Funa vs. Chairman, G.R. No.

192791 (2012)

FACTS:

On February 15, 2001, Pres Arroyo appointed Carague as Chairman of the COA for a term of 7 years.
Carague’s term of office started on February 2, 2001 to end on February 2, 2008. On February 7, 2004,
Villar was appointed as the third member of the COA for a term of 7 years starting February 2, 2004 until
February 2, 2011.

Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year of Villar as COA
Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008.
Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly
thereafter, on June 11, 2008, the Commission on Appointments confirmed his appointment. He was to
serve as Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated in the appointment papers, until the expiration of the
original term of his office as COA Commissioner or on February 2, 2011. Challenged in this recourse,
Villar, in an obvious bid to lend color of title to his hold on the chairmanship, insists that his appointment
as COA Chairman accorded him a fresh term of seven (7) years which is yet to lapse. He would argue, in
fine, that his term of office, as such chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7 years reckoned from
February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to that position.

In the meantime, Evelyn R. San Buenaventura was appointed as COA Commissioner to serve the
unexpired term of Villar as Commissioner or up to February 2, 2011.Before the Court could resolve this
petition; Villar resigned his position and was replaced by Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan.

ISSUES:

1: W/N a promotional appointment from the position of Commissioner to Chairman is constitutionally

permissible and does NOT constitute reappointment as barred by the Article IX (D), Sec 1 (2) of the
Constitution

2: W/N the appointment of Villar to the position of COA Chairman which is made vacant by the
expiration of term of the predecessor is valid

RULINGS:

1. Yes. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is eligible
for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing
chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate
period of the length of service as commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of the predecessor
will not exceed 7 years and provided further that the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from
death, resignation, disability or removal by impeachment.

Reappointment found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and the same office
(Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). On the other hand, an appointment
involving a movement to a different position or office (Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a
new appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under the
Constitution.

2. No. The Constitution clearly provides that if the vacancy results from the expiration of the term of the
predecessor, the appointment of a COA member shall be for a fixed 7-year term.

Here, the vacancy in the position of COA chairman left by Carague in February 2, 2008 resulted from the
expiration of his 7-year term. Under that circumstance, there can be no unexpired portion of the term of
the predecessor to speak of. Hence, in light of the 7-year aggregate rule, Villar’s appointment to a full
term is not valid as he will be allowed to serve more than seven 7 years under the constitutional ban.

Villar had already served 4 years of his 7-year term as COA Commissioner. A shorter term, however, to
comply with the 7-year aggregate rule would also be invalid as the corresponding appointment would
effectively breach the clear purpose of the Constitution of giving to every appointee so appointed
subsequent to the first set of commissioners, a fixed term of office of 7 years.

Brillantes vs Yorac, Gr No. 93867

FACTS:

In December 1989, acoup attempt occurred prompting the president to create a fact finding commission
which would be chaired by Hilario Davide. Consequently he has to vacate his chairmanship over the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Haydee Yorac, an associate commissioner in the COMELEC,
was appointed by then President Corazon Aquino as a temporary substitute, in short, she was appointed in
an acting capacity. Sixto Brillantes, Jr. then questioned such appointment urging that under Art 10-C of
the Constitution “in no case shall any member of the COMELEC be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity”. Brillantes further argued that the choice of the acting chairman should not
come from the President for such is an internal matter that should be resolved by the members themselves
and that the intrusion of the president violates the independence of the COMELEC as a constitutional
commission.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the designation made by the president violates the constitutional independence of the
COMELEC.
HELD:

Yes. Yorac’s designation as acting chairman is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court ruled that although
all constitutional commissions are essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the
president in the discharge of their functions. The designation made by the president has dubious
justification as it was merely grounded on the quote “administrative expediency” to present the functions
of the COMELEC. Aside from such justification, it found no basis on existing rules on statutes. It is the
members of the COMELEC who should choose whom to sit temporarily as acting chairman in the
absence of Davide (they normally do that by choosing the most senior member). But even though the
president’s appointment of Yorac as acting president is void, the members of COMELEC can choose to
reinstate Yorac as their acting chairman – the point here is that, it is the members who should elect their
acting chairman pursuant to the principle that constitutional commissions are independent bodies

GSIS v. CSC

FACTS:

The GSIS dismissed six government employees on account of irregularities in the canvassing of supplies.
Five of these six dismissed employees appealed to the Merit Systems Board. The Board found the
dismissals to be illegal because effected without formal charges having been filed or an opportunity
given to the employees to answer, and ordered the remand of the cases to the GSIS for appropriate
disciplinary proceedings.

The GSIS took the issue to the Civil Service which then ruled that the dismissal was indeed illegal. The
CSC thereafter ordered the reinstatement of the employees and demanded the payment of backwages.
The replacements of the dismissed employees should then be released from service.

The GSIS remained unconvinced and raised the issue to the SC. SC affirmed the Civil Service ruling saying
that The CSC acted within its authority and Reinstatement was proper However, the SC modified the
requirement of backpay. Said backpay should be made after the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings.

In the course of the proceedings 2 of the employees died.

Heirs of the dismissed employees filed a motion for execution of the Civil Service resolution so that
backwages can be paid. GSIS however denied the motion saying that the SC modified that part of the
ruling.

CSC nonetheless thumbed its nose to the GSIS and granted the motion. GSIS was made to pay. GSIS filed
certiorari with the SC asking that the CSC order be nullified. The GSIS contends that the CSC has no
power to execute its judgments.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Civil Service Comission has the power to enforce its judgments?
RULING:

It would seem quite obvious that the authority to decide cases is inutile unless accompanied by the
authority to see that what has been decided is carried out. Hence, the grant to a tribunal or agency of
adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and adjudge cases, should normally and logically be
deemed to include the grant of authority to enforce or execute the judgments it thus renders, unless the
law otherwise provides. The Civil Service Commission has the power to execute its judgment, finalorders
or resolutions. The CSC is a constitutional commission invested by theConstitution and relevant laws not
only with the authority to administer the civil service but is also vested with quasi-judicial powers. It has
the authority to hear and decideadministrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it or brought to
it on appeal.

The writ of execution issued on June 20, 1990 is valid. The Court upholds thesame, simply because there
is no fair and feasible alternative in the circumstances. The binding force of Resolution of July 4, 1988, for
all intents and purposes, is that it makes exoneration in the administrative proceedings a condition
precedent to payment of said back salaries, it can not however exact an impossible performance or
decree a useless exercise such as that the subsequent disciplinary proceedings is an empty, and inutile
procedure as to the deceased employees.

The questioned order of the Civil Service Commission merely recognized the impossibility of complying
with the Resolution of July 4, 1988 and the legal futility of attempting a post-mortem investigation of the
character contemplated. Back salaries were awarded to the heirs of the deceased and the petition of
GSIS was dismissed.

Pangasinan State University vs. CA, 526 SCRA 92

FACTS

At the heart of this controversy is a 124-hectare land in Barrio Cadlan, Pili, Camarines Sur owned by
petitioners Annie, Anne Marie, James John, James Francis and Anne Margareth (all surnamed Manubay)
and Manubay Agro-Industrial Development Corporation.

On November 15, 1994, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Pili issued a notice of coverage
placing the property under the comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP). Petitioners did not
protest the notice.

On July 1, 1996, petitioners filed an application at the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for
conversion of the property from agricultural to residential.

On August 26, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan of Pili passed Resolution No. 145 approving the
Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of 1996 of the Municipality of Pili, Camarines Sur. The ordinance
reclassified the subject property from agricultural to highly urbanized intended for mixed residential and
commercial use.
Thereafter, petitioners requested DAR Regional Director Percival C. Dalugdug to set aside the November
15, 1994 notice of coverage. They pointed out that the land had been reclassified and the property was
no longer suitable for agricultural purposes. Director Dalugdug denied their request in a letter dated
November 13, 1996.

Respondent Ernesto Garilao, then DAR Secretary, upheld Director Dalugdug and denied petitioners’
application for conversion, considering that the property had already been placed under the CARP.

Aggrieved, petitioners separately asked respondent to reconsider. They insisted that, because the MARO
issued a notice of coverage, not a notice of acquisition, their application for conversion should have been
approved. The motions were denied.

On April 28, 1998, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the
denial of their application for conversion. They averred that respondent acted with grave abuse of
discretion when he denied their application. According to them, the issuance of a mere notice of
coverage placing agricultural land under the CARP was not a ground for the denial of such application.

In a resolution dated June 1, 1999, the CA dismissed the petition. DAR-AO No. 7, s. 1997 provides that
the decision of the DAR Secretary may be appealed either to the Office of the President (OP) or to the
CA. Considering that the issue raised by petitioners involved the administrative implementation of the
CARP, the OP was more competent to rule on the issue. Moreover, by failing to bring the matter to the
said office, petitioner did not exhaust all available administrative remedies before resorting to a petition
for certiorari.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied.

ISSUE:

Petitioners contend that the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari as they did not violate the
rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. The act of a department secretary may be directly
challenged in a petition for certiorari.

RULING:

Petition denied. Under the doctrine of qualified political agency, department secretaries are alter egos or
assistants of the President and their acts are presumed to be those of the latter unless disapproved or
reprobated by him. Thus, as a rule, an aggrieved party affected by the decision of a cabinet secretary
need not appeal to the OP and may file a petition for certiorari directly in the Court of Appeals assailing
the act of the said secretary.

Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that, for a petition for certiorari to prosper, petitioner
must show (1) the public respondent acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and (2) there is no appeal or a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

In a petition for certiorari premised on grave abuse of discretion, it must be shown that public
respondent patently and grossly abused his discretion and that such abuse amounted to an evasion of
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of
law. In other words, the public respondent exercised his power arbitrarily and despotically by reason of
passion or hostility.

Here, inasmuch as respondent had a valid ground to deny petitioners ’ application, he did not commit
grave abuse of discretion.1avvphi1

Furthermore, DAR-AO No. 7, s. 1997 requires an appeal (of the denial of application of conversion) to the
OP. It was the plain, speedy and adequate remedy contemplated by Section 1 of Rule 65.

Needless to state, elevating the matter to the OP was consistent with the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. A party aggrieved by an order of an administrative official should first appeal to
the higher administrative authority before seeking judicial relief. Otherwise, as in this case, the
complaint will be dismissed for being premature or for having no cause of action.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. LARRY ALFONSO

FACTS:

Respondent Larry M. Alfonso is the Director of the Human Resources Management Department of PUP.
On July 6, 2006, Dr. Zenaida Pia, Professor IV in PUP-Sta. Mesa, and Dindo Emmanuel Bautista, President
of Unyon ng mga Kawani sa PUP, jointly filed an Affidavit-Complaint against Alfonso for violation of
Republic Act (RA) No. 6713, charging the latter with grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the Service, and violation of Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.

The affidavit-complaint was lodged before the Civil Service Commission (CSC).

In their affidavit, Dr. Pia and Bautista alleged, among others, that respondent repeatedly abused his
authority as head of PUP’s personnel department when the latter prepared and included his name in
Special Order Nos. 0960 and 1004 for overnight services, ostensibly authorizing him to work for 24 hours
straight from May 16 to 20, May 22 to 27 and May 29 to June 2, 2006.

As a result thereof, Alfonso made considerable earnings for allegedly working in humanly impossible
conditions 24 hours straight daily, for three consecutive weeks.

Respondent averred that he only rendered overnight work on May 17, 19, 22, 24, 26, 29 and 31, 2006.

He explained that his daily time record explicitly indicates that it covers overnight services pursuant to
S.O. No. 1004, series of 2006, and that an entry such as "Day 17, arrival 8:00 PM; Day 18, departure 8:00
AM" connoted only a day of overnight work and not continuous two (2) days of rendition of services.
The CSC, however, found Alfonso’s explanation wanting.

It issued Resolution No. 061821 formally charging Alfonso with grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the Service, and imposing a 90-day preventive suspension against him.

Aggrieved, respondent filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration of the preventive suspension order
and requested a change of venue from the CSC-Central Office to the CSC-National Capital Region (CSC-
NCR).

In the motion, he argued that it is the CSC-NCR regional office that has jurisdiction over the matter
pursuant to Section 6 of CSC Resolution No. 99-1936, and that to hold otherwise may deprive him of his
right to appeal.

Without ruling on the motion, Assistant Commissioner Atty. Anicia Marasigan-de Lima, head of CSC-NCR,
issued an Order directing the Office of the President of PUP to implement the preventive suspension
order against respondent.

CA rendered a Decision in favor of Alfonso.

ISSUE:

Whether the CSC has jurisdiction to hear and decide the complaint filed against Alfonso.

RULING:

As the central personnel agency of the government,21 the CSC has jurisdiction to supervise the
performance of and discipline, if need be, all government employees, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters such as PUP. Accordingly, all PUP
officers and employees, whether they be classified as teachers or professors pursuant to certain
provisions of law, are deemed, first and foremost, civil servants accountable to the people and
answerable to the CSC in cases of complaints lodged by a citizen against them as public servants.
Admittedly, the CSC has appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary cases decided by government
departments, agencies and instrumentalities. However, a complaint may be filed directly with the CSC,
and the Commission has the authority to hear and decide the case, although it may opt to deputize a
department or an agency to conduct the investigation. Specifically, Sections 9(j) and 37(a) of P.D. 807,
otherwise known as the Civil Service Law of 1975, provide:

SECTION 9. Powers and Functions of the Commission. – The Commission shall administer the Civil
Service and shall have the following powers and function:

xxxx
(j) Hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in accordance with Section
37 or brought to it on appeal;

xxxx

Section 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. – (a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative
disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in
an amount exceeding thirty days’ salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from
Office. A complaint may be filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a government
official or employee in which case it may hear and decide the case or it may deputize any department or
agency or official or group of officials to conduct the investigation. The results of the investigation shall
be submitted to the Commission with recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other action
to be taken.22

We are not unmindful of certain special laws that allow the creation of disciplinary committees and
governing bodies in different branches, subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities of the government
to hear and decide administrative complaints against their respective officers and employees. Be that as
it may, we cannot interpret the creation of such bodies nor the passage of laws such as – R.A. Nos. 8292
and 4670 allowing for the creation of such disciplinary bodies – as having divested the CSC of its inherent
power to supervise and discipline government employees, including those in the academe. To hold
otherwise would not only negate the very purpose for which the CSC was established, i.e. to instill
professionalism, integrity, and accountability in our civil service, but would also impliedly amend the
Constitution itself.

But it is not only for this reason that Alfonso’s argument must fail. Equally significant is the fact that he
had already submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the CSC when he filed his counter-affidavit27 and his
motion for reconsideration and requested for a change of venue, not from the CSC to the BOR of PUP,
but from the CSC-Central Office to the CSC-NCR.28 It was only when his motion was denied that he
suddenly had a change of heart and raised the question of proper jurisdiction.29 This cannot be allowed
because it would violate the doctrine of res judicata, a legal principle that is applicable to administrative
cases as well.30 At the very least, respondent’s active participation in the proceedings by seeking
affirmative relief before the CSC already bars him from impugning the Commission’s authority under the
principle of estoppel by laches.31

In this case, the complaint-affidavits were filed by two PUP employees. These complaints were not
lodged before the disciplinary tribunal of PUP, but were instead filed before the CSC, with averments
detailing respondent’s alleged violation of civil service laws, rules and regulations. After a fact-finding
investigation, the Commission found that a prima facie case existed against Alfonso, prompting the
Commission to file a formal charge against the latter.32 Verily, since the complaints were filed directly
with the CSC, and the CSC has opted to assume jurisdiction over the complaint, the CSC’s exercise of
jurisdiction shall be to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction. To repeat, it
may, however, choose to deputize any department or agency or official or group of officials such as the
BOR of PUP to conduct the investigation, or to delegate the investigation to the proper regional
office.33 But the same is merely permissive and not mandatory upon the Commission.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT

FACTS:

The Civil Service Commission present petition for mandamus seeks to compel the Department of Budget
and Management to release the balance of its budget for fiscal year 2002. At the same time, it seeks a
determination by this Court of the extent of the constitutional concept of fiscal autonomy. the amount of
P215,270,000.00 was appropriated for its Central Office by the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of
2002, while the total allocations for the same Office, if all sources of funds are considered, amount to
P285,660,790.44. It complains, however, that the total fund releases by respondent to its Central Office
during the fiscal year 2002 was only P279,853,398.14, thereby leaving an unreleased balance of
P5,807,392.30. this balance was intentionally withheld by respondent on the basis of its no report, no
release policy whereby allocations for agencies are withheld pending their submission of the documents
mentioned in Sections 3.8 to 3.10 and Section 7.0 of National Budget Circular No. 478 on Guidelines on
the Release of the FY 2002 Funds, which documents are:

1. Annual Cash Program (ACP)

2. Requests for the Release of Special Allotment Release Order (SARO) and Notice of Cash
Allocation (NCA)

3. Summary List of Checks Issued and Cancelled

4. Statement of Allotment, Obligations and Balances

5. Monthly Statement of Charges to Accounts Payable

6. Quarterly Report of Actual Income

7. Quarterly Financial Report of Operations

8. Quarterly Physical Report of Operations

9. FY 2001 Preliminary and Final Trial Balance

10. Statement of Accounts Payable

Petitioner contends that the application of the no report, no release policy upon independent
constitutional bodies of which it is one is a violation of the principle of fiscal autonomy and, therefore,
unconstitutional. Respondent, at the outset, opposes the petition on procedural grounds. It contends
that first, petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedies as it could have sought clarification from
respondents Secretary regarding the extent of fiscal autonomy before resorting to this Court. Second,
even assuming that administrative remedies were exhausted, there are no exceptional and compelling
reasons to justify the direct filing of the petition with this Court instead of the trial court, thus violating
the hierarchy of courts.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the congress reduce the appropriations of the Constitutional Commission

RULING:

The plain implication of the omission of the provision proscribing such reduction of appropriations below
that for the previous year is that Congress is not prohibited from reducing the appropriations of
Constitutional Commissions below the amount appropriated for them for the previous year.

WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of all the foregoing discussions, GRANTED. Respondent’s act of
withholding the subject funds from petitioner due to revenue shortfall is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Accordingly, respondent is directed to release to petitioner the amount of Five Million Eight Hundred
Seven Thousand, Three hundred Ninety Two Pesos and Thirty Centavos (P5,807,392.30) representing the
unreleased balance of petitioners appropriation for its Central Office by the General Appropriations Act
for FY 2002.

Leveriza vs. IAC 157 SCRA 282

FACTS:

The Republic of the Philippines (RP) through the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) entered into a
lease contract (Contract A) on April 2, 1965 with Rosario C. Leveriza overa parcel of land containing an
area of 4,502 square meters, for 25 years.

On May 21, 1965, another lease contract (Contract B and in effect a sublease) was entered into by and
between Rosario C. Leveriza and plaintiff Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc. (MOPI) over the same parcel of land,
but reduced to 3,000 square meters for 25 years.

On June 1, 1968, a new lease contract (Contract C) was entered into, by and between CAA and MOPI
over the same parcel of land, but reduced to 3,000 square meters, for 25 years, without the approval of
the secretary of the Public Works and Communications (PWC).

Due to the overlapped term of the lease contracts between CAA, Leveriza and MOPI, the CAA seeks the
rescission or cancellation of Contract A and Contract B on the ground that Contract A from which
Contract B is derived and depends has already been cancelled by the CAA and maintains that Contract C
with the CAA is the only valid and subsisting contract insofar as the parcel of land, subject to the present
litigation is concerned. On the other hand, Leverizas' claimthat Contract A which is their contract with
CAA has never been legally cancelled and still valid and subsisting; that it is Contract C between MOPI
and CAA which should be declared void.

The lower court and Intermediate Appellate Court ruled in favor of CAA, hence, this present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the administrator of CAA had the statutory authority, without the approval of the then
secretary of the PWC, to enter into or cancel a lease contract over a real property owned by the RP.

HELD:

Yes, the Supreme Court upheld CAA’s authority to enter into and cancel a contract of lease over a
property owned by the RP without the approval of the secretary of the PWC.

Under 567 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC), such contract of lease must be executed: (1) by the
President of the Philippines, or (2) by an officer duly designated by him or (3) by an officer expressly
vested by law. It is readily apparent that in the case at bar, the CAA has the authority to enter into
Contracts of Lease for the government under the third category.

As provided in Section 32 of Republic Act 776, the Administrator (Director) of the CAA by reason of its
creation and existence, administers properties belonging to the Republic of the Philippines and it is on
these properties that the Administrator must exercise his vast power and discharge his duty to enter
into, make and execute contract of any kind with any person, firm, or public or private corporation or
entity and to acquire, hold, purchase, or lease any personal or real property, right of ways and
easements which may be proper or necessary.

The basic principle of statutory construction mandates that general legislation must give way tospecial
legislation on the same subject, and generally be so interpreted as to embrace only casesin which the
special provisions are not applicable, that specific statute prevails over a general statute and that where
two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefore
specially should prevail.

Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs. Hernandez, 143 SCRA 602

Facts: A case was filed against the MWSS before an arbitration branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) on charges of failure to pay wage differentials, allowances and other monetary
benefits to its contractual employees numbering 2,500 or so. MWSS asserted:

it is a government-owned and controlled corporation (GOCC), and therefore the NLRC has no jurisdiction
over the case

assuming the contrary arguendo, “the terms and conditions of the complainants who are all contractual
employees are governed by their respective contracts”

Hernandez, the Labor Arbiter, ruled against MWSS, observing that:

If the complainants were regular employees, the NLRC would have no jurisdiction; but since the
complainants were non-regular or contractual employees, the NLRC has jurisdiction.

The Civil Service Decree applies to employees in government corporations in all matters except
“monetary claims,” which is governed by the Labor Code.

MWSS filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition at the Supreme Court to invalidate the decision of
the Labor Arbiter.

Issue: Are contractual employees of the MWSS covered by the Labor Code or by laws and regulations
governing the civil service?

Ruling: The decision and order of the Labor Arbiter, having been rendered without jurisdiction, are
declared void and set aside.

National Housing Corporation vs. Juco: employees of the GOCCs are governed by civil service law, rules
and regulations; the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over them.

It is uncontested that MWSS is a GOCC; therefore, employment in the MWSS is governed by the civil
service law, rules and regulations; and controversies arising from or connected with that employment
are not cognizable by the NLRC.

There is no legal or logical justification for the distinction made by the Labor Arbiter between regular and
non-regular employees of the MWSS in order to justify its jurisdiction. Positions in the civil service are
classified into career and non-career service, the latter of which includes contractual personnel.

Montecillo vs. Civil Service Commission

FACTS:

Petitioners assail the validity of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 22, Series of 1991, on the ground that its
issuance amounted to an abuse of respondents power to promulgate rules and regulations pursuant to
the Civil Service Law. Employee positions in the Metropolitan Cebu Water District (MCWD) were re-
classified during the latter part of 1995 to conform with position descriptions and corresponding salary
grades in the civil service. Accordingly, while the personnel structure of the MCWD was being modified,
three of its employees -- petitioners Asela B. Montecillo, Marilou Joan V. Ortega and Charrishe Dosdos --
applied for promotional appointment to the position of Secretary to the Assistant General Manager or
Private Secretary C, as the position later came to be known. At the time of their application, petitioners
had been occupying the position of Department Secretary and were employed in the MCWD for six to
seven years. When their appointments were forwarded to the Civil Service Commission Field Office (CSC
FO) by MCWD General Manager Dulce Abanilla, the CSC FO refused to approve petitioners appointments
as permanent on the ground that the position applied for was a primarily confidential and co-terminous
position. This ruling was upheld by the CSC Regional Office and affirmed on appeal by respondent.
ISSUE:

WON CSC abused its rule-making power

HELD:

AFFIRMED. Respondent was expressly empowered to declare positions in the Civil Service as may
properly be classified as primarily confidential under Section 12, Chapter 3, Book V of the Administrative
Code of 1987. To our mind, this signifies that the enumeration found in Section 6, Article IV of the Civil
Service Decree, which defines the non-career service, is not an exclusive list. Respondent could
supplement the enumeration, as it did when it issued Memorandum Circular No. 22, s. of 1991, by
specifying positions in the civil service, which are considered primarily confidential and therefore their
occupants are co-terminous with the official they serve. The assailed memorandum circular can not be
deemed as an unauthorized amendment of the law. On the contrary, it was issued pursuant to a power
expressly vested by law upon respondent. As such, it must be respected by this Court as a valid issuance
of a constitutionally independent body.

SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF SAN ANDRES v CA

FACTS:

Antonio, priate respondent, was elected barangay captain of Sapang Palay Catanduanes on March 1989.
He was later elected president of the Association of Barangay Council(ABC) for the Municiplity of San
Andres Catanduanes. Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1983, he was appointed by the
President as Member of the Sanguniang Bayan of the sid municipality. Meanwhile, DILG Sec. declared
the election for the president of the Federation of the Association of Barangay Council(FABC) void for
lack of quorum. As a result, the provincial council was reorganized. DILG Sec then designated private
respondent as a temporary member of the Sanguniang Panlalawigan of Catanduanes effective on 15
June 1990. Because of his designation, private respondent tendered his resignation as a member of the
Sanguniang Bayan dated 14 June 1990 to the Mayor of San Andres Catanduanes. Copies of his letters
were also forwarded to the provincial governor, DILG and the municipal treasurer. Subsequently, Aquino
then the Vice President of ABC was appointed by the provincial governor as member of the Sanguniang
Bayan in place of private respondent. Aquino assumed office on 18 July 1980 after taking his oath.
Subsequently, the ruling of the DILG annulling the election of the FABC president was reversed by the
Supreme Court and declared the appointment of private respondent void for lacking the essential
qualification of being the president of FABC. On 31 March 1992, private respondent wrote to the
Sanguniang Bayan(SB) of San Andres regarding his re-assumption of his original position. SB refused.

ISSUES:
1. Whether Antonio’s resignation was complete. 2. W/N respondent abandoned his membership in the
SB.

HELD:

1. The resignation was not complete for lack of acceptance thereof of the proper authority however, an
office may still be deemed relinquished through voluntary abandonment which needs no acceptance. In
Ortiz vs Comelec, resignation is defined as the “act of giving up of an ifficer by which he declines his
office andrenounces the further right to use it”. It can be express or implied. To constitute a complete
and operative resignation the folloving must be present. (1) an intention to relinquish a part of the term;
(b) an act of relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by the proper authority. In the case at bar, there was
no evidence that the private respondent’s resignation was accepted by the proper authority. Although
the Local Government Code of 1983 was silent as to who specifically should accept the resignation it
provides that the position shall be deemed vacated only upon acceptance of resignation and should be
acted upon by the Sangunian concerned. The resignation letter was tendered to the mayor and copies
were sent to the governor, DILG and the municipal treasurer but none of them expressly acted on it.
Furthermore, under established jurisprudence, resignations, in the absence of statutory provisions as to
whom it should be submitted, should be submitted to the appointing power. Therefore, the resignation
should have been submitted to the president or to the DILG as the president’s alter ego.

2. Tackling the second issue, abandonment has been defined as the voluntary relinquishment of an office
by the holder, with the intention of terminating his possession and contro thereof. It is a species of
resignation. While resignation is the formal relinquishment, abandonment is the voluntary
relinquishment by non-user. There are 2 essential elements of abandonment : (1) an intention to
abandon and (2) an overt act by which intention is carried on. In the case at bar, the first element was
manifested on the following instances: (1) private respondent’s failure to perform his function as SB; (2)
his failure to collect the corresponding renumeration for the position, (3)his failure to object to the
appointment of Aquino as his replacement to SB and (4) his prolonged failure to initiate any act to
reassume his post in the SB after SC had nullified his designation as member of Sanguniang
Panlalawigan. The second element was demonstrated by the following: (1) his letter of resignation, (2)
his assumption of office as member of the Sanguniang Panlalawigan, (3) his faithful discharge of his
duties and functions of SP and (4) his recept of renumeration for such post.