Perfecto v Meer 85 Phil 552

GREGORIO PERFECTO vs. BIBIANO L. MEER

[G.R. No. L-2348. February 27, 1950.]

Facts:
In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay income
tax upon his salary as member of this Court during the year 1946. After paying the amount (P802), he
instituted this action in the Manila Court of First Instance contending that the assessment was illegal,
his salary not being taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation
of the Constitution.

Issue:
Does the imposition of an income tax upon this salary amount to a diminution thereof?

Held:
Yes. As in the United States during the second period, we must hold that salaries of judges are not
included in the word "income" taxed by the Income Tax Law. Two paramount circumstances may
additionally be indicated, to wit: First, when the Income Tax Law was first applied to the Philippines
1913, taxable "income" did not include salaries of judicial officers when these are protected from
diminution. That was the prevailing official belief in the United States, which must be deemed to have
been transplanted here; and second, when the Philippine Constitutional Convention approved (in
1935) the prohibition against diminution of the judges' compensation, the Federal principle was known
that income tax on judicial salaries really impairs them.

This is not proclaiming general tax immunity for men on the bench. These pay taxes. Upon buying
gasoline, or cars or other commodities, they pay the corresponding duties. Owning real property, they
pay taxes thereon. And on incomes other than their judicial salary, assessments are levied. It is only
when the tax is charged directly on their salary and the effect of the tax is to diminish their official
stipend that the taxation must be resisted as an infringement of the fundamental charter.

Judges would indeed be hapless guardians of the Constitution if they did not perceive and blocken
croachments upon their prerogatives in whatever form. The undiminishable character of judicial
salaries is not a mere privilege of judges personal and therefore waivable but a basic limitation upon
legislative or executive action imposed in the public interest (Evans vs. Gore).
 Edencia vs. David
G.R. No. L-6355-56
Separation of Powers
FACTS:

Saturnino David, the then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the taxing of Justice Pastor
Endencia’s and Justice Fernando Jugo’s salary pursuant to Sec 13 of RA 590 which provides that “SEC. 13. No
salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered
as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his
compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.” According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of
appellant Collector of Internal Revenue, our decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not
received favorably by Congress, because immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted
Republic Act No. 590. To bring home his point, the Solicitor General reproduces what he considers
the pertinent discussion in the Lower House of House Bill No. 1127 which became Republic Act No.
590.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.

HELD:
By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act No. 590, Congress says that taxing the
salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation
or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase “which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office,” found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring tithe salaries of
judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an
invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. “The rule is
recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law
was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a
word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the
legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining term. ** The reason behind the exemption
in the Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Federal Supreme Court and this Court, is to
preserve the independence of the Judiciary, not only of this High Tribunal but of the other courts,
whose present membership number more than 990judicial officials. The independence of the judges is of far
greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries.

In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the effect that the
collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the
Constitution. We further hold that the interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes
is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law,
the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not
violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later
interpreting said statute, especially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs
counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land.
 Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
[GR L-78780, 23 July 1987]
FACTS:
1. Petitioners David Nitafan, Wenceslao Polo and Maximo Savellano Jr., were duly appointed and
qualified Judges of the RTC National Capital Judicial Region.
2. Petitioners seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, (CIR and the Financial Officer of
the Supreme Court) from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.
3. Petitioners submit that “any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitutes
a decreased or diminution of their salaries, contrary to Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution.”

ISSUE:
Is a deduction of withholding tax a diminution of the salaries of Judges/Justices?

HELD:
The SC hereby makes of record that it had then discarded the ruling in PERFECTO VS. MEER
(88 Phil 552) and ENDENCIA VS. DAVID (93 Phil 696), that declared the salaries of members of the
Judiciary exempt from payment of the income tax and considered such payment as a diminution of
their salaries during their continuance in office. The Court hereby reiterates that the salaries
of Justices and Judges are property subject to general income tax applicable to all income earners
and that the payment of such income tax by Justices and Judges does not fall within the constitution
protection against decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office. The debates,
interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in question until it was
finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the1987
Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The
ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional
construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be
given effect.

The ruling that “the imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a diminution thereof,
and so violates the Constitution in Perfecto vs. Meer, as affirmed in Endencia vs. David must be
deemed discarded.
 Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS
GR 122156, 3 February 1997En banc, Bellosillo (p): 6 concur, others dissent
Facts:
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of
the Philippine Government under Proclamation 50dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through
public bidding 30% to 51%of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close
bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a
Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares atP41.58 per share,
and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the
declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary
contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00per share tendered by Renong Berhad in a
letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince
Hotel sent manager’s check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused to accept. On
17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid
and that the sale of 51% of them may be hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad,
Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus. the next day the Court issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to
the Malaysian firm.

Issue(s):
1. Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-
executing.

2. Whether the 51% share is part of the national patrimony.

Held:
The 1987 Philippine Constitution, Article XII Section 10 provides: “The Congress shall, upon
recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to
citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose
capitalist owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas
of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of
enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos. In the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos. The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its
national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals indri
otitis.”
 Aquino vs. Minister of defense Juan Ponce Enrile
G.R. No. 122156, Sept. 17, 1974
Martial Law
Habeas Corpus
Power of the President to Order Arrests

Facts:

Enrile (then Minister of National Defense), pursuant to the order of Marcos issued and ordered the
arrest of a number of individuals including Benigno Aquino Jr even without any charge against them.
Hence, Aquino and some others filed for habeas corpus against Juan Ponce Enrile. Enrile’s answer
contained a common and special affirmative defense that the arrest is valid pursuant to Marcos’
declaration of Martial Law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Aquino’s detention is legal in accordance to the declaration of Martial Law.

HELD:

The Constitution provides that in case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger
against the state, when public safety requires it, the President may suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part therein under Martial Law. In the case at bar, the
state of rebellion plaguing the country has not yet disappeared, therefore, there is a clear and
imminent danger against the state. The arrest is then a valid exercise pursuant tithe President’s
order.
 LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. AQUINO
(G.R. No. 73748 - May 22, 1986)

FACTS:

1. On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she
and Vice President Laurel were taking power.2.On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued
providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the "new
government was installed through direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units
of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

HELD:

Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of
politics where only the people are the judge. The Court further held that:

1. The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire
country;

2. It is not merely a de fact on government but in fact and law a de jure government; and

3. The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.

Lawyers League v. Aquino, GR 73748, May 22, 1986 (See next case.)
- In re: Saturnino Bermudez, GR 76180, Oct. 24, 1986, 145 SCRA 160
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
G.R. No. 76180 October 24, 1986
IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ, petitioner.
R E S O L U T IO N
PER CURIAM:

In a petition for declaratory relief impleading no respondents, petitioner, as a lawyer, quotes the first
paragraph of Section 5 (not Section 7 as erroneously stated) of Article XVIII of the proposed1986
Constitution, which provides in full as follows:

Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February7,
1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June30,
1992.

The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held
on the second Monday of May, 1992.
Claiming that the said provision "is not clear" as to whom it refers, he then asks the Court "to declare
and answer the question of the construction and definiteness as to who, among the present
incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel and the elected President
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice-President Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to under the said Section
7 (sic) of ARTICLE XVIII of the TRANSITORY PROVISIONS of the proposed 1986Constitution refers to,.
...

The petition is dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction and for lack for cause of action.

Prescinding from petitioner's lack of personality to sue or to bring this action, (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43
SCRA 677); it is elementary that this Court assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory
relief. More importantly, the petition amounts in effect to a suit against the incumbent President of the
Republic, President Corazon C. Aquino, and it is equally elementary that incumbent Presidents are
immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure.

The petition furthermore states no cause of action. Petitioner's allegation of ambiguity or vagueness
of the afore quoted provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common
public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President Corazon
C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the
extension of their term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections. Hence,
the second paragraph of the cited section provides for the holding on the second Monday of May,
1992 of the first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under said 1986 Constitution.
In previous cases, the legitimacy of the government of President Corazon C. Aquino was likewise
sought to be questioned with the claim that it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.
The said cases were dismissed outright by this court which held that:

Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy
of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the
people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the
government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it
is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the
community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government. All the eleven
members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic
under her government. (Joint Resolution of May 22, 1986 in G.R. No. 73748 [Lawyers League for a
Better Philippines, etc. vs. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.]; G.R. No. 73972 [People's Crusade
for Supremacy of the Constitution. etc. vs. Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al.]; and G.R. No. 73990 [Councilor Clifton
U. Ganay vs. Corazon C. Aquino, et al.])

For the above-quoted reason, which is fully applicable to the petition at bar, mutatis mutandis, there
can be no question that President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel are the
incumbent and legitimate President and Vice-President of the Republic of the Philippines. Or the
above-quoted reasons, which are fully applicable to the petition at bar,

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed.

Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Alampay and Paras, JJ., concur.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:
FELICIANO, JJ., concurring.
The petitioner asks the Court to declare who are "the incumbent President and Vice President elected
in the February 7, 1986 elections" as stated in Article XVIII, Section 5 of the Draft Constitution
adopted by the Constitutional Commission of 1986.

We agree that the petition deserves outright dismissal as this Court has no original jurisdiction over
petitions for declaratory relief.

As to lack of cause of action, the petitioner's prayer for a declaration as to who were elected
President and Vice President in the February 7, 1986 elections should be addressed not to this Court
but to other departments of government constitutionally burdened with the task of making that
declaration.

The 1935 Constitution, the 1913 Constitution as amended, and the 1986 Draft Constitution uniformly
provide 'that boards of canvassers in each province and city shall certified who were elected
President and Vice President in their respective areas. The certified returns are transmitted to the
legislature which proclaims, through the designated Presiding Head, who were duty elected.

Copies of the certified returns from the provincial and city boards of canvassers have not been
furnished this Court nor is there any need to do so. In the absence of a legislature, we cannot assume the function
of stating, and neither do we have any factual or legal capacity to officially declare, who were elected
President and Vice President in the February 7, 1986 elections.

As to who are the incumbent President and Vice President referred to in the 1986 Draft Constitution,
we agree that there is no doubt the 1986 Constitutional Commission referred to President Corazon C.
Aquino and Vice President Salvador H. Laurel.

Finally, we agree with the Resolution of the Court in G.R. Nos. 73748, 73972, and 73990.

For the foregoing reasons, we vote to DISMISS the instant petition.

CRUZ, J., concurring:

I vote to dismiss this petition on the ground that the Constitution we are asked to interpret has not yet
been ratified and is therefore not yet effective. I see here no actual conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial
determination at this time. (Aetna Life Insurance Co. vs. Haworth, 300 U.S.227; PACU vs. Secretary
of Education, 97 Phil. 806.)
 In re: Letter of Reynato Puno
CIRCULAR NO. 17 December 20, 1988
CIRCULAR NO. 17 December 20, 1988
SUPREME COURT CIRCULARS AND ORDERS

TO: THE COURT OF APPEALS, ALL JUDGES OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, COURT OF
TAXAPPEALS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPALTRIAL
COURTS, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, SHARI'A DISTRICT COURTS, SHARI'A CIRCUITCOURTS,
AND THE IBP.

SUBJECT: COMPLAINTS AGAINST JUSTICES AND JUDGES OF THE LOWER COURTS FILED WITHTHE
COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE TO BE PROMPTLY REFERRED TO THE SUPREME COURT
FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION.

Quoted hereunder, for the information and guidance of all concerned, is the resolution of the Court En
Banc, dated November 29, 1988, in "RE: Letter of Acting Presiding Justice RODOLFO A.NOCON and
Associate Justices REYNATO Puno and ALFREDO MARIGOMEN of the Court of Appeals."

Acting on the letter of Acting Presiding Justice Rodolfo A. Nocon and Associate Justices
ReynatoPuno and Alfredo Marigomen of the Court of Appeals (First Division), dated November 11,
1988,addressed to Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, the Court Resolved to require the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline headed by Atty. Jose F. Racela, Jr., Executive Commissioner, to
REFER the complaint filed by Atty. Eduardo R. Balaoing docketed as CBD Case No. 055 to this Court
for appropriate action as the said complaint was filed against them in their capacity as Court
of Appeals Justices regarding a petition filed before their division. The assumption of such jurisdiction
is a duplication of the Court's exclusive sphere of authority and power, not to mention its far-reaching
ill effects on the administration of justice as provided for in Section 11, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution, which states:

Sec. 11. The members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower courts shall hold office during good behavior
until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their
office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order
their dismissal by vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
issues in the case and voted thereon.

A review of the history of Rule 139-B on Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys will show that thebe’s
proposal to be given jurisdiction over complaints against a justice of the Court of Appeals or judge of
a lower court was rejected in its final draft. Thus, the second paragraph of Section 3 of the Draft of the
Proposed New Rule 139 suggested by the IBP which grants authority to its Board of Governors to acts
on complaints against a Justice of the Court of Appeals or judge of the lower court is conspicuously dropped in
its final version. In view whereof all complaints against Justices and Judges of the lower court filed
with the Commission on Bar Discipline should promptly be REFERRED to the Supreme Court for
appropriate action.

Strict compliance herewith is hereby enjoined.

December 20, 1988.

 (Sgd.) MAXIMO A. MACEREN
Court Administrator
Joseph Estrada vs. Macapagal & Desierto
G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001
De Jure vs. De Facto President

Facts:
Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
claims she is the President. From the beginning of Erap’s term, he was plagued by problems that slowly but surely
eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4,2000. Singson, a longtime
friend of the Estrada, went on air and accused the Estrada, his family and friends of receiving millions
of pesos from jueteng lords. The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 19, the
fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. At1:20 p.m., the petitioner informed Executive
Secretary Edgardo Angara that General AngeloReyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, had defected. January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. On January 22, the Monday
after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers and duties of the
Presidency. After his fall from the pedestal of power, the Erap’s legal problems appeared in clusters.
Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Arroyo is a legitimate (de jure) president.

HELD:
The SC holds that the resignation of Estrada cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving
Malacañang. In the press release containing his final statement,(1) he acknowledged the oath-taking
of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality;(2) he
emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability
and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears;(3) he
expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was
referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not
shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country.

Estrada’s reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up;
and(5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit
of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be
attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner’s valedictory, his final
act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense. Even if Erap can prove that he did not resign,
still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely
unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that
respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be
reviewed by this Court.
 De Leon vs. Esguerra
GR 78059, Aug. 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 602

Facts:
Alfredo de Leon won as barangay captain and other petitioners won as councilmen of
barangay Dolores, taytay, Rizal. On February 9, 1987, de Leon received memo antedated December
1, 1986signed by OIC Gov. Benhamin Esguerra, February 8, 1987, designating Florentino Magno, as
new captain by authority of minister of local government and similar memo signed February 8,
1987,designated new councilmen.

Issue:
Whether or not designation of successors is valid.

Held:
No, memoranda has no legal effect.

1. Effectivity of memoranda should be based on the date when it was signed. So, February 8,
1987and not December 1, 1986.

2. February 8, 1987, is within the prescribed period. But provisional constitution was no longer in
efffect then because 1987 constitution has been ratified and its transitory provision, Article XVIII, sec.
27 states that all previous constitution were suspended.

3. Constitution was ratified on February 2, 1987. Thus, it was the constitution in effect. Petitioners
now acquired security of tenure until fixed term of office for barangay officials has been fixed.
Barangay election act is not inconsistent with constitution.
 DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 127325 - March 19, 1997)

Facts:

Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of People’s Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and
Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to lift the term limits of
elective officials, through People’s Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987
Constitution, which provides for the right of the people to exercise the power to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing the
publication of the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the
hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, Public Interest Law
Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco filed
a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizable by the COMELEC.
The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil action for
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the Delfin petition rising the
several arguments, such as the following: (1) The constitutional provision on people’s initiative to
amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has
been passed; (2) the people’s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision
thereof. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision, therefore it is outside the power of people’s
initiative. The Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.(2)Whether
or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such
initiative.(3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision or an
amendment of the Constitution.

Held:

Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory, thus, without implementing legislation the
same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right, the people
cannot exercise it if Congress does not provide for its implementation. The portion of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule that what has been
delegated, cannot be delegated (potestas delegata non delegari potest). The delegation of the power
to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to
implement the exercise of the right to people’s initiative. The lifting of the term limits was held to be
that of a revision, as it would affect other provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization of
elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal access to opportunities for public service, and
prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative.

However, considering the Court’s decision in the above Issue, the issue of whether or not the petition
is a revision or amendment has become academic
 Tolentino vs. COMELEC
Political Law
Amendment to the Constitution

FACTS:

The Constitutional Convention of 1971 scheduled an advance plebiscite on the proposal to lower the
voting age from 21 to 18, before the rest of the draft of the Constitution (then under revision)had been
approved. Tolentino et al filed a motion to prohibit such plebiscite and the same was granted by the
SC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition will prosper.

HELD:

The propose amendments shall be approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which
the amendments are submitted to the people for ratification. Election here is singular which meant
that the entire constitution must be submitted for ratification at one plebiscite only.

Furthermore, the people were not given a proper “frame of reference” in arriving at their decision
because they had at the time no idea yet of what the rest of the revised Constitution would ultimately
be and therefore would be unable to assess the proposed amendment in the light of the entire
document. This is the “Doctrine of Submission” which means that all the proposed amendments to
the Constitution shall be presented to the people for the ratification or rejection at the same time, NOT
piecemeal.
 Philippine Bar Association vs. COMELEC
140 SCRA 455
January 7, 1986

FACTS:

11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883 which calls for special
national elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap elections) for the offices of President and Vice-
president of the Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it allows the President to
continue holding office after the calling of the special election.

Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos’ letter of conditional “resignation” did not create the
actual vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of the Constitution which could be the basis of the
holding of a special election for President and Vice President earlier than the regular elections for
such positions in 1987. The letter states that the President is: “irrevocably vacat(ing) the position of
President effective only when the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as
President by taking his oath office ten (10) days after his proclamation.”

The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited constitutional provision
that the incumbent President actually resign, vacate his office and turn it over to the Speaker of the
Batasang Pambansa as acting President, their standard bearers have not filed any suit or petition in
intervention for the purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election. They have-not insisted that
President Marcos vacate his office, so long as the election is clean, fair and honest.

ISSUE:

Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court therefore stop and prohibit the holding of
the elections

HELD:
The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of an injunction
restraining respondents from holding the election on February 7, 1986, in as much as there are less
than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional.
The events that have transpired since December 3,as the Court did not issue any restraining
order, have turned the issue into a political question (from the purely justiciable issue of the
questioned constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the actual vacancy of the President’s office)
which can be truly decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election,
since there is no issue more political than the election. The Court cannot stand in the way of letting
the people decide through their ballot, either to give the incumbent president a new mandate or to
elect a new president.

Done in the City of Manila, this 25th of February in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
eighty-six.

(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO

 President

Reference: Javante-De Dios, Daroy, Kalaw-Tirol (1988). Dictatorship and Revolution. Conspectus
Foundation Inc.; p. 761

Source:

http://www.gov.ph/1986/02/25/proclamation-no-1-2/

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Proclamation No. 3, s. 1986
MALACAÑANG
MANILA
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
PROCLAMATION NO. 3

DECLARING A NATIONAL POLICY TO IMPLEMENT REFORMS MANDATED BY THE

PEOPLEPROTECTING THEIR BASIC RIGHTS, ADOPTING A PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION,
AND PROVIDINGFOR AN ORDERLY TRANSITION TO A GOVERNMENT UNDER A NEW
CONSTITUTION

WHEREAS, the new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino
people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines;

WHEREAS, the heroic action of the people was done in defiance of the provisions of the
1973Constitution, as amended;

WHEREAS, the direct mandate of the people as manifested by their extraordinary action demands
the complete reorganization of the government, restoration of democracy, protection of basic rights,
rebuilding of confidence in the entire government system, eradication of graft and corruption,
restoration of peace and order, maintenance of the supremacy of civilian authority over the military,
and the transition to government under a New Constitution in the shortest time possible;

WHEREAS, during the period of transition to a New Constitution it must be guaranteed that the
government will respect basic human rights and fundamental freedoms;

WHEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the power vested
in me by the sovereign mandate of the people; do hereby promulgate the following Constitution:

PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

ARTICLE 1…ADOPTION OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE1973 CONSTITUTION, AS

AMENDED

SECTION 1. The provisions of ARTICLE I (National Territory), ARTICLE III (Citizenship), ARTICLE
IV(Bill of Rights), ARTICLE V (Duties and Obligations of Citizens), and ARTICLE VI (Suffrage) of
the1973 Constitution, as amended, remain in the force and effect and are hereby adopted in toto as
part of this Provisional Constitution.

SECTION 2. The provision of ARTICLE II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies), ARTICLE
VII(The President), ARTICLE X (The Judiciary), ARTICLE XI (Local Government), ARTICLE
XIII(Accountability of Public Officers), ARTICLE XIV (The National Economy and Patrimony of the
Nation), ARTICLE XV (General Provisions) of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, are hereby
adopted as part of this Provisional Constitution, as amended, are hereby adopted as part of this
Provisional Constitution, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Proclamation.

ARTICLE II…THE PRESIDENT, THE VICE-PRESIDENT, AND THE CABINET

SECTION 1. Until a legislature is elected and convened under a New Constitution, the President shall
continue to exercise legislative power.

The President shall give priority to measures to achieve the mandate of the people to:

a) Completely reorganize the government and eradicate unjust and oppressive structures, and all
iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime;

b) Make effective the guarantees of civil, political, human, social, economic and cultural rights and
freedoms of the Filipino people, and provide remedies against violations thereof;

c) Rehabilitate the economy and promote the nationalist aspirations of the people;

d) Recover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime and
protect the interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets of accounts;

e) Eradicate graft and corruption in government and punish those guilty thereof; and,

f) Restore peace and order, settle the problem of insurgency, and pursue national reconciliation
based on justice.

SECTION 2. The President shall be assisted by a Cabinet which shall be composed of Ministers
wither without portfolio who shall be appointed by the President. They shall be accountable to and
hold office at the pleasure of the President.

SECTION 3. The President shall have control of and exercise general supervision over all local
governments.

SECTION 4. In case of permanent vacancy arising from death, incapacity or resignation of the
President, the Vice-President shall become President.

In case of death, permanent incapacity, or resignation of the Vice-President, the Cabinet shall choose
from among themselves the Minister with portfolio who shall act as President.

SECTION 5. The Vice-President may be appointed Member of the Cabinet and may perform such
other functions as may be assigned to him by the President.
SECTION 6. The President, the Vice-President, and the Members of the Cabinet shall be subject tithe
disabilities provided for in Section 8, Article VII, and in Section 6 and 7 Article IX, respectively, of the
1973 Constitution, as amended.

Where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance
of that duty, the individual who considers himself injured has a right to resort to the law for a remedy.
The President, by signing the commission, appointed Marbury a justice of the peace in the District of
Columbia. The seal of the United States, affixed thereto by the Secretary of State, is conclusive
testimony of the verity of the signature, and of the completion of the appointment. Having this legal
right to the office, he has a consequent right to the commission, a refusal to deliver which is a plain
violation of that right for which the laws of the country afford him a remedy.

Yes. The Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they
are unconstitutional and therefore void.

It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule
to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret the rule. If two laws conflict with each
other, the Court must decide on the operation of each. If courts are to regard the Constitution, and the
Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary
act, must govern the case to which they both apply.

No. Congress cannot expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction beyond what is

specified in Article III of the Constitution.

The Constitution states that “the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a

party. In all other cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.” If it had been intended
to leave it in the discretion of the Legislature to apportion the judicial power between the Supreme
and inferior courts according to the will of that body, this section is mere surplus age and is entirely
without meaning. If Congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction where the
Constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original, and original jurisdiction where the
Constitution has declared it shall be appellate, the distribution of jurisdiction made in the Constitution,
is form without substance.

No. The Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus.
To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate
jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction.

It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a
cause already instituted, and does not create that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus maybe
directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper is, in effect, the
same as to sustain an original action for that paper, and is therefore a matter of original jurisdiction.

Disposition

Application for writ of mandamus denied. Marbury doesn’t get the commission

See Ex Parte McCardle for a constitutional law case brief holding that that the Constitution gives
Congress the express power to make exceptions to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction.

Source:

Full text of Case Digest ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

------
 Defensor-Santiago vs. Guingona

G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic WritesLabels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:

During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress, Senator Fernan was declared the duly
elected President of the Senate by a vote of 20 to 2. Senator Tatad manifested that, with the
agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming
the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised
the majority, while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged tithe minority.
Senator Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDPParty numbering 7
and, thus, also a minority had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. Thereafter, the
majority leader informed the body that he was in receipt of a letter signed by the7 Lakas-NUCD-
UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue
thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the
Senate. Senators Santiago and Tatad filed a petition for quo warranto, alleging that Senator
Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority
leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition

(2) Whether or not there is an actual violation of the Constitution

Held:

Regarding the first issue, jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined by the
allegations of the complaint or petition, regardless of whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief
asserted. In light of the allegations of the petitioners, it is clear that the Court has jurisdiction over the
petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate
or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the
exercise of their functions and prerogatives.

However, the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the
Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House. The term
“majority,” when referring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply means the number
greater than half or more than half of any total. In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the
President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the
members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto
constitute the minority, who could thereby elect the minority leader. No law or regulation states that
the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.

While the Constitution is explicit in the manner of electing a Senate President and a House
Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of
Congress. All that the Charter says under Art. VI, Sec. 16(1) is that “each House shall choose such
other officers as it may deem necessary.” The method of choosing who will be such other officers is
merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the said constitutional provision.
Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by the Court. Sources:
Francisco Vs. House Of Representatives [415 SCRA 44; G.R. No. 160261; 10 Nov
2003]
Sunday, January 18, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic WritesLabels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:

Impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide. The
justiciable controversy poised in front of the Court was the constitutionality of the subsequent filing of
a second complaint to controvert the rules of impeachment provided for bylaw.

Issue:

Whether or Not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief JusticeHilario G.
Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the
Constitution and whether the resolution thereof is a political question
has resulted in apolitical crisis.

Held:

In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address all the
issues which this controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance,
that the feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor legally
permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not departure
from, the Constitution.

In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of
the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive
or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge
by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people. At the same
time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by the
Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without
destroying their indispensable co-equality. There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that
the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and
balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed
to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and
interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by
the Constitution. When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of
a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any
government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite
way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or
privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or
penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. In fine, when the proceeding involves the
assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal
interest.

In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are
illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a
wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Before he can
invoke the power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest
in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct
injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he
has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.

At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be
entertained. This Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any
impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief
Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds. As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue
to question the validity of any official action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator.
Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the
prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.

The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a
proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House
shall be necessary… to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the
line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the
filing of a complaint does. To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can
initiate impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of Representatives shall
have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision
and is contrary to the principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with
"impeachment proceeding. “Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and
referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the
filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary
General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against
the same official within a one year period. The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial
scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings
initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule.
Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn
justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court
to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government. No one is above
the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system which recognizes equality of all
men before the law as essential to the law's moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect
for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch or instrumentality
that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality other than the Supreme Court which
has discerned its real meaning and ramifications through its application to numerous cases especially
of the high-profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law and
neither is any other member of this Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that
he gets to have less in law than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every individual's rights
irrespective of his station in life.

Thus, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of
Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr is barred under paragraph
5,section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.