Professional Documents
Culture Documents
ASHLEY PEEL*
ABSTRACT
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, New England Law | Boston (2017). B.A. cum laude,
History, Political Science, & Public Relations, Mount Saint Mary College (2014). I would like to
thank my parents, Loretta and Robert, for their constant support, encouragement, and love
throughout my education. I would also like to thank the Editors and Associates for their hard
work and dedication in publishing this Comment.
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324 New England Law Review Vol. 51|2
INTRODUCTION
to Object to Unreasonable Searches, 41 ARK. L. REV. 487 passim (1988) (discussing the progression
of decisions which have led to an elimination of standing and allowing the protection of the
Fourth Amendment in only the narrowest of circumstances).
3 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”); see
also David A. Macdonald, Jr., Comment, Standing to Challenge Searches and Seizures: A Small
Group of States Chart Their Own Course, 63 TEMP. L. REV. 559, 559, 590 (1990) (comparing the
Supreme Courts view of standing with various state approaches to standing, and concluding
that broader standing requirements should be adopted).
4 Simien, supra note 2, at 489.
5 Macdonald, supra note 3, at 559.
6 See Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 137 (2008) (discussing standing
and its failure to vindicate the right of the amendment which it is supposed to protect).
7 Macdonald, supra note 3, at 559 (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978)).
2017 Target Standing and the SJC 325
8 See Michelle Alexandria Curtis, Note, Ninth Circuit Joint Venture Standing: A Joint
Possessory Interest is Sufficient to Establish Fourth Amendment Standing, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 311, 314,
318 (1992) (citing to the Supreme Court in Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 176–78
(1969), which highlighted the value of the exclusionary rule by reiterating that illegally
obtained evidence will be suppressed even if it is at the expense of weakening or destroying
the case against the defendant).
9 Macdonald, supra note 3, at 586.
10 Commonwealth v. Santiago, 24 N.E.3d 560, 564 (Mass. 2015) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Scardamaglia, 573 N.E.2d 5, 5 (Mass. 1991)).
11 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (1978) (“And since the exclusionary rule is an attempt
to effectuate the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment, it is proper to permit only defendants
whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated to benefit from the rule's protections.”
(quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974))).
12 See,e.g., Waring v. State, 670 P.2d 357, 362 (Alaska 1983) (agreeing with the Supreme
Court that target standing would not deter unlawful conduct in most situations, but holding
that the purpose of the exclusionary rule would be effectuated when target standing is
allowed in circumstances of police knowingly and intentionally violating a co-defendant’s
rights); State v. Owen, 453 So. 2d 1202, 1205 (La. 1984) (acknowledging the federal
jurisprudence rule, but holding that under Louisiana law “any person that is adversely
affected” by an illegal search and seizure has standing).
13 Santiago, 24 N.E.3d at 563 (“[T]arget standing permits a criminal defendant who is the
‘target’ of a search by police ‘to contest the legality of that search and object to the admission
at trial of evidence obtained as a result of the search,’ in effect permitting the defendant ‘to
assert that a violation of the Fourth Amendment rights of a third party entitled him to have
evidence suppressed at his trial.” (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133 (1978))).
326 New England Law Review Vol. 51|2
If the defendant is granted protection under this target standing theory, the
exclusionary rule prohibits admittance of the evidence that was taken in
violation of a third party’s Fourth Amendment rights.14 The exclusionary
rule’s main objective is to deter future unlawful police conduct that is in
direct conflict with the purpose and guarantees of the Fourth
Amendment.15 These states have recognized that a broader interpretation
of the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule may be appropriate in
circumstances where egregious police misconduct results in the illegal
seizure of evidence that incriminates a third party.16
The Supreme Court has rejected target standing as a protection
guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment.17 The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court (SJC) is amongst the state courts that have acknowledged
that, in circumstances of egregious police misconduct, the target standing
theory may be appropriate in order to combat and deter police from
illegally seizing evidence.18 Notwithstanding this acknowledgment, the SJC
has yet to take the definitive step of determining that a situation presented
to it, involving police misconduct, has elevated to a degree that would
warrant such an application of the target standing rule.19 Using the limited
exclusionary rule set by the U.S. Supreme Court, the SJC determined in
Commonwealth v. Santiago that the defendant was not a victim of egregious
police misconduct and therefore target standing was not available.20 In
Following its decision in Rakas, the Supreme Court confronted the issue
of target standing again in United States v. Payner, which further restricted
the application of target standing.38 The defendant in Payner moved to
suppress illegally seized evidence—documents that showed he falsified his
income tax return—from the briefcase of a third party.39 The district court
in Payner held that “society’s interest in deterring bad faith conduct by
exclusion outweighs society’s interest in furnishing the trier of fact with all
relevant evidence.”40 The Payner court cited Rakas to re-enforce its holding
that the exclusionary rule only applies to criminal defendants that have
had their own constitutional rights infringed upon.41 The court further
restricted the rule, explaining that a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights
are violated only when that defendant’s legitimate expectation of privacy is
infringed upon, not that of a third party.42
In examining if target standing could be warranted, the court in Payner,
like that in Rakas, relied on the necessity of balancing administrative
burdens against practical application.43 The Payner court adopted the
Government’s argument that an “extension of the supervisory power
would enable federal courts to exercise a standard-less discretion in their
application of the exclusionary rule to enforce the Fourth Amendment.”44
The court articulated that there are circumstances that may warrant the
On May 14, 2012 Angel Santiago was riding a bicycle in the North End
of Springfield, Massachusetts, when he caught the attention of Police
Officer William Catellier, who was on uniform patrol.51 Officer Catellier
had no previous interactions with Santiago, but he noticed him because the
North End is a known area where “drug runners sometimes use bicycles to
relay drugs and money between street level dealers and buyers.”52 Two
days later, Officer Catellier was on patrol in the North End when he
observed Santiago again riding his bike.53 Officer Catellier, unaware at the
time that Santiago had been arrested the previous day, undertook
surveillance of Santiago in his marked cruiser.54 After losing sight of him
for less than a minute, Officer Catellier observed Santiago dismount his
bike and walk east down Bancroft Street, where he then approached a
man—later identified as Edwin Ramos—who stepped out of the entryway
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Santiago, 24 N.E.3d at 562.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 563.
62 Id. at 562.
63 Santiago, 24 N.E.3d at 562.
64 Id. at 563.
65 Id. at 562–63.
66 Id.
67 See Commonwealth v. Amendola, 550 N.E.2d 121, 126 (Mass. 1990) (holding that when a
defendant is charged with a crime in which possession is an essential element of guilt, the
defendant shall be deemed to have standing to contest the legality of the search and seizure of
the evidence).
68 See Santiago, 24 N.E.3d at 563.
332 New England Law Review Vol. 51|2
69 See HAMID R. KUSHA, DEFENDANT RIGHTS 149 (2004) (addressing the issue of
reasonableness in search and seizure activities which held that “reasonable suspicion” is
necessary to entitle a Terry-type stop where police can stop, question, and frisk a person who
the police officer believes is acting suspiciously).
70 See Santiago, 24 N.E.3d at 563; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (holding that an
officer who, in light of experience, observes unusual conduct, and after identifying him or
herself as an officer and making reasonable inquiries, if “nothing in the initial stages of the
encounter serves to dispel” the officer’s own reasonable fear of safety “or others’ safety, [the
officer] is entitled . . . to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such
persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault” the officer).
71 See U.S. CONST. amend IV; see also Santiago, 24 N.E.3d at 563.
72 See Santiago, 24 N.E.3d at 564.
73 See id.
74 Id. at 563.
75 See id.; see also MASS. R. CRIM. P. 15(a)(2) (permitting a right to an interlocutory appeal).
76 See Santiago, 24 N.E.3d at 563.
77 See infra Part III.
78 See Santiago, 24 N.E.3d at 563.
2017 Target Standing and the SJC 333
III. The SJC Strict Adherence to the Supreme Court’s Holding in Rakas
A. Commonwealth v. Santiago
Since 1990, the SJC has consistently been presented with the question
of target standing in relation to article fourteen of the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights,79 but to date it has refused to adopt target standing.80
The SJC in Santiago began its analysis by referencing the Supreme Court’s
definition of target standing and its decision to not accept it as a viable
claim.81 The SJC reiterated the Supreme Court’s holding that the primary
purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct by excluding
evidence that has been seized in violation of an individual’s rights which
are granted by federal and state constitutions.82 The SJC, in compliance
with its precedent, explained that in order to warrant application of the
exclusionary rule there must be a balance “between effectuating its
deterrent purpose and permitting the fact finder to decide a criminal case
based on the available relevant evidence, including ‘highly relevant
evidence of guilt.’”83 The SJC again consulted the Supreme Court’s decision
in Rakas for determining how to effectuate the proper balance.84 The SJC
considered the Supreme Court’s opinion in Rakas, that the appropriate
79 See MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XIV (“Every subject has a right to be secure from all
unreasonable searches, and seizures, of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his
possessions. All warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the cause or foundation of
them be not previously supported by oath or affirmation; and if the order in the warrant to a
civil officer, to make search in suspected places, or to arrest one or more suspected persons, or
to seize their property, be not accompanied with a special designation of the persons or
objects of search, arrest, or seizure: and no warrant ought to be issued but in cases, and with
the formalities prescribed by the laws.”).
80 See, e.g., Santiago, 24 N.E.3d at 563; Commonwealth v. Vacher, 14 N.E.3d 264, 274–75
(Mass. 2014) (holding that this was not a case of egregious police misconduct and the
defendant did not prove that he was not the original target of the search and seizure, therefore
the evidence was not excluded under the theory of target standing); Commonwealth v.
Waters, 649 N.E.2d 724, 726 (Mass. 1995) (holding that in the absence of distinctly egregious
misconduct that might justify target standing, the defendant may not utilize the target
standing theory); Commonwealth v. Scardamaglia, 573 N.E.2d 5, 8 (Mass. 1991) (noting that
few jurisdictions have adopted the target standing rule, and the court is reluctant to adopt it
except possibly in circumstances of distinctly egregious police conduct); Commonwealth v.
Manning, 548 N.E.2d 1223, 1225 (Mass. 1990) (seeking to apply target standing to invalidate
the search because the police were seeking to reach one specific defendant); Commonwealth
v. Price, 562 N.E.2d 1355, 1359 (Mass. 1990) (refusing to extend target standing in the absence
of police misconduct or unfairness).
81 See Santiago, 24 N.E.3d at 563.
82 Id. at 563–64.
83 Id. at 564 (quoting Scardamaglia, 573 N.E.2d at 8).
84 See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (1978); see also Santiago, 24 N.E.3d at 564.
334 New England Law Review Vol. 51|2
B. Commonwealth v. Scardamaglia
95 See id. at 8.
96 Id. at 5.
97 See id. at 6.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 8.
100 See Commonwealth v. Santiago, 24 N.E.3d 560, 563 (Mass. 2015).
101 Scardamaglia,573 N.E.2d at 6 (citations omitted) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,
133–34, 136–37 (1978)).
336 New England Law Review Vol. 51|2
the need for reliable evidence at trial.124 The Waring court agreed with the
Supreme Court’s view that allowing a co-defendant to assert standing for
the violation of the other defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights would not
significantly deter unlawful police misconduct in most situations.125 The
Waring court then turned its analysis to instances of egregious police
misconduct, which it believed individuals must be protected against.126 The
Waring court held that circumstances of gross or shocking “police
misconduct which shocks the conscience, or is of a nature that calls for the
judiciary, as a matter of judicial integrity, to disassociate itself from benefits
derivable therefrom,” would permit invocation of the exclusionary rule.127
Using this reasoning, the Waring court acknowledged that in order to
preserve judicial integrity, and deter misconduct, the exclusionary rule
should be extended to a co-defendant in instances where police knowingly
and intentionally violate the co-defendants rights.128 The court zealously
believed that in accepting this theory, it would deter police from violating
the rights of a person who will not be prosecuted in the hopes that the
illegally obtained evidence would eventually be used against another
defendant.129 The court concluded that a co-defendant can assert target
standing if they can prove: “(1) that a police officer obtained the evidence
as a result of gross or shocking misconduct, or (2) that the officer
deliberately violated a co-defendant’s rights.”130
The SJC should have emulated the Waring court’s approach to the
Supreme Court’s balancing test of the exclusionary clause.131 Before the SJC
conducts its balancing test there must first be a determination that there
was presence of egregious police misconduct.132 The SJC, in conflict with
the trial judge’s opinion, found the police conduct in Santiago did not rise
to an egregious level because it believed that there was probable cause for a
“Terry-type” search.133 A reasonable suspicion standard is necessary when
an officer conducts a “Terry-type” stop, which is when he is acting within
his own experiences and observes something suspicious which causes him
124 See Alderman, 394 U.S. at 174–75 (“[W]e are not convinced that the additional benefits of
extending the exclusionary rule to other defendants would justify further encroachment upon
the public interest in prosecuting those accused of crime and having them acquitted or
convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth.”).
125 Waring, 670 P.2d at 362.
126 See id. at 361–62.
127 Id. at 362 (quoting State v. Sears, 553 P.2d 907, 914 (Alaska 1976)).
128 See id. at 262–63.
129 See id. at 363.
130 Id.
131 See Waring, 670 P.2d at 361.
132 See id.
133 See Commonwealth v. Santiago, 24 N.E.3d 560, 563 (Mass. 2015)
2017 Target Standing and the SJC 339
appeared to him that there had been a struggle and someone had gone
through the drawers and cabinets of the home.145 The victim identified one
of the perpetrators as Owen and provided the address of where Owen had
stayed one time with a friend.146 Officer McCann dispatched other officers
to the address, and when the officers approached the trailer they witnessed
an individual looking out the window, and soon after the lights to the
residence were turned off.147 Officer McCann stated that he heard
movement inside, but no one answered the door when the officers
identified themselves as police officers.148 The officers tried to rouse Evans,
the owner of the trailer, out of the residence but when there was no
response, the officers entered the residence without permission.149
Conflicting facts were offered by the defendants and officers, but the
officers testified that they witnessed Owen and another sleeping in the
front room.150 The officer’s further testified that they told another
individual to get the owner of the residence because they were
investigating an armed robbery and stabbing in which Owen was a
suspect.151 During the time that they were waiting for Officer McCann,
Evans, the owner of the trailer, consented to a search of the trailer.152 The
officers were asked by the defendants why they were there; no one was
handcuffed, no search was conducted, and no arrests were made.153 Once
Officer McCann arrived, Evans again consented to the search, and the
search was conducted and resulted in the discovery of numerous coins and
prescription bottles with the victim’s name on them.154 The defendants
were arrested as a result of this evidence and, at trial, filed a motion to
suppress the evidence obtained claiming the search was illegal.155
Instead of directly adopting the Supreme Court’s position on target
standing, the Owen court acknowledged that Louisiana does not have a
federal rule equivalent that disallows an individual to raise the violation of
the targeted individual’s constitutional rights.156 The court went on to
recognize that precedent has always interpreted that under the Louisiana
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Owen, 435 So. 2d at 1203–04.
150 Id. at 1204.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 See id.
154 Id.
155 See Owen, 435 So. 2d at 1204.
156 See id. at 1205.
2017 Target Standing and the SJC 341
157 Id. (interpreting the state constitution); see also LA. CONST. art. 1, § 5.
158 See Owen, 453 So. 2d at 1205.
159 Id.
160 See id. at 1207.
161 See MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XIV.
162 See Owen, 453 So. 2d at 1205.
163 See Commonwealth v. Santiago, 24 N.E.3d 560, 563 (Mass. 2015).
164 See Waring v. State, 670 P.2d 357, 361 (Alaska 1983); see also Owen, 453 So. 2d at 1205.
165 SeeKeith A. Fabi, Comment, The Exclusionary Rule: Not the “Expressed Juice of the Woolly-
Headed Thistle”, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 937, 945 (1986).
342 New England Law Review Vol. 51|2
in the United States.166 Since its application, the Supreme Court has
revisited the exclusionary rule to ensure that it is being applied in
congruence with the original aims of the Fourth Amendment.167 In
revisiting the exclusionary rule, the court has acknowledged the public’s
misconception that the application of the rule results in countless guilty
defendants running free and impedes the truth finding functions of the
judicial system.168 Paradoxically, this also appears to be the court’s concern
with accepting the application of target standing.169 However, this concern
is unfounded and misplaced.170 Target standing would not allow countless
guilty defendants to go free; instead, target standing would effectuate the
purpose of the Fourth Amendment, by allowing a third-party defendant to
assert the exclusionary rule when that individual has been an incidental
victim of egregious police misconduct in seizing incriminating evidence.171
CONCLUSION
166 Id. at 942 (“Without [sic] that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be
so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all
brutish means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Court’s high regard as freedom
‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”) (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961)).
167 See,
e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914);
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); see Fabi, supra note 165, at 942.
168 See, e.g., United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 (1980) (discussing the social costs of
broadening the application of the exclusionary rule); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,
354 (1974) (stating that the public finds it more advantageous to allow a possible excessive
governmental intrusion than the risk of setting free a guilty defendant); see also Fabi, supra
note 165, at 942.
169 See Fabi, supra note 165, at 942.
170 See id.
171 See id.
172 See, e.g., Waring v. State, 670 P.2d 357, 361 (Alaska 1983); State v. Owen, 453 So. 2d 1202,
174 See generally Waring, 670 P.2d at 361 (holding that applicable state law guarantees third
parties the right to assert target standing); Owen, 453 So. 2d at 1205 (finding target standing to
be applicable in circumstances of extremely egregious police misconduct that shocks the
conscience).
175 See generally Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 128, 133 (1978) (holding that the petitioners
did not have standing under the Fourth Amendment where they failed to show any legitimate
expectation of privacy).
176 See id. at 133.
177 See id.