlations for the revised HE Scale
were above .50. The alpha coefficients were .84 for the revised HE Scale
and .70 for the PE Scale, indicating that both instruments had adequate
internal consistency.
The value questionnaire was administered to additional samples, one
of which—at Carnegie-Mellon University—was large enough (n = 167)
for a factor analysis. We carried out a principal-components factor anal-
ysis, using a four-factor solution with varimax rotation. It accounted for
46% of the total explained variance. (We tried other factor solutions,
but they did not provide additional interpretable information.) With a
cutoff value of .35 to determine loadings, 9 out of 10 HE items loaded
on Factor 1, Factor 3, or both. HE items loading on Factor 1 seem pri-
marily to advocate kindly concern for others, whereas HE items loading
on Factor 3 generally invoke egalitarian principles. All PE items, but
no HE items, loaded on Factors 2 or 4. Factor 2 items seem mainly to
involve moral rejection of pleasure and the easy life, whereas Factor 4
items extol the work motive and emphasize its role in success. Three PE
items loaded (negatively) on Factor 3; none loaded on Factor 1.'
Procedure for Testing Relations
To assess value-attitude relations, the racial attitude and value ques-
tionnaires were administered to a total of 783 White undergraduates at
eight campuses. In each sample, half the subjects received the value
items first and the other half received the attitude items first. We found
only a few scattered order effects, and these did not show any discernible
pattern either within samples or across samples. Therefore, we disre-
garded order in analyzing the-data.
Results
We predicted that relations between scales would be consis-
tent with the notion of two largely independent cognitive struc-
tures, each having one value component and one attitude com-
ponent. In Table 2 we present the relevant data. It is apparent
that correlations from the three southern samples provided no
consistent support for the model. In contrast, the northern cam-
pus correlations were mostly in line with the theoretical predic-
tions. In all six northern samples, correlations between HE and
Pro-Black scores and between PE and Anti-Black scores were
significant, with most rs at or above .40. Cross-over corre-
897
lations, on the other hand, generally were low and nonsignifi-
cant, with all but 2 of the 24 being below .30.
The bottom row in Table 2 consists of the pooled within-cell
correlations for all samples to which the scales were adminis-
tered. (Because pooling of correlations involving the HE Scale
made use of data from the revised HE Scale only, the samples
used for the pooled HE correlations were Carnegie-Mellon,
Manhattan ville, and Brooklyn 2.) It can be seen that the pooled
correlations fit the theoretical model reasonably well (see Figure
1). The one exception is the correlation of-.28 between HE and
Anti-Black scores, which is somewhat higher than expected. In
accordance with the model, this correlation is significantly
lower than the r = .46 for HE versus Pro-Black, t(547) = 2.09,
p < .03. However, contrary to prediction the HE versus Anti-
Black correlation is not significantly lower than the correlation
of .40 between PE and Anti-Black.
Discussion
Study 1 's results were consistent with our theoretical model
of value-attitude relations, except for the southern data, sug-
gesting that the theoretical model may be less appropriate in the
South than in the North. (The deviation of the southern data
from the model is discussed later in this article.)
Although there appears to be some content overlap between
the value and attitude items, there is also a substantial amount
of independence. The value items are statements about general
moral precepts, preferred end states of life, and preferred in-
strumentalities, whereas the attitude items refer mainly to be-
liefs and judgments about a particular group. The obtained cor-
relations with two MRAI subscales indicate that attitudes are
more than mere extensions of the two value orientations into
the domain of race. As yet, there exists no convergent or predic-
tive validation for the HE Scale. However, extensive research on
the PE Scale finds little if any evidence that it directly implies
beliefs about Blacks' self-respect, community cohesion, family
strength, or even parental attitudes toward education (Anti-
Black Items 1, 2,4, 7, and 9). In previous studies (e.g., Feather,
1984; Mirels & Garrett, 1971), PE scores seem to be related to
referents such as respect for authority, obedience, and antiimag-
ination, but hardly at all to our attitude referents when race is
not involved.
In the next study we set out to demonstrate by using a prim-
ing technique that the theoretically predicted relations are
causal in nature. We designed the experiment to test the notions
that an induced increase in the cognitive availability of a single
value orientation or attitude will tend to produce an increased
endorsement of the corresponding attitude or value, but not of
the theoretically unrelated value or attitude.
Study 2
That making one set of cognitions salient can arouse other,
mentally related concepts has been shown in recent work in
cognition and social cognition, and in the study of context
5
A factor analysis with oblique rotation (four-factor solution) pro-
vided similar results, but with no overlap at all in the loadings of PE
and HE items. Factor intercorrelations are close to zero, except for a
correlation of. 37 between the two factors on which PE items loaded.
 898 IRWIN KATZ AND R. GLEN HASS

Table 2
Intercorrelations of Attitude and Value Scales for Colleges and Total Sample

Correlations

School Pro-Anti Pro-HE Pro-PE Anti-HE Anti-PE HE-PE

North
Iowa State University 173 -.17 .27** -.23" -.19** .48" .01
Providence College 77 .01 .44** -.28" -.06 .23* -.06
Brooklyn College 1 74 -.14 .33** .10 -.16 .34" .08
Brooklyn College 2 -.09 .52*" .02 -.31* .57" -.12
—"
Carnegie-Mellon
University 167 -.27** .48** -.11 -.36** .36** .04
Manhattanville College 67 .13 .40** -.05 -.09 .42" .17
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South
University of Delaware 29 -.43* .40* -.45* -.29 .33 -.43*
University of Georgia 87 -.27** .17 -.24* -.17 .37" -.02
Texas A&M 50 -.07 .30* -.32* -.06 .40" -.05

Total sample" —c -.16** .46** -.14** -.28** .40" .05

Note. Pro = Pro-Black scale, Anti = Anti-Black scale, HE = Humanitarian-Egalitarian Scale, PE = Protestant Ethic Scale
• For the Brooklyn College 2 sample,« = 59 for Pro-Anti and 41 for all other correlations.
b
These are pooled within-group correlations, adjusting for differences in sample means.
c
Pooled correlations involving HE are based on data from the revised HE scale only (administered to Carnegie-Mellon University, Manhattanville
College, and Brooklyn College 2 samples), hence « = 783 or 765 for pooled correlations not involving HE, and 275 for the HE correlations.
* p < .05. ** p < .01. (Tests were two-tailed.)

effects in attitude surveys. Current theories of cognition hold
that concepts are held in memory in an associative network
consisting of clusters of related material. At any given moment
each concept in the network has a certain level of activation,
and when that activation exceeds a threshold the concept enters
consciousness. The two major determinants of the level of acti-
vation of a category (its availability or accessibility) are the re-
cency and frequency of its being accessed from memory (Tver-
sky & Kahneman, 1974). Furthermore, the activation process
spreads through the associative network so that a concept's acti-
vation level is raised by the processing of a related concept
(Glass & Holyoak, 1986). For example, Meyer and Schvanev-
eldt (1976) have demonstrated that response time to a test word
is faster when that word is immediately preceded in the test list
by a closely related word than it is when the test word is pre-
ceded by an unrelated word. This priming process is presumed
to operate because knowledge is organized, and activating a con-
cept in one part of that organized structure is presumed to facil-
itate retrieval of other related concepts.
Researchers interested in the social consequences of cogni-
tion have found that increasing the momentary accessibility of
Value Level: Protestant Ethic H * HU™ni,anor,ism
'
\ .*
.40
V
/N*
.46
information may often influence subsequent social judgments
(e.g., Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977; lyengar, Kinder, Peters, &
Krosnick, 1984; Wyer, Bodenhausen, & Gorman, 1985). Prim-
ing can also influence what details are remembered after expo-
sure to a given situation (Pichert & Anderson, 1977; Trabasso,
1982). Dovidio, Evans, and Tyler (1986) demonstrated that
priming can facilitate the retrieval of cognitions relevant to ra-
cial attitudes. They found that priming subjects with racial cate-
gories (White or Black) shortened response times to identify
traits that are stereotypically attributed to these groups. It is as
if, once made accessible, the primed concept acts as a mental
filter through which the later events are processed or recalled.
In general terms, beliefs, attitudes, and values facilitate the
organization of material in memory. They improve the recall of
cognitively relevant material, and they promote the creation of
cognitively consistent inferences. Bradburn (1982) and Schu-
man and Presser (1981) have cited numerous examples of atti-
tude surveys with counterbalanced designs in which early ques-
tions are shown to activate a mental context (similar to a prime
in the terminology used here) and influence respondents' replies
to later questions. As one of the processes underlying context
effects, Schuman and Presser described an increase in the avail-
ability of responses that results from altering the respondent's
mental set.
Rather than viewing the effects of question-ordering as a
problem, we made use of them in the current experiment to
investigate further the value-attitude connections found in
Study 1. We hypothesized that if subjects were first given a single
value scale (HE or PE) to fill out and afterwards administered

•^/ / ^\ the complete attitude questionnaire, the value scale would act as
a prime so that their scores would be raised on the theoretically
AnliDlack ' » Problack
corresponding attitude scale (Pro- or Anti-Black), but not on
Figure 1. Pooled product-moment correlations the other attitude scale. We also hypothesized that if subjects
between value and attitude scores. first filled out a single attitude scale (Pro- or Anti-Black) and
 RACIAL ATTITUDES AND VALUES
subsequently the complete value questionnaire, the attitude
scale would act as a prime so that their scores would be raised
on the theoretically corresponding value (HE or PE), but not
on the other value.
Values have long been thought of as more basic or central
than attitudes. In our conceptualization, we retain that notion
by viewing values as important cognitive structures with asso-
ciative connections to many attitudes. The difference between
values and attitudes, then, is in terms of the relative number
of interconnections with otherwise similar cognitive elements,
with values surrounded by and connected to more attitudes
than vice versa. Once a particular value-attitude connection is
activated, however, there is no reason to expect it to operate any
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more rapidly or strongly in one direction than in the other. We
therefore expected that the attitude prime would activate the
relevant value no less than the value prime activated the rele-
vant attitude. (Our cognitive model would lead us to speculate
that a value prime would activate more attitudes than vice versa,
but that is a matter for future research.)
Method
Subjects
Subjects in the experiment were 122 White students (54 men and 68
women) in an introductory psychology course at Brooklyn College.
They participated in order to satisfy part of a course requirement. (We
excluded from the analysis 59 Black, Hispanic, and Asian students who
participated.)
Procedure
Subjects were run in groups of 2 to 9 people. They were seated at
individual carrel desks that were widely separated from one another in
order to minimize interaction between subjects and provide them with
a sense of privacy while they completed the questionnaires. Subjects
were assigned to conditions by the random distribution of questionnaire
booklets. Because the instructions and procedure were identical for all
conditions, more than one condition was run simultaneously during
an experimental session. The experimenter was always blind as to the
assignment of any given subject, as well as to the conditions being run
during the session.
In all six experimental conditions, subjects first completed a question-
naire that acted as the priming manipulation. In the two value prime
conditions, one group of subjects completed the HE Scale and another
group filled out the PE Scale of the Social Values Questionnaire de-
scribed in Study 1. In the two attitude prime conditions, subjects filled
out either the Pro-Black or the Anti-Black scale of the Racial Attitudes
Questionnaire, also described in Study 1. Subjects in the two control
conditions completed a filler questionnaire with the same 6-point re-
sponse format, called the Survey of Personal Values. It consisted of 12
innocuous attitude items designed to be unrelated to racial attitudes,
humanitarianism, and the Protestant ethic (e.g., "The food we eat has
a big effect on the state of our health").
On completion of the priming questionnaire, subjects in the two
value prime conditions and half of the control subjects were given the
complete Racial Attitudes Questionnaire. Those in the attitude prime
conditions and the other half of the control group were given the com-
plete Social Values Questionnaire. Afterwards, subjects were debriefed
and then dismissed.
Results
Table 3 shows the effect of the Protestant ethic and humani-
tarianism primes on subjects' racial attitudes. We analyzed the
899
Table 3
Effect of Value Scale Priming on Racial Attitudes Scores
Priming condition
Measured HE Scale PE Scale Control
attitude (B = 19) (n = 20) (n = 20)
Pro-Black
M 36.79 32.25 33.10
SD 4.13 11.56 6.94
Anti-Black
M 27.79 34.05 27.70
SD 8.54 7.83 11.05
Note. The higher the score, the more extreme the attitude. HE = Hu-
manitarianism-Egalitarianism; PE = Protestant Ethic.
results of this portion of the experiment by using a 2 X 3 mixed
analysis of variance (ANOVA), with the three levels of the prim-
ing manipulation (humanitarianism, Protestant ethic, and con-
trol) as a between-subjects factor and the Pro-Black and Anti-
Black scales as a within-subjects factor. The analysis produced
a significant, although conceptually meaningless, main effect
for the racial attitudes measure, F(l, 56) = 4.89, p < .05. This
result simply means that subjects tended to agree more with the
statements on the Pro-Black Scale than they did with state-
ments on the Anti-Black Scale. Because we made no attempt to
equate the strength of the statements when the two scales were
constructed, it is difficult to interpret the meaning of this effect.
Of more interest is the marginally significant interaction effect
of the priming manipulation and the racial attitudes scales, F(2,
56) = 2.80, p < .07, which takes the form that we hypothesized.
Subjects responded more favorably to the Pro-Black Scale when
they were primed with the humanitarianism statements than
when they were primed with PE statements or control items.
However, the reverse effect occurred on responses to the Anti-
Black Scale, where scores were higher with a PE prime than
with an HE or a control prime. Consistent with these findings,
a 2 X 2 ANOVA done on the four experimental conditions re-
i suited in a significant interaction effect that supported the hy-
pothesis, F(l, 37) = 4.82,p < .05.
Furthermore, direct comparison of the experimental condi-
tions with the control conditions suggests that the primed value
outlook caused an intensification of the corresponding racial
attitude component without affecting the theoretically unre-
lated racial attitude. The PE prime intensified anti-Black atti-
tude, F(l, 56) = 4.71,p< .05, whereas the HE prime did not,
F < 1, ns. Although in the expected direction, the HE prime
effect on Pro-Black scores was not significant, F[l, 56) = 1.98,
p > . 10. Pro-Black scores were not influenced by the PE prime,
F< l,ns.
The part of the experiment designed to test the effect of prim-
ing racial attitudes on PE and HE scores also produced hypo-
thesis-confirming results (see Table 4). We analyzed the data
using a 2 X 3 mixed ANOVA with three levels of the priming
manipulation (pro-Black statements, anti-Black statements,
and control) as a between-subjects variable and the two value
scales as a within-subjects factor. Again the analysis produced a
conceptually unimportant main effect between the value scales,
 900 IRWIN KATZ AND R. GLEN HASS
Table 4
Effect of Racial Attitude Scale Priming on Value Scores
Priming condition
Pro-Black Scale Anti-Black Scale Control
Measured value («= 22) (n = 20) (n = 21)
Humanitarianism
M 43.00 39.20 37.81
SD 6.45 5.72 7.19
Protestant ethic
M 33.00 38.05 32.76
SD 10.53 7.50 6.50
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Note. The higher the score, the more extreme the value.
F(l, 60) = 29.96, p < .01, indicating that subjects had higher
scores on HE than on PE.
The relevant finding was the significant interaction, as pre-
dicted, between the priming manipulation and the value scale
responses, F(2,60) = 7.22, p < .01. As Table 4 shows, this inter-
action supported the hypothesized relation. Subjects were more
willing to express humanitarian values when primed with pro-
Black statements than when primed with anti-Black statements
or control items. The reverse effect was found on the responses
to the PE Scale, in which scores were higher for subjects who
had been exposed to anti-Black statements than for those who
had been exposed to pro-Black statements or control items.
Also consistent with the hypothesis, a 2 X 2 ANOVA done on the
four experimental conditions resulted in a significant interac-
tion effect, F(l, 40) = 11.03, p < .01.
Direct comparison of the experimental and control condi-
tions suggests that the primed racial attitude caused increased
agreement with the theoretically corresponding value items
without affecting responses to the theoretically unrelated value
items. That is, the pro-Black prime strengthened endorsement
of HE items, F(\, 60) - 6.86, p < .02, whereas the anti-Black
prime did not, F < 1, ns. Similarly, the anti-Black prime in-
creased PE scores, F(l,60) = 4.06, p < .05, whereas the pro-
Black prime did not, F<l,ns.
To examine our priming hypotheses further, we compared
subjects who scored above and below the median on the priming
scale. If making the topic of the priming questionnaire salient
activates and increases endorsement of the related cognitive di-
mension, the effect should be stronger for those subjects who
are more in agreement with the primed attitude or value. For
example, strong agreement with the items on the HE Scale
when it was used as the prime should lead to greater endorse-
ment of the Pro-Black Scale items. Weak agreement with the
humanitarianism prime should dampen the effect, although it
should not eliminate it. Because of the unipolarity of the scales
(discussed later in this article), subjects both above and below
the median should be affected by the priming manipulation,
although the strength of the effect should be greater for those
subjects above the median.
We divided the subjects in each of the four experimental con-
ditions into two groups based on whether their scores were
above or below the median on the priming questionnaire. We
found that in every instance the hypothesized effect of the prim-
ing manipulation was stronger for those subjects whose scores
were above the median on the prime than for those whose scores
were below the median. Differences that were significant when
comparing scores of subjects above the median on the prime
became nonsignificant when we analyzed data from subjects
who scored below the median. (Cell means are presented in Ta-
ble 5.)
More specifically, subjects whose responses to the humanitar-
ianism prime were above the median became significantly more
favorable than control subjects on the Pro-Black Scale items,
F( 1, 36) = 5.06, p < .04, whereas subjects who scored below the
median did not differ significantly from the control subjects,
F < 1. Similarly, subjects who were above the median on the PE
priming questionnaire endorsed the Anti-Black Scale items sig-
nificantly more than control subjects, F[l, 37) = 8.19, p < .01,
whereas subjects who scored below the median did not, F < I.
When we used the racial attitudes scales as the priming ma-
nipulation, we obtained corresponding results. Subjects who
were above the median on the pro-Black prime became signifi-
cantly more willing to endorse items on the HE Scale than did
control subjects, F(l, 40) = 5.15, p < .05. Subjects below the
median on the pro-Black prime also tended to increase their
endorsement of HE items when compared with control sub-
jects, but the difference was not significant, P(l, 40) = 3.15,
p < .09. Finally, subjects whose responses to the anti-Black
prime were above the median had higher PE scores than did
control subjects, F( 1, 38) = 6.89, p < .02, whereas subjects be-
low the median did not, F(l, 38) = 1.74, ns.
Of course, some portion of the results of the median shift
analysis is probably due to the correlations between the scales
(e.g., someone who has a high score on the HE Scale is likely to
be more pro-Black than the norm to begin with). Although the
current research design does not permit an unambiguous re-
moval of the effect of the interscale correlations from the me-
dian split analysis, it is clear that the results cannot be fully
accounted for by the correlations. This fact is made most evi-
dent by the results for the subjects whose scores on the priming
questionnaire were below the median. If the results were pri-
marily due to the correlations between the scales, scores for sub-
jects who were below the median on the prime should have been
lower than those of control subjects. However, as Table 5 shows,
the means for the below-the-median subjects were consistently
higher than those for the corresponding control subjects (al-
though the levels did not achieve customary levels of signifi-
cance). Although these results are suggestive, more methodolog-
ically satisfying separation of the effects of the prime on subjects
above and below the median from the effects of the scale corre-
lations would require additional research.
To summarize then, in every comparison groups above the
median on the prime became significantly more favorable to-
ward the hypothesized value or racial attitude than control
group subjects, whereas subjects below the median on the prim-
ing questionnaire consistently differed (nonsignificantly) in the
same direction as the above-the-median subjects. Finally, in no
case was there a significant effect of a priming manipulation
on any theoretically unrelated value or racial attitude either for
subjects above the median or for subjects below the median on
their respective priming questionnaire, all Fs < 1.
Discussion
It appears that the correlations observed in Study 1 between
the HE and Pro-Black scales and between the PE and Anti-
 RACIAL ATTITUDES AND VALUES
Table 5
Median Split Comparison of the Effect of the Priming Manipulation
Humanitarianism
Measure Above median Below median
Attitude
Pro-Black 38.10 35.33
Anti-Black 25.90 29.89
« 10 9 20
Pro-Black
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Value
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Humanitarianism 43.63 42.36
Protestant ethic 32.64 33.36
11 11
Black scales do indeed reflect systematic linkages between value
and attitude components within two distinct cognitive struc-
tures. The results of Study 2 seem rather striking when one con-
siders the weakness of the priming manipulation, which con-
sisted merely of having subjects fill out a brief questionnaire
on the concept being primed. Presumably, a manipulation that
more strongly advocated the primed concept might have had a
greater effect.6
However, because the results of priming experiments are of-
ten open to alternative explanations based on demand charac-
teristics, we should consider the viability of a demand interpre-
tation of Study 2. Because the priming manipulation consisted
of filling out a questionnaire, it may have evoked various moti-
vations when subjects filled out the dependent measure ques-
tionnaire.
We believe demand explanations are untenable, because of
the several patterns of results that one might argue demand
characteristics could produce, none corresponds to the com-
plete pattern of results obtained. One possibility is that the par-
ticular racial attitude or value outlook measured by the priming
questionnaire might have suggested to subjects that certain re-
sponses on the later questionnaire were more "correct" or de-
sired by the experimenter. Because the items on the scales used
to measure the effect of the priming manipulation were always
mixed and were not obviously distinguishable as items on sepa-
rate scales, such a motivation on the part of subjects should have
led to greater agreement with items on one scale and greater
disagreement with items on the other. For example, the HE
Scale prime should have led both to stronger endorsement of
Pro-Black items and to rejection of Anti-Black statements. The
results, however, repeatedly showed an increase in agreement
with the items on the scale theoretically connected to the prime
and no effect on the other scale. Why the priming manipulation
should produce an effect on the items of one of the scales that
followed it but not on other items that common sense would
say should be related is difficult to explain in terms of demand
characteristics.
Another demand-characteristics explanation could be that
the priming questionnaire put subjects in an "agree mode" that
affected their responses on the second questionnaire, because
901
Priming manipulation
Protestant ethic
Control Above median Below median
33.10 32.18 32.33
27.70 37.64 29.67
11 9
Control Anti-Black
37.81 39.20 39.20
32.76 39.80 36.30
21 10 10
the wording of most of the items on the questionnaires was in
the same direction. But of course an agree orientation should
have produced an increase in the scores obtained on both of the
scales contained in the second questionnaire, another pattern
of results different from those obtained.
For either of the foregoing demand-characteristics explana-
tions to account for the results obtained, subjects would sponta-
neously have had to become aware that the scrambled items
on the second questionnaire were in two categories, accurately
assigned the items to the two scales, and correctly identified one
group of items as related to the priming questionnaire and the
other group as unrelated to it. We consider this a very unlikely
scenario, given the nonobviousness of the scale differences.
A further bit of evidence against the foregoing demand inter-
pretations is provided by the median split analysis. That effects
were stronger for subjects whose scores on the priming ques-
tionnaire were above the median than for those with scores be-
low the median is not easily explained in terms of situational
demands. Real or imagined situational pressure to give what
might have seemed an experimentally desirable or socially cor-
rect response should have been the same regardless of subjects'
scores on the priming questionnaire.
We also believe that the full pattern of results cannot be ex-
plained in terms of a need to appear consistent. If, when sub-
6
We should comment on an important difference in the procedures
used in Studies 1 and 2, and the effect of that difference on the results.
In Study 1 subjects filled out, successively, the complete Racial Attitudes
Questionnaire (Pro-Black and Anti-Black scales) and the complete So-
cial Values Questionnaire (HE and PE scales). Because subjects were
exposed to both parts of each questionnaire, and because on each ques-
tionnaire the items from the two scales were thoroughly mixed, we did
not expect priming effects. The arousal of either of the cognitive do-
mains (humanitarian-pro-BIack, or Protestant ethic-anti-Black)
should have been weakened or cancelled by the simultaneous arousal of
the other. The absence of order effects in Study 1 confirms the absence
of priming effects. In Study 2, on the other hand, the priming manipula-
tion was designed to increase the cognitive salience of only one of the
value-attitude pairs, without arousing the other pair. So although sub-
jects in both experiments filled out value and attitude questionnaires,
differential priming effects were produced only in the second study.
 902 IRW1N KATZ AND R. GLEN HASS
jects filled out the second questionnaire, they perceived a de-
mand to appear consistent with their responses on the priming
questionnaire, the demand should have been especially strong
for those subjects who scored above the median on the prime.
Hence, they should have given more extreme responses on the
related postpriming scale, as we found. However, similar consis-
tency effects should have been found on the other postpriming
scale as well, because the scrambled items were not readily dis-
tinguishable. However, contrary to the consistency-demand ex-
planation, subjects above the median on the prime did not show
any priming effects on the theoretically unrelated scale. Fur-
thermore, subjects filled out the questionnaires anonymously
while seated at desks separated from one another, which should
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have reduced a need to appear consistent to others.
Another issue relating to the present results has to do with the
direction of the priming effects. As we predicted, the priming
manipulation consistently produced stronger endorsement of
the attitude or value corresponding to the prime, rather than a
polarization of responses to the scales. It is important to note
that in other instances of priming one would expect the manip-
ulation to produce polarization of responses on a subsequent
issue. For example, priming subjects on a controversial topic
such as abortion rights might polarize subjects' attitudes toward
a political candidate: those favoring abortion rights becoming
more favorable toward a candidate who advocates a similar po-
sition, and those who oppose abortion becoming more negative
toward the candidate (lyengar et al., 1984). In the present exper-
iment, however, we did not predict polarized responses follow-
ing the priming manipulation because we believe the dimen-
sions underlying the scales to be unipolar in our society. Unipo-
larity should be especially likely for the Protestant ethic and
humanitarian values. Both are prominent values that are gener-
ally endorsed and socially important. The racial attitudes scales
were also conceptualized as largely unipolar. The reader will
recall, for example, that being low on the Pro-Black Scale is
neither conceptually nor empirically equivalent to being high
on the Anti-Black Scale. Moreover, with the possible exception
of the Anti-Black Scale (which produced a relatively symmetri-
cal distribution), the responses to the scales were generally in
line with our unipolarity assumptions. That is, most subjects
indicated more agreement than disagreement with the concepts
underlying the scales.
Finally, a question arises as to whether the results of the pres-
ent experiment represent attitude and value change in the usual
sense of the term. Because we did not measure subjects' atti-
tudes and values again after a lapse of time or in another con-
text, we cannot answer this question with certainty. However,
we conjecture that the current results represent a temporary
shift in emphasis based on the activation of a group of related
cognitions, rather than enduring, internalized attitude change.
One emphasizes in an expression of attitude that part of one's
cognitive structure that comes to mind easily, that which is mo-
mentarily most accessible. We suspect that if a different set of
cognitions related to the attitude were made salient to the sub-
ject, the part of the attitude emphasized would shift in that di-
rection. Building on Sherif and Hovland's (1961) concept of a
latitude of acceptance, Hass (1981) has argued in favor of de-
fining attitudes as cognitive ranges, rather than as points on a
scale. Conceptualizing attitudes as ranges fits with current no-
tions of attitudes as cognitive categories and schemata. An atti-
tude is, of course, a complex cognitive structure comprised of
many individual cognitions in association with one another.
Those individual cognitions are in many cases also associated
with other cognitions that are not considered part of the atti-
tude. Priming an individual with a concept related to an atti-
tude should make salient or accessible the portion of the attitude
cognitively associated with the primed concept. As a result, the
current point of emphasis will shift toward that part of the atti-
tude most related to the prime. Such shifts are probably tempo-
rary, sit nationally specific, and in effect only so long as the
prime is salient. However, it is possible (perhaps likely) that if
such value-attitude associations are made frequently and in
persuasive or socially reinforcing contexts that strengthen their
cognitive integration, the shifts may become more enduring.
General Discussion
We have identified in White college students two contradic-
tory, relatively independent dimensions of attitudes toward
Blacks, one friendly and the other hostile. We found these con-
flicting components to be causally linked with two discrete
value orientations: a humanitarian-egalitarian outlook appar-
ently creating commitment to racial justice and sympathy for
Blacks as the underdog, and the Protestant ethic, with its em-
phasis on self-reliance and self-discipline, which seems to gener-
ate critical perceptions of Blacks. There undoubtedly are many
other distinguishable components of racial attitude, including
some that are positive. (The MRAI, for example, measures 13
such factors; Brigham et al., 1976; Woodmansee & Cook,
1967.) Also, there likely exist many other value-attitude link-
ages. However, our purpose has been to focus on a particular
sector of this cognitive domain. Within this sector, our correla-
tional and experimental findings generally support the concep-
tion of two distinct value-attitude structures existing simulta-
neously within individuals.
Although the data generally conform to this pattern, there
are some deviations that should be mentioned. Most notably, as
Table 2 shows, the expected configuration does not show up
consistently in the three southern subsamples. The data ob-
tained from a very small group of University of Delaware stu-
dents (n = 29) deviate sharply from the model. However, results
for the larger Georgia and Texas subsamples are more in line
with predictions, except for relations between the Pro-Black
and the two value scales. We find these exceptions puzzling and
can only speculate that because racial segregation in the South
was historically more rigid and pervasive than in the North, the
kind of beliefs tapped by the Pro-Black items may still strongly
reflect traditional local norms of inequality. As a result, the tie
to certain general values may be more tenuous than in the
North. (Recall that Pro-Black scores in the southern sample are
significantly lower than in the northern sample.) In general, the
notion of a value-attitude duality may prove to be less descrip-
tive of people in some regions, localities, and socioeconomic
groups than in others.1
7
Furthermore, in the absence of relevant empirical data we do not
assume that the obtained relation between the Protestant Ethic and
Anti-Black scales is generalizable to other racial or ethnic out-groups,
because there probably is considerable variation in the majority's beliefs
about duTerent groups. Some Asian populations in America, for exam-
 RACIAL ATTITUDES AND VALUES
Of course, our interpretation of Studies 1 and 2 assumes that
the scales adequately assess the relevant value and attitude con-
structs. We present data in Study 1 that support this assump-
tion. All of the newly devised instruments are internally consis-
tent and virtually free of social desirability response bias, as
measured by the SDS. Also, responses to Pro-Black and Anti-
Black items that are keyed in a reverse direction indicate that
acquiescence bias is not an important influence on subjects'
scores. Additional evidence in support of the construct validity
of both attitude scales is provided by (a) correlations between
the scales and two subscales of Woodmansee and Cook's
MRAI, and (b) comparisons of the mean scores of White and
Black samples.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
The findings on validity are not conclusive, and do not en-
tirely rule out the possibility that individual differences in can-
dor are a major source of variation in the attitude scores. On
the other hand, the fact that the attitude questionnaire was an-
swered anonymously in a group setting suggests that if subjects
did withhold their true feelings, their purpose was to enhance
their personal self-image of fairness and kindliness toward
Blacks as a disadvantaged group. Subjects should, however, have
no need to defend such a self-image if they have not in some
degree internalized the principle of racial justice.
Moreover, if concealment of one's true feelings is a strong mo-
tive behind the questionnaire responses, the effect should be
even more apparent on the Anti-Black Scale than on the Pro-
Black Scale, because the expression of racial antagonism is
probably perceived as more self-revealing than failure to ex-
press sympathy. Yet the mean rating assigned to individual
Anti-Black items in the northern sample is approximately mid-
way between agree and disagree. Apparently these subjects are
not suppressing critical beliefs about Black people to the extent
of rejecting most of the Anti-Black items. Also, if defensiveness
is a pervasive influence on responses, it should both elevate Pro-
Black scores and depress Anti-Black scores, in which case indi-
vidual differences in defensiveness would create an inverse cor-
relation between the two. However, the obtained correlation in
the northern sample is a low -. 12. We conclude that at least in
the northern sample, faking of responses is not a serious threat
to the validity of the racial attitude scales.
We should also mention that several of our pro- and anti-
Black items do not directly measure attitude in the usual sense,
but instead try to get at attitude inferentially by assessing opin-
ions regarding alleged facts about Black people, as well as other
kinds of belief. Our assumption is that these cognitions are
likely to have associated with them certain positive and negative
affects, such as liking and sympathy or disdain and hostility.
The validation data are encouraging in this regard. However,
it remains to be determined by further research whether our
putative attitudes "behave" like attitudes in the sense of predict-
ing measurable affects and actions in concrete situations.
Another issue relating to the adequacy of the attitude scales
has to do with the extent to which important areas of racial
sentiment have been left out. On the face of it, two obvious
omissions are fear of Black violence and aversion to close inter-
racial contacts. Sears and Allen (1984) have suggested that
pie, are probably seen as positive rather than negative exemplars of the
Protestant ethic values.
903
many Whites acquire deep-rooted racial fears and animosities
in then- early years and never lose them. These feelings appear
to be nurtured by the subjective association of Blacks with
crime and social disorder, especially on the part of Whites who
live near racial ghettos and feel threatened by their expanding
boundaries. (See, for example, Ashmore & Del Boca, 1976;
Rieder, 1987.) We are currently in the process of developing a
scale to measure racial fear.
However, our present purpose is not to measure all the com-
ponents of racial attitude, but rather to demonstrate the preva-
lence of a type of positive attitude and a type of negative attitude
toward Blacks, each of which is rooted in a core American value
outlook. Our thinking has been influenced by Rokeach's (1973)
early experiments on the relation between the values of freedom
and equality, on one hand, and civil rights attitude and behavior,
on the other hand. Whereas Rokeach focuses on the linkage be-
tween beliefs in freedom and equality (particularly the latter)
and favorable racial attitude, however, we are concerned with a
duality in the general value-racial attitude relation. We do not
maintain that all important components of racial attitude are
value-expressive. On the contrary, we accept Herek's (1986)
neofunctionalist position, which calls attention to a range of
other psychological functions served by attitudes. For example,
Bobo (1983) has shown that an important function of racial
prejudice is the protection of vested material interests.
We believe our scales may prove useful in studying the rela-
tion between one type of attitudinal conflict and behavior. Ro-
keach demonstrated that inducing self-awareness of value-atti-
tude inconsistencies can lead to positive change in responses
to minorities; and a few other investigators, such as Frey and
Gaertner (1986) and McConahay (1986) have assumed that
egalitarian beliefs may sometimes inhibit the expression of ra-
cial bias. Overall, however, there have been relatively few at-
tempts at exploring this area more fully.
Elsewhere we have proposed a theory about the role of ambiv-
alence as a motivation of extreme behavior toward minority
group members (I. Katz, 1981; I. Katz, Wackenhut, & Hass,
1986). The new Pro-Black and Anti-Black scales can be used to
investigate the behavioral effects of one kind of ambivalence by
measuring the conflicting attitudes directly.
Beyond the conceptual issues we have discussed, there seem
to be social implications to the present findings. We note first
that the causal relation in the northern sample between egalitar-
ianism and sympathy for Blacks as a deprived group suggests
the usefulness of an educational strategy that strengthens the
egalitarian outlook and spells out its relation to minority rights.
In addition, the observed causal linkage between endorsement
of the Protestant ethic and expression of certain negative senti-
ments about Blacks is intriguing because Protestant ethic val-
ues appear to be central in American culture, whereas unfavor-
able racial attitudes are no longer publicly sanctioned. If indeed
some derogatory views about Black people are rooted in an im-
portant value outlook of the majority, this fact would help ex-
plain their enduring nature. Furthermore, it suggests that com-
municators who advocate commitment to self-reliance, self-dis-
cipline, and work may have the (perhaps unintended) effect of
increasing the strength of an anti-Black attitude in their audi-
ence, even if racial issues are not mentioned. To prevent this
outcome, they should make clear in their messages that the use
of Protestant ethic standards of evaluation is appropriate only
 904 IRWIN KATZ AND R. GLEN HASS
when competitive importunities and incentives are equal for all
players. Finally, the apparent independence of the pro-Black-
humanitarian cognitive structure and the anti-Black-Protes-
tant ethic structure in the North offers at least a partial explana-
tion of the resistance of certain kinds of anti-Black sentiment
to change based on appeals made exclusively to egalitarian mo-
tives. Such efforts may strengthen a person's pro-Black attitude
without having any effect on his or her anti-Black feelings.
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Appendix

Attitude and Value Items

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This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

Pro-Black Anti-Black

1. Black people do not have the same employment opportunities that
Whites do.
2. It's surprising that Black people do as well as they do, considering
all the obstacles they face.
3. Too many Blacks still lose out on jobs and promotions because of
their skin color.
4. Most big corporations in America are really interested in treating
their Black and White employees equally."
5. Most Blacks are no longer discriminated against.9
6. Blacks have more to offer than they have been allowed to show.
7. The typical urban ghetto public school is not as good as it should
be to provide equal opportunities for Blacks.
8. This country would be better off if it were more willing to
assimilate the good things in Black culture.
9. Sometimes Black job seekers should be given special consideration
in hiring.
10. Many Whites show a real lack of understanding of the problems
that Blacks face.
1. The root cause of most of the social and economic ills of Blacks is
the weakness and instability of the Black family.
2. Although there are exceptions, Black urban neighborhoods don't
seem to have strong community organization or leadership.
3. On the whole, Black people don't stress education and training.
4. Many Black teenagers don't respect themselves or anyone else.
5. Blacks don't seem to use opportunities to own and operate little
shops and businesses.
6. Very few Black people are just looking for a free ride.*
7. Black children would do better in school if their parents had better
attitudes about learning.
8. Blacks should take the jobs that are available and then work their
way up to better jobs.
9. One of the biggest problems for a lot of Blacks is their lack of serf-
respect.
10. Most Blacks have the drive and determination to get ahead."

Protestant Ethic Humanitarianism-Egalitarianism

1. Most people spend too much time in unprofitable amusements. 1. One should be kind to all people.
2. Our society would have fewer problems if people had less leisure 2. One should find ways to help others less fortunate than oneself.
time. 3. A person should be concerned about the well-being of others.
3. Money acquired easily is usually spent unwisely. 4. There should be equality for everyone—because we are all human
4. Most people who don't succeed in life are just plain lazy. beings.
3. Anyone who is willing and able to work hard has a good chance of 5. Those who are unable to provide for their basic needs should be
succeeding. helped by others.
6. People who fail at a job have usually not tried hard enough. 6. A good society is one in which people feel responsible for one
7. Life would have very little meaning if we never had to surfer. another.
8. The person who can approach an unpleasant task with enthusiasm 7. Everyone should have an equal chance and an equal say in most
is the person who gets ahead. things.
9. If people work hard enough they are likely to make a good life for 8. Acting to protect the rights and interests of other members of the
themselves. community is a major obligation for all persons.
10. I feel uneasy when there is little work for me to do. 9. In dealing with criminals the courts should recognize that many
11. A distaste for hard work usually reflects a weakness of character. are victims of circumstances.
10. Prosperous nations have a moral obligation to share some of their
wealth with poor nations.

8
Item scored in reverse.

Received April 22, 1987

Revision received April 15,1988
Accepted May 3, 1988