G.R. No. 131516. March 5, 2003.
* mind would subject her child to the humiliation,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. RONNIE RULLEPA y GUINTO, accused-
appellant.
Criminal Law; Rape; Child Witnesses; Accused’s
suggestion that the 3-year old complainant merely
imagined the things of which he is accused, perhaps
getting the idea from television programs, is
preposterous.—Accused-appellant’s suggestion that Cyra
May merely imagined the things of which he is accused,
perhaps getting the idea from television programs, is
preposterous. It is true that “the ordinary child is a
‘great weaver of romances,’ ” and her “imagination may
induce (her) to relate something she has heard or read
in a story as personal experience.” But Cyra May’s
account is hardly the stuff of romance or fairy tales.
Neither is it normal TV fare, if at all. This Court cannot
believe that a victim of Cyra May’s age could concoct a
tale of defloration, allow the examination of her private
parts, and undergo the expense, trouble, inconvenience,
not to mention the trauma of public trial.
Same; Same; Same; That the complainant suffered
pain in her vagina but not in her anus despite her
testimony that the accused inserted his penis in both
orifices does not diminish her credibility.—More. That
Cyra May suffered pain in her vagina but not in her
anus despite her testimony that accused-appellant
inserted his penis in both orifices does not diminish her
credibility. It is possible that accused-appellant’s penis
failed to penetrate her anus as deeply as it did her
vagina, the former being more resistant to extreme
forces than the latter.
Same; Same; Courts are seldom, if at all, convinced
that a mother would stoop so low as to subject her
daughter to physical hardship and shame concomitant
to a rape prosecution just to assuage her own hurt
feelings.—Accused-appellant’s imputation of ill motive
on the part of Gloria is puerile. No mother in her right
disgrace and trauma attendant to a prosecution for rape
if she were not motivated solely by the desire to
incarcerate the person responsible for the child’s
defilement. Courts are seldom, if at all, convinced that a
mother would stoop so low as to subject her daughter to
physical hardship and shame concomitant to a rape
prosecution just to assuage her own hurt feelings.
Same; Same; Statutory Rape; Elements.—In fine, the
crime committed by accused-appellant is not merely
acts of lasciviousness but statutory rape. The two
elements of statutory rape are (1) that the accused had
carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) that the woman is
below twelve years of age. As shown in the previous
discussion, the first element, carnal knowledge, had
been established beyond reasonable doubt. The same is
true with respect to the second element. The victim’s
age is relevant in rape cases since it may constitute
an element of the offense. Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.
Same; Same; Same; Guidelines in Appreciating Age
as Element of the Crime or as a Qualifying
Circumstance.—Because of the seemingly conflicting
decisions regarding the sufficiency of evidence of the
victim’s age in rape cases, this Court, in the recently
decided case of People v. Pruna, established a set of
guidelines in appreciating age as an element of the
crime or as a qualifying circumstance, to wit: 1. The best
evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an
original or certified true copy of the certificate of live
birth of such party. 2. In the absence of a certificate of
live birth, similar authentic documents such as
baptismal certificate and school records which show the
date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age. 3.
If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is
shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise
unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the
victim’s mother or a member of the family either by
Page 1 of 187
affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on
matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or
date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section
40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient
under the following circumstances: a. If the victim is
alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to
be proved is that she is less than 7 years old; b. If the
victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is
sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and
what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18
“years old. 4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth,
authentic document, or the testimony of the victim’s
mother or relatives concerning the victim’s age, the
complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that it is
expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. 5. It is
the prosecution that has the burden, of proving the age
of the offended party. The failure of the accused to
object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall
not be taken against him. 6. The trial court should
always make a categorical finding as to the age of the
victim.
Same; Same; Evidence; Judicial Notice; While
several cases suggest that courts may take “judicial
notice” of the appearance of the victim in determining
her age, a handful of cases holds that courts, without the
requisite hearing prescribed by Section 3, Rule 129 of the
Rules of Court, cannot take judicial notice of the victim’s
age.—Several cases suggest that courts may take
“judicial notice” of the appearance of the victim in
determining her age. For example, the Court, in People
v. Tipay, qualified the ruling in People v. Javier, which
required the presentation of the birth certificate to
prove the rape victim’s age, with the following
pronouncement: This does not mean, however, that the
presentation of the certificate of birth is at all times
necessary to prove minority. The minority of a victim of
tender age who may be below the age of ten is quite
manifest and the court can take judicial notice thereof.
The crucial years pertain to the ages of fifteen to
seventeen where minority may seem to be dubitable due
to one’s physical appearance. In this situation, the
prosecution has the burden of proving with certainty
the fact that the victim was under 18 years of age when
the rape was committed in order to justify the
imposition of the death penalty under the above-cited
provision. (Italics supplied.) On the other hand, a
handful of cases holds that courts, without the requisite
hearing prescribed by Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court, cannot take judicial notice of the victim’s age.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and
Phrases; Judicial notice is a phrase sometimes used in a
loose way to cover some other judicial action—certain
rules of evidence, usually known under other names, are
frequently referred to in terms of judicial notice; The
process by which the trier of facts judges a person’s age
from his or her appearance cannot be categorized as
judicial notice.—Judicial notice signifies that there are
certain “facta probanda” or propositions in a party’s
case, as to which he will not be required to offer
evidence; these will be taken for true by the tribunal
without the need of evidence. Judicial notice, however,
is a phrase sometimes used in a loose way to cover some
other judicial action. Certain rules of Evidence, usually
known under other names, are frequently referred to in
terms of judicial notice. The process by which the trier
of facts judges a person’s age from his or her
appearance cannot be categorized as judicial notice.
Judicial notice is based upon convenience and
expediency for it would certainly be superfluous,
inconvenient, and expensive both to parties and the
court to require proof, in the ordinary way, of facts
which are already known to courts. As Tundag puts it, it
“is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may
properly take and act on without proof because they
already know them.” Rule 129 of the Rules of Court,
Page 2 of 187
where the provisions governing judicial notice are
found, is entitled “What Need Not Be Proved.” When the
trier of facts observes the appearance of a person to
ascertain his or her age, he is not taking judicial notice
of such fact; rather, he is conducting an examination of
the evidence, the evidence being the appearance of the
person. Such a process militates against the very
concept of judicial notice, the object of which is to do
away with the presentation of evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A person’s appearance,
where relevant, is admissible as object evidence, the same
being addressed to the senses of the court.—This is not to
say that the process is not sanctioned by the Rules of
Court; on the contrary, it does. A person’s appearance,
where relevant, is admissible as object evidence, the
same being addressed to the senses of the court. Section
1, Rule 130 provides: SECTION 1. Object as evidence.—
Objects as evidence are those addressed to the senses of
the court. When an object is relevant to the fact in issue,
it may be exhibited to, examined or viewed by the court.
“To be sure,” one author writes, “this practice of
inspection by the court of objects, things or persons
relevant to the fact in dispute, has its roots in ancient
judicial procedure.” The author proceeds to quote from
another authority: “Nothing is older or commoner in the
administration of law in all countries than the
submission to the senses of the tribunal itself, whether
judge or jury, of objects which furnish evidence. The
view of the land by the jury, in real actions, of a wound
by the judge where mayhem was alleged, and of the
person of one alleged to be an infant, in order to fix his
age, the inspection and comparison of seals, the
examination of writings, to determine whether they are
(‘)blemished,(‘) the implements with which a crime was
committed or of a person alleged, in a bastardy
proceeding, to be the child of another, are few
illustrations of what may be found abundantly in our
own legal records and textbooks for seven centuries
past.” (Italics supplied.)
Same; Same; Same; Same; Experience teaches that
corporal appearances are approximately an index of the
age of their bearer, particularly for the marked extremes
of old age and youth.—A person’s appearance, as
evidence of age (for example, of infancy, or of being
under the age of consent to intercourse), is usually
regarded as relevant; and, if so, the tribunal may
properly observe the person brought before it.
Experience teaches that corporal appearances are
approximately an index of the age of their bearer,
particularly for the marked extremes of old age and
youth. In every case such evidence should be accepted
and weighed for what it may be in each case worth. In
particular, the outward physicalappearance of an
alleged minor may be considered in judging his age; a
contrary rule would for such an inference be
pedantically over-cautious. Consequently, the jury or
the court trying an issue of fact may be allowed to judge
the age of persons in court by observation of such
persons. The formal offer of the person as evidence is
not necessary. The examination and cross-examination
of a party before the jury are equivalent to exhibiting
him before the jury and an offer of such person as an
exhibit is properly refused.
Same; Same; Same; Same; There can be no question
as to the admissibility of a person’s appearance in
determining his or her age, and as to the weight to
accord such appearance, especially in rape cases, People
v. Pruna, 390 SCRA 577 (G.R. No. 138471, 10 October
2002), laid down the guidelines.—There can be no
question, therefore, as to the admissibility of a person’s
appearance in determining his or her age. As to the
weight to accord such appearance, especially in rape
cases, Pruna laid down guideline No. 3, which is again
reproduced hereunder: 3. If the certificate of live birth
or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
Page 3 of 187
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if
clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a member
of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is
qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such
as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party
pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence shall be sufficient under the following
circumstances: a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3
years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she
is less than 7 years old; b. If the victim is alleged to be
below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 12 years old; c. If the victim is
alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to
be proved is that she is less than 18 years old. Under the
above guideline, the testimony of a relative with respect
to the age of the victim is sufficient to constitute proof
beyond reasonable doubt in cases (a), (b) and (c) above.
In such cases, the disparity between the allegation and
the proof of age is so great that the court can easily
determine from the appearance of the victim the
veracity of the testimony. The appearance corroborates
the relative’s testimony.
Same; Same; Same; Same; As the alleged age
approaches the age sought to be proved, the person’s
appearance, as object evidence of her age, loses probative
value, and doubt as to her true age becomes greater,
which doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused.—
As the alleged age approaches the age sought to be
proved, the person’s appearance, as object evidence of
her age, loses probative value. Doubt as to her true age
becomes greater and, following Agadas, such doubt
must be resolved in favor of the accused. This is because
in the era of modernism and rapid growth, the victim’s
mere physical appearance is not enough to gauge her
exact age. For the extreme penalty of death to be
upheld, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be
substantiated. Verily, the minority of the victim should
be not only alleged but likewise proved with equal
certainty and clearness as the crime itself. Be it
remembered that the proof of the victim’s age in the
present case spells the difference between life and
death.
AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 96.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant.
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
On complaint of Cyra May Francisco Buenafe,
accused-appellant Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto was charged
with Rape before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of November, 1995, in
Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, by means of
force and intimidation, to wit: by then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously removing her
panty, kissing her lips and vagina and thereafter
rubbing his penis and inserting the same to the inner
portion of the vagina of the undersigned complainant, 3
years of age, a minor, against her will and without her
consent.[1]
Arraigned on January 15, 1996, accused-appellant
pleaded not guilty.[2]
From the testimonies of its witnesses, namely Cyra
May,[3] her mother Gloria Francisco Buenafe, Dr.
Cristina V. Preyra, and SPO4 Catherine Borda, the
prosecution established the following facts:
Page 4 of 187
 On November 20, 1995, as Gloria was about to set the
table for dinner at her house in Quezon City, Cyra May,
then only three and a half years old, told her, Mama, si
kuya Ronnie lagay niya titi niya at sinaksak sa puwit at
sa bibig ko.
Kuya Ronnie is accused-appellant Ronnie Rullepa,
the Buenafes house boy, who was sometimes left with
Cyra May at home.
Gloria asked Cyra May how many times accused-
appellant did those things to her, to which she answered
many times. Pursuing, Gloria asked Cyra May what else
he did to her, and Cyra May indicated the room where
accused-appellant slept and pointed at his pillow.
As on the night of November 20, 1995 accused-
appellant was out with Glorias husband Col.
Buenafe,[4] she waited until their arrival at past 11:00
p.m. Gloria then sent accused-appellant out on an
errand and informed her husband about their daughters
plaint. Buenafe thereupon talked to Cyra May who
repeated what she had earlier told her mother Gloria.
When accused-appellant returned, Buenafe and
Gloria verified from him whether what Cyra May had
told them was true. Ronnie readily admitted doing those
things but only once, at 4:00 p.m. of November 17, 1995
or three days earlier. Unable to contain her anger,
Gloria slapped accused-appellant several times.
Since it was already midnight, the spouses waited
until the following morning to bring accused-appellant
to Camp Karingal where he admitted the imputations
against him, on account of which he was
detained. Glorias sworn statement[5] was then taken.[6]
Recalling what accused-appellant did to her, Cyra
May declared at the witness stand: Sinaksak nya ang titi
sa pepe ko, sa puwit ko, at sa bunganga, thus causing
her pain and drawing her to cry. She added that
accused-appellant did these to her twice in his bedroom.
Dr. Ma. Cristina V. Preyra, the Medico-Legal Officer
and Chief of the Biological Science Branch of the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory who
examined Crya May, came up with her report dated
November 21, 1995,[7] containing the following findings
and conclusions:
FINDINGS:
GENERAL AND EXTRA GENITAL:
Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female
child subject. Breasts are undeveloped. Abdomen is flat
and soft.
GENITAL:
There is absence of pubic hair. Labia majora are full,
convex and coaptated with congested and abraded labia
minora presenting in between. On separating the same
is disclosed an abraded posterior fourchette and an
elastic, fleshy type intact hymen. External vaginal
orifice does not admit the tip of the examining index
finger.
xxx
CONCLUSION:
Subject is in virgin state physically.
There are no external signs of recent application of
any form of trauma at the time of examination.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Page 5 of 187
 By Dr. Preyras explanation, the abrasions on
the labia minora could have been caused by friction
with an object, perhaps an erect penis. She doubted if
riding on a bicycle had caused the injuries.[8]
The defenses sole witness was accused-appellant,
who was 28 and single at the time he took the witness
stand on June 9, 1997. He denied having anything to do
with the abrasions found in Cyra Mays genitalia, and
claimed that prior to the alleged incident, he used to be
ordered to buy medicine for Cyra May who had
difficulty urinating. He further alleged that after he
refused to answer Glorias queries if her husband
Buenafe, whom he usually accompanied whenever he
went out of the house, was womanizing, Gloria would
always find fault in him. He suggested that Gloria was
behind the filing of the complaint. Thus:
q- According to them you caused the abrasions
found in her genital?
a- That is not true, sir.
q- If that is not true, what is the truth?
a- As I have mentioned earlier that before I
started working with the family I was sent to
Crame to buy medicine for the daughter
because she had difficulty in urinating.
q- Did you know why the child has difficulty in
urinating?
a- No, I do not know, sir.
q- And how about the present complaint filed
against you, the complaint filed by the
mother of the victim?
a- I did not do it, sir.
q- What is the truth, what can you say about this
present complaint filed against you?
a- As I said Mrs. Buenafe got mad at me because
after I explained to her that I was going with
her gusband (sic) to the children of the
husband with a former marriage.[9]
Finding for the prosecution, Branch 96 of the
Quezon City RTC rendered judgment, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding
accused RONNIE RULLEPA y GUINTO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape, and he is accordingly
sentenced to death.
The accused is ordered to pay CYRA MAE BUENAFE the
amount of P40,000.00 as civil indemnity.
Costs to be paid by the accused.[10] (Italics in the
original.)
Hence, this automatic review, accused-appellant
assigning the following errors to the trial court:
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONSIDERING AS
ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS ADMISSION.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED ON (sic) RULING THAT
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS SILENCE DURING
TRIAL AMOUNTED TO AN IMPLIED ADMISSION OF
GUILT.
III
Page 6 of 187
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE
CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
IV
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING
THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH UPON THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.[11] (Emphasis supplied.)
Accused-appellant assails the crediting by the trial
court, as the following portion of its decision shows, of
his admission to Gloria of having sexually assaulted
Cyra May:
In addition, the mother asserted that Rullepa had
admitted Cyra Ma[y]s complaint during the
confrontation in the house. Indeed, according to the
mother, the admission was even expressly qualified by
Rullepas insistence that he had committed the sexual
assault only once, specifying the time thereof as
4:00 pm of November 17, 1995. That qualification proved
that the admission was voluntary and true. An
uncoerced and truthful admission like this should be
absolutely admissible and competent.
xxx
Remarkably, the admission was not denied by the
accused during trial despite his freedom to deny it if
untrue. Hence, the admission became conclusive upon
him.[12] (Emphasis supplied.)
To accused-appellant, the statements attributed to
him are inadmissible since they were made out of fear,
having been elicited only after Cyra Mays parents
bullied and questioned him. He thus submits that it was
error for the trial court to take his failure to deny the
statements during the trial as an admission of guilt.
Accused-appellants submission does not persuade.
The trial court considered his admission merely as
an additional ground to convince itself of his
culpability. Even if such admission, as well as the
implication of his failure to deny the same, were
disregarded, the evidence suffices to establish his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
The plain, matter-of-fact manner by which Cyra May
described her abuse in the hands of her Kuya Ronnie is
an eloquent testament to the truth of her
accusations. Thus she testified on direct examination:
q- Do you recall if Ronnie Rullepa did anything
to you?
a- Yes, sir.
q- What did he do to you?
a- Sinaksak nya ang titi sa pepe ko, sa puwit ko,
at sa bunganga
q- How many times did he do that to you?
a- Twice, sir.
xxx
q- Do you remember when he did these things to
you?
a- Opo.
q- When was that?
a- When my mother was asleep, he put he
removed my panty and inserted his penis
inside my vagina, my anus and my mouth,
sir.
xxx
Page 7 of 187
 q- After your Kuya Ronnie did those things to
you what did you feel?
a- Sabi nya ganito (Witness putting her finger in
her lips) Nasaktan po ako at umiyak po ako.
q- Did you cry because of hurt?
a- Yes.
q- What part of your body hurt?
a- Pepe ko po. When I went to the bathroom to
urinate, I felt pain in my organ, sir.[13]
Cyra May reiterated her testimony during cross-
examination, providing more revolting details of her
ordeal:
q- So, you said that Kuya Ronnie did something
to you what did he do to you on November
17, 1995?
a- Sinaksak nga yong titi nya. He inserted his
penis to my organ and to my mouth, sir.
xxx
q- When you said that your kuya Ronnie inserted
his penis into your organ, into your mouth,
and into your anus, would you describe what
his penis?
a- It is a round object, sir.
C o u r t:
Is this titi of your kuya Ronnie a part of his
body?
a- Opo.
q- Was that in the head of kuya Ronnie?
a- No, sir.
q- Which part of his body that titi located?
(Witness pointing to her groin area)
C o u r t:
Continue
xxx
q- Why were you in that room?
a- Gusto nya po matulog ako sa kuwarto niya.
q- When you were in that room, what did Kuya
Ronnie do to you?
a- Hinubo po niya ang panty ko.
q- And after he remove your panty, what did
Kuya Ronnie do, what did he do to you?
a- He inserted his penis to my organ, sir.
q- Why did kuya Ronnie, was kuya Ronnie
already naked or he was already wearing
any clothing?
a- Still had his clothing on, sir.
q- So, where did his penis, saan lumabas ang
penis ni Kuya Ronnie?
a- Dito po, (Witness referring or pointing to her
groin area)
xxx
q- So, thats the and at the time, you did not cry
and you did not shout for help?
a- Sabi nya po, not to make any noise because my
mother might be roused from sleep.
q- How long was kuya Ronnie did that to you?
a- Matagal po.
Page 8 of 187
 q- After kuya Ronnie scrub his penis to your
vagina, what other things did he do?
a- After that he inserted his penis to my mouth,
and to my anus, sir.
q- You did not complain and you did not shout?
a- I cried, sir.[14]
Accused-appellant draws attention to the statement
of Cyra May that he was not in the house on November
17 (1995), as reflected in the following transcript of her
testimony:
q- Is it not a fact that you said a while ago that
when your father leaves the house, he [was]
usually accompanied by your kuya Ronnie?
a- Opo.
q- Why is it that Kuya Ronnie was in the house
when you father left the house at that time,
on November 17?
a- He was with Kuya Ronnie, sir.
q- So, it is not correct that kuya Ronnie did
something to you because your kuya Ronnie
[was] always with your Papa?
a- Yes, sir.[15]
The above-quoted testimony of Cyra May does not
indicate the time when her father Col. Buenafe left their
house on November 17, 1995 with accused-appellant
and, thus, does not preclude accused-appellants
commission of rape on the same date. In any event, a
young child is vulnerable to suggestion, hence, her
affirmative response to the defense counsels above-
quoted leading questions.
As for the variance in the claim regarding when
Gloria was informed of the rape, Gloria having testified
that she learned of it on November 20, 1995[16] while
Cyra May said that immediately after the incident, she
awakened her mother who was in the adjacent room
and reported it:[17] This is a minor matter that does not
detract from Cyra Mays categorical, material testimony
that accused-appellant inserted his penis into her
vagina.
Accused-appellant goes on to contend that Cyra May
was coached, citing the following portion of her
testimony:
q- Yong sinabi mong sinira nya ang buhay mo,
where did you get that phrase?
a- It was the word of my Mama, sir.[18]
On the contrary, the foregoing testimony indicates that
Cyra May was really narrating the truth, that of hearing
her mother utter sinira niya ang buhay mo.
Accused-appellants suggestion that Cyra May
merely imagined the things of which he is accused,
perhaps getting the idea from television programs, is
preposterous. It is true that the ordinary child is a great
weaver of romances, and her imagination may induce
(her) to relate something she has heard or read in a
story as personal experience.[19] But Cyra Mays account
is hardly the stuff of romance or fairy tales. Neither is it
normal TV fare, if at all.
This Court cannot believe that a victim of Cyra Mays
age could concoct a tale of defloration, allow the
examination of her private parts, and undergo the
expense, trouble, inconvenience, not to mention the
trauma of public trial.[20]
Besides, her testimony is corroborated by the
findings of Dr. Preyra that there were abrasions in
her labia minora, which she opined, could have been
caused by friction with an erect penis.
Page 9 of 187
 This Court thus accords great weight to the
following assessment of the trial court regarding the
competency and credibility of Cyra May as a witness:
Her very tender age notwithstanding, Cyra Ma(y)
nonetheless appeared to possess the necessary
intelligence and perceptiveness sufficient to invest her
with the competence to testify about her
experience. She might have been an impressionable
child as all others of her age are but her narration
of Kuya Ronnies placing his titi in her pepe was
certainly one which could not be considered as a
common childs tale. Her responses during the
examination of counsel and of the Court established her
consciousness of the distinction between good and bad,
which rendered inconceivable for her to describe a bad
act of the accused unless it really happened to
her. Needless to state, she described the act of the
accused as bad. Her demeanor as a witness manifested
during trial by her unhesitant, spontaneous, and plain
responses to questions further enhanced her claim to
credit and trustworthiness.[21] (Italics in the original.)
In a futile attempt at exculpation, accused-appellant
claims that even before the alleged incident Cyra May
was already suffering from pain in urinating. He
surmises that she could have scratched herself which
caused the abrasions. Dr. Preyra, however, was quick to
rule out this possibility. She stated categorically that
that part of the female organ is very sensitive and
rubbing or scratching it is painful.[22] The abrasions
could not, therefore, have been self-inflicted.
That the Medical-Legal Officer found no external
signs of recent application of any form of trauma at the
time of the examination does not preclude accused-
appellants conviction since the infliction of force is
immaterial in statutory rape.[23]
More. That Cyra May suffered pain in her vagina but
not in her anus despite her testimony that accused-
appellant inserted his penis in both orifices does not
diminish her credibility. It is possible that accused-
appellants penis failed to penetrate her anus as deeply
as it did her vagina, the former being more resistant to
extreme forces than the latter.
Accused-appellants imputation of ill motive on the
part of Gloria is puerile. No mother in her right mind
would subject her child to the humiliation, disgrace and
trauma attendant to a prosecution for rape if she were
not motivated solely by the desire to incarcerate the
person responsible for the childs defilement.[24] Courts
are seldom, if at all, convinced that a mother would
stoop so low as to subject her daughter to physical
hardship and shame concomitant to a rape prosecution
just to assuage her own hurt feelings.[25]
Alternatively, accused-appellant prays that he be
held liable for acts of lasciviousness instead of rape,
apparently on the basis of the following testimony of
Cyra May, quoted verbatim, that he merely scrubbed his
penis against her vagina:
q- Is it not a fact that kuya Ronnie just made
some scrubbed his penis into your vagina?
a- Yes, sir.
q- And when he did not actually penetrated your
vagina?
a- Yes, sir.[26]
Dr. Preya, however, found abrasions in the labia
minora, which is directly beneath the labia
majora,[27] proving that there was indeed penetration of
the vagina, not just a mere rubbing or scrubbing of the
penis against its surface.
Page 10 of 187
 In fine, the crime committed by accused-appellant is
not merely acts of lasciviousness but statutory rape.
The two elements of statutory rape are (1) that the
accused had carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) that
the woman is below twelve years of age.[28] As shown in
the previous discussion, the first element, carnal
knowledge, had been established beyond reasonable
doubt. The same is true with respect to the second
element.
The victims age is relevant in rape cases since it
may constitute an element of the offense. Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659,[29]provides:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is
committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:
x x x.
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age x x x.
x x x.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua.
x x x.
Furthermore, the victims age may constitute
a qualifying circumstance, warranting the imposition of
the death sentence. The same Article states:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of
rape is committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of
age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity with the
third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim.
x x x.
4. when the victim is x x x a child below seven (7)
years old.
x x x.
Because of the seemingly conflicting decisions
regarding the sufficiency of evidence of the victims age
in rape cases, this Court, in the recently decided case
of People v. Pruna,[30] established a set of guidelines in
appreciating age as an element of the crime or as a
qualifying circumstance, to wit:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended
party is an original or certified true copy of the
certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar
authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and
school records which show the date of birth of the
victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is
shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise
unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the
victims mother or a member of thefamily either by
affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on
matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or
date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section
40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient
under the following circumstances:
Page 11 of 187
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and
what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7
years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and
what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12
years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and
what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18
years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic
document, or the testimony of the victims mother or
relatives concerning the victims age, the complainants
testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and
clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving
the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused
to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall
not be taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical
finding as to the age of the victim.
Applying the foregoing guidelines, this Court in
the Pruna case held that the therein accused-appellant
could only be sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetuasince:
x x x no birth certificate or any similar authentic
document, such as a baptismal certificate of LIZETTE,
was presented to prove her age. x x x.
x x x.
However, the Medico-Legal Report relied upon by the
trial court does not in any way prove the age of
LIZETTE, for there is nothing therein which even
mentions her age. Only testimonial evidence was
presented to establish LIZETTEs age. Her mother,
Jacqueline, testified (that the victim was three years old
at the time of the commission of the crime).
xxx
Likewise, LIZETTE testified on 20 November 1996, or
almost two years after the incident, that she was 5 years
old. However, when the defense counsel asked her how
old she was on 3 January 1995, or at the time of the
rape, she replied that she was 5 years old. Upon further
question as to the date she was born, she could not
answer.
For PRUNA to be convicted of rape in its qualified form
and meted the supreme penalty of death, it must be
established with certainty that LIZETTE was below 7
years old at the time of the commission of the crime. It
must be stressed that the severity of the death penalty,
especially its irreversible and final nature once carried
out, makes the decision-making process in capital
offenses aptly subject to the most exacting rules of
procedure and evidence.
In view of the uncertainty of LIZETTEs exact age,
corroborative evidence such as her birth certificate,
baptismal certificate or any other authentic document
should be introduced in evidence in order that the
qualifying circumstance of below seven (7) years old is
appreciated against the appellant. The lack of objection
on the part of the defense as to her age did not excuse
the prosecution from discharging its burden. That the
defense invoked LIZETTEs tender age for purposes of
questioning her competency to testify is not necessarily
Page 12 of 187
an admission that she was below 7 years of age when
PRUNA raped her on 3 January 1995. Such being the
case, PRUNA cannot be convicted of qualified rape, and
hence the death penalty cannot be imposed on him.
However, conformably with no. 3 (b) of the foregoing
guidelines, the testimony of LIZETTEs mother that she
was 3 years old at the time of the commission of the
crime is sufficient for purposes of holding PRUNA liable
for statutory rape, or rape of a girl below 12 years of
age. Under the second paragraph of Article 335, as
amended by R.A. No. 7659, in relation to no. 3 of the first
paragraph thereof, having carnal knowledge of a
woman under 12 years of age is punishable by reclusion
perpetua. Thus, the penalty to be imposed on PRUNA
should be reclusion perpetua, and not death penalty.
(Italics in the original.)
Several cases[31] suggest that courts may take
judicial notice of the appearance of the victim in
determining her age. For example, the Court, in People
v. Tipay,[32] qualified the ruling in People v.
Javier,[33] which required the presentation of the birth
certificate to prove the rape victims age, with the
following pronouncement:
This does not mean, however, that the presentation of
the certificate of birth is at all times necessary to prove
minority. The minority of a victim of tender age who
may be below the age of ten is quite manifest and the
court can take judicial notice thereof. The crucial years
pertain to the ages of fifteen to seventeen where
minority may seem to be dubitable due to ones physical
appearance.In this situation, the prosecution has the
burden of proving with certainty the fact that the victim
was under 18 years of age when the rape was committed
in order to justify the imposition of the death penalty
under the above-cited provision. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand, a handful of cases[34] holds that
courts, without the requisite hearing prescribed by
Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court,[35] cannot take
judicial notice of the victims age.
Judicial notice signifies that there are certain facta
probanda, or propositions in a partys case, as to which
he will not be required to offer evidence; these will be
taken for true by the tribunal without the need of
evidence.[36] Judicial notice, however, is a phrase
sometimes used in a loose way to cover some other
judicial action. Certain rules of Evidence, usually
known under other names, are frequently referred to in
terms of judicial notice.[37]
The process by which the trier of facts judges a
persons age from his or her appearance cannot be
categorized as judicial notice. Judicial notice is based
upon convenience and expediency for it would certainly
be superfluous, inconvenient, and expensive both to
parties and the court to require proof, in the ordinary
way, of facts which are already known to
courts.[38] As Tundag puts it, it is the cognizance of
certain facts which judges may properly take and act
on without proof because they already know them. Rule
129 of the Rules of Court, where the provisions
governing judicial notice are found, is entitled What
Need Not Be Proved. When the trier of facts observes
the appearance of a person to ascertain his or her age,
he is not taking judicial notice of such fact; rather, he is
conducting an examination of the evidence, the
evidence being the appearance of the person.Such a
process militates against the very concept of judicial
notice, the object of which is to do away with the
presentation of evidence.
This is not to say that the process is not sanctioned
by the Rules of Court; on the contrary, it does. A persons
appearance, where relevant, is admissible as object
Page 13 of 187
evidence, the same being addressed to the senses of the worth. In particular, the outward physicalappearance of
court. Section 1, Rule 130 provides: an alleged minor may be considered in judging his age;
a contrary rule would for such an inference be
SECTION 1. Object as evidence. Objects as evidence are pedantically over-cautious.[42] Consequently, the jury or
those addressed to the senses of the court. When an the court trying an issue of fact may be allowed to judge
object is relevant to the fact in issue, it may be exhibited the age of persons in court by observation of such
to, examined or viewed by the court. persons.[43] The formal offer of the person as evidence is
not necessary.The examination and cross-examination
To be sure, one author writes, this practice of of a party before the jury are equivalent to exhibiting
inspection by the court of objects, things him before the jury and an offer of such person as an
or persons relevant to the fact in dispute, has its roots in exhibit is properly refused. [44]
ancient judicial procedure.[39]The author proceeds to
This Court itself has sanctioned the determination
quote from another authority:
of an aliens age from his appearance. In Braca v.
Collector of Customs,[45] this Court ruled that:
Nothing is older or commoner in the administration of
law in all countries than the submission to the senses of
The customs authorities may also determine from the
the tribunal itself, whether judge or jury, of objects
personal appearance of the immigrant what his age
which furnish evidence. The view of the land by the
is. The person of a Chinese alien seeking admission into
jury, in real actions, of a wound by the judge where
the Philippine Islands is evidence in an investigation by
mayhem was alleged, and of the person of one alleged to
the board of special inquiry to determine his right to
be an infant, in order to fix his age, the inspection and
enter; and such body may take into consideration his
comparison of seals, the examination of writings, to
appearance to determine or assist in determining his
determine whether they are ()blemished,() the
age and a finding that the applicant is not a minor based
implements with which a crime was committed or of a
upon such appearance is not without evidence to
person alleged, in a bastardy proceeding, to be the child
support it.
of another, are few illustrations of what may be found
abundantly in our own legal records and textbooks for
This Court has also implicitly recognized the same
seven centuries past.[40] (Emphasis supplied.)
process in a criminal case. Thus, in United States v.
Agadas,[46] this Court held:
A persons appearance, as evidence of age (for
example, of infancy, or of being under the age of consent
Rosario Sabacahan testified that he was 17 years of age;
to intercourse), is usually regarded as relevant; and, if
that he had never purchased a cedula; and that he was
so, the tribunal may properly observe the person
going to purchase a cedula the following
brought before it.[41] Experience teaches that corporal
january. Thereupon the court asked this defendant
appearances are approximately an index of the age of
these questions: You are a pretty big boy for
their bearer, particularly for the marked extremes of old
seventeen. Answer: I cannot tell exactly because I do not
age and youth. In every case such evidence should be
remember when I was born, but 17 years is my
accepted and weighed for what it may be in each case
guess. Court: If you are going to take advantage of that
Page 14 of 187
excuse, you had better get some positive evidence to
that effect. Answer: I do not remember, as I already
stated on what date and in what year I was born. The
court, in determining the question of the age of the
defendant, Rosario Sabacahan, said:
The defendant, Rosario Sabacahan, testified that he
thought that he was about 17 years of age, but judging
by his appearance he is a youth 18 or 19 years old. He
has shown that he has no positive information on the
subject and no effort was made by the defense to prove
the fact that he is entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of article 9, paragraph 2, of the Penal
code, which fact it is held to be incumbent upon the
defense to establish by satisfactory evidence in order to
enable the court to give an accused person the benefit of
the mitigating circumstance.
In United States vs. Estavillo and Perez (10 Off. Gaz.,
1984) Estavillo testified, when the case was tried in the
court below, that he then was only 16 years of
age. There was no other testimony in the record with
reference to his age. But the trial judge said: The
accused Estavillo, notwithstanding his testimony giving
his age as 16 years, is, as a matter of fact, not less than
20. This court, in passing upon the age of Estavillo, held:
We presume that the trial court reached this conclusion
with reference to the age of Estavillo from the latters
personal appearance. There is no proof in the record, as
we have said, which even tends to establish the
assertion that this appellant understated his age. * * * It
is true that the trial court had an opportunity to note
the personal appearance of Estavillo for the purpose of
determining his age, and by so doing reached the
conclusion that he was at least 20, just two years over
18. This appellant testified that he was only 16, and this
testimony stands uncontradicted. Taking into
consideration the marked difference in the penalties to
be imposed upon that age, we must, therefore, conclude
(resolving all doubts in favor of the appellants) that the
appellants ages were 16 and 14 respectively.
While it is true that in the instant case Rosario testified
that he was 17 years of age, yet the trial court reached
the conclusion, judging from the personal appearance of
Rosario, that he is a youth 18 or 19 years old. Applying
the rule enunciated in the case just cited, we must
conclude that there exists a reasonable doubt, at least,
with reference to the question whether Rosario was, in
fact 18 years of age at the time the robbery was
committed. This doubt must be resolved in favor of the
defendant, and he is, therefore, sentenced to six months
of arresto mayor in lieu of six years ten months and one
day of presidio mayor. x x x.
There can be no question, therefore, as to
the admissibility of a persons appearance in
determining his or her age. As to the weight to accord
such appearance, especially in rape cases, Pruna laid
down guideline no. 3, which is again reproduced
hereunder:
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is
shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise
unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the
victims mother or a member of the family either by
affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on
matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or
date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section
40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient
under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and
what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7
years old;
Page 15 of 187
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and
what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12
years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and
what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18
years old.
Under the above guideline, the testimony of a
relative with respect to the age of the victim is sufficient
to constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt in cases (a),
(b) and (c) above. In such cases, the disparity between
the allegation and the proof of age is so great that the
court can easily determine from the appearance of the
victim the veracity of the testimony. The appearance
corroborates the relatives testimony.
As the alleged age approaches the age sought to be
proved, the persons appearance, as object evidence of
her age, loses probative value. Doubt as to her true age
becomes greater and, following Agadas, supra, such
doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused.
This is because in the era of modernism and rapid
growth, the victims mere physical appearance is not
enough to gauge her exact age. For the extreme penalty
of death to be upheld, nothing but proof beyond
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute
the crime must be substantiated. Verily, the minority of
the victim should be not only alleged but likewise
proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime
itself. Be it remembered that the proof of the victims age
in the present case spells the difference between life
and death.[47]
In the present case, the prosecution did not offer the
victims certificate of live birth or similar authentic
documents in evidence. The victim and her mother,
however, testified that she was only three years old at
the time of the rape. Cyra Mays testimony goes:
q- Your name is Cyra Mae is that correct?
a- Yes, sir.
q- And you are 3 years old?
a- Yes, sir.[48]
That of her mother goes:
Q How old was your daughter when there things
happened?
A 3 and years old.
Q When was she born?
A In Manila, May 10, 1992.[49]
Because of the vast disparity between the alleged
age (three years old) and the age sought to be proved
(below twelve years), the trial court would have had no
difficulty ascertaining the victims age from her
appearance. No reasonable doubt, therefore, exists that
the second element of statutory rape, i.e., that the victim
was below twelve years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense, is present.
Whether the victim was below seven years old,
however, is another matter. Here, reasonable doubt
exists. A mature three and a half-year old can easily be
mistaken for an underdeveloped seven-year old. The
appearance of the victim, as object evidence, cannot be
accorded much weight and, following Pruna, the
testimony of the mother is, by itself, insufficient.
As it has not been established with moral certainty
that Cyra May was below seven years old at the time of
the commission of the offense, accused-appellant cannot
be sentenced to suffer the death penalty. Only the
penalty of reclusion perpetua can be imposed upon him.
Page 16 of 187
 In line with settled jurisprudence, the civil
indemnity awarded by the trial court is increased
to P50,000.00. In addition, Cyra May is entitled to an
award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00.[50]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 96,
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant
Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto is found GUILTY of Statutory
Rape, defined and punished by Article 335 (3) of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to
pay private complainant, Cyra May Buenafe y Francisco,
the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.

Page 17 of 187
 G.R. No. 157177. February 11, 2008.*
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
petitioner, vs. JESUSA P. REYES and CONRADO B.
REYES, respondents.
Appeals; As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial
court when affirmed by the Court of Appeals are final
and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal by the
Supreme Court, as long as they are borne out by the
record or are based on substantial evidence;
Exceptions.—The issue raises a factual question. The
Court is not a trier of facts, its jurisdiction being limited
to reviewing only errors of law that may have been
committed by the lower courts. As a rule, the findings of
fact of the trial court when affirmed by the CA are final
and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal by
this Court, as long as they are borne out by the record
or are based on substantial evidence. Such rule however
is not absolute, but is subject to well-established
exceptions, which are: 1) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; 2) when
there is a grave abuse of discretion; 3) when the finding
is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures; 4) when the judgment of the CA is based on
a misapprehension of facts; 5) when the findings of facts
are conflicting; 6) when the CA, in making its findings,
went beyond the issues of the case, and those findings
are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; 7) when the findings of the CA are contrary to
those of the trial court; 8) when the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; 9) when the CA manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties and which, if properly considered, would justify
a different conclusion; and 10) when the findings of fact
of the CA are premised on the absence of evidence and
are contradicted by the evidence on record. We hold
that this case falls under exception Nos. 1, 3, 4, and 9
which constrain us to resolve the factual issue.
Actions; Evidence; Quantum of Proof; Burden of
Proof; In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof
must establish his case by preponderance of evidence, or
that evidence which is of greater weight or is more
convincing than that which is in opposition to it.—It is a
basic rule in evidence that each party to a case must
prove his own affirmative allegations by the degree of
evidence required by law. In civil cases, the party
having the burden of proof must establish his case by
preponderance of evidence, or that evidence which is of
greater weight or is more convincing than that which is
in opposition to it. It does not mean absolute truth;
rather, it means that the testimony of one side is more
believable than that of the other side, and that the
probability of truth is on one side than on the other.
Same; Same; Witnesses; Where the trial judge did not
hear the testimonies himself, he would not be in a better
position than the Supreme Court to assess the credibility
of witnesses on the basis of their demeanor.—For a better
perspective on the calibration of the evidence on hand,
it must first be stressed that the judge who had heard
and seen the witnesses testify was not the same judge
who penned the decision. Thus, not having heard the
testimonies himself, the trial judge or the appellate
court would not be in a better position than this Court
to assess the credibility of witnesses on the basis of their
demeanor. Hence, to arrive at the truth, we thoroughly
reviewed the transcripts of the witnesses’ testimonies
and examined the pieces of evidence on record.
Same; Same; Same; Banks and Banking; Great
evidentiary weight is given to the teller’s tape,
considering that it is inserted into the bank’s computer
terminal, which records the teller’s daily transactions in
the ordinary course of business, and there is no showing
that the same had been purposely manipulated to prove
the bank’s claim.—The teller’s tape definitely
establishes the fact of respondent Jesusa’s original
intention to withdraw the amount of P200,000.00, and
Page 18 of 187
not P100,000.00 as she claims, from her savings account,
to be transferred as her initial deposit to her new
Express Teller account, the insufficiency of her balance
in her savings account, and finally the fund transfer of
the amount of P100,000.00 from her savings account to
her new Express Teller account. We give great
evidentiary weight to the teller’s tape, considering that
it is inserted into the bank’s computer terminal, which
records the teller’s daily transactions in the ordinary
course of business, and there is no showing that the
same had been purposely manipulated to prove
petitioner’s claim.
Same; Same; Same; Physical evidence is a mute but
eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in our
hierarchy of trustworthy evidence—where the physical
evidence on record runs counter to the testimonial
evidence of the prosecution witnesses, the Court has
consistently ruled that the physical evidence should
prevail; To uphold the declaration of the Court of
Appeals that it is unlikely for the bank depositor and her
daughter to concoct a false story against a banking
institution is to give weight to conjectures and surmises,
which the Court cannot countenance.—Physical
evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth,
and it ranks high in our hierarchy of trustworthy
evidence. We have, on many occasions, relied
principally upon physical evidence in ascertaining the
truth. Where the physical evidence on record runs
counter to the testimonial evidence of the prosecution
witnesses, we consistently rule that the physical
evidence should prevail. In addition, to uphold the
declaration of the CA that it is unlikely for respondent
Jesusa and her daughter to concoct a false story against
a banking institution is to give weight to conjectures
and surmises, which we cannot countenance.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Benedicto, Verzosa, Gealogo, Burkley and
Associatesfor petitioner.
Teresita Gandioco Oledan for respondents.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul the
Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated October 29,
2002 as well as its Resolution [2] dated February 12, 2003,
which affirmed with modification the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 142, in Civil Case No.
91-3453, [3] requiring Bank of Philippine Islands (petitioner) to
return to spouses Jesusa P. Reyes and Conrado B. Reyes
(respondents) the amount of P100,000.00 plus interest and
damages.
The conflicting versions of the parties are aptly
summarized by the trial court, to wit:
On December 7, 1990 at around 2:00
p.m., plaintiff Jesusa Reyes together with her
daughter, Joan Reyes, went to BPI Zapote
Branch to open an ATM account, she being
interested with the ongoing promotions of BPI
entitling every depositor with a deposit
amounting to P2,000.00 to a ticket with a car as
its prize to be raffled every month.
She was accommodated, in lieu of the
bank manager Mr. Nicasio, by Cicero Capati
(Pats) who was an employee of the bank and in
charge of the new accounts and time deposits
characteristically described as having
homosexual inclinations. They were entertained
Page 19 of 187
by Capati and were made to sit at a table
occupied by a certain Liza.
Plaintiff informed Capati that they
wanted to open an ATM account for the amount
of P200,000.00, P100,000.00 of which shall be
withdrawn from her exiting savings account
with BPI bank which is account no. 0233-2433-
88 and the other P100,000.00 will be given by
her in cash.
Capati allegedly made a mistake and
prepared a withdrawal slip for P200,00.00 to be
withdrawn from her existing savings account
with said bank and the plaintiff Jesusa Reyes
believing in good faith that Capati prepared the
papers with the correct amount signed the same
unaware of the mistakes in figures.
While she was being entertained by
Capati, her daughter Joan Reyes was filling up
the signature cards and several other forms.
Minutes later after the slips were
presented to the teller, Capati returned to where
the plaintiff was seating and informed the latter
that the withdrawable balance could not
accommodate P200,000.00.
Plaintiff explained that she is
withdrawing the amount of P100,000.00 only
and then changed and correct the figure two (2)
into one (1) with her signature super-imposed
thereto signifying the change, afterwhich the
amount of P100,000.00 in cash in two bundles
containing 100 pieces of P500.00 peso bill were
given to Capati with her daughter Joan
witnessing the same. Thereafter Capati
prepared a deposit slip for P200,000.00 in the
name of plaintiff Jesusa Reyes with the new
account no. 0235-0767-48 and brought the same
to the teller's booth.
After a while, he returned and handed to
the plaintiff her duplicate copy of her deposit to
account no. 0235-0767-48 reflecting the amount
of P200,000.00 with receipt stamp showing
December 7, as the date.
Plaintiff and daughter then left.
On December 14, 1990, Mrs. Jesusa
received her express teller card from said bank.
Thereafter on December 26, 1990,
plaintiff left for the United States (Exhs. T, U-
U-1) and returned to Manila on January 31,
1991 (Exhs. V-V-1).
When she went to her pawnshop, she was
made aware by her statement of account sent to
her by BPI bank that her ATM account only
contained the amount of P100,000.00 with
interest.
She then sent her daughter to inquire,
however, the bank manager assured her that
they would look into the matter.
On February 6, 1991, plaintiff instructed
Efren Luna, one of her employees, to update her
savings account passbook at the BPI with the
folded deposit slip forP200,000.00 stapled at the
outer cover of said passbook. After presenting
the passbook to be updated and when the same
was returned, Luna noticed that the deposit slip
stapled at the cover was removed and validated
at the back portion thereof.
Page 20 of 187
 Thereafter, Luna returned with the
passbook to the plaintiff and when the latter saw
the validation, she got angry.
Plaintiff then asked the bank manager
why the deposit slip was validated, whereupon
the manager assured her that the matter will be
investigated into.
When no word was heard as to the
investigation made by the bank, Mrs. Reyes sent
two (2) demand letters thru her lawyer
demanding return of the missing P100,000.00
plus interest (Exhs. B and C). The same was
received by defendant on July 25,
1991 and October 7, 1991, respectively.
The last letter prompted reply from
defendant inviting plaintiff to sit down and
discuss the problem.
The meeting resulted to the bank
promising that Capati will be submitted to a lie
detector test.
Plaintiff, however, never learned of the
result of said test. Plaintiff filed this instant
case.
Defendant on the other hand claimed that
Bank of the Philippine Island admitted that
Jesusa Reyes had effected a fund transfer in the
amount of P100,000.00 from her ordinary
savings account to the express teller account she
opened on December 7, 1990 (Exhs. 3 to 3-C),
however, it was the only amount she deposited
and no additional cash deposit of P100,000.00
was made. That plaintiff wanted to effect the
transfer of P200,000.00 but the balance in her
account was not sufficient and could not
accommodate the same. Plaintiff thereafter
agreed to reduce the amount to be withdrawn
from P200,000.00 to P100,000.00 with plaintiffs
signature superimposed on said corrections;
that the original copy of the deposit slip was also
altered from P200,000.00 to P100,000.00,
however, instead of plaintiff signing the same,
the clerk-in-charge of the bank, in this case
Cicero Capati, signed the alteration himself for
Jesusa Reyes had already left without signing
the deposit slip. The documents were
subsequently machine validated for the amount
of P100,000.00 (Exhs. 2 and 4).
Defendant claimed that there was
actually no cash involved with the transactions
which happened on December 7, 1990 as
contained in the banks teller tape (Exhs.1 to 1-
C).
Defendant further claimed that when
they subjected Cicero Capati to a lie detector
test, the latter passed the same with flying colors
(Exhs. 5 to 5-C), indicative of the fact that he
was not lying when he said that there really was
no cash transaction involved when plaintiff
Jesusa Reyes went to the defendant bank on
December 7, 1990; defendant further alleged
that they even went to the extent of informing
Jesusa Reyes that her claim would not be given
credit (Exh. 6) considering that no such
transaction was really made on December 7,
1990. [4]
On August 12, 1994, the RTC issued a Decision [5] upholding
the versions of respondents, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Court finds in favor of the plaintiff Jesusa P.
Reyes and Conrado Reyes and against defendant
Page 21 of 187
 Bank of the Philippine Islands ordering the
latter to:
1. Return to plaintiffs their P100,000.00 with
interest at 14% per annum from December
7, 1990;
2. Pay plaintiffs P1,000,000.00 as moral
damages;
2. Pay plaintiffs P350,000.00 as exemplary
damages;
3. Pay plaintiffs P250,000.00 for and
attorney's fees. [6]
The RTC found that petitioner's claim that respondent Jesusa
deposited only P100,000.00 instead of P200,000.00 was hazy;
that what should control was the deposit slip issued by the
bank to respondent, for there was no chance by which
respondent could write the amount of P200,000.00 without
petitioner's employee noticing it and making the necessary
corrections; that it was deplorable to note that it was when
respondent Jesusa's bankbook was submitted to be updated
after the lapse of several months when the alleged error
claimed by petitioner was corrected; that Article 1962 of the
New Civil Code provides that a deposit is constituted from the
moment a person receives a thing belonging to another with
the obligation of safely keeping it and of returning the same;
that under Article 1972, the depositary is obliged to keep the
thing safely and to return it when required to the depositor or
to his heirs and successors or to the person who may have
been designated in the contract.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA which in a Decision
dated October 29, 2002 affirmed the RTC decision with
modification as follows:
Nonetheless, the award of 14% interest
per annum on the missing P100,000.00 can stand
some modification. The interest thereon should
be 12% per annum, reckoned from May 12,
1991, the last day of the five day-grace period
given by plaintiff-appellees' counsel under the
first demand letter dated May 6, 1991 (Exhibit
B), or counted from May 7, 1991, the date when
defendant-appellant received said letter.
Interest is demandable when the obligation
consist in the payment of money and the debtor
incurs in delay.
Also, we have to reduce the P1 million
award of moral damages to a reasonable sum
of P50,000.00. Moral damages are not intended
to enrich a plaintiff at the expense of a
defendant. They are awarded only to enable the
injured party to obtain means, diversion, or
amusements that will serve to alleviate the
moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of
the defendant's culpable action. The award of
moral damages must be proportionate to the
suffering inflicted.
In addition, we have to delete the award
of P350,000.00 as exemplary damages. The
absence of malice and bad faith, as in this case,
renders the award of exemplary damages
improper.
Finally, we have to reduce the award of
attorney's fees to a reasonable sum
of P30,000.00, as the prosecution of this case has
not been attended with any unusual difficulty.
WHEREFORE, with the modifications
thus indicated, the judgment appealed from is in
all other respects AFFIRMED. Without costs. [7]
Page 22 of 187
 A. In affirming the decision of the trial court
In finding petitioner liable for the missing P100,000.00, holding BPI liable for the amount
the CA held that the RTC correctly gave credence to the of P100,000.00 representing an alleged
additional deposit of respondents, the
testimonies of respondent Jesusa and Joan Reyes to the effect Honorable Court of Appeals gravely abused
that aside from the fund transfer of P100,000.00 from Jesusa's its discretion by resolving the issue based on
a conjecture and ignoring physical evidence
savings account, Jesusa also made a cash deposit
in favor of testimonial evidence.
of P100,000.00 in the afternoon of December 7, 1990; that it is
unlikely for these two to concoct a story of falsification B. The Court of Appeals gravely abused its
discretion, being as it is contrary to law, in
against a banking institution of the stature of petitioner if holding BPI liable to respondents for the
their claims were not true; that the duplicate copy of the payment of interest at the rate of 12% per
annum.
deposit slip showed a deposit of P200,000.00; this, juxtaposed
with the fact that it was not machine-validated and the C. This Honorable Court gravely abused its
discretion, being as it is contrary to law, in
original copy altered by the bank's clerk from P200,000.00
holding BPI liable for moral damages and
to P100,000.00 with the altered amount validated, is indicative attorney's fees at the reduced amounts
of anomaly; that even if it was bank employee Cicero Capati of P50,000.00 and P30,000.00,
respectively. [8]
who prepared the deposit slip, Jesusa stood her ground and
categorically denied having any knowledge of the alteration
The main issue for resolution is whether the CA erred in
therein made; that petitioner must account for the
sustaining the RTC's finding that respondent Jesusa made an
missing P100,000.00 because it was the author of the loss; that
initial deposit of P200,000.00 in her newly opened Express
banks are engaged in business imbued with public interest
Teller account on December 7, 1990.
and are under strict obligation to exercise utmost fidelity in
dealing with its clients, in seeing to it that the funds therein
The issue raises a factual question. The Court is not a trier of
invested or by them received are properly accounted for and
facts, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only errors of
duly posted in their ledgers.
law that may have been committed by the lower courts. [9] As a
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a
rule, the findings of fact of the trial court when affirmed by
Resolution dated February 12, 2003.
the CA are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on
appeal by this Court, as long as they are borne out by the
Hence, the present petition on the following grounds:
record or are based on substantial evidence. [10] Such rule
Page 23 of 187
however is not absolute, but is subject to well-established
exceptions, which are: 1) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; 2) when there is a
grave abuse of discretion; 3) when the finding is grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; 4) when the
judgment of the CA is based on a misapprehension of f acts; 5)
when the findings of facts are conflicting; 6) when the CA, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case, and
those findings are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee; 7) when the findings of the CA are
contrary to those of the trial court; 8) when the findings of
fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; 9) when the CA manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and
10) when the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the
absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on
record. [11] We hold that this case falls under exception Nos. 1,
3, 4, and 9 which constrain us to resolve the factual issue.
It is a basic rule in evidence that each party to a case must
prove his own affirmative allegations by the degree of
evidence required by law. [12] In civil cases, the party having
the burden of proof must establish his case by preponderance
of evidence, [13] or that evidence which is of greater weight or
is more convincing than that which is in opposition to it. It
does not mean absolute truth; rather, it means that the
testimony of one side is more believable than that of the other
side, and that the probability of truth is on one side than on
the other. [14]
Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides t he
guidelines for determining preponderance of evidence, thus:
SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence,
how determined.- In civil cases, the party having
the burden of proof must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence. In determining
where the preponderance or superior weight of
evidence on the issues involved lies the court
may consider all the facts and circumstances of
the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying,
their intelligence, their means and opportunity
of knowing the facts to which they are
testifying, the nature of the facts to which they
testify, the probability or improbability of their
testimony, their interest or want of interest, and
also their personal credibility so far as the same
legitimately appear upon the trial. The court
may also consider the number of witnesses,
though the preponderance is not necessarily
with the greater number.
For a better perspective on the calibration of the evidence on
hand, it must first be stressed that the judge who had heard
and seen the witnesses testify was not the same judge who
penned the decision. Thus, not having heard the testimonies
himself, the trial judge or the appellate court would not be in
a better position than this Court to assess the credibility of
witnesses on the basis of their demeanor.
Hence, to arrive at the truth, we thoroughly reviewed the
transcripts of the witnesses' testimonies and examined the
pieces of evidence on record.
Page 24 of 187
After a careful and close examination of the records and
evidence presented by the parties, we find that respondents
failed to successfully prove by preponderance of evidence that
respondent Jesusa made an initial deposit of P200,000.00 in
her Express Teller account.
Respondent Jesusa and her daughter Joan testified that at the
outset, respondent Jesusa told Capati that she was opening an
Express Teller account for P200,000.00; that she was going to
withdraw and transfer P100,000.00 from her savings account
to her new account, and that she had an
additional P100,000.00 cash. However, these assertions are not
borne out by the other evidence presented. Notably, it is not
refuted that Capati prepared a withdrawal
slip [15] for P200,000.00. This is contrary to the claim of
respondent Jesusa that she instructed Capati to make a fund
transfer of only P100,000.00 from her savings account to the
Express Teller account she was opening. Yet, respondent
Jesusa signed the withdrawal slip. We find it strange that she
would sign the withdrawal slip if her intention in the first
place was to withdraw only P100,000.00 from her savings
account and deposit P100,000.00 in cash with her.
Moreover, respondent Jesusa's claim that she signed the
withdrawal slip without looking at the amount indicated
therein fails to convince us, for respondent Jesusa, as a
businesswoman in the regular course of business and taking
ordinary care of her concerns, [16] would make sure that she
would check the amount written on the withdrawal slip before
affixing her signature. Significantly, we note that the space
provided for her signature is very near the space where the
amount of P200,000.00 in words and figures are written; thus,
she could not have failed to notice that the amount
of P200,000.00 was written instead of P100,000.00.
The fact that respondent Jesusa initially intended to transfer
the amount of P200,000.00 from her savings account to her
new Express Teller account was further established by the
teller's tape presented as petitioner's evidence and by the
testimony of Emerenciana Torneros, the teller who had
attended to respondent Jesusa's transactions.
The teller's tape, [17] Exhibit 1 unequivocally shows the
following data:
151159 07DEC90 1370 288A 233324299
151245 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
***200000.00 [18]
BIG AMOUNT
151251 07DEC90 1601 288J 233243388
***200000.00
151309 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
***200000.00
PB BALANCE ERROR
BAL. 229,257.64
151338 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
***200000.00
BIG AMOUNT
151344 07DEC90 1601 288J 233243388
***200000.00
151404 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
***200000.00
Page 25 of 187
TOD The first column shows the exact time of the transactions; the
151520 07DEC90 1601 288A 233320145 second column shows the date of the transactions; the third
***2000.00 column shows the bank transaction code; the fourth column
151705 07DEC90 1789 288A 233324299
***22917.00 shows the teller's code; and the fifth column shows the client's
151727 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388 account number. The teller's tape reflected various
***100000.00
transactions involving different accounts on December 7,
BIG AMOUNT
151730 07DEC90 1601 288J 233243388 1990 which included respondent Jesusa's Savings Account No.
***100000.00 233243388 and her new Express Teller Account No.
151746 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
***100000.00 [19] 235076748. It shows that respondent Jesusa's initial intention
151810 07DEC90 1370 288A 235076748 to withdraw P200,000.00, not P100,000.00, from her Savings
151827 07DEC90 1790 288A 235076748
***100000.00 ***100000.00 [20] Account No. 233324299 was begun at 3 o'clock, 12 minutes
and 45 seconds as shown in Exhibit 1-c.
151903 07DEC90 1301 288A 233282405
151914 07DEC90 1690 288A 235008955
***1778.05 In explaining the entries in the teller's tape, Torneros testified
152107 07DEC90 1601 288A 3333241381 that when she was processing respondent Jesusa's withdrawal
***5000.00
152322 07DEC90 1601 288A 233314374 in the amount of P200,000.00, her computer rejected the
***2000.00 transaction because there was a discrepancy; [21] thus, the
152435 07DEC90 1370 288A 235076764
152506 07DEC90 1790 288A 235076764 word BIG AMOUNT appeared on the tape. Big amount means
***4000.00 ***4000.00 that the amount was so big for her to approve, [22] so she keyed
152557 07DEC90 1601 288A 233069469
in the amount again and overrode the transaction to be able to
***2000.00
152736 07DEC90 1601 288A 233254584 process the withdrawal using an officer's override with the
***2000.00 latter's approval. [23] The letter J appears after Figure 288 in
152849 07DEC90 0600 288A 231017585
***3150.00 686448 the fourth column to show that she overrode the
152941 07DEC90 1790 288A 3135052255 transaction. She then keyed again the amount of P200,000.00
***2800.00 ***2800.00
153252 07DEC90 1601 288A 233098264 at 3 o'clock 13 minutes and 9 seconds; however, her computer
(Emphasis supplied) rejected the transaction, because the balance she keyed in
based on respondent Jesusa's passbook was wrong; [24] thus
appeared the phrase balance error on the tape, and the

Page 26 of 187
computer produced the balance of P229,257.64, and so she seconds, the amount of P100,000.00 was deposited to
keyed in the withdrawal of P200,000.00. [25] Since it was a big respondent Jesusa's new Express Teller Account No.
amount, she again had to override it, so she could process the 235076748.
amount. However, the withdrawal was again rejected for the
reason TOD, overdraft, [26] which meant that the amount to be The teller's tape definitely establishes the fact of respondent
withdrawn was more than the balance, considering that there Jesusa's original intention to withdraw the amount
was a debited amount of P30,935.16 reflected in respondent of P200,000.00, and not P100,000.00 as she claims, from her
Jesusa's passbook, reducing the available balance to savings account, to be transferred as her initial deposit to her
[27]
only P198,322.48. new Express Teller account, the insufficiency of her balance
in her savings account, and finally the fund transfer of the
Torneros then called Capati to her cage and told him of the amount of P100,000.00 from her savings account to her new
insufficiency of respondent Jesusa's balance. [28] Capati then Express Teller account. We give great evidentiary weight to
motioned respondent Jesusa to the teller's cage; and when she the teller's tape, considering that it is inserted into the bank's
was already in front of the teller's cage, Torneros told her computer terminal, which records the teller's daily
that she could not withdraw P200,000.00 because of overdraft; transactions in the ordinary course of business, and there is
thus, respondent Jesusa decided to just no showing that the same had been purposely manipulated to
[29]
withdraw P100,000.00. prove petitioner's claim.
This explains the alteration in the withdrawal slip with the
superimposition of the figure 1 on the figure 2 and the change Respondent Jesusa's bare claim, although corroborated by her
of the word two to one to show that the withdrawn amount daughter, that the former deposited P100,000.00 cash in
from respondent Jesusa's savings account was addition to the fund transfer of P100,000.00, is not established
only P100,000.00, and that respondent Jesusa herself signed by physical evidence. While the duplicate copy of the deposit
the alterations. slip [30] was in the amount of P200,000.00 and bore the stamp
The teller's tape showed that the withdrawal of the amount mark of teller Torneros, such duplicate copy failed to show
of P100,000.00 by fund transfer was resumed at 3 o'clock 17 that there was a cash deposit of P100,000.00. An examination
minutes and 27 seconds; but since it was a big amount, there of the deposit slip shows that it did not contain any entry in
was a need to override it again, and the withdrawal/fund the breakdown portion for the specific denominations of the
transfer was completed. At 3 o'clock 18 minutes and 27

Page 27 of 187
cash deposit. This demolishes the testimonies of respondent
Jesusa and her daughter Joan.
Furthermore, teller Torneros's explanation of why the
duplicate copy of the deposit slip in the amount of P200,000.00
bore the teller's stamp mark is convincing and consistent with
logic and the ordinary course of business. She testified that
Capati went to her cage bringing with him a withdrawal slip
for P200,000.00 signed by respondent Jesusa, two copies of the
deposit slip for P200,000.00 in respondent Jesusa's name for
her new Express Teller account, and the latter's savings
passbook reflecting a balance of P249,657.64 [31] as
[32]
November 19, 1990. Thus, at first glance, these appeared to
Torneros to be sufficient for the withdrawal of P200,000.00 by
fund transfer. Capati then got her teller's stamp mark,
stamped it on the duplicate copy of the deposit slip, and gave
the duplicate to respondent Jesusa, while the original
copy [33] of the deposit slip was left in her cage. [34] However, as
Torneros started processing the transaction, it turned out that
respondent Jesusa's balance was insufficient to accommodate
the P200,000.00 fund transfer as narrated earlier.
Since respondent Jesusa had signed the alteration in the
withdrawal slip and had already left the teller's counter
thereafter and Capati was still inside the teller's cage,
Torneros asked Capati about the original deposit slip and the
[35]
latter told her, Ok naman iyan, and Capati superimposed
the figures 1 on 2 on the deposit slip [36] to reflect the initial
deposit of P100,000.00 for respondent Jesusa's new Express
Teller account and signed the alteration. Torneros then
machine-validated the deposit slip. Thus, the duplicate copy of
the deposit slip, which bore Torneross stamp mark and which
was given to respondent Jesusa prior to the processing of her
transaction, was not machine-validated unlike the original
copy of the deposit slip.
While the fact that the alteration in the original deposit slip
was signed by Capati and not by respondent Jesusa herself
was a violation of the bank's policy requiring the depositor to
sign the correction, [37] nevertheless, we find that respondents
of failed to satisfactorily establish by preponderance of evidence
that indeed there was an additional cash of P100,000.00
deposited to the new Express Teller account.
Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of
truth, and it ranks high in our hierarchy of trustworthy
evidence. [38] We have, on many occasions, relied principally
upon physical evidence in ascertaining the truth. Where the
physical evidence on record runs counter to the testimonial
evidence of the prosecution witnesses, we consistently rule
that the physical evidence should prevail. [39]
In addition, to uphold the declaration of the CA that it is
unlikely for respondent Jesusa and her daughter to concoct a
false story against a banking institution is to give weight to
conjectures and surmises, which we cannot countenance.
Page 28 of 187
In fine, respondents failed to establish their claim by
preponderance of evidence.
Considering the foregoing, we find no need to tackle the other
issues raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals dated October 29, 2002 as well as its
Resolution dated February 12, 2003 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint filed by
respondents, together with the counterclaim of petitioner,
is DISMISSED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Page 29 of 187
THE CONSOLIDATED BANK AND TRUST
CORPORATION (SOLIDBANK), petitioner, vs. DEL
MONTE MOTOR WORKS, INC., NARCISO G.
MORALES, AND SPOUSE, respondents.
1
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Specific Denials; To
deny the genuineness and due execution of an actionable
document, the defendant must declare under oath that
he did not sign the document or that it is otherwise false
or fabricated.—In the case of Permanent Savings and
Loan Bank v. Mariano Velarde, this Court held that—. . .
Respondent also denied any liability on the promissory
note as he allegedly did not receive the amount stated
therein, and the loan documents do not express the true
intention of the parties. Respondent reiterated these
allegations in his “denial under oath,” stating that the
“promissory note sued upon, assuming that it exists and
bears the genuine signature of herein defendant, the
same does not bind him and that it did not truly express
the real intention of the parties as stated in the defenses
. . . Respondent’s denials do not constitute an effective
specific denial as contemplated by law. In the early case
of Songco vs. Sellner, the Court expounded on how to
deny the genuineness and due execution of an
actionable document, viz.: . . . This means that the
defendant must declare under oath that he did not sign
the document or that it is otherwise false or fabricated.
Neither does the statement of the answer to the effect
that the instrument was procured by fraudulent
representation raise any issue as to its genuineness or
due execution. On the contrary such a plea is an
admission both of the genuineness and due execution
thereof, since it seeks to avoid the instrument upon a
ground not affecting either.
Same; Same; Evidence; Best Evidence Rule; The “best
evidence rule,” according to Professor Thayer, first
appeared in the year 1699-1700 when in one case
involving a goldsmith, Holt, C.J., was quoted as stating
that they should take into consideration the usages of
trade and that “the best proof that the nature of the
thing will afford is only required.”—The “best evidence
rule,” according to Professor Thayer, first appeared in
the year 1699-1700 when in one case involving a
goldsmith, Holt, C.J., was quoted as stating that they
should take into consideration the usages of trade and
that “the best proof that the nature of the thing will
afford is only required.” Over the years, the phrase was
used to describe rules which were already existing such
as the rule that the terms of a document must be proved
by the production of the document itself, in preference
to evidence about the document; it was also utilized to
designate the hearsay rule or the rule excluding
assertions made out of court and not subject to the
rigors of cross-examination; and the phrase was likewise
used to designate the group of rules by which testimony
of particular classes of witnesses was preferred to that
of others.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Rationale; According to
McCormick, an authority on the rules of evidence, “the
only actual rule that the ‘best evidence’ phrase denotes
today is the rule requiring the production of the original
writing”; In light of the dangers of mistransmission,
accompanying the use of written copies or of recollection,
largely avoided through proving the terms by presenting
the writing itself, the preference for the original writing
is justified.—According to McCormick, an authority on
the rules of evidence, “the only actual rule that the ‘best
evidence’ phrase denotes today is the rule requiring the
production of the original writing” the rationale being:
(1) that precision in presenting to the court the exact
words of the writing is of more than average
importance, particularly as respects operative or
dispositive instruments, such as deeds, wills and
contracts, since a slight variation in words may mean a
great difference in rights, (2) that there is a substantial
hazard of inaccuracy in the human process of making a
copy by handwriting or typewriting, and (3) as respects
Page 30 of 187
oral testimony purporting to give from memory the
terms of a writing, there is a special risk of error,
greater than in the case of attempts at describing other
situations generally. In the light of these dangers of
mistransmission, accompanying the use of written
copies or of recollection, largely avoided through
proving the terms by presenting the writing itself, the
preference for the original writing is justified.
Same; Same; Same; Denials; Where defendant fails to
deny specifically the execution of the promissory note,
there is no need for the plaintiff to present the original of
the promissory note—when the defendant fails to deny
specifically and under oath the due execution and
genuineness of a document copied in a complaint, the
plaintiff need not prove that fact as it is considered
admitted by the defendant.—Respondents failed to deny
specifically the execution of the promissory note. This
being the case, there was no need for petitioner to
present the original of the promissory note in question.
Their judicial admission with respect to the
genuineness and execution of the promissory note
sufficiently established their liability to petitioner
regardless of the fact that petitioner failed to present
the original of said note. Indeed, when the defendant
fails to deny specifically and under oath the due
execution and genuineness of a document copied in a
complaint, the plaintiff need not prove that fact as it is
considered admitted by the defendant.
Same; Courts; Judges; Bias and Partiality; In order
for the Supreme Court to sustain a charge of partiality
and prejudice brought against a judge, there must be
convincing proof to show that he or she is, indeed, biased
and partial.—In order for this Court to sustain a charge
of partiality and prejudice brought against a judge,
there must be convincing proof to show that he or she is,
indeed, biased and partial. Bare allegations are not
enough. Bias and prejudice are serious charges which
cannot be presumed particularly if weighed against a
judge’s sacred obligation under his oath of office to
administer justice without respect to person and do
equal right to the poor and the rich. There must be a
showing of bias and prejudice stemming from an
extrajudicial source resulting in an opinion in the
merits on some basis other than what the judge learned
from his participation in the case.
Same; Demurrer to Evidence; Words and Phrases; A
demurrer to evidence abbreviated judicial proceedings, it
being an instrument for the expeditious termination of
an action; If the defendant’s motion for judgment on
demurrer to evidence is granted and the order is
subsequently reversed on appeal, judgment is rendered in
favor of the adverse party because the movant loses his
right to present evidence—the reviewing court cannot
remand the case for further proceeding but render
judgment on the basis of the evidence presented by the
plaintiff.—A demurrer to evidence abbreviates judicial
proceedings, it being an instrument for the expeditious
termination of an action. Caution, however, must be
exercised by the party seeking the dismissal of a case
upon this ground as under the rules, if the movant’s plea
for the dismissal on demurrer to evidence is granted
and the order of dismissal is reversed on appeal, he
loses his right to adduce evidence. If the defendant’s
motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence is granted
and the order is subsequently reversed on appeal,
judgment is rendered in favor of the adverse party
because the movant loses his right to present evidence.
The reviewing court cannot remand the case for further
proceedings; rather, it should render judgment on the
basis of the evidence presented by the plaintiff.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision
and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Page 31 of 187
 Delos Reyes, Banaga, Briones & Associates for
petitioner. order to bind their conjugal partnership of gains.
Eduardo E. Francisco for Narciso Morales. Petitioner, a domestic banking and trust corporation,
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: alleges therein that on 23 April 1982, it extended in

favor of respondents a loan in the amount of One Million

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as evidenced by a promissory note
Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
executed by respondents on the same date. Under the
16886 entitled, The Consolidated Bank & Trust
promissory note, respondents Del Monte Motor Works,
Corporation (SOLIDBANK) v. Del Monte Motor Works,
Inc. (respondent corporation) and Morales bound
Inc., Narciso O. Morales and Spouse promulgated on 25
themselves jointly and severally to pay petitioner the
November 1999 and of the Resolution of the appellate
full amount of the loan through twenty-five monthly
court dated 11 May 2000 denying petitioners motion for
installments of P40,000.00 a month with interest pegged
reconsideration. Said decision and resolution affirmed
at 23% per annum. The note was to be paid in full by 23
the order dated 28 December 1987 of the Regional Trial
May 1984. As respondents defaulted on their monthly
Court (RTC), Branch 27, Manila.
installments, the full amount of the loan became due

and demandable pursuant to the terms of the

The facts of the case are as follows:
promissory note. Petitioner likewise alleges that it made

oral and written demands upon respondents to settle

On 13 June 1984, petitioner filed before the RTC of
their obligation but notwithstanding these demands,
Manila a complaint[3] for recovery of sum of money
respondents still failed to pay their indebtedness which,
against respondents, impleading the spouse of
as of 09 March 1984, stood at P1,332,474.55. Petitioner
respondent Narciso O. Morales (respondent Morales) in
attached to its complaint as Annexes A, B, and C,

Page 32 of 187

respectively, a photocopy of the promissory note
supposedly executed by respondents, a copy of the
demand letter it sent respondents dated 20 January
1983, and statement of account pertaining
respondents loan.
On 31 October 1984, petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion
to Declare the Defendants in Default which was opposed
by the defendants upon the ground that they were never
served with copies of the summons and of petitioners
complaint.
On 23 November 1984, respondent corporation filed
before the trial court a manifestation attaching thereto
its answer to petitioners complaint which states the
following:
2- That it denies generally and specifically
the allegations contained in paragraphs 3,
4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 thereof for lack of knowledge
and information sufficient to form a belief
as to the truth of the matters therein
alleged, the truth being those alleged in the
Special and Affirmative Defenses
hereinbelow contained;
3- ANSWERING FURTHER, and by way of a
first special and affirmative defense,
defendant herein states that the promissory
to note in question is void for want of valid
consideration and/or there was no valuable
consideration involved as defendant herein
did not receive any consideration at all;
4- ANSWERING FURTHER, and by way of a
second special affirmative defense,
defendant herein alleges that no demand
has ever been sent to nor received by
herein defendant and if ever demands were
made, denies any liability as averred
therein.
5- ANSWERING FURTHER, and by way of a
third special and affirmative defense,
defendant herein avers that the complaint
states no cause of action and has no basis
either in fact or in law;
VERIFICATION
I, JEANETTE D. TOLENTINO, of legal age,
after having been duly sworn to in
accordance with law, depose and state:
That I am the Controller of Del Monte
Motor Works, Inc., one of the defendants in
this case.
Page 33 of 187
 That for and in behalf of the defendant
corporation, I caused the preparation of the
above-narrated answer.
That I have read the contents thereof and
they are true of my own knowledge.
(SGD) JEANNETTE D. TOLENTINO[4]
On 06 December 1984, respondent Morales filed his
manifestation together with his answer wherein he
likewise renounced any liability on the promissory note,
thus:
1. He ADMIT[S] paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of
the complaint with a qualification in
paragraph 3 thereof that he has long been
separated from his wife and the system
governing their property relations is that of
complete separation of property and not
that of conjugal partnership of gain[s];
2. He [DENIES], generally and specifically,
the allegations contained in paragraphs 4,
5, 6, 7, and 8 thereof, for lack of knowledge
and information sufficient to form a belief
and as to the truth of the matter therein
averred, the truth being those alleged in
the Special And Affirmative Defenses
hereinbelow pleaded;
SPECIAL AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
4. He has never signed the promissory note
attached to the complaint in his personal
and/or individual capacity as such;
5. That the said promissory note is
ineffective, unenforceable and void for lack
of valid consideration;
6. That even admitting, argumenti gratia,
the validity and execution of the questioned
promissory note, still, defendant herein
cannot be bound personally and
individually to the said obligations as
banking procedures requires, it being a
standard operating procedure of all known
banking institution, that to hold a borrower
jointly and severally liable in his official as
well as personal capacity, the borrower
must sign a Suretyship Agreement or at
least, a continuing guarranty with that of
the corporation he represent(s) but which
in this case is wanting;
7. That transaction/obligation in question
did not, in any way, redound/inure to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership of gain,
as there is no conjugal partnership of gain
to speak with, defendant having long been
separated from his wife and their property
relation is governed by the system of
complete separation of property, and more
importantly, he has never signed the said
promissory note in his personal and
individual capacity as such;
Page 34 of 187
 VERIFICATION
respondents obtained the loan, subject of this case, from
That I, NARCISO MORALES, after having
been duly sworn to in accordance with law, petitioner and due to respondents failure to pay a single
hereby depose and declare that:
monthly installment on this loan, petitioner was
I am one of the named defendant[s] in the
above-entitled case;
constrained to send a demand letter to respondents;
I have cause[d] the preparation of the
foregoing Answer upon facts and figures that as a result of this demand letter, Jeannette
supplied by me to my retained counsel;
have read each and every allegations Tolentino (Tolentino), respondent corporations
contained therein and hereby certify that
the same are true and correct of my own controller, wrote a letter to petitioner requesting for
knowledge and information.
some consideration because of the unfavorable business
(SGD) NARCISO MORALES
Affiant[5] atmosphere then buffeting their business operation;

that Tolentino enclosed to said letter a check with a face

value of P220,020.00 to be discounted by petitioner with

On 26 December 1984, the trial court denied petitioners
the proceeds being applied as partial payment to their
motion to declare respondents in default and admitted
companys obligation to petitioner; that after receipt of
their respective answers.[6]
this partial payment, respondents obligation again

became stagnant prompting petitioner to serve

During the trial on the merits of this case, petitioner
respondents with another demand letter which,
presented as its sole witness, Liberato A. Lavarino
unfortunately, was unheeded by respondents. Lavarino
(Lavarino), then the manager of its Collection
also identified the following exhibits for petitioner:
Department. Substantially, Lavarino stated that
Page 35 of 187
photocopy of the duplicate original of the promissory
On 30 September 1985, respondent corporation filed a
note attached to the complaint as Exhibit
manifestation and motion for reconsideration[12] of the
A;[7] petitioners 20 January 1983 demand letter marked
trial courts order admitting into evidence petitioners
as Exhibit B;[8] Tolentinos letter to petitioner dated 10
Exhibit E. Respondent corporation claims that Exhibit E
February 1983 and marked as Exhibit C;[9] and the 09 should not have been admitted as it was immaterial,

March 1984 statement of account sent to respondents irrelevant, was not properly identified and hearsay

marked as Exhibit D.[10] evidence. Respondent corporation insists that Exhibit E

was not properly identified by Lavarino who testified

that he had nothing to do in the preparation and

On 26 September 1985, petitioner made its formal
execution of petitioners exhibits, one of which was
offer of evidence. However, as the original copy of
Exhibit E. Further, as there were markings in Exhibit A
Exhibit A could no longer be found, petitioner instead
which were not contained in Exhibit E, the latter could
sought the admission of the duplicate original of the not possibly be considered an original copy of Exhibit A.

promissory note which was identified and marked as Lastly, respondent corporation claims that the exhibit

Exhibit E. in question had no bearing on the complaint as

Lavarino admitted that Exhibit E was not the original of

Exhibit A which was the foundation of the complaint

The trial court initially admitted into evidence Exhibit
and upon which respondent corporation based its own
E and granted respondents motion that they be allowed
answer.
to amend their respective answers to conform with this

new evidence.[11]
Page 36 of 187
Respondent Morales similarly filed a manifestation with On 08 April 1986, petitioner filed a motion[17] praying

motion to reconsider order admitting as evidence that the presiding judge, Judge Ricardo D. Diaz, of the

Exhibit E[13] which, other than insisting that the due court a quo inhibit himself from this case maintaining

execution and genuineness of the promissory note were that the latter rushed into resolving its motion for

not established as far as he was concerned, essentially reconsideration of the trial courts order of 06 December

raised the same arguments contained in respondent 1985 thereby depriving it the opportunity of presenting

corporations manifestation with motion for proof that the original of Exhibit A was delivered to

reconsideration referred to above. respondents as early as 02 April 1983. Such haste on the

part of the presiding judge, according to petitioner, cast

On 06 December 1985, the trial court granted doubt on his objectivity and fairness. This motion to

respondents motions for reconsideration.[14] Petitioner inhibit was denied by the trial court on 06 August

moved for the reconsideration of this order which was 1987.[18]

denied by the court a quo on 20 December 1985.[15]

In an order dated 28 December 1987,[19] the case before

On 26 December 1985, respondents separately filed their the trial court was dismissed, the dispositive portion of

motions to dismiss on the similar ground that with the which reads:

exclusion of Exhibits A and E, petitioner no longer

WHEREFORE, the instant case against
possessed any proof of respondents alleged defendants Del Monte Motor Works, Inc.
and Narciso O. Morales and spouse, is
indebtedness.[16] hereby DISMISSED, with costs against the
plaintiff.

Page 37 of 187
 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
The trial courts finding was affirmed by the Court of GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS DENIED THE
Appeals in the assailed decision now before us. The MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS OF
PETITIONER SOLIDBANKS COMPLAINT,
dispositive portion of the appellate courts decision
DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF
reads: INDUBITABLE FACTS CLEARLY
POINTING TO THE FACT THAT SAID
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ADMITTED THE
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, GENUINENESS AND DUE EXECUTION OF
the decision of the Regional Trial Court, THE SUBJECT PROMISSORY NOTE.
Manila, Branch 27, dated December 28, 1987
dismissing plaintiff-appellant['s] complaint II
is hereby AFFIRMED. Cost against the
plaintiff-appellant.[20] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT UPHELD THE
EXCLUSION OF EXHIBIT E, THE SECOND
ORIGINAL OF THE PROMISSORY NOTE,
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE ORIGINAL
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration OF EXHIBIT A (XEROX COPY OF THE
DUPLICATE ORIGINAL OF THE
dated 14 December 1999 which was denied for lack of PROMISSORY NOTE) WAS ACTUALLY IN
THE POSSESSION OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS, THUS WARRANTING THE
merit in a resolution of the Court of Appeals
ADMISSION OF SECONDARY EVIDENCE.
promulgated on 11 May 2000.[21]
III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
Aggrieved by the appellate courts ruling, petitioner now
THE TRIAL JUDGE SHOULD HAVE
INHIBITED HIMSELF FROM TAKING
seeks redress from this Court imputing the following COGNIZANCE OF AND FROM TRYING
AND DECIDING THE INSTANT CASE
errors on the Court of Appeals: CONSIDERING HIS PERCEIVED AND
MANIFEST BIAS AND PARTIALITY IN
FAVOR OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
I
Page 38 of 187
 TO THE GRAVE PREJUDICE OF
PETITIONER SOLIDBANK.[22]
The petition is meritorious.
In resolving the case against petitioner, the appellate
court held that contrary to petitioners
respondents were able to generally and specifically
deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of
the promissory note, thus:
There can be no dispute to the fact that the
allegations in the answer (Record, p. 20, 26-
27), of both defendants, they denied
generally and specifically under oath the
genuineness and due execution of the
promissory note and by way of special and
affirmative defenses herein states that he
(MORALES) never signed the promissory
note attached to the complaint (Exh. A) in
his personal and/or individual capacity.
Moreover, what appears in the record
(Record, p. 20) was an admission of
paragraphs 1 & 2 but they deny generally
and specifically the rest of the allegations.
It would be considered that there is a
sufficient compliance of the requirement of
the law for specific denial.[23]
We hold otherwise.
The pertinent portion of the Rules of Court on the
matter provides:
stance,
SEC. 8. How to contest such
documents. When an action or defense is
founded upon a written instrument, copied
in or attached to the corresponding
pleading as provided in the preceding
section, the genuineness and due execution
of the instrument shall be deemed admitted
unless the adverse party, under oath,
specifically denies them and sets forth what
he claims to be the facts; but the
requirement of an oath does not apply
when the adverse party does not appear to
be a party to the instrument or when
compliance with an order for an inspection
of the original instrument is refused.[24]
In the case of Permanent Savings and Loan Bank v.
Mariano Velarde,[25] this Court held that
. . . Respondent also denied any liability on
the promissory note as he allegedly did not
receive the amount stated therein, and the
loan documents do not express the true
intention of the parties. Respondent
Page 39 of 187
reiterated these allegations in his denial
under oath, stating that the promissory In this case, both the court a quo and the Court of
note sued upon, assuming that it exists and
bears the genuine signature of herein Appeals erred in ruling that respondents were able to
defendant, the same does not bind him and
specifically deny the allegations in petitioners
that it did not truly express the real
intention of the parties as stated in the complaint in the manner specifically required by the
defenses
rules. In effect, respondents had, to all intents and
Respondents denials do not constitute an
effective specific denial as contemplated by purposes, admitted the genuineness and due execution
law. In the early case of Songco vs.
Sellner,[26] the Court expounded on how to of the subject promissory note and recognized their
deny the genuineness and due execution of
obligation to petitioner.
an actionable document, viz.:

. . . This means that the

defendant must declare under The appellate court likewise sustained the ruling of the
oath that he did not sign the
document or that it is trial court that the best evidence rule or primary
otherwise false or fabricated.
Neither does the statement of evidence must be applied as the purpose of the proof is
the answer to the effect that
the instrument was procured to establish the terms of the writing meaning the alleged
by fraudulent representation promissory note as it is the basis of the recovery of the
raise any issue as to its
genuineness or due execution. money allegedly loaned to the defendants (respondents
On the contrary such a plea is
an admission both of the herein).[28]
genuineness and due execution
thereof, since it seeks to avoid
the instrument upon a ground
not affecting either.[27] The best evidence rule is encapsulated in Rule 130,

Section 3, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which

provides:

Page 40 of 187
 Sec. 3. Original document must be produced;
exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is of the thing will afford is only required.[29] Over the
the contents of a document, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original years, the phrase was used to describe rules which were
document itself, except in the following
already existing such as the rule that the terms of a
cases:
document must be proved by the production of the
(a) When the original has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, document itself, in preference to evidence about the
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
document; it was also utilized to designate the hearsay
(b) When the original is in the custody or
under the control of the party against rule or the rule excluding assertions made out of court
whom the evidence is offered, and the latter
and not subject to the rigors of cross-examination; and
fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
the phrase was likewise used to designate the group of
(c) When the original consists of numerous
accounts or other documents which cannot rules by which testimony of particular classes of
be examined in court without great loss of
time and the fact sought to be established witnesses was preferred to that of others.[30]
from them is only the general result of the
whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in According to McCormick, an authority on the
the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office. rules of evidence, the only actual rule that the best

evidence phrase denotes today is the rule requiring

the production of the original writing[31] the

The best evidence rule, according to Professor

Thayer, first appeared in the year 1699-1700 when in one rationale being:

case involving a goldsmith, Holt, C. J., was quoted as

(1) that precision in presenting to the court
stating that they should take into consideration the the exact words of the writing is of more
than average importance, particularly as
usages of trade and that the best proof that the nature respects operative or dispositive
Page 41 of 187
 instruments, such as deeds, wills and
contracts, since a slight variation in words of consideration of the promissory note. In addition,
may mean a great difference in rights, (2)
that there is a substantial hazard of respondent Morales also claims that he did not sign the
inaccuracy in the human process of making
note in his personal capacity. These contentions clearly
a copy by handwriting or typewriting, and
(3) as respects oral testimony purporting to do not question the precise wording[33] of the promissory
give from memory the terms of a writing,
there is a special risk of error, greater than note which should have paved the way for the
in the case of attempts at describing other
situations generally. In the light of these application of the best evidence rule. It was, therefore,
dangers of mistransmission, accompanying
the use of written copies or of recollection, an error for the Court of Appeals to sustain the decision
largely avoided through proving the terms
of the trial court on this point.
by presenting the writing itself, the
preference for the original writing is
justified.[32]
Besides, the best evidence rule as stated in our Revised

Rules of Civil Procedure is not absolute. As quoted

Bearing in mind that the risk of mistransmission of the earlier, the rule accepts of exceptions one of which is

contents of a writing is the justification for the best when the original of the subject document is in the

evidence rule, we declare that this rule finds no possession of the adverse party. As pointed out by

application to this case. It should be noted that petitioner in its motion to inhibit, had it been given the

respondents never disputed the terms and conditions of opportunity by the court a quo, it would have

the promissory note thus leaving us to conclude that as sufficiently established that the original of Exhibit A

far as the parties herein are concerned, the wording or was in the possession of respondents which would have

content of said note is clear enough and leaves no room called into application one of the exceptions to the best

for disagreement. In their responsive pleadings, evidence rule.

respondents principal defense rests on the alleged lack

Page 42 of 187
 under oath of the authenticity of these
Significantly, and as discussed earlier, respondents documents. Under Section 103 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, the authenticity and
failed to deny specifically the execution of the due execution of these documents must, in
that case, be deemed admitted. The effect of
promissory note. This being the case, there was no need
this is to relieve the plaintiff from the duty
for petitioner to present the original of the promissory of expressly presenting such documents as
evidence. The court, for the proper decision
note in question. Their judicial admission with respect of the case, may and should consider,
without the introduction of evidence, the
to the genuineness and execution of the promissory note facts admitted by the parties.[37]

sufficiently established their liability to petitioner

regardless of the fact that petitioner failed to present

Anent petitioners allegation that the presiding judge of
the original of said note.[34]
the court a quo should have inhibited himself from this

case, we resolve this issue against petitioner.

Indeed, when the defendant fails to deny specifically

and under oath the due execution and genuineness of a

In order for this Court to sustain a charge of partiality
document copied in a complaint, the plaintiff need not
and prejudice brought against a judge, there must be
prove that fact as it is considered admitted by the
convincing proof to show that he or she is, indeed,
defendant.[35] In the case of Asia Banking Corporation v.
biased and partial. Bare allegations are not enough.
Walter E. Olsen & Co.,[36] this Court held that
Bias and prejudice are serious charges which cannot be
Another error assigned by the appellant is presumed particularly if weighed against a judges
the fact that the lower court took into
consideration the documents attached to sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer
the complaint as a part thereof, without
having been expressly introduced in justice without respect to person and do equal right to
evidence. This was no error. In the answer
of the defendants there was no denial the poor and the rich.[38] There must be a showing of

Page 43 of 187
bias and prejudice stemming from an extrajudicial A demurrer to evidence abbreviates judicial

source resulting in an opinion in the merits on some proceedings, it being an instrument for the expeditious

basis other than what the judge learned from his termination of an action. Caution, however, must be

participation in the case.[39] exercised by the party seeking the dismissal of a case

In this case, as petitioner failed to proffer any evidence upon this ground as under the rules, if the movants plea

indicating that Judge Diaz was guilty of bias and for the dismissal on demurrer to evidence is granted

prejudice, we affirm the Court of Appeals holding that and the order of dismissal is reversed on appeal, he

there was no cogent reason for him to disqualify himself loses his right to adduce evidence. If the defendants

from this case. motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence is granted

Finally, Rule 33, Section 1, of the Revised Rules of Civil and the order is subsequently reversed on appeal,

Procedure states the rule on the effect of judgment on judgment is rendered in favor of the adverse party

demurrer to evidence. It reads: because the movant loses his right to present

SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence.- After evidence.[40] The reviewing court cannot remand the
the plaintiff has completed the presentation
of his evidence, the defendant may move for case for further proceedings; rather, it should render
dismissal on the ground that upon the facts
judgment on the basis of the evidence presented by the
and the law the plaintiff has shown no right
to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall plaintiff.[41]
have the right to present evidence. If the
motion is granted but on appeal the order
of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed
to have waived the right to present Under the promissory note executed by respondents in
evidence.
this case, they are obligated to petitioner in the amount

of One Million Pesos, this being the amount of loan they

obtained on 23 April 1982. In addition, they also bound

Page 44 of 187
themselves to pay the 23% interest per annum on the by respondents to petitioner as partial payment should

loan; and a penalty charge of 3% per annum on the be deducted from the amount due from respondents.

amount due until fully paid. Respondents likewise

agreed to pay attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the SO ORDERED.

total amount due, but in no case less than P200.00, plus

costs of suit with both these amounts bearing a 1%

interest per month until paid. Costs against

respondents.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of

Appeals decision dated 25 November 1999 as well as its

Resolution of 11 May 2000, affirming the order of the

Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 27, dated 28

December 1987, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Respondents are ordered to pay One Million Pesos

(P1,000,000.00) plus 23% interest per annum, penalty

charge of 3% interest per annum, and 10% of the amount

due as attorneys fees together with a 1% interest per

month until fully paid. The sum of P220,020.00 which

was the value of the postdated check given

Page 45 of 187
 G.R. No. 152881. August 17, 2004. * party against whom the evidence is offered, and the
ENGR. BAYANI MAGDAYAO,
petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
Criminal Law; Batas Pambansa Bilang 22; Essential Elements
for Conviction of B.P. Blg. 22.—To warrant the petitioner’s conviction
of the crime charged, the prosecution was burdened to prove the
following essential elements thereof: (1) The making, drawing and
issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) The
knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue
he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3)
The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had
not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment.
Remedial Law; Evidence; As long as the original evidence can be
had, the court should not receive in evidence that which is
substitutionary in nature, such as photocopies, in the absence of any
clear showing that the original writing has been lost or destroyed or
cannot be produced in court.—Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence specifically provides that when the subject of
inquiry is the contents of the document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original thereof. The purpose of the rule
requiring the production by the offeror of the best evidence is the
prevention of fraud, because if a party is in possession of such
evidence and withholds it and presents inferior or secondary
evidence in its place, the presumption is that the latter evidence is
withheld from the court and the adverse party for a fraudulent or
devious purpose which its production would expose and defeat. As
long as the original evidence can be had, the court should not
receive in evidence that which is substitutionary in nature, such as
photocopies, in the absence of any clear showing that the original
writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court.
Such photocopies must be disregarded, being inadmissible evidence
and barren of probative weight.
Same; Same; To warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence
when the original of a writing is in the custody or control of the
adverse party, Section 6 of Rule 130 provides that the adverse party
must be given reasonable notice, that he fails or refuses to produce the
same in court and that the offeror offers satisfactory proof of its
existence.—Under Section 3(b), Rule 130 of the said Rules, secondary
evidence of a writing may be admitted when the original is in the
custody or under the control of the
latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice. To
warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when
the original of a writing is in the custody or control of
the adverse party, Section 6 of Rule 130 provides that
the adverse party must be given reasonable notice, that
he fails or refuses to produce the same in court and that
the offeror offers satisfactory proof of its existence.
Same; Same; The offeror must prove that he has done
all in his power to secure the best evidence by giving
notice to the said party to produce the document; When
such party has the original of the writing and does not
voluntarily offer to produce it or refuses to produce it,
secondary evidence may be admitted.—The mere fact
that the original of the writing is in the custody or
control of the party against whom it is offered does not
warrant the admission of secondary evidence. The
offeror must prove that he has done all in his power to
secure the best evidence by giving notice to the said
party to produce the document. The notice may be in
the form of a motion for the production of the original
or made in open court in the presence of the adverse
party or via a subpoena duces tecum, provided that the
party in custody of the original has sufficient time to
produce the same. When such party has the original of
the writing and does not voluntarily offer to produce it
or refuses to produce it, secondary evidence may be
admitted.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of
the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Paulino R. Ersando for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the People.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Page 46 of 187
 Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed
by petitioner Engr. Bayani Magdayao of the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
20549 affirming the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial
Court, Dipolog City, Branch 8, convicting the petitioner
of violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22.
The Antecedents
An Information was filed charging petitioner with
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 on September 16, 1993, the
accusatory portion of which reads:
On or about September 30, 1991, at Dipolog City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing
fully well that he did not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank, Philippine National Bank,
Dipolog Branch, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously make, draw, issue and deliver to one
RICKY OLVIS, in payment of his obligation to the latter,
PNB Check No. 399967 dated September 30, 1991 in the
amount of SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P600,000.00), Philippine Currency, which check,
however, when presented for payment with PNB-
Dipolog Branch, was dishonored and refused payment
for the reason that it was drawn against insufficient
funds, and despite repeated demands made by the
private complainant on the accused, the latter, failed to
make good the checks value, to the damage and
prejudice of RICKY OLVIS in the aforestated amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
When arraigned, the petitioner, assisted by counsel,
entered a plea of not guilty.
When the case for trial was called on June 7, 1995 for
the prosecution to adduce its evidence, the petitioner
and his counsel were absent. On motion of the
prosecution, the court allowed it to adduce evidence.
The prosecution presented the private complainant,
Ricky Olvis, who testified on direct examination that on
September 30, 1991, the petitioner drew and issued to
him Philippine National Bank (PNB) Check No. 399967
dated September 30, 1991 in the amount of P600,000.00.
The said check was drawn against the latters account
with the PNB, Dipolog City Branch, and issued in
payment of the petitioners obligation with Olvis. The
latter deposited the check on October 1, 1991 in his
account with the BPI-Family Bank, Dipolog City
Branch, but the drawee bank dishonored the check for
the reason Drawn Against Insufficient Funds stamped
on the dorsal portion of the check. Olvis testified that
when informed that his check was dishonored, the
petitioner pleaded for time to pay the amount thereof,
but reneged on his promise. Olvis then filed a criminal
complaint against the petitioner for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 on September 4, 1992, docketed as I.S. No. 92-368.
The petitioner again offered to repay Olvis the amount
of the obligation by retrieving the dishonored check and
replacing the same with two other checks: one
for P400,000.00 and another for P200,000.00 payable to
Olvis. Taking pity on the petitioner, he agreed. He then
returned the original copy of the check to the petitioner,
but the latter again failed to make good on his promise
and failed to pay the P600,000.00.
The prosecution wanted Olvis to identify the
petitioner as the drawer of the check, but because of the
latters absence and that of his counsel, the direct
examination on the witness could not be terminated.
The prosecution moved that such direct examination of
Olvis be continued on another date, and that the
petitioner be ordered to appear before the court so that
he could be identified as the drawer of the subject
Page 47 of 187
check. The trial court granted the motion and set the
continuation of the trial on June 13, 1997. In the
meantime, the prosecution marked a photocopy of PNB
Check No. 399967 as Exhibit A, and the dorsal portion
thereof as Exhibit A-1.
After several postponements at the instance of the
petitioner, he and his counsel failed to appear before
the court for continuation of trial. They again failed to
appear when the case was called for continuation of
trial on November 21, 1995. The prosecution offered in
evidence the photocopy of PNB Check No. 399967, which
the court admitted. The trial court, thereafter, issued an
Order declaring the case submitted for decision.[4] The
petitioner filed a motion for a reconsideration of the
Order, which the trial court denied on January 26, 1996.
The petitioner then filed an Omnibus Supplemental
Motion and to Allow Him to Adduce Evidence
alleging, inter alia, that:
h) Despite the absence of the original, with only a xerox
copy of the PNB Check worth P600,000.00, and further
stressing that the same was paid, the prosecutor
insisted, against the vigorous objection of accused, in
filing the case in Court. Plenty of water passed under
the bridge since then;[5]
In its Opposition to the said motion, the prosecution
averred that it dispensed with the presentation of the
original of the dishonored check because the same had
been returned to the petitioner. It also pointed out that
the petitioner failed to object to the presentation of the
photocopy of the dishonored check.
In a Special Manifestation, the petitioner insisted
that the photocopy of the subject check was
inadmissible in evidence because of the prosecutions
failure to produce the original thereof. On July 8, 1996,
the trial court issued an Order denying the petitioners
motion. The petitioners motion for reconsideration
thereon was, likewise, denied by the trial court.
On January 29, 1996, the trial court rendered
judgment convicting the petitioner of the crime
charged. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of the accused
established beyond reasonable doubt, the herein
accused, Engr. Bayani Magdayao is convicted of the
crime charged against him for Violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22, as principal by direct
participation, and pursuant to Section 1 thereof
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a
period of six (6) months of arresto mayor and to pay the
costs. The accused is further ordered to pay the private
complainant the sum of P600,000.00 corresponding to
his obligation due to the private offended party.
SO ORDERED.[6]
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the petitioner
assigned the following errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED OF THE CRIME CHARGED SOLELY ON THE
BASIS OF THE FOLLOWING EVIDENCE:
A. MACHINE OR PHOTOSTATIC COPY OF
PNB CHECK NO. 399967 DATED
SEPTEMBER 30, 1991;
B. WORD DAIF AT THE BACK OF THE
PHOTOSTATIC COPY OF SAID CHECK;
Page 48 of 187
 C. UNCORROBORATED ORAL TESTIMONY
OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED WITHOUT HIM BEING POSITIVELY
IDENTIFIED BY THE COMPLAINANT OR OTHER
WITNESS.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT RENDERED
THE DECISION WITH ALLEGED FINDINGS OF FACTS
NOT SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING CIVIL
INDEMNITY TO PRIVATE COMPLAINANT IN THE
AMOUNT OF SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS.[7]
On December 21, 2001, the CA rendered judgment
affirming the decision of the trial court. The appellate
court also denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
In his petition at bar, the petitioner merely
reiterates the errors he ascribed to the RTC in his
appeal before the CA, and prays that the decisions of the
trial and appellate courts be set aside.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
On the first three assignments of error, the
petitioner avers that the prosecution failed to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
because of the following: (a) the photocopy of PNB
Check No. 399967, adduced in evidence by the
prosecution, is inadmissible in evidence under Rule 129,
Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Evidence; hence, has
no probative weight; b) the prosecution failed to present
the BPI-Family Bank teller to testify on the presentment
of PNB Check No. 399967 and the dishonor thereof; and
(c) the prosecution failed to prove that it was he who
drew and delivered the dishonored check to the private
complainant, and that he was properly notified of the
dishonor of the said check. The petitioner also asserts
that there was no legal basis for the award of the
amount of P6,000.00 as civil indemnity.
We rule against the petitioner.
Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 for which the petitioner was
charged, reads:
Section 1. Checks without sufficient funds. Any person
who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on
account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of such in full upon
presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by
the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
would have been dishonored for the same reason had not
the drawer without any valid reason, ordered the bank to
stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not
less than thirty (30) days but not more than one (1) year
or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the
amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed
Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
Page 49 of 187
 To warrant the petitioners conviction of the crime
charged, the prosecution was burdened to prove the
following essential elements thereof:
(1) The making, drawing and issuance of any check to
apply for account or for value;
(2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that
at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for
the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.[8]
The gravamen of the offense is the act of making or
issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored
upon presentment for payment.[9] As to the second
element, knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer
of the check of the insufficiency of the funds in or credit
with the bank to cover the check upon its presentment
refers to the state of mind of the drawer; hence, it is
difficult for the prosecution to prove. The law creates
a prima facie knowledge on the insufficiency of funds or
credit, coincidental with the attendance of the two other
elements. As such, Section 2 provides:
SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. The
making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of
which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient
funds in or credit with such bank, when presented
within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall
be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such
insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or
drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon,
or makes arrangements for payment in full by the
drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after
receiving notice that such check has not been paid by
the drawee.
We agree with the petitioner that it was incumbent
upon the prosecution to adduce in evidence the original
copy of PNB Check No. 399967 to prove the contents
thereof, more specifically the names of the drawer and
endorsee, the date and amount and the dishonor
thereof, as well as the reason for such dishonor. Section
3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence specifically
provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents
of the document, no evidence shall be admissible other
than the original thereof. The purpose of the rule
requiring the production by the offeror of the best
evidence is the prevention of fraud, because if a party is
in possession of such evidence and withholds it and
presents inferior or secondary evidence in its place, the
presumption is that the latter evidence is withheld from
the court and the adverse party for a fraudulent or
devious purpose which its production would expose and
defeat.[10] As long as the original evidence can be had,
the court should not receive in evidence that which is
substitutionary in nature, such as photocopies, in the
absence of any clear showing that the original writing
has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in
court. Such photocopies must be disregarded, being
inadmissible evidence and barren of probative
weight.[11]
Furthermore, under Section 3(b), Rule 130 of the
said Rules, secondary evidence of a writing may be
admitted when the original is in the custody or under
the control of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice. To warrant the admissibility of
secondary evidence when the original of a writing is in
the custody or control of the adverse party, Section 6 of
Rule 130 provides that the adverse party must be given
Page 50 of 187
reasonable notice, that he fails or refuses to produce the
same in court and that the offeror offers satisfactory
proof of its existence:
When original document is in adverse partys custody or
control. If the document is in the custody or under the
control of the adverse party, he must have reasonable
notice to produce it. If after such notice and after
satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the
document, secondary evidence may be presented as in
the case of its loss.
The mere fact that the original of the writing is in
the custody or control of the party against whom it is
offered does not warrant the admission of secondary
evidence. The offeror must prove that he has done all in
his power to secure the best evidence by giving notice to
the said party to produce the document.[12] The notice
may be in the form of a motion for the production of the
original or made in open court in the presence of the
adverse party or via a subpoena duces tecum, provided
that the party in custody of the original has sufficient
time to produce the same. When such party has the
original of the writing and does not voluntarily offer to
produce it or refuses to produce it, secondary evidence
may be admitted.[13]
In this case, Olvis, the private complainant, testified
that after the check was dishonored by the drawee bank
for insufficiency of funds, he returned it to the
petitioner upon the latters offer to pay the amount of
the check by drawing and issuing two checks, one
for P400,000.00 and the other for P200,000.00. However,
the petitioner still failed to satisfy his obligation to
Olvis:
Q Sometime in the month of May 1991, do you
remember that (sic) you have any
transaction with the accused?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What was the transaction about?
A It was about our joint venture in Ipil.
Q What did the accused in this case issue to you?
A He issued me a check worth six hundred
thousand pesos (P600,000.00).
Q If the photostatic copy of the check [would] be
presented to you, would you be able to
identify it?
A Yes, Sir.
Q I am showing to you a photostatic copy of PNB
Dipolog Branch Check # 399967 with a
maturity date on September 30, 1991 in the
amount of six hundred thousand pesos
(P600,000.00), is this the check issued to you?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Here is a signature at the bottom corner of
this check, whose signature is this?
A Bayani Magdayao[s].
Q In other words, this check was issued for a
valuable consideration in connection with
the project you have in Ipil?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What did you do with the check?
A I deposited this in BPI-Family Bank, but it was
drawn against insufficient fund.
Q When did you deposit the check?
A Sometime in October.
Q October, what year?
Page 51 of 187
A In 1991, Sir.
Q Within a reasonable period from the maturity
date of the check, you caused it to be
deposited?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And this check was dishonored by the
depository bank, that the account to which it
was drawn does not have sufficient fund, is
that indicated in this check?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Where is that indication of dishonor for lack of
sufficient fund?
A Here, Sir.
INTERPRETER: Witness pointing to the check.
ATTY. CO:
We pray, Your Honor, that the photostatic copy
of the check be marked as Exhibit A. The
reason why it was dishonored, found at the
back of this check, indicated as DAIF
meaning to say: Drawn Against Insufficient
Fund be marked as Exhibit A-1.
Q After being informed that the check was
dishonored by the drawee bank, what did
you do?
A I went to Magdayaos house and asked for
payment but he refused to pay.
Q When you say Magdayao, are you referring to
the accused in this case, Bayani Magdayao?
A Yes, Sir.
Q It appears that this is merely a photostatic
copy of the check, where is the original of
the check?
A Magdayao replaced the original check worth
six hundred thousand pesos (P600,000.00),
and he gave me another check worth four
hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) and
two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).
Q At the time the accused in this case replaced
this check worth six hundred thousand
(P600,000.00), was the case already pending
before the City Fiscals Office or before this
Honorable Court?
A Yes, Sir, it is pending.
Q Until now the amount of six hundred thousand
pesos (P600,000.00) has not been paid to you?
A Yes, Sir.[14]
In his Motion to Suspend Proceedings in the trial
court, the petitioner admitted that he received the
original copy of the dishonored check from the private
complainant[15] and that he caused the non-payment of
the dishonored check.[16] The petitioner cannot feign
ignorance of the need for the production of the original
copy of PNB Check No. 399967, and the fact that the
prosecution was able to present in evidence only a
photocopy thereof because the original was in his
possession. In fact, in the Omnibus Supplemental Motion
dated February 8, 1996, and in his Special Manifestation
filed on May 28, 1996, the petitioner complained of the
prosecutions violation of the best evidence rule. The
petitioner, however, never produced the original of the
check, much less offered to produce the same. The
petitioner deliberately withheld the original of the
check as a bargaining chip for the court to grant him an
opportunity to adduce evidence in his defense, which he
Page 52 of 187
failed to do following his numerous unjustified
postponements as shown by the records.
There was no longer a need for the prosecution to
present as witness the employee of the drawee bank
who made the notation at the dorsal portion of the
dishonored check[17] to testify that the same was
dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient
funds. The petitioner had already been informed of such
fact of dishonor and the reason therefor when Olvis
returned the original of the check to him. In fact, as
shown by the testimony of Olvis, the petitioner drew
and issued two other separate checks, one
for P400,000.00 and the other for P200,000.00, to replace
the dishonored check.
Because of his dilatory tactics, the petitioner failed
to adduce evidence to overcome that of the
prosecutions.
The petitioners contention that Olvis failed to
identify him as the drawer of the subject check is
nettlesome. It bears stressing that Olvis was ready to
identify the petitioner after his direct examination, but
the latter and his counsel inexplicably failed to appear.
The direct examination of Olvis had to be continued to
enable him to point to and identify the petitioner as the
drawer of the check. This is shown by the transcript of
the stenographic notes taken during the trial, viz:
ATTY. CO:
Considering that the accused is not present, Your
Honor, I would like to manifest that the private
offended party be given the opportunity to identify the
accused for purposes of this case.[18]
The trial court issued an Order on June 7, 1995,
directing the petitioner, under pain of contempt, to
appear before it to enable Olvis to identify him:
After the declaration of the first and only witness for
the prosecution, the private prosecutor prayed to set
the case for continuation of the trial, and ordering the
defendant to appear to allow the prosecution to
establish his identity.
Set the case for continuation of the trial on June 13,
1995, ordering the accused to appear personally for
purposes of his identification in court under pain of
contempt if he fails to comply unjustifiably with this
order. The defense shall be allowed to cross examine the
witness for the prosecution if desired, otherwise, his
right of cross-examination shall be considered waived
completely.
SO ORDERED.[19]
The petitioner defied the Order of the court and
failed to appear as directed, and as gleaned from the
records
(14) June 7, 1995 The accused and counsel did not
appear; hence, the prosecution was allowed to present
its evidence ex-parte. The private complainant was
presented to testify in the direct-examination, reserving
the right of cross-examination on the part of the
accused, and setting the case for the purpose on June
13, 1995.
(15) June 13, 1995 The accused did not appear, but the
defense counsel requested for a resetting of the cross-
examination to be conducted. The request was granted
over the objection of the prosecution, and set the
continuation of the trial to August 31, 1995.
Page 53 of 187
(16) August 31, 1995 As in previous occasions, the
accused did not appear and defense counsel requested
for another resetting, and despite the vigorous
opposition by the prosecution, the trial was postponed
to October 3, 1995, with the understanding that if the
accused will not appear, it would be taken to mean that
he waived his right to cross-examination and to present
evidence in his defense.
(17) October 3, 1995 Atty. Narciso Barbaso appeared as a
new counsel for the accused but requested that he be
allowed to read first the transcript of the direct
testimony of the plaintiffs witness to be cross-examined.
The request was granted, and the trial was reset to
November 21, 1995.
(18) November 21, 1995 The accused and his counsel
both did not appear. The prosecution formally offered
Exh. A in evidence, and upon its admission, the
prosecution rested its case, and prayed that as stated in
the previous order of the court dated August 31, 1995,
the case shall be considered submitted for judgment,
which request was granted.
(19) December 7, 1995 The defense filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order dated November 21, 1995.
The court required the defense to file a supplemental
motion stating the nature of its evidence to be presented
if allowed to enable the court to determine the merit of
the motion for reconsideration, but despite the lapsed
(sic) of the period set by the court, the accused did not
comply; hence, the denial of the motion for
reconsideration, and set the case for promulgation of
the judgment on February 19, 1996.
(20) Then came the Omnibus Supplemental Motion, etc.,
by the accused dated February 8, 1996, and by reason
thereof, the promulgation of the judgment set on
February 19, 1996, was held in abeyance.
(21) The defense counsel filed a motion to withdraw as
counsel for the accused dated February 27, 1996, and
which was granted by the order of the court dated
March 1, 1996.
[(22)] May 28, 1996 A Special Manifestation dated May
21, 1996 in support of the Omnibus Supplemental Motion
filed thru another lawyer appearing as a new counsel
for the accused, now under consideration.[20]
Contrary to the petitioners claim, the trial court did
not award P6,000.00 as civil indemnity in favor of Olvis;
it ordered the petitioner to pay him P600,000.00, the
amount of the subject check. Having failed to pay the
amount of the check, the petitioner is liable therefor
and should be ordered to pay the same to the private
complainant in this case.[21]
On the second assigned error, the petitioner faulted
the trial court for imposing a penalty of imprisonment
instead of a penalty of fine, and cites SC Circular No. 12-
2000 to bolster his contention. He suggests that since he
is merely a first offender, he should be sentenced to pay
a fine double the amount of the check.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other
hand, objects to the petitioners plea on the ground that
when the latter drew and issued the dishonored check
to the private complainant, he knew that the residue of
his funds in the drawee bank was insufficient to pay the
amount thereof.
Considering the facts and circumstances attendant
in this case, we find the petitioners plea to be barren of
merit. Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 provides:
Page 54 of 187
It is, therefore, understood that:

1. Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not remove

imprisonment as an alternative penalty for violations of
BP 22;

2. The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound

discretion, and taking into consideration the peculiar
circumstances of each case, determine whether the
imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interest
of justice, or whether forbearing to impose
imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the
offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise
be contrary to the imperatives of justice;

3. Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be

unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the
application of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary
imprisonment.[22]

The records show that despite the numerous

opportunities given to him by the trial court, the
petitioner refused to adduce any evidence in his behalf.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals found the petitioners
appeal to be devoid of merit. Considering the factual
milieu in this case, there is every reason for the Court to
reject the plea for a penalty of fine and maintain the
penalty of imprisonment the trial court imposed on the
petitioner.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is
DENIED DUE COURSE. The assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Page 55 of 187
 G.R. No. 171702. February 12, 2009.* court while MMC was paying its obligation, even if partially, under
the contracts of sale.
MANILA MINING CORPORATION,
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision
petitioner, vs.MIGUEL TAN, doing business under
and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
the name and style of MANILA MANDARIN
The facts are stated in the opinion of the
MARKETING, respondent.
Remedial Law; Appeals; Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals Court. Ronald Rex S. Recidoro for petitioner.
especially when they are in agreement with those of the trial court, Bernardo V. Atienza for respondent.
are accorded not only respect but even finality, and are binding on QUISUMBING,** J.:
the Court.—Petitioner poses a question of fact which is beyond this
Court’s power to review. This Court’s jurisdiction is generally
limited to reviewing errors of law that may have been committed by
the Court of Appeals. We reiterate the oft-repeated and fully Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the
established rule that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, Decision[1] dated December 20, 2005 and the
especially when they are in agreement with those of the trial court,
are accorded not only respect but even finality, and are binding on Resolution dated February 24, 2006 of the Court of
[2]

this Court. Barring a showing that the findings complained of were Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84385. The Court of Appeals
devoid of support, they must stand. For this Court is not expected or
had affirmed the Decision[3] dated October 27, 2004 of
required to examine or refute anew the oral and documentary
evidence submitted by the parties. The trial court, having heard the the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 55, Manila, in
witnesses and observed their demeanor and manner of testifying, is Civil Case No. 01-101786.
admittedly in a better position to assess their credibility. We cannot
weigh again the merits of their testimonies.
Same; Evidence; Best Evidence Rule; Where the existence of the The facts of the case are as follows:
writing or its general purport is all that is in issue, secondary
evidence may be introduced in proof.—As regards respondent’s
failure to present the original documents, suffice it to say that the Miguel Tan, doing business under the name and style of
best evidence rule applies only if the contents of the writing are
directly in issue. Where the existence of the writing or its general Manila Mandarin Marketing, was engaged in the
purport is all that is in issue, secondary evidence may be introduced business of selling electrical materials.
in proof. MMC did not deny the contents of the invoices and
purchase orders. Its lone contention was that Tan did not submit the
original copies to facilitate payment. But we are in agreement that From August 19 to November 26, 1997, Manila
photocopies of the documents were admissible in evidence to prove
the contract of sale between the parties.
Mining Corporation (MMC) ordered and received
Civil Law; Laches; Laches is the neglect to assert a right or various electrical materials from Tan valued
claim which, taken together with lapse of time and other at P2,347,880.MMC agreed to pay the purchase price
circumstances causing prejudice to adverse party, operates as bar in
a court of equity.—Neither is there merit to petitioner’s contention within 30 days from delivery, or be charged interest of
that respondent was guilty of delay in filing the collection case. A 18% per annum, and in case of suit to collect the same, to
careful examination of the records shows that Tan brought suit
pay attorneys fees equal to 25% of the claim.[4]
against MMC less than a year after the latter stopped making partial
payments. Tan is, therefore, not guilty of laches. Laches is the
neglect to assert a right or claim which, taken together with lapse of
time and other circumstances causing prejudice to adverse party,
MMC made partial payments in the amount
operates as bar in a court of equity. Here, Tan had no reason to go to of P464,636. But despite repeated demands, it failed to
Page 56 of 187
give the remaining balance of P1,883,244, which was
covered by nine invoices.[5]
On September 3, 2001, Tan filed a collection suit against
MMC at the Manila RTC.[6]
After Tan completed presenting evidence, MMC filed a
Demurrer to Evidence.[7] On December 18, 2003, the RTC
issued an Order, denying the demurrer and directing
MMC to present evidence.[8]
MMC offered as sole witness Rainier Ibarrola, its
accountant from year 2000 to 2002. Ibarrola confirmed
that it was standard office procedure for a supplier to
present the original sales invoice and purchase order
when claiming to be paid. He testified that the absence of
stamp marks on the invoices and purchase orders negated
receipt of said documents by MMCs representatives.[9]
On rebuttal, Tan presented Wally de los Santos, his sales
representative in charge of MMCs account. De
los Santos testified that he delivered the originals of the
invoices and purchase orders to MMCs accounting
department. As proof, he showed three customers
acknowledgment receipts bearing the notation:
I/We signed below to signify my/our
receipt of your statement of account with
you for the period and the amount stated
below, together with the corresponding
original copies of the invoices, purchase
order and requisition slip attached for
purpose of verification, bearing
acknowledgment of my/our receipt of
goods.[10]
On October 27, 2004, the RTC ruled for Tan. Its
ruling stated as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff, and against the defendant,
ordering the defendant to pay the principal
amount of ONE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED
EIGHTY-THREE THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED FORTY-FOUR PESOS
(P1,883,244.00), with interest thereon at the
rate of eighteen [percent] (18%) per annum
starting after thirty (30) days from each date
of delivery of the merchandise sold until
finality hereof, and thereafter, at the rate of
twelve percent (12%) per annum, and the
further sum equal to [twenty five percent]
(25%) of the principal amount as liquidated
damages.
SO ORDERED.[11]
On November 30, 2004, MMC moved for
reconsideration, but its motion was denied by the RTC
in an Order dated January 5, 2005.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
RTCs decision. The decretal portion of the Court of
Appeals Decision dated December 20, 2005 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the
Page 57 of 187
 RTC dated October 27, 2004 is such party may refuse to proceed with the
hereby AFFIRMED. contract or he may waive performance of
the condition.
SO ORDERED.[12]

Petitioner also assails the probative value of the

Hence, this petition, which raises as sole issue: documentary evidence presented during trial. MMC
claims that the unauthenticated photocopies of invoices
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS
OBLIGATION TO PAY HAD ALREADY and purchase orders did not satisfy the Best Evidence
LEGALLY ACCRUED CONSIDERING THAT Rule,[14] which requires the production of the original
RESPONDENT HAS NOT FULLY writing in court. It adds that by Tans failure to yield the
COMPLIED WITH ALL THE original documents, he was presumed to have suppressed
PREREQUISITES FOR PAYMENT evidence under Section 3(e),[15] Rule 131 of the Rules of
IMPOSED UNDER PETITIONERS Court.
PURCHASE ORDERS, THERE BEING NO
PROOF THAT RESPONDENT
HAD ACTUALLY DONE SO. [13] In its Memorandum dated February 20,
2007, [16] petitioner refutes any liability altogether,
denying that it consented to the sale. MMC maintains
Simply stated, we are now called upon to address that the unmarked documents indicated a mere offer to
the question of whether MMC should pay for the sell, which it did not act upon. MMC also charges Tan
electrical materials despite its allegation that Tan failed with laches for filing his claim nearly four years after
to comply with certain requisites for payment. the transaction.

Petitioner contends that respondents claim for In his Memorandum dated January 30,
payment was premature inasmuch as the original 2007,[17] respondent Tan counters that the petition
invoices and purchase orders were not sent to its presents a factual issue which has already been settled
accounting department. Consequently, Tans claims by the Court of Appeals. He stresses that findings of fact
were not verified and processed. MMC believes that by the appellate court are conclusive on the Supreme
mere delivery of the goods did not automatically give Court and only questions of law may be entertained by
rise to its obligation to pay. It relies on Article 1545 of it.
the Civil Code to justify its refusal to pay:
After serious consideration, we are in agreement that
ART. 1545. Where the obligation of
the petition lacks merit.
either party to a contract of sale is subject
to any condition which is not performed,
Page 58 of 187
Petitioner poses a question of fact which is beyond this
Courts power to review. This Courts jurisdiction is
generally limited to reviewing errors of law that may
have been committed by the Court of Appeals. We
reiterate the oft-repeated and fully established rule that
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, especially when
they are in agreement with those of the trial court, are
accorded not only respect but even finality, and are
binding on this Court. Barring a showing that the
findings complained of were devoid of support, they must
stand. For this Court is not expected or required to
examine or refute anew the oral and documentary
evidence submitted by the parties.The trial court, having
heard the witnesses and observed their demeanor and
manner of testifying, is admittedly in a better position to
assess their credibility.[18] We cannot weigh again the
merits of their testimonies.
Having thoroughly reviewed the records of this case, we
find no persuasive much less compelling reason to
overturn the findings and conclusions of the trial court
and appellate court. We hereby sustain their findings
and conclusions.
Worth stressing, Article 1475 of the Civil Code provides
the manner by which a contract of sale is perfected:
ART. 1475. The contract of sale is
perfected at the moment there is a meeting
of minds upon the thing which is the object
of the contract and upon the price.
From that moment, the parties may
reciprocally demand performance, subject to
the provisions of the law governing the form
of contracts.
In this case, the purchase orders constituted accepted
offers when Tan supplied the electrical materials to
MMC.[19] Hence, petitioner cannot evade its obligation to
pay by claiming lack of consent to the perfected
contracts of sale. The invoices furnished the details of
the transactions.
As regards respondents failure to present the
original documents, suffice it to say that the best
evidence rule applies only if the contents of the writing
are directly in issue. Where the existence of the writing
or its general purport is all that is in issue, secondary
evidence may be introduced in proof.[20] MMC did not
deny the contents of the invoices and purchase
orders. Its lone contention was that Tan did not submit
the original copies to facilitate payment. But we are in
agreement that photocopies of the documents were
admissible in evidence to prove the contract of sale
between the parties.
Neither is there merit to petitioners contention
that respondent was guilty of delay in filing the
collection case. A careful examination of the records
shows that Tan brought suit against MMC less than a
year after the latter stopped making partial
payments. Tan is, therefore, not guilty of laches.
Laches is the neglect to assert a right or claim
which, taken together with lapse of time and other
circumstances causing prejudice to adverse party,
Page 59 of 187
operates as bar in a court of equity.[21] Here, Tan had no
reason to go to court while MMC was paying its
obligation, even if partially, under the contracts of sale.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of

merit. The Decision dated December 20, 2005 and
Resolution dated February 24, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84385 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Page 60 of 187
 G.R. No. 132214. August 1, 2000. * evidence, i.e., an eyewitness account of the commission
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. ZALDY CASINGAL, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Murder; Evidence; Presidential
Decree No. 1866; The amendment in Republic Act No.
8294 was that if homicide or murder is committed with
the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use shall be
considered as a special aggravating circumstance.—On
June 6, 1997, Republic Act 8294 amended P.D. 1866
which codified the laws on illegal possession of
firearms. Among its amendments was that if homicide or
murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, such use shall be considered as a special
aggravating circumstance. The amendment meant: first,
the use of an unlicensed firearm in the commission of
homicide or murder shall not be treated as a separate
offense, but as a special aggravating circumstance;
second, as a single crime, is ommitted (i.e., homicide or
murder with the aggravating circumstance of illegal
possession of firearm), only one penalty shall be
imposed on the accused.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Being favorable to the
accused, Republic Act 8294 should thus be retroactively
applied in the present case.—This Court has previously
ruled that R.A. 8294 is favorable to the accused, and
should thus be retroactively applied in the present case.
It was thus error for the trial court to convict the
accused of two separate offenses, i.e., Murder and Illegal
Possession of Firearm and Ammunitions. The crime for
which the accused may be charged is murder,
aggravated by illegal possession of firearm.
Same; Same; Same; Positive identification requires
essentially proof of identity and not per se an eyewitness
account of the very act of committing the crime.—
Positive identification requires essentially proof of
identity and not per se an eyewitness account of the
very act of committing the crime. A witness may identify
an accused as the perpetrator of the crime by direct
of the crime. There are instances, however, when a
witness may not have actually seen the very act of
commission of a crime, but he may still be able to
identify the accused as the perpetrator as when the
latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with
the victim immediately before and right after the
commission of the crime. In this case, the positive
identification forms part of circumstantial evidence,
which, when taken together with other pieces of
evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to a fair
and reasonable conclusion that the accused is the
author of the crime to the exclusion of all others.
Otherwise, if circumstantial evidence could not be
resorted to in proving the identity of the accused when
direct evidence is not available, then felons would go
scot-free and the community would be denied proper
protection.
Same; Same; Same; Requisites in order that
circumstantial evidence may sustain the conviction of an
accused.—The rules on evidence and jurisprudence
sustain the conviction of an accused through
circumstantial evidence when the following requisites
concur: (1) there must be more than one circumstance;
(2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (3)
the combination of all circumstances produces a
conviction beyond doubt of the guilt of the accused.
Same; Same; Same; It is well-settled that where there
is no evidence that the witness against the accused was
actuated by any improper motive, and absent any
compelling reason to conclude otherwise, his testimony
will be given full faith and credit.—The trial court noted
in its decision that the testimony of Cruz was “. . . direct,
frank, unfaltering and straight-forward . . . His
testimony bore ‘the marks of truth and sincerity,’ having
been delivered spontaneously, naturally and in
straightforward manner.” It also found that there is “. . .
nothing in the records which would show any base
Page 61 of 187
motive or vile reason on the part of the witness to
falsely implicate the herein accused.” It is well-settled
that where there is no evidence that the witness against
the accused was actuated by any improper motive, and
absent any compelling reason to conclude otherwise, his
testimony will be given full faith and credit.
Same; Same; Same; Qualifying
Circumstance; Treachery; Requisites to prove
treachery.—To prove treachery, the following must be
shown: (1) the employment of means of execution that
gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend
himself or to retaliate; and (2) the deliberate and
conscious adoption of the means of execution. It is also
the running case law that where treachery is alleged,
the manner of attack must be proven. Without any
particulars as to the manner in which the aggression
commenced or how the act which resulted in the
victim’s death unfolded, treachery cannot be
appreciated.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Evident
Premeditation; Requisites to prove evident
premeditation.—There is evident premeditation when
the following facts are proven: (1) the time when the
accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act
showing that the accused clung to his determination to
commit the crime; and (3) the lapse of sufficient period
of time between the decision and the execution of the
crime, to allow the accused to reflect upon the
consequences of his act.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of
San Carlos City, Pangasinan, Br. 57.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
Must a man be brought behind bars when no one
saw him pull the trigger of the carbine that felled his
fellowman?
In Criminal Case No. SCC-2411, the accused-
appellant was charged with the crime of Murder in an
Information which states:
"That on or about May 8, 1995, in Barangay Sawat,
municipality of Urbiztondo, province of Pangasinan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent
to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
shoot one Diosdado Palisoc with a U.S. Carbine cal. 30
inflicting upon him the following injuries:
-Gunshot wound on the left chest
POE: 0.5 cm., anterior shoulder
POX: 0.5 cm. 5th ICS-L paravertebral line
- Hypovolemic shock
which caused the death of said Diosdado Palisoc as a
consequence, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code:"[1]
In Criminal Case No. 2412, he was likewise charged
with the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and
Ammunition. The Information states:
"That on or about May 8, 1995, in Barangay Sawat,
municipality of Urbiztondo, province of Pangasinan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then
Page 62 of 187
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in
his possession, custody and control one (1) U.S. Carbine
caliber 30 with ammunition, without first securing the
necessary permit and license to possess the same, which
he used in the commission of the crime of Murder.
Contrary to P.D. 1866.[2]
The accused pled not guilty to both crimes. Trial
proceeded in due course.
The facts of the shooting incident are based mainly
on the narration of prosecution witness Edgardo Mula
Cruz. It appears that on the May 8, 1995 local elections,
at about 8:15 p.m., Cruz was near the gate of Sawat
Elementary School in Barangay Sawat, Urbiztondo,
Pangasinan, waiting for Palisoc, the victim.[3] Palisoc
went home to get food or "baon" for Cruz and
himself.[4] Cruz was talking with his friends and facing
the road when he saw Palisoc coming.[5] He heard a
gunshot, and when he turned his head towards its
direction, he saw Palisoc facing the accused and falling
to the ground. Carrying a U.S. carbine caliber .30, the
accused ran towards the house of one Francisca
Galpao.[6] The area where the shooting incident took
place was lighted by an electric bulb near the school
gate. Cruz stood seven meters from both the victim and
the accused whom he (Cruz) knew personally as they
were neighbors.[7] After the accused left the crime scene,
Cruz sought assistance from the policemen assigned at
the Sawat Elementary School for the elections.[8] One of
the policemen brought Palisoc to the Virgen Milagrosa
Medical Hospital.[9] Palisoc expired in the operating
room, the gunshot wound on his chest causing his
death.[10] Cruz returned to the Sawat school to act as
pollwatcher.[11] The following day, he executed an
affidavit narrating the shooting incident.[12]
An investigation team was dispatched to the crime
scene where some bloodstains, a fired bullet caliber .30
and fired caliber .30 cartridge were found.[13] On May 9,
1995, the accused was arrested in the house of one Mimi
Payaoan in Barangay Salavante, Urbiztondo,
Pangasinan. On the same day, pursuant to a search
warrant, one (1) carbine caliber .30 with serial number
5611988 with one long magazine and 30 rounds of live
ammunition were found in the house of Francisca
Galpao.[14] The firearm with the magazine and
ammunitions, as well as the fired bullet and cartridge
were submitted for ballistic examination conducted by
Police Inspector Pascual G. Mangal-ip.[15]
Police Inspector Mangal-ip testified that the fired
cartridge and slug found at the crime scene were the
same with the cartridge and slug found in the house of
Francisca Galpao and test-fired from the carbine
submitted for ballistic examination. He concluded that
the cartridge and slug found at the crime scene came
from carbine caliber .30 with serial number
5611988.[16] Chief Inspector Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid
also testified that the paraffin test on the presence of
gunpowder nitrates on the hands of the accused and on
said carbine caliber .30 yielded positive results.[17]
The version of the defense was presented through
the sole testimony of the accused. He did not dispute
that the victim was shot on the night of May 8, 1995 with
the use of carbine caliber .30 with serial number
5611988.[18] Nor did he deny his presence at the crime
scene.[19] He, however, pointed to another person as the
triggerman.
The accused testified that on May 3, 1995, while in
Baguio City, he received a letter from a certain Ernesto
Payaoan, requesting him to go to Urbiztondo,
Pangasinan to help in the local elections.[20] The accused
obliged and arrived in Urbiztondo on May 7, 1995. He
spent the night in the house of Francisca Galpao.[21] The
Page 63 of 187
next morning, Payaoan came and instructed the accused
to clean carbine caliber .30 with serial number 5611988
and to fire it to test its condition. The accused did as
instructed and then gave the firearm back to
Payaoan.[22] He asked Payaoan why the gun was being
tested and Payaoan revealed that he would kill
Diosdado Palisoc. The accused tried to stop Payaoan as
Palisoc was his second cousin, but to no avail.[23]
On May 8, 1995, at about 7:30 in the evening, the
accused and Payaoan went to Sawat Elementary
School. Payaoan brought the carbine with him.[24] When
they saw Palisoc, Payaoan shot the victim and passed
the firearm to the accused. He ordered the accused to
run and bring the gun to the house of Francisca
Galpao.[25] His story was reduced to an affidavit which
he executed about seven (7) months after the shooting
incident or on December 20, 1995.[26] On January 25,
1996, he executed another affidavit[27]retracting his
December 20, 1995 affidavit. On February 13, 1996, he
made another affidavit[28] recanting his second
affidavit. The accused likewise claimed that while in
detention in the Municipal Jail of Urbiztondo,
Pangasinan, he confided to SPO1 Teofilo Garcia that it
was Payaoan who killed Palisoc.[29]
Payaoan testified as a rebuttal witness. He declared
that on May 7 and 8, 1995, he was at the Regional PNP
Command on standby detail because they were on red
alert for election duties.[30] At that time, he was a
member of the General Services Group, PNP Recom 1,
San Fernando, La Union. He buttressed his claim with a
certification that on May 6-9, 1995, he was in the camp
vicinity in San Fernando, La Union for election
duties.[31]
The prosecution likewise presented SPO1 Teofilo
Garcia. He confirmed that the accused was a detention
prisoner in the Municipal Jail of Urbiztondo,
Pangasinan from May up to June 1995, but denied that
the accused confided to him that it was Payaoan who
shot Palisoc.[32]
The trial court found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of both Murder and Illegal Possession
of Firearm and Ammunitions.[33] Hence, this appeal with
the lone assignment of error, viz:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF MURDER AND VIOLATION
OF P.D. 1866 DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
PROSECUTION FAILED TO SUBSTANTIATE HIS
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
Prefatorily, we shall discuss the applicable law. On
June 6, 1997, Republic Act 8294 amended P.D. 1866
which codified the laws on illegal possession of
firearms. Among its amendments was that if homicide or
murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, such use shall be considered as a special
aggravating circumstance.[34] The amendment
meant: first, the use of an unlicensed firearm in the
commission of homicide or murder shall not be treated
as a separate offense, but as a special aggravating
circumstance; second, as a single crime is committed
(i.e., homicide or murder with the aggravating
circumstance of illegal possession of firearm), only one
penalty shall be imposed on the accused.[35]
In its Joint Decision, the trial court convicted the
accused of murder and illegal possession of firearm and
ammunitions. It stressed that R.A. 8294 cannot be given
retroactive effect for it was enacted in 1997 while the
crimes charged against the accused were committed in
1995. It held that to give R.A. 8294 retroactive effect
would be prejudicial to the accused and violative of Art.
III, Sec. 22 of the 1987 Constitution which provides that,
"(n)o ex-post facto law or bill of attainder shall be
enacted."[36]
Page 64 of 187
 We disagree. This Court has previously ruled that
R.A. 8294 is favorable to the accused, and should thus be
retroactively applied in the present case.[37] It was thus
error for the trial court to convict the accused of two
separate offenses, i.e., Murder and Illegal Possession of
Firearm and Ammunitions. The crime for which the
accused may be charged is murder, aggravated by
illegal possession of firearm.
We now examine the evidence to determine the guilt
of the accused. The accused makes much of the fact that
no one saw him in the act of shooting. It is true that
there was no eyewitness to the shooting of the victim,
but the testimony of prosecution witness Cruz is
sufficient to convict the accused as responsible for the
death of Palisoc. He stated in his affidavit executed the
day after the shooting incident, viz:
"Q. Do you know who shot Diosdado Palisoc?
A. Yes sir, Zaldy Casingal also resident of Barangay
Salavante, Urbiztondo, Pangasinan.[38]
proceeded (sic) to the house of Ating Galpaw (sic)
after Diosdado Palisoc was shot?
A. There was an electric bulb near the gate, sir.
Q. How far were you to (sic) Zaldy Casingal when you
saw him holding a firearm proceeding to the
house of Ating Galpaw?
A. About seven (7) meters, sir.
Q. And how far were you to (sic) Diosdado Palisoc
when he was shot?
A. The same, sir.[39]
xxx
Q. You mentioned Zaldy Casingal as a person whom
you saw carrying a firearm/carbine after
Diosdado Palisoc was shot, do you know this
Zaldy Casingal personally?
A. Yes, sir.

He likewise testified as follows: Q. Why do you know him?

PROS. SORIANO: A. He is our neighbor, sir.

Q. When he fell down, what did you do?
A. I called up a police, sir.
Q. Before you called up a police, could you tell this
Honorable Court the direction where the shot
came from?
A. Yes, sir. When I turned my head where the shot
came from, I saw Zaldy Casingal holding a
carbine going to the house of Ating Galpaw (sic).
xxx
Q. If he is now in (sic) courtroom, will you please
point to him?
A. (Witness pointing to a man with a mustache, and
when he asked his name he answered Zaldy
Casingal).[40]
xxx
ATTY. VALDEZ:
Q. You said that you did not actually see who shot
Diosdado Palisoc, is that correct?

Q. How were you able to recognize Zaldy Casingal A. Yes, sir.[41]

whom you said was holding a carbine and xxx
Page 65 of 187
 ATTY. VALDEZ:
Q. After you saw Diosdado Palisoc shot, did you
look to the direction where the shot came from?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you saw a person running, is that correct?
xxx
A. There is sir, it was Zaldy Casingal bringing a
gun.[42]
ATTY. VALDEZ:
Q. When you said that you saw Zaldy Casingal
bringing a gun, how far was he from the place
where you were standing?
A. At about seven (7) meters, sir.
Q. You said that there was an electric bulb in the
Sawat Elementary School, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And this electric bulb was installed inside the
school room?
A. It is in (sic) the gate, sir.
Q. How far is this electric bulb, Mr. witness (sic)?
A. It is about four (4) meters, sir.
Q. And in the place where you saw Zaldy Casingal
running with the gun, there was (sic) various
obstruction on (sic) the illumination of that light,
is that correct?
A. None, sir, because it is a road."[43]
For the accused to be convicted of murder, he must
be positively identified as the assailant of the
victim. Positive identification requires essentially proof
of identity and not per se an eyewitness account of the
very act of committing the crime. A witness may identify
an accused as the perpetrator of the crime by direct
evidence, i.e., an eyewitness account of the commission
of the crime. There are instances, however, when a
witness may not have actually seen the very act of
commission of a crime, but he may still be able to
identify the accused as the perpetrator as when the
latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with
the victim immediately before and right after the
commission of the crime. In this case, the positive
identification forms part of circumstantial evidence,
which, when taken together with other pieces of
evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to a fair
and reasonable conclusion that the accused is the
author of the crime to the exclusion of all
others. Otherwise, if circumstantial evidence could not
be resorted to in proving the identity of the accused
when direct evidence is not available, then felons would
go scot-free and the community would be denied proper
protection.[44] The rules on evidence and jurisprudence
sustain the conviction of an accused through
circumstantial evidence when the following requisites
concur: (1) there must be more than one circumstance;
(2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (3)
the combination of all circumstances produces a
conviction beyond doubt of the guilt of the accused.[45]
In fine, it is not decisive that Cruz did not actually
see the accused shoot the victim. But immediately after
the victim was shot, Cruz saw the accused holding the
carbine which felled the victim, and then accused ran
towards the house of Francisca Galpao. The trial court
noted in its decision that the testimony of Cruz was ". . .
direct, frank, unfaltering and straightforward . . . His
testimony bore the marks of truth and sincerity, having
been delivered spontaneously, naturally and in
straightforward manner.[46] It also found that there is . . .
nothing in the records which would show any base
Page 66 of 187
motive or vile reason on the part of the witness to
falsely implicate the herein accused."[47] It is well-settled
that where there is no evidence that the witness against
the accused was actuated by any improper motive, and
absent any compelling reason to conclude otherwise, his
testimony will be given full faith and credit.[48]
Cruzs positive identification of the accused as the
victim's assailant is corroborated by several pieces of
circumstantial evidence. Immediately after Cruz heard
a gunshot, he saw the accused carrying a U.S. carbine
caliber .30 and running towards the house of one
Francisca Galpaw. The day after the shooting incident,
carbine caliber .30 with serial number 5611988 with one
long magazine and 30 rounds of live ammunition of the
same caliber were seized in the house of Francisca
Galpao. The paraffin test conducted upon the seized
carbine and upon the accused yielded positive
results. The ballistic examination also showed that the
fired cartridge and slug found at the crime scene were
the same with the cartridge and slug that were found in
the house of Francisca Galpao and test-fired from the
seized carbine submitted for ballistic
examination. These pieces of circumstantial evidence
point to the accused as Palisocs assailant.
The defense's attempt to cast doubt upon the
prosecution's theory by passing the buck to Ernesto
Payaoan is futile for lack of supporting evidence. The
accuseds lone testimony that the supposed triggerman,
Ernesto Payaoan, only handed to him the carbine used
in killing the victim and that he accepted and ran away
with it is not credible. As held in People v.
Maliput,[49] "far from bordering merely on the imaginary,
captious or plainly being a possible doubt, any
reasonable doubt must be nothing less than a fair doubt
based on reason and common sense (emphasis
supplied)."[50] Certainly, it is beyond reason and common
sense for the accused to have taken hold of the carbine
in full view of the people near the crime scene mindless
of the danger that it would incriminate him.
However, we hold that the evidence to prove
treachery or alevosia which will qualify the killing to
murder is insufficient. To prove treachery, the following
must be shown: (1) the employment of means of
execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity
to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the deliberate
and conscious adoption of the means of execution.[51] It
is also the running case law that where treachery is
alleged, the manner of attack must be proven. Without
any particulars as to the manner in which the
aggression commenced or how the act which resulted in
the victim's death unfolded, treachery cannot be
appreciated.[52] In the case at bar, prosecution witness
Cruz testified on what transpired immediately after the
killing of the victim. He had no knowledge of the
circumstances before the shooting and the shooting
itself. There is therefore no proof that the victim had no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate. Nor is
there any evidence to show that the victim was
unarmed. Even assuming arguendo that the attack is
sudden, there is no evidence that the means of execution
was deliberately adopted.[53] The finding of the trial
court that the accused shot the victim several times
does not find support from the evidence on record.
Evident premeditation cannot likewise be
appreciated. There is evident premeditation when the
following facts are proven: (1) the time when the
accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act
showing that the accused clung to his determination to
commit the crime; and (3) the lapse of sufficient period
of time between the decision and the execution of the
crime, to allow the accused to reflect upon the
consequences of his act.[54] The trial court appreciated
this aggravating circumstance based on the accused's
testimony. A close scrutiny of the accused's testimony,
Page 67 of 187
however, will show that he testified that it was not him
but Payaoan who planned to kill the victim and clung to
his determination to kill, and that there was sufficient
interval of time between the premeditation and the
execution of the crime to allow Payaoan to reflect upon
the consequences of his act. There is no proof
whatsoever with respect to the accuseds plan to kill the
victim and when he conceived of such plan.
There being no circumstance to qualify the killing to
murder, the accused should be convicted of
homicide. The penalty imposed upon the accused should
correspondingly be lowered to reclusion temporal. As
there is no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the
proper imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its
medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the minimum term is anywhere within the range
of prision mayor, or from six (6) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years, and the maximum within the range
of reclusion temporal in its medium period, or from
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months.[55]
We come now to the charge of illegal possession of
firearm. As aforediscussed, the accused cannot be
charged separately with this offense. It can only be
treated as a special qualifying circumstance. Even then,
the prosecution was not able to prove that the accused
lacked the license or permit to own or possess the
firearm. While the prosecution presented a photocopy of
a certification issued by the PNP Firearms and
Explosives Unit stating that the accused was not a
licensed holder of a firearm of any kind and caliber,[56]it
failed to submit the original of the same. Rule 130, Sec. 3
of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions.
- When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than
the original document itself, except in the following
cases. . .
The subject certification does not fall under the
exceptions. Hence, we cannot give any evidentiary value
to the photocopy of the certification.[57] Neither did the
prosecution present the testimony of a representative of
the PNP Firearms and Explosive Unit to establish that
the accused is not licensed to possess carbine caliber .30
with serial number 5611988. This omission is fatal to the
prosecution.[58] In fine, the crime of the accused cannot
be qualified as having been committed with an
unlicensed, illegally possessed firearm.
Prescinding from these premises, we have to modify
the pecuniary liabilities imposed by the trial court. As
the accused is liable only for homicide, he cannot be
ordered to pay a fine of P30,000.00. The award of
exemplary damages cannot also be given. Under Art.
2230 of the Civil Code, "(i)n criminal offenses, exemplary
damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed
when the crime was committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances. The evidence on record
does not show any aggravating circumstance. We
sustain the award of moral damages as the prosecution
was able to prove that the victims death caused the
latter's family extreme grief, sleepless nights and loss of
appetite.[59]Funeral and other related expenses are
likewise adequately supported by the evidence on
record.[60]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the impugned Joint Decision is MODIFIED. The
accused-appellant is found guilty of the crime of Homicide and sentenced to
an indeterminate sentence of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor medium as minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal medium as maximum.The trial court's award
of P50,000.00 for civil indemnity, P20,000.00 for moral damages,
and P25,000.00 for funeral and other related expenses is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Page 68 of 187
 G.R. No. 187850. August 17, 2016.*
ANITA U. LORENZANA, petitioner, vs. RODOLFO
LELINA, respondent.
Remedial Law; Petition for Review on Certiorari; Questions of
fact is not within the province of a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.—The issues raised invite
a redetermination of questions of fact which is not within the
province of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Factual findings of the trial court affirmed
by the CA are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on
appeal.
Same; Same; As an exception, a review of the factual findings
may be made when the judgment of the Court of Appeals (CA) is
premised on a misapprehension of facts or a failure to consider
relevant facts which would justify a different conclusion.—In certain
cases, we held that as an exception, a review of such factual findings
may be made when the judgment of the CA is premised on a
misapprehension of facts or a failure to consider certain relevant
facts, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.
Same; Best Evidence Rule; The best evidence rule requires that
when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence
is admissible other than the original document itself.—The best
evidence rule requires that when the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence is admissible other than the
original document itself except in the instances mentioned in
Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. As such, mere
photocopies of documents are inadmissible pursuant to the best
evidence rule.
Same; Same; Courts are not precluded to accept in evidence a
mere photocopy of a document when no objection was raised when it
was formally offered.—Evidence not objected to is deemed admitted
and may be validly considered by the court in arriving at its
judgment. Courts are not precluded to accept in evidence a mere
photocopy of a document when no objection was raised when it was
formally offered.
Same; Civil Procedure; The appellate court may not consider
any other ground of objection, except those that were raised at the
proper time.—Moreover, grounds for objection must be specified in
any case. Grounds for objections not raised at the proper time shall
be considered waived, even if the evidence was objected to on some
other ground. Thus, even on appeal, the appellate court may not
consider any other ground of objection, except those that were
raised at the proper time.
Land Registration; What really defines a piece of land is not
the area but its boundaries laid down, as enclosing the land and
indicating its limits.—We have consistently ruled that what really
defines a piece of land is not the area, calculated with more or less
certainty mentioned in the description, but its boundaries laid down,
as enclosing the land and indicating its limits. Where land is sold for
a lump sum and not so much per unit of measure or number, the
boundaries of the land stated in the contract determine the effects
and scope of the sale, and not its area.
Civil Procedure; Money judgments are enforceable only
against the property belonging to the judgment debtor alone.—Money
judgments are enforceable only against property unquestionably
belonging to the judgment debtor alone. If property belonging to any
third person is mistakenly levied upon to answer for another man’s
indebtedness, the Rules of Court gives such person all the right to
challenge the levy through any of the remedies provided for under
the rules, including an independent “separate action” to vindicate
his or her claim of ownership and/or possession over the foreclosed
property.
Same; Paraphernal property may not be answerable for
obligations of the husband which resulted in the judgment against
him in favor of another person.—As a rule, if at the time of the levy
and sale by the sheriff, the property did not belong to the conjugal
partnership, but was paraphernal property, such property may not
be answerable for the obligations of the husband which resulted in
the judgment against him in favor of another person. The levied
property being exclusive property of Ambrosia, and Ambrosia not
being a party to the collection case, the levied property may not
answer for Aquilino’s obligations.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Andres, Marcelo, Padernal, Guerrero &
Paras for petitioner.
Artuz, Bello, Borja Law Office for respondent.
JARDELEZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45
of the Revised Rules of Court filed by Anita U.
Lorenzana (petitioner) from the Court of Appeals' (CA)
Decision2 dated April 30, 2008 (CA Decision) and the
Page 69 of 187
Resolution3 dated April 27, 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86187.
The CA affirmed the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Decision4 dated March 7, 2005 (RTC Decision) upholding
Rodolfo Lelina's (respondent) ownership over the half of
the 16,047 square meters (sq. m.) of land claimed by
petitioner, and cancelling the Deed of Final Conveyance
and Tax Declaration in petitioner's
name.5chanrobleslaw
Facts
On April 1, 1975, Ambrosia Lelina (Ambrosia), married
to Aquilino Lelina (Aquilino), executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale6 over one-half (1/2) of an undivided parcel
of land covered by Tax Declaration (TD) No. 14324-C
(property) in favor of her son, the respondent. The Deed
of Absolute Sale, however, specified only an area of 810
sq. m. as the one-half (1/2) of the property covered by the
tax declaration.7Nevertheless, the Deed of Absolute Sale
contained the description of the land covered by TD No.
14324-C, as follows: "[b]ounded on the: North by
Constancio Batac-& National highway[,] East by Cecilio
Lorenzana, South by Cr[ee]k, and West by Andres
Cuaresma."8]
Immediately after the execution of the Deed of Absolute
Sale, respondent took possession of the property. Since
then, the tenants of the property, Fidel Labiano,
Venancio Lagria, and Magdalena Lopez, continued to
deliver his share of the produce of the property as well
as produce of the remaining half of the land covered by
TD No. 14324-C until December 1995.9chanrobleslaw
Around August 1996,10 respondent and his three tenants
were invited at the Municipal Agrarian Office of
Tagudin, Ilocos Sur for a conference where they were
informed that the property is already owned by
petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Final Conveyance and
TD No. 11-21367-A both in the name of
petitioner. Alerted by the turn of events, respondent
11
filed a complaint for quieting of title and cancellation of
documents12 on September 24, 1996, with the RTC
Branch 25, Tagudin, Ilocos Sur, claiming that there
appears to be a cloud over his ownership and possession
of the property.
In her Answer,13 petitioner alleged that she acquired a
land with an area of 16,047 sq. m. through a foreclosure
sale. Petitioner claims that she became the judgment
creditor in a case for collection of sum of
money14 (collection case) she filed against Aquilino, and
the decision in her favor became final on March 20, 1975,
with an Entry of Judgment issued on April 10,
1975.15 Thereafter, by virtue of a writ of execution to
enforce the decision in the collection case, the sheriff
levied on a land with an area of 16,047 sq. m. covered by
the TD No. 11-05370-A16 (levied property) under the
name of Ambrosia. Petitioner claimed that she emerged
as the sole and highest bidder when the levied property
was auctioned. An auction sale was conducted on
September 29, 1977 and a Certificate of Sale was issued
in favor of petitioner. The same Certificate of Sale was
registered with the Register of Deeds on October 18,
1977.17 No redemption having been made despite the
lapse of the one year period for redemption, a Deed of
Final Conveyance18 was issued in her favor on October
9, 1978. The same was registered with the Register of
Deeds of Ilocos Sur on October 16, 1978.19chanrobleslaw
During trial, it was undisputed that the property is
found within the levied property.20 The levied property
has the following boundaries: North by Constancio
Batac; East by National Road and heirs of Pedro Mina &
Cecilio Lorenzana; South by Creek; and West by Andres
Cuaresma, Eladio Ma and Creek.21It was further shown
that the Deed of Final Conveyance expressly describes
Page 70 of 187
the levied property as registered and owned by
Ambrosia.22 Petitioner testified that she did not
immediately possess the levied property, but only did so
in 1995.23 On the other hand, respondent testified that
sometime in 1975 and prior to the sale of the property to
him, the other half of the levied property was owned by
Godofredo Lorenzana (Godofredo).24 He also claimed
that he and Godofredo have agreed that he will hold in
trust the latter's share of produce from the other half of
the land.25cralawredchanrobleslaw
After trial, respondent submitted his
Memorandum26 dated December 16, 2004 where he
explained that the land he was claiming was the one-
half (1/2) of the 16,047 sq. m. formerly covered by TD No.
14324-C described in the Deed of Absolute Sale. Thus, he
prayed that his title to the property, i.e. the one-half
(1/2) of the levied property, be upheld.
The RTC upheld respondent's ownership over the half of
the levied property.27 It ruled that the levied
property is exclusively owned by Ambrosia, and could
not be held to answer for the obligations of her husband
in the collection case. As a result, it declared the Deed of
Final Conveyance dated October 9, 1978, as well as the
proceedings taken during the alleged auction sale of
levied property, invalid and without force and effect on
Ambrosia's paraphernal property.29 It also cancelled the
TD No. 11-21367-A in the name of petitioner.30]
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal from the RTC
Decision. In her Appellant's Brief,31 petitioner argued
that the trial court erred: (1) in awarding one-half (1/2)
of the levied property, which is more than the 810 sq. m.
prayed for in the complaint; (2) in ruling that the Deed
of Final Conveyance in favor of petitioner is invalid; and
(3) in awarding litigation expenses and attorney's fees in
favor of respondent.
The CA affirmed the findings of the RTC and upheld
respondent's ownership over the property.32 It ruled
that the power of the court in the execution of its
judgment extends only to properties unquestionably
belonging to the judgment debtor. Since Ambrosia
exclusively owned the levied property, the sheriff in the
collection case, on behalf of the court, acted beyond its
power and authority when it levied on the property.
Consequently, petitioner cannot rely on the execution
sale in proving that she has better right over the
property because such execution sale is void.33 Finding
petitioner's claim over the property as invalid, the CA
upheld respondent's right to the removal of the cloud on
his title.34 The CA deleted the award of litigation
expenses and attorney's fees, there being no finding of
facts in the RTC Decision that warrants the same.35
Hence, this petition.
Arguments
Petitioner argues that respondent's sole basis for his
claim of ownership over the property is the Deed of
Absolute Sale, the original of which was not presented
in court. Since only the photocopy of the Deed
of Absolute Sale was presented, its contents are
inadmissible for violating the best evidence rule. Thus,
respondent's claim of ownership should be
denied. chanrobleslaw
36
Petitioner next claims that even if the Deed of Absolute
Sale be considered in evidence, it only proves
respondent's ownership over the 810 sq. m., and not the
half of the 16,047 sq. m. levied property. Accordingly, the
area of the lot awarded should be limited to what was
prayed for in the Complaint.37chanrobleslaw
Lastly, petitioner assails the finding that Ambrosia is
Page 71 of 187
the exclusive owner of the levied property. She asserts exception urging us to pass upon anew the RTC and
that at the very least, the levied property is jointly CA's findings, regarding the ownership of the property
owned by the spouses Ambrosia and Aquilino and and levied property which led the lower courts to cancel
therefore, it may be validly held answerable for the the Deed of Final Conveyance and TD No. 11-21367-A
obligations incurred by Aquilino. Accordingly, she under petitioner's name.
asserts that the Deed of Final Conveyance should not
have been totally invalidated but should have been We find no reversible error committed by the RTC and
upheld as to the other half of the levied property.38 In CA in ruling that the Deed of Absolute Sale proves
this connection, she maintains that the lower courts respondent's ownership over the property, and that
should not have ordered the remaining half of the levied petitioner failed to establish a registrable title on the
property be held in trust by respondent because the property and levied property.
alleged landholding of Godofredo was not proven to be
the same or even part of the levied I. Respondent is the owner of half
property.39chanrobleslaw of the levied property.

Issues We affirm the finding that respondent is the owner of

the property equivalent to half of the levied property.
I. Whether respondent is the owner of one-half (1/2)
of the levied property comprising of 16,047 sq. m. A. Waiver of objection to the Best
Evidence Rule.
II. Whether the Deed of Final Conveyance and TD
No. 11- 21367-A, both in the name of petitioner, Petitioner claims that the photocopy of the Deed of
were correctly cancelled. Absolute Sale should not have been admitted in
evidence to prove respondent's ownership over the
property. We disagree.
Ruling
We deny the petition. The best evidence rule requires that when the subject of
The issues raised invite a re-determination of questions inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence is
of fact which is not within the province of a petition for admissible other than the original document itself
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules except in the instances mentioned in Section 3, Rule 130
of Court. Factual findings of the trial court affirmed by of the Revised Rules of Court. As such, mere
the CA are final and conclusive and may not be photocopies of documents are inadmissible pursuant to
reviewed on appeal.40 In certain cases, we held that as the best evidence rule.42 Nevertheless, evidence not
an exception, a review of such factual findings may be objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly
made when the judgment of the CA is premised on a considered by the court in arriving at its
misapprehension of facts or a failure to consider certain judgment.43 Courts are not precluded to accept in
relevant facts, which, if properly considered, would evidence a mere photocopy of a document when no
justify a different conclusion.41 Petitioner invokes this objection was raised when it was formally

Page 72 of 187
offered.44chanrobleslaw
In order to exclude evidence, the objection
to admissibility of evidence must be made at the proper
time, and the grounds specified.45 Objection to evidence
must be made at the time it is formally offered.46 In case
of documentary evidence, offer is made after all the
witnesses of the party making the offer have testified,
specifying the purpose for which the evidence is being
offered.47 It is only at this time, and not at any other,
that objection to the documentary evidence may be
made. And when a party failed to interpose a timely
objection to evidence at the time they were offered in
evidence, such objection shall be considered as
waived.48 This is true even if by its nature the evidence
is inadmissible and would have surely been rejected if it
had been challenged at the proper time.49 Moreover,
grounds for objection must be specified in any
case.50 Grounds for objections not raised at the proper
time shall be considered waived, even if the evidence
was objected to on some other ground.51 Thus, even on
appeal, the appellate court may not consider any other
ground of objection, except those that were raised at the
proper time.52chanrobleslaw
In this case, the objection to the Deed of Absolute Sale
was belatedly raised. Respondent submitted his Formal
Offer of Evidence53 on February 12, 2003 which included
the Deed of Absolute Sale as Exhibit A. While petitioner
filed a Comment and Objection54 on February 21, 2003,
she only objected to the Deed of Absolute Sale for being
self-serving. In the Order55 dated February 27, 2003, the
RTC admitted the Deed of Absolute Sale, rejecting the
objection of petitioner. Having failed to object on the
ground of inadmissibility under the best evidence rule,
petitioner is now deemed to have waived her objection
on this ground and cannot raise it for the first time on
appeal.56chanrobleslaw
B. The Deed of Absolute Sale
sufficiently proves respondent's
ownership over the property.
We stress that petitioner does not question the validity
of the sale, but merely the admissibility of the deed.
Having been admitted in evidence as to its contents, the
Deed of Absolute Sale sufficiently proves respondent's
ownership over the property. The deed, coupled with
respondent's possession over the property since its sale
in 1975 until 1995, proves his ownership.
Petitioner maintains that without conceding the
correctness of the CA Decision, respondent's ownership
of the land should only be limited to 810 sq. m. in
accordance with his complaint and evidence presented.
Thus, the CA went over and beyond the allegations in
the complaint making its finding devoid of factual
basis.57chanrobleslaw
We note that petitioner actively participated in the
proceedings below. During the course of trial she was
confronted with the issue of ownership of the levied
property, and she admitted that the property is found
within the former.58 From the beginning, petitioner was
apprised of respondent's claim over the half of the land
described in the Deed of Absolute Sale, which has the
same boundaries as the land described in TD No. 11-
05730-A. While respondent in his complaint stated a
claim for an area of only 810 sq. m., he adequately
clarified his claim for the one-half (1/2) of the levied
property in his Memorandum59 dated December 16, 2004
before the RTC. Hence, it could not be said that
petitioner was deprived of due process by not being
notified or given the opportunity to oppose the claim
over half of the levied property.

Page 73 of 187
At any rate, we have consistently ruled that what really
defines a piece of land is not the area, calculated with
more or less certainty mentioned in the description, but
its boundaries laid down, as enclosing the land and
indicating its limits.60 Where land is sold for a lump sum
and not so much per unit of measure or number, the
boundaries of the land stated in the contract determine
the effects and scope of the sale, and not its area.61 This
is consistent with Article 1542 of the Civil Code which
provides:
Art. 1542. In the sale of real estate, made for a lump sum
and not at the rate of a certain sum for a unit of
measure or number, there shall be no increase or
decrease of the price, although there be a greater or
lesser areas or number than that stated in the contract.
The same rule shall be applied when two or more
immovables are sold for a single price; but if, besides
mentioning the boundaries, which is indispensable in
every conveyance of real estate, its area or number
should be designated in the contract, the vendor shall
be bound to deliver all that is included within said
boundaries, even when it exceeds the area or number
specified in the contract; and, should he not be able to
do so, he shall suffer a reduction in the price, in
proportion to what is lacking in the area or number,
unless the contract is rescinded because the vendee
does not accede to the failure to deliver what has been
stipulated. (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, the land covered by TD No. 14324-C in the
Deed of Absolute Sale, from where the one-half (1/2)
portion belonging to respondent is taken, has the
following boundaries: North by Constancio Batac &
National Highway; East by Cecilio Lorenzana; South by
Creek; and West by Andres Cuaresma.62 This is the same
extent and location of the lot covered in the Deed of
Final Conveyance, TD No. 11-05730-A in Ambrosia's
name, and petitioner's TD No. 11-21367-A. This
description should prevail over the area specified in the
Deed of Absolute Sale. Thus, we agree with the courts
below that respondent owns half of the levied property.
Respondent having been able to make a prima facie case
as to his ownership over the property, it was incumbent
upon petitioner to prove her claim of ownership over
the levied property by preponderance of evidence.
In Dantis v. Maghinang, Jr.,63 citing Jison v. Court of
Appeals,64 we held:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue
has the burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil
case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the
course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a
prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of
evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff’s
prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned
in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party
having the burden of proof must produce a
preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff
having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and
not upon the weakness of the defendant's. The concept
of "preponderance of evidence" refers to evidence which
is of greater weight, or more convincing, that which is
offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means
probability of truth.65chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
As correctly found by both the RTC and CA, petitioner
failed to establish her claim over the levied property.
Petitioner has been inconsistent in her versions as to
how she acquired ownership over the levied property.
In her Answer, she claims that she is the owner of the
levied property by virtue of having been the highest
bidder in the public auction to execute the decision in
the collection case.66During her testimony, however, she
contradicts herself by claiming that the levied property
was awarded to her husband by her father-in-law or the
Page 74 of 187
brother of Ambrosia, and the latter's husband Aquilino
was merely appointed as administrator of the
land.67 The inconsistencies between these claims are
glaring because if the levied property was truly
awarded to her by her father-in-law, she could have just
vindicated her claim in an independent action, and not
participate in the public auction. Moreover, this is
inconsistent with her claim that Aquilino was the owner
of the levied property which is answerable for
Aquilino's debt.68 Thus, the RTC and CA correctly did
not give credence to these versions but instead
considered that her claim of ownership is anchored only
on the Deed of Final Conveyance.
Petitioner's ownership anchored on this Deed of Final
Conveyance, however, likewise fails.
II. The Deed of Final
Conveyance and TD No.
11-21367-A were correctly
cancelled.
Money judgments are enforceable only against property
unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor
alone.69 If property belonging to any third person is
mistakenly levied upon to answer for another man's
indebtedness, the Rules of Court gives such person all
the right to challenge the levy through any of the
remedies provided for under the rules, including an
independent "separate action" to vindicate his or her
claim of ownership and/or possession over the
foreclosed property.70chanrobleslaw
The determinative question here is to whom the
property belongs at the time of the levy and execution
sale. To recall, respondent acquired the property
through the Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 1, 1975,
while petitioner bought the levied property at the
public auction held on September 29, 1977. Obviously,
respondent already owned the property at the time
petitioner bought the levied property, and thus cannot
be levied and attached for the obligations of Aquilino in
the collection case.
As to the other half of the levied property, we uphold
the CA and the RTC's finding that prior to its transfer to
respondent and one Godofredo Lorenzana, the levied
property was paraphernal property of Ambrosia. The
records show that Ambrosia owned the levied property
as evidenced by: (1) TD No. 11-05370-A in her name; (2) a
provision in the Deed of Final Conveyance that it is
Ambrosia who exclusively owns the land;71 and (3) an
admission from petitioner herself in her Appellant's
Brief that Ambrosia is the declared owner of the levied
property.72 These pieces of evidence vis-a¬vis
petitioner's inconsistent theories of ownership,
undoubtedly have more weight, and in fact had been
given more weight by the courts below.
As a rule, if at the time of the levy and sale by the
sheriff, the property did not belong to the conjugal
partnership, but was paraphernal property, such
property may not be answerable for the obligations of
the husband which resulted in the judgment against
him in favor of another person.73 The levied property
being exclusive property of Ambrosia, and Ambrosia not
being a party to the collection case, the levied property
may not answer for Aquilino's obligations. Even
assuming that the levied property belonged to the
conjugal partnership of Ambrosia and Aquilino, it may
still not be levied upon because petitioner did not
present proof that the obligation redounded to the
benefit of the family. More importantly, Aquilino's
interest over a portion of the levied property as
conjugal property is merely inchoate prior to the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership.74chanrobleslaw
Page 75 of 187
 hereby AFFIRMED.
Thus, we find that the levied property may not answer
for the obligations of Aquilino because the latter does SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlib
not own it at the time of the levy. Hence, the Deed of
Final Conveyance and TD No. 11-21367-A were correctly
cancelled for being the outcome of an invalid levy.

A final note.
Petitioner does not have a legal claim of ownership over
the property because her alleged title results from an
invalid levy and execution. Thus, it is of no moment that
respondent never registered the Deed of Absolute Sale,
or that he never declared it for taxation purposes—
petitioner does not have a valid claim over the property
that would benefit from respondent's lapses.

This likewise holds true as to the other half of the levied

property determined to be the property of Godofredo.
Petitioner's claim that there is no basis in ordering
respondent to hold in trust the other half of the levied
property in favor of Godofredo fails. Records show that
the CA gave credence to respondent's testimony that the
other half of the levied property was sold to Godofredo,
and that the latter agreed that respondent shall receive
the proceeds of the produce on behalf of
Godofredo.75 Upon such findings, it became incumbent
upon petitioner to show otherwise by proving her
ownership. This, however, she failed to do. Thus,
petitioner cannot claim that the courts below erred in
not awarding Godofredo's portion to her.

From the foregoing, we uphold respondent's ownership

over the subject property, as well as the cancellation of
Deed of Final Conveyance and TD No. 11-21367-A under
the name of petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed

Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are

Page 76 of 187
 G.R. Nos. 150613-14. June 29, 2004. * victim sufficiently substitutes for the elements of violence
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
appellee, vs. MANUEL MANTIS, appellant.
Criminal Law; Rape; Evidence; Consensual sexual
congress as an affirmative defense needs convincing
proof such as love notes, mementos and credible
witnesses attesting to the consensual romantic
relationship between the offender and his supposed
victim.—Consensual sexual congress as an affirmative
defense needs convincing proof such as love notes,
mementos, and credible witnesses attesting to the
consensual romantic relationship between the offender
and his supposed victim. Having admitted to carnal
knowledge of the complainant, the burden shifts to the
appellant to prove his defense by substantial evidence.
In the instant cases, however, we find that other than
appellant’s preposterous tale, there is no scintilla of
evidence whatsoever to support his changed theory
based on the victim’s alleged consent.
Same; Same; Same; The amount of force required in
rape cases is relative; It need not be overpowering or
irresistible; All that is necessary is that the force
employed as an element of the offense be sufficient to
consummate the purpose which the accused had in
mind.—Appellant’s claim that Mary Jane consented to
the sex act, without his use of force or intimidation, is
not supported by the evidence on record. Mary Jane
categorically and forthrightly testified that she resisted
appellant’s advances, but was unsuccessful because the
appellant was holding her tightly. The amount of force
required in rape cases is relative. It need not be
overpowering or irresistible. All that is necessary is that
the force employed as an element of the offense be
sufficient to consummate the purpose which the
accused had in mind.
Same; Same; Same; Well established is the rule, that
in instances of rape committed by a father, or a father’s
surrogate, his moral ascendancy and influence over the
and intimidation.—This Court has previously observed
that victims of tender age are easily intimidated and
cowed into silence even by the mildest threat against
their lives. Appellant himself admits that he had played
a father role to Mary Jane since her childhood.
Appellant exercised moral ascendancy and influence
over her. Well established is the rule, that in instances
of rape committed by a father, or a father’s surrogate,
his moral ascendancy and influence over the victim
sufficiently substitutes for the elements of violence and
intimidation.
Same; Same; Same; Victims certainly do not cherish
keeping in their memory an accurate account of the
dates, number of times, and the manner in which they
were sexually violated.—The resulting pregnancy is not
an element of rape. In this case, appellant’s contention
is debunked by Mary Jane’s testimony in open court.
She testified that appellant raped her not only on the
dates stated in the charge sheets, but also on several
other occasions. She could not be faulted if she could
not recall the precise dates of these incidents,
considering her age and the trauma she suffered.
Victims certainly do not cherish keeping in their
memory an accurate account of the dates, number of
times, and the manner in which they were sexually
violated.
Same; Same; Same; A rape victim cannot be expected
to summon the courage to report a sexual assault
committed against her person, where the act was
accompanied by a death threat.—The OSG stresses that
delay in reporting rape does not undermine the charge
if such delay is satisfactorily explained. Here, the delay
is explained by the death threats made by the appellant
against the victim and her mother. It is not uncommon
for a young girl to be intimidated and cowed into silence
and conceal for some time the violation of her honor,
even by the mildest threat against her life. Mary Jane’s
Page 77 of 187
testimony is not discredited simply because she failed to AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Regional
immediately report to her mother or the authorities the Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, Br. 52.
abuses she suffered in the hands of the appellant. A rape
victim cannot, after all, be expected to summon the The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
courage to report a sexual assault committed against The Solicitor General for appellee.
her person, where the act was accompanied by a death Public Attorney’s Office for appellant.
threat.
Same; Same; Death Penalty; In order to justify the QUISUMBING, J.:
imposition of the death penalty, there must be
independent evidence proving the age of the victim, other
In its judgment1 dated October 24, 2001, the Regional
than the testimonies of witnesses and the absence of
Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, Branch 52, found
denial by the accused; A certified true copy of the
appellant, Manuel Mantis, guilty beyond reasonable
certificate of live birth showing the complainant’s age or
doubt of two counts of rape and sentenced him for each
some other authentic document such as a baptismal
count to suffer the penalty of death and to indemnify
certificate or a school record has been recognized as
the victim, Mary Jane L. Balbin, the sum of ₱75,000 as
competent evidence.—But an examination of the
civil indemnity and ₱75,000 as moral damages.
prosecution’s exhibits shows that the prosecution has
failed to present in evidence the original copy of Mary
He was charged in two separate informations, both
Jane’s birth certificate. Further, there is no showing
dated August 25, 1999, by the Office of the Provincial
that the original certificate of birth was lost or
Prosecutor of Pampanga as follows:
destroyed, or was unavailable, without the fault of the
prosecution. Decisions of this Court relating to the rape
(1) Criminal Case No. G-4788 That on or about the
of minors invariably state that in order to justify the
3rd day of April, 1999 in the municipality of
imposition of the death penalty, there must be
Floridablanca, province of Pampanga, Philippines
independent evidence proving the age of the victim,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
other than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and
Court, the above-named accused, MANUEL
the absence of denial by the accused. A certified true
MANTIS, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
copy of the certificate of live birth showing the
and feloniously entered (sic) the room of Mary
complainant’s age or some other authentic document
Jane L. Balbin, 12 years old, the daughter of his
such as a baptismal certificate or a school record has
common-law spouse, and by means of force, threat
been recognized as competent evidence. A mere
and intimidation, accused succeeded in having
photocopy of said certificate, however, does not prove
carnal knowledge with Mary Jane L. Balbin,
the victim’s minority, for said photocopy does not
against the latter’s will.
qualify as competent evidence for that purpose. As
repeatedly held by this Court, in a capital case, we are
bound by the standards of strict scrutiny, given the Contrary to law.2
gravity of the death sentence and the irreversibility of
its execution. (2) Criminal Case No. G-4797 That on or about the
16th day of July 1998 in the municipality of
Page 78 of 187
 Floridablanca, province of Pampanga, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, MANUEL
MANTIS, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously entered (sic) the room of Mary
Jane L. Balbin, 11 years old, the daughter of his
common-law spouse, and by means of force,
threat, and intimidation, accused succeeded in
having carnal knowledge with Mary Jane L.
Balbin, against the latter’s will.
Contrary to law.3
With the assistance of counsel, he pleaded not guilty to
the foregoing charges. The cases were then jointly heard
since they involved the same parties and the same
evidence .
The evidence for the prosecution established that:
Private complainant Mary Jane L. Balbin was
born on September 28, 1986, as shown by her
testimony and a photocopy of her birth
certificate.4 She had known the appellant since
she was six (6) years of age since he was the
common-law husband ("live-in" partner ) of her
mother, Merly S. Leona. She had come to consider
him as her own father, calling him "Papa".5 Mary
Jane lived with her mother, her siblings, and
appellant in a three-bedroom house at Valdez,
Floridablanca, Pampanga. At the time of the
incident in Criminal Case No. G-4788, she was a
first year high school student at Guillermo D.
Mendoza High School in Guagua, Pampanga.6
Mary Jane testified that in the afternoon of July 16,
1998, she and her godfather, one Antonio Bartolo,
brought her mother to the hospital because she was
sick.7 That evening, appellant fetched Mary Jane from
the hospital and took her home to Valdez,
Floridablanca.8 A certain George Nanquil remained at
the hospital to watch over Mary Jane’s mother.
Once home, Mary Jane entered her room and was
preparing for bed, when suddenly the appellant entered
her room. To her surprise, appellant was wearing
nothing but a t-shirt.9 Without further ado, appellant
grabbed her and removed her shirt, shorts, and panty.
She tried to free herself from his tight embrace, but to
no avail. Appellant then inserted his phallus inside her
private part, causing her much pain.10 When she
continued to struggle, appellant threatened to kill her
and her mother should she report what he was doing to
her.11 Appellant’s threat cowed her into submission.
Fearful of what she or her mother might suffer in the
hands of appellant, Mary Jane endured her ordeal in
silence.
In the months that followed, Mary Jane did not breathe
a single word to anyone about the harrowing experience
she suffered. Not to the authorities or her mother, not to
her friends, not to her classmates or teachers.12 Her
fearful silence, however, merely emboldened the
appellant into repeating his dastardly act.
During the wee hours of April 3, 1999, while Mary Jane
was asleep in her room with her two (2) sisters,
appellant again entered her room.13 Mary Jane was
awakened when she felt him lie beside her. She saw that
he was wearing nothing but a shirt.14 Appellant swiftly
stripped her of her clothes and proceeded to forcibly
insert his organ into her vagina.15 She struggled against
the unwanted penile invasion, but her resistance was
fruitless as appellant held her very tightly. She did not
shout, despite the fact that her mother was in the
Page 79 of 187
garage,16 because she was scared of his threat to kill her
and her mother.
Living in fear and shame, Mary Jane would have kept
her silence had she not become pregnant. She then
divulged to appellant’s employer, one Ruben Cabrera,
what appellant had done to her.
On July 26, 1999, the victim was examined by Dr. Grace
Salinas, medical officer of the Romana Pangan District
Hospital in San Jose, Floridablanca, Pampanga. Mary
Jane disclosed to Dr. Salinas that appellant had been
sexually abusing her since she was seven (7) years old.
Dr. Salinas confirmed that she was indeed enceinte. Dr.
Salinas’ findings, as reduced to writing, are as follows:
...
3. Last menstrual period = February 3rd week
1999
4. Breast = conical
5. Internal examination = vagina admits one
finger with ease, healed hymenal laceration 12, 3,
6, 9 o’clock
6. Obstetric ultrasound (7-22-99)
Result - a single live fetus in breech presentation
at about 20 weeks and 1 day AOG17
...
Dr. Salinas testified that she could not make a
determination as to how many times the victim
had been forced to engage in unwanted sexual
intercourse, but Mary Jane most likely had a
sexual encounter in February 1999, which
resulted in her pregnancy.18
After her medical examination, Mary Jane filed a sworn
complaint with the police authorities alleging that
appellant raped her on July 16, 1998 and on April 3, 1999
as well.19 She likewise attested that prior to April 3,
1999, the appellant had engaged in forcible sex with her
several times, but she could no longer recall the dates of
these incidents.
On November 29, 1999, Mary Jane gave birth to a baby
girl, whom she named Mary Grace. She identified
appellant as the father.20
Appellant raised the defenses of denial and alibi to both
charges. He testified that he was separated from his
legal spouse, a certain Purisima Gamboa, and started
living in with the victim’s mother, Merly Leona in
September 27, 1992.21 Mary Jane came to live with him
and Merly sometime in August 1995.
Appellant contended that he could not have raped the
victim on the night of July 16, 1998 because he was at
the hospital looking after Merly Leona who was then
confined. He claimed that he stayed in the hospital from
8:30 p.m. of July 16, 1998 to 3:00 p.m. of the following
day.22 Hence, he could not have raped Mary Jane in
their house at Valdez, Floridablanca, Pampanga, as
claimed by her.
As to the second rape charge, appellant insisted that it
could not have happened, since on April 3, 1999, he was
at Maligaya Subdivision, Pulungmasle, Guagua,
Pampanga up to 5:00 p.m.23 He stayed the night at his
employer’s office as was his wont and only went home at
6:30 a.m. the following day to have breakfast.24 The
appellant explained that he and Merly did not spend
Page 80 of 187
their nights at the house where Mary Jane was staying,
since they regularly slept at the office of his employer,
Ruben Cabrera, located some 600 meters away from said
house.25 He insisted that he never slept one single night
in the same house where Mary Jane was
staying. Instead he allowed Jorge Mercado, Joel
26
Casupanan, and Roderick Manalansan to sleep in the
house where Mary Jane stayed, as she and her siblings
had no adult companion at nights.27 He claimed that
Casupanan was Mary Jane’s boyfriend.28 He also made
much of the fact that their neighbor, one Rico Pinili,
was a frequent visitor of Mary Jane’s at night. Appellant
tried to portray the victim as a loose and unchaste
female who could have been made pregnant by any of
the men previously mentioned, as any or all of them
could have enjoyed her favors.
In open court, he claimed that he had an ax to grind
against Casupanan, whom he suspected of having an
affair with Merly Leona. He testified that a few days
after he was incarcerated, Merly Leona started living
with Casupanan and that he had previously caught
them kissing and embracing in the kitchen of his
house.29
Further, appellant testified that the rape charges
against him were concocted by Mary Jane at her
mother’s behest following a violent scolding he gave
them, which prompted them to leave the house. He
insisted that the fact that Mary Jane only complained of
the alleged rapes after she became pregnant casts doubt
upon the veracity of her testimony.
The trial court found the prosecution’s evidence
weighty and convincing. It declared appellant guilty as
charged. Accordingly, it decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, this court hereby (a) finds accused
Manuel Mantis GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of rape as charged in Criminal Case
No. 4797 and Criminal Case No. 4788; and (b)
sentences the accused as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 4797, to suffer the
penalty of death and to indemnify Mary
Jane L. Balbin the amount of ₱75,000.00 and
to pay her the additional sum of ₱75,000.00
for moral damages; and
2. In Criminal Case No. 4788, to suffer the
penalty of death and to indemnify Mary
Jane L. Balbin the amount of ₱75,000.00 and
to pay her the additional sum of ₱75,000.00
for moral damages.
The records of these cases, including the
transcript of stenographic notes, are hereby
ordered forwarded to the Honorable Supreme
Court for automatic review pursuant to Article 47
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659.
With costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.30
Hence, this automatic review pursuant to Art. VIII, Sec.
5 (2d)31 of the Constitution and Rule 122, Sec. 3 (c) and
Sec. 10 of the Rules of Court.32 Before us, appellant
assigns the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF
Page 81 of 187
 THE CRIME OF RAPE WHEN HIS GUILT WAS
NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH
WHEN THE INFORMATION DID NOT STATE
WITH SPECIFICITY THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF AGE AND
RELATIONSHIP. 33
Simply stated, the issues for our resolution concern: (1)
the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence to establish
the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (2)
assuming that appellant is guilty as charged, the
propriety of the penalties imposed upon him.
On the first issue, appellant contends that it was error
for the trial court to find him guilty of rape committed
"by means of force, threat, or intimidation" in Criminal
Case No. G-4788 since a perusal of the prosecution’s
evidence, including the victim’s own testimony, would
clearly show that there was no use of force on his part,
and that the victim did not offer the good faith
resistance required by law and jurisprudence against
sexual assault. He avers that a closer examination of the
private complainant’s statements in open court as to
what transpired that evening of April 3, 1999, would
clearly show that she never shouted for help when she
noticed appellant’s presence beside her,
notwithstanding that her two sisters were sleeping
beside her and her mother was in the garage. Nor did
she create any commotion of any sort which could have
at least caused her sleeping sisters who were in the
same room to wake up or cause her mother to rush to
her room and find out what was wrong. Appellant
insists that this was unusual, considering that he was
unarmed at the time and there is no showing that he
covered the victim’s mouth to prevent her from
shouting. Appellant submits that the foregoing
circumstances taken together, far from showing that the
sexual act was committed by means of force, instead
show that the complaining witness had voluntarily
consented to the sexual act.
For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) counters that the appellant’s theory of consensual
sex is so preposterous as to strain credulity. The OSG
points out that in Criminal Case No. G-4797, the
Information charged appellant with ravishing Mary
Jane on July 16, 1998, when she was but eleven (11)
years old. In other words, appellant was indicted for
statutory rape. The Solicitor General stresses that
under prevailing law, sexual intercourse with a woman
below the age of twelve (12) years is statutory rape and
her consent to the intercourse, is conclusively presumed
by law to be involuntary, as she is considered to have no
will of her own.
Anent Criminal Case No. G-4788, the OSG points out that
the evidence on record shows that the victim tried to
free herself from the appellant’s unwanted clutches, but
was unsuccessful as he held her tightly. Nor should she
be faulted for her failure to shout, says the OSG. The
reason she did not shout is that appellant threatened to
kill her and her mother if she shouted.
The Solicitor General submits that in this case, the
jurisprudential rule – that the degree of force required
in rape cases is relative and need not be overpowering
or irresistible – should be applied. All that is necessary
to show is that the force employed was sufficient to
consummate the purpose which the accused had in
mind. Furthermore, the law does not impose upon the
victim the burden of proving resistance.
Page 82 of 187
We find that the appellant’s last-ditch arguments to
persuade us of his innocence are far from convincing.
His defense is without merit.
Appellant’s change of theory on appeal cannot exculpate
him. In the proceedings below, appellant raised the
defense of alibi and denied having any sexual relations
with the private complainant. Before us, appellant now
admits having carnal knowledge of her but maintains
that it was consensual all along. His shift of theory does
not, however, aid his cause.
Consensual sexual congress as an affirmative defense
needs convincing proof such as love notes, mementos,
and credible witnesses attesting to the consensual
romantic relationship between the offender and his
supposed victim.34 Having admitted to carnal knowledge
of the complainant, the burden shifts to the appellant to
prove his defense by substantial evidence.35 In the
instant cases, however, we find that other than
appellant’s preposterous tale, there is no scintilla of
evidence whatsoever to support his changed theory
based on the victim’s alleged consent. Furthermore,
even assuming arguendo, that there was some form of
amorous relationship, such averment will not
necessarily rule out the use of force or intimidation by
appellant to have sex against her will.36
Appellant’s claim that Mary Jane consented to the sex
act, without his use of force or intimidation, is not
supported by the evidence on record. Mary Jane
categorically and forthrightly testified that she resisted
appellant’s advances, but was unsuccessful because the
appellant was holding her tightly. The amount of force
required in rape cases is relative. It need not be
overpowering or irresistible. All that is necessary is that
the force employed as an element of the offense be
sufficient to consummate the purpose which the
accused had in mind.37
The intimidation employed by the malefactor in rape
must be viewed in the light of the victim’s perception
and judgment at the time of the offense and not by any
hard-and-fast rule or standard. All that is required is
that the intimidation be sufficient to produce fear in the
victim, a fear that if she does not yield to the brute
demands of the appellant, something injurious would
happen to her. This Court has previously observed that
victims of tender age are easily intimidated and cowed
into silence even by the mildest threat against their
lives.38 Appellant himself admits that he had played a
father role to Mary Jane since her childhood. Appellant
exercised moral ascendancy and influence over her.
Well established is the rule, that in instances of rape
committed by a father, or a father’s surrogate, his moral
ascendancy and influence over the victim sufficiently
substitutes for the elements of violence and
intimidation.39
Appellant casts doubt on Mary Jane’s credibility as a
witness when she testified that she was raped on July
16, 1998 and on April 3, 1999, basing on the expert
opinion of Dr. Salinas that the sexual intercourse which
caused Mary Jane’s pregnancy must have occurred in
February 1999. But for the appellee, the OSG counters
that the medical examination of the rape victim, as well
as the medical certificate which ensues, is merely
corroborative in character and is not an indispensable
element for conviction of the rapist. The resulting
pregnancy is not an element of rape. In this case,
appellant’s contention is debunked by Mary Jane’s
testimony in open court. She testified that appellant
raped her not only on the dates stated in the charge
sheets, but also on several other occasions. She could
not be faulted if she could not recall the precise dates of
Page 83 of 187
these incidents, considering her age and the trauma she
suffered. Victims certainly do not cherish keeping in
their memory an accurate account of the dates, number
of times, and the manner in which they were sexually
violated.40
Appellant contends that the private complainant’s delay
in reporting the rape in Criminal Case No. G-4797 for a
period of one (1) year and six (6) days, and her
admission that she only divulged the rapes because she
discovered she was pregnant and was ashamed to be
pregnant at such a young age, destroyed her credibility.
However, the OSG stresses that delay in reporting rape
does not undermine the charge if such delay is
satisfactorily explained. Here, the delay is explained by
the death threats made by the appellant against the
victim and her mother. It is not uncommon for a young
girl to be intimidated and cowed into silence and
conceal for some time the violation of her honor, even
by the mildest threat against her life.41 Mary Jane’s
testimony is not discredited simply because she failed to
immediately report to her mother or the authorities the
abuses she suffered in the hands of the appellant. A rape
victim cannot, after all, be expected to summon the
courage to report a sexual assault committed against
her person, where the act was accompanied by a death
threat.42
It bears stressing that the trial court gave full credence
and probative value to the private complainant’s
testimony, finding that she testified in a straightforward
and positive manner when she disclosed the details of
her ravishment. Appellant has not come up with any
justifiable reason for us to overturn the trial court’s
findings. Thus, we sustain the trial court ruling that
appellant’s guilt has been proved in each case by the
prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
We agree, however, that the death sentence imposed
upon him by the trial court in each case is erroneous
and ought to be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
In these cases, private complainant testified that she
was born on September 28, 1986. Her testimony was
supported by a photocopy of her "Certificate of Live
Birth" showing that she was born in September 1986.
But an examination of the prosecution’s exhibits shows
that the prosecution has failed to present in evidence
the original copy of Mary Jane’s birth certificate.
Further, there is no showing that the original certificate
of birth was lost or destroyed, or was unavailable,
without the fault of the prosecution. Decisions of this
Court relating to the rape of minors invariably state
that in order to justify the imposition of the death
penalty, there must be independent evidence proving
the age of the victim, other than the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses and the absence of denial by the
accused. A certified true copy of the certificate of live
birth showing the complainant’s age or some other
authentic document such as a baptismal certificate or a
school record has been recognized as competent
evidence.43 A mere photocopy of said certificate,
however, does not prove the victim’s minority, for said
photocopy does not qualify as competent evidence for
that purpose. As repeatedly held by this Court, in a
capital case, we are bound by the standards of strict
scrutiny, given the gravity of the death sentence and the
irreversibility of its execution. Hence, appellant herein
could be held liable only for two counts of simple rape
and the sentence of death imposed upon him for each
count of rape must be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
Further, pursuant to current jurisprudence, the award
of civil indemnity ought to be reduced, in each count,
from ₱75,000 to ₱50,000 only. Similarly, the award of
moral damages in each count should also be reduced
Page 84 of 187
from ₱75,000 to ₱50,000 only. But, in each count, by way
of public example in order to protect young children
from molestation and abuse by perverse elders, the
award to the victim of ₱25,000 as exemplary damages is
in order.

WHEREFORE, the decision dated October 24, 2001, of

the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, Branch
52, in Criminal Cases Nos. G-4788 and G-4797, finding
appellant MANUEL MANTIS GUILTY of two counts of
rape is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The
death sentence imposed upon the appellant for each
count of rape is hereby reduced to reclusion perpetua.
Appellant is DIRECTED to pay the private complainant,
Mary Jane Balbin, the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, another ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and
₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of rape.
Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Page 85 of 187
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
appellee, vs. GENARO CAYABYAB y FERNANDEZ,
appellant.
Criminal Law; Rape; Rape, such as committed
against a “child below seven (7) years old,” is a dastardly
and repulsive crime which merit no less than the penalty
of death.—Rape, such as committed against a “child
below seven (7) years old,” is a dastardly and repulsive
crime which merit no less than the penalty of death
pursuant to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code.
This special qualifying circumstance of age must be
specifically pleaded or alleged with certainty in the
information and proven during the trial; otherwise the
penalty of death cannot be imposed.
Same; Same; Evidence; The best evidence to prove the
age of a person is the original birth certificate or
certified true copy thereof and in its absence, similar
authentic documents may be presented such as
baptismal certificates and school records.—To
paraphrase Pruna, the best evidence to prove the age of
a person is the original birth certificate or certified true
copy thereof; in their absence, similar authentic
documents may be presented such as baptismal
certificates and school records. If the original or
certified true copy of the birth certificate is not
available, credible testimonies of the victim’s mother or
a member of the family may be sufficient under certain
circumstances. In the event that both the birth
certificate or other authentic documents and the
testimonies of the victim’s mother or other qualified
relative are unavailable, the testimony of the victim may
be admitted in evidence provided that it is expressly
and clearly admitted by the accused.
Same; Same; Same; Best Evidence Rule; A certificate
of live birth is a public record in the custody of the local
civil registrar who is a public officer, and the
presentation of a photocopy is admissible as secondary
evidence to prove its contents.—Without doubt, a
certificate of live birth is a public record in the custody
of the local civil registrar who is a public officer.
Clearly, therefore, the presentation of the photocopy of
the birth certificate of Alpha Jane is admissible as
secondary evidence to prove its contents. Production of
the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court’s
discretion, whenever in the case at hand the opponent
does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document
and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring
production. In the case at bar, the defense did not
dispute the contents of the photocopied birth
certificate; in fact it admitted the same. Having failed to
raise a valid and timely objection against the
presentation of this secondary evidence the same
became a primary evidence, and deemed admitted and
the other party is bound thereby.
Same; Same; Damages; Moral damages is distinct
from exemplary damages, hence must be awarded
separately.—Anent the award of damages, we sustain
the award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity consistent
with the prevailing jurisprudence that if the crime is
qualified by circumstances which warrant the
imposition of the death penalty by applicable
amendatory laws, the accused should be ordered to pay
the complainant the amount of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity. The Court notes that the trial court awarded
P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages. Moral
damages is distinct from exemplary damages, hence
must be awarded separately. The award of moral
damages is automatically granted in rape cases without
need of further proof other than the commission of the
crime because it is assumed that a rape victim has
actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to such
award. However, the award of P50,000.00 must be
increased to P75,000.00 in accord with prevailing
jurisprudence. As regards exemplary damages, we held
in People v. Catubig that the presence of an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, entitles
Page 86 of 187
the offended party to an award of exemplary damages.
Conformably, we award the amount of P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages in accord with the prevailing
jurisprudence.
AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City, Br. 109.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for appellee.
Public Attorney’s Office for appellant.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Genaro Cayabyab y Fernandez was sentenced
to death by the RegionalTrialCourtofPasayCity, Branch
109, in Criminal Case No. 01-1311, for rape committed
against six-year-old Alpha Jane Bertiz.1
Alpha Jane was born on November 26, 1994,2 and the
eldest among the six children of Conrado and Metchie
Bertiz.3 She was six years and nine months old when the
rape was committed on August 7, 2001.
On that day, at around 6:00 p.m., Alpha Jane was at
home in Manlunas St., Lagoon Area, Villamor Airbase,
PasayCity, taking care of her younger siblings. Her
mother went to buy kerosene, while her father was out.
On the guise of teaching arithmetic, appellant went to
the victim's house and asked her to lie down on her
father's bed. When she refused, appellant removed her
clothes and his own clothes, then forced her to lie down
on the bed and laid on top of her and inserted his penis
into her vagina. Alpha Jane shouted in pain which
startled the appellant who sprayed her with tear gas
and left.4
Her mother, Metchie arrived shortly thereafter and
Alpha Jane told her what had happened. She
immediately reported the incident to the barangay
officials and brought Alpha Jane to the Philippine Air
Force General Hospital for medical examination. She
also sought assistance from the police at the 521st Air
Police Squadron who, after gathering information from
the victim, arrested the appellant at his house.5 Alpha
Jane was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory at
CampCrame the following day,6 and on August 10, 2001,
to the Child Protection Unit (CPU) at UP-PGH7 for
further medical examinations, which both found
hymenal abrasions and lacerations, respectively, on the
victim's genitalia.8
On August 10, 2001, appellant was charged with rape
before the RegionalTrialCourtofPasayCity in an
Information that reads:
That on or about the 07th day of August 2001, in Pasay
City, Metro , Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
GENARO CAYABYAB Y FERNANDEZ, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously by means of
force and intimidation have carnal knowledge of
ALPHA JEAN BERTIS Y JONGCO, a minor six (6) years
of age, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.9
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Trial then ensued.
Appellant raised the defenses of denial and alibi. He
testified that on August 7, 2001, he was plying his
normal route inside the Villamor Airbase as a tricycle
driver from 6:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m.10 After returning the
tricycle to its owner Roberto Gabo at the corner of 14th
Page 87 of 187
and 15th Sts., Villamor Airbase, he reached home at
around 7:30 p.m and went to sleep after eating
dinner.11 At around 9:30 p.m., he woke up to urinate at
the back of their house when three (3) policemen
arrested and mauled him.12 At the headquarters, he was
forced to admit the rape13 while the victim's father
asked for money in exchange for his release, which he
refused.14
The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. It found the victim's testimony
consistent with the medical findings of the doctors from
the PNP Crime Laboratory and CPU, UP-PGH.
Moreover, it applied the rule that an unsubstantiated
defense of denial and alibi cannot prevail over a positive
and categorical testimony of a minor victim. Finally, it
appreciated the qualifying circumstance of minority
and imposed the penalty of death. The dispositive
portion reads:
In view of all the foregoing, the Court opines that the
prosecution has proven the guilt of the accused Genaro
Cayabyab y Fernandez beyond reasonable doubt for
rape as defined and penalized under Article 335,
paragraph 3 and 4 as the victim herein is only six (6)
years old and hereby sentence accused Genaro
Cayabyab y Fernandez to DEATH and to pay civil
indemnity in the amount of Php 75,000.00 and moral and
exemplary damages in the amount of Php 50,000.00 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED.15
The case was directly elevated to this Court for
automatic review. However, pursuant to our decision
in People v. Mateo16 modifying the pertinent provisions
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure insofar as
direct appeals from the Regional Trial Court to the
Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed is
death, reclusion perpetuaor life imprisonment, this case
was transferred to the Court of Appeals,17 which
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court, thus:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the
trial court finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing
him to suffer the supreme penalty of death
is AFFIRMED intoto, and accordingly certifies the case
and elevate the entire records to the Supreme Court for
review pursuant to Rule124, Section 13[a] of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended by A.M. No.
00-5-03-SC.
SO ORDERED.18
We have painstakingly reviewed the evidence on record
and found no cogent reason to disturb the findings of
the trial court and the appellate court. There is no
doubt that appellant raped Alpha Jane on August 7, 2001
inside their house at Villamor Airbase, PasayCity. This
credibility given by the trial court to the rape victim is
an important aspect of evidence19 which appellate
courts can rely on because of its unique opportunity to
observe the witnesses, particularly their demeanor,
conduct, and attitude, during the direct and cross-
examination by counsel.
On direct examination, Alpha Jane narrated the
incident and positively identified appellant as her
assailant, thus:
Fiscal Barrera:
Now at around 6:00 p.m. of August 7, 2001 where were
you?
Page 88 of 187
A. I was inside our house.
Q. You mean your house at lagoon area, Villamor Air
Base, Pasay City?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What about you mother and father where were they
on that date and time?
A. My mother bought gas while my father was
'naglalakad ng spray gun for painting.
Q. Who were left in your house on August 7, 2001 at 6:00
p.m. while your mother bought gas and your father was
walking with his spray gun used for painting?
A. My brothers and sisters.
Q. While in your house on said date and time do you
know of any unusual incident that happened to you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What was that unusual incident that happened to
you?
A. Kuya Jimmy entered our house.
Q. After Kuya Jimmy entered your house, what
happened next?
A. Kuya Jimmy called for me inside our house.
Q. What did you do when Kuya Jimmy called for you?
A. He asked me one plus one and I answered two.
Q. After that what else happened?
A. He asked me to lie down on my father's bed.
Q. Did you follow him?
A. No, sir, I did not follow.
Q. And so what else happened?
A. He removed my clothes 'hinubaran niya ako; he
removed my shorts and panty.
Q. After Kuya Jimmy removed your shorts and panty,
what happened?
A. 'Pinatungan po niya ako', he laid on top of me.
Q. What happened when he laid on top of you?
A. He inserted his penis inside my private part.
Fiscal Barrera:
What did you do when this Kuya Jimmy inserted his
penis to your private part?
A. I shouted, sir.
Q. After Kuya Jimmy inserted his penis inside your
vagina and you shouted, what happened?
A. 'Pinakawalan niya ako', he released me.
Q. Then what happened?
A. 'Tinergas niya ako.
Page 89 of 187
Q. After Kuya Jimmy teargas you, what happened?
A. I run away.
Q. Regarding what Kuya Jimmy did to you, did you
report it to your mother?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. This Kuya Jimmy whom you said went inside your
house and removed your shorts and panty and
thereafter inserted his penis inside your vagina on
August 7, 2001 can you point at him if you see him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. If this Kuya Jimmy Cayabyab is inside the courtroom
will you be able to identify him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is he inside the courtroom?
Interpreter:
Witness pointed to a person who answered by the name
of Genaro Cayabyab.20
Despite grueling cross-examination by the defense
suggesting extortion by the victim's father, Alpha Jane
remained steadfast and consistent that it was appellant
who raped her. The victim's testimony was supported by
the medico-legal report of the medico-legal experts from
the PNP Crime Laboratory and CPU, UP-PGH, to wit:
ANO-GENITAL
EXAMINATION
Hymen: Tanner Stage 2, hymenal transection at 5
oclock, Type of Hymen: Anullar
...
IMPRESSIONS
Evidence of blunt force or penetrating trauma.
(Exh. 'L', p. 8, Records)
Dr. Baluyut explained that in her findings, the terms
hymenal transection at 5 oclock and laceration at 5
oclock are synonymous (TSN, November 20, 2001, p. 6).
Dr. Baluyut further explained that there was prior
injury to the victim's hymen which might have been
caused by the insertion of a blunt object such as an
erected penis which was compatible with the victim's
claim that she had been raped (TSN, November 20, 2001,
pp. 6-7).21
The trial court correctly imposed the death penalty.
Rape, such as committed against a 'child below seven (7)
years old', is a dastardly and repulsive crime which
merit no less than the penalty of death pursuant to
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. This special
qualifying circumstance of age must be specifically
pleaded or alleged with certainty in the information and
proven during the trial; otherwise the penalty of death
cannot be imposed.
In the case of People v. Pruna,22 this Court took note of
conflicting pronouncements concerning the
appreciation of minority, either as an element of the
crime or as a qualifying circumstance. There were a
Page 90 of 187
number of cases where no birth certificate was
presented where the Court ruled that the age of the
victim was not duly proved.23 On the other hand, there
were also several cases where we ruled that the age of
the rape victim was sufficiently established despite the
failure of the prosecution to present the birth certificate
of the offended party to prove her age.24 Thus, in order
to remove any confusion, we set in Pruna the
following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an
element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance.
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended
party is an original or certified true copy of the
certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar
authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and
school records which show the date of birth of the
victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is
shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise
unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the
victim's mother or a member of the family either by
affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on
matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or
date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section
40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient
under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and
what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7
years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and
what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12
years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and
what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18
years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic
document, or the testimony of the victim's mother or
relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's
testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and
clearly admitted by the accused.78
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving
the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused
to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall
not be taken against him.25
To paraphrase Pruna, the best evidence to prove the age
of a person is the original birth certificate or certified
true copy thereof; in their absence, similar authentic
documents may be presented such as baptismal
certificates and school records. If the original or
certified true copy of the birth certificate is not
available, credible testimonies of the victim's mother or
a member of the family may be sufficient under certain
circumstances. In the event that both the birth
certificate or other authentic documents and the
testimonies of the victim's mother or other qualified
relative are unavailable, the testimony of the victim may
be admitted in evidence provided that it is expressly
and clearly admitted by the accused.
In Pruna, no birth certificate or any similar authentic
document, such as the baptismal certificate of the
victim was presented to prove her age. The trial court
based its finding that Lizette was 3 years old when she
was raped on the Medico-Legal Report, and the fact that
the defense did not contest her age and questioned her
qualification to testify because of her tender age. It was
however noted that the Medico-Legal Report never
Page 91 of 187
mentioned her age and only the testimony of her mother
was presented to establish Lizette's age. The Court
found that there was uncertainty as to the victim's exact
age, hence, it required that corroborative evidence, such
as her birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any
other authentic document should be introduced in
evidence in order that the qualifying circumstance of
'below seven (7) years old is appreciated.
Unlike in Pruna, the trial court in this case made a
categorical finding that Alpha Jane was only 6 years old
at the time she was raped, based not only on the
testimonies of the complainant and her mother, but also
on the strength of the photocopy of Alpha Jane's birth
certificate. It is well to note that the defense did not
object to the presentation of the birth certificate; on the
contrary it admitted the same 'as to fact of birth.
We are not unaware of our ruling in People v.
Mantis26 that a mere photocopy of the birth certificate,
in the absence of any showing that the original copy was
lost or destroyed, or was unavailable, without the fault
of the prosecution, does not prove the victim's minority,
for said photocopy does not qualify as competent
evidence for that purpose.
However, there are other exceptions to the 'best
evidence rule as expressly provided under Section 3,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions.
' When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than
the original document itself, except in the following
cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the
part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the
control of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or
other documents which cannot be examined in court
without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the
whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of
a public officer or is recorded in a public
office. [Emphasis supplied]
Without doubt, a certificate of live birth is a public
record in the custody of the local civil registrar who is a
public officer. Clearly, therefore, the presentation of the
photocopy of the birth certificate of Alpha Jane is
admissible as secondary evidence to prove its contents.
Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the
trial court's discretion, whenever in the case at hand the
opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the
document and no other useful purpose will be served by
requiring production.27
In the case at bar, the defense did not dispute the
contents of the photocopied birth certificate; in fact it
admitted the same. Having failed to raise a valid and
timely objection against the presentation of this
secondary evidence the same became a primary
evidence, and deemed admitted and the other party is
bound thereby.28
Page 92 of 187
In fine, we find that the prosecution sufficiently proved appellant is further ordered to pay the victim P75,000.00
that Alpha Jane was only six-years-old, being born on as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
November 26, 1994, when the rape incident happened on
August 7, 2001. SO ORDERED.

Anent the award of damages, we sustain the award of

P75,000.00 as civil indemnity consistent with the
prevailing jurisprudence that if the crime is qualified by
circumstances which warrant the imposition of the
death penalty by applicable amendatory laws, the
accused should be ordered to pay the complainant the
amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity.

The Court notes that the trial court awarded P50,000.00

as moral and exemplary damages. Moral damages is
distinct from exemplary damages, hence must be
awarded separately. The award of moral damages is
automatically granted in rape cases without need of
further proof other than the commission of the crime
because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually
suffered moral injuries entitling her to such
award.29 However, the award of P50,000.00 must be
increased to P75,000.00 in accord with prevailing
jurisprudence.30 As regards exemplary damages, we held
in People v. Catubig31 that the presence of an
aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or
qualifying, entitles the offended party to an award of
exemplary damages. Conformably, we award the
amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages in accord
with the prevailing jurisprudence.32

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court

of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Criminal Case No. 01-1311,
as affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 00258, finding appellant Genaro Cayabyab
y Fernandez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape and imposing the penalty
of DEATH33 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
Page 93 of 187
 G.R. No. 170604. September 2, 2013.*
HEIRS OF MARGARITA PRODON, petitioners, vs.
HEIRS OF MAXIMO S. ALVAREZ AND VALENTINA
CLAVE, REPRESENTED BY REV. MAXIMO
ALVAREZ, JR., respondents.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Best Evidence Rule; The Best Evidence
Rule stipulates that in proving the terms of a written document the
original of the document must be produced in court.—The Best
Evidence Rule stipulates that in proving the terms of a written
document the original of the document must be produced in court.
The rule excludes any evidence other than the original writing to
prove the contents thereof, unless the offeror proves: (a) the
existence or due execution of the original; (b) the loss and
destruction of the original, or the reason for its non-production in
court; and (c) the absence of bad faith on the part of the offeror to
which the unavailability of the original can be attributed.
Same; Same; Same; The primary purpose of the Best Evidence
Rule is to ensure that the exact contents of a writing are brought
before the court.—The primary purpose of the Best Evidence Rule is
to ensure that the exact contents of a writing are brought before the
court, considering that (a) the precision in presenting to the court
the exact words of the writing is of more than average importance,
particularly as respects operative or dispositive instruments, such as
deeds, wills and contracts, because a slight variation in words may
mean a great difference in rights; (b) there is a substantial hazard of
inaccuracy in the human process of making a copy by handwriting
or typewriting; and (c) as respects oral testimony purporting to give
from memory the terms of a writing, there is a special risk of error,
greater than in the case of attempts at describing other situations
generally. The rule further acts as an insurance against fraud.
Verily, if a party is in the possession of the best evidence and
withholds it, and seeks to substitute inferior evidence in its place,
the presumption naturally arises that the better evidence is withheld
for fraudulent purposes that its production would expose and defeat.
Lastly, the rule protects against misleading inferences resulting
from the intentional or unintentional introduction of selected
portions of a larger set of writings.
Same; Same; Same; The Best Evidence Rule applies only when
the terms of a writing are in issue.—The Best Evidence Rule applies
only when the terms of a writing are in issue. When the evidence
sought to be introduced concerns external facts, such as the
existence, execution or delivery of the writing, without reference to
its terms, the Best Evidence Rule cannot be invoked. In such a case,
secondary evidence may be admitted even without accounting for
the original.
Civil Law; Quieting of Titles; For an action to quiet title to
prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (a) the
plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest
in the real property subject of the action; and (b) the deed, claim,
encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title
must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.—This case involves an
action for quieting of title, a common-law remedy for the removal of
any cloud or doubt or uncertainty on the title to real property by
reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding
that is apparently valid or effective, but is, in truth and in fact,
invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be
prejudicial to said title. In such an action, the competent court is
tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and
other claimants to place things in their proper place and to make the
one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the
other. The action is for the benefit of both, so that he who has the
right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated,
and he can thereafter fearlessly introduce any desired
improvements, as well as use, and even abuse the property. For an
action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must
concur, namely: (a) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an
equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the
action; and (b) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed
to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal
efficacy.
Same; Same; The action for quieting of title may be based on the
fact that a deed is invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable. The
terms of the writing may or may not be material to an action for
quieting of title, depending on the ground alleged by the plaintiff.—
The action for quieting of title may be based on the fact that a deed
is invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable. The terms of the
writing may or may not be material to an action for quieting of title,
depending on the ground alleged by the plaintiff. For instance, when
an action for quieting of title is based on the unenforceability of a
contract for not complying with the Statute of Frauds, Article 1403 of
the Civil Code specifically provides that evidence of the agreement
cannot be received without the writing, or a secondary evidence of
its contents. There is then no doubt that the Best Evidence Rule will
come into play.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of
the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the
Court.468
Page 94 of 187
 Acosta Law Office for respondents.
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of
a written document are the subject of the inquiry. In an
action for quieting of title based on the inexistence of a
deed of sale with right to repurchase that purportedly
cast a cloud on the title of a property, therefore, the
Best Evidence Rule does not apply, and the defendant is
not precluded from presenting evidence other than the
original document.
The Case
This appeal seeks the review and reversal of the
decision promulgated on August 18, 2005,1 whereby the
Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the judgment rendered
on November 5, 1997 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 35, in Manila in Civil Case No. 96-78481 entitled
Heirs of Maximo S Alvarez and Valentina Clave,
represented by Rev. Maximo S. Alvarez and Valentina
Clave, represented by Rev. Maximo Alvarez, Jr. v.
Margarita Prodon and the Register of Deeds of the City
of Manila dismissing the respondents’ action for
quieting of title.2
Antecedents
In their complaint for quieting of title and damages
against Margarita Prodon,3 the respondents averred as
the plaintiffs that their parents, the late spouses
Maximo S. Alvarez, Sr. and Valentina Clave, were the
registered owners of that parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 84797 of the
Register of Deeds of Manila; that their parents had been
in possession of the property during their lifetime; that
upon their parents’ deaths, they had continued the
possession of the property as heirs, paying the real
property taxes due thereon; that they could not locate
the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 84797, but the
original copy of TCT No. 84797 on file with the Register
of Deeds of Manila was intact; that the original copy
contained an entry stating that the property had been
sold to defendant Prodon subject to the right of
repurchase; and that the entry had been maliciously
done by Prodon because the deed of sale with right to
repurchase covering the property did not exist.
Consequently, they prayed that the entry be cancelled,
and that Prodon be adjudged liable for damages.
The entry sought to be cancelled reads:
ENTRY NO. 3816/T-84797 – SALE W/ RIGHT TO
REPURCHASE IN FAVOR OF: MARGARITA PRODON,
SINGLE, FOR THE SUM OF ₱120,000.00, THE HEREIN
REGISTERED OWNER RESERVING FOR HIMSELF
THE RIGHTS TO REPURCHASE SAID PROPERTY FOR
THE SAME AMOUNT WITHIN THE PERIOD OF SIX
MONTH (sic) FROM EXECUTION THEREOF. OTHER
CONDITION SET FORTH IN (DOC. NO. 321, PAGE 66,
BOOK NO. VIII OF LISEO A. RAZON, NOT.PUB. OF
MANILA)
DATE OF INSTRUMENT – SEPT. 9, 1975
DATE OF INSCRIPTION – SEPT. 10, 1975,
AT 3:42 P.M.4
In her answer,5 Prodon claimed that the late Maximo
Alvarez, Sr. had executed on September 9, 1975 the deed
of sale with right to repurchase; that the deed had been
registered with the Register of Deeds and duly
annotated on the title; that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr.
had been granted six months from September 9, 1975
within which to repurchase the property; and that she
Page 95 of 187
had then become the absolute owner of the property due
to its non-repurchase within the given 6-month period.
During trial, the custodian of the records of the
property attested that the copy of the deed of sale with
right to repurchase could not be found in the files of the
Register of Deeds of Manila.
On November 5, 1997, the RTC rendered
judgment,6 finding untenable the plaintiffs’ contention
that the deed of sale with right to repurchase did not
exist. It opined that although the deed itself could not
be presented as evidence in court, its contents could
nevertheless be proved by secondary evidence in
accordance with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, upon proof of its execution or existence and of
the cause of its unavailability being without bad faith. It
found that the defendant had established the execution
and existence of the deed, to wit:
In the case under consideration, the execution and
existence of the disputed deed of sale with right to
repurchase accomplished by the late Maximo Alvarez in
favor of defendant Margarita Prodon has been
adequately established by reliable and trustworthy
evidences (sic). Defendant Prodon swore that on
September 9, 1975 she purchased the land covered by
TCT No. 84747 (Exhibit 1) from its registered owners
Maximo S. Alvarez, Sr. and Valentina Clave (TSN, Aug. 1,
1997, pp.5-7); that the deed of sale with right to
repurchase was drawn and prepared by Notary Public
Eliseo Razon (Ibid., p. 9); and that on September 10,
1975, she registered the document in the Register of
Deeds of Manila (Ibid., pp.18-19).
The testimony of Margarita Prodon has been confirmed
by the Notarial Register of Notary Public Eliseo Razon
dated September 10, 1975 (Exhibit 2), and by the
Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds of Manila
(Exhibit 4).
Page 66 of Exhibit 2 discloses, among others, the
following entries, to wit: "No. 321; Nature of Instrument:
Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase; Name of
Persons: Maximo S. Alvarez and Valentina Alvarez
(ack.); Date and Month: 9 Sept." (Exhibit 2-a).
Exhibit 4, on the other hand, also reveals the following
data, to wit: ‘Number of Entry: 3816; Month, Day and
Year: Sept. 10, 1975; Hour and Minute: 3:42 p.m.; Nature
of Contract: Sale with Right to Repurchase; Executed
by: Maximo S. Alvarez; In favor: Margarita Prodon; Date
of Document: 9-9-75; Contract value: 120,000.’ (Exhibit 4-
a). Under these premises the Court entertains no doubt
about the execution and existence of the controverted
deed of sale with right to repurchase.7
The RTC rejected the plaintiffs’ submission that the late
Maximo Alvarez, Sr. could not have executed the deed of
sale with right to repurchase because of illness and poor
eyesight from cataract. It held that there was no proof
that the illness had rendered him bedridden and
immobile; and that his poor eyesight could be corrected
by wearing lenses.
The RTC concluded that the original copy of the deed of
sale with right to repurchase had been lost, and that
earnest efforts had been exerted to produce it before the
court. It believed Jose Camilon’s testimony that he had
handed the original to one Atty. Anacleto Lacanilao, but
that he could not anymore retrieve such original from
Atty. Lacanilao because the latter had meanwhile
suffered from a heart ailment and had been
recuperating.
Ruling of the CA
Page 96 of 187
On appeal, the respondents assigned the following
errors, namely:
A.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE DUE EXECUTION AND EXISTENCE OF THE
QUESTIONED DEED OF SALE WITH RIGHT TO
REPURCHASE HAS BEEN DULY PROVED BY THE
DEFENDANT.
B.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING
THE PIECES OF EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
DEFENDANTS AS PROOFS OF THE DUE EXECUTION
AND EXISTENCE OF THE QUESTIONED DEED OF
SALE WITH RIGHT TO REPURCHASE.
C.
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE QUESTIONED DEED OF SALE WITH RIGHT
TO REPURCHASE HAS BEEN LOST OR OTHERWISE
COULD NOT BE PRODUCED IN COURT WITHOUT THE
FAULT OF THE DEFENDANT.
D.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN REJECTING
THE PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIM THAT THEIR FATHER
COULD NOT HAVE EXECUTED THE QUESTIONED
DOCUMENT AT THE TIME OF ITS ALLEGED
EXECUTION.8
On August 18, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed
decision, reversing the RTC, and ruling as follows:
The case of the Department of Education Culture and
Sports (DECS) v. Del Rosario in GR No. 146586 (January
26, 2005) is instructive in resolving this issue. The said
case held:
"Secondary evidence of the contents of a document
refers to evidence other than the original document
itself. A party may introduce secondary evidence of the
contents of a written instrument not only when the
original is lost or destroyed, but also when it cannot be
produced in court, provided there is no bad faith on the
part of the offeror. However, a party must first
satisfactorily explain the loss of the best or primary
evidence before he can resort to secondary evidence. A
party must first present to the court proof of loss or
other satisfactory explanation for non-production of the
original instrument. The correct order of proof is as
follows: existence, execution, loss, contents, although
the court in its discretion may change this order if
necessary."
It is clear, therefore, that before secondary evidence as
to the contents of a document may be admitted in
evidence, the existence of [the] document must first be
proved, likewise, its execution and its subsequent loss.
In the present case, the trial court found all three (3)
prerequisites ha[ve] been established by Margarita
Prodon. This Court, however, after going through the
records of the case, believes otherwise. The Court finds
that the following circumstances put doubt on the very
existence of the alleged deed of sale. Evidence on record
showed that Maximo Alvarez was hospitalized between
August 23, 1975 to September 3, 1975 (Exhibit "K"). It was
also established by said Exhibit "L" that Maximo Alvarez
suffered from paralysis of half of his body and blindness
due to cataract. It should further be noted that barely 6
days later, on September 15, 1975, Maximo Alvarez was
Page 97 of 187
again hospitalized for the last time because he died on
October of 1975 without having left the hospital. This
lends credence to plaintiffs-appellants’ assertion that
their father, Maximo Alvarez, was not physically able to
personally execute the deed of sale and puts to serious
doubt [on] Jose Camilion’s testimony that Maximo
Alvarez, with his wife, went to his residence on
September 5, 1975 to sell the property and that again
they met on September 9, 1975 to sign the alleged deed
of sale (Exhibits "A" and "1"). The Court also notes that
from the sale in 1975 to 1996 when the case was finally
filed, defendant-appellee never tried to recover
possession of the property nor had she shown that she
ever paid Real Property Tax thereon. Additionally, the
Transfer Certificate of Title had not been transferred in
the name of the alleged present owner. These actions
put to doubt the validity of the claim of ownership
because their actions are contrary to that expected of
legitimate owners of property.
Moreover, granting, in arguendo, that the deed of sale
did exist, the fact of its loss had not been duly
established. In De Vera, et al. v Sps. Aguilar (218 SCRA
602 1993), the Supreme Court held that after proof of the
execution of the Deed it must also be established that
the said document had been lost or destroyed, thus:
"After the due execution of the document has been
established, it must next be proved that said document
has been lost or destroyed. The destruction of the
instrument may be proved by any person knowing the
fact. The loss may be shown by any person who knew
the fact of its loss, or by anyone who had made, in the
judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the
place or places where the document or papers of similar
character are usually kept by the person in whose
custody the document lost was, and has been unable to
find it; or who has made any other investigation which
is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument is
indeed lost.
However, all duplicates or counterparts must be
accounted for before using copies. For, since all the
duplicates or multiplicates are parts of the writing itself
to be proved, no excuse for non-production of the
writing itself can be regarded as established until it
appears that all of its parts are unavailable (i.e. lost,
retained by the opponent or by a third person or the
like).
In the case at bar, Atty. Emiliano Ibasco, Jr., notary
public who notarized the document testified that the
alleged deed of sale has about four or five original
copies. Hence, all originals must be accounted for before
secondary evidence can be given of any one. This[,]
petitioners failed to do. Records show that petitioners
merely accounted for three out of four or five original
copies." (218 SCRA at 607-608)
In the case at bar, Jose Camilion’s testimony showed
that a copy was given to Atty. Anacleto Lacanilao but he
could not recover said copy. A perusal of the testimony
does not convince this Court that Jose Camilion had
exerted sufficient effort to recover said copy. x x x
xxxx
The foregoing testimony does not convince this Court
that Jose Camilion had exerted sufficient effort to
obtain the copy which he said was with Atty. Lacanilao.
It should be noted that he never claimed that Atty.
Lacanilao was already too sick to even try looking for
the copy he had. But even assuming this is to be so, Jose
Camilion did not testify that Atty. Lacanilao had no one
in his office to help him find said copy. In fine, this
Court believes that the trial court erred in admitting the
Page 98 of 187
secondary evidence because Margarita Prodon failed to
prove the loss or destruction of the deed.
In fine, the Court finds that the secondary evidence
should not have been admitted because Margarita
Prodon failed to prove the existence of the original deed
of sale and to establish its loss.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 35 in Civil
Case No. 96-78481 is hereby REVERSED and a new one
entered ordering the cancellation of Entry No. 3816/T-
84797 inscribed at the back of TCT No. 84797 in order to
remove the cloud over plaintiff-appellants’ title.
SO ORDERED.9
The heirs of Margarita Prodon (who meanwhile died on
March 3, 2002) filed an Omnibus Motion for Substitution
of Defendant and for Reconsideration of the
Decision,10 wherein they alleged that the CA erred: (a) in
finding that the pre-requisites for the admission of
secondary evidence had not been complied with; (b) in
concluding that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had been
physically incapable of personally executing the deed of
sale with right to repurchase; and (c) in blaming them
for not recovering the property, for not paying the
realty taxes thereon, and for not transferring the title in
their names.
On November 22, 2005, the CA issued
itsresolution,11 allowing the substitution of the heirs of
Margarita Prodon, and denying their motion for
reconsideration for its lack of merit.
Hence, the heirs of Margarita Prodon (petitioners) have
appealed to the Court through petition for review on
certiorari.
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioners submit the following as
issues, namely: (a) whether the pre-requisites for the
admission of secondary evidence had been complied
with; (b) whether the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had been
physically incapable of personally executing the deed of
sale with right to repurchase;and (c) whether Prodon’s
claim of ownership was already barred by laches.12
Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
1.
Best Evidence Rulewas not applicable herein
We focus first on an unseemly error on the part of the
CA that, albeit a harmless one, requires us to re-examine
and rectify in order to carry out our essential
responsibility of educating the Bench and the Bar on
the admissibility of evidence. An analysis leads us to
conclude that the CA and the RTC both misapplied the
Best Evidence Rule to this case, and their
misapplication diverted the attention from the decisive
issue in this action for quieting of title. We shall
endeavor to correct the error in order to turn the case
to the right track.
Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court embodies the
Best Evidence
Rule, to wit:
Page 99 of 187
Section 3. Original document must be produced;
exceptions. — When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible
other than the original document itself, except in the
following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed,
or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith
on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under
control of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous
accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and
the fact sought to be established from them is
only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office.
The Best Evidence Rule stipulates that in proving the
terms of a written document the original of the
document must be produced in court. The rule excludes
any evidence other than the original writing to prove
the contents thereof, unless the offeror proves: (a) the
existence or due execution of the original; (b) the loss
and destruction of the original, or the reason for its non-
production in court; and (c) the absence of bad faith on
the part of the offeror to which the unavailability of the
original can be attributed.13
The primary purpose of the Best Evidence Rule is to
ensure that the exact contents of a writing are brought
before the court,14 considering that (a) the precision in
presenting to the court the exact words of the writing is
of more than average importance, particularly as
respects operative or dispositive instruments, such as
deeds, wills and contracts, because a slight variation in
words may mean a great difference in rights; (b) there is
a substantial hazard of inaccuracy in the human process
of making a copy by handwriting or typewriting; and (c)
as respects oral testimony purporting to give from
memory the terms of a writing, there is a special risk of
error, greater than in the case of attempts at describing
other situations generally.15 The rule further acts as an
insurance against fraud.16Verily, if a party is in the
possession of the best evidence and withholds it, and
seeks to substitute inferior evidence in its place, the
presumption naturally arises that the better evidence is
withheld for fraudulent purposes that its production
would expose and defeat.17 Lastly, the rule protects
against misleading inferences resulting from the
intentional or unintentional introduction of selected
portions of a larger set of writings.18
But the evils of mistransmission of critical facts, fraud,
and misleading inferences arise only when the issue
relates to the terms of the writing. Hence, the Best
Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a writing
are in issue. When the evidence sought to be introduced
concerns external facts, such as the existence, execution
or delivery of the writing, without reference to its
terms, the Best Evidence Rule cannot be invoked.19 In
such a case, secondary evidence may be admitted even
without accounting for the original.
This case involves an action for quieting of title, a
common-law remedy for the removal of any cloud or
doubt or uncertainty on the title to real property by
reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance,
or proceeding that is apparently valid or effective, but
Page 100 of 187
is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title. In
such an action, the competent court is tasked to
determine the respective rights of the complainant and
other claimants to place things in their proper place
and to make the one who has no rights to said
immovable respect and not disturb the other. The action
is for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right
would see every cloud of doubt over the property
dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly introduce
any desired improvements, as well as use, and even
abuse the property. For an action to quiet title to
prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur,
namely: (a) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an
equitable title to or interest in the real property subject
of the action; and (b) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or
proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must
be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its
prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.20
The action for quieting of title may be based on the fact
that a deed is invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable. The terms of the writing may or may not
be material to an action for quieting of title, depending
on the ground alleged by the plaintiff. For instance,
when an action for quieting of title is based on the
unenforceability of a contract for not complying with
the Statute of Frauds, Article 1403 of the Civil Code
specifically provides that evidence of the agreement
cannot be received without the writing, or a secondary
evidence of its contents. There is then no doubt that the
Best Evidence Rule will come into play.
It is not denied that this action does not involve the
terms or contents of the deed of sale with right to
repurchase. The principal issue raised by the
respondents as the plaintiffs, which Prodon challenged
head on, was whether or not the deed of sale with right
to repurchase, duly executed by the late Maximo
Alvarez, Sr., had really existed. They alleged in the
complaint that:
xxxx
9. Such entry which could have been maliciously and
deliberately done by the defendant Margarita Prodon
created cloud and [is] prejudicial to the title of the
property subject matter of this case, since while it is
apparently valid or effective, but in truth and in fact it
is invalid, ineffective or unenforceable inasmuch that
the instrument purporting to be a Deed of Sale with
right of repurchase mentioned in the said entry does not
exist.21
xxxx
On her part, Prodon specifically denied the allegation,
averring in her answer that "sometime [o]n September 9,
1975, deceased Maximo S. Alvarez lawfully entered into
a Contract of Sale with Right to Repurchase, object of
which is the titled lot located at Endaya Street, Tondo,
Manila, in favor of defendant."22 In the pre-trial order,
the RTC defined the issue to be tried as "[w]hether or
not the alleged document mentioned in the said entry is
existing, valid or unenforceable,"23 and did not include
the terms of the deed of sale with right to repurchase
among the issues.
Apparently, the parties were fully cognizant of the
issues as defined, for none of them thereafter ventured
to present evidence to establish the terms of the deed of
sale with right to repurchase. In the course of the trial,
however, a question was propounded to Prodon as to
who had signed or executed the deed, and the question
was objected to based on the Best Evidence Rule. The
RTC then sustained the objection.24 At that point began
Page 101 of 187
the diversion of the focus in the case. The RTC should
have outrightly overruled the objection because the fact
sought to be established by the requested testimony was
the execution of the deed, not its terms.25 Despite the
fact that the terms of the writing were not in issue, the
RTC inexplicably applied the Best Evidence Rule to the
case and proceeded to determine whether the requisites
for the admission of secondary evidence had been
complied with, without being clear as to what secondary
evidence was sought to be excluded. In the end, the RTC
found in its judgment that Prodon had complied with
the requisites for the introduction of secondary
evidence, and gave full credence to the testimony of
Jose Camilon explaining the non-production of the
original. On appeal, the CA seconded the RTC’s mistake
by likewise applying the Best Evidence Rule, except that
the CA concluded differently, in that it held that Prodon
had not established the existence, execution, and loss of
the original document as the pre-requisites for the
presentation of secondary evidence. Its application of
the Best Evidence Rule naturally led the CA to rule that
secondary evidence should not have been admitted, but
like the RTC the CA did not state what excluded
secondary evidence it was referring to.
Considering that the Best Evidence Rule was not
applicable because the terms of the deed of sale with
right to repurchase were not the issue, the CA did not
have to address and determine whether the existence,
execution, and loss, as pre-requisites for the
presentation of secondary evidence, had been
established by Prodon’s evidence. It should have simply
addressed and determined whether or not the
"existence" and "execution" of the deed as the facts in
issue had been proved by preponderance of evidence.
Indeed, for Prodon who had the burden to prove the
existence and due execution of the deed of sale with
right to repurchase, the presentation of evidence other
than the original document, like the testimonies of
Prodon and Jose Camilon, the Notarial Register of
Notary Eliseo Razon, and the Primary Entry Book of the
Register of Deeds, would have sufficed even without
first proving the loss or unavailability of the original of
the deed.
2.
Prodon did not preponderantly establish the existence
and due execution of the deed of sale with right to
repurchase
The foregoing notwithstanding, good trial tactics still
required Prodon to establish and explain the loss of the
original of the deed of sale with right to repurchase to
establish the genuineness and due execution of the
deed.26 This was because the deed, although a collateral
document, was the foundation of her defense in this
action for quieting of title.27 Her inability to produce the
original logically gave rise to the need for her to prove
its existence and due execution by other means that
could only be secondary under the rules on evidence.
Towards that end, however, it was not required to
subject the proof of the loss of the original to the same
strict standard to which it would be subjected had the
loss or unavailability been a precondition for presenting
secondary evidence to prove the terms of a writing.
A review of the records reveals that Prodon did not
adduce proof sufficient to show the lossor explain the
unavailability of the original as to justify the
presentation of secondary evidence. Camilon, one of her
witnesses, testified that he had given the original to her
lawyer, Atty. Anacleto Lacanilao, but that he (Camilon)
could not anymore retrieve the original because Atty.
Lacanilao had been recuperating from his heart
Page 102 of 187
ailment. Such evidence without showing the inability to When was this specifically?
locate the original from among Atty. Lacanilao’s
belongings by himself or by any of his assistants or A
representatives was inadequate. Moreover, a duplicate
original could have been secured from Notary Public Sometime the first week of September or about
Razon, but no effort was shown to have been exerted in September 5, 1975, sir.
that direction.
Q
In contrast, the records contained ample indicia of the
improbability of the existence of the deed. Camilon What was the purpose of the spouses Maximo and
claimed that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had twice Valentina in meeting you on that date?
gone to his residence in Meycauayan, Bulacan, the first
on September 5, 1975, to negotiate the sale of the A
property in question, and the second on September 9,
1975, to execute the deed of sale with right to They were selling a piece of land, sir.
repurchase, viz:
xxxx
Q
Q
Do you also know the deceased plaintiff in this case,
Maximo Alvarez, Sr. and his wife Valentina Clave, Mr. At the time when the spouses Maximo Alvarez, Sr. and
Witness? Valentina Clave approached you to sell their piece of
land located at Endaya, Tondo, Manila, what document,
A if any, did they show you?

Yes, sir. A

Q The title of the land, sir.

A xxxx

Q Q

Under what circumstance were you able to know the You said that on the first week of September or
deceased plaintiff Maximo Alvarez, Sr. and his wife? September 5, 1975 spouses Maximo and Valentina
approached you at the time, what did you tell the
When they went to our house, sir. spouses, if any?

Page 103 of 187

A After Margarita Prodon told you that[,] what happened
next, if any?
I asked them to come back telling them that I was going
to look for a buyer, sir. A

xxxx I waited for the spouses Alvarez to bring them to my

aunt, sir.
Q
Q
You said that you told the spouse[s] Alvarez to just come
back later and that you will look for a buyer, what Were you able to finally bring the spouses before
happened next, if any? Margarita Prodon?

A A

I went to see my aunt Margarita Prodon, sir. Valentina Clave returned to our house and asked me if
they can now sell the piece of land, sir.
Q
Q
A
What did you tell Valentina Clave?
What did you tell your aunt Margarita Prodon?
A
I convinced her to buy the lot.
Q
ATTY. REAL
We went to the house of my aunt so she can meet her
Q personally, sir.

What was the reply of Margarita Prodon, if any? And did the meeting occur?

A WITNESS

She agreed, provided that she should meet the spouses, A

sir.
Yes, sir.
Q

Page 104 of 187

 ATTY. REAL March 31 – May 19, 1975 • Prostatitis, c
• Arteriosclerotic heart d
• Atrial fibri
Q • Congestive heart f
• CFC III29
What happened at the meeting?
June 2- June 6, 1975 • Chest pains (Atrial F
• Painful urination (Chronic prostatitis)30
A
August 23-September 3, 1975 • Arteriosclerotic heart d
• Congestive heart failure,
I told Valentina Clave in front of the aunt of my wife • Atrial fibri
that they, the spouses, wanted to sell the land, sir. • Cardiac functional capacity III-B31

September 15-October 2, 1975 • Arteriosclerotic heart d

Q • Atrial fibri
• Congestive heart f
• Pneu
What was the reply of your aunt Margarita Prodon at • Urinary tract inf
the time? • Cerebrovascular accident,
• Upper GI bleeding probably secondary to
ulcers32
A

That Valentina Clave should come back with her
husband because she was going to buy the lot, sir.28
The foregoing testimony could not be credible for the
purpose of proving the due execution of the deed of sale
with right to repurchase for three reasons.1âwphi1
The first is that the respondents preponderantly
established that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had been
in and out of the hospital around the time that the deed
of sale with right to repurchase had been supposedly
executed on September 9, 1975. The records manifested
that he had been admitted to the Veterans Memorial
Hospital in Quezon City on several occasions, and had
then been diagnosed with the serious ailments or
conditions, as follows:
d of confinement Diagnosis
The medical history showing the number of very serious
ailments the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had been suffering
from rendered it highly improbable for him to travel
from Manila all the way to Meycauayan, Bulacan, where
Prodon and Camilon were then residing in order only to
negotiate and consummate the sale of the property. This
high improbability was fully confirmed by his son,
Maximo, Jr., who attested that his father had been
seriously ill, and had been in and out of the hospital in
1975.33 The medical records revealed, too, that on
September 12, 1975, or three days prior to his final
admission to the hospital, the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr.
had suffered from "[h]igh grade fever, accompanied by
chills, vomiting and cough productive of whitish sticky
sputum;"had been observed to be "conscious" but "weak"
and "bedridden" with his heart having "faint" sounds,
irregular rhythm, but no murmurs; and his left upper
extremity and left lower extremity had suffered 90%
motor loss.34 Truly, Prodon’s allegation that the deed of

Page 105 of 187

sale with right to repurchase had been executed on properly. Her inaction was an index of the falsity of her
September 9, 1975 could not command belief. claim against the respondents.

The second is that the annotation on TCT No. 84797 of
the deed of sale with right to repurchase and the entry
in the primary entry book of the Register of Deeds did
not themselves establish the existence of the deed. They
proved at best that a document purporting to be a deed
of sale with right to repurchase had been registered
with the Register of Deeds. Verily, the registration alone
of the deed was not conclusive proof of its authenticity
or its due execution by the registered owner of the
property, which was precisely the issue in this case. The
explanation for this is that registration, being a specie
of notice, is simply a ministerial act by which an
instrument is inscribed in the records of the Register of
Deeds and annotated on the dorsal side of the certificate
of title covering the land subject of the instrument.35 It
is relevant to mention that the law on land registration
does not require that only valid instruments be
registered, because the purpose of registration is only to
give notice.36
In view of the foregoing circumstances, we concur with
the CA that the respondents preponderantly, proved
that the deed of sale with right to repurchase executed
by the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. did not exist in fact.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision
promulgated on August 18, 2005 by the Court of Appeals
in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 58624 entitled Heirs of Maximo S.
Alvarez and Valentina Clave, represented by Rev.
Maximo Alvarez, Jr. v. Margarita Prodon and the
Register of Deeds of the City Manila; and ORDERS the
petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

By the same token, the entry in the notarial register of

Notary Public Razon could only be proof that a deed of
sale with right to repurchase had been notarized by
him, but did not establish the due execution of the deed.

The third is that the respondents’ remaining in the

peaceful possession of the property was further
convincing evidence demonstrating that the late
Maximo Alvarez, Sr. did not execute the deed of sale
with right to repurchase. Otherwise, Prodon would have
herself asserted and exercised her right to take over the
property, legally and physically speaking, upon the
expiration in 1976 of the repurchase period stipulated
under the deed, including transferring the TCT in her
name and paying the real property taxes due on the
Page 106 of 187
 Decision[3] of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 79,
G.R. No. 179470. April 20, 2010.*
Las Pias City, in Civil Case No. 4542.
NISSAN NORTH EDSA operating under the name
MOTOR CARRIAGE, INC., petitioner, vs. UNITED
PHILIPPINE SCOUT VETERANS DETECTIVE AND The Facts
PROTECTIVE AGENCY, respondent.
Evidence; Documentary Evidence; Best Evidence Rule; The best
evidence rule is the rule which requires the highest grade of evidence Respondent United Philippine Scout Veterans Detective
to prove a disputed fact, however, it applies only when the contents of
a document are the subject of the inquiry.—Nissan’s reliance on the and Protective Agency (United) is a domestic
best evidence rule is misplaced. The best evidence rule is the rule corporation engaged in the business of providing
which requires the highest grade of evidence to prove a disputed
fact. However, the same applies only when the contents of a security services.[4] In 1993, it entered into a contract for
document are the subject of the inquiry. In this case, the contents of
the service contract between Nissan and United have not been put in security services with petitioner[5] Nissan North Edsa
issue. Neither United nor Nissan disputes the contents of the service (Nissan), and beginning 23 April 1993, it was able to post
contract; as in fact, both parties quoted and relied on the same
provision of the contract (paragraph 17) to support their respective 18 security guards within Nissans compound located in
claims and defenses. Thus, the best evidence rule finds no
application here. EDSA Balintawak, Quezon City.[6]
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision
and resolution of the Court of Appeals. In the morning of 31 January 1996, Nissan informed
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
United, through the latters General Manager, Mr.
Felipe Antonio B. Remollo and Elmar Jay
Martin I. Dejaresco for petitioner. Ricarte Galope (Galope), that its services were being
Cayton, Manzano, Peñalosa & Morante for terminated beginning 5:00 p.m. of that day.[7] Galope
respondent. personally pleaded with the personnel manager of
PEREZ, J.:
Nissan to reconsider its decision.[8] When Nissan failed
The Case
to act on this verbal request, Galope wrote a
Letter[9] dated 5 February 1996, addressed to Nissans

Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the general manager, formally seeking a reconsideration of

Rules of Court assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of its action. As this was likewise ignored, Uniteds

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 80580. The challenged President and Chairman of the Board wrote a

decision affirmed with modification the Decision[2] of Letter[10] dated 27 February 1996, addressed to Nissans

the Regional Trial Court, Branch 200, Las Pias City, in President and General Manager, demanding payment of

Civil Case No. LP-02-0265 which, in turn, affirmed the the amount equivalent to thirty (30) days of service in

Page 107 of 187

view of Nissans act of terminating Uniteds services
without observing the required 30-day prior written
notice as stipulated under paragraph 17 of their service
contract.
As a result of Nissans continued failure to comply with
Uniteds demands, the latter filed a case for Sum of
Money with damages before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Las Pias City.
In its Answer, Nissan maintained that the above-
mentioned paragraph 17 of the service contract
expressly confers upon either party the power to
terminate the contract, without the necessity of a prior
written notice, in cases of violations of the provisions
thereof.[11] Nissan alleged that United violated the terms
of their contract, thereby allowing Nissan to unilaterally
terminate the services of United without prior notice.[12]
It appears that on 3 November 1995, Uniteds night
supervisor and night security guard did not report for
duty.[13] This incident was the subject of a Memorandum
issued by Nissans security officer to Uniteds officer-in-
charge stationed at its security detachment.[14] Then, on
16 January 1996, at noontime, the security supervisor
assigned at Nissans premises abandoned
post.[15] Although the general manager of United
directed the immediate replacement of its security
supervisor,[16] Nissan nevertheless claimed that its
premises had been exposed to threats in security, which
allegedly constitutes a clear violation of the provisions
of the service contract.[17]
On 6 April 2001, Nissans counsel withdrew his
appearance in the case with Nissans conformity. Despite
the directive of the trial court for Nissan to hire another
lawyer, no new counsel was engaged by it. Accordingly,
the case was submitted for decision on the basis of the
evidence adduced by respondent United.[18]
The Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court
In its Decision dated 31 July 2002, the Metropolitan
Trial Court ruled in favor of herein respondent United.
The trial court pronounced that Nissan has not adduced
any evidence to substantiate its claim that the terms of
their contract were violated by United; and that absent
any showing that violations were committed, the 30-day
prior written notice should have been observed.[19]
It thus rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing,
judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
his defendant to pay the plaintiff as follows:
1. The sum of P108,651.00 plus
legal interest from February 1,
Page 108 of 187
 1996 until fully paid as actual rulings of the lower court.[23] It denied the appeal and
damages;
affirmed the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court.

2. The sum of P20,000.000 as

exemplary damages; Nissan filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision
of the Regional Trial Court but the same was denied in

3. The sum of P30,000.00 as an Order[24] dated 15 October 2003.

attorneys fees and other litigation
expenses; and Nissan further went on an appeal to the Court of
Appeals, citing the same assignment of errors it
4. Costs of suit.[20] presented before the Regional Trial Court.

Nissan appealed to the Regional Trial Court, The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

questioning the award of actual and exemplary

damages, as well as the directive to pay attorneys fees The 14 February 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals

and litigation expenses. It alleged that there was no affirmed the Decision dated 10 June 2003 and the 15

evidence to support the award of actual damages, as the October 2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court, with the

service contract, upon which the amount of the award modification that the award for exemplary damages was

was based, was never presented nor offered as evidence deleted. The Court of Appeals held that the breach of

in the trial.[21] Furthermore, no evidence was adduced to contract was not done by Nissan in a wanton,

show bad faith on the part of Nissan in unilaterally fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent

terminating the contract, making the award of manner.[25]

exemplary damages improper.[22]

Nissan sought reconsideration of the decision affirming

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court the judgment of the lower court but the Court of
Appeals denied the same in a Resolution[26] promulgated

In its Decision dated 10 June 2003, the Regional Trial on 24 August 2007.

Court declared the appeal without merit as there

appears no cogent reason to reverse the findings and Hence, this petition.

Page 109 of 187

 defenses. Thus, the best evidence rule finds no
The Issue application here.

Petitioner Nissan insists that no judgment can properly The real issue in this case is whether or not Nissan
be rendered against it, as respondent United failed, committed a breach of contract, thereby entitling
during the trial of the case, to offer in evidence the United to damages in the amount equivalent to 30 days
service contract upon which it based its claim for sum of service.
money and damages. As a result, the decisions of the
lower courts were mere postulations.[27] Nissan asserts We rule in the affirmative.
that the resolution of this case calls for the application
of the best evidence rule.[28] At the heart of the controversy is paragraph 17 of the
The Ruling of the Court service contract, which reads:
However, violations committed by either
party on the provisions of this Contract
The petition is without merit. We thus sustain the ruling shall be sufficient ground for the
of the Court of Appeals. termination of this contract, without the
necessity of prior notice, otherwise a thirty
(30) days prior written notice shall be
Nissans reliance on the best evidence rule is observed.[31]
misplaced. The best evidence rule is the rule which
requires the highest grade of evidence to prove a Nissan argues that the failure of Uniteds security
disputed fact.[29]However, the same applies only when guards to report for duty on two occasions, without
the contents of a document are the subject of the justifiable cause, constitutes a violation of the
inquiry.[30] In this case, the contents of the service provisions of the service contract, sufficient to entitle
contract between Nissan and United have not been put Nissan to terminate the same without the necessity of a
in issue. Neither United nor Nissan disputes the 30-day prior notice.
contents of the service contract; as in fact, both parties
quoted and relied on the same provision of the contract We hold otherwise.
(paragraph 17) to support their respective claims and As the Metropolitan Trial Court of Las Pias City stated
in its decision, Nissan did not adduce any evidence to
Page 110 of 187
substantiate its claim that the terms of the contract
were violated by United.

What Nissan failed to do is to point out or indicate

the specific provisions of the service contract which
were violated by United as a result of the latters lapses
in security. In so failing, Nissans act of unilaterally
terminating the contract constitutes a breach thereof,
entitling United to collect actual damages.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 14 February

2007 and the Resolution dated 24 August 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 80580
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Page 111 of 187


G.R. No. 191696. April 10, 2013.*
ROGELIO DANTIS, petitioner, vs. JULIO
MAGHINANG, JR., respondent.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Burden of Proof; It is an age-old rule
in civil cases that he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it
and a mere allegation is not evidence.―It is an age-old rule in civil
cases that he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a
mere allegation is not evidence. After carefully sifting through the
evidence on record, the Court finds that Rogelio was able to
establish a prima facie case in his favor tending to show his
exclusive ownership of the parcel of land under TCT No. T-125918
with an area of 5,657 square meters, which included the 352-square
meter subject lot. From the records, it appears that TCT No. T-125918
is a derivative of TCT No. T-256228, which covered a bigger area of
land measuring 30,000 square meters registered in the name of
Emilio Dantis; that Emilio died intestate on November 13, 1952; that
Emilio’s five heirs, including Rogelio, executed an extrajudicial
partition of estate on December 22, 1993 and divided among
themselves specific portions of the property covered by TCT No. T-
256228, which were already set apart by metes and bounds; that the
land known as Lot 6-D-1 of the subdivision plan Psd-031421-054315
with an area of 5,657 sq. m. went to Rogelio, the property now
covered by TCT No. T-125918; and that the property was declared for
realty tax purpose in the name of Rogelio for which a tax declaration
was issued in his name; and that the same had not been transferred
to anyone else since its issuance.
Same; Same; Best Evidence Rule; A secondary evidence is
admissible only upon compliance with Rule 130, Section 5, which
states that: when the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence
and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may
prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order
stated.―A secondary evidence is admissible only upon compliance
with Rule 130, Section 5, which states that: when the original has
been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror,
upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents
by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document,
or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. Accordingly, the
offeror of the secondary evidence is burdened to satisfactorily prove
the predicates thereof, namely: (1) the execution or existence of the
original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or its non-
production in court; and (3) the unavailability of the original is not
due to bad faith on the part of the proponent/offeror. Proof of the
due execution of the document and its subsequent loss would
constitute the basis for the introduction of secondary evidence.
In MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation, 536
SCRA 408 (2007), it was held that where the missing document is the
foundation of the action, more strictness in proof is required than
where the document is only collaterally involved.
Civil Law; Contracts; Contract of Sale; By the contract of sale,
one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the
ownership of, and to deliver, a determinate thing, and the other to pay
therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.―By the contract
of sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer
the ownership of, and to deliver, a determinate thing, and the other
to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent. A contract
of sale is a consensual contract and, thus, is perfected by mere
consent which is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the
acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the
contract. Until the contract of sale is perfected, it cannot, as an
independent source of obligation, serve as a binding juridical
relation between the parties. The essential elements of a contract of
sale are: a) consent or meeting of the minds, that is, consent to
transfer ownership in exchange for the price; b) determinate subject
matter; and c) price certain in money or its equivalent. The absence
of any of the essential elements shall negate the existence of a
perfected contract of sale.
Same; Same; Same; An agreement anent the manner of payment
goes into the price so much so that a disagreement on the manner of
payment is tantamount to a failure to agree on the price.―In Swedish
Match, AB v. Court of Appeals, 441 SCRA 1 (2004), the Court ruled
that the manner of payment of the purchase price was an essential
element before a valid and binding contract of sale could exist.
Albeit the Civil Code does not explicitly provide that the minds of
the contracting parties must also meet on the terms or manner of
payment of the price, the same is needed, otherwise, there is no sale.
An agreement anent the manner of payment goes into the price so
much so that a disagreement on the manner of payment is
tantamount to a failure to agree on the price.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision
and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Vicente D. Millora for petitioner.
Roldan E. Villacorta for respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
Page 112 of 187
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to
reverse and set aside the January 25, 2010 Decision1 and
the March 23, 2010 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA). in CA-G.R. CV No. 85258, reversing the March 2,
2005 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18,
Malolos, Bulacan (RTC), in an action for quieting of title
and recovery of possession with damages.
The Facts
The case draws its origin from a complaint4 for quieting
of title and recovery of possession with damages filed by
petitioner Rogelio Dantis (Rogelio) against respondent
Julio Maghinang, Jr. (Julio, Jr.) before the RTC,
docketed as Civil Case No. 280-M-2002. Rogelio alleged
that he was the registered owner of a parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
125918, with an area of 5,657 square meters, located in
Sta. Rita, San Miguel, Bulacan; that he acquired
ownership of the property through a deed of
extrajudicial partition of the estate of his deceased
father, Emilio Dantis (Emilio), dated December 22, 1993;
that he had been paying the realty taxes on the said
property; that Julio, Jr. occupied and built a house on a
portion of his property without any right at all; that
demands were made upon Julio, Jr. that he vacate the
premises but the same fell on deaf ears; and that the
acts of Julio, Jr. had created a cloud of doubt over his
title and right of possession of his property. He, thus,
prayed that judgment be rendered declaring him to be
the true and real owner of the parcel of land covered by
TCT No. T-125918; ordering Julio, Jr. to deliver the
possession of that portion of the land he was occupying;
and directing Julio, Jr. to pay rentals from October 2000
and attorney’s fees of ₱100,000.00.
He added that he was constrained to institute an
ejectment suit against Julio, Jr. before the Municipal
Trial Court of San Miguel, Bulacan (MTC), but the
complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and
lack of cause of action.
In his Answer,5 Julio, Jr. denied the material allegations
of the complaint. By way of an affirmative defense, he
claimed that he was the actual owner of the 352 square
meters (subject lot) of the land covered by TCT No. T-
125918 where he was living; that he had been in open
and continuous possession of the property for almost
thirty (30) years; the subject lot was once tenanted by
his ancestral relatives until it was sold by Rogelio’s
father, Emilio, to his father, Julio Maghinang, Sr. (Julio,
Sr.); that later, he succeeded to the ownership of the
subject lot after his father died on March 10, 1968; and
that he was entitled to a separate registration of the
subject lot on the basis of the documentary evidence of
sale and his open and uninterrupted possession of the
property.
As synthesized by the RTC from the respective
testimonies of the principal witnesses, their
diametrically opposed positions are as follows:
Plaintiff Rogelio Dantis testified that he inherited 5,657
square meters of land, identified as Lot 6-D-1 of
subdivision plan Psd-031421-054315, located at Sta. Rita,
San Miguel, Bulacan, through an Extrajudicial Partition
of Estate of Emilio Dantis, executed in December 1993
which land was titled later on under his name, Rogelio
Dantis, married to Victoria Payawal, as shown by copy
of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-125918, issued by
the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on September 29, 1998,
declared for taxation purposes as Tax Declaration with
ARP No. C20-22-043-07-046. According to him, defendant
and his predecessor-in-interest built the house located
on said lot. When he first saw it, it was only a small hut
but when he was about 60 years old, he told defendant
Page 113 of 187
not to build a bigger house thereon because he would
need the land and defendant would have to vacate the
land. Plaintiff, however, has not been in physical
possession of the premises.
Defendant Julio Maghinang, Jr., presented by plaintiff
as adverse witness, testified that he has no title over the
property he is occupying. He has not paid realty taxes
thereon. He has not paid any rental to anybody. He is
occupying about 352 square meters of the lot. He
presented an affidavit executed on September 3, 1953 by
Ignacio Dantis, grandfather of Rogelio Dantis and the
father of Emilio Dantis. The latter was, in turn, the
father of Rogelio Dantis.
The affidavit, according to affiant Ignacio Dantis,
alleged that Emilio Dantis agreed to sell 352 square
meters of the lot to Julio Maghinang on installment.
Defendant was then 11 years old in 1952.
Defendant Julio Maghinang, Jr. likewise testified for
the defendant’s case as follows: He owns that house
located at Sta. Rita, San Miguel, Bulacan, on a 352
square meter lot. He could not say that he is the owner
because there is still question about the lot. He claimed
that his father, Julio Maghinang (Sr.), bought the said
lot from the parents of Rogelio Dantis. He admitted that
the affidavit was not signed by the alleged vendor,
Emilio Dantis, the father of Rogelio Dantis. The receipt
he presented was admittedly a mere photocopy. He
spent ₱50,000.00 as attorney’s fees. Since 1953, he has
not declared the property as his nor paid the taxes
thereon because there is a problem.6
On March 2, 2005, the RTC rendered its decision
declaring Rogelio as the true owner of the entire 5,657-
square meter lot located in Sta. Rita, San Miguel,
Bulacan, as evidenced by his TCT over the same. The
RTC did not lend any probative value on the
documentary evidence of sale adduced by Julio, Jr.
consisting of: 1) an affidavit allegedly executed by
Ignacio Dantis (Ignacio), Rogelio’s grandfather, whereby
said affiant attested, among others, to the sale of the
subject lot made by his son, Emilio, to Julio, Sr. (Exhibit
"3")7; and 2) an undated handwritten receipt of initial
downpayment in the amount of ₱100.00 supposedly
issued by Emilio to Julio, Sr. in connection with the sale
of the subject lot (Exhibit "4").8 The RTC ruled that even
if these documents were adjudged as competent
evidence, still, they would only serve as proofs that the
purchase price for the subject lot had not yet been
completely paid and, hence, Rogelio was not duty-bound
to deliver the property to Julio, Jr. The RTC found
Julio, Jr. to be a mere possessor by tolerance. The
dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. quieting the title and removing whatever cloud over
the title on the parcel of land, with area of 5,647 sq.
meters, more or less, located at Sta. Rita, San Miguel,
Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
125918 issued by the Register of Deeds of Bulacan in the
name of "Rogelio Dantis, married to Victoria Payawal";
2. declaring that Rogelio Dantis, married to Victoria
Payawal, is the true and lawful owner of the
aforementioned real property; and
3. ordering defendant Julio Maghinang, Jr. and all
persons claiming under him to peacefully vacate the
said real property and surrender the possession thereof
to plaintiff or latter’s successors-in-interest.
No pronouncement as to costs in this instance.
Page 114 of 187
SO ORDERED.9
Julio, Jr. moved for a reconsideration of the March 2,
2005 Decision, but the motion was denied by the RTC in
its May 3, 2005 Order.10 Feeling aggrieved, Julio, Jr.
appealed the decision to the CA.
On January 25, 2010, the CA rendered the assailed
decision in CA-G.R. CV NO. 85258, finding the appeal to
be impressed with merit. It held that Exhibit "4" was an
indubitable proof of the sale of the 352-square meter lot
between Emilio and Julio, Sr. It also ruled that the
partial payment of the purchase price, coupled with the
delivery of the res, gave efficacy to the oral sale and
brought it outside the operation of the statute of frauds.
Finally, the court a quo declared that Julio, Jr. and his
predecessors-in-interest had an equitable claim over the
subject lot which imposed on Rogelio and his
predecessors-in-interest a personal duty to convey what
had been sold after full payment of the selling price. The
decretal portion of the CA decision reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed
from is reversed. The heirs of Julio Maghinang Jr. are
declared the owners of the 352-square meter portion of
the lot covered by TCT No. T-125968 where the residence
of defendant Julio Maghinang is located, and the
plaintiff is ordered to reconvey the aforesaid portion to
the aforesaid heirs, subject to partition by agreement or
action to determine the exact metes and bounds and
without prejudice to any legal remedy that the plaintiff
may take with respect to the unpaid balance of the
price.
SO ORDERED.11
The motion for reconsideration12 filed by Rogelio was
denied by the CA in its March 23, 2010 Resolution.
Unfazed, he filed this petition for review on certiorari
before this Court.
Issues:
The fundamental question for resolution is whether
there is a perfected contract of sale between Emilio and
Julio, Sr. The determination of this issue will settle the
rightful ownership of the subject lot.
Rogelio submits that Exhibit "3" and Exhibit "4" are
devoid of evidentiary value and, hence, deserve scant
consideration. He stresses that Exhibit "4" is
inadmissible in evidence being a mere photocopy, and
the existence and due execution thereof had not been
established. He argues that even if Exhibit "4" would be
considered as competent and admissible evidence, still,
it would not be an adequate proof of the existence of the
alleged oral contract of sale because it failed to provide
a description of the subject lot, including its metes and
bounds, as well as its full price or consideration.13
Rogelio argues that while reconveyance may be availed
of by the owner of a real property wrongfully included
in the certificate of title of another, the remedy is not
obtainable herein since he is a transferee in good faith,
having acquired the land covered by TCT No. T-125918,
through a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition of Estate.14 He
asserts that he could not be considered a trustee as he
was not privy to Exhibit "4." In any event, he theorizes
that the action for reconveyance on the ground of
implied trust had already prescribed since more than 10
years had lapsed since the execution of Exhibit "4" in
1953. It is the petitioner’s stance that Julio, Jr. did not
acquire ownership over the subject lot by acquisitive
prescription contending that prescription does not lie
against a real property covered by a Torrens title. He
opines that his certificate of title to the subject lot
Page 115 of 187
cannot be collaterally attacked because a Torrens title
is indefeasible and must be respected unless challenged
in a direct proceeding.15
The Court’s Ruling
In the case at bench, the CA and the RTC reached
different conclusions on the question of whether or not
there was an oral contract of sale. The RTC ruled that
Rogelio Dantis was the sole and rightful owner of the
parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-125918 and that no
oral contract of sale was entered into between Emilio
Dantis and Julio Maghinang, Sr. involving the 352-
square meter portion of the said property. The CA was
of the opposite view. The determination of whether
there existed an oral contract of sale is essentially a
question of fact.
In petitions for review under Rule 45, the Court, as a
general rule, does not venture to re-examine the
evidence presented by the contending parties during
the trial of the case considering that it is not a trier of
facts and the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive
and binding upon this Court. The rule, however, admits
of several exceptions. One of which is when the findings
of the CA are contrary to those of the trial
court.16 Considering the incongruent factual conclusions
of the CA and the RTC, this Court is constrained to
reassess the factual circumstances of the case and
reevaluate them in the interest of justice.
The petition is meritorious.
It is an age-old rule in civil cases that he who alleges a
fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation
is not evidence.17 After carefully sifting through the
evidence on record, the Court finds that Rogelio was
able to establish a prima facie case in his favor tending
to show his exclusive ownership of the parcel of land
under TCT No. T-125918 with an area of 5,657 square
meters, which included the 352-square meter subject lot.
From the records, it appears that TCT No. T-125918 is a
derivative of TCT No. T-256228, which covered a bigger
area of land measuring 30,000 square meters registered
in the name of Emilio Dantis; that Emilio died intestate
on November 13, 1952; that Emilio’s five heirs, including
Rogelio, executed an extra-judicial partition of estate on
December 22, 1993 and divided among themselves
specific portions of the property covered by TCT No. T-
256228, which were already set apart by metes and
bounds; that the land known as Lot 6-D-1 of the
subdivision plan Psd-031421-054315 with an area of 5,657
sq. m. went to Rogelio, the property now covered by TCT
No. T-125918; and that the property was declared for
realty tax purpose in the name of Rogelio for which a
tax declaration was issued in his name; and that the
same had not been transferred to anyone else since its
issuance.
In light of Rogelio’s outright denial of the oral sale
together with his insistence of ownership over the
subject lot, it behooved upon Julio, Jr. to contravene the
former’s claim and convince the court that he had a
valid defense. The burden of evidence shifted to Julio,
Jr. to prove that his father bought the subject lot from
Emilio Dantis. In Jison v. Court of Appeals,18 the Court
held:
Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue
has the burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil
case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the
course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a
prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of
evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff’s
prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned
in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party
Page 116 of 187
having the burden of proof must produce a
preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff
having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and
not upon the weakness of the defendant’s. The concept
of "preponderance of evidence" refers to evidence which
is of greater weight, or more convincing, that which is
offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means
probability of truth.19
Julio, Jr. failed to discharge this burden. His pieces of
evidence, Exhibit "3" and Exhibit "4," cannot prevail over
the array of documentary and testimonial evidence that
were adduced by Rogelio. The totality of Julio, Jr.’s
evidence leaves much to be desired.
To begin with, Exhibit "3," the affidavit of Ignacio, is
hearsay evidence and, thus, cannot be accorded any
evidentiary weight. Evidence is hearsay when its
probative force depends on the competency and
credibility of some persons other than the witness by
whom it is sought to be produced. The exclusion of
hearsay evidence is anchored on three reasons: 1)
absence of cross-examination; 2) absence of demeanor
evidence; and 3) absence of oath.20
Jurisprudence dictates that an affidavit is merely
hearsay evidence where its affiant/maker did not take
the witness stand.21 The sworn statement of Ignacio is of
this kind. The affidavit was not identified and its
averments were not affirmed by affiant Ignacio.
Accordingly, Exhibit "3" must be excluded from the
judicial proceedings being an inadmissible hearsay
evidence. It cannot be deemed a declaration against
interest for the matter to be considered as an exception
to the hearsay rule because the declarant was not the
seller (Emilio), but his father (Ignacio). Exhibit "4," on
the other hand, is considered secondary evidence being
a mere photocopy which, in this case, cannot be
admitted to prove the contents of the purported
undated handwritten receipt. The best evidence rule
requires that the highest available degree of proof must
be produced. For documentary evidence, the contents of
a document are best proved by the production of the
document itself to the exclusion of secondary or
substitutionary evidence, pursuant to Rule 130, Section
322.
A secondary evidence is admissible only upon
compliance with Rule 130, Section 5, which states that:
when the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot
be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its
execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove
its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in
some authentic document, or by the testimony of
witnesses in the order stated. Accordingly, the offeror of
the secondary evidence is burdened to satisfactorily
prove the predicates thereof, namely: (1) the execution
or existence of the original; (2) the loss and destruction
of the original or its non-production in court; and (3) the
unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on
the part of the proponent/offeror. Proof of the due
execution of the document and its subsequent loss
would constitute the basis for the introduction of
secondary evidence.23 In MCC Industrial Sales
Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation, it was held
24
that where the missing document is the foundation of
the action, more strictness in proof is required than
where the document is only collaterally involved.
Guided by these norms, the Court holds that Julio, Jr.
failed to prove the due execution of the original of
Exhibit "4" as well as its subsequent loss. A nexus of
logically related circumstance rendered Julio, Jr.’s
evidence highly suspect. Also, his testimony was riddled
with improbabilities and contradictions which tend to
Page 117 of 187
erode his credibility and raise doubt on the veracity of Q: And you remember what was signed in this receipt.
his evidence. From your memory can you tell the title of this Exhibit
"4"?
First, the claim of Julio, Jr. that Emilio affixed his
signature on the original of Exhibit "4" in 1953 is highly A: What I can say that it is a Sale, Sir.
improbable because record shows that Emilio died even
before that year, specifically, on November 13, 1952. Q: So, when you said that you witnessed an alleged sale
Excerpts from Julio, Jr.’s testimony relative to this you are referring to Exhibit "4"?
matter are as follows:
A: Yes, Sir.25 (Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Vicente Millora
Second, Julio, Jr.’s testimony pertinent to the alleged
(On Cross-examination) loss of the original of Exhibit "4" is laden with
inconsistencies that detract from his credibility. His
Q: You don’t remember how old you were when this testimony bears the earmarks of falsehood and, hence,
according to you you witnessed Emilio Dantis signed not reliable. Julio, Jr. testified in this wise:
this?
Atty. Roldan Villacorta
A: Eleven years old, Sir.
(On Direct examination)
Q: So that was 1953?
Q: Mr. Witness, I noticed that this document marked as
A: Yes, Sir. Exhibit "4" is only a photocopy, where is the original of
this document?
Q: And you were then…?
A: The original was with the safekeeping of my parents
A: I was born October 1942, Sir. because of the lapse of time the original was misplaced,
Sir.26
Q: You were eleven (11) years old?
The above testimony of Julio, Jr. tends to give the
A: Yes, Sir. impression that the original of the document was lost
while it was in the possession of his parents. During
Q: And you mean to say that you witnessed the signing cross-examination, however, he testified that it was lost
allegedly of the original of Exhibit "4" when you were while it was in his possession.
eleven (11) years old?
Atty. Vicente Millora
A: Yes, Sir.
(On Cross-examination)
Page 118 of 187
Q: x x x Where did you keep that document?
A: I was the one keeping that document because I live in
different places, [the said] it was lost or misplaced, Sir.
Q: In other words, it was lost while the same was in your
possession??
A: Yes, Sir.27 (Emphasis supplied)
Still, later, Julio, Jr. claimed that his sister was the one
responsible for the loss of the original of Exhibit "4"
after borrowing the same from him. Atty. Vicente
Millora
(On Cross-examination)
Q: So, who is your sister to whom you gave the original?
A: Benedicta Laya, Sir.
Q: In other words now, you did not lost the document or
the original of Exhibit "4" but you gave it to your sister,
am I correct?
A: I just lent to her the original copy, Sir.
Q: So, you lent this original of Exhibit "4" to your sister
and your sister never returned the same to you?
A: Yes, Sir, because it was lost, that was the only one left
in her custody.
Interpreter:
Witness referring to the xerox copy.
Atty. Vicente Millora
Q: In other words, it was your sister who lost the
original, is that correct?
A: Yes, Sir, when I lent the original.28 (Emphasis
supplied)
The Court also notes the confused narration of Julio, Jr.
regarding the last time he saw the original of Exhibit "4."
Atty. Vicente Millora
(On Cross-examination)
Q: And when did you last see the original?
A: When my mother died in 1993 that was the last time I
tried to see the original of the document after her
interment, Sir.
Q: Where did you see this document?
A: From the safekeeping of my mother, Sir.29
xxxx
Q: When did you get this Exhibit "4" now, the photocopy
from your sister?
A: When the interment of my mother in September 1993,
Sir.
Q: Now, let us reform. Which one did you get after the
interment of your mother, this Exhibit "4" or the
original?
Page 119 of 187
A: I asked that xerox copy because I have lost the
original and I could not find the same, Sir.
Q: So, from the safe of your mother after her interment,
what used you found and got this Exhibit "4"?
A: Yes, Sir, from my sister.
Q: So, not from your mother safe?
A: The original was taken from the safe of my mother,
Sir.
Q: So after your mother’s death you never saw the
original?
A: I did not see it anymore because the original was lost
before she died, Sir.30 (Underscoring supplied)
Third, it is quite strange that two receipts were
prepared for the initial payment of ₱100.00 in
connection with the sale of the subject lot. The Court
notes that the contents of Exhibit "4" were similar to
those of Annex "A"31 of Julio, Jr.’s Answer, dated June 9,
2002. Annex "A," however, was typewritten and the name
of the recipient indicated therein was a certain Cornelio
A. Dantis, whose identity and participation in the
alleged sale was never explained.
Fourth, apart from the lone testimony of Julio, Jr., no
other witness who knew or read Exhibit "4," much less
saw it executed, was presented. In the absence of any
shred of corroborative evidence, the Court cannot help
but entertain doubts on the truthfulness of Julio, Jr.’s
naked assertion.
Assuming, in gratia argumenti, that Exhibit "4" is
admissible in evidence, there will still be no valid and
perfected oral contract for failure of Julio, Jr. to prove
the concurrence of the essential requisites of a contract
of sale by adequate and competent evidence.
By the contract of sale, one of the contracting parties
obligates himself to transfer the ownership of, and to
deliver, a determinate thing, and the other to pay
therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.32 A
contract of sale is a consensual contract and, thus, is
perfected by mere consent which is manifested by the
meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing
and the cause which are to constitute the
contract.33 Until the contract of sale is perfected, it
cannot, as an independent source of obligation, serve as
a binding juridical relation between the parties.34 The
essential elements of a contract of sale are: a) consent or
meeting of the minds, that is, consent to transfer
ownership in exchange for the price; b) determinate
subject matter; and c) price certain in money or its
equivalent.35 The absence of any of the essential
elements shall negate the existence of a perfected
contract of sale.36
Seemingly, Julio, Jr. wanted to prove the sale by a
receipt when it should be the receipt that should further
corroborate the existence of the sale. At best, his
testimony only alleges but does not prove the existence
of the verbal agreement. Julio, Jr. miserably failed to
establish by preponderance of evidence that there was a
meeting of the minds of the parties as to the subject
matter and the purchase price.
The chief evidence of Julio, Jr. to substantiate the
existence of the oral contract of sale is Exhibit "4." For a
better understanding and resolution of the issue at
hand, Exhibit "4" is being reproduced here:
Alamin ng sino mang
Page 120 of 187
Makababasa
Akong si Emilio Dantis may sapat na Gulang may asawa
naninirahan sa Sta Rita San Miguel Bul. ay kusang
nagsasasay ng sumosunod.
Na ako Tumanggap Kay Julio Maghinang ng ₱100.00
peso cuartang Pilipino, bilang paunang bayad sa Lupa
niyang nilote sa akin 400 apat na raan mahigit na metro
cudrado.
Testigo Tumangap,
Emilio a Dantis
A perusal of the above document would readily show
that it does not specify a determinate subject matter.
Nowhere does it provide a description of the property
subject of the sale, including its metes and bounds, as
well as its total area. The Court notes that while Julio,
Jr. testified that the land subject of the sale consisted of
352 square meters, Exhibit "4," however, states that it’s
more than 400 square meters. Moreover, Exhibit "4" does
not categorically declare the price certain in money.
Neither does it state the mode of payment of the
purchase price and the period for its payment.
In Swedish Match, AB v. Court of Appeals,37 the Court
ruled that the manner of payment of the purchase price
was an essential element before a valid and binding
contract of sale could exist. Albeit the Civil Code does
not explicitly provide that the minds of the contracting
parties must also meet on the terms or manner of
payment of the price, the same is needed, otherwise,
there is no sale.38 An agreement anent the manner of
payment goes into the price so much so that a
disagreement on the manner of payment is tantamount
to a failure to agree on the price.39 Further, in Velasco v.
Court of Appeals,40 where the parties already agreed on
the object of sale and on the purchase price, but not on
how and when the downpayment and the installment
payments were to be paid, this Court ruled:
Such being the situation, it cannot, therefore, be said
that a definite and firm sales agreement between the
parties had been perfected over the lot in question.
Indeed, this Court has already ruled before that a
definite agreement on the manner of payment of the
purchase price is an essential element in the formation
of a binding and enforceable contract of sale. The fact,
therefore, that the petitioners delivered to the
respondent the sum of ₱10,000.00 as part of the down-
payment that they had to pay cannot be considered as
sufficient proof of the perfection of any purchase and
sale agreement between the parties herein under Art.
1482 of the new Civil Code, as the petitioners themselves
admit that some essential matter - the terms of payment
- still had to be mutually covenanted.41
The CA held that partial performance of the contract of
sale- giving of a downpayment coupled with the delivery
of the res - took the oral contract out of the scope of the
Statute of Frauds. This conclusion arose from its
erroneous finding that there was a perfected contract of
sale. The above disquisition, however, shows that there
was none. There is, therefore, no basis for the
application of the Statute of Frauds. The application of
the Statute of Frauds presupposes the existence of a
perfected contract.42 As to the delivery of the res, it does
not appear to be a voluntary one pursuant to the
purported sale. If Julio, Jr. happened to be there, it was
because his ancestors tenanted the land. It must be
noted that when Julio, Jr. built his house, Rogelio
protested.
Page 121 of 187
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
January 25, 2010 Decision and the March 23, 2010
Resolution of the Court Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No.
85258, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The March 2,
2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 18, in Civil Case No. 280-M-2002, is
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Page 122 of 187

 G.R. No. 142641. July 17, 2006. * Same; Same; The 90-day period provided in the law
PACIFICO B. ARCEO, JR., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Criminal Law; Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22); A
person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a
check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a
period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing
thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee
bank, shall be liable for violating the law on bouncing
checks.—Section 1 of BP 22 provides: SECTION 1. Checks
without sufficient funds.—Any person who makes or
draws and issues any check to apply on account or for
value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
the payment of such check in full upon its presentment,
which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have
been dishonored for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to
stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not
less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or
by a fine of not less than but not more than double the
amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed
Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court. The same
penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when
he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep
sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full
amount of the check if presented within a period of
ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for
which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.
Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or
entity, the person or persons who actually signed the
check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this
Act.
is not an element of the offense, neither does it discharge
petitioner from his duty to maintain sufficient funds in
the account within a reasonable time from the date
indicated in the check.—In Wong v. Court of Appeals, 351
SCRA 100 (2001), the Court ruled that the 90-day period
provided in the law is not an element of the offense.
Neither does it discharge petitioner from his duty to
maintain sufficient funds in the account within a
reasonable time from the date indicated in the check.
According to current banking practice, the reasonable
period within which to present a check to the drawee
bank is six months. Thereafter, the check becomes stale
and the drawer is discharged from liability thereon to
the extent of the loss caused by the delay.
Same; Same; The presentment of the check to the
drawee bank 120 days after its issue was still within the
allowable period.—Cenizal’s presentment of the check to
the drawee bank 120 days (four months) after its issue
was still within the allowable period. Petitioner was
freed neither from the obligation to keep sufficient
funds in his account nor from liability resulting from
the dishonor of the check.
Evidence; Best Evidence Rule; The best evidence rule
applies only where the content of the document is the
subject of inquiry, and not where the issue is the
execution or existence of the document or the
circumstances surrounding its execution.—Petitioner’s
insistence on the presentation of the check in evidence
as a condition sine qua non for conviction under BP 22
is wrong. Petitioner anchors his argument on Rule 130,
Section 3, of the Rules of Court, otherwise known as the
best evidence rule. However, the rule applies only where
the content of the document is the subject of the
inquiry. Where the issue is the execution or existence of
the document or the circumstances surrounding its
execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and
testimonial evidence is admissible.
Page 123 of 187
 Same; Same; The gravamen of the offense is the act
of drawing and issuing a worthless check, and not the
fact of issuance or execution of the check.—The
gravamen of the offense is the act of drawing and
issuing a worthless check. Hence, the subject of the
inquiry is the fact of issuance or execution of the check,
not its content.
Criminal Law; Batas Pambansa Blg. 22; The
elements of the offense are: (1) the making, drawing and
issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; (2)
knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the
time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check
in full upon its presentment; and (3) subsequent dishonor
of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds
or credit, or dishonor of the check for the same reason
had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the
bank to stop payment.—Based on the allegations in the
information, petitioner was charged for violating the
first paragraph of BP 22. The elements of the offense
are: 1. the making, drawing and issuance of any check to
apply to account or for value; 2. knowledge of the
maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon
its presentment; and 3. subsequent dishonor of the
check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit, or dishonor of the check for the same reason had
not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the
bank to stop payment.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision
and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Edilberto B. Cosca for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the People.
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the April
28, 1999 decision[1] and March 27, 2000 resolution[2] of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 19601 affirming the
trial courts judgment finding
petitioner Pacifico B. Arceo, Jr. liable for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 22, otherwise known as the
Bouncing Checks Law.
The facts of the case as found by the trial court and
adopted by the Court of Appeals follow.
On March 14, 1991, [petitioner],
obtained a loan from private
complainant Josefino Cenizal [] in the
amount of P100,000.00. Several weeks
thereafter, [petitioner] obtained an
additional loan of P50,000.00 from
[Cenizal]. [Petitioner] then issued in favor
of Cenizal, Bank of the Philippine Islands
[(BPI)] Check No. 163255, postdated August
4, 1991, for P150,000.00, at Cenizals house
located at 70 Panay Avenue, Quezon City.
When August 4, 1991 came, [Cenizal] did
not deposit the check immediately because
[petitioner] promised [] that he would
replace the check with cash. Such promise
was made verbally seven (7) times. When
his patience ran out, [Cenizal] brought the
check to the bank for encashment. The
head office of the Bank of the Philippine
Islands through a letter dated December 5,
Page 124 of 187
 1991, informed [Cenizal] that the check
bounced because of insufficient funds. Petitioner claims that the trial and appellate courts

Thereafter, [Cenizal] went to the house of erred in convicting him despite the failure of the
[petitioner] to inform him of the dishonor
prosecution to present the dishonored check during the
of the check but [Cenizal] found out that
[petitioner] had left the place. So, [Cenizal] trial. He also contends that he should not be held liable
referred the matter to a lawyer who wrote
a letter giving [petitioner] three days from for the dishonor of the check because it was presented
receipt thereof to pay the amount of the
check. [Petitioner] still failed to make good beyond the 90-day period provided under the law.
the amount of the check. As a consequence,
[Cenizal] executed on January 20, 1992 Petitioner further questions his conviction since the
before the office of the City Prosecutor
notice requirement was not complied with and he was
of Quezon City his affidavit and submitted
documents in support of his complaint for given only three days to pay, not five banking days as
[e]stafa and [v]iolation of [BP 22] against
[petitioner]. After due investigation, this required by law. Finally, petitioner asserts that he had
case for [v]iolation of [BP 22] was filed
against [petitioner] on March 27, 1992. The already paid his obligation to Cenizal.
check in question and the return slip were
however lost by [Cenizal] as a result of a Petitioners contentions have no merit.
fire that occurred near his residence on
September 16, 1992. [Cenizal] executed an
Affidavit of Loss regarding the loss of the
check in question and the return slip.[3] SIGNIFICANCE OF
THE 90-DAY
PERIOD
FOR PRESENTMEN
After trial, petitioner was found guilty as charged. T OF THE CHECK

Aggrieved, he appealed to the Court of Appeals.

However, on April 28, 1999, the appellate court affirmed Petitioner asserts that there was no violation of BP 22
the trial courts decision in toto. Petitioner sought because the check was presented to the drawee bank
reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition. only on December 5, 1991 or 120 days from the date

Page 125 of 187

 ninety (90) days from the date appearing
thereof (August 4, 1991). He argues that this was beyond thereon, for which reason it is dishonored
by the drawee bank.
the 90-day period provided under the law in connection
Where the check is drawn by a corporation,
with the presentment of the check. We disagree.
company or entity, the person or persons
who actually signed the check in behalf of
Section 1 of BP 22 provides: such drawer shall be liable under this Act.

SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. ―

Any person who makes or draws and
issues any check to apply on account or for
In Wong v. Court of Appeals,[4] the Court ruled that the
value, knowing at the time of issue that he
does not have sufficient funds in or credit 90-day period provided in the law is not an element of
with the drawee bank for the payment of
such check in full upon its presentment, the offense. Neither does it discharge petitioner from
which check is subsequently dishonored
by the drawee bank for insufficiency of his duty to maintain sufficient funds in the account
funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not within a reasonable time from the date indicated in the
the drawer, without any valid reason,
ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be check. According to current banking practice, the
punished by imprisonment of not less than
reasonable period within which to present a check to
thirty days but not more than one (1) year
or by a fine of not less than but not more the drawee bank is six months. Thereafter, the check
than double the amount of the check
which fine shall in no case exceed Two becomes stale and the drawer is discharged from
Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such
fine and imprisonment at the discretion of liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the
the court.
delay.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any
Thus, Cenizals presentment of the check to
person who, having sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank when he the drawee bank 120 days (four months) after its issue
makes or draws and issues a check, shall
fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain was still within the allowable period. Petitioner was
a credit to cover the full amount of the
check if presented within a period of freed neither from the obligation to keep sufficient
Page 126 of 187
funds in his account nor from liability resulting from
Here, the due execution and existence of the
the dishonor of the check.
check were sufficiently established. Cenizal testified

APPLICABILITY OF that he presented the originals of the check, the return

THE
BEST EVIDENCE slip and other pertinent documents before the Office of
RULE
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City when he executed

his complaint-affidavit during the preliminary

Petitioners insistence on the presentation of the
investigation. The City Prosecutor found a prima
check in evidence as a condition sine qua non for
facie case against petitioner for violation of BP 22 and
conviction under BP 22 is wrong. Petitioner anchors his
filed the corresponding information based on the
argument on Rule 130, Section 3, of the Rules of Court,
documents. Although the check and the return slip were
otherwise known as the best evidence rule. However,
among the documents lost by Cenizal in a fire that
the rule applies only where the content of the document
occurred near his residence on September 16, 1992, he
is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is the
was nevertheless able to adequately establish the due
execution or existence of the document or the
execution, existence and loss of the check and the
circumstances surrounding its execution, the best
return slip in an affidavit of loss as well as in his
evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is
testimony during the trial of the case.
admissible.[5]

The gravamen of the offense is the act of drawing and Moreover, petitioner himself admited that he issued the

issuing a worthless check.[6] Hence, the subject of the check. He never denied that the check was presented for

inquiry is the fact of issuance or execution of the check, payment to the draweebank and was dishonored for

not its content. having been drawn against insufficient funds.

Page 127 of 187
 Both the trial and appellate courts found that petitioner
PRESENCE OF THE
ELEMENTS OF issued BPI check no. 163255 postdated August 4, 1991 in
THE OFFENSE
the amount of P150,000 in consideration of a loan which

he obtained from Cenizal. When the check was

Based on the allegations in the information,[7] petitioner deposited, it was dishonored by the draweebank for
was charged for violating the first paragraph of BP 22. having been drawn against insufficient funds. There
The elements of the offense are: was sufficient evidence on record that petitioner knew

1. the making, drawing and issuance of the insufficiency of his funds in the drawee bank at
of any check to apply to account or
for value; the time of the issuance of the check. In fact, this was

2. knowledge of the maker, drawer, or why, on maturity date, he requested the payee not
issuer that at the time of issue he does
to encash it with the promise that he would replace it
not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the with cash. He made this request and assurance seven
payment of the check in full upon its
presentment; and times but repeatedly failed to make good on his

promises despite the repeated accommodation granted

him by the payee, Cenizal.

3. subsequent dishonor of the check
by the drawee bank for insufficiency
of funds or credit, or dishonor of the
check for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid cause,
ordered the bank to stop payment.[8]
NOTICE OF
DISHONOR TO
PETITIONER
All these elements are present in this case. AND PAYMENT OF T
HE OBLIGATION
Page 128 of 187
 petitioner should have redeemed or taken the check
The trial court found that, contrary to petitioners
back in the ordinary course of business.[10] Instead, the
claim, Cenizals counsel had informed petitioner in
check remained in the possession of the payee who
writing of the checks dishonor and demanded payment
demanded the satisfaction of petitioners obligation
of the value of the check. Despite receipt of the notice of
when the check became due as well as when the check
dishonor and demand for payment, petitioner still failed
was dishonored by the drawee bank.
to pay the amount of the check.

These findings (due notice to petitioner and

Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of
nonpayment of the obligation) were confirmed by the
the period of five banking days from receipt of notice of
appellate court. This Court has no reason to rule
dishonor within which to pay the amount of the
otherwise. Well-settled is the rule that the factual
check.[9] While petitioner may have been given only
findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the
three days to pay the value of the check, the trial court
appellate court, are not to be disturbed.[11]
found that the amount due thereon remained unpaid
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
even after five banking days from his receipt of the
The April 28, 1999 decision and March 27, 2000
notice of dishonor. This negated his claim that he had
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
already paid Cenizal and should therefore be relieved of
19601 are AFFIRMED.
any liability.
Costs against petitioner.

Moreover, petitioners claim of payment was

nothing more than a mere allegation. He presented no SO ORDERED.

proof to support it. If indeed there was payment,

Page 129 of 187

 G.R. No. 165487. July 13, 2011.*
COUNTRY BANKERS INSURANCE
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO
LAGMAN, respondent.
Insurance Law; Continuing Bond; Rice Storage Business; A
continuing bond, as in this case where there is no fixed expiration
date, may be cancelled only by the obligee, by the Insurance
Commissioner, and by the court; By law and by the specific contract
involved in this case, the effectivity of the bond required for the
obtention of a license to engage in the business of receiving rice for
storage is determined not alone by the payment of premiums but
principally by the Administrator of the National Food Authority
(NFA).—The 1989 Bonds have identical provisions and they state in
very clear terms the effectivity of these bonds, viz.: NOW,
THEREFORE, if the above-bounded Principal shall well and truly
deliver to the depositors PALAY received by him for STORAGE at
any time that demand therefore is made, or shall pay the market
value therefore in case he is unable to return the same, then this
obligation shall be null and void; otherwise it shall remain in full
force and effect and may be enforced in the manner provided by said
Act No. 3893 as amended by Republic Act No. 247 and P.D. No. 4. This
bond shall remain in forceuntil cancelled by the Administrator of
National Food Authority. This provision in the bonds is but in
compliance with the second paragraph of Section 177 of the
Insurance Code, which specifies that a continuing bond, as in this
case where there is no fixed expiration date, may be cancelled only
by the obligee, which is the NFA, by the Insurance Commissioner,
and by the court. Thus: In case of a continuing bond, the obligor
shall pay the subsequent annual premium as it falls due until the
contract of suretyship is cancelled by the obligee or by the
Commissioner or by a court of competent jurisdiction, as the case
may be. By law and by the specific contract involved in this case, the
effectivity of the bond required for the obtention of a license to
engage in the business of receiving rice for storage is determined not
alone by the payment of premiums but principally by the
Administrator of the NFA. From beginning to end, the
Administrator’s brief is the enabling or disabling document.
Evidence; Best Evidence Rule; Words and Phrases; Under the
best evidence rule, the original document must be produced whenever
its contents are the subject of inquiry; A photocopy, being a mere
secondary evidence, is not admissible unless it is shown that the
original is unavailable.—Lagman’s insistence on novation depends
on the validity, nay, existence of the allegedly novating 1990 Bond.
Country Bankers understandably impugns both. We see the point.
Lagman presented a mere photocopy of the 1990 Bond. We rule as
inadmissible such copy. Under the best evidence rule, the original
document must be produced whenever its contents are the subject of
inquiry. The rule is encapsulated in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court, as follow: Sec. 3. Original document must be produced;
exceptions.—When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
documents, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases: (a) When the original
has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without
bad faith on the part of the offeror; (b) When the original is in the
custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence
is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of
time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the
general result of the whole; and (d) When the original is a public
record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office. A photocopy, being a mere secondary evidence, is not
admissible unless it is shown that the original is unavailable.
Same; Same; A party must first present to the court proof of loss
or other satisfactory explanation for the non-production of the
original instrument, and when more than one original copy exists, it
must appear that all of them have been lost, destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court before secondary evidence can be given of any
one.—Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to
prove the contents of the original, the offeror must prove the
following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2) the
loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its non-
production in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of
bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can be
attributed. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence,
execution, loss, and contents. In the case at bar, Lagman mentioned
during the direct examination that there are actually four (4)
duplicate originals of the 1990 Bond: the first is kept by the NFA, the
second is with the Loan Officer of the NFA in Tarlac, the third is
with Country Bankers and the fourth was in his possession. A party
must first present to the court proof of loss or other satisfactory
explanation for the non-production of the original instrument. When
more than one original copy exists, it must appear that all of them
have been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court before
secondary evidence can be given of any one. A photocopy may not be
used without accounting for the other originals.
Novation; Requisites; Words and Phrases; Novation is the
extinguishment of an obligation by the substitution or change of the
obligation by a subsequent one which extinguishes or modifies the
first, either by changing the object or principal conditions, or by
substituting another in place of the debtor, or by subrogating a third
person in the rights of the creditor.—Having discounted the existence
and/or validity of the 1990 Bond, there can be no novation to speak
Page 130 of 187
of. Novation is the extinguishment of an obligation by the
substitution or change of the obligation by a subsequent one which
extinguishes or modifies the first, either by changing the object or These are the undisputed facts.
principal conditions, or by substituting another in place of the
debtor, or by subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor.
Nelson Santos (Santos) applied for a license with
For novation to take place, the following requisites must concur: 1) the National Food Authority (NFA) to engage in the
There must be a previous valid obligation; 2) The parties concerned
must agree to a new contract; 3) The old contract must be
business of storing not more than 30,000 sacks
extinguished; and 4) There must be a valid new contract. of palayvalued at P5,250,000.00 in his warehouse
Insurance Law; Indemnity Agreements; Co-signors to an
Indemnity Agreement bind themselves jointly and severally to the at Barangay Malacampa, Camiling, Tarlac. Under Act
bonding company to indemnify it for any damage or loss sustained on No. 3893 or the General Bonded Warehouse Act, as
the account of the execution of the bond, among others.—The liability
of Lagman is expressed in Indemnity Agreements executed in amended, [3] the approval for said license was
consideration of the 1989 Bonds which we have considered as conditioned upon posting of a cash bond, a bond
continuing contracts. Under both Indemnity Agreements, Lagman, as
co-signor, together with Santos, Ban Lee Lim and Reguine, bound secured by real estate, or a bond signed by a duly
themselves jointly and severally to Country Bankers to indemnify it authorized bonding company, the amount of which shall
for any damage or loss sustained on the account of the execution of
the bond, among others. The pertinent identical stipulations of the be fixed by the NFA Administrator at not less than
Indemnity Agreements state: INDEMNITY:—To indemnify and make thirty-three and one third percent (33 1/3%) of the
good to the COMPANY jointly and severally, any damages, prejudice,
loss, costs, payments advances and expenses of whatever kind and market value of the maximum quantity of rice to be
nature, including attorney’s fees and legal costs, which the received.
COMPANY may, at any time, sustain or incur, as well as to reimburse
to said COMPANY all sums and amounts of money which the
COMPANY or its representatives shall or may pay or cause to be paid Accordingly, Country Bankers Insurance
or become liable to pay, on account of or arising from the execution
of the above-mentioned BOND or any extension, renewal, alteration Corporation (Country Bankers) issued Warehouse Bond
or substitution thereof made at the instance of the undersigned or
No. 03304[4] for P1,749,825.00 on 5 November 1989 and
anyone of them.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision Warehouse Bond No. 02355[5] for P749,925.00 on 13
and resolution of the Court of Appeals. December 1989 (1989 Bonds) through its agent, Antonio
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Lagman (Lagman). Santos was the bond principal,
Velasquez and Associates for petitioner. Lagman was the surety and the Republic of the
Leonides S. Respicio for respondent. Philippines, through the NFA was the obligee. In
PEREZ, J.:
consideration of these issuances, corresponding
Indemnity Agreements[6] were executed by Santos, as
This is a petition for review on certiorari under
bond principal, together with Ban Lee Lim Santos (Ban
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing
Lee Lim), Rhosemelita Reguine (Reguine) and Lagman,
the Decision[1] and Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals
as co-signors. The latter bound themselves jointly and
dated 21 June 2004 and 24 September 2004, respectively.
severally liable to Country Bankers for any damages,
Page 131 of 187
prejudice, losses, costs, payments, advances and
expenses of whatever kind and nature, including
attorneys fees and legal costs, which it may sustain as a
consequence of the said bond; to reimburse Country
Bankers of whatever amount it may pay or cause to be
paid or become liable to pay thereunder; and to pay
interest at the rate of 12% per annum computed and
compounded monthly, as well as to pay attorneys fees of
20% of the amount due it.[7]
Santos then secured a loan using his warehouse
receipts as collateral.[8] When the loan matured, Santos
defaulted in his payment. The sacks of palay covered by
the warehouse receipts were no longer found in the
bonded warehouse.[9] By virtue of the surety bonds,
Country Bankers was compelled to pay P1,166,750.37.[10]
Consequently, Country Bankers filed a complaint
for a sum of money docketed as Civil Case No. 95-73048
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. In his
Answer, Lagman alleged that the 1989 Bonds were valid
only for 1 year from the date of their issuance, as
evidenced by receipts; that the bonds were never
renewed and revived by payment of premiums; that on 5
November 1990, Country Bankers issued Warehouse
Bond No. 03515 (1990 Bond) which was also valid for one
year and that no Indemnity Agreement was executed for
the purpose; and that the 1990 Bond supersedes,
cancels, and renders no force and effect the 1989
Bonds.[11]
The bond principals, Santos and Ban Lee Lim, were not
served with summons because they could no longer be
found.[12] The case was eventually dismissed against
them without prejudice.[13] The other co-signor, Reguine,
was declared in default for failure to file her answer.[14]
On 21 September 1998, the trial court rendered
judgment declaring Reguine and Lagman jointly and
severally liable to pay Country Bankers the amount
of P2,400,499.87.[15] The dispositive portion of the RTC
Decision[16] reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered, ordering defendants
Rhomesita [sic] Reguine and Antonio
Lagman, jointly and severally liable to pay
plaintiff, Country Bankers Assurance
Corporation, the amount of P2,400,499.87,
with 12% interest from the date the
complaint was filed until fully satisfied plus
20% of the amount due plaintiff as and for
attorneys fees and to pay the costs.
As the Court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the persons of defendants
Nelson Santos and Ban Lee Lim Santos, let
the case against them be
DISMISSED. Defendant Antonio Lagmans
counterclaim is likewise DISMISSED, for
lack of merit.[17]
In holding Lagman and Reguine solidarily liable to
Country Bankers, the trial court relied on the express
terms of the Indemnity Agreement that they jointly and
Page 132 of 187
severally bound themselves to indemnify and make good
to Country Bankers any liability which the latter may
incur on account of or arising from the execution of the
bonds.[18]
The trial court rationalized that the bonds remain in
force unless cancelled by the Administrator of the NFA
and cannot be unilaterally cancelled by Lagman. The
trial court emphasized that for the failure of Lagman to
comply with his obligation under the Indemnity
Agreements, he is likewise liable for damages as a
consequence of the breach.
Lagman filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA G.R. CV No. 61797. He insisted that the
lifetime of the 1989 Bonds, as well as the corresponding
Indemnity Agreements was only 12 months. According
to Lagman, the 1990 Bond was not pleaded in the
complaint because it was not covered by an Indemnity
Agreement and it superseded the two prior bonds.[19]
On 21 June 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered the
assailed Decision reversing and setting aside the
Decision of the RTC and ordering the dismissal of the
complaint filed against Lagman.[20]
The appellate court held that the 1990 Bond superseded
the 1989 Bonds. The appellate court observed that the
1990 Bond covers 33.3% of the market value of the palay,
thereby manifesting the intention of the parties to make
the latter bond more comprehensive. Lagman was also
exonerated by the appellate court from liability because
he was not a signatory to the alleged Indemnity
Agreement of 5 November 1990 covering the 1990
Bond. The appellate court rejected the argument of
Country Bankers that the 1989 bonds were continuing,
finding, as reason therefor, that the receipts issued for
the bonds indicate that they were effective for only one-
year.
Country Bankers sought reconsideration which was
denied in a Resolution dated 24 September 2004.[21]
Expectedly, Country Bankers filed the instant petition
attributing two (2) errors to the Court of Appeals, to wit:
A.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING
THE EXPRESS PROVISIONS OF SECTION
177 OF THE INSURANCE CODE WHEN IT
HELD THAT THE SUBJECT SURETY
BONDS WERE SUPERSEDED BY A
SUBSEQUENT BOND NOTWITHSTANDING
THE NON-CANCELLATION THEREOF BY
THE BOND OBLIGEE.
B.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
RECEIPTS FOR THE PAYMENT OF
PREMIUMS PREVAIL OVER THE
EXPRESS PROVISION OF THE SURETY
BOND THAT FIXES THE TERM
THEREOF.[22]
Page 133 of 187
Country Bankers maintains that by the express terms of
the 1989 Bonds, they shall remain in full force until
cancelled by the Administrator of the NFA. As
continuing bonds, Country Bankers avers that Section
177 of the Insurance Code applies, in that the bond may
only be cancelled by the obligee, by the Insurance
Commissioner or by a competent court.
Country Bankers questions the existence of a
third bond, the 1990 Bond, which allegedly cancelled the
1989 Bonds on the following grounds: First, Lagman
failed to produce the original of the 1990 Bond and no
basis has been laid for the presentation of secondary
evidence; Second, the issuance of the 1990 Bond was not
approved and processed by Country Bankers; Third, the
NFA as bond obligee was not in possession of the 1990
Bond. Country Bankers stresses that the cancellation of
the 1989 Bonds requires the participation of the bond
obligee. Ergo, the bonds remain subsisting until
cancelled by the bond obligee. Country Bankers further
assert that Lagman also failed to prove that the NFA
accepted the 1990 Bond in replacement of the 1989
Bonds.
Country Bankers notes that the receipts issued for the
1989 Bonds are mere evidence of premium payments
and should not be relied on to determine the period of
effectivity of the bonds. Country Bankers explains that
the receipts only represent the transactions between the
bond principal and the surety, and does not involve the
NFA as bond obligee.
Country Bankers calls this Courts attention to the
incontestability clause contained in the Indemnity
Agreements which prohibits Lagman from questioning
his liability therein.
In his Comment, Lagman raises the issue of novation by
asserting that the 1989 Bonds were superseded by the
1990 Bond, which did not include Lagman as
party.Therefore, Lagman argues, Country Bankers has
no cause of action against him. Lagman also reiterates
that because of novation, the 1989 bonds are neither
perpetual nor continuing.
Lagman anchors his defense on two (2)
arguments: 1) the 1989 Bonds have expired and 2) the
1990 Bond novates the 1989 Bonds.
The Court of Appeals held that the 1989 bonds
were effective only for one (1) year, as evidenced by the
receipts on the payment of premiums.
We do not agree.
The official receipts in question serve as proof of
payment of the premium for one year on each surety
bond. It does not, however, automatically mean that the
surety bond is effective for only one (1) year. In fact, the
effectivity of the bond is not wholly dependent on the
payment of premium. Section 177 of the Insurance Code
expresses:
Page 134 of 187

Sec. 177. The surety is entitled to
payment of the premium as soon as the
contract of suretyship or bond is perfected
and delivered to the obligor. No contract of
suretyship or bonding shall be valid and
binding unless and until the premium
therefor has been paid, except where the
obligee has accepted the bond, in which
case the bond becomes valid and
enforceable irrespective of whether or not
the premium has been paid by the obligor
to the surety: Provided, That if the contract
of suretyship or bond is not accepted by, or
filed with the obligee, the surety shall
collect only reasonable amount, not
exceeding fifty per centum of the premium
due thereon as service fee plus the cost of
stamps or other taxes imposed for the
issuance of the contract or bond: Provided,
however, That if the non-acceptance of the
bond be due to the fault or negligence of
the surety, no such service fee, stamps or
taxes shall be collected. (Emphasis
supplied)
The 1989 Bonds have identical provisions and
they state in very clear terms the effectivity of these
bonds, viz:
NOW, THEREFORE, if the above-bounded
Principal shall well and truly deliver to the
depositors PALAY received by him for
STORAGE at any time that demand
therefore is made, or shall pay the market
value therefore in case he is unable to
return the same, then this obligation shall
be null and void; otherwise it shall remain
in full force and effect and may be enforced
in the manner provided by said Act No.
3893 as amended by Republic Act No. 247
and P.D. No. 4. This bond shall remain in
force until cancelled by the Administrator
of National Food Authority.[23]
This provision in the bonds is but in compliance with
the second paragraph of Section 177 of the Insurance
Code, which specifies that a continuing bond, as in this
case where there is no fixed expiration date, may be
cancelled only by the obligee, which is the NFA, by the
Insurance Commissioner, and by the court. Thus:
In case of a continuing bond, the
obligor shall pay the subsequent annual
premium as it falls due until the contract of
suretyship is cancelled by the obligee or by
the Commissioner or by a court of
competent jurisdiction, as the case may be.
By law and by the specific contract involved in this case,
the effectivity of the bond required for the obtention of
a license to engage in the business of receiving rice for
storage is determined not alone by the payment of
premiums but principally by the Administrator of the
NFA. From beginning to end, the Administrators brief is
the enabling or disabling document.
The clear import of these provisions is that the
surety bonds in question cannot be unilaterally
Page 135 of 187
cancelled by Lagman. The same conclusion was reached
by the trial court and we quote:
As there appears no record of cancellation
of the Warehouse Bonds No. 03304 and No.
02355 either by the administrator of the
NFA or by the Insurance Commissioner or
by the Court, the Warehouse Bonds are
valid and binding and cannot be
unilaterally cancelled by defendant
Lagman as general agent of the plaintiff.[24]
While the trial court did not directly rule on the
existence and validity of the 1990 Bond, it upheld the
1989 Bonds as valid and binding, which could not be
unilaterally cancelled by Lagman. The Court of Appeals,
on the other hand, acknowledged the 1990 Bond as
having cancelled the two previous bonds by
novation. Both courts however failed to discuss their
basis for rejecting or admitting the 1990 Bond, which, as
we indicated, is bone to pick in this case.
Lagmans insistence on novation depends on the
validity, nay, existence of the allegedly novating 1990
Bond. Country Bankers understandably impugns
both. We see the point. Lagman presented a mere
photocopy of the 1990 Bond. We rule as inadmissible
such copy.
Under the best evidence rule, the original
document must be produced whenever its contents are
the subject of inquiry.[25] The rule is encapsulated in
Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as follow:
Sec. 3. Original document must be
produced; exceptions. When the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a documents, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself, except in the
following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the
custody or under the control of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and
the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of
numerous accounts or other documents
which cannot be examined in court without
great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general
result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public
record in the custody of a public officer or
is recorded in a public office.[26]
A photocopy, being a mere secondary evidence, is
not admissible unless it is shown that the original is
unavailable.[27] Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
states:
SEC.5 When original document is
unavailable. When the original document
has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, the offeror, upon proof
Page 136 of 187
 of its execution or existence and the cause
of its unavailability without bad faith on
his part, may prove its contents by a copy,
or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the testimony of
witnesses in the order stated.
Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary
evidence to prove the contents of the original, the
offeror must prove the following: (1) the existence or
due execution of the original; (2) the loss and
destruction of the original or the reason for its non-
production in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror,
the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of
the original can be attributed. The correct order of
proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and
contents.[28]
In the case at bar, Lagman mentioned during the
direct examination that there are actually four (4)
duplicate originals of the 1990 Bond: the first is kept by
the NFA, the second is with the Loan Officer of the NFA
in Tarlac, the third is with Country Bankers and the
fourth was in his possession.[29] A party must first
present to the court proof of loss or other satisfactory
explanation for the non-production of the original
instrument.[30] When more than one original copy exists,
it must appear that all of them have been lost,
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court before
secondary evidence can be given of any one. A
photocopy may not be used without accounting for the
other originals.[31]
Despite knowledge of the existence and
whereabouts of these duplicate originals, Lagman
merely presented a photocopy. He admitted that he kept
a copy of the 1990 Bond but he could no longer produce
it because he had already severed his ties with Country
Bankers. However, he did not explain why severance of
ties is by itself reason enough for the non-availability of
his copy of the bond considering that, as it appears from
the 1989 Bonds, Lagman himself is a bondsman. Neither
did Lagman explain why he failed to secure the original
from any of the three other custodians he mentioned in
his testimony. While he apparently was able to find the
original with the NFA Loan Officer, he was merely
contented with producing its photocopy. Clearly,
Lagman failed to exert diligent efforts to produce the
original.
Fueling further suspicion regarding the existence
of the 1990 Bond is the absence of an Indemnity
Agreement. While Lagman argued that a 1990 Bond
novates the 1989 Bonds, he raises the defense of non-
existence of an indemnity agreement which would
conveniently exempt him from liability. The trial court
deemed this defense as indicia of bad faith, thus:
To the observation of the Court,
defendant Lagman contended that being a
general agent (which requires a much
Page 137 of 187
 higher qualification than an ordinary
agent), he is expected to have attended
seminars and workshops on general
insurance wherein he is supposed to have
acquired sufficient knowledge of the
general principles of insurance which he
had fully practised or implemented from
experience. It somehow appears to the
Courts assessment of his reneging liability
of the bonds in question, that he is still
short of having really understood the
principle of suretyship with reference to
the transaction of indemnity in which he is
a signatory. If, as he alleged, that he is well-
versed in insurance, the Court finds no
excuse for him to stand firm in denying his
liability over the claim against the bonds
with indemnity provision. If he insists in
not recognizing that liability, the more that
this Court is convinced that his knowledge
that insurance operates under the principle
of good faith is inadequate. He missed the
exception provided by Section 177 of the
Insurance Code, as amended, wherein non-
payment of premium would not have the
same essence in his mind that the
agreements entered into would not have
full force or effect. It could be glimpsed,
therefore, that the mere fact of cancelling
bonds with indemnity agreements and
replacing them (absence of the same) to
escape liability clearly manifests bad faith
on his part.[32] (Emphasis supplied.)
Having discounted the existence and/or validity of the
1990 Bond, there can be no novation to speak
of. Novation is the extinguishment of an obligation by
the substitution or change of the obligation by a
subsequent one which extinguishes or modifies the first,
either by changing the object or principal conditions, or
by substituting another in place of the debtor, or by
subrogating a third person in the rights of the
creditor. For novation to take place, the following
requisites must concur: 1) There must be a previous
valid obligation; 2) The parties concerned must agree to
a new contract; 3) The old contract must be
extinguished; and 4) There must be a valid new
contract.[33]
In this case, only the first element of novation
exists. Indeed, there is a previous valid obligation, i.e.,
the 1989 Bonds. There is however neither a valid new
contract nor a clear agreement between the parties to a
new contract since the very existence of the 1990 Bond
has been rendered dubious. Without the new contract,
the old contract is not extinguished.
Implied novation necessitates a new obligation
with which the old is in total incompatibility such that
the old obligation is completely superseded by the new
one.[34] Quite obviously, neither can there be implied
novation. In this case, there is no new obligation.
The liability of Lagman is expressed in Indemnity
Agreements executed in consideration of the 1989 Bonds
which we have considered as continuing
contracts. Under both Indemnity Agreements, Lagman,
as co-signor, together with Santos, Ban Lee Lim and
Reguine, bound themselves jointly and severally to
Page 138 of 187
Country Bankers to indemnify it for any damage or loss
sustained on the account of the execution of the bond,
among others. The pertinent identical stipulations of
the Indemnity Agreements state:
INDEMNITY: ─ To indemnify and make
good to the COMPANY jointly and
severally, any damages, prejudice, loss,
costs, payments advances and expenses of
whatever kind and nature, including
attorneys fees and legal costs, which the
COMPANY may, at any time, sustain or
incur, as well as to reimburse to said
COMPANY all sums and amounts of money
which the COMPANY or its representatives
shall or may pay or cause to be paid or
become liable to pay, on account of or
arising from the execution of the above-
mentioned BOND or any extension,
renewal, alteration or substitution thereof
made at the instance of the undersigned or
anyone of them.[35]
Moreover, the Indemnity Agreements also
contained identical Incontestability Clauses which
provide:
INCONTESTABILITY OF PAYMENTS
MADE BY THE COMPANY: ─ Any payment
or disbursement made by the COMPANY on
account of the above-mentioned Bond, its
renewals, extensions, alterations or
substitutions either in the belief that the
COMPANY was obligated to make such
payment or in the belief that said payment
was necessary or expedient in order to
avoid greater losses or obligations for
which the COMPANY might be liable by
virtue of the terms of the above-mentioned
Bond, its renewals, extensions, alterations,
or substitutions, shall be final and shall not
be disputed by the undersigned, who
hereby jointly and severally bind
themselves to indemnify [Country Bankers]
of any and all such payments, as stated in
the preceding clauses.
In case the COMPANY shall have
paid[,] settled or compromised any liability,
loss, costs, damages, attorneys fees,
expenses, claims[,] demands, suits, or
judgments as above-stated, arising out of or
in connection with said bond, an itemized
statement thereof, signed by an officer of
the COMPANY and other evidence to show
said payment, settlement or compromise,
shall be prima facie evidence of said
payment, settlement or compromise, as well
as the liability of the undersigned in any
and all suits and claims against the
undersigned arising out of said bond or this
bond application.[36]
Lagman is bound by these Indemnity
Agreements. Payments made by Country Bankers by
virtue of the 1989 Bonds gave rise to Lagmans obligation
to reimburse it under the Indemnity
Agreements. Lagman, being a solidary debtor, is liable
for the entire obligation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
Page 139 of 187
G.R. CV No. 61797 are SET ASIDE and the Decision
dated 21 September 1998 of the RTC is
hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Page 140 of 187

G.R. No. 170338. December 23, 2008.*
VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner, vs. THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON
PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND
SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY,
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL
REFORMS, respondents.
G.R. No. 179275. December 23, 2008.*
SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D.
AGCAOILI, petitioners, vs. THE SENATE OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT
THE HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR, respondent.
MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, petitioner-in-
intervention.
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY
C. AQUINO, RODOLFO G. BIAZON, PANFILO M.
LACSON, LOREN B. LEGARDA, M.A. JAMBY A.S.
MADRIGAL, and ANTONIO F. TRILLANES,
respondents-intervenors.
Remedial Law; Actions; Legal Standing; Concept of legal
standing or locus standi explained in Tolentino vs COMELEC.—
In Tolentino v. COMELEC, 420 SCRA 438 (2004), we explained that “
‘[l]egal standing’ or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial
interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury because of the challenged governmental act x x x,” thus,
generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can
show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened
injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2)
the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the
injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. The gist of the
question of standing is whether a party has “alleged such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.”
Same; Same; Same; In recent cases, Court has relaxed the
stringent direct injury test.—Considering that locus standi is a mere
procedural technicality, the Court, in recent cases, has relaxed the
stringent direct injury test. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA
160 (2006), articulates that a “liberal policy has been observed,
allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic
organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or
validity of laws, regulations and rulings.” The fairly recent Chavez v.
Gonzales, 545 SCRA 441 (2008), even permitted a non-member of the
broadcast media, who failed to allege a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy, to challenge the acts of the Secretary of
Justice and the National Telecommunications Commission. The
majority, in the said case, echoed the current policy that “this Court
has repeatedly and consistently refused to wield procedural barriers
as impediments to its addressing and resolving serious legal
questions that greatly impact on public interest, in keeping with the
Court’s duty under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether or
not other branches of government have kept themselves within the
limits of the Constitution and the laws, and that they have not
abused the discretion given to them.”
Same; Same; Moot and Academic; Court dismissed G.R. No.
170338 for being moot and academic; The exercise by the Court of
judicial power is limited to the determination and resolution of
actual cases and controversies.—The Court, however, dismisses G.R.
No. 170338 for being moot and academic. Repeatedly stressed in our
prior decisions is the principle that the exercise by this Court of
judicial power is limited to the determination and resolution of
actual cases and controversies. By actual cases, we mean existing
conflicts appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory, for otherwise the decision of the Court
will amount to an advisory opinion. The power of judicial inquiry
does not extend to hypothetical questions because any attempt at
abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions
and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Neither will the
Court determine a moot question in a case in which no practical
relief can be granted. A case becomes moot when its purpose has
become stale. It is unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of
a case presenting a moot question as a judgment thereon cannot
have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be
enforced.
Constitutional Law; Legislative Inquiry; Senate cannot be
allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative
inquiry without duly published rules of procedure; The requisite of
publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements
of due process.—As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court
grants the same. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the
conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published
rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional
requirement. Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides that “[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or any
Page 141 of 187
of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.”
The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the
basic requirements of due process. Publication is indeed imperative,
for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no
notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What constitutes
publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides
that “[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion
of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper
of general circulation in the Philippines.” The respondents in G.R.
No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that
the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation
only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the
14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members
commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the
publication of these rules when they first opened their session.173
Same; Same; The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot
justify the Senate’s defiance of the clear and unambiguous language
of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution; The constitutional
mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice
or tradition followed by the Senate.—Respondents justify their non-
observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing
that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that,
they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and
accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page. The Court
does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot
justify the Senate’s defiance of the clear and unambiguous language
of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law
instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly
published rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction
whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or
revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules
prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the
Senate.
Same; Same; Statutes; Internet; Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8792,
otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, does not
make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and
regulations.—The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of
R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of
2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet
is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data
message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a
written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the
law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being
the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic
documents. It does not make the internet a medium for publishing
laws, rules and regulations.
Same; Same; The recent publication does not cure the infirmity
of the inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant petitions.—The
Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the October 31, 2008
issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial notice
of this fact, the recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the
inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant petitions. Insofar as
the consolidated cases are concerned, the legislative investigation
subject thereof still could not be undertaken by the respondent
Senate Committees, because no published rules governed it, in clear
contravention of the Constitution.
PUNO, C.J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Legislative Inquiry; A faithful adherence of
the case at bar to the Neri Ruling would yield the conclusion that the
“Garci tapes” investigation may be conducted even without the
published Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries, and that only
those orders and proceedings that result in the violation of the rights
of the witnesses may be considered null and void.—It will be recalled
that in the March 25 Neri Decision, the Court struck down not the
entire proceedings of the Senate investigation on the NBN-ZTE deal
for want of published Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries, but
only the Order dated January 30, 2008, citing petitioner Romulo L.
Neri in contempt of the Senate Committees and directing his arrest
and detention (January 30 Contempt Order) as stated in the
dispositive portion of the Decision. A faithful adherence of the case
at bar to the Neri Ruling would yield the conclusion that the “Garci
tapes” investigation may be conducted even without the published
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries, and that only those orders
and proceedings that result in the violation of the rights of the
witnesses may be considered null and void. The ponencia did not,
however, show which orders or proceedings resulted in this
violation and, instead, made a blanket prohibition of the conduct of
the “Garci tapes” investigation for want of published Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries.
Same; Same; In both the March 25 Neri Decision and the
September 4 Neri Resolution, the Court did not invalidate the entire
Senate investigation proceedings conducted in accordance with the
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries, which were not published in
the 14th Congress.—In both the March 25 Neri Decision and the
September 4 Neri Resolution, the Court did not invalidate the entire
Senate investigation proceedings conducted in accordance with the
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries, which were notpublished in
the 14th Congress. In fact, the Court ruled on the issue of executive
privilege raised in said proceedings. It struck down only the January
Page 142 of 187
30 Contempt Order against therein petitioner Neri for failure to
comply with Section 18 of the Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries, while at the same time holding these rules as
constitutionally infirm for want of publication.
Same; Same; The continuing effectivity of the Senate Rules from
one Congress to the next, which the Court acknowledged in its
September 4 Neri Resolution, evinces the nature of the Senate as a
continuing body governed by its continuing Senate Rules.—The
continuing effectivity of the Senate Rules from one Congress to the
next, which the Court acknowledged in its September 4 Neri
Resolution, evinces the nature of the Senate as a continuing body
governed by its continuing Senate Rules. If the Senate were not a
continuing body, there would be no reason for the Senate Rules to
likewise have a continuing effect. In contradistinction, the
effectivity of the Rules of Proceedings of the House of
Representatives (House Rules)—which is admittedly not a
continuing body, as the terms of all congressmen end at the same
time—terminates upon the expiration of one Congress. Thus, Rule 1,
Section 1 of the 14th Congress House Rules adopted on November 20,
2007 reflects the practice of the House of Representatives of
adopting rules of proceedings on its first meeting and organization
upon the opening of a succeeding Congress.
Same; Same; As a general rule, one-time publication suffices to
satisfy the due process requirement to inform the public of a rule that
would govern it and affect its rights.—As a general rule, one-time
publication suffices to satisfy the due process requirement to inform
the public of a rule that would govern it and affect its rights. It is not
uncommon for laws and rules to provide that they shall take effect
upon a certain date following publication in a newspaper of general
circulation without having to state that they “shall remain in force
until they are amended or repealed” for them to have continuing
effect. These laws and rules are published only once, and yet they
continue to be in force. The Court itself employs this language in its
rules as shown in the recently promulgated Rule on the Writ
of Habeas Data and Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
Same; Same; The exception to the general rule that one-time
publication suffices for a law or rule to have continuing effect is when
there are circumstances or factors that interrupt this continuity.—
The exception to the general rule that one-time publication suffices
for a law or rule to have continuing effect is when there are
circumstances or factors that interrupt this continuity. An example
is the discontinuation of the existence of the House of
Representatives as a legislative body, which terminates the
effectivity of its published Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries
and requires the publication of these rules in the succeeding
Congress for them to take effect. As discussed above and in my
Dissents to the March 25 Neri Decision and September 4 Neri
Resolution, the Senate, unlike the House of Representatives, is a
continuing body. Thus, contrary to the holding of the ponencia, the
Senate’s Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries, sans amendment,
need not be published by the Senate of every Congress and need not
also state that they shall “remain in force until they are amended or
repealed” for them to be effective from one Congress to the next.
Quite the opposite of the ponencia’s ruling, in the absence of
language stating that the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries
shall not continue in effect from one Congress to the next, these
rules shall have continuing effect.
Same; Anti-Wiretapping Law; What Republic Act (R.A.) 4200
penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or
recording private communications by means of the devices
enumerated therein.—A private communication is characterized as
such based not on the content of the communication, but on
the context that it was said in private and not for public
consumption. That the content or nature of the communication is
immaterial was ruled in Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590
(1995), viz.: ... the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a
violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be
specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are
the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private
communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The
mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a
private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to
constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200.177
Same; Same; Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4200 provides for exceptions
when wiretapping is allowed by written order of the court.—R.A. No.
4200, however, provides for exceptions when wiretapping is allowed
by written order of the court under Section 3, viz.: Section 3. Nothing
contained in this Act, however, shall render it unlawful or
punishable for any peace officer, who is authorized by a written
order of the Court, to execute any of the acts declared to be unlawful
in the two preceding sections in cases involving the crimes of
treason, espionage, provoking war and disloyalty in case of war,
piracy, mutiny in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to
commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to
commit sedition, inciting to sedition, kidnapping as defined by the
Revised Penal Code, and violations of Commonwealth Act No. 616,
punishing espionage and other offenses against national
security: Provided, That such written order shall only be issued or
granted upon written application and the examination under oath or
affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and a
showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of
the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed or is being
Page 143 of 187
committed or is about to be committed: Provided, however, That in
cases involving the offenses of rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to
commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly
commit sedition, and inciting to sedition, such authority shall be
granted only upon prior proof that a rebellion or acts of sedition, as
containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly
the case may be, have actually been or are being committed; (2) that between the President of the Philippines and a high-
there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence will be
obtained essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the ranking official of the Commission on Elections
solution of, or to the prevention of, any of such crimes; and (3) that
there are no other means readily available for obtaining such
(COMELEC) surfaced. They captured unprecedented
evidence. public attention and thrust the country into a
Same; Same; Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4200 makes illegally
wiretapped communications inadmissible in any proceeding.—To controversy that placed the legitimacy of the present
further give teeth to the above prohibition, R.A. No. 4200 makes
administration on the line, and resulted in the near-
illegally wiretapped communications inadmissible in any
proceeding, viz.: Section 4. Any communication or spoken word, or collapse of the Arroyo government. The tapes,
the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the
same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained notoriously referred to as the Hello Garci tapes,
obtained or se-cured by any person in violation of the preceding
allegedly contained the Presidents instructions to
sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any
judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to
investigation.
Same; Same; The exception under Section 1 in relation to Section manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential
3 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4200 does not include the use of illegally
elections. These recordings were to become the subject
wiretapped communication for purposes of prosecuting violations of
R.A. No. 4200 itself.—The exception under Section 1 in relation to of heated legislative hearings conducted separately by
Section 3 of R.A. No. 4200 does not include the use of illegally
wiretapped communication for purposes of prosecuting violations of committees of both Houses of Congress.[1]
R.A. No. 4200 itself as the Court did in Ramirez. Not reading this
exception into the law would impede the prosecution of the acts it
prohibits and contradict the very purpose for adopting the law as In the House of Representatives (House), on June
clearly stated in its title, “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire
Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of 8, 2005, then Minority Floor Leader Francis G. Escudero
Communication, and for Other Purposes.” Well-settled is the rule in
delivered a privilege speech, Tale of Two Tapes, and set
statutory construction that “where there is ambiguity, such
interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be in motion a congressional investigation jointly
adopted.” Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper frienda est, ut
evitatur inconveniens et absurdum. R.A. No. 4200 should be given a conducted by the Committees on Public Information,
sensible construction, so as to give effect to its rationale and intent
Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security,
and thus avoid an unjust or absurd interpretation. The ineluctable
conclusion is that the use of illegally wiretapped communication Information and Communications Technology, and
must be allowed in a prosecution under R.A. No. 4200 precisely to
deter the commission of illegal wiretapping. Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (respondent House
Committees). During the inquiry, several versions of the
NACHURA, J.: wiretapped conversation emerged. But on July 5, 2005,

Page 144 of 187

National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director directed to desist from further using the recordings in
Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of any of the House proceedings.[5]
former NBI Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to
the respondent House Committees seven alleged Without reaching its denouement, the House
original tape recordings of the supposed three-hour discussion and debates on the Garci tapes abruptly
taped conversation. After prolonged and impassioned stopped.
debate by the committee members on the admissibility
and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were After more than two years of quiescence, Senator
eventually played in the chambers of the House.[2] Panfilo Lacson roused the slumbering issue with a
privilege speech, The Lighthouse That Brought
On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Darkness. In his discourse, Senator Lacson promised to
Committees decided to suspend the hearings provide the public the whole unvarnished truth the
indefinitely. Nevertheless, they decided to prepare whats, whens, wheres, whos and whys of the alleged
committee reports based on the said recordings and the wiretap, and sought an inquiry into the perceived
testimonies of the resource persons.[3] willingness of telecommunications providers to
participate in nefarious wiretapping activities.
Alarmed by these developments, petitioner
Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano) filed with this Court On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator
a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer Lacsons speech was referred to the Senate Committee
for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of on National Defense and Security, chaired by Senator
Preliminary Injunction[4] docketed as G.R. No. 170338. Rodolfo Biazon, who had previously filed two
He prayed that the respondent House Committees be bills[6] seeking to regulate the sale, purchase and use of
restrained from using these tape recordings of the wiretapping equipment and to prohibit the Armed
illegally obtained wiretapped conversations in their Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from performing
committee reports and for any other purpose. He electoral duties.[7]
further implored that the said recordings and any
reference thereto be ordered stricken off the records of In the Senates plenary session the following day,
the inquiry, and the respondent House Committees a lengthy debate ensued when Senator Richard Gordon

Page 145 of 187

aired his concern on the possible transgression of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4200[8] if the body were to Intervening as respondents,[15] Senators Aquilino
conduct a legislative inquiry on the matter. On August Q. Pimentel, Jr., Benigno Noynoy C. Aquino, Rodolfo G.
28, 2007, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered a Biazon, Panfilo M. Lacson, Loren B. Legarda, M.A.
privilege speech, articulating her considered view that Jamby A.S. Madrigal and Antonio F. Trillanes filed their
the Constitution absolutely bans the use, possession, Comment[16] on the petition on September 25, 2007.
replay or communication of the contents of the Hello
Garci tapes. However, she recommended a legislative The Court subsequently heard the case on oral
investigation into the role of the Intelligence Service of argument.[17]
the AFP (ISAFP), the Philippine National Police or
other government entities in the alleged illegal On October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a
wiretapping of public officials.[9] member of the ISAFP and one of the resource persons
summoned by the Senate to appear and testify at its
On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago hearings, moved to intervene as petitioner in G.R. No.
Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired justices of the 179275.[18]
Court of Appeals, filed before this Court a Petition for
Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of consolidate G.R. Nos. 170338 and 179275.[19]
Preliminary Injunction,[10] docketed as G.R. No. 179275,
seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled It may be noted that while both petitions involve
legislative inquiry. They argued in the main that the the Hello Garci recordings, they have different
intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and objectivesthe first is poised at preventing the playing of
Section 3, Article III of the Constitution.[11] the tapes in the House and their subsequent inclusion in
the committee reports, and the second seeks to prohibit
As the Court did not issue an injunctive writ, the and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the
Senate proceeded with its public hearings on the Hello wiretapped conversation.
Garci tapes on September 7,[12] 17[13] and October
1,[14] 2007.

Page 146 of 187

 The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No.
170338, and grants the second, G.R. No. 179275. However, considering that locus standi is a mere
procedural technicality, the Court, in recent cases, has
-I- relaxed the stringent direct injury test. David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo[23] articulates that a liberal policy has
Before delving into the merits of the case, the been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of
Court shall first resolve the issue on the parties Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions
standing, argued at length in their pleadings. involving the constitutionality or validity of laws,
regulations and rulings.[24] The fairly recent Chavez v.
In Tolentino v. COMELEC,[20] we explained Gonzales[25] even permitted a non-member of the
that [l]egal standing or locus standi refers to a personal broadcast media, who failed to allege a personal stake in
and substantial interest in a case such that the party the outcome of the controversy, to challenge the acts of
has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the the Secretary of Justice and the National
challenged governmental act x x x, thus, Telecommunications Commission. The majority, in the
said case, echoed the current policy that this Court has
generally, a party will be allowed to litigate repeatedly and consistently refused to wield procedural
only when (1) he can show that he has
personally suffered some actual or barriers as impediments to its addressing and resolving
threatened injury because of the allegedly serious legal questions that greatly impact on public
illegal conduct of the government; (2) the
interest, in keeping with the Courts duty under the 1987
injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action; and (3) the injury is likely to be Constitution to determine whether or not other
redressed by a favorable action.[21] branches of government have kept themselves within
the limits of the Constitution and the laws, and that
they have not abused the discretion given to them.[26]
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party
has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justifies
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
his standing to initiate the petition by alleging that he is
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the person alluded to in the Hello Garci tapes. Further,
the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
his was publicly identified by the members of the
constitutional questions.[22]
Page 147 of 187
respondent committees as one of the voices in the
recordings.[27] Obviously, therefore, petitioner
Garcillano stands to be directly injured by the House
committees actions and charges of electoral fraud. The
Court recognizes his standing to institute the petition
for prohibition.
In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and
Agcaoili justify their standing by alleging that they are
concerned citizens, taxpayers, and members of the IBP.
They are of the firm conviction that any attempt to use
the Hello Garci tapes will further divide the country.
They wish to see the legal and proper use of public
funds that will necessarily be defrayed in the ensuing
public hearings. They are worried by the continuous
violation of the laws and individual rights, and the
blatant attempt to abuse constitutional processes
through the conduct of legislative inquiries purportedly
in aid of legislation.[28]
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to
due process considering that he is summoned to attend
the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of
his rights therein through the publication of the Senate
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which
underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a
taxpayer bewailing the useless and wasteful
expenditure of public funds involved in the conduct of
the questioned hearings.[29]
Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege
an interest in the execution of the laws and that
intervenor Sagge asserts his constitutional right to due
process,[30] they satisfy the requisite personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy by merely being citizens
of the Republic.
Following the Courts ruling in Francisco, Jr. v.
The House of Representatives,[31] we find sufficient
petitioners Ranadas and Agcaoilis and intervenor
Sagges allegation that the continuous conduct by the
Senate of the questioned legislative inquiry will
necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.[32] It
should be noted that in Francisco, rights personal to
then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had been
injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the
House of Representatives, yet the Court granted
standing to the petitioners therein for, as in this case,
they invariably invoked the vindication of their own
rightsas taxpayers, members of Congress, citizens,
individually or in a class suit, and members of the bar
and of the legal professionwhich were also supposedly
violated by the therein assailed unconstitutional acts.[33]
Page 148 of 187
 Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No.
179275 shows that the petitioners and intervenor Sagge
advance constitutional issues which deserve the
attention of this Court in view of their seriousness,
novelty and weight as precedents. The issues are of
transcendental and paramount importance not only to
the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, and should
be resolved for the guidance of all.[34]
Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and
given the liberal attitude it has shown in prior cases
climaxing in the more recent case of Chavez, the Court
recognizes the legal standing of petitioners Ranada and
Agcaoili and intervenor Sagge.
- II -
The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for
being moot and academic. Repeatedly stressed in our
prior decisions is the principle that the exercise by this
Court of judicial power is limited to the determination
and resolution of actual cases and controversies.[35] By
actual cases, we mean existing conflicts appropriate or
ripe for judicial determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, for otherwise the decision of the Court will
amount to an advisory opinion. The power of judicial
inquiry does not extend to hypothetical questions
because any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities.[36] Neither will the
Court determine a moot question in a case in which no
practical relief can be granted. A case becomes moot
when its purpose has become stale.[37] It is unnecessary
to indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting
a moot question as a judgment thereon cannot have any
practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot
be enforced.[38]
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano implores
from the Court, as aforementioned, the issuance of an
injunctive writ to prohibit the respondent House
Committees from playing the tape recordings and from
including the same in their committee report. He
likewise prays that the said tapes be stricken off the
records of the House proceedings. But the Court notes
that the recordings were already played in the House
and heard by its members.[39] There is also the widely
publicized fact that the committee reports on the Hello
Garci inquiry were completed and submitted to the
House in plenary by the respondent
committees.[40] Having been overtaken by these events,
the Garcillano petition has to be dismissed for being
moot and academic. After all, prohibition is a preventive
remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done,
and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already
accomplished.[41]
Page 149 of 187
 - III -
As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court
grants the same. The Senate cannot be allowed to
continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative
inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in
clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.
Legislation had been published in newspapers of
general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006.[45] With
respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress,
however, of which the term of half of its members
commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken
for the publication of these rules when they first opened
their session.

Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this
explicitly provides that [t]he Senate or the House of very same question. In Neri v. Senate Committee on
Representatives, or any of its respective committees Accountability of Public Officers and
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in Investigations,[46] we said:
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.
The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to Fourth, we find merit in the
argument of the OSG that respondent
satisfy the basic requirements of due Committees likewise violated Section 21 of
process.[42] Publication is indeed imperative, for it will Article VI of the Constitution, requiring
that the inquiry be in accordance with
be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden
the duly published rules of procedure. We
a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which quote the OSGs explanation:
he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
The phrase duly
one.[43] What constitutes publication is set forth in
published rules of procedure
Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that [l]aws requires the Senate of every
shall take effect after 15 days following the completion Congress to publish its rules of
procedure governing inquiries
of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a in aid of legislation because
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.[44] every Senate is distinct from
the one before it or after
it. Since Senatorial elections
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their are held every three (3) years
pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate for one-half of the Senates
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of membership, the composition
of the Senate also changes by
Page 150 of 187
 the end of each term. Each
Senate may thus enact a The subject was explained with greater lucidity in
different set of rules as it may
deem fit. Not having published our Resolution[48] (On the Motion for Reconsideration) in
its Rules of Procedure, the the same case, viz.:
subject hearings in aid of
legislation conducted by the
On the nature of the Senate as a continuing
14th Senate, are therefore,
body, this Court sees fit to issue a
procedurally infirm.
clarification. Certainly, there is no debate
that the Senate as an institution is
continuing, as it is not dissolved as an
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his Dissenting and entity with each national election or
Concurring Opinion, reinforces this ruling with the change in the composition of its
members. However, in the conduct of its
following rationalization: day-to-day business the Senate of each
Congress acts separately and
The present Senate under the 1987 independently of the Senate of the
Constitution is no longer a continuing Congress before it. The Rules of the Senate
legislative body. The present Senate has itself confirms this when it states:
twenty-four members, twelve of whom are
elected every three years for a term of six RULE XLIV
years each. Thus, the term of twelve UNFINISHED BUSINESS
Senators expires every three years,
leaving less than a majority of Senators to SEC. 123. Unfinished business
continue into the next Congress. The 1987 at the end of the session shall
Constitution, like the 1935 Constitution, be taken up at the next session
requires a majority of Senators to in the same status.
constitute a quorum to do
business. Applying the same reasoning All pending matters and
in Arnault v. Nazareno, the Senate under proceedings shall terminate
the 1987 Constitution is not a continuing upon the expiration of one (1)
body because less than majority of the Congress, but may be taken by
Senators continue into the next the succeeding Congress as if
Congress. The consequence is that present for the first time.
the Rules of Procedure must be republished
by the Senate after every expiry of the term Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending
of twelve Senators.[47] matters and proceedings, i.e., unpassed
bills and even legislative investigations, of
Page 151 of 187
the Senate of a particular Congress are
considered terminated upon the expiration
of that Congress and it is merely optional
on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to
take up such unfinished matters, not in the
same status, but as if presented for the first
time. The logic and practicality of such a
rule is readily apparent considering that
the Senate of the succeeding Congress
(which will typically have a different
composition as that of the previous
Congress) should not be bound by the acts
and deliberations of the Senate of which
they had no part. If the Senate is a
continuing body even with respect to the
conduct of its business, then pending
matters will not be deemed terminated with
the expiration of one Congress but will, as a
matter of course, continue into the next
Congress with the same status.
This dichotomy of the continuity of the
Senate as an institution and of the opposite
nature of the conduct of its business is
reflected in its Rules. The Rules of the
Senate (i.e. the Senates main rules of
procedure) states:
RULE LI
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF,
THE RULES
SEC. 136. At the start of each
session in which the Senators
elected in the preceding
elections shall begin their term
of office, the President may
endorse the Rules to the
appropriate committee for
amendment or revision.
The Rules may also be
amended by means of a motion
which should be presented at
least one day before its
consideration, and the vote of
the majority of the Senators
present in the session shall be
required for its approval.
RULE LII
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT
SEC. 137. These Rules shall
take effect on the date of their
adoption and shall remain in
force until they are amended
or repealed.
Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted
above takes into account the new
composition of the Senate after an election
and the possibility of the amendment or
revision of the Rules at the start
of each session in which the newly elected
Senators shall begin their term.
However, it is evident that the Senate has
determined that its main rules are intended
to be valid from the date of their adoption
until they are amended or repealed. Such
language is conspicuously absent from
the Rules. The Rules simply state (t)hese
Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after
publication in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation. The latter does not
Page 152 of 187
 explicitly provide for the continued available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public
effectivity of such rules until they are
amended or repealed. In view of the at the Senates internet web page.[49]
difference in the language of the two sets of
Senate rules, it cannot be presumed that
The Court does not agree. The absence of any
the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would
continue into the next Congress. The amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senates
Senate of the next Congress may easily defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of
adopt different rules for its legislative
Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic
inquiries which come within the rule on
unfinished business. law instructs, without more, that the Senate or its
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution requiring that the inquiry be legislation only in accordance with duly published rules
conducted in accordance with the duly of procedure, and does not make any distinction whether
published rules of procedure is or not these rules have undergone amendments or
categorical. It is incumbent upon the
Senate to publish the rules for its revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said
legislative inquiries in each Congress or rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition
otherwise make the published rules clearly followed by the Senate.
state that the same shall be effective in
subsequent Congresses or until they are
amended or repealed to sufficiently put Justice Carpios response to the same argument
public on notice.
raised by the respondents is illuminating:
If it was the intention of the Senate for its
present rules on legislative inquiries to be The publication of the Rules of
effective even in the next Congress, it could Procedure in the website of the Senate, or
have easily adopted the same language it in pamphlet form available at the Senate, is
had used in its main rules regarding not sufficient under the Taada v.
effectivity. Tuvera ruling which requires publication
either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general
circulation. The Rules of Procedure even
Respondents justify their non-observance of the
provide that the rules shall take effect
constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that seven (7) days after publication in two (2)
the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, newspapers of general circulation,
precluding any other form of
despite that, they are published in booklet form
Page 153 of 187
 publication. Publication in accordance
with Taada is mandatory to comply with
the due process requirement because Very recently, the Senate caused the publication
the Rules of Procedure put a persons liberty of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in
at risk. A person who violates the Rules of
Aid of Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues
Procedure could be arrested and detained
by the Senate. of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial
notice of this fact, the recent publication does not cure
the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited by
The invocation by the respondents of the
the instant petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases
provisions of R.A. No. 8792,[50] otherwise known as the
are concerned, the legislative investigation subject
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim
thereof still could not be undertaken by the respondent
of valid publication through the internet is all the more
Senate Committees, because no published rules
incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data
governed it, in clear contravention of the Constitution.
message or an electronic document as the functional
equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds it
purposes.[51] In other words, the law merely recognizes
unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised in the
the admissibility in evidence (for their being the
consolidated petitions.
original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic
documents.[52] It does not make the internet a medium for
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338
publishing laws, rules and regulations.
is DISMISSED, and the petition in G.R. No. 179275
is GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be issued
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate
enjoining the Senate of the Republic of
Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the
the Philippines and/or any of its committees from
Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative
conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation centered on
inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct
the Hello Garci tapes.
of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be
deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the
SO ORDERED.
rules, because it can do so only in accordance with its
duly published rules of procedure.

Page 154 of 187

 G.R. No. 204894. March 10, 2014.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.
NOEL ENOJAS y HINGPIT,
ARNOLD GOMEZ y FABREGAS, FERNANDO
SANTOS y DELANTAR and ROGER
JALANDONI y ARI, appellants.
Criminal Law; Aggravating Circumstances; Aid of Armed Men;
Use of Unlicensed Firearms; In “aid of armed men,” the men act as
accomplices only. They must not be acting in the commission of the
crime under the same purpose as the principal accused, otherwise
they are to be regarded as co-principals or co-conspirators. The use of
unlicensed firearm, on the other hand, is a special aggravating
circumstance that is not among the circumstances mentioned in
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as qualifying a homicide to
murder.—In “aid of armed men,” the men act as accomplices only.
They must not be acting in the commission of the crime under the
same purpose as the principal accused, otherwise they are to be
regarded as co-principals or co-conspirators. The use of unlicensed
firearm, on the other hand, is a special aggravating circumstance
that is not among the circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code as qualifying a homicide to murder.
Consequently, the accused in this case may be held liable only for
homicide, aggravated by the use of unlicensed firearms, a
circumstance alleged in the information.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Text Messages; Text messages are to be
proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or
has personal knowledge of them.—As to the admissibility of the text
messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with the Court’s
earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to
criminal actions. Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of
a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of
them. Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged
text messages with the other accused in order to identify and entrap
them. As the recipient of those messages sent from and to the mobile
_______________
* THIRD DVISION.
314phone in his
possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge
of such messages and was competent to testify on them.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Office of the Solicitor General for appellee.
Public Attorney’s Office for appellants.
ABAD, J.
On September 4, 2006 the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas
charged appellants Noel Enojas y Hingpit (Enojas),
Arnold Gomez y Fabregas (Gomez), Fernando Santos y
Delantar (Santos), and Roger Jalandoni y Ari
(Jalandoni) with murder before the Las Pifias Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case 06-0854.1
PO2 Eduardo Gregorio, Jr. (P02 Gregorio) testified that
at around 10:30 in the evening of August 29, 2006, he and
P02 Francisco Pangilinan (PO2 Pangilinan) were
patrolling the vicinity of Toyota Alabang and SM
Southmall when they spotted a taxi that was
suspiciously parked in front of the Aguila Auto Glass
shop near the intersection of BF Almanza and Alabang-
Zapote Roads. The officers approached the taxi and
asked the driver, later identified as accused Enojas, for
his documents. The latter complied but, having
entertained doubts regarding the veracity of documents
shown them, they asked him to come with them to the
police station in their mobile car for further
questioning.2
Accused Enojas voluntarily went with the police officers
and left his taxi behind. On reaching the 7-11
convenience store on the Zapote-Alabang Road,
however, they stopped and PO2 Pangilinan went down
to relieve himself there. As he approached the store’s
door, however, he came upon two suspected robbers and
shot it out with them. PO2 Pangilinan shot one suspect
dead and hit the other who still managed to escape. But
someone fired at PO2 Pangilinan causing his death.
Page 155 of 187
On hearing the shots, PO2 Gregorio came around and
fired at an armed man whom he saw running towards
Pilar Village. He saw another man, who came from the
Jollibbee outlet, run towards Alabang-Zapote Road
while firing his gun at PO2 Gregorio. The latter
returned fire but the men were able to take a taxi and
escape. PO2 Gregorio radioed for help and for an
ambulance. On returning to his mobile car, he realized
that accused Enojas, the taxi driver they had with them
had fled.
P/Insp. Ferjen Torred (Torred), the Chief of
Investigation Division of the Las Piñas Police, testified
that he and PO2 Teoson Rosarito (PO2 Rosarito)
immediately responded to PO2 Gregorio’s urgent call.
Suspecting that accused Enojas, the taxi driver who
fled, was involved in the attempted robbery, they
searched the abandoned taxi and found a mobile phone
that Enojas apparently left behind. P/Ins. Torred
instructed PO3 Joel Cambi (PO3 Cambi) to monitor its
incoming messages.3
The police later ascertained that the suspect whom PO2
Pangilinan had killed was someone named Reynaldo
Mendoza who was armed with a .38 caliber revolver. The
police found spent 9 mm and M-16 rifle shells at the
crime scene. Follow-up operations at nearby provinces
resulted in finding the dead body of one of the suspects,
Alex Angeles, at the Metro South Medical Center along
Molino, Bacoor, Cavite.4
PO3 Cambi and PO2 Rosarito testified that they
monitored the messages in accused Enojas’ mobile
phone and, posing as Enojas, communicated with the
other accused. The police then conducted an
entrapment operation that resulted in the arrest of
accused Santos and Jalandoni. Subsequently, the police
were also able to capture accused Enojas and Gomez.
The prosecution presented the transcripts of the mobile
phone text messages between Enojas and some of his co-
accused.5
The victim’s father, Ricardo Pangilinan, testified that
his son was at the time of his death 28 years old,
unmarried, and was receiving police pay of ₱8,000.00 to
₱10,000.00 per month. Ricardo spent ₱99,999 for burial
expense, ₱16,000.00 for the interment services, and
₱50,000.00 for purchase of the cemetery lot.6
Manifesting in open court that they did not want to
adduce any evidence or testify in the case,7 the accused
opted to instead file a trial memorandum on March 10,
2008 for their defense. They pointed out that they were
entitled to an acquittal since they were all illegally
arrested and since the evidence of the text messages
were inadmissible, not having been properly identified.
On June 2, 2008 the RTC rendered judgment,8 finding all
the accused guilty of murder qualified by evident
premeditation and use of armed men with the special
aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearms.
It thus sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, without the possibility of parole and to
indemnify the heirs of PO2 Pangilinan with ₱165,999.00
as actual damages, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages,
₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages, and ₱2,080,000.00 as
compensation for loss of earning capacity.
Upon review in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 03377, on June 14, 2012
the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the appeal and
affirmed in toto the conviction of the accused.9 The CA,
however, found the absence of evident premeditation
since the prosecution failed to prove that the several
accused planned the crime before committing it. The
accused appealed from the CA to this Court.10
Page 156 of 187
The defense points out that the prosecution failed to
present direct evidence that the accused Enojas, Gomez,
Santos, or Jalandoni took part in shooting PO2
Pangilinan dead.11 This may be true but the prosecution
could prove their liability by circumstantial evidence
that meets the evidentiary standard of proof beyond
reasonable doubt. It has been held that circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is more
than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.12
Here the totality of the circumstantial evidence the
prosecution presented sufficiently provides basis for the
conviction of all the accused. Thus:
1. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused
Enojas as the driver of the taxicab suspiciously
parked in front of the Aguila Auto Glass shop. The
officers were bringing him with them to the police
station because of the questionable documents he
showed upon query. Subsequent inspection of the
taxicab yielded Enojas’ mobile phone that
contained messages which led to the entrapment
and capture of the other accused who were also
taxicab drivers.
2. Enojas fled during the commotion rather than
remain in the cab to go to the police station where
he was about to be taken for questioning, tending
to show that he had something to hide. He
certainly did not go to the police afterwards to
clear up the matter and claim his taxi.
3. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused
Gomez as one of the men he saw running away
from the scene of the shooting.
4. The text messages identified "Kua Justin" as one
of those who engaged PO2 Pangilinan in the
shootout; the messages also referred to "Kua
Justin" as the one who was hit in such shootout
and later died in a hospital in Bacoor, Cavite.
These messages linked the other accused.
5. During the follow-up operations, the police
investigators succeeded in entrapping accused
Santos, Jalandoni, Enojas, and Gomez, who were
all named in the text messages.
6. The text messages sent to the phone recovered
from the taxi driven by Enojas clearly made
references to the 7-11 shootout and to the
wounding of "Kua Justin," one of the gunmen, and
his subsequent death.
7. The context of the messages showed that the
accused were members of an organized group of
taxicab drivers engaged in illegal activities.
8. Upon the arrest of the accused, they were found
in possession of mobile phones with call numbers
that corresponded to the senders of the messages
received on the mobile phone that accused Enojas
left in his taxicab.13
The Court must, however, disagree with the CA’s ruling
that the aggravating circumstances of a) aid of armed
men and b) use of unlicensed firearms qualified the
killing of PO2 Pangilinan to murder. In "aid of armed
men," the men act as accomplices only. They must not be
acting in the commission of the crime under the same
purpose as the principal accused, otherwise they are to
be regarded as co-principals or co-conspirators. The use
of unlicensed firearm, on the other hand, is a special
aggravating circumstance that is not among the
Page 157 of 187
circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code as qualifying a homicide to
murder.14 Consequently, the accused in this case may be
held liable only for homicide, aggravated by the use of
unlicensed firearms, a circumstance alleged in the
information.
As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC
admitted them in conformity with the Court’s earlier
Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to
criminal actions.15 Text messages are to be proved by
the testimony of a person who was a party to the same
or has personal knowledge of them.16 Here, PO3 Cambi,
posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages
with the other accused in order to identify and entrap
them. As the recipient of those messages sent from and
to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had
personal knowledge of such messages and was
competent to testify on them.
WHEREFORE, the Court MODIFIES the Court of
Appeals Decision of June 14, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-HC
03377. The Court instead FINDS accused-appellants
Noel Enojas y Hingpit, Arnold Gomez y Fabregas,
Fernando Santos y Delantar, and Roger Jalandoni y Ari
GUILTY of the lesser crime of HOMICIDE with the
special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed
firearms. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
Court SENTENCES each of them to 12 years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal,
as maximum. The Court also MODIFIES the award of
exemplary damages by increasing it to ₱30,000.00, with
an additional ₱50,000.00 for civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.

The accused lament that they were arrested without a

valid warrant of arrest.1âwphi1 But, assuming that this
was so, it cannot be a ground for acquitting them of the
crime charged but for rejecting any evidence that may
have been taken from them after an unauthorized
search as an incident of an unlawful arrest, a point that
is not in issue here. At any rate, a crime had been
committed—the killing of PO2 Pangilinan—and the
investigating police officers had personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the persons they were to arrest had
committed it.17 The text messages to and from the
mobile phone left at the scene by accused Enojas
provided strong leads on the participation and
identities of the accused. Indeed, the police caught them
in an entrapment using this knowledge.

The award of damages by the courts below has to be

modified to conform to current jurisprudence.18
Page 158 of 187
 G.R. No. 203302. March 12, 2013.* electronically generated and written in the CF cards when the
ballots are fed into the PCOS machine. The ballot images are the
MAYOR EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI, counterparts produced by electronic recording which accurately
petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and reproduce the original, and thus are the equivalent of the original.
HOMER T. SAQUILAYAN, respondents. As pointed out by the COMELEC, “[t]he digital images of the physical
Constitutional Law; Due Process; There is no denial of due ballots are electronically and instantaneously generated by the
process where there is opportunity to be heard, either through oral PCOS machines once the physical ballots are fed into and read by
arguments or pleadings. It is settled that “opportunity to be heard” the machines.” Hence, the ballot images are not secondary evidence.
does not only mean oral arguments in court but also written The official physical ballots and the ballot images in the CF cards
arguments through pleadings.—There is no denial of due process are both original documents. The ballot images in the CF cards have
where there is opportunity to be heard, either through oral the same evidentiary weight as the official physical ballots.
arguments or pleadings. It is settled that “opportunity to be heard”
does not only mean oral arguments in court but also written
arguments through pleadings. Thus, the fact that a party was heard *CASE PDF
on his motion for reconsideration negates any violation of the right
to due process. The Court has ruled that denial of due process
cannot be invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard
on his motion for reconsideration.
Election Law; Automated Election System (AES); The picture
images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the Precinct Count
Optical Scan (PCOS), are likewise ‘official ballots’ that faithfully
capture in electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as defined by
Section 2 (3) of R.A. No. 9369; In short, both the ballot images in the
Compact Flash (CF) cards and the printouts of such images have the
same evidentiary value as the official physical ballots filled up by the
voters.—We have already ruled that the ballot images in the CF
cards, as well as the printouts of such images, are the functional
equivalent of the official physical ballots filled up by the voters, and
may be used in an election protest. In the recent consolidated cases
of Vinzons-Chato v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
and Panotes and Panotes v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal and Vinzons-Chato, 689 SCRA 107 (2013), the Court ruled
that “the picture images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by
the PCOS, are likewise ‘official ballots’ that faithfully capture in
electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as defined by Section 2
(3) of R.A. No. 9369.” The Court declared that the printouts of the
ballot images in the CF cards “are the functional equivalent of the
paper ballots filled out by the voters and, thus, may be used for
purposes of revision of votes in an electoral protest.” In short, both
the ballot images in the CF cards and the printouts of such images
have the same evidentiary value as the official physical ballots filled
up by the voters.
Same; Same; Evidence; The ballot images are not secondary
evidence. The official physical ballots and the ballot images in the
Compact Flash (CF) cards are both original documents. The ballot
images in the CF cards have the same evidentiary weight as the
official physical ballots.―The ballot images, which are digital, are
Page 159 of 187
 G.R. No. 170633. October 17, 2007.*
MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION,
petitioner, vs. SSANGYONG CORPORATION, respondent.
Actions; Pleadings and
Practice; Attorneys; Judgments; While receipt of a copy of the
decision by one of several counsels on record is notice to all,
and the period to appeal commences on such date even if the
other counsel has not yet received a copy of the decision, the
rule may be relaxed where it appears that there is an apparent
agreement between the counsels that it would be the
collaborating, not the principal, who would file the appeal
brief and the subsequent pleadings in the Court of Appeals.—It
cannot be gainsaid that in Albano v. Court of Appeals, 362
SCRA 667 (2001), we held that receipt of a copy of the decision
by one of several counsels on record is notice to all, and the
period to appeal commences on such date even if the other
counsel has not yet received a copy of the decision. In this
case, when Atty. Samson received a copy of the CA decision on
September 14, 2005, MCC had only fifteen (15) days within
which to file a motion for reconsideration conformably with
Section 1, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, or to file a petition for
review on certiorari in accordance with Section 2, Rule 45.
The period should not be reckoned from September 29, 2005
(when Castillo Zamora & Poblador received their copy of the
decision) because notice to Atty. Samson is deemed notice to
collaborating counsel. We note, however, from the records of
the CA, that it was Castillo Zamora & Poblador, not Atty.
Samson, which filed both MCC’s and Chan’s Brief and Reply
Brief. Apparently, the arrangement between the two counsels
was for the collaborating, not the principal, counsel to file the
appeal brief and subsequent pleadings in the CA. This
explains why it was Castillo Zamora & Poblador which filed
the motion for the reconsideration of the CA decision, and
they did so on October 5, 2005, well within the 15-day period
from September 29, 2005, when they received their copy of the
CA decision. This could also be the reason why the CA did not
find it necessary to resolve the question of the timeliness of
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, even as the CA denied
the same.
Same; Same; Same; Procedural Rules and
Technicalities; It should be remembered that the Rules were
promulgated to set guidelines in the orderly administration of
justice, not to shackle the hand that dispenses it.—It should be
remembered that the Rules were promulgated to set
guidelines in the orderly administration of justice, not to
shackle the hand that dispenses it. Otherwise, the courts
would be consigned to being mere slaves to technical rules,
deprived of their judicial discretion. Technicalities must take
a backseat to substantive rights. After all, it is circumspect
leniency in this respect that will give the parties the fullest
opportunity to ventilate the merits of their respective causes,
rather than have them lose life, liberty, honor or property on
sheer technicalities.
Same; Same; Motions for Reconsideration; Mere
restatement of arguments in a motion for reconsideration does
not per se result in a pro forma motion; The pro forma rule will
not apply if the arguments were not sufficiently passed upon
and answered in the decision sought to be reconsidered.—
Suffice it to say that the mere restatement of arguments in a
motion for reconsideration does not per se result in a pro
forma motion. In Security Bank and Trust Company, Inc. v.
Cuenca, 341 SCRA 781 (2000), we held that a motion for
reconsideration may not be necessarily pro forma even if it
reiterates the arguments earlier passed upon and rejected by
the appellate court. A movant may raise the same arguments
precisely to convince the court that its ruling was erroneous.
Furthermore, the pro forma rule will not apply if the
arguments were not sufficiently passed upon and answered in
the decision sought to be reconsidered.
Same; Same; The Supreme Court has ample authority to
go beyond the pleadings when, in the interest of justice or for
the promotion of public policy, there is a need to make its own
findings in order to support its conclusions.—The second issue
poses a novel question that the Court welcomes. It provides
the occasion for this Court to pronounce a definitive
interpretation of the equally innovative provisions of the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 (R.A. No. 8792) vis-àvis the
Rules on Electronic Evidence. Although the parties did not
raise the question whether the original facsimile
transmissions are “electronic data messages” or “electronic
documents” within the context of the Electronic Commerce
Act (the petitioner merely assails as inadmissible evidence the
photocopies of the said facsimile transmissions), we deem it
appropriate to determine first whether the said fax
Page 160 of 187
transmissions are indeed within the coverage of R.A. No. 8792
before ruling on whether the photocopies thereof are covered
by the law. In any case, this Court has ample authority to go
beyond the pleadings when, in the interest of justice or for the
promotion of public policy, there is a need to make its own
findings in order to support its conclusions.
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 (R.A. No.
8792); Evidence;Rules on Electronic Evidence; Best Evidence
Rule; Words and Phrases; To be admissible in evidence as an
electronic data message or to be considered as the functional
equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence
Rule, the writing must foremost be an “electronic data
message” or an “electronic document.”—The ruling of the
Appellate Court is incorrect. R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known
as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, considers an
electronic data message or an electronic document as the
functional equivalent of a written document for evidentiary
purposes. The Rules on Electronic Evidence regards an
electronic document as admissible in evidence if it complies
with the rules on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of
Court and related laws, and is authenticated in the manner
prescribed by the said Rules. An electronic document is also
the equivalent of an original document under the Best
Evidence Rule, if it is a printout or output readable by sight
or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately. Thus, to
be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to
be considered as the functional equivalent of an original
document under the Best Evidence Rule, the writing must
foremost be an “electronic data message” or an “electronic
document.”
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Words and
Phrases; While “data message” has reference to information
electronically sent, stored or transmitted, it does not
necessarily mean that it will give rise to a right or extinguish
an obligation, unlike an “electronic document,” nevertheless
evident from the law is the legislative intent to give the two
terms the same construction.—The clause on the
interchangeability of the terms “electronic data message” and
“electronic document” was the result of the Senate of the
Philippines’ adoption, in Senate Bill 1902, of the phrase
“electronic data message” and the House of Representative’s
employment, in House Bill 9971, of the term “electronic
document.” In order to expedite the reconciliation of the two
versions, the technical working group of the Bicameral
Conference Committee adopted both terms and intended
them to be the equivalent of each one. Be that as it may, there
is a slight difference between the two terms. While “data
message” has reference to information electronically sent,
stored or transmitted, it does not necessarily mean that it will
give rise to a right or extinguish an obligation, unlike an
electronic document. Evident from the law, however, is the
legislative intent to give the two terms the same construction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The “international
origin” mentioned in Section 37 of the Electronic Commerce
Act can only refer to the UNCITRAL Model Law, and the
UNCITRAL’s definition of “data message.”—As further guide
for the Court in its task of statutory construction, Section 37
of the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 provides that Unless
otherwise expressly provided for, the interpretation of this
Act shall give due regard to its international origin and the
need to promote uniformity in its application and the
observance of good faith in international trade relations. The
generally accepted principles of international law and
convention on electronic commerce shall likewise be
considered. Obviously, the “international origin” mentioned
in this section can only refer to the UNCITRAL Model Law,
and the UNCITRAL’s definition of “data message”: “Data
message” means information generated, sent, received or
stored by electronic, optical or similar means including, but
not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic
mail, telegram, telex or telecopy, is substantially the same as
the IRR’s characterization of an “electronic data message.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A construction should be
rejected that gives to the language used in a statute a meaning
that does not accomplish the purpose for which the statute was
enacted, and that tends to defeat the ends which are sought to
be attained by the enactment.—Congress deleted the phrase,
“but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI),
electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy,” and replaced the
term “data message” (as found in the UNCITRAL Model Law)
with “electronic data message.” This legislative divergence
from what is assumed as the term’s “international origin” has
bred uncertainty and now impels the Court to make an
inquiry into the true intent of the framers of the law. Indeed,
Page 161 of 187
in the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure,
the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and
spirit of the law. A construction should be rejected that gives
to the language used in a statute a meaning that does not
accomplish the purpose for which the statute was enacted,
and that tends to defeat the ends which are sought to be
attained by the enactment.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Facsimile
Transmissions;There is no question that when Congress
formulated the term “electronic data message,” it intended the
same meaning as the term “electronic record” in the Canada
law, which construction of the term “electronic data message,”
excludes telexes or faxes, except computergenerated faxes, in
harmony with the Electronic Commerce Law’s focus on
“paperless” communications and the “functional equivalent
approach” that it espouses; Facsimile transmissions are not
“paperless” but verily are paper-based.—When the Senate
consequently voted to adopt the term “electronic data
message,” it was consonant with the explanation of Senator
Miriam Defensor-Santiago that it would not apply “to telexes
or faxes, except computer-generated faxes, unlike the United
Nations model law on electronic commerce.” In explaining the
term “electronic record” patterned after the ECommerce Law
of Canada, Senator Defensor-Santiago had in mind the term
“electronic data message.” This term then, while maintaining
part of the UNCITRAL Model Law’s terminology of “data
message,” has assumed a different context, this time,
consonant with the term “electronic record” in the law of
Canada. It accounts for the addition of the word “electronic”
and the deletion of the phrase “but not limited to, electronic
data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or
telecopy.” Noteworthy is that the Uniform Law Conference of
Canada, explains the term “electronic record,” as drafted in
the Uniform Electronic Evidence Act, in a manner strikingly
similar to Sen. Santiago’s explanation during the Senate
deliberations: x x x There is no question then that when
Congress formulated the term “electronic data message,” it
intended the same meaning as the term “electronic record” in
the Canada law. This construction of the term “electronic
data message,” which excludes telexes or faxes, except
computer-generated faxes, is in harmony with the Electronic
Commerce Law’s focus on “paperless” communications and
the “functional equivalent approach” that it espouses. In fact,
the deliberations of the Legislature are replete with
discussions on paperless and digital transactions. Facsimile
transmissions are not, in this sense, “paperless,” but verily are
paper-based.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A facsimile
machine, which was first patented in 1843 by Alexander Bain,
is a device that can send or receive pictures and text over a
telephone line, and works by digitizing an image; A fax
machine is essentially an image scanner, a modem and a
computer printer combined into a highly specialized
package.—A facsimile machine, which was first patented in
1843 by Alexander Bain, is a device that can send or receive
pictures and text over a telephone line. It works by digitizing
an image—dividing it into a grid of dots. Each dot is either on
or off, depending on whether it is black or white.
Electronically, each dot is represented by a bit that has a
value of either 0 (off) or 1 (on). In this way, the fax machine
translates a picture into a series of zeros and ones (called a
bit map) that can be transmitted like normal computer data.
On the receiving side, a fax machine reads the incoming data,
translates the zeros and ones back into dots, and reprints the
picture. A fax machine is essentially an image scanner, a
modem and a computer printer combined into a highly
specialized package. The scanner converts the content of a
physical document into a digital image, the modem sends the
image data over a phone line, and the printer at the other end
makes a duplicate of the original document.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; In a virtual or
paperless environment, technically, there is no original copy to
speak of, as all direct printouts of the virtual reality are the
same, in all respects, and are considered as originals;
Ineluctably, the law’s definition of “electronic data message,”
which, as aforesaid, is interchangeable with “electronic
document,” could not have included facsimile transmissions,
which have an original paper-based copy as sent and a paper-
based facsimile copy as received; While Congress anticipated
future developments in communications and computer
technology when it drafted the law, it excluded the early forms
of technology, like telegraph, telex and telecopy (except
computer-generated faxes, which is a newer development as
compared to the ordinary fax machine to fax machine
Page 162 of 187
transmission), when it defined the term “electronic data
message.”—In an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists
an original paper-based information or data that is scanned,
sent through a phone line, and re-printed at the receiving
end. Be it noted that in enacting the Electronic Commerce Act
of 2000, Congress intended virtual or paperlesswritings to be
the functional equivalent and to have the same legal
function as paper-based documents. Further, in a virtual or
paperless environment, technically, there is no original copy
to speak of, as all direct printouts of the virtual reality are the
same, in all respects, and are considered as originals.
Ineluctably, the law’s definition of “electronic data message,”
which, as aforesaid, is interchangeable with “electronic
document,” could not have included facsimile transmissions,
which have an original paper-based copy as sent and a paper-
based facsimile copy as received. These two copies are distinct
from each other, and have different legal effects. While
Congress anticipated future developments in communications
and computer technology when it drafted the law, it excluded
the early forms of technology, like telegraph, telex and
telecopy (except computer-generated faxes, which is a newer
development as compared to the ordinary fax machine to fax
machine transmission), when it defined the term “electronic
data message.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Administrative
Law;The power of administrative officials to promulgate rules
in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to
what is found in the legislative enactment itself; The IRR went
beyond the parameters of the law when it adopted verbatim the
UNCITRAL Model Law’s definition of “data message,” without
considering the intention of Congress when the latter deleted
the phrase “but not limited to, electronic data interchange
(EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy.”—Clearly
then, the IRR went beyond the parameters of the law when it
adopted verbatim the UNCITRAL Model Law’s definition of
“data message,” without considering the intention of
Congress when the latter deleted the phrase “but not limited
to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail,
telegram, telex or telecopy.” The inclusion of this phrase in the
IRR offends a basic tenet in the exercise of the rule-making
power of administrative agencies. After all, the power of
administrative officials to promulgate rules in the
implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is
found in the legislative enactment itself. The implementing
rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the law or
expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a
statute is vested in the Legislature. Thus, if a discrepancy
occurs between the basic law and an implementing rule or
regulation, it is the former that prevails, because the law
cannot be broadened by a mere administrative issuance—an
administrative agency certainly cannot amend an act of
Congress. Had the Legislature really wanted ordinary fax
transmissions to be covered by the mantle of the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000, it could have easily lifted without a bit
of tatter the entire wordings of the UNCITRAL Model Law.
Same; Same; Same; Best Evidence Rule; Facsimile
Transmisions; A facsimile transmission cannot be considered
as electronic evidence—it is not the functional equivalent of an
original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as
electronic evidence.—We, therefore, conclude that the
terms “electronic data message” and “electronic document,” as
defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not
include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile
transmissioncannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is
not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best
Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Since a facsimile
transmission is not an “electronic data message” or an
“electronic document,” and cannot be considered as electronic
evidence by the Court, with greater reason is a photocopy of
such a fax transmission not electronic evidence.—Since a
facsimile transmission is not an “electronic data message” or
an “electronic document,” and cannot be considered as
electronic evidence by the Court, with greater reason is a
photocopy of such a fax transmission not electronic evidence.
In the present case, therefore, Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-
POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits “E” and “F”),
which are mere photocopiesof the original fax transmittals,
are not electronic evidence, contrary to the position of both
the trial and the appellate courts.
Actions; Contracts; Breach of Contract; Requisites.—
Despite the pro forma invoices not being electronic evidence,
this Court finds that respondent has proven by
preponderance of evidence the existence of a perfected
Page 163 of 187
contract of sale. In an action for damages due to a breach of a
contract, it is essential that the claimant proves (1) the
existence of a perfected contract, (2) the breach thereof by the
other contracting party and (3) the damages which he/she
sustained due to such breach. Actori incumbit onus probandi.
The burden of proof rests on the party who advances a
proposition affirmatively. In other words, a plaintiff in a civil
action must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence, that is, evidence that has greater weight, or is more
convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it.
Civil Law; Same; Sales; Elements; In general, contracts
are perfected by mere consent, which is manifested by the
meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the
cause which are to constitute the contract.—In general,
contracts are perfected by mere consent, which is manifested
by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing
and the cause which are to constitute the contract. The offer
must be certain and the acceptance absolute. They are,
moreover, obligatory in whatever form they may have been
entered into, provided all the essential requisites for their
validity are present. Sale, being a consensual contract, follows
the general rule that it is perfected at the moment there is a
meeting of the minds upon the thing which is the object of the
contract and upon the price. From that moment, the parties
may reciprocally demand performance, subject to the
provisions of the law governing the form of contracts. The
essential elements of a contract of sale are (1) consent or
meeting of the minds, that is, to transfer ownership in
exchange for the price, (2) object certain which is the subject
matter of the contract, and (3) cause of the obligation which is
established.
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Best Evidence
Rule; Requisites Before Admission of Secondary Evidence; It
has been held that where the missing document is the
foundation of the action, more strictness in proof is required
than where the document is only collaterally involved.—
Because these documents are mere photocopies, they are
simply secondary evidence, admissible only upon compliance
with Rule 130, Section 5, which states, “[w]hen the original
document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced
in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence
and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his
part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its
contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of
witnesses in the order stated.” Furthermore, the offeror of
secondary evidence must prove the predicates thereof,
namely: (a) the loss or destruction of the original without bad
faith on the part of the proponent/offeror which can be shown
by circumstantial evidence of routine practices of destruction
of documents; (b) the proponent must prove by a fair
preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable inference
of the loss or destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must
be shown that a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful
search has been made for the document in the proper place or
places. It has been held that where the missing document is
the foundation of the action, more strictness in proof is
required than where the document is only collaterally
involved. Given these norms, we find that respondent failed to
prove the existence of the original fax transmissions of
Exhibits “E” and “F,” and likewise did not sufficiently prove
the loss or destruction of the originals. Thus, Exhibits “E” and
“F” cannot be admitted in evidence and accorded probative
weight.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Appeals; Evidence not objected
to is deemed admitted and may be validly considered by the
court in arriving at its judgment; Issues not raised on appeal
are deemed abandoned.—Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-
POSTS080-1 (Exhibit “X”), however, is a mere photocopy of its
original. But then again, petitioner MCC does not assail the
admissibility of this document in the instant petition. Verily,
evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may be
validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment.
Issues not raised on appeal are deemed abandoned.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Appropriate conduct by the
parties may be sufficient to establish an agreement, and while
there may be instances where the exchange of correspondence
does not disclose the exact point at which the deal was closed,
the actions of the parties may indicate that a binding
obligation has been undertaken.—The logical chain of events,
as gleaned from the evidence of both parties, started with the
petitioner and the respondent agreeing on the sale and
purchase of 220MT of stainless steel at US$1,860.00 per MT.
This initial contract was perfected. Later, as petitioner asked
for several extensions to pay, adjustments in the delivery
Page 164 of 187
dates, and discounts in the price as originally agreed, the
parties slightly varied the terms of their contract, without
necessarily novating it, to the effect that the original order
was reduced to 200MT, split into two deliveries, and the price
discounted to US$1,700 per MT. Petitioner, however, paid only
half of its obligation and failed to open an L/C for the other
100MT. Notably, the conduct of both parties sufficiently
established the existence of a contract of sale, even if the
writings of the parties, because of their contested
admissibility, were not as explicit in establishing a contract.
Appropriate conduct by the parties may be sufficient to
establish an agreement, and while there may be instances
where the exchange of correspondence does not disclose the
exact point at which the deal was closed, the actions of the
parties may indicate that a binding obligation has been
undertaken.
Same; Same; Same; It is a well-entrenched rule that the
failure of a buyer to furnish an agreed letter of credit is a
breach of the contract between buyer and seller; Damages for
failure to open a commercial credit may, in appropriate cases,
include the loss of profit which the seller would reasonably
have made had the transaction been carried out.—With our
finding that there is a valid contract, it is crystal-clear that
when petitioner did not open the L/C for the first half of the
transaction (100MT), despite numerous demands from
respondent Ssangyong, petitioner breached its contractual
obligation. It is a well-entrenched rule that the failure of a
buyer to furnish an agreed letter of credit is a breach of the
contract between buyer and seller. Indeed, where the buyer
fails to open a letter of credit as stipulated, the seller or
exporter is entitled to claim damages for such breach.
Damages for failure to open a commercial credit may, in
appropriate cases, include the loss of profit which the seller
would reasonably have made had the transaction been
carried out.
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Breach of
Contract; Damages; It is axiomatic that actual or
compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be
proven with a reasonable degree of certainty.—This Court,
however, finds that the award of actual damages is not in
accord with the evidence on record. It is axiomatic that actual
or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be
proven with a reasonable degree of certainty. In Villafuerte v.
Court of Appeals, 459 SCRA 58 (2005), we explained that:
Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in order
to compensate a party for an injury or loss he suffered. They
arise out of a sense of natural justice and are aimed at
repairing the wrong done. Except as provided by law or by
stipulation, a party is entitled to an adequate compensation
only for such pecuniary loss as he has duly proven. It is
hornbook doctrine that to be able to recover actual damages,
the claimant bears the onus of presenting before the court
actual proof of the damages alleged to have been suffered.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; In the absence of
corroborative evidence, self-serving statements of account are
not sufficient basis to award actual damages—the court
cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork as
to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend on
competent proof that the claimant had suffered, and on
evidence of, the actual amount thereof.—The statement of
account and the details of the losses sustained by respondent
due to the said breach are, at best, self-serving. It was
respondent Ssangyong itself which prepared the said
documents. The items therein are not even substantiated by
official receipts. In the absence of corroborative evidence, the
said statement of account is not sufficient basis to award
actual damages. The court cannot simply rely on speculation,
conjecture or guesswork as to the fact and amount of
damages, but must depend on competent proof that the
claimant had suffered, and on evidence of, the actual amount
thereof.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Nominal damages
are recoverable where a legal right is technically violated and
must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no
actual present loss of any kind or where there has been a
breach of contract and no substantial injury or actual
damages whatsoever have been or can be shown.—The Court
finds that petitioner knowingly breached its contractual
obligation and obstinately refused to pay despite repeated
demands from respondent. Petitioner even asked for several
extensions of time for it to make good its obligation. But in
spite of respondent’s continuous accommodation, petitioner
completely reneged on its contractual duty. For such
inattention and insensitivity, MCC must be held liable for
Page 165 of 187
nominal damages. “Nominal damages are ‘recoverable where
a legal right is technically violated and must be vindicated
against an invasion that has produced no actual present loss
of any kind or where there has been a breach of contract and
no substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever have
been or can be shown.’” Accordingly, the Court awards
nominal damages of P200,000.00 to respondent Ssangyong.
Attorney’s Fees; In the instant case, the Court finds the award
of attorney’s fees proper considering that the defendant’s
unjustified refusal to pay has compelled the plaintiff to
litigate and to incur expenses to protect its rights.—As to the
award of attorney’s fees, it is well-settled that no premium
should be placed on the right to litigate and not every
winning party is entitled to an automatic grant of attorney’s
fees. The party must show that he falls under one of the
instances enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. In the
instant case, however, the Court finds the award of attorney’s
fees proper, considering that petitioner MCC’s unjustified
refusal to pay has compelled respondent Ssangyong to litigate
and to incur expenses to protect its rights.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Zamora, Poblador, Vasquez & Bretaña for petitioner.
Donato, Zarate & Rodriguez for respondent.
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 82983and
its Resolution2 denying the motion for reconsideration
thereof.
Petitioner MCC Industrial Sales (MCC), a domestic
corporation with office at Binondo, Manila, is engaged in the
business of importing and wholesaling stainless steel
products.3 One of its suppliers is the Ssangyong Corporation
(Ssangyong),4 an international trading company5 with head
office in Seoul, South Korea and regional headquarters in
Makati City, Philippines.6 The two corporations conducted
business through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy
transmissions.7 Ssangyong would send the pro formainvoices
containing the details of the steel product order to MCC; if the
latter conforms thereto, its representative affixes his
signature on the faxed copy and sends it back to Ssangyong,
again by fax.8 On April 13, 2000, Ssangyong Manila Office sent,
by fax, a letter9 addressed to Gregory Chan, MCC Manager
[also the President10 of Sanyo Seiki Stainless Steel
Corporation], to confirm MCC’s and Sanyo Seiki’s order of 220
metric tons (MT) of hot rolled stainless steel under a
preferential rate of US$1,860.00 per MT. Chan, on behalf of the
corporations, assented and affixed his signature on
the conforme portion of the letter.11
On April 17, 2000, Ssangyong forwarded to MCC Pro
Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTSO40112 containing the terms
and conditions of the transaction. MCC sent back by fax to
Ssangyong the invoice bearing the conformity signature 13 of
Chan. As stated in the pro forma invoice, payment for the
ordered steel products would be made through an irrevocable
letter of credit (L/C) at sight in favor of
Ssangyong.14 Following their usual practice, delivery of the
goods was to be made after the L/C had been opened.
In the meantime, because of its confirmed transaction with
MCC, Ssangyong placed the order with its steel manufacturer,
Pohang Iron and Steel Corporation (POSCO), in South
Korea15 and paid the same in full.
Because MCC could open only a partial letter of credit, the
order for 220MT of steel was split into two,16 one
for 110MT covered by Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTS0401-
117 and another for 110MT covered by ST2-POSTS0401-
2,18 both dated April 17, 2000.
On June 20, 2000, Ssangyong, through its Manila Office,
informed Sanyo Seiki and Chan, by way of a fax transmittal,
that it was ready to ship 193.597MT of stainless steel from
Korea to the Philippines. It requested that the opening of the
L/C be facilitated.19 Chan affixed his signature on the fax
transmittal and returned the same, by fax, to Ssangyong.20
Two days later, on June 22, 2000, Ssangyong Manila Office
informed Sanyo Seiki, thru Chan, that it was able to secure a
US$30/MT price adjustment on the contracted price of
US$1,860.00/MT for the 200MT stainless steel, and that the
goods were to be shipped in two tranches, the first 100MT on
that day and the second 100MT not later than June 27, 2000.
Page 166 of 187
Ssangyong reiterated its request for the facilitation of the
L/C’s opening.21
Ssangyong later, through its Manila Office, sent a letter, on
June 26, 2000, to the Treasury Group of Sanyo Seiki that it
was looking forward to receiving the L/C details and a cable
copy thereof that day.22 Ssangyong sent a separate letter of
the same date to Sanyo Seiki requesting for the opening of the
L/C covering payment of the first 100MT not later than June
28, 2000.23 Similar letters were transmitted by Ssangyong
Manila Office on June 27, 2000.24 On June 28, 2000, Ssangyong
sent another facsimile letter to MCC stating that its principal
in Korea was already in a difficult situation25 because of the
failure of Sanyo Seiki and MCC to open the L/C’s.
The following day, June 29, 2000, Ssangyong received, by
fax, a letter signed by Chan, requesting an extension of time
to open the L/C because MCC’s credit line with the bank had
been fully availed of in connection with another transaction,
and MCC was waiting for an additional credit line.26 On the
same date, Ssangyong replied, requesting that it be informed
of the date when the L/C would be opened, preferably at the
earliest possible time, since its Steel Team 2 in Korea was
having problems and Ssangyong was incurring warehousing
costs.27 To maintain their good business relationship and to
support MCC in its financial predicament, Ssangyong offered
to negotiate with its steel manufacturer, POSCO, another
US$20/MT discount on the price of the stainless steel ordered.
This was intimated in Ssangyong’s June 30, 2000 letter to
MCC.28 On July 6, 2000, another follow-up letter29for the
opening of the L/C was sent by Ssangyong to MCC.
However, despite Ssangyong’s letters, MCC failed to open a
letter of credit.30 Consequently, on August 15, 2000,
Ssangyong, through counsel, wrote Sanyo Seiki that if the
L/C’s were not opened, Ssangyong would be compelled to
cancel the contract and hold MCC liable for damages for
breach thereof amounting to US$96,132.18, inclusive of
warehouse expenses, related interests and charges.31
Later, Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS080-132 and ST2-
POSTS080-233 dated August 16, 2000 were issued by Ssangyong
and sent via fax to MCC. The invoices slightly varied the
terms of the earlier pro forma invoices (ST2POSTSO401, ST2-
POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2), in that the quantity was
now officially 100MT per invoice and the price was reduced
to US$1,700.00 per MT. As can be gleaned from the
photocopies of the said August 16, 2000 invoices submitted to
the court, they both bear the conformity signature of MCC
Manager Chan.
On August 17, 2000, MCC finally opened an L/C with
PCIBank for US$170,000.00 covering payment for 100MT of
stainless steel coil under Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-
POSTS080-2.34 The goods covered by the said invoice were
then shipped to and received by MCC.35
MCC then faxed to Ssangyong a letter dated August 22,
2000 signed by Chan, requesting for a price adjustment of the
order stated in Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTS080-1,
considering that the prevailing price of steel at that time was
US$1,500.00/MT, and that MCC lost a lot of money due to a
recent strike.36
Ssangyong rejected the request, and, on August 23, 2000,
sent a demand letter37 to Chan for the opening of the second
and last L/C of US$170,000.00 with a warning that, if the said
L/C was not opened by MCC on August 26, 2000, Ssangyong
would be constrained to cancel the contract and hold MCC
liable for US$64,066.99 (representing cost difference,
warehousing expenses, interests and charges as of August 15,
2000) and other damages for breach. Chan failed to reply.
Exasperated, Ssangyong through counsel wrote a letter to
MCC, on September 11, 2000, canceling the sales contract
under ST2-POSTS0401-1/ST2-POSTS0401-2, and demanding
payment of US$97,317.37 representing losses, warehousing
expenses, interests and charges.38
Ssangyong then filed, on November 16, 2001, a civil action
for damages due to breach of contract against defendants
MCC, Sanyo Seiki and Gregory Chan before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City. In its complaint,39Ssangyong
alleged that defendants breached their contract when they
refused to open the L/C in the amount of US$170,000.00 for the
remaining 100MT of steel under Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-
POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2.
After Ssangyong rested its case, defendants filed a
Demurrer to Evidence40 alleging that Ssangyong failed to
present the original copies of the pro forma invoices on which
the civil action was based. In an Order dated April 24, 2003,
the court denied the demurrer, ruling that the documentary
evidence presented had already been admitted in the
Page 167 of 187
December 16, 2002 Order41 and their admissibility finds Poblador entered its appearance as their collaborating
support in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8792, otherwise known as counsel.
the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000. Considering that both In their Appeal Brief filed on March 9, 2005,46 MCC and
testimonial and documentary evidence tended to substantiate Chan raised before the CA the following errors of the RTC:
the material allegations in the complaint, Ssangyong’s
evidence sufficed for purposes of a prima facie case.42 1. I.THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY ERRED
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its IN FINDING THAT APPELLANTS VIOLATED THEIR
Decision43 on March 24, 2004, in favor of Ssangyong. The trial CONTRACT WITH APPELLEE
court ruled that when plaintiff agreed to sell and defendants
agreed to buy the 220MT of steel products for the price of 1. A.THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY ERRED
US$1,860 per MT, the contract was perfected. The subject IN FINDING THAT APPELLANTS AGREED TO
transaction was evidenced by Pro FormaInvoice Nos. ST2- PURCHASE 200 METRIC TONS OF STEEL
POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2, which were later PRODUCTS FROM APPELLEE, INSTEAD OF ONLY
amended only in terms of reduction of volume as well as the 100 METRIC TONS.
price per MT, following Pro FormaInvoice Nos. ST2-
POSTS080-1 and ST2POSTS080-2. The RTC, however,
1. 1.THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY ERRED
excluded Sanyo Seiki from liability for lack of competent
IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE PRO
evidence. The fallo of the decision reads:
FORMA INVOICES WITH REFERENCE NOS.
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judgment is hereby
ST2POSTS0401-1 AND ST2-POSTS0401-2.
rendered ordering defendants MCC Industrial Sales
Corporation and Gregory Chan, to pay plaintiff, jointly and
severally the following: 1. II.THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY ERRED
IN AWARDING ACTUAL DAMAGES TO APPELLEE.
1. 1)Actual damages of US$93,493.87 representing the
outstanding principal claim plus interest at the rate 1. III.THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY
of 6% per annum from March 30, 2001. ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY’S FEES TO
2. 2)Attorney’s fees in the sum of P50,000.00 plus APPELLEE.
P2,000.00 per counsel’s appearance in court, the same 2. IV.THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY
being deemed just and equitable considering that by ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GREGORY CHAN
reason of defendants’ breach of their obligation under JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH
the subject contract, plaintiff was constrained to APPELLANT MCC.47
litigate to enforce its rights and recover for the
damages it sustained, and therefore had to engage the On August 31, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision 48affirming
services of a lawyer. the ruling of the trial court, but absolving Chan of any
3. 3)Costs of suit. liability. The appellate court ruled, among others, that Pro
Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2POSTS0401-
No award of exemplary damages for lack of sufficient basis. 2 (Exhibits “E,” “E-1” and “F”) were admissible in evidence,
SO ORDERED.”44 although they were mere facsimile printouts of MCC’s steel
On April 22, 2004, MCC and Chan, through their counsel of orders.49 The dispositive portion of the appellate court’s
record, Atty. Eladio B. Samson, filed their Notice of decision reads:
Appeal.45 On June 8, 2004, the law office of Castillo Zamora & “WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court holds:

Page 168 of 187

 1. (1)The award of actual damages, with interest,
attorney’s fees and costs ordered by the lower court is
hereby AFFIRMED.
2. (2)Appellant Gregory Chan is hereby ABSOLVED from
any liability.
SO ORDERED.”50
A copy of the said Decision was received by MCC’s and Chan’s
principal counsel, Atty. Eladio B. Samson, on September 14,
2005.51 Their collaborating counsel, Castillo Zamora &
Poblador,52 likewise, received a copy of the CA decision on
September 19, 2005.53
On October 4, 2005, Castillo Zamora & Poblador, on behalf
of MCC, filed a motion for reconsideration of the said
decision.54 Ssangyong opposed the motion contending that the
decision of the CA had become final and executory on account
of the failure of MCC to file the said motion within the
reglementary period. The appellate court resolved, on
November 22, 2005, to deny the motion on its merits, 55without,
however, ruling on the procedural issue raised.
Aggrieved, MCC filed a petition for review
on certiorari56before this Court, imputing the following errors
to the Court of Appeals:
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A LEGAL QUESTION
NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH JURISPRUDENCE AND
SANCTIONED A DEPARTURE FROM THE USUAL AND
ACCEPTED COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS BY
REVERSING THE COURT A QUO’S DISMISSAL OF THE
COMPLAINT IN CIVIL CASE NO. 02124 CONSIDERING
THAT:
1. I.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING
THE ADMISSIBILITY IN EVIDENCE OF THE
PROFORMA INVOICES WITH REFERENCE NOS.
ST2POSTSO401-1 AND ST2-POSTSO401-2, DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THE SAME WERE MERE
PHOTOCOPIES OF FACSIMILE PRINTOUTS.
2. II.THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO
APPRECIATE THE OBVIOUS FACT THAT, EVEN
ASSUMING PETITIONER BREACHED THE
SUPPOSED CONTRACT, THE FACT IS THAT
PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THAT IT
SUFFERED ANY DAMAGES AND THE AMOUNT
THEREOF.
3. III.THE AWARD OF ACTUAL DAMAGES IN THE
AMOUNT OF US$93,493.87 IS SIMPLY
UNCONSCIONABLE AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN AT
LEAST REDUCED, IF NOT DELETED BY THE
COURT OF APPEALS.57
In its Comment, Ssangyong sought the dismissal of the
petition, raising the following arguments: that the CA
decision dated 15 August 2005 is already final and executory,
because MCC’s motion for reconsideration was filed beyond
the reglementary period of 15 days from receipt of a copy
thereof, and that, in any case, it was a pro forma motion; that
MCC breached the contract for the purchase of the steel
products when it failed to open the required letter of credit;
that the printout copies and/or photocopies of facsimile or
telecopy transmissions were properly admitted by the trial
court because they are considered original documents under
R.A. No. 8792; and that MCC is liable for actual damages and
attorney’s fees because of its breach, thus, compelling
Ssangyong to litigate.
The principal issues that this Court is called upon to
resolve are the following:
1. I– Whether the CA decision dated 15 August 2005 is
already final and executory;
2. II– Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of
facsimile transmissions are electronic evidence and
admissible as such;
3. III– Whether there was a perfected contract of sale
between MCC and Ssangyong, and, if in the
affirmative, whether MCC breached the said contract;
and
4. IV– Whether the award of actual damages and
attorney’s fees in favor of Ssangyong is proper and
justified.
-I-
It cannot be gainsaid that in Albano v. Court of Appeals,58we
held that receipt of a copy of the decision by one of several
Page 169 of 187
counsels on record is notice to all, and the period to appeal
commences on such date even if the other counsel has not yet
received a copy of the decision. In this case, when Atty.
Samson received a copy of the CA decision on September 14,
2005, MCC had only fifteen (15) days within which to file a
motion for reconsideration conformably with Section 1, Rule
52 of the Rules of Court, or to file a petition for review
on certiorari in accordance with Section 2, Rule 45. The
period should not be reckoned from September 29, 2005 (when
Castillo Zamora & Poblador received their copy of the
decision) because notice to Atty. Samson is deemed notice to
collaborating counsel.
We note, however, from the records of the CA, that it was
Castillo Zamora & Poblador, not Atty. Samson, which filed
both MCC’s and Chan’s Brief and Reply Brief. Apparently, the
arrangement between the two counsels was for the
collaborating, not the principal, counsel to file the appeal
brief and subsequent pleadings in the CA. This explains why
it was Castillo Zamora & Poblador which filed the motion for
the reconsideration of the CA decision, and they did so on
October 5, 2005, well within the 15-day period from September
29, 2005, when they received their copy of the CA decision.
This could also be the reason why the CA did not find it
necessary to resolve the question of the timeliness of
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, even as the CA denied
the same.
Independent of this consideration though, this Court
assiduously reviewed the records and found that strong
concerns of substantial justice warrant the relaxation of this
rule.
In Philippine Ports Authority v. Sargasso Construction and
Development Corporation,59 we ruled that:
“In Orata v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we held that where
strong considerations of substantive justice are manifest in
the petition, this Court may relax the strict application of the
rules of procedure in the exercise of its legal jurisdiction. In
addition to the basic merits of the main case, such a petition
usually embodies justifying circumstance which warrants our
heeding to the petitioner’s cry for justice in spite of the
earlier negligence of counsel. As we held in Obut v. Court of
Appeals:
[W]e cannot look with favor on a course of action which
would place the administration of justice in a straight jacket
for then the result would be a poor kind of justice if there
would be justice at all. Verily, judicial orders, such as the one
subject of this petition, are issued to be obeyed, nonetheless a
non-compliance is to be dealt with as the circumstances
attending the case may warrant. What should guide judicial
action is the principle that a party-litigant is to be given the
fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or
defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or
property on technicalities.
The rules of procedure are used only to secure and not
override or frustrate justice. A six-day delay in the perfection
of the appeal, as in this case, does not warrant the outright
dismissal of the appeal. In Development Bank of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, we gave due course to the
petitioner’s appeal despite the late filing of its brief in the
appellate court because such appeal involved public interest.
We stated in the said case that the Court may exempt a
particular case from a strict application of the rules of
procedure where the appellant failed to perfect its appeal
within the reglementary period, resulting in the appellate
court’s failure to obtain jurisdiction over the case. In Republic
vs. Imperial, Jr., we also held that there is more leeway to
exempt a case from the strictness of procedural rules when
the appellate court has already obtained jurisdiction over the
appealed case. We emphasize that:
[T]he rules of procedure are mere tools intended to facilitate
the attainment of justice, rather than frustrate it. A strict and
rigid application of the rules must always be eschewed when
it would subvert the rule’s primary objective of enhancing
fair trials and expediting justice. Technicalities should never
be used to defeat the substantive rights of the other party.
Every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity
for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from
the constraints of technicalities.”60
Moreover, it should be remembered that the Rules were
promulgated to set guidelines in the orderly administration of
justice, not to shackle the hand that dispenses it. Otherwise,
the courts would be consigned to being mere slaves to
technical rules, deprived of their judicial discretion.
Technicalities must take a backseat to substantive rights.
Page 170 of 187
After all, it is circumspect leniency in this respect that will
give the parties the fullest opportunity to ventilate the merits
of their respective causes, rather than have them lose life,
liberty, honor or property on sheer technicalities.61
The other technical issue posed by respondent is the
alleged pro forma nature of MCC’s motion for reconsideration,
ostensibly because it merely restated the arguments
previously raised and passed upon by the CA.
In this connection, suffice it to say that the mere
restatement of arguments in a motion for reconsideration
does not per se result in a pro forma motion. In Security Bank
and Trust Company, Inc. v. Cuenca,62 we held that a motion
for reconsideration may not be necessarily pro forma even if
it reiterates the arguments earlier passed upon and rejected
by the appellate court. A movant may raise the same
arguments precisely to convince the court that its ruling was
erroneous. Furthermore, the pro formarule will not apply if
the arguments were not sufficiently passed upon and
answered in the decision sought to be reconsidered.
- II -
The second issue poses a novel question that the Court
welcomes. It provides the occasion for this Court to
pronounce a definitive interpretation of the equally
innovative provisions of the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000
(R.A. No. 8792) vis-àvis the Rules on Electronic Evidence.
Although the parties did not raise the question whether the
original facsimile transmissions are “electronic data
messages” or “electronic documents” within the context of the
Electronic Commerce Act (the petitioner merely assails as
inadmissible evidence the photocopies of the said facsimile
transmissions), we deem it appropriate to determine first
whether the said fax transmissions are indeed within the
coverage of R.A. No. 8792 before ruling on whether the
photocopies thereof are covered by the law. In any case, this
Court has ample authority to go beyond the pleadings when,
in the interest of justice or for the promotion of public policy,
there is a need to make its own findings in order to support
its conclusions.63
Petitioner contends that the photocopies of the pro
forma invoices presented by respondent Ssangyong to prove
the perfection of their supposed contract of sale are
inadmissible in evidence and do not fall within the ambit of
R.A. No. 8792, because the law merely admits as the best
evidence the original fax transmittal. On the other hand,
respondent posits that, from a reading of the law and the
Rules on Electronic Evidence, the original facsimile
transmittal of the pro forma invoice is admissible in evidence
since it is an electronic document and, therefore, the best
evidence under the law and the Rules. Respondent further
claims that the photocopies of these fax transmittals
(specifically ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2) are
admissible under the Rules on Evidence because the
respondent sufficiently explained the nonproduction of the
original fax transmittals.
In resolving this issue, the appellate court ruled as follows:
Admissibility of Pro Forma
Invoices; Breach of Contract
by Appellants
Turning first to the appellants’ argument against the
admissibility of the Pro Forma Invoices with Reference Nos.
ST2POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits “E,” “E-1”
and “F,” pp. 215-218, Records), appellants argue that the said
documents are inadmissible (sic) being violative of the best
evidence rule.
The argument is untenable.
The copies of the said pro-forma invoices submitted by the
appellee are admissible in evidence, although they are mere
electronic facsimile printouts of appellant’s orders. Such
facsimile printouts are considered Electronic Documents
under the New Rules on Electronic Evidence, which came into
effect on August 1, 2001. (Rule 2, Section 1 [h], A.M. No. 01-7-
01-SC).
“(h) ‘Electronic document’ refers to information or the
representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other
modes of written expression, described or however
represented, by which a right is established or an obligation
extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed,
which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed,
retrieved or produced electronically. It includes digitally
signed documents and any printout or output, readable by
sight or other means, which accurately reflects the electronic
data message or electronic document. For purposes of these
Page 171 of 187
Rules, the term ‘electronic document’ may be used
interchangeably with ‘electronic data message.’
An electronic document shall be regarded as the
equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence
Rule, as long as it is a printout or output readable by sight or
other means, showing to reflect the data accurately. (Rule 4,
Section 1, A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC)
The ruling of the Appellate Court is incorrect. R.A. No.
8792,64 otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of
2000, considers an electronic data message or an electronic
document as the functional equivalent of a written document
for evidentiary purposes.65 The Rules on Electronic Evi-
_______________
65 Sections 6, 7 and 10 of R.A. No. 8792 read:
Sec. 6. Legal Recognition of Data Messages.—Information shall
not be denied legal effect, validity or enforceability solely on
the grounds that it is in the data message purporting to give
rise to such legal effect, or that it is merely referred to in that
electronic data message.
Sec. 7. Legal Recognition of Electronic Documents.—
Electronic documents shall have the legal effect, validity or
enforceability as any other document or legal writing, and—
(a) Where the law requires a document to be in writing,
that requirement is met by an electronic document if the said
electronic document maintains its integrity and reliability
and can be authenticated so as to be usable for subsequent
reference, in that—
1. (i)The electronic document has remained complete and
unaltered, apart from the addition of any
endorsement and any authorized change, or any
change which arises in the normal course of
communication, storage and display; and
2. (ii)The electronic document is reliable in the light of
the purpose for which it was generated and in the
light of all the relevant circumstances.
1. (b)Paragraph (a) applies whether the requirement
therein is in the form of an obligation or whether the
law simply provides consequences for the document
not being presented or retained in its original form.
2. (c)Where the law requires that a document be
presented or retained in its original form, that
requirement is met by an electronic document if—
1. (i)There exists a reliable assurance as to the integrity
of the document from the time when it was first
generated in its final form; and
2. (ii)That document is capable of being displayed to the
person to whom it is to be presented: Provided, That
no provision of this Act shall apply to vary any and all
For evidentiary purposes, an electronic document shall be the
functional equivalent of a written document under existing
laws.
This Act does not modify any statutory rule relating to the
admissibility of electronic data messages or electronic
documents, except the rules relating to authentication and
best evidence.
Sec. 10. Original Documents.—(1) Where the law requires
information to be presented or retained in its original form,
that requirement is met by an electronic data message or
electronic document if:
1. (a)The integrity of the information from the time when
it was first generated in its final form, as an
electronic data message or electronic document is
shown by evidence aliunde or otherwise; and
2. (b)Where it is required that information be presented,
that the information is capable of being displayed to
the person to whom it is to be presented.
(2) Paragraph (1) applies whether the requirement therein
is in the form of an obligation or whether the law simply
provides consequences for the information not being
presented or retained in its original form.
(3) For the purposes of subparagraph (a) of paragraph (1):
1. (a)the criteria for assessing integrity shall be whether
the information has remained complete and
Page 172 of 187
 unaltered, apart from the addition of any
endorsement and any change which arises in the
normal course of communication, storage and display;
and
2. (b)the standard of reliability required shall be assessed
in the light of the purpose for which the information
was generated and in the light of all relevant
circumstances.
66A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC, effective on August 1, 2001.
by the Rules of Court and related laws, and is authenticated
in the manner prescribed by the said Rules. 67An electronic
document is also the equivalent of an original document
under the Best Evidence Rule, if it is a printout or output
readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data
accurately.68
_______________
67 Rule 3 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence reads:
RULE 3
ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS
SECTION 1. Electronic Documents as functional equivalent
of paper-based documents.—Whenever a rule of evidence
refers to the term writing, document, record, instrument,
memorandum or any other form of writing, such term shall be
deemed to include an electronic document as defined in these
Rules.
SEC. 2. Admissibility.—An electronic document is
admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on
admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and related
laws and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by these
Rules.
68 Rule 4 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence reads:
RULE 4
BEST EVIDENCE RULE
SECTION 1. Original of an Electronic Document.—An
electronic document shall be regarded as the equivalent of an
original document under the Best Evidence Rule if it is a
printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown to
reflect the data accurately.
SEC. 2. Copies as equivalent of the originals.—When a
document is in two or more copies executed at or about the
same time with identical contents, or is a counterpart
produced by the same impression as the original, or from the
same matrix, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or
by chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques
which accurately reproduces the original, such copies or
duplicates shall be regarded as the equivalent of the original.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, copies or duplicates shall
not be admissible to the same extent as the original if:
Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data
message or to be considered as the functional equivalent of an
original document under the Best Evidence Rule, the writing
must foremost be an “electronic data message” or an
“electronic document.”
The Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 defines electronic
data message and electronic document as follows:
“Sec. 5. Definition of Terms.—For the purposes of this Act, the
following terms are defined, as follows:
xxx
c. “Electronic Data Message” refers to information
generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or
similar means.
xxx
f. “Electronic Document” refers to information or the
representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other
modes of written expression, described or however
represented, by which a right is established or an obligation
extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed,
which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed,
retrieved or produced electronically.”
The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No.
8792,69 which was signed on July 13, 2000 by the then
Secretaries of the Department of Trade and Industry, the
Department of Budget and Management, and then Governor
of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, defines the terms as:
“Sec. 6. Definition of Terms.—For the purposes of this Act and
these Rules, the following terms are defined, as follows:
xxx
Page 173 of 187
 (e) “Electronic Data Message” refers to information
generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or
similar means, but not limited to, electronic data interchange
(EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy. Throughout
these Rules, the term “electronic data message” shall be
equivalent to and be used interchangeably with “electronic
document.”
xxxx
(h) “Electronic Document” refers to information or the
representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other
modes of written expression, described or however
represented, by which a right is established or an obligation
extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed,
which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed,
retrieved or produced electronically. Throughout these Rules,
the term “electronic document” shall be equivalent to and be
used interchangeably with “electronic data message.”
The phrase “but not limited to, electronic data interchange
(EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy” in the IRR’s
definition of “electronic data message” is copied from the
Model Law on Electronic Commerce adopted by the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL),70 from which majority of the provisions of R.A.
No. 8792 were taken.71 While Congress deleted this phrase in
the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, the drafters of the IRR
reinstated it. The deletion by Congress of the said phrase is
significant and pivotal, as discussed hereunder.
The clause on the interchangeability of the terms
“electronic data message” and “electronic document” was the
result of the Senate of the Philippines’ adoption, in Senate
Bill 1902, of the phrase “electronic data message” and the
House of Representative’s employment, in House Bill 9971, of
the term “electronic document.”72 In order to expedite the
reconciliation of the two versions, the technical working
group of the Bicameral Conference Committee adopted both
terms and intended them to be the equivalent of each
one.73 Be that as it may, there is a slight difference between
the two terms. While “data message” has reference
to information electronically sent, stored or transmitted, it
does not necessarily mean that it will give rise to a right or
extinguish an obligation,74 unlike an electronic document.
Evident from the law, however, is the legislative intent to give
the two terms the same construction.
The Rules on Electronic Evidence promulgated by this
Court defines the said terms in the following manner:
“SECTION 1. Definition of Terms.—For purposes of these
Rules, the following terms are defined, as follows:
xxxx
1. (g)“Electronic data message” refers to information
generated, sent, received or stored by electronic,
optical or similar means.
2. (h)“Electronic document” refers to information or the
representation of information, data, figures, symbols
or other modes of written expression, described or
however represented, by which a right is established
or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may
be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced
electronically. It includes digitally signed documents
and print-out or output, readable by sight or other
means, which accurately reflects the electronic data
message or electronic document. For purposes of these
Rules, the term “electronic document” may be used
interchangeably with “electronic data message.”
Given these definitions, we go back to the original question: Is
an original printout of a facsimile transmission an electronic
data message or electronic document?
The definitions under the Electronic Commerce Act of
2000, its IRR and the Rules on Electronic Evidence, at first
glance, convey the impression that facsimile transmissionsare
electronic data messages or electronic documents because
they are sent by electronic means. The expanded definition of
an “electronic data message” under the IRR, consistent with
the UNCITRAL Model Law, further supports this theory
considering that the enumeration “x x x [is] not limited to,
electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram,
telex or telecopy.” And to telecopy is to send a document from
one place to another via a fax machine.75
As further guide for the Court in its task of statutory
construction, Section 37 of the Electronic Commerce Act of
2000 provides that
Page 174 of 187
“Unless otherwise expressly provided for, the interpretation
of this Act shall give due regard to its international origin and
the need to promote uniformity in its application and the
observance of good faith in international trade relations. The
generally accepted principles of international law and
convention on electronic commerce shall likewise be
considered.”
Obviously, the “international origin” mentioned in this
section can only refer to the UNCITRAL Model Law, and the
UNCITRAL’s definition of “data message”:
“Data message” means information generated, sent, received
or stored by electronic, optical or similar means including,
but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI),
electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy.”76
is substantially the same as the IRR’s characterization of an
“electronic data message.”
However, Congress deleted the phrase, “but not limited to,
electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram,
telex or telecopy,” and replaced the term “data message” (as
found in the UNCITRAL Model Law ) with “electronic data
message.” This legislative divergence from what is assumed as
the term’s “international origin” has bred uncertainty and
now impels the Court to make an inquiry into the true intent
of the framers of the law. Indeed, in the construction or
interpretation of a legislative measure, the primary rule is to
search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. 77 A
construction should be rejected that gives to the language
used in a statute a meaning that does not accomplish the
purpose for which the statute was enacted, and that tends to
defeat the ends which are sought to be attained by the
enactment.78 Interestingly, when Senator Ramon B.
Magsaysay, Jr., the principal author of Senate Bill 1902 (the
predecessor of R.A. No. 8792), sponsored the bill on second
reading, he proposed to adopt the term “data message” as
formulated and defined in the UNCITRAL Model
Law.79 During the period of amendments, however, the term
evolved into “electronic data message,” and the phrase “but
not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic
mail, telegram, telex or telecopy” in the UNCITRAL Model Law
was deleted. Furthermore, the term “electronic data
message,” though maintaining its description under the
UNCITRAL Model Law, except for the aforesaid deleted
phrase, conveyed a different meaning, as revealed in the
following proceedings:
“x x x x
Senator Santiago. Yes, Mr. President. I will furnish a copy
together with the explanation of this proposed amendment.
And then finally, before I leave the Floor, may I please be
allowed to go back to Section 5; the Definition of Terms. In
light of the acceptance by the good Senator of my proposed
amendments, it will then become necessary to add certain
terms in our list of terms to be defined. I would like to add a
definition on what is “data,” what is “electronic record” and
what is an “electronic record system.”
If the gentleman will give me permission, I will proceed
with the proposed amendment on Definition of Terms, Section
5.
Senator Magsaysay. Please go ahead, Senator Santiago.
Senator Santiago. We are in Part 1, short title on the
Declaration of Policy, Section 5, Definition of Terms.
At the appropriate places in the listing of these terms that
have to be defined since these are arranged alphabetically,
Mr. President, I would like to insert the term DATA and its
definition. So, the amendment will read: “DATA” MEANS
REPRESENTATION, IN ANY FORM, OF INFORMATION OR
CONCEPTS.
The explanation is this: This definition of “data” or “data” as
it is now fashionably pronounced in America—the definition
of “data” ensures that our bill applies to any form of
information in an electronic record, whether these are figures,
facts or ideas.
So again, the proposed amendment is this: “DATA” MEANS
REPRESENTATIONS, IN ANY FORM, OF INFORMATION OR
CONCEPTS.
Senator Magsaysay. May I know how will this affect the
definition of “Data Message” which encompasses electronic
records, electronic writings and electronic documents?
Senator Santiago. These are completely congruent with
each other. These are compatible. When we define “data,” we
are simply reinforcing the definition of what is a data
message.
Senator Magsaysay. It is accepted, Mr. President.
Page 175 of 187
 Senator Santiago. Thank you. The next term is
“ELECTRONIC RECORD.” The proposed amendment is as
follows:
“ELECTRONIC RECORD” MEANS DATA THAT IS
RECORDED OR STORED ON ANY MEDIUM IN OR BY A
COMPUTER SYSTEM OR OTHER SIMILAR DEVICE, THAT
CAN BE READ OR PERCEIVED BY A PERSON OR A
COMPUTER SYSTEM OR OTHER SIMILAR DEVICE. IT
INCLUDES A DISPLAY, PRINTOUT OR OTHER OUTPUT OF
THAT DATA.
The explanation for this term and its definition is as
follows: The term “ELECTRONIC RECORD” fixes the scope of
our bill. The record is the data. The record may be on any
medium. It is electronic because it is recorded or stored in or
by a computer system or a similar device.
The amendment is intended to apply, for example, to data
on magnetic strips on cards or in Smart cards. As drafted, it
wouldnot apply to telexes or faxes, except computer-generated
faxes, unlike the United Nations model law on electronic
commerce. It would also not apply to regular digital telephone
conversations since the information is not recorded. It would
apply to voice mail since the information has been recorded in
or by a device similar to a computer. Likewise, video records
are not covered. Though when the video is transferred to a
website, it would be covered because of the involvement of the
computer. Music recorded by a computer system on a compact
disc would be covered.
In short, not all data recorded or stored in digital form is
covered. A computer or a similar device has to be involved in
its creation or storage. The term “similar device” does not
extend to all devices that create or store data in digital form.
Although things that are not recorded or preserved by or in a
computer system are omitted from this bill, these may well be
admissible under other rules of law. This provision focuses on
replacing the search for originality proving the reliability of
systems instead of that of individual records and using
standards to show systems reliability.
Paper records that are produced directly by a computer
system such as printouts are themselves electronic records
being just the means of intelligible display of the contents of
the record. Photocopies of the printout would be paper record
subject to the usual rules about copies, but the original
printout would be subject to the rules of admissibility of this
bill.
However, printouts that are used only as paper records and
whose computer origin is never again called on are treated as
paper records. In that case, the reliability of the computer
system that produces the record is irrelevant to its reliability.
Senator Magsaysay. Mr. President, if my memory does not
fail me, earlier, the lady Senator accepted that we use the
term “Data Message” rather than “ELECTRONIC RECORD” in
being consistent with the UNCITRAL term of “Data
Message.” So with the new amendment of defining
“ELECTRONIC RECORD,” will this affect her accepting of the
use of “Data Message” instead of “ELECTRONIC RECORD”?
Senator Santiago. No, it will not. Thank you for reminding
me. The term I would like to insert is ELECTRONIC DATA
MESSAGE in lieu of “ELECTRONIC RECORD.”
Senator Magsaysay. Then we are, in effect, amending
theterm of the definition of “Data Message” on page 2A, line 31,
to which we have no objection.
Senator Santiago. Thank you, Mr. President.
xxxx
Senator Santiago. Mr. President, I have proposed all the
amendments that I desire to, including the amendment on the
effect of error or change. I will provide the language of the
amendment together with the explanation supporting that
amendment to the distinguished sponsor and then he can feel
free to take it up in any session without any further
intervention. Senator Magsaysay. Before we end, Mr.
President, I understand from the proponent of these
amendments that these are based on the Canadian E-
commerce Law of 1998. Is that not right?
Senator Santiago. That is correct.”80
Thus, when the Senate consequently voted to adopt the term
“electronic data message,” it was consonant with the
explanation of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago that it
would not apply “to telexes or faxes, except computer-
generated faxes, unlike the United Nations model law on
electronic commerce.” In explaining the term “electronic
record” patterned after the E-Commerce Law of Canada,
Senator Defensor-Santiago had in mind the term “electronic
data message.” This term then, while maintaining part of the
UNCITRAL Model Law’s terminology of “data message,” has
Page 176 of 187
assumed a different context, this time, consonant with the
term “electronic record” in the law of Canada. It accounts for
the addition of the word “electronic” and the deletion of the
phrase “but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI),
electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy.” Noteworthy is
that the Uniform Law Conference of Canada, explains the
term “electronic record,” as drafted in the Uniform Electronic
Evidence Act, in a manner strikingly similar to Sen.
Santiago’s explanation during the Senate deliberations:
“Electronic record” fixes the scope of the Act. The record is
the data. The record may be any medium. It is “electronic”
because it is recorded or stored in or by a computer system or
similar device. The Act is intended to apply, for example, to
data on magnetic strips on cards, or in smart cards. As
drafted, it would not apply to telexes or faxes (except computer-
generated faxes), unlike the United Nations Model Law on
Electronic Commerce. It would also not apply to regular
digital telephone conversations, since the information is not
recorded. It would apply to voice mail, since the information
has been recorded in or by a device similar to a computer.
Likewise video records are not covered, though when the
video is transferred to a Web site it would be, because of the
involvement of the computer. Music recorded by a computer
system on a compact disk would be covered.
In short, not all data recorded or stored in “digital” form is
covered. A computer or similar device has to be involved in its
creation or storage. The term “similar device” does not extend
to all devices that create or store data in digital form.
Although things that are not recorded or preserved by or in a
computer system are omitted from this Act, they may well be
admissible under other rules of law. This Act focuses on
replacing the search for originality, proving the reliability of
systems instead of that of individual records, and using
standards to show systems reliability.
Paper records that are produced directly by a computer
system, such as printouts, are themselves electronic records,
being just the means of intelligible display of the contents of
the record. Photocopies of the printout would be paper
records subject to the usual rules about copies, but the
“original” printout would be subject to the rules of
admissibility of this Act.
However, printouts that are used only as paper records,
and whose computer origin is never again called on, are
treated as paper records. See subsection 4(2). In this case the
reliability of the computer system that produced the record is
relevant to its reliability.”81
There is no question then that when Congress formulated the
term “electronic data message,” it intended the same meaning
as the term “electronic record” in the Canada law. This
construction of the term “electronic data message,”
which excludes telexes or faxes, except computer-generated
faxes, is in harmony with the Electronic Commerce Law’s
focus on “paperless” communications and the “functional
equivalent approach”82 that it espouses. In fact, the
deliberations of the Legislature are replete with discussions
on paperless and digital transactions. Facsimile transmissions
are not, in this sense, “paperless,” but verily are paper-based.
A facsimile machine, which was first patented in 1843 by
Alexander Bain,83 is a device that can send or receive pictures
and text over a telephone line. It works by digitizing an
image—dividing it into a grid of dots. Each dot is either on or
off, depending on whether it is black or white. Electronically,
each dot is represented by a bit that has a value of either 0
(off) or 1 (on). In this way, the fax machine translates a
picture into a series of zeros and ones (called a bit map) that
can be transmitted like normal computer data. On the
receiving side, a fax machine reads the incoming data,
translates the zeros and ones back into dots, and reprints the
picture.84 A fax machine is essentially an image scanner, a
modem and a computer printer combined into a highly
specialized package. The scanner converts the content of a
physical document into a digital image, the modem sends the
image data over a phone line, and the printer at the other end
makes a duplicate of the original document.85 Thus,
in Garvida v. Sales, Jr.,86 where we explained the
unacceptability of filing pleadings through fax machines, we
ruled that:
“A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the
transmission and reproduction of printed and graphic matter
by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time,
and representing the shade or tone of each area by a specified
amount of electric current. The current is transmitted as a
signal over regular telephone lines or via microwave relay
Page 177 of 187
and is used by the receiver to reproduce an image of the
elemental area in the proper position and the correct shade.
The receiver is equipped with a stylus or other device that
produces a printed record on paper referred to as a facsimile.
x x x A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is,
at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original.
Without the original, there is no way of determining on its face
whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and
was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in
fact, be a sham pleading.”87
Accordingly, in an ordinary facsimile transmission, there
exists an original paper-based information or data that is
scanned, sent through a phone line, and re-printed at the
receiving end. Be it noted that in enacting the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000, Congress intended virtual or
paperless writings to be the functional equivalent and to have
the same legal function as paper-based documents.88Further,
in a virtual or paperless environment, technically, there is no
original copy to speak of, as all direct printouts of the virtual
reality are the same, in all respects, and are considered as
originals.89 Ineluctably, the law’s definition of “electronic data
message,” which, as aforesaid, is interchangeable with
“electronic document,” could not have included facsimile
transmissions, which have an original paper-based copy as
sent and a paper-based facsimile copy as received. These two
copies are distinct from each other, and have different legal
effects. While Congress anticipated future developments in
communications and computer technology90 when it drafted
the law, it excluded the early forms of technology, like
telegraph, telex and telecopy (except computer-generated
faxes, which is a newer development as compared to the
ordinary fax machine to fax machine transmission), when it
defined the term “electronic data message.”
Clearly then, the IRR went beyond the parameters of the
law when it adopted verbatim the UNCITRAL Model Law’s
definition of “data message,” without considering the
intention of Congress when the latter deleted the phrase “but
not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic
mail, telegram, telex or telecopy.” The inclusion of this phrase
in the IRR offends a basic tenet in the exercise of the rule-
making power of administrative agencies. After all, the power
of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the
implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is
found in the legislative enactment itself. The implementing
rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the law or
expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a
statute is vested in the Legislature.91Thus, if a discrepancy
occurs between the basic law and an implementing rule or
regulation, it is the former that prevails, because the law
cannot be broadened by a mere administrative issuance—an
administrative agency certainly cannot amend an act of
Congress.92 Had the Legislature really wanted ordinary fax
transmissions to be covered by the mantle of the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000, it could have easily lifted without a bit
of tatter the entire wordings of the UNCITRAL Model Law.
Incidentally, the National Statistical Coordination Board
Task Force on the Measurement of E-Commerce,93 on
November 22, 2006, recommended a working definition of
“electronic commerce,” as “[a]ny commercial transaction
conducted through electronic, optical and similar medium,
mode, instrumentality and technology. The transaction
includes the sale or purchase of goods and services, between
individuals, households, businesses and governments
conducted over computer-mediated networks through the
Internet, mobile phones, electronic data interchange (EDI)
and other channels through open and closed networks.” The
Task Force’s proposed definition is similar to the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development’s
(OECD’s) broad definition as it covers transactions made over
any network, and, in addition, it adopted the following
provisions of the OECD definition: (1) for transactions, it
covers sale or purchase of goods and services; (2) for
channel/network, it considers any computer-mediated
network and NOT limited to Internet alone; (3) it excludes
transactions received/placed using fax, telephone or non-
interactive mail; (4) it considers payments done online or
offline; and (5) it considers delivery made online (like
downloading of purchased books, music or software
programs) or offline (deliveries of goods).94
We, therefore, conclude that the terms “electronic data
message” and “electronic document,” as defined under the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile
transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be
considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional
Page 178 of 187
equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is exchange for the price, (2) object certain which is the subject
not admissible as electronic evidence. matter of the contract, and (3) cause of the obligation which is
Since a facsimile transmission is not an “electronic data established.101
message” or an “electronic document,” and cannot be In this case, to establish the existence of a perfected
considered as electronic evidence by the Court, with greater contract of sale between the parties, respondent Ssangyong
reason is a photocopy of such a fax transmission not formally offered in evidence the testimonies of its witnesses
electronic evidence. In the present case, therefore, Pro and the following exhibits:
Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 Exhibit Description Purpose
(Exhibits “E” and “F”), which are mere photocopies of the
E Pro forma Invoice dated 17 April 2000 To show that
original fax transmittals, are not electronic evidence,
contrary to the position of both the trial and the appellate with Contract No. ST2-POSTS0401- defendants
courts. 1, photocopy contracted with
- III - plaintiff for the
Nevertheless, despite the pro forma invoices not being delivery of 110
electronic evidence, this Court finds that respondent has MT of stainless
proven by preponderance of evidence the existence of a
steel from Korea
perfected contract of sale.
In an action for damages due to a breach of a contract, it is payable by way of
essential that the claimant proves (1) the existence of a an irrevocable
perfected contract, (2) the breach thereof by the other letter of credit in
contracting party and (3) the damages which he/she sustained favor of plaintiff,
due to such breach. Actori incumbit onus probandi. The
among other
burden of proof rests on the party who advances a
proposition affirmatively.95 In other words, a plaintiff in a conditions.
civil action must establish his case by a preponderance of E-1 Pro forma Invoice dated 17 April 2000 To show that
evidence, that is, evidence that has greater weight, or is more with Contract No. ST2- defendants sent
convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it. 96 POSTS0401, contained in their
In general, contracts are perfected by mere
facsimile/thermal paper faxed by confirmation of
consent,97which is manifested by the meeting of the offer and
the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to defendants to plaintiff showing the the (i) delivery to
constitute the contract. The offer must be certain and the printed transmission details on the upper it of the specified
acceptance absolute.98 They are, moreover, obligatory in portion of said paper as coming from stainless steel
whatever form they may have been entered into, provided all defendant MCC on 26 Apr 00 08:41AM products, (ii)
the essential requisites for their validity are present.99Sale,
defendants’
being a consensual contract, follows the general rule that it is
perfected at the moment there is a meeting of the minds upon payment thereof
the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the by way of an
price. From that moment, the parties may reciprocally irrevocable letter
demand performance, subject to the provisions of the law of credit in favor
governing the form of contracts.100
of plaintiff,
The essential elements of a contract of sale are (1) consent
or meeting of the minds, that is, to transfer ownership in among other

Page 179 of 187

Exhibit Description Purpose Exhibit Description Purpose
conditions. G-1 Signature of
E-2 Conforme signature of Mr. Gregory To show that defendant Gregory
Chan, contained in facsimile/thermal defendants sent Chan, contained in
paper faxed by defendants to plaintiff their facsimile/thermal
showing the printed transmission details confirmation of paper.
on the upper portion of said paper as the (i) delivery to H Letter to defendants To prove that defendants were
coming from defendant MCC on 26 Apr 00 it of the total of dated 22 June informed of the successful price
08:41AM 220MT specified 2000, original adjustments secured by plaintiff
stainless steel in favor of former and were
products, (ii) advised of the schedules of its
defendants’ L/C opening.
payment thereof I Letter to defendants To prove that plaintiff
by way of an dated 26 June repeatedly requested defendants
irrevocable letter 2000, original for the agreed opening of the
of credit in favor J Letter to defendants Letters of Credit, defendants’
of plaintiff, dated 26 June failure and refusal to comply
among other 2000, original with their obligations and the
conditions. K Letter to defendants problems of plaintiff is incurring
F Pro forma Invoice dated 17 April To show that dated 27 June by reason of defendants’ failure
2000with Contract No. ST2 defendants 2000, original and refusal to open the L/Cs.
contracted with L Facsimile message to
plaintiff for defendants dated 28
delivery of June 2000, photocopy
POSTSO401- another 110 MT of stainless steel
M Letter from To prove that defendants admit
2, photocopy from Korea payable by way of an
defendants dated 29 of their liabilities to plaintiff,
irrevocable letter of credit in
June 2000, contained that they requested for “more
favor of plaintiff, among other
in facsimile/thermal extension” of time for the
conditions.
paper faxed by
G Letter to defendant To prove that defendants were
defendants to
SANYO SEIKE dated informed of the date of L/C
plaintiff showing opening of the Letter of
20 June opening and
the printed Credit, and begging for
2000, contained in defendant’s conforme/approval
transmission favorable
facsimile/thermal thereof.
details on the understanding and
paper
Page 180 of 187
Exhibit Description Purpose Exhibit Description Purpose
upper portion of consideration. extension of time
said paper as notwithstanding.
coming from P Letter to
defendant MCC on defendants dated
29 June 00 11:12 06 July
AM 2000, original
M-1 Signature of Q Demand letter to To prove that plaintiff
defendant Gregory defendants dated was constrained to
Chan, contained in 15 Aug engaged services of a
facsimile/thermal 2000, original lawyer for collection
paper faxed by efforts.
defendants to R Demand letter to To prove that
plaintiff showing defendants dated defendants opened the
the printed 23 Aug first L/C in favor of
transmission 2000, original plaintiff, requested for
details on the further postponement
upper portion of of the final L/C and for
said paper as minimal amounts, were
coming from urged to open the final
defendant MCC on L/C on time, and were
June 00 11:12 AM informed that failure to
N Letter to comply will cancel the
defendants dated contract.
29 June S Demand letter to To show defendants’
2000, original defendants dated refusal and failure to
O Letter to To prove that plaintiff 11 Sept open the final L/C on
defendants dated reiterated its request 2000, original time, the cancellation of
30 June for defendants to L/C the contract as a
2000, photocopy opening after the consequence thereof,
latter’s request for and final demand upon
extension of time was defendants to remit its
granted, defendants’ obligations.
failure and refusal to W Letter from To prove that there was
comply therewith plaintiff a perfected sale and
Page 181 of 187
Exhibit Description Purpose Exhibit Description Purpose
SSANGYONG to purchase agreement US$1,700/ton.
defendant SANYO between the parties for X-1 Notation To prove that the
SEIKI dated 13 220 metric tons of steel “1/2,” photocopy present Pro
April 2000, with fax products at the price of forma Invoice was the
back from US$1,860/ton. first of 2 pro
defendants SANYO forma invoices.
SEIKI/MCC to X-2 Ref. No. ST2- To prove that the
plaintiff POSTS080- present Pro
SSANGYONG, cont 1, photocopy forma Invoice was the
ained in first of 2 pro
facsimile/thermal forma invoices.
paper with back-up X-3 Conformesignature To prove that defendant
photocopy of defendant MCC, acting through
W-1 Conforme signature To prove that Gregory Gregory Chan, agreed
of defendant defendants, acting Chan, photocopy to the sale and purchase
Gregory through Gregory Chan, of the balance of 100
Chan, contained in agreed to the sale and metric tons at the
facsimile/thermal purchase of 220 metric discounted price of
paper with back-up tons of steel products at US$1,700/ton, apart
photocopy the price of from the other order
US$1,860/ton. and shipment of 100
W-2 Name of sender To prove that metric tons which was
MCC Industrial defendants sent their delivered by plaintiff
Sales Corporation conformity to the sale SSANGYONG and paid
and for by defendant MCC.
purchase agreement by DD Letter from To prove that there was
facsimile transmission. defendant MCC to a perfected sale and
X Pro formaInvoice To prove that defendant plaintiff purchase agreement
dated 16 August MCC agreed to adjust SSANGYONG dated between plaintiff
2000, photocopy and split the confirmed 22 August SSANGYONG and
purchase order into 2 2000, contained in defendant MCC for the
shipments at 100 metric facsimile/thermal balance of 100 metric
tons each at the paper with back-up tons, apart from the
discounted price of photocopy other order and
Page 182 of 187
Exhibit Description Purpose
shipment of 100 metric
tons which was
delivered by plaintiff discussed above we cannot apply the Electronic Commerce
462
SSANGYONG and paid for by
defendant MCC.
DD-1 Ref. No. ST2- To prove that there was a
POSTS080- perfected sale and purchase
1, contained in agreement between plaintiff
facsimile/thermal SSANGYONG and defendant
paper with back-up MCC for the balance of 100
photocopy metric tons, apart from the
other order and shipment of
100 metric tons which was
delivered by plaintiff
SSANGYONG and paid for by
defendant MCC.
DD-2 Signature of To prove that defendant
defendant Gregory MCC, acting through
Chan, contained in Gregory Chan, agreed to the
facsimile/thermal sale and purchase of the
paper with back-up balance of 100 metric tons,
photocopy apart from the other order
and shipment of 100 metric
tons which was delivered by
plaintiff Ssangyong and paid
for by defendant MCC.102
Significantly, among these documentary evidence presented
by respondent, MCC, in its petition before this Court, assails
the admissibility only of Pro Forma Invoice
Nos. ST2POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits “E” and
“F”). After sifting through the records, the Court found that
these invoices are mere photocopies of their original fax
transmittals. Ssangyong avers that these documents were
prepared after MCC asked for the splitting of the original
order into two, so that the latter can apply for an L/C with
greater facility. It, however, failed to explain why the
originals of these documents were not presented.
To determine whether these documents are admissible in
evidence, we apply the ordinary Rules on Evidence, for as
Act of 2000 and the Rules on Electronic Evidence.
Because these documents are mere photocopies, they are
simply secondary evidence, admissible only upon compliance
with Rule 130, Section 5, which states, “[w]hen the original
document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced
in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence
and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his
part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its
contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of
witnesses in the order stated.” Furthermore, the offeror of
secondary evidence must prove the predicates thereof,
namely: (a) the loss or destruction of the original without bad
faith on the part of the proponent/offeror which can be shown
by circumstantial evidence of routine practices of destruction
of documents; (b) the proponent must prove by a fair
preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable inference
of the loss or destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must
be shown that a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful
search has been made for the document in the proper place or
places. It has been held that where the missing document is
the foundation of the action, more strictness in proof is
required than where the document is only collaterally
involved.103
Given these norms, we find that respondent failed to prove
the existence of the original fax transmissions of Exhibits E
and F, and likewise did not sufficiently prove the loss or
destruction of the originals. Thus, Exhibits E and F cannot be
admitted in evidence and accorded probative weight. It is
observed, however, that respondent Ssangyong did not rely
merely on Exhibits E and F to prove the perfected contract. It
also introduced in evidence a variety of other documents, as
enumerated above, together with the testimonies of its
witnesses. Notable among them are Pro Forma Invoice
Nos. ST2-POSTS080-1 and ST2-POSTS080-2 which were issued
by Ssangyong and sent via fax to MCC. As already mentioned,
these invoices slightly varied the terms of the earlier invoices
such that the quantity was now officially 100MT per invoice
Page 183 of 187
and the price reduced to US$1,700.00 per MT. The copies of
the said August 16, 2000 invoices submitted to the court bear
the conformity signature of MCC Manager Chan.
Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTS080-1 (Exhibit “X”),
however, is a mere photocopy of its original. But then again,
petitioner MCC does not assail the admissibility of this
document in the instant petition. Verily, evidence not
objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly considered
by the court in arriving at its judgment.104Issues not raised on
appeal are deemed abandoned.
As to Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTS080-2(Exhibits “1-
A” and “2-C”), which was certified by PCIBank as a true copy
of its original,105 it was, in fact, petitioner MCC which
introduced this document in evidence. Petitioner MCC paid
for the order stated in this invoice. Its admissibility,
therefore, is not open to question.
These invoices (ST2-POSTS0401, ST2-POSTS080-1and ST2-
POSTS080-2), along with the other unchallenged documentary
evidence of respondent Ssangyong, preponderate in favor of
the claim that a contract of sale was perfected by the parties.
This Court also finds merit in the following observations of
the trial court:
“Defendants presented Letter of Credit (Exhibits “1,” “1-A” to
“1-R”) referring to Pro Forma Invoice for Contract No.
ST2POSTS080-2, in the amount of US$170,000.00, and which
bears the signature of Gregory Chan, General Manager of
MCC. Plaintiff, on the other hand, presented Pro
Forma Invoice referring to Contract No. ST2-POSTS080-1, in
the amount of US$170,000.00, which likewise bears the
signature of Gregory Chan, MCC. Plaintiff accounted for the
notation “1/2” on the right upper portion of the Invoice, that
is, that it was the first of two (2) pro forma invoices covering
the subject contract between plaintiff and the defendants.
Defendants, on the other hand, failed to account for the
notation “2/2” in its Pro Forma Invoice (Exhibit “1-A”).
Observably further, both Pro Forma Invoices bear the same
date and details, which logically mean that they both apply to
one and the same transaction.”106
Indeed, why would petitioner open an L/C for the second half
of the transaction if there was no first half to speak of?
The logical chain of events, as gleaned from the evidence of
both parties, started with the petitioner and the respondent
agreeing on the sale and purchase of 220MT of stainless steel
at US$1,860.00 per MT. This initial contract was perfected.
Later, as petitioner asked for several extensions to pay,
adjustments in the delivery dates, and discounts in the price
as originally agreed, the parties slightly varied the terms of
their contract, without necessarily novating it, to the effect
that the original order was reduced to 200MT, split into two
deliveries, and the price discounted to US$1,700 per MT.
Petitioner, however, paid only half of its obligation and failed
to open an L/C for the other 100MT. Notably, the conduct of
both parties sufficiently established the existence of a
contract of sale, even if the writings of the parties, because of
their contested admissibility, were not as explicit in
establishing a contract.107 Appropriate conduct by the parties
may be sufficient to establish an agreement, and while there
may be instances where the exchange of correspondence does
not disclose the exact point at which the deal was closed, the
actions of the parties may indicate that a binding obligation
has been undertaken.108
With our finding that there is a valid contract, it is
crystalclear that when petitioner did not open the L/C for the
first half of the transaction (100MT), despite numerous
demands from respondent Ssangyong, petitioner breached its
contractual obligation. It is a well-entrenched rule that the
failure of a buyer to furnish an agreed letter of credit is a
breach of the contract between buyer and seller. Indeed,
where the buyer fails to open a letter of credit as stipulated,
the seller or exporter is entitled to claim damages for such
breach. Damages for failure to open a commercial credit may,
in appropriate cases, include the loss of profit which the
seller would reasonably have made had the transaction been
carried out.109
- IV -
This Court, however, finds that the award of actual damages
is not in accord with the evidence on record. It is axiomatic
that actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed,
but must be proven with a reasonable degree of
certainty.110 In Villafuerte v. Court of Appeals,111 we explained
that:
“Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in order
to compensate a party for an injury or loss he suffered. They
arise out of a sense of natural justice and are aimed at
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repairing the wrong done. Except as provided by law or by of its contents. The steel items indicated in the sales
stipulation, a party is entitled to an adequate compensation contract114 with a Korean corporation are different in all
only for such pecuniary loss as he has duly proven. It is respects from the items ordered by petitioner MCC, even in
hornbook doctrine that to be able to recover actual damages, size and quantity. We observed the following discrepancies:
the claimant bears the onus of presenting before the court List of commodities as stated in Exhibit “V”:
actual proof of the damages alleged to have been suffered, COMMODITY: Stainless Steel HR Sheet in Coil, Slit Edge
thus: SPEC: SUS304 NO. 1
A party is entitled to an adequate compensation for such
pecuniary loss actually suffered by him as he has duly proved. SIZE/Q’TY:
Such damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of 2.8MM X 1,219MM X C 8.193MT
proof, but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree 3.0MM X 1,219MM X C 7.736MT
of certainty. We have emphasized that these damages cannot 3.0MM X 1,219MM X C 7.885MT
be presumed and courts, in making an award must point out 3.0MM X 1,219MM X C 8.629MT
specific facts which could afford a basis for measuring
4.0MM X 1,219MM X C 7.307MT
whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne.” 112
In the instant case, the trial court awarded to respondent 4.0MM X 1,219MM X C 7.247MT
Ssangyong US$93,493.87 as actual damages. On appeal, the 4.5MM X 1,219MM X C 8.450MT
same was affirmed by the appellate court. Noticeably, 4.5MM X 1,219MM X C 8.870MT
however, the trial and the appellate courts, in making the 5.0MM X 1,219MM X C 8.391MT
said award, relied on the following documents submitted in
6.0MM X 1,219MM X C 6.589MT
evidence by the respondent: (1) Exhibit “U,” the Statement of
Account dated March 30, 2001; (2) Exhibit “U-1,” the details of 6.0MM X 1,219MM X C 7.878MT
the said Statement of Account); (3) Exhibit “V,” the contract of 6.0MM X 1,219MM X C 8.397MT
the alleged resale of the goods to a Korean corporation; and TOTAL: 95.562MT115
(4) Exhibit “V-1,” the authentication of the resale contract List of commodities as stated in Exhibit “X” (the invoice
from the Korean Embassy and certification from the that was not paid):
Philippine Consular Office. DESCRIPTION: Hot Rolled Stainless Steel Coil SUS 304
The statement of account and the details of the losses
SIZE AND QUANTITY:
sustained by respondent due to the said breach are, at best,
selfserving. It was respondent Ssangyong itself which 2.6 MM X 4’ X C 10.0MT
prepared the said documents. The items therein are not even 3.0 MM X 4’ X C 25.0MT
substantiated by official receipts. In the absence of 4.0 MM X 4’ X C 15.0MT
corroborative evidence, the said statement of account is not 4.5 MM X 4’ X C 15.0MT
sufficient basis to award actual damages. The court cannot
5.0 MM X 4’ X C 10.0MT
simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork as to the
fact and amount of damages, but must depend 6.0 MM X 4’ X C 25.0MT
on competent proof that the claimant had suffered, and on TOTAL: 100MT116
evidence of, the actual amount thereof.113 From the foregoing, we find merit in the contention of MCC
Furthermore, the sales contract and its authentication that Ssangyong did not adequately prove that the items resold
certificates, Exhibits “V” and “V-1,” allegedly evidencing the at a loss were the same items ordered by the petitioner.
resale at a loss of the stainless steel subject of the parties’ Therefore, as the claim for actual damages was not proven,
breached contract, fail to convince this Court of the veracity the Court cannot sanction the award.

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 Nonetheless, the Court finds that petitioner knowingly admissible other than the original document itself. (Llemos vs.
breached its contractual obligation and obstinately refused to Llemos, 513 SCRA 128 [2007])
pay despite repeated demands from respondent. Petitioner
even asked for several extensions of time for it to make good
its obligation. But in spite of respondent’s continuous
accommodation, petitioner completely reneged on its
contractual duty. For such inattention and insensitivity, MCC
must be held liable for nominal damages. “Nominal damages
are ‘recoverable where a legal right is technically violated
and must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced
no actual present loss of any kind or where there has been a
breach of contract and no substantial injury or actual
damages whatsoever have been or can be
shown.”117 Accordingly, the Court awards nominal damages of
P200,000.00 to respondent Ssangyong.
As to the award of attorney’s fees, it is well settled that no
premium should be placed on the right to litigate and not
every winning party is entitled to an automatic grant of
attorney’s fees. The party must show that he falls under one of
the instances enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil
Code.118 In the instant case, however, the Court finds the
award of attorney’s fees proper, considering that petitioner
MCC’s unjustified refusal to pay has compelled respondent
Ssangyong to litigate and to incur expenses to protect its
rights.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appeal is
PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 82983 is MODIFIED in that the award of
actual damages is DELETED. However, petitioner is
ORDERED to pay respondent NOMINAL DAMAGES in the
amount of P200,000.00, and the ATTORNEY’S FEES as
awarded by the trial court.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Austria-
Martinez, ChicoNazario and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Petition partially granted, judgment modified.
Notes.—Only the original document is the best evidence of
the fact as to whether the heirs executed a Deed of Partition
wherein the entire inherited property was conveyed to only
one of them. (Santos vs. Santos, 342 SCRA 753 [2000])
Under Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court, the original
documents must be produced and no evidence shall be

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