PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PANFILO M. LACSON, respondent.[G.R. No. 149453.

April 1, 2003]
Facts:

The respondent and his co-accused were charged with multiple murder for the shooting and
killing of eleven male persons bandied as members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang. In
support of their Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioners contend that (a) Section 8, Rule
117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
81679 to Q-99-81689; and (b) the time-bar in said rule should not be applied retroactively.

Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:

Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the
express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.

Since the conditions sine qua non for the application of the new rule were not present when
Judge Agnir, Jr. issued his resolution, the State is not barred by the time limit set forth in the
second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The
State can thus revive or refile Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or file new
Informations for multiple murder against the respondent.

The respondent, on the other hand, insists that, as found by the Court in its Resolution and
Judge Agnir, Jr. in his resolution, the respondent himself moved for the provisional dismissal of
the criminal cases. The respondent further asserts that the heirs of the victims, through the
public and private prosecutors, were duly notified of said motion and the hearing thereof.
He contends that it was sufficient that the public prosecutor was present during the March
22, 1999 hearing on the motion for judicial determination of the existence of probable cause
because criminal actions are always prosecuted in the name of the People, and the private
complainants merely prosecute the civil aspect thereof.

The petitioners contend that even on the assumption that the respondent expressly
consented to a provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 and all
the heirs of the victims were notified of the respondents motion before the hearing thereon
and were served with copies of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the eleven cases,
the two-year bar in Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should
be applied prospectively and not retroactively against the State. To apply the time limit
retroactively to the criminal cases against the respondent and his co-accused would violate
the right of the People to due process, and unduly impair, reduce, and diminish the States
substantive right to prosecute the accused for multiple murder.
Issue:
Whether the THE TIME-BAR IN SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SHOULD NOT
BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY.
RULING:
In this case, the Court agrees with the petitioners that the time-bar of two years under the
new rule should not be applied retroactively against the State. Statutes regulating the
procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and
to that extent. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants’ rights
may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive
application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he
is adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive application of procedural statutes constitutionally
objectionable. The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise
from, procedural laws. It has been held that a person has no vested right in any particular
remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or
criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure.

Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the
accused alone. The interests of society and the offended parties which have been wronged
must be equally considered.

Input: Criminal law provides or regulates that steps by which one who committed a crime is
to be punished.”
PEOPLE, et al. v. Lacson, April 1, 2003
FACTS: Before the court is the petitioner’s motion of reconsideration of the resolution dated May 23, 2002, for the
determination of several factual issues relative to the application of Sec. 8 Rule 117 of RRCP on the dismissal of the
cases Q-99- 81679 and Q-99-81689 against the respondent. The respondent was charged with the shooting and killing of
eleven male persons. The court confirmed the express consent of the respondent in the provisional dismissal of the
aforementioned cases when he filed for judicial determination. The court also ruled the need to determine whether the
other facts for its application are attendant.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the requisites for the applicability of Sec. 8, Rule 117 of 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure were
complied with in the Kuratong Baleleng cases
a. Was express consent given by the respondent?
b. Was notice for the motion, the hearing and the subsequent dismissal given to the heirs of the victims?
Section 8, Rule 117 is not applicable to the case since the conditions for its applicability, namely: 1) prosecution with the
express consent of the accused or both of them move for provisional dismissal,
2) offended party notified,
3) court grants motion and dismisses cases provisionally,
4) public prosecutor served with copy of orders of provisional dismissal, which is the defendants burden to prove, which in
this case has not been done
a. The defendant never filed and denied unequivocally in his statements, through counsel at the Court of Appeals, that he
filed for dismissal nor did he agree to a provisional dismissal thereof.
b. No notice of motion for provisional dismissal, hearing and subsequent dismissal was given to the heirs of the victims.

2. WON time-bar in Sec 8 Rule 117 should be applied prospectively or retroactively.

Time-bar should not be applied retroactively. Though procedural rules may be applied retroactively, it should not be if to
do so would work injustice or would involve intricate problems of due process. Statutes should be construed in light of the
purposes to be achieved and the evils to be remedied. This is because to do so would be prejudicial to the State since,
given that the Judge dismissed the case on March 29,1999, and the New rule took effect on Dec 1,2000, it would only in
effect give them 1 year and three months to work instead of 2 years. At that time, they had no knowledge of the said rule
and therefore they should not be penalized for that. “Indeed for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to
be dispensed for the accused alone.” The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and the
accused. It should not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar therein
provided merely to benefit the accused. To do so would cause an injustice of hardship to the state and adversely affect
the administration of justice.

Held: Motion granted