G.R. No.
125532 July 10, 1998
SECRETARY TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR.; STATE PROSECUTORS JUDE ROMANO,
LEAH ARMAMENTO, MANUEL TORREVILLAS, JOAQUIN ESCOVAR, MENRADO
CORPUS; the NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; and POTENCIANO
ROQUE, petitioners,vs.
Petitioners relate the antecedent facts of this case as follows:
COURT OF APPEALS and RODOLFO PINEDA, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
This case is an offshoot of the investigation conducted by the government in the last
quarter of 1995, which delved into the alleged participation of national and local officials
in jueteng and other forms of illegal gambling. Although the Court of Appeals upheld the
admission into the Witness Protection Program of Potenciano A. Roque, who claimed
personal knowledge of such gambling activities, the secretary of justice nonetheless
challenges the side opinion of the appellate court that the testimony of the witness must,
as a condition precedent to his admission into said Program, be shown to be capable of
substantial corroboration in its material points. The justice secretary claims that such
corroboration need not be demonstrated prior to or simultaneous with the witness'
admission into the Program, as long as such requirement can be demonstrated when he
actually testifies in court. However, inasmuch as Roque has already been admitted into the
Program and has actually finished testifying, the issue presented by petitioners has
become moot. Thus, any judgment that this Court may render on the instant petition would
be merely an academic disquisition on a hypothetical problem. Until it can be shown that
an actual controversy exists, courts have no jurisdiction to render a binding decision.
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari to partially set aside the June 28, 1996 Decision of
the Court of Appeals, 1which disposed as follows: 2
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED for want of merit, and the injunction issued against
respondent judges from hearing the criminal actions against petitioner
is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
The Court of Appeals upheld the justice secretary's denial on January 11, 1996 of private
respondent's "Petition for Reconsideration of Admittance of Potenciano A. Roque to the
Witness Protection Program."
Although Respondent Court ruled in favor of the government, herein petitioners
nonetheless assail the following portion of the said Decision:
. . . From the explicit terms of the statute, it is at once apparent that the
presence of such corroborative evidence is sine qua non to a witness'
admission into the Program. Being in the nature of a condition
precedent [to] his admission into the Program, the existence of such
corroborative evidence must be shown at the time his application for
admission is being evaluated.
The Antecedent Facts
3
Sometime in the last quarter of 1995, the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) conducted an investigation on the alleged
participation and involvement of national and local government officials
in "jueteng" and other forms of illegal gambling.
The case was also the subject of a legislative inquiry/investigation by
both the Senate and the House of Representatives.
In November 1995, one Potenciano Roque, claiming to be an
eyewitness to the networking of . . . national and local politicians and
gambling lords, sought admission into the Government's "Witness
Protection, Security and Benefit Program." Allegedly, he gained first-
hand information in his capacity as Chairman of the Task Force Anti-
Gambling (TFAG) during the term of former President Corazon C.
Aquino until his resignation in 1989. He also revealed that he and
members of his family were in danger of being liquidated, facing as he
did the formidable world of corruption with a well-entrenched hold on
Philippine social, political and economic systems.
After a thorough evaluation of his qualifications, convinced of his
compliance with the requirements of Republic Act No. 6981, otherwise
known as the "Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act," the
Department of Justice admitted Roque to the program, providing him a
monthly allowance, temporary shelter and personal and security
protection during witness duty.
On November 30, 1995, Roque executed a sworn statement before NBI
Agents Sixto M. Burgos, Jr. and Nelson M. Bartolome, alleging that
during his stint as Chairman of the Task Force Anti-Gambling (TFAG),
several gambling lords, including private respondent Rodolfo Pineda,
and certain politicians offered him money and other valuable
considerations, which he accepted, upon his agreement to cease
conducting raids on their respective gambling operations (Annex "B").
On the basis of Roque's sworn statement, the sworn statement and
supplemental affidavit of one Angelito H. Sanchez, and the sworn
statement of Gen. Lorenzo Mateo (Annexes "C," "D" and "E"), then NBI
Director Mariano M. Mison forwarded the result of their investigation on
the "jueteng" scam to the Department of Justice (DOJ), recommending
the filing of the following charges against Pineda and other persons . . .
.
xxx xxx xxx
 The DOJ Task Force on Illegal Gambling (composed of the petitioner-
prosecutors), created by petitioner Secretary Teofisto Guingona on
November 24, 1995 (Annex "F"), conducted a preliminary investigation
of the case and subpoenaed all the respondents in I.S. No. 95-774,
therein requiring them to submit their counter-affidavits by December
22, 1995.
On December 21, 1995, Roque executed a supplemental sworn
statement relative to I.S. No. 95-774, clarifying some of his statements
in his first affidavit (Annex "G"). Consequently, the December 22, 1995
setting was cancelled and reset to January 8, 1996 to give Pineda and
other respondents time to refute the charges contained in the
supplemental sworn statement.
On January 5, 1996, Pineda filed a "Petition for Reconsideration of
Admittance of Potenciano A. Roque to the Witness Protection
Program," which was denied by petitioner Secretary in a letter-reply
dated January 11, 1996 (Annexes "H" and "I"). On January 23, 1996,
Pineda filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with
Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction
with the respondent Court of Appeals.
xxx xxx xxx
In the meantime, petitioner-prosecutors proceeded with their
preliminary investigation, and on February 2, 1996, they issued a
resolution finding probable cause to charge private respondent Pineda
with several offenses (Annex "K"). On February 5, 1996, three (3)
Informations for corruption of public officials were filed against him in
the Manila and Pasig City Trial Courts (Annexes "L," "M" and "N"). He
was subsequently arraigned on February 28, 1996 in the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 7 of the City of Manila presided by Judge Enrico
Lanzanes, and on March 14, 1996 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch
168, of Pasig City, presided by Judge Benjamin Pelayo.
On March 19, 1996, the Court of Appeals came up with a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining both trial courts from hearing the
criminal actions in the meantime.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision, Respondent Court addressed mainly the issue of whether the secretary of
justice acted in excess of his jurisdiction (a) in admitting Petitioner Roque into the Program
and (b) in excluding him from the Informations filed against private respondent. Private
respondent contended that Roque's admission was illegal on two grounds: first, his
testimony could not be substantially corroborated in its material points; and second, he
appeared to be the most guilty or at least more guilty than private respondent, insofar as
the crimes charged in the Informations were concerned.
Respondent Court also ruled that RA 6981 contemplates two kinds of witnesses: (a) a
witness who has perceived or has knowledge of, or information on, the commission of a
crime under Section 3; and (b) aparticeps criminis or a participant in the crime under
Section 10.
Based on his sworn statements, Roque participated in the commission of the crimes
imputed to private respondent (corruption of public officials) by accepting bribe money.
Necessarily, his admission to the Program fell under Section 10, which requires that he
should not appear to be the most guilty of the imputed crimes. Respondent Court found
that private respondent sought to bribe him several times to prevent him from conducting
raids on private respondent's gambling operations. Such "passive participation" in the
crimes did not make him more guilty than private respondent.
On the first issue, Respondent Court initially ruled that, by express provision of Sections 3
and 10, the requirement of corroboration is a condition precedent to admission into the
Program. A contrary interpretation would only sanction the squandering of the various
benefits of the Program on one who might later be adjudged disqualified from admission
for lack of evidence to corroborate his testimony.
However, in the same breath, Respondent Court upheld herein petitioners' alternative
position that substantial corroboration was nevertheless actually provided by Angelito
Sanchez' and retired Gen. Lorenzo M. Mateo's testimonies. Hence, it disposed in favor of
the government.
Subsequently, this petition was filed. 4
The Issue
The lone issue raised by this petition is worded as follows:
Whether or not a witness' testimony requires prior or simultaneous
corroboration at the time he is admitted into the witness protection,
security and benefit program. 5
As noted earlier, this petition is unusual and unique. Despite ruling in their favor,
Respondent Court is assailed by petitioners for opining that admission to the Program
requires prior or simultaneous corroboration of the material points in the witness'
testimony.
Respondent Court and private respondent are of the opinion that Sections 3 (b) & 10 (d) of
RA 6981 expressly require that corroboration must already exist at the time of the witness'
application as a prerequisite to admission into the Program. RA 6981 pertinently provides:
Sec. 10. State Witness. Any person who has participated in the
commission of a crime and desires to be a witness for the State, can
apply and, if qualified as determined in this Act and by the Department,
shall be admitted into the Program whenever the following are present:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material
points;
On the other hand, petitioners contend that said provisions merely require that the
testimony of the state witness seeking admission into the Program "can be substantially
corroborated" or is "capable of corroboration." So long as corroboration can be obtained
when he testifies in court, he satisfies the requirement that "his testimony can be
substantially corroborated on its material points."
The Court's Ruling
The petition must fail, because the facts and the issue raised by petitioners do not warrant
the exercise of judicial power.
No Actual Controversy
Without going into the merits of the case, the Court finds the petition fundamentally
defective. The Constitution provides that judicial power "includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable." 6 According to Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a noted constitutionalist, courts are
mandated to settle disputes between real conflicting parties through the application of the
law. 7 Judicial review, which is merely an aspect of judicial power, demands the following:
(1) there must be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the question
must be ripe for adjudication; 8 and (3) the person challenging must have "standing"; that
is, he has personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will
sustain direct injury. 9
The first requisite is that there must be before a court an actual case calling for the
exercise of judicial power. Courts have no authority to pass upon issues through advisory
opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems 10 or friendly suits collusively
arranged between parties without real adverse interests. 11 Courts do not sit to adjudicate
mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually
challenging. 12 As a condition precedent to the exercise of judicial power, an actual
controversy between litigants must first exist. 13
An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an assertion
of opposite legal claims, which can be resolved on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence. A justiciable controversy is distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract
difference or dispute, in that the former involves a definite and concrete dispute touching
on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. A justiciable controversy
admits of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in character, whereas an
opinion only advises what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. 14
Thus, no actual controversy was found in Abbas vs. Commission on Elections 15 regarding
the provision in the Organic Act, which mandates that should there be any conflict between
national law and Islamic Law, the Shari'ah courts should apply the former. In that case, the
petitioner maintained that since the Islamic Law (Shari'ah) was derived from the Koran,
which makes it part of divine law, the Shari'ah may not be subjected to any "man-made"
national law. This Court dismissed petitioner's argument because, as enshrined in the
Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable. No actual controversy between real
litigants existed, because no conflicting claims involving the application of national law
were presented. This being so, the Supreme Court refused to rule on a merely
perceived potential conflict between the provisions of the Muslim Code and those of the
national law.
In contrast, the Court held in Sabello vs. Department of Education, Culture and
Sports 16 that there was a justiciable controversy where the issue involved was whether
petitioner — after he was given an absolute pardon — merited reappointment to the
position he had held prior to his conviction, that of Elementary Principal I. The Court said
that such dispute was not hypothetical or abstract, for there was a definite and concrete
controversy touching on the legal relations of parties and admitting of specific relief
through a court decree that was conclusive in character. That case did not call for mere
opinion or advice, but for affirmative relief.
Closely related to the requirement of an "actual case," Bernas continues, is the second
requirement that the question is "ripe" for adjudication. A question is ripe for adjudication
when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it. Thus, in PACU vs. Secretary of Education, 17 the Court declined to pass
judgment on the question of the validity of Section 3 of Act No. 2706, which provided that
before a private school may be opened to the public, it must first obtain a permit from the
secretary of education, because all the petitioning schools had permits to operate and
were actually operating, and none of them claimed that the secretary had threatened to
revoke their permit.
In Tan vs. Macapagal, 18 the Court said that Petitioner Gonzales "had the good sense to
wait" until after the enactment of the statute [Rep. Act No. 4913 (1967)] requiring the
submission to the electorate of certain proposed amendments to the Constitution
[Resolution Nos. 1 and 3 of Congress as a constituent body (1967)] before he could file his
suit. It was only when this condition was met that the matter became ripe for adjudication;
prior to that stage, the judiciary had to keep its hands off.
The doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch of government to be left alone
to discharge its duties as it sees fit. Being one such branch, the judiciary, Justice Laurel
asserted, "will neither direct nor restrain executive [or legislative action] . . . ." 19 The
legislative and the executive branches are not allowed to seek its advice on what to do or
not to do; thus, judicial inquiry has to be postponed in the meantime. Before a court may
enter the picture, a prerequisite is that something has been accomplished or performed by
either branch. Then may it pass on the validity of what has been done but, then again, only
"when . . . properly challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding." 20
In the case at bar, it is at once apparent that petitioners are not requesting that this Court
reverse the ruling of the appellate court and disallow the admission in evidence of
Respondent Roque's testimony, inasmuch as the assailed Decision does not appear to be
in conflict with any of their present claims. Petitioners filed this suit out of fear that the
assailed Decision would frustrate the purpose of said law, which is to encourage witnesses
to come out and testify. But their apprehension is neither justified nor exemplified by this
particular case. A mere apprehension does not give rise to a justiciable controversy.
After finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the government prosecutors,
Respondent Court allowed the admission of Roque into the Program. In fact, Roque had
already testified in court against the private respondent. Thus, the propriety of Roque's
admission to the Program is already a moot and academic issue that clearly does not
warrant judicial review.
Manifestly, this petition involves neither any right that was violated nor any claims that
conflict. In fact, no affirmative relief is being sought in this case. The Court concurs with the
opinion of counsel for private respondent that this action is a "purely academic exercise,"
which has no relevance to the criminal cases against Respondent Pineda. After the
assailed Decision had been rendered, trial in those cases proceeded in earnest, and
Roque testified in all of them. Said counsel filed his Memorandum only to satisfy his
"academic interest on how the State machinery will deal with witnesses who are admittedly
guilty of the crimes but are discharged to testify against their co-accused." 21
Petitioners failed not only to present an actual controversy, but also to show a case ripe for
adjudication. Hence, any resolution that this Court might make in this case would
constitute an attempt at abstraction that can only lead to barren legal dialectics and sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities. 22
An Executive Function
In the present petition, the government is in effect asking this Court to render an advisory
opinion on what the government prosecutors should do — when, how and whom to grant
or to deny admission into the Program. To accede to it is tantamount to an incursion into
the functions of the executive department. From their arguments stated above, both sides
have obviously missed this crucial point, which is succinctly stated in Webb vs. De Leon: 23
It is urged that they [the provisions of RA 6918] constitute ". . . an
intrusion into judicial prerogative for it is only the court which has the
power under the Rules on Criminal Procedure to discharge an accused
as a state witness." The argument is based on Section 9, Rule 119
which gives the court the prerogative to approve the discharge of an
accused to be a state witness. Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it
lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a
judicial function, the sole prerogative of courts and beyond executive
and legislative interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes
appertains to the executive department of government whose principal
power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed.
A necessary component of this power to execute our laws is the right to
prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor
with a wide range of discretion — the discretion of whether, what and
whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of
factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors. We thus hold that it
is not constitutionally impermissible for Congress to enact R.A. 6981
vesting in the Department of Justice the power to determine who can
qualify as a witness in the program and who shall be granted immunity
from prosecution. Section 9 of Rule 119 does not support the
proposition that the power to choose who shall be a state witness is an
inherent judicial prerogative. Under this provision, the court is given the
power to discharge a state witness only because it has already
acquired jurisdiction over the crime and the accused. The discharge of
an accused is part of the exercise of jurisdiction but is not a recognition
of an inherent judicial function. Moreover, the Rules of Court have
never been interpreted to be beyond change by legislation designed to
improve the administration of our justice system. [Emphasis ours]
Simply stated, the decision on whether to prosecute and whom to indict is executive in
character. Only when an information, charging two or more persons with a certain offense,
has already been filed in court will Rule 119, Section 9 of the Rules of Court, come into
play, viz.:
Sec. 9. Discharge of one of several defendants to be witness for the
prosecution. — When two or more persons are charged with the
commission of a certain offense, the competent court, at any time
before they have entered upon their defense, may direct one or more of
them to be discharged with the latter's consent that he or they may be
witnesses for the government when in the judgment of the court:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the defendant
whose discharge is requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said
defendant;
(c) The testimony of said defendant can be substantially corroborated in
its material points;
(d) Said defendant does not appear to be the most guilty;
(e) Said defendant has not at any time been convicted of any offense
involving moral turpitude.
In the present case, Roque was not one of those accused in the Informations
filed by the government prosecutors. Rule 119, Section 9, is therefore clearly not
applicable.
A resort to the progenitors of RA 6981 will yield the same result. Although Presidential
Decree 1731 and National Emergency Memorandum Order No. 26 state
only when immunity from suit attaches to a witness, they do not specify who are qualified
for admission into the Program. PD 1731, otherwise known as a law "Providing for
Rewards and Incentives to Government Witnesses and Informants and for Other
Purposes" provides:
Sec. 4. Any such informants or witnesses who shall testify, or provide
vital information, regarding the existence or activity of a group involved
in the commission of crimes against national security or public order, or
of an organized/syndicated crime or crime group, and/or the culpability
of individual members thereof in accordance with this Decree shall,
upon recommendation of the state prosecutor, fiscal or military lawyer,
as approved by the Secretary of National Defense or the Secretary of
Justice, as the case may be, be immune from criminal prosecution for
his participation or involvement in any such criminal activity which is the
subject of the investigation or prosecution, in addition to the benefits
under Sec. 2 hereof: Provided, that, immunity from criminal prosecution
shall, in the case of a witness offering to testify, attach only upon his
actually testifying in court in accordance with his undertaking as
accepted by the state prosecutor, fiscal, or military lawyer: Provided,
further, that the following conditions are complied with:
xxx xxx xxx
 c. That such testimony or information can be substantially corroborated
in its material points;
xxx xxx xxx
The same tenor was adopted in National Emergency Memorandum Order No. 26 signed
by former President Corazon C. Aquino, Section 5 (c) of which provides:
c. Immunity from Criminal Prosecution. — This applies to the witness
participation or involvement in the criminal case in which his testimony
is necessary and may be availed of only upon his actually testifying in
court in accordance with his undertaking, and provided that:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Such testimony or information can be substantially corroborated in
its material points;
xxx xxx xxx
One may validly infer from the foregoing that the government prosecutor is afforded much
leeway in choosing whom to admit into the Program. Such inference is in harmony with the
basic principle that this is an executive function.
RA 6981 is a much needed penal reform law that could help the government in curbing
crime by providing an antidote, as it were, to the usual reluctance of witnesses to testify.
The Department of Justice has clearly explained the rationale for said law: 24
Witnesses, for fear of reprisal and economic dislocation, usually refuse
to appear and testify in the investigation/prosecution of criminal
complaints/cases. Because of such refusal, criminal complaints/cases
have been dismissed for insufficiency and/or lack of evidence. For a
more effective administration of criminal justice, there was a necessity
to pass a law protecting witnesses and granting them certain rights and
benefits to ensure their appearance in investigative bodies/courts.
This Court should then leave to the executive branch the decision on how best to
administer the Witness Protection Program. Unless an actual controversy arises, we
should not jump the gun and unnecessarily intervene in this executive function.
Closer Scrutiny of the Assailed Decision
Finally, an accurate reading of the assailed Decision will further enlighten petitioners as to
its true message. Respondent Court did sustain Roque's admission into the Program —
even as it held that the first contention of petitioners was untenable — based on the latter's
alternative argument that Roque's testimony was sufficiently corroborated by that of
General Mateo. While Respondent Court insisted that corroboration must exist prior to or
simultaneous with Roque's admission into the Program, it sanctioned subsequent
compliance to cure this defect. The reason for this is found in the penultimate paragraph of
the Decision, in which Respondent Court categorically stated that it found no manifest
abuse of discretion in the petitioners' action. There is no quarrel with this point. Until a
more opportune occasion involving a concrete violation of RA 6981 arises, the Court has
no jurisdiction to rule on the issue raised by petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-19650 September 29, 1966
CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER GENERAL, respondent-
appellant.
CASTRO, J.:
FACTS
In 1960, Caltex (Philippines), Inc. announced its “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest”. The
mechanics of the contest were as follows:
1. Participants must estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each
Caltex station will dispense during a specified period;
2. Contest is open to all car owners or licensed drivers;
3. Participants need not buy any Caltex products to be eligible. No fee is required.
4. Participants just need to fill out a form and drop their entries at the nearest Caltex
station.
To publicize their contest, Caltex sought the assistance of the Philippine Postal Office.
However, then acting Postmaster Enrico Palomar denied the request of Caltex as Palomar
deemed that the contest is a violation of the Postal Law (Chapter 52 of the Revised
Administrative Code [RAC]).
Palomar cited Section 1954 of the RAC:
SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter. — No matter belonging to any of the
following classes, whether sealed as first-class matter or not, shall be imported into the
Philippines through the mails, or to be deposited in or carried by the mails of the
Philippines, or be delivered to its addressee by any officer or employee of the Bureau of
Posts:
Written or printed matter in any form advertising, describing, or in any manner pertaining
to, or conveying or purporting to convey any information concerning any lottery, gift
enterprise, or similar scheme depending in whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any
scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining any money or property of any kind by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.
According to Palomar, the contest is a lottery hence, communications pertaining thereto
cannot be mailed by Caltex via Philippine Post.
Feeling aggrieved, Caltex brought the issue before the regular courts thru a petition for
declaratory relief. Caltex argued that their contest is not a lottery; that under prevailing
jurisprudence, lottery consists of the following elements:
a. consideration;
b. prize;
c. chance.
Caltex insists that their contest is not a lottery because the first element, consideration, is establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry
missing. Said element is missing because participants are not required to pay anything – into effect.
there’s no consideration on the part of the participants. A new doctrine abrogating an old rule operates prospectively and should not adversely
Palomar assailed the petition as he argued that the same is not proper. He insisted that he
affect those favored by the old rule.
was merely applying the law and that there is no legal issue at all; that there is no need for
the courts to call for a construction on the statute in question. Palomar further argued that
even if the said contest, assuming arguendo, is not considered a lottery, the same is G.R. No. 110398 November 7, 1997
considered as a gift enterprise which is still prohibited by the Postal Law to be mailed.
ISSUES:
NEGROS NAVIGATION CO., INC., petitioner,
1. Whether or not Caltex’s petition for declaratory relief is proper.
vs.
2. Whether or not the Caltex contest is a lottery/gift enterprise.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON MIRANDA, SPS. RICARDO and VIRGINIA DE LA
HELD:
VICTORIA, respondents.
1. Yes. The petition is proper. Construction of a law is in order if what is in issue is an
inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used in a certain law. As defined in Black’s
Law Dictionary: Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the MENDOZA, J.:
meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given
case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that FACTS:
the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.
2. No.
Sometime in April 1980, Ramon Miranda, one of the private respondents in this case
The contest is not a lottery. The contention of Caltex is well taken, i.e., the first element is
lacking (no consideration). purchased four special tickets (Numbers 74411, 74412, 74413 and 74414) from the
The contest is also not a gift enterprise. The Supreme Court went on to discuss that under petitioner for his wife, children and niece who were then bound to leave for Bacolod City to
prevailing jurisprudence and legal doctrines as well as definitions provided by legal attend a family reunion.
luminaries, there is no explicit definition as to what a gift enterprise is. However, under
the Postal Law, the term “gift enterprise” was used in association with the term “lottery”. As On 22 April 1980, private respondent’s aforementioned relatives boarded M/V Don Juan of
such, the principle of noscitur a sociis, a principle in statutory construction, is applicable. Negros Navigation Co., Inc., that was leaving Manila at 1:00 PM. As expected, said vessel
Under this principle, it is only logical that the term under a construction should be accorded sailed on time. However, on the evening of 22 April, petitioner’s vessel collided with the
no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated
therewith. Hence, applying noscitur a sociis, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a M/T Tacloban City- an oil tanker owned by the Philippine National Oil Corporation (PNOC)
consideration, so also must the term “gift enterprise” be so construed. Therefore, since the and the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC). Obviously, several
contest does not include a consideration, it is neither a lottery nor a gift enterprise. Caltex passengers perished in the sea tragedy. Some bodies were found, and some, including
should be allowed to avail of the Philippine postal service. the relatives of private respondents were never found.

G.R. No. L-39990 July 22, 1975 Knowing the ill-fate of the M/V Don Juan, private respondents, namely Garcia and Sps de
la Victoria filed a complaint against the Negros Navigation, the PNOC, and the
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, PNOC/STC. Private respondents sought for damages for the death of their relatives
vs. namely Ardita de la Miranda, Rosario V. Miranda, Ramon Miranda Jr., and Elfreda de la
RAFAEL LICERA, defendant-appellant. Victoria.

CASTRO, J.: The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the private respondents, and asked petitioners,
including PNOC and PNOC/STC to pay the moral damages sought by Garcia and Sps. de
la Victoria. And upon review by the Court Appeals, the appellate court affirmed the RTC’s
FACTS: In 1961, accused was granted an appointment as secret agent of Governor
decision with several modification.
Leviste. In 1965, accused was charged with illegal possession of firearms. The SC held
that where at the time of his appointment, People v. Macarandang (1959) was applicable,
ISSUES:
which held that secret agents were exempt from the license requirement, and later People
v. Mapa (1967) was decided, the earlier case should be held applicable. Several issues were raised in this case. However, for the sake of having a discourse on
the abovementioned principle/concept of Statutory Construction, we shall focus on the
HELD: Art. 8 of the Civil Code decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
issue of whether or not the ruling in the Mecenas VS CA, finding the crew members of
laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions,
petitioners to be grossly negligent in the performance of their duty, is binding in this case.
although in them¬selves not law, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The
application or interpretation placed by the courts upon a law is part of the law as of the
HELD:
date of the enactment of the said law since the Court's application or interpretation merely
Yes. The court’s adherence to the Mecenas Case1 is dictated by the principle of stare
decisis et non quieta movere (Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been
settled).
 The petitioners assail the lower court’s reliance on the Mecenas Case, arguing
that although the same case arose out of the same incident as that involved in the
Mecenas, THE PARTIES ARE DIFFERENT AND TRIALS WERE CONDUCTED
SEPARATELY. Furthermore they contend that the decision in this case must be based on
the allegations, the defenses pleaded and evidence adduced stated on the records of the
case.
 The Supreme Court ruled otherwise. The Supreme Court stated that although
the merits of the individual claims against the petitioner are different in both cases, there
remains a similarity which is material in the decision of the court vis-à-vis the case at hand,
i.e. the cause of the sinking of its ship on 22 April 1980 and the liabilities (of petitioner) for
such accident.
DOCTRINE
 STARE DECISIS
o “Stare decisis et non quieta movere” (Follow past precedents and do
not disturbed what has been settled).
o Under the principle of Stare Decisis, it is required that past decisions of
the court be followed in the adjudication of cases.
o A ruling of the supreme court as to the construction of a law should be
followed in subsequent cases INVOLVING SIMILAR QUESTIONS.
o The principle presupposes that the facts of the precedent and the case
to which it is applied are substantially the same. If facts are dissimilar,
then the aforementioned principle does not apply.
o Purpose of this principle is to have stability in the law.
The doctrine of stare decisis applies in this case. It is a rule that a ruling of the court as to
the construction of a law should be followed in subsequent cases INVOLVING SIMILAR
QUESTIONS. Although the personal circumstances and claims of Mecenas, and Miranda
and de la Victoria are different as contended by the petitioner, the two cases raised similar
question/issue, i.e. on the damages for which the petitioner was liable due to the sinking of
its ship.
G.R. No. L-13954 August 12, 1959
GENARO GERONA, ET AL., petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, ET AL., respondents-appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
FACTS:
1. Petitioners belong to the Jehova’s Witness whose children were expelled from their
schools when they refused to salute, sing the anthem, recite the pledge during the conduct
of flag ceremony. DO No. 8 issued by DECS pursuant to RA 1265 which called for the
manner of conduct during a flag ceremony. The petitioners wrote the Secretary of
Education on their plight and requested to reinstate their children. This was denied.
2. As a result, the petitioners filed for a writ of preliminary injunction against the Secretary
and Director of Public Schools to restrain them from implementing said DO No. 8.
3. The lower court (RTC) declared DO 8 invalid and contrary to the Bill of Rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not DO 8 is valid or constitutional
DO 8 is valid. Saluting the flag is not a religious ritual and it is for the courts to determine,
not a religious group, whether or not a certain practice is one.
1. The court held that the flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the
Philippines, an emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of
freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect. Considering the
complete separation of church and state in our system of government, the flag is utterly
devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the flag consequently does not involve any
religious ceremony.
After all, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious ceremony must
rest with the courts. It cannot be left to a religious group or sect, much less to a follower of
said group or sect; otherwise, there would be confusion and misunderstanding for there
might be as many interpretations and meanings to be given to a certain ritual or ceremony
as there are religious groups or sects or followers.
2. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot
mean exemption form or non-compliance with reasonable and non-discriminatory laws,
rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority. In enforcing the flag salute on
the petitioners, there was absolutely no compulsion involved, and for their failure or refusal
to obey school regulations about the flag salute they were not being persecuted. Neither
were they being criminally prosecuted under threat of penal sacntion. If they chose not to
obey the flag salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public education being
maintained at the expense of their fellow citizens, nothing more. According to a popular
expression, they could take it or leave it. Having elected not to comply with the regulations
about the flag salute, they forfeited their right to attend public schools.
3. The Filipino flag is not an image that requires religious veneration; rather it is symbol of
the Republic of the Philippines, of sovereignty, an emblem of freedom, liberty and national
unity; that the flag salute is not a religious ceremony but an act and profession of love and
allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which the flag stands for; that by authority
of the legislature, the Secretary of Education was duly authorized to promulgate
Department Order No. 8, series of 1955; that the requirement of observance of the flag
ceremony or salute provided for in said Department Order No. 8, does not violate the
Constitutional provision about freedom of religion and exercise of religion; that compliance
with the non-discriminatory and reasonable rules and regulations and school discipline,
including observance of the flag ceremony is a prerequisite to attendance in public
schools; and that for failure and refusal to participate in the flag ceremony, petitioners were
properly excluded and dismissed from the public school they were attending.
Separate Opinions
BARRERA, J., concurring:
I am in substantial accord with teh well-thought and well-expressed opinion of Mr. Justice
Montemayor.
As much reliacne has been place by appellants on the Barnette case decided by the
Supreme Court of the United States (West Virginia State Board of Education vs. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 87 L. ed. 1628), two fundamental features distinguishing that case from the
one before us, bear some stressing.
The underlying and, I belive, compelling consideration that impelled the majority in the
Barnette case to overrule the Gobitis decision (Minersville School District vs. Gobitis, 310
U.S. 586, 84 L. ed 1375) was the compulsory nature of the order of the State Board of
Education making non-compliance therewith virtually unlawful in the sense that under the
West Virginia Code, upon expulsion of the disobeying pupil, his parents or guardian
become liable to criminal prosecution1 for such absence due to expulsion and if convicted
are subjected to fine not exceeding $50 and jail term not exceeding thirty days. 2 The
delinquent pupil may be proceeded against and sent to reformatories maintained for
ciminally inclined juveniles.3 Hence, the Court treated the case as one where "the sole
conflict is between authority and rights of the individual. The State asserts power to
condition access to public education on making a prescribed sign and profession, and at
the same time to coerce attendance (in school) by punishing both parent and child". As
thus presented, really the conflict there between authority and liberty become deeply
sharpened and has attained the proportion of repugnance to a degree that left no choice to
the Court except to apply the rationale of the grave-and-imminent-danger rule and to
enjoin, under the circumstances, the enforcement of the West Virginia School Regulation.
Fortunately the problem the instant case presents to us is unaccompanied by such dire
consequences. Non-compliance with our prescribed flag ceremony does not result in
criminal prosecution either of the pupil or of the parent. All that the unwilling pupil suffers is
inability to continue his studies in a public school. If this and nothing else is the
consequence, as it presently appears to be the complaint of appellants in this case, then I
perceive no clear offense is done to the Constitution.
One other significant distinction between the Barnette case and the one before us is the
substnatial difference in the manner the flag salute is to be executed under the two laws,
and of course, the varying reaction and attitude taken by the Jehovah's Witnesses in
relation thereto. In West Virginia, the law requires the "Stiff-arm" salute, the saluter to keep
the right hand raised with palm turned up while the following is repeated: "I pledge
allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America and to the Republic for which it
stands; one Nations, indivisible with liberty and justice for all." The Jehovah's Witnesses
considered this posture of raising the hand at the same time reciting the pledge as an act
of obeisance contrary to their religious beliefs.
Here, what is required of all persons present during the flag ceremony is to stand at
attention while the flag is being raised and the National Anthem is being played or sung.
Boys and men with hats shall place the hat over the heart. Those without hats may stand
with their arms and hands down and straight at the sides. Those in military or Boy Scout
uniform shall give the salute prescribed by their regulations.
Appellants here have manifested through counsel, both in their brief and, I understand, in
the course of the oral argument, that they do not object to this requirement of standing at
attention with their arms and hands down and straight at the sides. Consequently, there
seems to be no irreconciliable fundamental conflict, except perhaps as regards the singing
of the National Anthem and the recital (unaccompanied by any particular physical position)
of the patriotic pledge near the close of the ceremony. As to the import of the National
Anthem and the Patriotic Pledge, I can add nothing to the very sober and well-considered
opinion of Justice Montemayor.
As I see the issuance, disentangled as it should and could be from the stress and strain of
counsels' doctrinal discussion and argumentation on the fundamentals of the freedom of
religion about which there could be no serious disagreement, and if viewed and interpreted
rationally — in a spirit of harmony, goodwill and in keeping with an appropriate sense of
nationalism — I find no reasonable consideration making the flag ceremony executed in
the manner prescribed by the questioned Department order and regulation, clearly
repugnant to the Constitution.
G.R. No. 95770 March 1, 1993
ROEL EBRALINAG, , petitioners,
vs.
THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU, respondent.
G.R. No. 95887 March 1, 1993
MAY AMOLO, represented by her parents MR. & MRS. ISAIAS AMOLO;, petitioners,
vs.
THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU and ANTONIO A.
SANGUTAN, respondents.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
Facts:
The petitioners in both (consolidated) cases were expelled from their classes by the public
school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and
recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 (An Act making flag
ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions) of July 11, 1955 , and by Department
Order No. 8 (Rules and Regulations for Conducting the Flag Ceremony in All Educational
Institutions) dated July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
(DECS) making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions.
Jehovah's Witnesses admitted that they taught their children not to salute the flag, sing the
national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of
worship" or "religious devotion" which they "cannot conscientiously give to anyone or
anything except God". They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State.
They think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge
transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of the
intellect and spirit which the Constitution protect against official control..
Issue:
Whether or not school children who are members or a religious sect may be
expelled from school for disobedience of R.A. No. 1265 and Department Order No. 8
Held:
No. Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and
the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his
Creator
The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is
the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a
serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public
interest, that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent." Absent such a threat to public
safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not justified. (Teehankee)
The petitioners further contend that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag
ceremony, they do not engage in "external acts" or behavior that would offend their
countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through the observance of the
flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their
respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. Since
they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.
The Court is not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses from saluting the
flag, singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, this religious group
which admittedly comprises a "small portion of the school population" will shake up our
part of the globe and suddenly produce a nation "untaught and uninculcated in and
unimbued with reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of country and admiration for
national heroes" . What the petitioners seek only is exemption from the flag ceremony, not
exclusion from the public schools where they may study the Constitution, the democratic
way of life and form of government, and learn not only the arts, sciences, Philippine history
and culture but also receive training for a vocation of profession and be taught the virtues
of "patriotism, respect for human rights, appreciation for national heroes, the rights and
duties of citizenship, and moral and spiritual values (Sec. 3[2], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution)
as part of the curricula. Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will
bring about the very situation that this Court had feared in Gerona. Forcing a small
religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates
their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for dully
constituted authorities.
Also, the expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where they are
enrolled violates their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to "protect
and promote the right of all citizens to quality education . . . and to make such education
accessible to all (Sec. 1, Art. XIV).
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., concurring:
I am happy to concur with Mme. Justice Carolina Griño-Aquino in her quietly eloquent
affirmation of a vital postulate of freedom. I would only add my brief observations
concerning Gerona v. Secretary of Education.
In my humble view, Gerona was based on an erroneous assumption. The Court that
promulgated it was apparently laboring under the conviction that the State had the right to
determine what was religious and what was not and to dictate to the individual what he
could and could not worship. In pronouncing that the flag was not a religious image but a
symbol of the nation, it
was implying that no one had the right to worship it or — as the petitioners insisted — not
to worship it. This was no different from saying that the cult that reveres Rizal as a divinity
should not and cannot do so because he is only a civic figure deserving honor but not
veneration.
It seems to me that every individual is entitled to choose for himself whom or what to
worship or whether to worship at all. This is a personal decision he alone can make. The
individual may worship a spirit or a person or a beast or a tree (or a flag), and the State
cannot prevent him from doing so. For that matter, neither can it compel him to do so. As
long as his beliefs are not externalized in acts that offend the public interest, he cannot be
prohibited from harboring them or punished for doing so.
In requiring the herein petitioners to participate in the flag ceremony, the State has
declared ex cathedrathat they are not violating the Bible by saluting the flag. This is to me
an unwarranted intrusion into their religious beliefs, which tell them the opposite. The State
cannot interpret the Bible for them; only they can read it as they see fit. Right or wrong, the
meaning they derive from it cannot be revised or reversed except perhaps by their own
acknowledged superiors. But certainly not the State. It has no competence in this matter.
Religion is forbidden territory that the State, for all its power and authority, cannot invade.
I am not unaware of Justice Frankfurter's admonition that "the constitutional protection of
religious freedom terminated disabilities, it did not create new privileges. It gave religious
equality, not civil immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not
freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma."
But in the case at bar, the law to which the petitioners are made to conform clashes with
their own understanding of their religious obligations. Significantly, as the ponencia notes,
their intransigence does not disturb the peaceful atmosphere of the school or otherwise
prejudice the public order. Their refusal to salute the flag and recite the patriotic pledge
does not disrupt the flag ceremony. They neither mock nor disdain it. The petitioners
simply stand at attention and keep quiet "to show their respect for the right of those who
choose to participate in the solemn proceedings." It is for this innocuous conduct that,
pursuant to the challenged law and regulations, the teachers have been dismissed and the
students excelled.
Freedom of speech includes the right to be silent. Aptly has it been said that the Bill of
Rights that guarantees to the individual the liberty to utter what is in his mind also
guarantees to him the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind. The salute is a symbolic
manner of communication that conveys its message as clearly as the written or spoken
word. As a valid form of expression, it cannot be compelled any more than it can be
prohibited in the face of valid religious objections like those raised in this petition. To
impose it on the petitioners is to deny them the right not to speak when their religion bids
them to be silent. This coercion of conscience has no place in the free society.
The democratic system provides for the accommodation of diverse ideas, including the
unconventional and even the bizarre or eccentric. The will of the majority prevails, but it
cannot regiment thought by prescribing the recitation by rote of its opinions or proscribing
the assertion of unorthodox or unpopular views as in this case. The conscientious
objections of the petitioners, no less than the impatience of those who disagree with them,
are protected by the Constitution. The State cannot make the individual speak when the
soul within rebels.
PADILLA, J., concurring:
I concur in the Court's decision penned by Madame Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino that
school teachers and students who cannot salute the flag, sing the national anthem and
recite the pledge of loyalty to the country, on grounds of religious belief or conviction, may
not on this ground alone be dismissed from the service or expelled from the school.
At the same time, I am really concerned with what could be the
far-reaching consequences of our ruling in that, we may in effect be sanctioning
a privileged or elite class of teachers and students who will hereafter be exempt from
participating, even when they are in the school premises, in the flag ceremony in
deference to their religious scruples. What happens, for instance, if some citizens, based
also on their religious beliefs, were to refuse to pay taxes and license fees to the
government? Perhaps problems of this nature should not be anticipated. They will be
resolved when and if they ever arise. But with today's decision, we may have created more
problems than we have solved.
It cannot also be denied that the State has the right and even the duty to promote among
its citizens, especially the youth, love and country, respect for the flag and reverence for its
national heroes. It cannot also be disputed that the State has the right to adopt reasonable
means by which these laudable objectives can be effectively pursued and achieved. The
flag ceremony is one such device intended to inspire patriotism and evoke the finest
sentiments of love of country and people.
In fine, the flag ceremony is a legitimate means to achieve legitimate (and noble) ends. For
a select few to be exempt from the flag ceremony and all that it represent seven if the
exemption is predicated on respect for religious scruples, could be divisive in its impact on
the school population or community.
I would therefore submit that, henceforth, teachers and students who because of religious
scruples or beliefs cannot actively participate in the flag ceremony conducted in the school
premises should be excluded beforehand from such ceremony. Instead of allowing the
religious objector to attend the flag ceremony and display therein his inability to salute the
flag, sing the national anthem and recite the pledge of loyalty to the Republic, he or she
should remain in the classroom while honors to the flag are conducted and manifested in
the "quadrangle" or equivalent place within school premises; or if the flag ceremony must
be held in a hall, the religious objector must take his or her place at the rear of (or outside)
the hall while those who actively participate in the ceremony must take the front places.
This arrangement can, in my view, achieve an accommodation and, to a certain extent,
harmonization of a citizen's constitutional right to freedom of religion and a valid exercise
of the State's fundamental and legitimate authority to require homage and honor to the flag
as the symbol of the Nation.
# Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., concurring:
I am happy to concur with Mme. Justice Carolina Griño-Aquino in her quietly eloquent
affirmation of a vital postulate of freedom. I would only add my brief observations
concerning Gerona v. Secretary of Education.
In my humble view, Gerona was based on an erroneous assumption. The Court that
promulgated it was apparently laboring under the conviction that the State had the right to
determine what was religious and what was not and to dictate to the individual what he
could and could not worship. In pronouncing that the flag was not a religious image but a
symbol of the nation, it
was implying that no one had the right to worship it or — as the petitioners insisted — not
to worship it. This was no different from saying that the cult that reveres Rizal as a divinity
should not and cannot do so because he is only a civic figure deserving honor but not
veneration.
It seems to me that every individual is entitled to choose for himself whom or what to
worship or whether to worship at all. This is a personal decision he alone can make. The
individual may worship a spirit or a person or a beast or a tree (or a flag), and the State
cannot prevent him from doing so. For that matter, neither can it compel him to do so. As
long as his beliefs are not externalized in acts that offend the public interest, he cannot be
prohibited from harboring them or punished for doing so.
In requiring the herein petitioners to participate in the flag ceremony, the State has
declared ex cathedrathat they are not violating the Bible by saluting the flag. This is to me
an unwarranted intrusion into their religious beliefs, which tell them the opposite. The State
cannot interpret the Bible for them; only they can read it as they see fit. Right or wrong, the
meaning they derive from it cannot be revised or reversed except perhaps by their own
acknowledged superiors. But certainly not the State. It has no competence in this matter.
Religion is forbidden territory that the State, for all its power and authority, cannot invade.
I am not unaware of Justice Frankfurter's admonition that "the constitutional protection of
religious freedom terminated disabilities, it did not create new privileges. It gave religious
equality, not civil immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not
freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma."
But in the case at bar, the law to which the petitioners are made to conform clashes with
their own understanding of their religious obligations. Significantly, as the ponencia notes,
their intransigence does not disturb the peaceful atmosphere of the school or otherwise
prejudice the public order. Their refusal to salute the flag and recite the patriotic pledge
does not disrupt the flag ceremony. They neither mock nor disdain it. The petitioners
simply stand at attention and keep quiet "to show their respect for the right of those who
choose to participate in the solemn proceedings." It is for this innocuous conduct that,
pursuant to the challenged law and regulations, the teachers have been dismissed and the
students excelled.
Freedom of speech includes the right to be silent. Aptly has it been said that the Bill of
Rights that guarantees to the individual the liberty to utter what is in his mind also
guarantees to him the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind. The salute is a symbolic
manner of communication that conveys its message as clearly as the written or spoken
word. As a valid form of expression, it cannot be compelled any more than it can be
prohibited in the face of valid religious objections like those raised in this petition. To
impose it on the petitioners is to deny them the right not to speak when their religion bids
them to be silent. This coercion of conscience has no place in the free society.
The democratic system provides for the accommodation of diverse ideas, including the
unconventional and even the bizarre or eccentric. The will of the majority prevails, but it
cannot regiment thought by prescribing the recitation by rote of its opinions or proscribing
the assertion of unorthodox or unpopular views as in this case. The conscientious
objections of the petitioners, no less than the impatience of those who disagree with them,
are protected by the Constitution. The State cannot make the individual speak when the
soul within rebels.
PADILLA, J., concurring:

I concur in the Court's decision penned by Madame Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino that
school teachers and students who cannot salute the flag, sing the national anthem and
recite the pledge of loyalty to the country, on grounds of religious belief or conviction, may
not on this ground alone be dismissed from the service or expelled from the school.

At the same time, I am really concerned with what could be the

far-reaching consequences of our ruling in that, we may in effect be sanctioning
a privileged or elite class of teachers and students who will hereafter be exempt from
participating, even when they are in the school premises, in the flag ceremony in
deference to their religious scruples. What happens, for instance, if some citizens, based
also on their religious beliefs, were to refuse to pay taxes and license fees to the
government? Perhaps problems of this nature should not be anticipated. They will be
resolved when and if they ever arise. But with today's decision, we may have created more
problems than we have solved.

It cannot also be denied that the State has the right and even the duty to promote among
its citizens, especially the youth, love and country, respect for the flag and reverence for its
national heroes. It cannot also be disputed that the State has the right to adopt reasonable
means by which these laudable objectives can be effectively pursued and achieved. The
flag ceremony is one such device intended to inspire patriotism and evoke the finest
sentiments of love of country and people.

In fine, the flag ceremony is a legitimate means to achieve legitimate (and noble) ends. For
a select few to be exempt from the flag ceremony and all that it represent seven if the
exemption is predicated on respect for religious scruples, could be divisive in its impact on
the school population or community.

I would therefore submit that, henceforth, teachers and students who because of religious
scruples or beliefs cannot actively participate in the flag ceremony conducted in the school
premises should be excluded beforehand from such ceremony. Instead of allowing the
religious objector to attend the flag ceremony and display therein his inability to salute the
flag, sing the national anthem and recite the pledge of loyalty to the Republic, he or she
should remain in the classroom while honors to the flag are conducted and manifested in
the "quadrangle" or equivalent place within school premises; or if the flag ceremony must
be held in a hall, the religious objector must take his or her place at the rear of (or outside)
the hall while those who actively participate in the ceremony must take the front places.
This arrangement can, in my view, achieve an accommodation and, to a certain extent,
harmonization of a citizen's constitutional right to freedom of religion and a valid exercise
of the State's fundamental and legitimate authority to require homage and honor to the flag
as the symbol of the Nation.