CALINAWAN, JOHN LEVI P. ATTY.

RANALAN

JD-1 June 30, 2018

AGRARIAN LAW EXAM

I.

A. The contention of SCR Agri- Business is not tenable. The expropriated property is for public
purpose. There has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of “public purpose” or
“public use”. For which the power of eminent domain may be exercised the old concept was that the
condemned property must actually be used by the general public before the taking thereof could satisfy
the constitutional requirement of “public use”. Under the new concept, public use means public
advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends to contribute to the general welfare and prosperity of
the whole community, like a resort complex for tourist or housing project (Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154
SCRA 461 1987)

B. Yes, the Department of Agrarian Reform- Province of Surigao del Norte cannot legally require
the city government of Surigao to first secure a conversion clearance before converting the use of the
land from agricultural to housing since after the passage of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, agricultural lands, though reclassified, have to go through the
process of conversion, jurisdiction over which is vested in the DAR. The Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) is mandated to approve or disapprove applications for conversion, restructuring or
readjustment of agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses, pursuant to Section 4(i) of Executive Order
No. 129-A, Series of 1987.Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988, likewise empowers the DAR to authorize under certain conditions, the
reclassification or conversion of agricultural lands. It being settled that jurisdiction over conversion of
land is vested in the DAR, the complaint for injunction was correctly dismissed by the trial and appellate
courts under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the
courts from resolving a controversy over which jurisdiction has initially been lodged with an
administrative body of special competence. For agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR); more specifically, in the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB)

II.

Tawa-tawa Development Corporation cannot object to DAR-Surigao del Norte by imputing grave
abuse of discretion for including the undeveloped portion of its landholding within the coverage of CARP
since as provided in EO 407(1990) amended by EO 448(1991),Sec. 1-A which states that All lands or
portions thereof reserved by virtue of Presidential proclamations for specific public uses by the
government, its agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations
suitable for agriculture and no longer actually, directly and exclusively used or necessary for the
purposes for which they have been reserved, as determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform in
coordination with the government agency or instrumentality concerned in whose favor the reservation
was established, shall be segregated from the reservation and transferred to the Department of
Agrarian Reform for distribution to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program."

Hence, the underdeveloped portion of the property which is estimated at 105 hectares shall be
covered by DAR.

III

If I am the legal counsel of Mr. Padillo, I will advise him that under R.A. 6657, commercial land is
not covered by CARP. As provided in the case of Luz Farms vs. DAR, the court held that lands devoted to
the raising of livestock, poultry and swine have been classified as industrial, not agricultural, and thus
exempt from the agrarian reform. The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the
framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the
constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the Government. It is evident from the foregoing
discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial
livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that
the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the
State. There is simply no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian
reform.

IV

Agricultural tenancy relationship is defined under RA 1199 that the parties are the landholder
and the tenant; that the object of the relationship is an agricultural land; there is consent freely given
either orally or in writing, express or implied; the purpose of the relationship is agricultural production;
there is personal cultivation; there is consideration given to the lessor either in a form of share of
the harvest or payment of fixed amount in money or produce to or both. In the provided case, there is
an existing agricultural tenancy relationship between Goofy and Ducky. Thus, he must not be illegally
ejected.

A. If I were the counsel of YY, I will advise him to invoke the provision of R.A. No. 3844. Under R.A. No.
3844. A Leasehold Relationship is established either by agreement of the parties (between the lessor
and lessee) which may be entered into either orally or in writing, expressly or impliedly or by operation
of law. An Agricultural lessor means a person, natural or juridical, who either as owner, civil law lessee,
usufructuary, or legal possessor, lets or grants to another the cultivation and use of his land for a price
certain. Cultivation is another important factor in determining the existence of tenancy relationships.
The agricultural leasehold relation once established shall confer upon the agricultural lessee the right to
continue working on the landholding until such leasehold relation is extinguished. The agricultural lessee
shall be entitled to security of tenure on his landholding and cannot be ejected therefrom unless
authorized by the Court for causes herein provided. In the case of XX and YY came into a contract that
YY shall strengthen the paddies, check if the property is irrigated, take out weeds, spray of insecticides
and to hire other workers to fertilize the land and perform other farm related task, where it considered
in the ambit of the term of Agricultural Lessor. Considering that YY was an Agricultural Lessor of XX he is
entitled to security of tenure on his landholding and cannot be ejected therefrom unless authorized by
the Court for causes herein provided.

B. If I were the counsel of XXX I will advise him and enlighten him on the provision of R.A. No. 3844.
Under the said provision, once a Leasehold Relationship is established either by agreement of the
parties (between the lessor and lessee) which may be entered into either orally or in writing, expressly
or impliedly or by operation of law the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to security of tenure on his
landholding and cannot be ejected therefrom unless authorized by the Court for causes herein provided.
In the case it is clear that a contract was entered into by both parties where the stipulation was in the
ambit of Agricultural Leasehold. Hence YY cannot be ejected.

VI.

A. If I am the Lawyer, the best remedy that I can suggest to my client is to file a petition for mandamus
seeking to compel respondent GSIS to accept Land Bank bonds at their face value as payment for a pre-
existing obligation with GSIS. (Maddumba vs. GSIS, 182 SCRA 281).

B. Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that “if landowners are called to sacrifice in the interest of land reform,
their acceptance of Land Bank bonds in payment of their agricultural lands, government lending
institutions should share in the sacrifice by accepting the same Land Bank bonds at their face value
(Ramirez vs. CA, 194 SCRA 81) Section 85 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 251 effective July 21, 1973, the GSIS may be compelled to accept Land Bank bonds. It is not disputed
that under the above quoted provisions, a government-owned or controlled corporation, like the GSIS, is
compelled to accept Land Bank bonds as payment for the purchase of its assets. As a matter of fact, the
bidder who offers to pay in bonds of the Land Bank is entitled to preference. What respondent GSIS is
resisting, however, is its being compelled to accept said bonds at their face value. Respondent, in
support of its stance that it can discount the bonds, avers that "(a) PD 251 has amended Section 85 of
RA 3844 by deleting and eliminating the original provision that Land Bank bonds shall be accepted 'in
the amount of their face value'; and (b) to accept the said bonds at their face value will impair the
actuarial solvency of the GSIS and thoroughly prejudice its capacity to pay death, retirement, insurance,
dividends and other benefits and claims to its more than a million members, the majority of whom are
low salaried government employees and workers." Provisions of Section 85 are primarily designed to
cushion the impact of dispossession. Not only would there be inconvenience resulting from
dispossession itself, but also from the modes of payment in financing the acquisition of farm lots.
Acceptance of Land Bank bonds, instead of money, undoubtedly involves a certain degree of sacrifice for
the landowner. This, of course, is in addition to the fact that, in case of expropriation of land covered by
land reform, the landowner will seldom get the compensation he desires. Thus, discounting the Land
Banks bonds, and thereby reducing their effective value, entails and imposes an additional burden on his
part. It is, in fact, in consideration of this sacrifice that we extended the rule on liberality in the
interpretation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3844, then known as the Agricultural Land Reform
Code, in favor not only of the actual tillers but the landowners as well. Ita semper fiat relatio ut valeat
dispositio. The interpretation must always be such that the disposition may prevail.