Dangwa Transco. Co. Inc. v.

CA
Facts:
Private respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioners for the death of Pedrito Cudiamat.
The deceased was attempting to board a bus, but it suddenly accelerated forward. He fell off and the bus
ran over him, resulting to his death.
Issue:
Whether the bus is liable as a common carrier to the deceased who was still attempting to board
Held:
It is the duty of common carriers of passengers to stop their conveyances a reasonable length of time in
order to afford passengers an opportunity to board and enter, and they are liable for injuries suffered by
boarding passengers resulting from the sudden starting up or jerking of their conveyances while they are
doing so.

La Mallorca v. CA
Facts:
Mariano Beltran and his family rode a bus owned by petitioner. Upon reaching their desired destination,
they alighted from the bus. But Mariano returned to get their baggage. His youngest daughter followed
him without his knowledge. When he stepped into the bus again, it suddenly accelerated. Mariano’s
daughter was found dead. The bus ran over her.
Issue:
Whether the liability of a common carrier extends even after the passenger had alighted
Held:
The relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from the
carrier’s vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but continues until the
passenger has had a reasonable time or reasonable opportunity to leave the current premises.
Japan Airlines V. Asuncion (G.R No. 161730, January 28,2005) 449 SCRA 544
FACTS:
This petition for review seeks to reverse and set aside the October 9, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals and its
January 12, 2004 resolution, which affirmed in toto the June 10, 1997 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 61 in Civil Case No. 92-3635.

On March 27, 1992, respondents Michael and Jeanette Asuncion left Manila on board Japan Airlines’ (JAL) Flight 742
bound for Los Angeles. Their itinerary included a stop-over in Narita and an overnight stay at Hotel Nikko Narita.
Upon arrival at Narita, Mrs. Noriko Etou-Higuchi of JAL endorsed their applications for shore pass and directed them
to the Japanese immigration official. A shore pass is required of a foreigner aboard a vessel or aircraft who desires to
stay in the neighborhood of the port of call for not more than 72 hours.

During their interview, the Japanese immigration official noted that Michael appeared shorter than his height as
indicated in his passport. Because of this inconsistency, respondents were denied shore pass entries and were
brought instead to the Narita Airport Rest House where they were billeted overnight.

Mr. Atsushi Takemoto of the International Service Center (ISC), the agency tasked by Japan’s Immigration
Department to handle passengers who were denied shore pass entries, brought respondents to the Narita Airport
Rest House where they stayed overnight until their departure the following day for Los Angeles. Respondents were
charged US$400.00 each for their accommodation, security service and meals.

On December 12, 1992, respondents filed a complaint for damages claiming that JAL did not fully apprise them of
their travel requirements and that they were rudely and forcibly detained at Narita Airport.

Issue: Whether or not JAL is liable of breach of contract of carriage.

Side Issues:
· Whether or not JAL is liable for moral, exemplary damages,
· Whether or not the plaintiff is liable for attorney’s fee and cost of suit incurred (JAL counterclaim)

Ruling:
The court finds that JAL did not breach its contract of carriage with respondents. It may be true that JAL has the duty
to inspect whether its passengers have the necessary travel documents, however, such duty does not extend to
checking the veracity of every entry in these documents. JAL could not vouch for the authenticity of a passport and
the correctness of the entries therein. The power to admit or not an alien into the country is a sovereign act which
cannot be interfered with even by JAL. This is not within the ambit of the contract of carriage entered into by JAL and
herein respondents. As such, JAL should not be faulted for the denial of respondents’ shore pass applications.

In the Respondents claim that petitioner breached its contract of carriage when it failed to explain to the
immigration authorities that they had overnight vouchers at the Hotel Nikko Narita. They imputed that JAL did not
exhaust all means to prevent the denial of their shore pass entry applications. JAL or any of its representatives have
no authority to interfere with or influence the immigration authorities. The most that could be expected of JAL is to
endorse respondents’ applications, which Mrs. Higuchi did immediately upon their arrival in Narita.

Moral damages may be recovered in cases where one willfully causes injury to property, or in cases of breach of
contract where the other party acts fraudulently or in bad faith. Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example
or correction for the public good, when the party to a contract acts in wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent
manner. Attorney’s fees are allowed when exemplary damages are awarded and when the party to a suit is
compelled to incur expenses to protect his interest.[17] There being no breach of contract nor proof that JAL acted
in wanton, fraudulent or malevolent manner, there is no basis for the award of any form of damages.

Neither should JAL be held liable to reimburse respondents the amount of US$800.00. It has been sufficiently proven
that the amount pertained to ISC, an agency separate and distinct from JAL, in payment for the accommodations
provided to respondents. The payments did not in any manner accrue to the benefit of JAL.

However, we find that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed JAL’s counterclaim for litigation expenses, exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees. The action was filed by respondents in utmost good faith and not manifestly frivolous.
Respondents honestly believed that JAL breached its contract. A person’s right to litigate should not be penalized by
holding him liable for damages. This is especially true when the filing of the case is to enforce what he believes to be
his rightful claim against another although found to be erroneous.[

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The October 9, 2002 decision of the
Court of Appeals and its January 12, 2004 resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 57440, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar
as the finding of breach on the part of petitioner and the award of damages, attorney’s fees and costs of the suit in
favor of respondents is concerned. Accordingly, there being no breach of contract on the part of petitioner, the
award of actual, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees and costs of the suit in favor of
respondents Michael and Jeanette Asuncion, is DELETED for lack of basis. However, the dismissal for lack of merit of
petitioner’s counterclaim for litigation expenses, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees, is SUSTAINED. No
pronouncement as to costs.

VILLANUEVA vs. DOMINGO

FACTS
On 22 October 1991 at about 9:45 in the evening, following a green traffic light, Priscilla Domingo’s silver Lancer car
with Plate No. NDW 781 ’91 then driven by Leandro Luis R. Domingo was cruising along the middle lane of South
Superhighway at moderate speed from north to south. Suddenly, a green Mitsubishi Lancer with plate No. PHK 201
’91 driven by Renato Dela Cruz Ocfemia darted from Vito Cruz Street towards the South Superhighway directly into
the path of NDW 781 ’91 thereby hitting and bumping its left front portion. As a result of the impact, NDW 781 ’91
hit two (2) parked vehicles at the roadside, the second hitting another parked car in front of it.

Per Traffic Accident Report prepared by Traffic Investigator Pfc. Patrocinio N. Acido, Ocfemia was driving with
expired license and positive for alcoholic breath. Hence, Manila Assistant City Prosecutor Oscar A. Pascua
recommended the filing of information for reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property and physical
injuries.

The original complaint was amended twice: first, impleading Auto Palace Car Exchange as commercial agent and/or
buyer-seller and second, impleading Albert Jaucian as principal defendant doing business under the name and style
of Auto Palace Car Exchange.

Except for Ocfemia, all the defendants filed separate answers to the complaint. Nostradamus Villanueva claimed
that he was no longer the owner of the car at the time of the mishap because it was swapped with a Pajero owned
by Albert Jaucian/Auto Palace Car Exchange. For her part, Linda Gonzales declared that her presence at the scene of
the accident was upon the request of the actual owner of the Mitsubishi Lancer (PHK 201 ’91) for whom she had
been working as agent/seller. On the other hand, Auto Palace Car Exchange represented by Albert Jaucian claimed
that he was not the registered owner of the car. Moreover, it could not be held subsidiary liable as employer of
Ocfemia because the latter was off-duty as utility employee at the time of the incident. Neither was Ocfemia
performing a duty related to his employment.

After trial, the trial court found petitioner liable and ordered him to pay respondent actual, moral and exemplary
damages plus appearance and attorney’s fees.

ISSUE
May the registered owner of a motor vehicle be held liable for damages arising from a vehicular accident involving
his motor vehicle while being operated by the employee of its buyer without the latter’s consent and knowledge?
YES
RULING
We have consistently ruled that the registered owner of any vehicle is directly and primarily responsible to the public
and third persons while it is being operated. The rationale behind such doctrine was explained way back in 1957 in
Erezo vs. Jepte.

The principle upon which this doctrine is based is that in dealing with vehicles registered under the Public Service
Law, the public has the right to assume or presume that the registered owner is the actual owner thereof, for it
would be difficult for the public to enforce the actions that they may have for injuries caused to them by the vehicles
being negligently operated if the public should be required to prove who the actual owner is. How would the public
or third persons know against whom to enforce their rights in case of subsequent transfers of the vehicles? We do
not imply by his doctrine, however, that the registered owner may not recover whatever amount he had paid by
virtue of his liability to third persons from the person to whom he had actually sold, assigned or conveyed the
vehicle.

Under the same principle the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for a public service, should primarily
be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle is being driven on the
highways or streets. The members of the Court are in agreement that the defendant-appellant should be held liable
to plaintiff-appellee for the injuries occasioned to the latter because of the negligence of the driver, even if the
defendant-appellant was no longer the owner of the vehicle at the time of the damage because he had previously
sold it to another.

Registration is required not to make said registration the operative act by which ownership in vehicles is transferred,
as in land registration cases, because the administrative proceeding of registration does not bear any essential
relation to the contract of sale between the parties (Chinchilla vs. Rafael and Verdaguer, 39 Phil. 888), but to permit
the use and operation of the vehicle upon any public highway (section 5 [a], Act No. 3992, as amended). The main
aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or
injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefore can be fixed on a definite individual,
the registered owner. Instances are numerous where vehicles running on public highways caused accidents or
injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles without positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with very scant
means of identification. It is to forestall these circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to the public, that the
motor vehicle registration is primarily ordained, in the interest of the determination of persons responsible for
damages or injuries caused on public highways.

The law, with its aim and policy in mind, does not relieve him directly of the responsibility that the law fixes and
places upon him as an incident or consequence of registration. Were a registered owner allowed to evade
responsibility by proving who the supposed transferee or owner is, it would be easy for him, by collusion with others
or otherwise, to escape said responsibility and transfer the same to an indefinite person, or to one who possesses no
property with which to respond financially for the damage or injury done. A victim of recklessness on the public
highways is usually without means to discover or identify the person actually causing the injury or damage. He has
no means other than by a recourse to the registration in the Motor Vehicles Office to determine who is the
owner. The protection that the law aims to extend to him would become illusory were the registered owner given
the opportunity to escape liability by disproving his ownership. If the policy of the law is to be enforced and carried
out, the registered owner should not be allowed to prove the contrary to the prejudice of the person injured, that is,
to prove that a third person or another has become the owner, so that he may thereby be relieved of the
responsibility to the injured person.

A registered owner who has already sold or transferred a vehicle has the recourse to a third-party complaint, in the
same action brought against him to recover for the damage or injury done, against the vendee or transferee of the
vehicle. The inconvenience of the suit is no justification for relieving him of liability; said inconvenience is the price
he pays for failure to comply with the registration that the law demands and requires.

Whether the driver is authorized or not by the actual owner is irrelevant to determining the liability of the
registered owner who the law holds primarily and directly responsible for any accident, injury or death caused by
the operation of the vehicle in the streets and highways. To require the driver of the vehicle to be authorized by the
actual owner before the registered owner can be held accountable is to defeat the very purpose why motor vehicle
legislations are enacted in the first place.
CASE DIGEST
Equitable Leasing Corporation vs Suyom
388 SCRA 445 (2002)

Facts:
On July 17, 1994, a Fuso Road Tractor driven by Raul Tutor rammed into the house cum store of Myrna Tamayo in
Tondo, Manila. A portion of the house was destroyed which caused death and injury. Tutor was charged with and
later convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and multiple physical injuries.

Upon verification with the Land Transportation Office, it was known that the registered owner of the tractor was
Equitable Leasing Corporation/leased to Edwin Lim. On April 15, 1995, respondents filed against Raul Tutor, Ecatine
Corporation (Ecatine) and Equitable Leasing Corporation (Equitable) a Complaint for damages.

The petitioner alleged that the vehicle had already been sold to Ecatine and that the former was no longer in
possession and control thereof at the time of the incident. It also claimed that Tutor was an employee, not of
Equitable, but of Ecatine.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner was liable for damages based on quasi delict for the negligent acts.

Held:
The Lease Agreement between petitioner and Edwin Lim stipulated that it is the intention of the parties to enter into
a finance lease agreement. Ownership of the subject tractor was to be registered in the name of petitioner, until the
value of the vehicle has been fully paid by Edwin Lim.

Lim completed the payments to cover the full price of the tractor. Thus, a Deed of Sale over the tractor was executed
by petitioner in favor of Ecatine represented by Edwin Lim. However, the Deed was not registered with the LTO.

Petitioner is liable for the deaths and the injuries complained of, because it was the registered owner of the tractor
at the time of the accident.The Court has consistently ruled that, regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the
registered owner is the lawful operator insofar as the public and third persons are concerned.

Since Equitable remained the registered owner of the tractor, it could not escape primary liability for the deaths and
the injuries arising from the negligence of the driver.

FEB Leasing & Financing Corp vs Siyong

FACTS: An Isuzu oil tanker, registered in the name of petitioner FEB Leasing and Finance Corporation and leased to
BG Hauler, Inc., was running along Del Monte Avenue in Quezon City. While executing a left turn upon reaching
an intersection, the oil tanker hit Loretta Baylon, daughter of respondent spouses Sergio and Maritess Baylon, who
was then crossing the Del Monte Avenue. Due to the strong impact, Loretta was violently thrown away resulting to
her death.

ISSUE: Whether or not FEB Leasing and Finance Corp. (now BPI Leasing Corp.) should be held liable

RULING: Yes. In accordance with the law on compulsory motor vehicle registration, with respect to the public and
third persons, the registered owner of a motor vehicle is directly and primarily responsible for the consequence of its
operation regardless of who the actual vehicle owner might be. Well-settled is the rule that the registered owner of
the vehicle is liable for quasi-delicts resulting from its use. Thus, even if the vehicle has already been sold, leased or
transferred to another person at the time the vehicle figured in an accident, the registeredvehicle owner would still
be liable for damages caused by the accident. The sale, transfer or lease of the vehicle, which is not registered with
the Land Transportation Office, will not bind third persons aggrieved in an accident involving the vehicle.