EN BANC
Mystery
[G.R. No. 9726. December 8, 1914. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CARSON TAYLOR, Defendant-
Appellant.
C. W O’Brien, for Appellant.
Solicitor-General Corpus, for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. LIBEL AND SLANDER; PUBLICATION; EDITOR, AUTHOR, PROPRIETOR,
MANAGER. — Section 6 of the Libel Law (Act No. 277) provides a
punishment only for the "author, editor, or proprietor," for the publication
of a libel in a newspaper. In the present case no person was represented to
be either the "author, the editor, or the proprietor" of the newspaper in
which the alleged libel was published. The proof shows that the defendant
was the "manager." There was not a word of proof showing that as
"manager" he was the author of the article published or the editor or the
proprietor of the newspaper. The "manager" of a newspaper may be the
author of the articles published or the editor or the publisher of the
newspaper. His exact relation to the newspaper or publication is a matter of
proof. He can not avoid responsibility as the "author, editor, or proprietor"
by using some other term or word, when, as a matter of fact, he is the
"author, editor, or proprietor." The "author, editor, or proprietor" of a
newspaper or publication can not avoid responsibility by simply calling
himself the "manager" or "printer." He can not wear the toga of "author,
editor, or proprietor" and hide his responsibility by giving himself some
other name. While the terms "author, editor, and proprietor" of a
newspaper are terms well defined, the particular words "author, editor, or
proprietor" are not material or important, further than they are words
which are intended to show the relation of the responsible party to the
publication. That relation may as well exist under some other name or
denomination.
DECISION
JOHNSON, J. :
This was an action for criminal libel.
The complaint alleged:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on the 25th day of September, 1913, the said Carson Taylor, being
then and there the acting editor and proprietor, manager, printer, and
publisher in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, of a certain daily bilingual
newspaper, edited in the English and Spanish languages, and known as the
’Manila Daily Bulletin,’ a paper of large circulation throughout the Philippine
Islands, as well as in the United States and other countries in all of which
both languages are spoken and written, having as such the supervision and
control of said newspaper, did then and there willfully, feloniously,
maliciously, and with intent to impeach the honesty, virtue, and reputation
of one Ramon Sotelo as member of the bar of the Philippine Islands and as a
private individual, and to expose him to public hatred, contempt and
ridicule, compose, print, edit, publish, and circulate and procure to be
composed, printed, edited, published, and circulated in said newspaper’s
issue of the above mentioned date, September 25, 1913, a certain false and
malicious defamation and libel in the English language of and concerning
the said Ramon Sotelo, which reads as follows. :jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"‘OWNERS FIRED BUILDING TO COLLECT INSURANCE. — CRIMINAL
CHARGES FOLLOW CIVIL SUIT.
"‘Conspiracy divulged in three sworn statements made by members of the
party after a family disagreement. Sensational statement sworn to.
of Calle O’Donnell fire solved and papers served.
"‘Conspiracy to defraud the insurance company.
"‘The building was fired to collect the amount of insurance.
"‘The movable furniture of value was removed before the fire.
"‘The full amount of the insurance was collected, and the conspiracy was a
success.
"‘The above is the gist of the sworn statements of Vicente Sotelo and
Eugenio Martin in connection with the fire that destroyed house No. 2157
Calle O’Donnell on April 4.
"‘The case in question is a sensational one to say .he least, and the court is
being petitioned to set aside the ruling and cite the parties to show cause
why they should not be cited to answer charges of conspiracy to defraud.
"‘On April 4, 1913, the house located at 2157 Calle O’Donnell was destroyed
by fire. The house was insured for P5,000, the contents for an additional
P5,000, with the West of Scotland Insurance Association, of which Lutz &
Co. are the local agents, with an additional P1,500 with Smith, Bell & Co.
"‘The full amount of the insurance on the property was paid by the agents of
the insurance companies and the matter apparently dropped from the
records.
"‘Then there was internal trouble and information began to leak out which
resulted in sensational statements to the effect that the destruction of the
property had been an act of incendiarism in order to collect the insurance.
Then there was an investigation started and it resulted in sworn statements
of the three persons above mentioned.
"‘Notarial returns were made yesterday by the sheriff, based on the sworn
statements and the parties are cited to appear in court and show cause.
"‘The investigation also showed that the furniture, which was supposed to
be in the house at the time of the conflagration and which was paid for by
the insurance agents, sworn statements having been made that it was
destroyed in the fire, was in a certain house in Montalban, where it was
identified upon the sworn statements of the above mentioned. Implicated
in the charges of conspiracy and fraud is the name of the attorney for the
plaintiff who made affidavit as to the burning of the house and against
whom criminal proceedings will be brought as well as against the original
owners.
"‘Attorney Burke, who represents Lutz & Co. in the proceedings, was seen
last night and asked for a statement as to the case. Mr. Burke refused to talk
on the case and stated that when it came to trial it would be time enough to
obtain the facts.
"‘The present action came before the court on a motion of Attorney Burke
to set aside the judgment, which, in the original case, gave the owners of
the property judgment for the amount of the insurance.
"‘Attorney Burke filed the sworn statements with the court and the notarial
returns to the same were made yesterday afternoon, the sworn statements
as to the burning of the house being in the hands of the sheriff.
"‘It was stated yesterday that a criminal action would follow the civil
proceedings instituted to recover the funds in the case entitled on the court
records, Maria Mortera de Eceiza and Manuel Eceiza versus the west of
Scotland Association, Limited, No. 10191 on the court records.
"‘It might be stated also that Eugenio Martin was one of the plaintiffs in the
recent suit brought against Ex Governor W. Cameron Forbes for lumber
supplied for his Boston home.’

"That in this article is contained the following paragraph. to wit:
"‘ . . .Implicated in the charges of conspiracy and fraud is the name of the
attorney for the plaintiff who made affidavit as to the burning of the house
and against whom criminal proceedings will be brought as well as against
the original owners,’ by which the said accused meant to refer and did refer
to the said Ramon Sotelo, who then and there was the attorney for the
plaintiff in the case aforesaid, No. 10191 of the Court of First Instance of the
city of Manila, and so was understood by the public who read the same; that
the statements and allegations made in said paragraph are wholly false and
untrue, thus impeaching the honesty, virtue and reputation of the said
offended party as a member of the bar of the Philippine Islands and as a
private individual, and exposing him to public hatred, contempt and ridicule.
Contrary to law."cralaw virtua1aw library
Upon said complaint the defendant was arrested, arraigned, plead not
guilty, was tried, found guilty of the crime charged, and sentenced by the
Honorable George N. Hurd, judge, to pay a fine of P200. From that sentence
the defendant appealed to this court and made the following assignment of
error:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"First. The court erred in finding that the defendant was responsible for and
guilty of the alleged libel.
"Second. The court erred in finding that the defendant was the proprietor
and publisher of the ’Manila Daily Bulletin.’
"Third. The court erred in finding that the alleged libelous article was
libelous per se.
"Fourth. The court erred in holding that the article was libelous, while
finding that there was no malice.
"Fifth. The court erred in finding that the alleged libelous article referred to
attorney Ramon Sotelo.
"Sixth. The court erred in finding that Ramon Sotelo was attorney for the
plaintiffs in case No. 10191, when the alleged libel was published."cralaw
virtua1aw library
After a careful examination of the record and the arguments presented by
the appellant, we deem it necessary to discuss only the first and second
assignments of error.
In the Philippine Islands there exist no crimes such as are known in the
United States and England as common law crimes. No act constitutes a
crime here unless it is made so by law. Libel is made a crime here by Act No.
277 of the United States Philippine Commission. Said Act (No. 277) not only
defines the crime of libel and prescribes the particular conditions necessary
to constitute it, but it also names the persons who may be guilty of such
crime. In the present case the complaint alleges that the defendant was, at
the time of the publication of said alleged article "the acting editor,
proprietor, manager, printer, publisher, etc. etc. of a certain bilingual
newspaper, etc., known as the ’Manila Daily Bulletin,’ a paper of large
circulation throughout the Philippine Islands, as well as in the United States
and other countries."cralaw virtua1aw library
It will be noted that the complaint charges the defendant as "the acting
editor, proprietor, manager, printer, and publisher." From an examination of
said Act No. 277, we find that section 6 provides that: "Every author, editor,
or proprietor of any book, newspaper, or serial publication is chargeable
with the publication of any words contained in any part of said book or
number of each newspaper or serial as fully as if he were the author of the
same."cralaw virtua1aw library
By an examination of said article, with reference to the persons who may be
liable for the publication of a libel in a newspaper, we find that it only
provides for the punishment of "the author, editor, or proprietor." It would
follow, therefore, that unless the proof shows that the defendant in the
present case is the "author, editor, or proprietor" of the newspaper in which
the libel was published, he can not be held liable.
In the present case the Solicitor-General in his brief said that — "No person
is represented to be either the ’author, editor, or proprietor.’" That
statement of the Solicitor-General is fully sustained by the record. There is
not a word of proof in the record showing that the defendant was either the
"author, the editor, or the proprietor." The proof shows that the defendant
was the "manager." He must, therefore, be acquitted of the crime charged
against him, unless it is shown by the proof that he, as "manager" of the
newspaper, was in some way directly responsible for the writing, editing, or
publishing of the matter contained in said alleged libelous article. The
prosecution presented the newspaper, the "Manila Daily Bulletin," for the
purpose of showing the relation which the defendant had to it. That was the
only proof presented by the prosecution to show the relation which the
defendant had to the publication of the libel in question. From an
examination of the editorial page of said exhibit, we find that it shows that
the "Manila Daily Bulletin" is owned by the "Bulletin Publishing Company,"
and that the defendant was its manager. There is not a word of proof in the
record which shows what relation the manager had to the publication of
said newspaper. We might, by a series of presumptions and assumptions,
conclude that the manager of a newspaper has some direct responsibility
with its publication. We believe, however, that such presumptions and
assumptions, in the absence of a single letter of proof relating thereto,
would be unwarranted and unjustified. The prosecuting attorney had an
opportunity to present proof upon that question. Either because he had no
proof or because no such proof was obtainable, he presented none. It
certainly is not a difficult matter to ascertain who is the real person
responsible for the publication of a newspaper which is published daily and
has a wide circulation in a particular community. No question was asked the
defendant concerning his particular relation to the publication of the
newspaper in question. We do not desire to be understood in our
conclusions here as holding that the "manager" or the "printer" may not,
under certain conditions and proper proof, be held to be the "author,
editor, or proprietor" of a newspaper. He may denominate himself as
"manager" or "printer" simply, and be at the same time the "author, editor,
or proprietor" of the newspaper. He can not avoid responsibility by using
some other term or word, indicating his relation to the newspaper or the
publication, when, as a matter of fact, he is the "author, the editor, or the
proprietor" of the same. His real relation to the said publication is a matter
of proof. The Solicitor-General, in his brief, says that the defendant used the
word "manager" with the hope of evading legal responsibility, as the Libel
Law places the responsibility for publishing a libel, on "every author, editor,
or proprietor of any book, etc." Had the prosecuting attorney in the trial of
the cause believed that the defendant, even though he called himself the
"manager" was, in fact, the "author, editor, or proprietor" of said
publication, he should have presented some proof supporting that
contention. Neither do we desire to be understood as holding that simply
because a person connected with the publication of a newspaper who calls
himself the "manager" or "printer" may not, in fact and at the same time, be
the "author, editor, or proprietor." The "author, editor, or proprietor" can
not avoid responsibility for the writing and publication of a libelous article,
by simply calling himself the "manager" or the "printer" of a newspaper.
That, however, is a question of proof. The burden is upon the prosecution to
show that the defendant is, by whatever name he may call himself, in truth
and in fact, the "author, editor, or proprietor" of a newspaper. The courts
cannot assume, in the absence of proof, that one who called himself
"manager" was in fact the "author, editor, or proprietor." We might assume,
perhaps, that the ’’manager" of a newspaper plays an important part in the
publication of the same by virtue of the general signification of the word
"manager." Men can not, however, be sentenced upon the basis of a mere
assumption. There must be some proof. The word "manage" has been
defined by Webster to mean "to have under control and direction; to
conduct; to guide; to administer; to treat; to handle." Webster defines
"manager" to be "one who manages; a conductor or director; as, the
manager of a theater." A manager, as that word is generally understood, we
do not believe includes the idea of ownership. Generally speaking it means
one who is representing another as an agent. That being true, his powers
and duties and obligations are generally defined by contract. He may have
expressed as well as implied powers, but whatever his powers and duties
are they must be dependent upon the nature of the business and the terms
of his contract. There is no fixed rule which indicates particularly and
definitely his duties, powers and obligations. An examination into the
character of the business and the contract of his employment must be made
for the purpose of ascertaining definitely what his duties and obligations
are. His exact relation is always a matter of proof. It is incumbent upon the
prosecution in a case like the present, to show that whatever title, name or
designation the defendant may bear, he was, in fact, the "author, the editor,
or the proprietor" of the newspaper. If he was in fact the "author, editor, or
proprietor," he can not escape responsibility by calling himself the
"manager" or "printer." It is the relation which he bears to the publication
and not the name or title which he has assumed, which is important in an
investigation. He can not wear the toga of author or editor and hide his
responsibility by giving himself some other name. While the terms "author,
editor, and proprietor" of a newspaper are terms well defined, the
particular words "author, editor, or proprietor" are not material or
important, further than that they are words which are intended to show the
relation of the responsible party to the publication. That relation may as
well exist under some other name or denomination.

For the foregoing reasons. therefore, there being no proof whatever in the
record showing that the defendant was the "author, the editor, or the
proprietor" of the newspaper in question, the sentence of the lower court
must be reversed, the complaint dismissed and the defendant discharged
from the custody of the law, with costs de officio. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Moreland, Trent and Araullo, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines facto law. Its retroactive application is prohibited by articles 21 and 22 of
SUPREME COURT the Revised Penal Code and section 12, Article IV of the Constitution.
Manila
The city court has original jurisdiction over the case because the
SECOND DIVISION penultimate paragraph or section 87 of the Judiciary Law, as amended by
Republic Acts Nos. 2613 and 3828, provides that "judges of city courts shall
G.R. No. L-46228 January 17, 1978 have like jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try parties charged
with an offense committed within their respective jurisdictions, in which the
penalty provided by law does not exceed prision correccional or
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not exceeding six thousand
vs. pesos or both."
HON. ROLANDO R. VILLARAZA (as City Judge of Cagayan de Oro City), and
CAESAR PUERTO, respondents.
As section 87 itself shows, that jurisdiction is concurrent with the court of
First Instance which is empowered to try "all criminal cases in which the
Francisco P. Rabanes, Edgardo Y. Raagas, Casiano A. Gamotin, Jr., Office of penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine
the City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City for petitioner. of more than two hundred pesos" (Sec. 44[f], Judiciary Law. See People vs.
Nazareno, L-40037, April 30, 1976, 70 SCRA 531).
Eric Menchavez for respondent Caesar Puerto.
It was not necessary for the city court to have conducted the preliminary
AQUINO, J.: investigation of the case. The filing of the information by the fiscal
presupposes that he had conducted the requisite preliminary investigation
This case is about the jurisdiction of a city court in estafa cases. pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Republic Act No. 5180, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 77.

On December 3, 1975 an assistant city fiscal charged Caesar Puerto with

estafa in the city court of Cagayan de Oro City for having issued on October WHEREFORE, the order of the Court of First Instance, returning the case to
16, 1974 two bouncing checks for the total sum of P4, 966. 63 (Criminal the city court, is affirmed and the two orders of the respondent city judge,
Case No. 32140). elevating the case to the Court of First Instance, are set aside. The city court
is directed to try the case. No costs.

City Judge Rolando R. Villaraza in his order March 31, 1976 noted that the
accused had waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. He SO ORDERED.
directed that the case be elevated, for trial, to the court of First Instance or
the Circuit Criminal Court. Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio and Concepcion Jr., JJ., concur.

Upon petition of the prosecution, the Court of first Instance of Misamis

Oriental, Cagayan de Oro Branch VIII, in its order of February 3, 1977
returned the case to the city court because in its opinion the case falls
within the concurrent jurisdiction of the two courts and, the city court, as
the first court which took cognizance of the case, should try it.

Disagreeing with the Court of First Instance, respondent city judge in his
order of April 21, 1977 directed the re-elevation of the case. His view is that
the case falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance because estafa committed by the accused is punishable by prision
mayor medium under Presidential Decree No. 818 which took effect on
October 22, 1975 and which amended article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code.

That order of respondent judge is assailed in the petition for certiorari filed
in this Court on May 27, 1977 by the office of the city fiscal of Cagayan de
Oro City.

We hold that the case was properly filed with the city court which has
original jurisdiction over it. The estafa imputed to Caesar Puerto is
punishable under article 315 of the Revised Penal Code by arresto
mayor maximum to prision correccional minimum or four months and one
day to two years and four months.

The penalty of prision mayor medium, or eight years and one day to ten
years, imposed by Presidential Decree No. 818, applies only to swindling by
means of issuing bouncing checks which was committed or after October
22, 1975.

That increased penalty does not apply to the estafa committed by Puerto on
October 16, 1974. To apply it to Puerto would make the decree an ex post
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-32485 October 22, 1970
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF THE
PETITIONER'S RIGHTS AND DUTIES UNDER SEC. 8 OF R.A. No. 6132.
KAY VILLEGAS KAMI, INC., petitioner.
MAKASIAR, J.:.
This petition for declaratory relief was filed by Kay Villegas Kami, Inc.,
claiming to be a duly recognized and existing non-stock and non-profit
corporation created under the laws of the land, and praying for a
determination of the validity of Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6132 and a declaration of
petitioner's rights and duties thereunder. In paragraph 7 of its petition,
petitioner avers that it has printed materials designed to propagate its
ideology and program of government, which materials include Annex B; and
that in paragraph 11 of said petition, petitioner intends to pursue its
purposes by supporting delegates to the Constitutional Convention who will
propagate its ideology.
Petitioner, in paragraph 7 of its petition, actually impugns because it
quoted, only the first paragraph of Sec. 8(a) on the ground that it violates
the due process clause, right of association, and freedom of expression and
that it is an ex post facto law.
The first three grounds were overruled by this Court when it held that the
questioned provision is a valid limitation on the due process, freedom of
expression, freedom of association, freedom of assembly and equal
protection clauses; for the same is designed to prevent the clear and
present danger of the twin substantive evils, namely, the prostitution of
electoral process and denial of the equal protection of the laws. Moreover,
under the balancing-of-interests test, the cleansing of the electoral process,
the guarantee of equal change for all candidates, and the independence of
the delegates who must be "beholden to no one but to God, country and
conscience," are interests that should be accorded primacy.1
The petitioner should therefore be accordingly guided by the
pronouncements in the cases of Imbong and Gonzales.2
The claim of petitioner that the challenged provision constitutes an ex post
facto law is likewise untenable.
An ex post facto law is one which:.
(1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of
the law and which was innocent when done, and
punishes such an act;
(2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was,
when committed;
(3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when
committed;
(4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes
conviction upon less or different testimony than the
law required at the time of the commission of the
offense;
(5) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only,
in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for
something which when done was lawful; and
(6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some
lawful protection to which he has become entitled,
such as the protection of a former conviction or
acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.3
From the aforesaid definition as well as classification of ex post facto laws,
the constitutional inhibition refers only to criminal laws which are given
retroactive effect.4
While it is true that Sec. 18 penalizes a violation of any provision of R.A. No.
6132 including Sec. 8(a) thereof, the penalty is imposed only for acts
committed after the approval of the law and not those perpetrated prior
thereto. There is nothing in the law that remotely insinuates that Secs. 8(a)
and 18, or any other provision thereof, shall apply to acts carried out prior
to its approval. On the contrary, See. 23 directs that the entire law shall be
effective upon its approval. It was approved on August 24, 1970.
WHEREFORE, the prayer of the petition is hereby denied and paragraph 1 of
Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is not unconstitutional. Without costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Dizon, Makalintal and Castro, JJ., concur.
Zaldivar, J., reserves his vote.
Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., concurring and dissenting:
Concurs and dissents in accordance with his separate opinion in Imbong v.
Comelec, L-32432 and Gonzales v. Comelec, L-32443.
BARREDO, J., dissenting:
Reiterates his views in Gonzales and Imbong insofar as they are relevant to
the issues in this case, dissents, even as agrees that Republic Act 6132 is not
ex post facto.
VILLAMOR, J., concurring:
Concurs in the sense that the law is declared not ex post facto law and
dissents as to the rest.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
The Court's decision reaffirms its split-vote ruling last September 11, 1970
in Imbong vs. Ferrer and Gonzales vs. Comelec1 upholding the
constitutionality of the first paragraph of section 8(a) of Republic Act 6132.
Inasmuch as I was unable to participate in the said cases, 2 I have expressed
my contrary view in my separate dissenting opinion in Badoy, Jr. vs.
Ferrer 3 that the challenged provision, together with the Act's other
restrictions and strictures enumerated therein, "oppressively and
unreasonably straitjacket the candidates as well as the electorate and
gravely violate the constitutional guaranties of freedom of expression,
freedom of the press and freedom of association, and, deny due process
and the equal protection of the laws."

I therefore dissent from the Court's decision at bar for the same reason and
considerations stated in my separate dissenting opinion in the case
of Badoy.

I only wish to add a few words on the statements in the main opinion
in Imbong-Gonzales that "(W)hile it may be true that a party's support of a
candidate is not wrong per se, it is equally true that Congress in the exercise
of the broad law-making authority can declare certain acts as mala
prohibita when justified by the exigencies of the times. One such act is the
party or organization support prescribed in Sec. 8(a), which ban is a valid
limitation on the freedom of association as well as expression, for the
reasons aforestated. Senator Tolentino emphasized that 'equality of
chances may be better attained by banning all organization support.' "

I trust that said statements were not intended, and should not be
construed, as endorsing the contention of Senator Tolentino, the Act's
sponsor, that "(T)he protection of the Constitution cannot be invoked for
the right of association when the purpose is a malum prohibitum because
such purpose would be "contrary to law" " and "(O)nce the ban (on party
and organization support) is approved into law, the freedom of association
cannot be invoked against it" since the Constitution decrees only that "(T)he
right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall
not be abridged."4

Such a concept of malum prohibitum vis-a-vis the Constitutional guarantee

of freedom of association which has its root in the Malolos Constitution
would render sterile and meaningless the Constitutional safeguard, should
Congress be conceded, in the exercise of its broad law-making authority, the
power to strike down at any time associations and societies by the simple
expedient of declaring their purposes or certain activities, not wrong per
se as "contrary to law" or mala prohibita. I believe that such a concept begs
the question. Obviously, the word "law" in the qualifying clause "for
purposes not contrary to law" does not mean that an enactment of the
legislature forecloses the question with finality and sounds the death-knell.
Laws that would regulate the purposes for which associations and societies
may be formed or would declare their purposes mala prohibita must pass
the usual constitutional test of reasonableness and furthermore, must not
abridge freedom of speech and press.5
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 125359 September 4, 2001
ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO and HECTOR T. RIVERA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. GUILLERMO L. LOJA, SR., PRESIDING JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 26, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Assailed in this petition is the consolidated decision rendered on May 23,
1996, by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35928 and CA-G.R. SP No.
35719. CA-G.R. SP No. 35928 had affirmed the order dated September 6,
1994, of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 26, insofar as it denied
petitioners’ respective Motions to Quash the Informations in twenty-five
(25) criminal cases for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960. Therein
included were informations involving: (a) consolidated Criminal Cases Nos.
91-101879 to 91-101883 filed against Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, Roberto S.
Benedicto, and Hector T. Rivera; (b) consolidated Criminal Cases Nos. 91-
101884 to 91-101892 filed against Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto; and (c)
Criminal Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969 also against Mrs. Marcos and
Benedicto. Note, however, that the Court of Appeals already dismissed
Criminal Case No. 91-101884.
The factual antecedents of the instant petition are as follows:
On December 27, 1991, Mrs. Imelda Marcos and Messrs. Benedicto and
Rivera were indicted for violation of Section 10 of Circular No. 9601 relation
to Section 342 of the Central Bank Act (Republic Act No. 265, as amended) in
five Informations filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883, the charge sheets alleged that
the trio failed to submit reports of their foreign exchange earnings from
abroad and/or failed to register with the Foreign Exchange Department of
the Central Bank within the period mandated by Circular No. 960. Said
Circular prohibited natural and juridical persons from maintaining foreign
exchange accounts abroad without prior authorization from the Central
Bank.3 It also required all residents of the Philippines who habitually earned
or received foreign currencies from invisibles, either locally or abroad, to
report such earnings or receipts to the Central Bank. Violations of the
Circular were punishable as a criminal offense under Section 34 of the
Central Bank Act.
That same day, nine additional Informations charging Mrs. Marcos and
Benedicto with the same offense, but involving different accounts, were
filed with the Manila RTC, which docketed these as Criminal Cases Nos. 91-
101884 to 91-101892. The accusatory portion of the charge sheet in
Criminal Case No. 91-101888 reads:
That from September 1, 1983 up to 1987, both dates inclusive,
and for sometime thereafter, both accused, conspiring and
confederating with each other and with the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, all residents of Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to submit reports in the
prescribed form and/or register with the Foreign Exchange
Department of the Central Bank within 90 days from October 21,
1983 as required of them being residents habitually/customarily
earning, acquiring or receiving foreign exchange from whatever
source or from invisibles locally or from abroad, despite the fact
they actually earned interests regularly every six (6) months for
the first two years and then quarterly thereafter for their
investment of $50-million, later reduced to $25-million in
December 1985, in Philippine-issued dollar denominated treasury
notes with floating rates and in bearer form, in the name of Bank
Hofmann, AG, Zuring, Switzerland, for the benefit of Avertina
Foundation, their front organization established for economic
advancement purposes with secret foreign exchange account
Category (Rubric) C.A.R. No. 211925-02 in Swiss Credit Bank (also
known as SKA) in Zurich, Switzerland, which earned, acquired or
received for the accused Imelda Romualdez Marcos and her late
husband an interest of $2,267,892 as of December 16, 1985
which was remitted to Bank Hofmann, AG, through Citibank, New
York, United States of America, for the credit of said Avertina
account on December 19, 1985, aside from the redemption of
$25 million (one-half of the original $50-M) as of December 16,
1985 and outwardly remitted from the Philippines in the amounts
of $7,495,297.49 and $17,489,062.50 on December 18, 1985 for
further investment outside the Philippine without first complying
with the Central Bank reporting/registering
requirements.1âwphi1.nêt
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
The other charge sheets were similarly worded except the days of the
commission of the offenses, the name(s) of the alleged dummy or dummies,
the amounts in the foreign exchange accounts maintained, and the names
of the foreign banks where such accounts were held by the accused.
On January 3, 1992, eleven more Informations accusing Mrs. Marcos and
Benedicto of the same offense, again in relation to different accounts, were
filed with the same court, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-
101969. The Informations were similarly worded as the earlier indictments,
save for the details as to the dates of the violations of Circular No. 960, the
identities of the dummies used, the balances and sources of the earnings,
and the names of the foreign banks where these accounts were maintained.
All of the aforementioned criminal cases were consolidated before Branch
26 of the said trial court.
On the same day that Criminal Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969 were
filed, the Central Bank issued Circular No. 13185 which revised the rules
governing non-trade foreign exchange transactions. It took effect on
January 20, 1992.
On August 24, 1992, the Central Bank, pursuant to the government’s policy
of further liberalizing foreign exchange transactions, came out with Circular
No. 1356,6 which amended Circular No. 1318. Circular No. 1353 deleted the
requirement of prior Central Bank approval for foreign exchange-funded
expenditures obtained from the banking system.
Both of the aforementioned circulars, however, contained a saving clause,
excepting from their coverage pending criminal actions involving violations
of Circular No. 960 and, in the case of Circular No. 1353, violations of both
Circular No. 960 and Circular No. 1318.
On September 19, 1993, the government allowed petitioners Benedicto and
Rivera to return to the Philippines, on condition that they face the various
criminal charges instituted against them, including the dollar-salting cases.
Petitioners posted bail in the latter cases.
On February 28, 1994, petitioners Benedicto and Rivera were arraigned.
Both pleaded not guilty to the charges of violating Central Bank Circular No.
960. Mrs. Marcos had earlier entered a similar plea during her arraignment
for the same offense on February 12, 1992.
On August 11, 1994, petitioners moved to quash all the Informations filed
against them in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883; 91-101884 to
91-101892, and 91-101959 to 91-101969. Their motion was grounded on
lack of jurisdiction, forum shopping, extinction of criminal liability with the
repeal of Circular No. 960, prescription, exemption from the Central Bank’s
reporting requirement, and the grant of absolute immunity as a result of a
compromise agreement entered into with the government.
On September 6, 1994, the trial court denied petitioners’ motion. A similar
motion filed on May 23, 1994 by Mrs. Marcos seeking to dismiss the dollar-
salting cases against her due to the repeal of Circular No. 960 had earlier
been denied by the trial court in its order dated June 9, 1994. Petitioners
then filed a motion for reconsideration, but the trial court likewise denied
this motion on October 18, 1994.
On November 21, 1994, petitioners moved for leave to file a second motion
for reconsideration. The trial court, in its order of November 23, 1994,
denied petitioners’ motion and set the consolidated cases for trial on
January 5, 1995.
Two separate petitions for certiorari and prohibition, with similar prayers for
temporary restraining orders and/or writs of preliminary injunction,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 35719 and CA-G.R. SP No. 35928, were
respectively filed by Mrs. Marcos and petitioners with the Court of Appeals.
Finding that both cases involved violations of Central Bank Circular No. 960,
the appellate court consolidated the two cases.
On May 23, 1996, the Court of Appeals disposed of the consolidated cases
as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent Judge in denying petitioners’ respective Motions to
Quash, except that with respect to Criminal Case No. 91-101884,
the instant petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
assailed September 6, 1994 Order, in so far as it denied the
Motion to Quash Criminal Case No. 91-101884 is hereby nullified
and set aside, and said case is hereby dismissed. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.7
Dissatisfied with the said decision of the court a quo, except with respect to
the portion ordering the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 91-101884,
petitioners filed the instant petition, attributing the following errors to the
appellate court:
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
INFORMATIONS/CASES FILED AGAINST PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS
ARE QUASHABLE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS:
(A) LACK OF JURISDICTION/FORUM SHOPPING/NO
VALID PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
(B) EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
1) REPEAL OF CB CIRCULAR NO. 960 BY CB
CIRCULAR NO. 153;
2) REPEAL OF R.A. 265 BY R.A. 76538
(C) PRESCRIPTION
(D) EXEMPTION FROM CB REPORTING REQUIREMENT
GRANT OF ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY.9
Simply stated, the issues for our resolution are:
(1) Did the Court of Appeals err in denying the Motion to Quash
for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court, forum
shopping by the prosecution, and absence of a valid preliminary
investigation?
(2) Did the repeal of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Republic
Act No. 265 by Circular No. 1353 and Republic Act No. 7653
respectively, extinguish the criminal liability of petitioners?
(3) Had the criminal cases in violation of Circular No. 960 already
prescribed?
(4) Were petitioners exempted from the application and coverage
of Circular No. 960?
(5) Were petitioners’ alleged violations of Circular No. 960
covered by the absolute immunity granted in the Compromise
Agreement of November 3, 1990?
On the first issue, petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court. They aver that the dollar-salting charges filed against them were
violations of the Anti-Graft Law or Republic Act No. 3019, and the
Sandiganbayan has original and exclusive jurisdiction over their cases.
Settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is
determined by the law in force at the time the action is instituted.10 The 25
cases were filed in 1991-92. The applicable law on jurisdiction then was
Presidential Decree 1601.11 Under P.D. No. 1606, offenses punishable by
imprisonment of not more than six years fall within the jurisdiction of the
regular trial courts, not the Sandiganbayan.12
In the instant case, all the Informations are for violations of Circular No. 960
in relation to Section 34 of the Central Bank Act and not, as petitioners
insist, for transgressions of Republic Act No. 3019. Pursuant to Section 34 of
Republic Act No. 265, violations of Circular No. 960 are punishable by
imprisonment of not more than five years and a fine of not more than
P20,000.00. Since under P.D. No. 1606 the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction to try criminal cases where the imposable penalty is less than six
years of imprisonment, the cases against petitioners for violations of
Circular No. 960 are, therefore cognizable by the trial court. No error may
thus be charged to the Court of Appeals when it held that the RTC of Manila
had jurisdiction to hear and try the dollar-salting cases.
Still on the first issue, petitioners next contend that the filing of the cases for
violations of Circular No. 960 before the RTC of Manila Constitutes forum
shopping. Petitioners argue that the prosecution, in an attempt to seek a
favorable verdict from more than one tribunal, filed separate cases involving
virtually the same offenses before the regular trial courts and the
Sandiganbayan. They fault the prosecution with splitting the cases.
Petitioners maintain that while the RTC cases refer only to the failure to
report interest earnings on Treasury Notes, the Sandiganbayan cases seek to
penalize the act of receiving the same interest earnings on Treasury Notes in
violation of the Anti-Graft Law’s provisions on prohibited transactions.
Petitioners aver that the violation of Circular No. 960 is but an element of
the offense of prohibited transactions punished under Republic Act No.
3019 and should, thus, be deemed absorbed by the prohibited transactions
cases pending before the Sandiganbayan.
For the charge of forum shopping to prosper, there must exist between an
action pending in one court and another action pending in one court and
another action before another court: (a) identity of parties, or at least such
parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts;
and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any
judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.13 Here,
we find that the single act of receiving unreported interest earnings on
Treasury Notes held abroad constitutes an offense against two or more
distinct and unrelated laws, Circular No. 960 and R.A. 3019. Said laws define
distinct offenses, penalize different acts, and can be applied
independently.14 Hence, no fault lies at the prosecution’s door for having
instituted separate cases before separate tribunals involving the same
subject matter.
With respect to the RTC cases, the receipt of the interest earnings violate
Circular No. 960 in relation to Republic Act No. 265 because the same was
unreported to the Central Bank. The act to be penalized here is the failure
to report the interest earnings from the foreign exchange accounts to the
proper authority. As to the anti-graft cases before the Sandiganbayan
involving the same interest earnings from the same foreign exchange
accounts, the receipt of the interest earnings transgresses Republic Act No.
3019 because the act of receiving such interest is a prohibited transaction
prejudicial to the government. What the State seeks to punish in these anti-
graft cases is the prohibited receipt of the interest earnings. In sum, there is
no identity of offenses charged, and prosecution under one law is not an
obstacle to a prosecution under the other law. There is no forum shopping.
Finally, on the first issue, petitioners contend that the preliminary
investigation by the Department of Justice was invalid and in violation of
their rights to due process. Petitioners argue that government’s ban on their
travel effectively prevented them from returning home and personally
appearing at the preliminary investigation. Benedicto and Rivera further
point out that the joint preliminary investigation by the Department of
Justice, resulted to the charges in one set of cases before the
Sandiganbayan for violations of Republic Act No. 3019 and another set
before the RTC for violation of Circular No. 960.
Preliminary investigation is not part of the due process guaranteed by the
Constitution.15 It is an inquiry to determine whether there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and the respondent is probably guilty thereof.16 Instead, the right to a
preliminary investigation is personal. It is afforded to the accused by statute,
and can be waived, either expressly or by implication.17 The waiver extends
to any irregularity in the preliminary investigation, where one was
conducted.
The petition in the present case contains the following admissions:
1. Allowed to return to the Philippines on September 19, 1993 …
on the condition that he face the criminal charges pending in
courts, petitioner-appellant Benedicto, joined by his co-petitioner
Rivera, lost no time in attending to the pending criminal charges
by posting bail in the above-mentioned cases.
2. Not having been afforded a real opportunity of attending the
preliminary investigation because of their forced absence from
the Philippines then, petitioners-appellants invoked their right to
due process thru motions for preliminary investigation … Upon
denial of their demands for preliminary investigation, the
petitioners intended to elevate the matter to the Honorable
Court of Appeals and actually caused the filing of a petition for
certiorari/prohibition sometime before their arraignment but
immediately caused the withdrawal thereof … in view of the
prosecution’s willingness to go to pre-trial wherein petitioner
would be allowed access to the records of preliminary
investigation which they could use for purposes of filing a motion
to quash if warranted.
3. Thus, instead of remanding the Informations to the
Department of Justice … respondent Judge set the case for pre-
trial in order to afford all the accused access to the records of
prosecution…
xxx
5. On the basis of disclosures at the pre-trial, the petitioners-
appellants Benedicto and Rivera moved for the quashing of the
informations/cases…18
The foregoing admissions lead us to conclude that petitioners have
expressly waived their right to question any supposed irregularity in the
preliminary investigation or to ask for a new preliminary investigation.
Petitioners, in the above excerpts from this petition, admit posting bail
immediately following their return to the country, entered their respective
pleas to the charges, and filed various motions and pleadings. By so doing,
without simultaneously demanding a proper preliminary investigation, they
have waived any and all irregularities in the conduct of a preliminary
investigation.19 The trial court did not err in denying the motion to quash
the informations on the ground of want of or improperly conducted
preliminary investigation. The absence of a preliminary investigation is not a
ground to quash the information.20
On the second issue, petitioners contend that they are being prosecuted for
acts punishable under laws that have already been repealed. They point to
the express repeal of Central Bank Circular No. 960 by Circular Nos. 1318
and 1353 as well as the express repeal of Republic Act No. 265 by Republic
Act No. 7653. Petitioners, relying on Article 22 of the Revised Penal
Code,21 contend that repeal has the effect of extinguishing the right to
prosecute or punish the offense committed under the old laws.22
As a rule, an absolute repeal of a penal law has the effect of depriving a
court of its authority to punish a person charged with violation of the old
law prior to its repeal.23 This is because an unqualified repeal of a penal law
constitutes a legislative act of rendering legal what had been previously
declared as illegal, such that the offense no longer exists and it is as if the
person who committed it never did so. There are, however, exceptions to
the rule. One is the inclusion of a saving clause in the repealing statute that
provides that the repeal shall have no effect on pending actions.24 Another
exception is where the repealing act reenacts the former statute and
punishes the act previously penalized under the old law. In such instance,
the act committed before the reenactment continues to be an offense in
the statute books and pending cases are not affected, regardless of whether
the new penalty to be imposed is more favorable to the accused.25
In the instant case, it must be noted that despite the repeal of Circular No.
960, Circular No. 1353 retained the same reportorial requirement for
residents receiving earnings or profits from non-trade foreign exchange
transactions.26Second, even the most cursory glance at the repealing
circulars, Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 shows that both contain a saving
clause, expressly providing that the repeal of Circular No. 960 shall have no
effect on pending actions for violation of the latter Circular.27 A saving
clause operates to except from the effect of the repealing law what would
otherwise be lost under the new law.28 In the present case, the respective
saving clauses of Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 clearly manifest the intent to
reserve the right of the State to prosecute and punish offenses for violations
of the repealed Circular No. 960, where the cases are either pending or
under investigation.
Petitioners, however, insist that the repeal of Republic Act No. 265,
particularly Section 34,29 by Republic Act No. 7653, removed the
applicability of any special sanction for violations of any non-trade foreign
exchange transactions previously penalized by Circular No. 960. Petitioners
posit that a comparison of the two provisions shows that Section 3630 of
Republic Act No. 7653 neither retained nor reinstated Section 34 of
Republic Act No. 265. Since, in creating the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,
Congress did not include in its charter a clause providing for the application
of Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265 to pending cases, petitioners’ pending
dollar-salting cases are now bereft of statutory penalty, the saving clause in
Circular No. 1353 notwithstanding. In other words, absent a provision in
Republic Act No. 7653 expressly reviving the applicability of any penal
sanction for the repealed mandatory foreign exchange reporting regulations
formerly required under Circular No. 960, violations of aforesaid repealed
Circular can no longer be prosecuted criminally.
A comparison of the old Central Bank Act and the new Bangko Sentral’s
charter repealing the former show that in consonance with the general
objective of the old law and the new law "to maintain internal and external
monetary stability in the Philippines and preserve the international value of
the peso,"31 both the repealed law and the repealing statute contain a penal
cause which sought to penalize in general, violations of the law as well as
orders, instructions, rules, or regulations issued by the Monetary Board. In
the case of the Bangko Sentral, the scope of the penal clause was expanded
to include violations of "other pertinent banking laws enforced or
implemented by the Bangko Sentral." In the instant case, the acts of
petitioners sought to be penalized are violations of rules and regulations
issued by the Monetary Board. These acts are proscribed and penalized in
the penal clause of the repealed law and this proviso for proscription and
penalty was reenacted in the repealing law. We find, therefore, that while
Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265 was repealed, it was nonetheless,
simultaneously reenacted in Section 36 of Republic Act No. 7653. Where a
clause or provision or a statute for the matter is simultaneously repealed
and reenacted, there is no effect, upon the rights and liabilities which have
accrued under the original statute, since the reenactment, in effect
"neutralizes" the repeal and continues the law in force without
interruption.32 The rule applies to penal laws and statutes with penal
provisions. Thus, the repeal of a penal law or provision, under which a
person is charged with violation thereof and its simultaneous reenactment
penalizing the same act done by him under the old law, will neither preclude
the accused’s prosecution nor deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear
and try his case.33 As pointed out earlier, the act penalized before the
reenactment continues to remain an offense and pending cases are
unaffected. Therefore, the repeal of Republic Act No. 265 by Republic Act
No. 7653 did not extinguish the criminal liability of petitioners for
transgressions of Circular No. 960 and cannot, under the circumstances of
this case, be made a basis for quashing the indictments against petitioners.
Petitioners, however, point out that Section 36 of Republic Act No. 7653, in
reenacting Section 34 of the old Central Act, increased the penalty for
violations of rules and regulations issued by the Monetary Board. They claim
that such increase in the penalty would give Republic Act No. 7653 an ex
post facto application, violating the Bill of Rights.34
Is Section 36 of Republic Act No. 7653 and ex post facto legislation?
An ex post facto law is one which: (1) makes criminal an act done before the
passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such
an act; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was when
committed; (3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment
than the law annexed to the crime when committed; (4) alters the legal
rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony
than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense; (5)
assuming to regulate civil rights, and remedies only, in effect imposes
penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful;
and (6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to
which he has become entitled such as the protection of a former conviction
or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.35
The test whether a penal law runs afoul of the ex post facto clause of the
Constitution is: Does the law sought to be applied retroactively take "from
an accused any right that was regarded at the time of the adoption of the
constitution as vital for the protection of life and liberty and which he
enjoyed at the time of the commission of the offense charged against
him."36
The crucial words in the test are "vital for the protection of life and
liberty."37 We find, however, the test inapplicable to the penal clause of
Republic Act No. 7653. Penal laws and laws which, while not penal in nature,
nonetheless have provisions defining offenses and prescribing penalties for
their violation operate prospectively.38 Penal laws cannot be given
retroactive effect, except when they are favorable to the
accused.39 Nowhere in Republic Act No. 7653, and in particular Section 36, is
there any indication that the increased penalties provided therein were
intended to operate retroactively. There is, therefore, no ex post facto law
in this case.
On the third issue, petitioners ask us to note that the dollar interest earnings
subject of the criminal cases instituted against them were remitted to
foreign banks on various dates between 1983 to 1987. They maintain that
given the considerable lapse of time from the dates of the commission of
the offenses to the institution of the criminal actions in 1991 and 1992, the
State’s right to prosecute them for said offenses has already prescribed.
Petitioners assert that the Court of Appeals erred in computing the
prescriptive period from February 1986. Petitioners theorize that since the
remittances were made through the Central Bank as a regulatory authority,
the dates of the alleged violations are known, and prescription should thus
be counted from these dates.
In ruling that the dollar-salting cases against petitioners have not yet
prescribed, the court a quo quoted with approval the trial court’s finding
that:
[T]he alleged violations of law were discovered only after the
EDSA Revolution in 1986 when the dictatorship was toppled
down. The date of the discovery of the offense, therefore, should
be the basis in computing the prescriptive period. Since (the)
offenses charged are punishable by imprisonment of not more
than five (5) years, they prescribe in eight (8) years. Thus, only a
little more than four (4) years had elapsed from the date of
discovery in 1986 when the cases were filed in 1991.40
The offenses for which petitioners are charged are penalized by Section 34
of Republic Act No. 265 "by a fine of not more than Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) and by imprisonment of not more than five years." Pursuant to
Act No. 3326, which mandates the periods of prescription for violations of
special laws, the prescriptive period for violations of Circular No. 960 is eight
(8) years.41 The period shall commence "to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the
time, from the discovery thereof and institution of judicial proceedings for
its investigation and punishment."42 In the instant case, the indictments
against petitioners charged them with having conspired with the late
President Ferdinand E. Marcos in transgressing Circular No. 960. Petitioners’
contention that the dates of the commission of the alleged violations were
known and prescription should be counted from these dates must be
viewed in the context of the political realities then prevailing. Petitioners, as
close associates of Mrs. Marcos, were not only protected from investigation
by their influence and connections, but also by the power and authority of a
Chief Executive exercising strong-arm rule. This Court has taken judicial
notice of the fact that Mr. Marcos, his family, relations, and close associates
"resorted to all sorts of clever schemes and manipulations to disguise and
hide their illicit acquisitions."43 In the instant case, prescription cannot,
therefore, be made to run from the dates of the commission of those
offenses were not known as of those dates. It was only after the EDSA
Revolution of February, 1986, that the recovery of ill-gotten wealth became
a highly prioritized state policy,44 pursuant to the explicit command of the
Provisional Constitution.45 To ascertain the relevant facts to recover "ill-
gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the (Marcos)
regime"46 various government agencies were tasked by the Aquino
administration to investigate, and as the evidence on hand may reveal, file
and prosecute the proper cases. Applying the presumption "that official
duty has been regularly performed",47 we are more inclined to believe that
the violations for which petitioners are charged were discovered only during
the post-February 1986 investigations and the tolling of the prescriptive
period should be counted from the dates of discovery of their commission.
The criminal actions against petitioners, which gave rise to the instant case,
were filed in 1991 and 1992, or well within the eight-year prescriptive
period counted from February 1986.
The fourth issue involves petitioners’ claim that they incurred no criminal
liability for violations of Circular No. 960 since they were exempted from its
coverage.
Petitioners postulate that since the purchases of treasury notes were done
through the Central Bank’s Securities Servicing Department and payments
of the interest were coursed through its Securities Servicing
Department/Foreign Exchange Department, their filing of reports would be
surplusage, since the requisite information were already with the Central
Bank. Furthermore, they contend that the foreign currency investment
accounts in the Swiss banks were subject to absolute confidentiality as
provided for by Republic Act No. 6426,48 as amended by Presidential Decree
Nos. 1035, 1246, and 1453, and fell outside the ambit of the reporting
requirements imposed by Circular No. 960. Petitioners further rely on the
exemption from reporting provided for in Section 10(q),49 Circular No. 960,
and the confidentiality granted to Swiss bank accounts by the laws of
Switzerland.
Petitioners correctly point out that Section 10(q) of Circular No. 960
exempts from the reporting requirement foreign currency eligible for
deposit under the Philippine Foreign Exchange Currency Deposit System,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 6426, as amended. But, in order to avail of the
aforesaid exemption, petitioners must show that they fall within its scope.
Petitioners must satisfy the requirements for eligibility imposed by Section
2, Republic Act No. 6426.50 Not only do we find the record bare of any proof
to support petitioners’ claim of falling within the coverage of Republic Act
No. 6426, we likewise find from a reading of Section 2 of the Foreign
Currency Deposit Act that said law is inapplicable to the foreign currency
accounts in question. Section 2, Republic Act No. 6426 speaks of "deposit
with such Philippine banks in good standing, as may…be designated by the
Central Bank for the purpose."51 The criminal cases filed against petitioners
for violation of Circular No. 960 involve foreign currency accounts
maintained in foreign banks, not Philippine banks. By invoking the
confidentiality guarantees provided for by Swiss banking laws, petitioners
admit such reports made. The rule is that exceptions are strictly construed
and apply only so far as their language fairly warrants, with all doubts being
resolved in favor of the general proviso rather than the exception.52 Hence,
petitioners may not claim exemption under Section 10(q).
With respect to the banking laws of Switzerland cited by petitioners, the
rule is that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws.53 Laws of foreign jurisdictions must be alleged and
proved.54 Petitioners failed to prove the Swiss law relied upon, either by: (1)
an official publication thereof; or (2) a copy attested by the officer having
the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied by a
certification from the secretary of the Philippine embassy or legation in such
country or by the Philippine consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular
agent stationed in such country, or by any other authorized officer in the
Philippine foreign service assigned to said country that such officer has
custody.55 Absent such evidence, this Court cannot take judicial cognizance
of the foreign law invoked by Benedicto and Rivera.
Anent the fifth issue, petitioners insist that the government granted them
absolute immunity under the Compromise Agreement they entered into
with the government on November 3, 1990. Petitioners cite our decision
in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 226 SCRA 314 (1993), upholding the validity
of the said Agreement and directing the various government agencies to be
consistent with it. Benedicto and Rivera now insist that the absolute
immunity from criminal investigation or prosecution granted to petitioner
Benedicto, his family, as well as to officers and employees of firms owned or
controlled by Benedicto under the aforesaid Agreement covers the suits
filed for violations of Circular No. 960, which gave rise to the present case.
The pertinent provisions of the Compromise Agreement read:
WHEREAS, this Compromise Agreement covers the remaining
claims and the cases of the Philippine Government against
Roberto S. Benedicto including his associates and nominees,
namely, Julita C. Benedicto, Hector T. Rivera, x x x
WHEREAS, specifically these claims are the subject matter of the
following cases (stress supplied):
1. Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 9
2. Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 24
3. Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 34
4. Tanodbayan (Phil-Asia)
5. PCGG I.S. No. 1.
xxx
WHEREAS, following the termination of the United States and
Swiss cases, and also without admitting the merits of their
respective claims and counterclaims presently involved in
uncertain, protracted and expensive litigation, the Republic of the
Philippines, solely motivated by the desire for the immediate
accomplishment of its recovery mission and Mr. Benedicto being
interested to lead a peaceful and normal pursuit of his endeavors,
the parties have decided to withdraw and/or dismiss their mutual
claims and counterclaims under the cases pending in the
Philippines, earlier referred to (underscoring supplied);
xxx
II. Lifting of Sequestrations, Extension of Absolute Immunity and
Recognition of the Freedom to Travel
a) The Government hereby lifts the sequestrations over the
assets listed in Annex "C" hereof, the same being within the
capacity of Mr. Benedicto to acquire from the exercise of his
profession and conduct of business, as well as all the haciendas
listed in his name in Negro Occidental, all of which were inherited
by him or acquired with income from his inheritance…and all the
other sequestered assets that belong to Benedicto and his
corporation/nominees which are not listed in Annex "A" as ceded
or to be ceded to the Government.
Provided, however, (that) any asset(s) not otherwise settled or
covered by this Compromise Agreement, hereinafter found and
clearly established with finality by proper competent court as
being held by Mr. Roberto S. Benedicto in trust for the family of
the late Ferdinand E. Marcos, shall be returned or surrendered to
the Government for appropriate custody and disposition.
b) The Government hereby extends absolute immunity, as
authorized under the pertinent provisions of Executive Orders
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, to Benedicto, the members of his family,
officers and employees of his corporations above mentioned,
who are included in past, present and future cases and
investigations of the Philippine Government, such that there shall
be no criminal investigation or prosecution against said persons
for acts (or) omissions committed prior to February 25, 1986, that
may be alleged to have violated any laws, including but not
limited to Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to the acquisition of
 any asset treated, mentioned or included in this Branch 26, are ordered dropped and that any criminal as well as civil
Agreement.lawphil.net liability ex delicto that might be attributable to him in the aforesaid cases
are declared extinguished by reason of his death on May 15,
x x x56 2000.lawphil.net No pronouncement as to costs.

In construing contracts, it is important to ascertain the intent of the parties SO ORDERED.

by looking at the words employed to project their intention. In the instant
case, the parties clearly listed and limited the applicability of the Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Compromise Agreement to the cases listed or identified therein. We have
ruled in another case involving the same Compromise Agreement that:

[T]he subject matters of the disputed compromise agreement are

Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0009, Civil Case No. 00234, Civil
Case No. 0034, the Phil-Asia case before the Tanodbayan and
PCGG I.S. No. 1. The cases arose from complaints for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages
against former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, members of his
family, and alleged cronies, one of whom was respondent
Roberto S. Benedicto.57

Nowhere is there a mention of the criminal cases filed against petitioners

for violations of Circular No. 960. Conformably with Article 1370 of the Civil
Code,58 the Agreement relied upon by petitioners should include only cases
specifically mentioned therein. Applying the parol evidence rule,59 where
the parties have reduced their agreement into writing, the contents of the
writing constitute the sole repository of the terms of the agreement
between the parties.60 Whatever is not found in the text of the Agreement
should thus be construed as waived and abandoned.61 Scrutiny of the
Compromise Agreement will reveal that it does not include all cases filed by
the government against Benedicto, his family, and associates.

Additionally, the immunity covers only "criminal investigation or prosecution

against said persons for acts (or) omissions committed prior to February 25,
1986 that may be alleged to have violated any penal laws, including but not
limited to Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to the acquisition of any asset
treated, mentioned, or included in this Agreement."62 It is only when the
criminal investigation or case involves the acquisition of any ill-gotten
wealth "treated mentioned, or included in this Agreement"63 that
petitioners may invoke immunity. The record is bereft of any showing that
the interest earnings from foreign exchange deposits in banks abroad, which
is the subject matter of the present case, are "treated, mentioned, or
included" in the Compromise Agreement. The phraseology of the grant of
absolute immunity in the Agreement precludes us from applying the same
to the criminal charges faced by petitioners for violations of Circular No.
960. A contract cannot be construed to include matters distinct from those
with respect to which the parties intended to contract.64

In sum, we find that no reversible error of law may be attributed to the

Court of Appeals in upholding the orders of the trial court denying
petitioners’ Motion to Quash the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 91-
101879 to 91-101883, 91-101884 to 91-101892, and 92-101959 to 92-
101969. In our view, none of the grounds provided for in the Rules of
Court65 upon which petitioners rely, finds applications in this case.

On final matter. During the pendency of this petition, counsel for petitioner
Roberto S. Benedicto gave formal notice to the Court that said petitioner
died on May 15, 2000. The death of an accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely
thereon.66

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The assailed consolidated

Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 23, 1996, in CA-G.R. SP No.
35928 and CA G.R. SP No. 35719, is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that the
charges against deceased petitioner, Roberto S. Benedicto, particularly in
Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883, 91-101884 to 101892, and
92-101959 to 92-101969, pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-32613-14 December 27, 1972
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SIMEON. FERRER (in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Tarlac, Branch I), FELICIANO CO alias LEONCIO CO alias "Bob," and NILO S.
TAYAG alias Romy Reyes alias "Taba," respondents.
Solicitor R. Mutuc for respondent Feliciano Co.
Jose W. Diokno for respondent Nilo Tayag.
CASTRO, J.:p
I. Statement of the Case
Posed in issue in these two cases is the constitutionality of the Anti-
Subversion
Act,1 which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines and other
"subversive associations," and punishes any person who "knowingly, willfully
and by overt acts affiliates himself with, becomes or remains a member" of
the Party or of any other similar "subversive" organization.
On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-
Subversion Act was filed against the respondent Feliciano Co in the Court of
First Instance of Tarlac. On March 10 Judge Jose C. de Guzman conducted a
preliminary investigation and, finding a prima facie case against Co, directed
the Government prosecutors to file the corresponding information. The
twice-amended information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27, recites:
That on or about May 1969 to December 5, 1969, in
the Municipality of Capas, Province of Tarlac,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused,
feloniously became an officer and/or ranking leader of
the Communist Party of the Philippines, an outlawed
and illegal organization aimed to overthrow the
Government of the Philippines by means of force,
violence, deceit, subversion, or any other illegal means
for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a
totalitarian regime and placing the government under
the control and domination of an alien power, by being
an instructor in the Mao Tse Tung University, the
training school of recruits of the New People's Army,
the military arm of the said Communist Party of the
Philippines.
That in the commission of the above offense, the
following aggravating circumstances are present, to
wit:
(a) That the crime has been committed in contempt of
or with insult to public authorities;
(b) That the crime was committed by a band; and
afford impunity.
(c) With the aid of armed men or persons who insure
or afford impunity.
Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of
attainder.
Meanwhile, on May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint was filed with the
same court, sharing the respondent Nilo Tayag and five others with
subversion. After preliminary investigation was had, an information was
filed, which, as amended, reads:
The undersigned provincial Fiscal of Tarlac and State
Prosecutors duly designated by the Secretary of Justice
to collaborate with the Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac,
pursuant to the Order dated June 5, above entitled
case, hereby accuse Nilo S. Tayag, alias Romy Reyes
alias TABA, ARTHUR GARCIA, RENATO (REY) CASIPE,
ABELARDO GARCIA, MANUEL ALAVADO, BENJAMIN BIE
alias COMMANDER MELODY and several JOHN DOES,
whose identities are still unknown, for violation of
REPUBLIC ACT No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-
Subversion Law, committed as follows:
That in or about March 1969 and for sometime prior
thereto and thereafter, in the Province of Tarlac, within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, and elsewhere
in the Philippines, the above-named accused
knowingly, willfully and by overt acts organized, joined
and/or remained as offices and/or ranking leaders, of
the KABATAANG MAKABAYAN, a subversive
organization as defined in Republic Act No. 1700; that
BENJAMIN BIE and COMMANDER MELODY, in addition
thereto, knowingly, willfully and by over acts joined
and/or remained as a member and became an officer
and/or ranking leader not only of the Communist Party
of the Philippines but also of the New People's Army,
the military arm of the Communist Party of the
Philippines; and that all the above-named accused, as
such officers and/or ranking leaders of the aforestated
subversive organizations, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, did then and there
knowingly, willfully and feloniously commit subversive
and/or seditious acts, by inciting, instigating and
stirring the people to unite and rise publicly and
tumultuously and take up arms against the
government, and/or engage in rebellious conspiracies
and riots to overthrow the government of the Republic
of the Philippines by force, violence, deceit, subversion
and/or other illegal means among which are the
following:
1. On several occasions within the province of Tarlac,
the accused conducted meetings and/or seminars
wherein the said accused delivered speeches
instigating and inciting the people to unite, rise in arms
and overthrow the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, by force, violence, deceit, subversion
and/or other illegal means; and toward this end, the
said accused organized, among others a chapter of the
KABATAANG MAKABAYAN in barrio Motrico, La Paz,
Tarlac for the avowed purpose of undertaking or
promoting an armed revolution, subversive and/or
seditious propaganda, conspiracies, and/or riots and/or
other illegal means to discredit and overthrow the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines and to
established in the Philippines a Communist regime.
 2. The accused NILO TAYAG alias ROMY REYES alias
TABA, together with FRANCISCO PORTEM alias KIKO
Gonzales and others, pursued the above subversive
and/or seditious activities in San Pablo City by
recruiting members for the New People's Army, and/or
by instigating and inciting the people to organize and
unite for the purpose of overthrowing the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines through armed
revolution, deceit, subversion and/or other illegal
means, and establishing in the Philippines a
Communist Government.
That the following aggravating circumstances attended
the commission of the offense: (a) aid of armed men or
persons to insure or afford impunity; and (b) craft,
fraud, or disguise was employed.
On July 21, 1970 Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity of the
statute on the grounds that (1) it is a bill of attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it
embraces more than one subject not expressed in the title thereof; and (4)
it denied him the equal protection of the laws.
Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court, in its resolution of
September 15, 1970, declared the statute void on the grounds that it is a bill
of attainder and that it is vague and overboard, and dismissed the
informations against the two accused. The Government appealed. We
resolved to treat its appeal as a special civil action for certiorari.
II. Is the Act a Bill of Attainder?
Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of attainder
or ex port facto law shall be enacted."2 A bill of attainder is a legislative act
which inflicts punishment without trial.3 Its essence is the substitution of a
legislative for a judicial determination of guilt.4 The constitutional ban
against bills of attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of
powers 5 by confining legislatures to
rule-making 6 and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial
function.7 History in perspective, bills of attainder were employed to
suppress unpopular causes and political minorities, 8 and it is against this
evil that the constitutional prohibition is directed. The singling out of a
definite class, the imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative intent,
suffice to stigmatizea statute as a bill of attainder. 9
In the case at bar, the Anti-Subversion Act was condemned by the court a
quo as a bill of attainder because it "tars and feathers" the Communist Party
of the Philippines as a "continuing menace to the freedom and security of
the country; its existence, a 'clear, present and grave danger to the security
of the Philippines.'" By means of the Act, the trial court said, Congress
usurped "the powers of the judge," and assumed "judicial magistracy by
pronouncing the guilt of the CCP without any of the forms or safeguards of
judicial trial." Finally, according to the trial court, "if the only issue [to be
determined] is whether or not the accused is a knowing and voluntary
member, the law is still a bill of attainder because it has expressly created a
presumption of organizational guilt which the accused can never hope to
overthrow."
1. When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does
not specify the Communist Party of the Philippines or the members thereof
for the purpose of punishment. What it does is simply to declare the Party
to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for the
purposes of the prohibition, stated in section 4, against membership in the
outlawed organization. The term "Communist Party of the Philippines"
issued solely for definitional purposes. In fact the Act applies not only to the
Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any other organization
having the same purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on
individuals but on conduct. 10
This feature of the Act distinguishes it from section 504 of the U.S. Federal
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 11 which, in U.S.
vs. Brown, 12 was held to be a bill of attainder and therefore
unconstitutional. Section 504 provided in its pertinent parts as follows:
(a) No person who is or has been a member of the
Communist
Party ... shall serve —
(1) as an officer, director, trustee, member of any
executive board or similar governing body, business
agent, manager, organizer, or other employee (other
than as an employee performing exclusively clerical or
custodial duties) of any labor organization.
during or for five years after the termination of his
membership in the Communist Party....
(b) Any person who willfully violates this section shall
be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not
more than one year, or both.
This statute specified the Communist Party, and imposes disability and
penalties on its members. Membership in the Party, without more, ipso
facto disqualifies a person from becoming an officer or a member of the
governing body of any labor organization. As the Supreme Court of the
United States pointed out:
Under the line of cases just outlined, sec. 504 of the
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
plainly constitutes a bill of attainder. Congress
undoubtedly possesses power under the Commerce
Clause to enact legislation designed to keep from
positions affecting interstate commerce persons who
may use of such positions to bring about political
strikes. In section 504, however, Congress has
exceeded the authority granted it by the Constitution.
The statute does not set forth a generally applicable
rule decreeing that any person who commits certain
acts or possesses certain characteristics (acts and
characteristics which, in Congress' view, make them
likely to initiate political strikes) shall not hold union
office, and leaves to courts and juries the job of
deciding what persons have committed the specified
acts or possessed the specified characteristics. Instead,
it designates in no uncertain terms the persons who
possess the feared characteristics and therefore cannot
hold union office without incurring criminal liability —
members of the Communist Party.
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control
Board, 367 US 1, 6 L ed 2d 625, 81 S CT 1357, lend a
support to our conclusion. That case involved an
appeal from an order by the Control Board ordering
the Communist Party to register as a "Communist-
action organization," under the Subversive Activities
Control Act of 1950, 64 Stat 987, 50 USC sec. 781 et
seq. (1958 ed). The definition of "Communist-action
organization" which the Board is to apply is set forth in
sec. 3 of the Act:
[A]ny organization in the United States ... which (i)is
substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by the
foreign government or foreign organization controlling
the world Communist movement referred to in section
2 of this title, and(ii) operates primarily to advance the
 objectives of such world Communist movement... 64
Stat 989, 50 USC sec. 782 (1958 ed.)
A majority of the Court rejected the argument that the
Act was a bill of attainder, reasoning that sec. 3 does
not specify the persons or groups upon which the
deprivations setforth in the Act are to be imposed, but
instead sets forth a general definition. Although the
Board has determined in 1953 that the Communist
Party was a "Communist-action organization," the
Court found the statutory definition not to be so
narrow as to insure that the Party would always come
within it:
In this proceeding the Board had found, and the Court
of Appeals has sustained its conclusion, that the
Communist Party, by virtud of the activities in which it
now engages, comes within the terms of the Act. If the
Party should at anytime choose to abandon these
activities, after it is once registered pursuant to sec. 7,
the Act provides adequate means of relief. (367 US, at
87, 6 L ed 2d at 683)
Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally
unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as the law alone, without
more, would suffice to secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is
that their guilt still has to be judicially established. The Government has yet
to prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully
and by overt acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive
character and with specific intent to further its basic objective, i.e., to
overthrow the existing Government by force deceit, and other illegal means
and place the country under the control and domination of a foreign power.
As to the claim that under the statute organizationl guilt is nonetheless
imputed despite the requirement of proof of knowing membership in the
Party, suffice it to say that is precisely the nature of conspiracy, which has
been referred to as a "dragneet device" whereby all who participate in the
criminal covenant are liable. The contention would be correct if the statute
were construed as punishing mere membership devoid of any specific intent
to further the unlawful goals of the Party. 13 But the statute specifically
required that membership must be knowing or active, with specific intent to
further the illegal objectives of the Party. That is what section 4 means when
it requires that membership, to be unlawful, must be shown to have been
acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." 14 The ingredient of specific
intent to pursue the unlawful goals of the Party must be shown by "overt
acts." 15 This constitutes an element of "membership" distinct from the
ingredient of guilty knowledge. The former requires proof of direct
participation in the organization's unlawful activities, while the latter
requires proof of mere adherence to the organization's illegal objectives.
2. Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies individuals and not
activities, this feature is not enough to render it a bill of attainder. A statute
prohibiting partners or employees of securities underwriting firms from
serving as officers or employees of national banks on the basis of a
legislative finding that the persons mentioned would be subject to the
temptation to commit acts deemed inimical to the national economy, has
been declared not to be a bill of attainder. 16 Similarly, a statute requiring
every secret, oath-bound society having a membership of at least twenty to
register, and punishing any person who becomes a member of such society
which fails to register or remains a member thereof, was declared valid even
if in its operation it was shown to apply only to the members of the Ku Klux
Klan. 17
In the Philippines the validity of section 23 (b) of the Industrial Peace
Act, 18 requiring labor unions to file with the Department of Labor affidavits
of union officers "to the effect that they are not members of the Communist
Party and that they are not members of any organization which teaches the
overthrow of the Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional
method," was upheld by this Court. 19
Indeed, it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to
easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict
punishment on them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of
attainder. 20 It is upon this ground that statutes which disqualified those
who had taken part in the rebellion against the Government of the United
States during the Civil War from holding office, 21 or from exercising their
profession, 22 or which prohibited the payment of further compensation to
individuals named in the Act on the basis of a finding that they had engages
in subversive activities, 23 or which made it a crime for a member of the
Communist Party to serve as an officer or employee of a labor union, 24 have
been invalidated as bills of attainder.
But when the judgment expressed in legislation is so universally
acknowledged to be certain as to be "judicially noticeable," the legislature
may apply its own rules, and judicial hearing is not needed fairly to make
such determination. 25
In New York ex rel. Bryant vs. Zimmerman, 26 the New York legislature
passed a law requiring every secret, oath-bound society with a membership
of at least twenty to register, and punishing any person who joined or
remained a member of such a society failing to register. While the statute
did not specify the Ku Klux Klan, in its operation the law applied to the KKK
exclusively. In sustaining the statute against the claim that it discriminated
against the Ku Klux Klan while exempting other secret, oath-bound
organizations like masonic societies and the Knights of Columbus, the
United States Supreme Court relied on common knowledge of the nature
and activities of the Ku Klux Klan. The Court said:
The courts below recognized the principle shown in the
cases just cited and reached the conclusion that the
classification was justified by a difference between the
two classes of associations shown by experience, and
that the difference consisted (a) in a manifest tendency
on the part of one class to make the secrecy
surrounding its purpose and membership a cloak for
acts and conduct inimical to personal rights and public
welfare, and (b) in the absence of such a tendency on
the part of the other class. In pointing out this
difference one of the courts said of the Ku Klux Klan,
the principal association in the included class: "It is a
matter of common knowledge that this organization
functions largely at night, its members disguised by
hoods and gowns and doing things calculated to strike
terror into the minds of the people;" and later said of
the other class: "These organizations and their
purposes are well known, many of them having been in
existence for many years. Many of them are oath-
bound and secret. But we hear no complaint against
them regarding violation of the peace or interfering
with the rights of others." Another of the courts said:
"It is a matter of common knowledge that the
association or organization of which the relator is
concededly a member exercises activities tending to
the prejudice and intimidation of sundry classes of our
citizens. But the legislation is not confined to this
society;" and later said of the other class: "Labor
unions have a recognized lawful purpose. The
benevolent orders mentioned in the Benevolent
Orders Law have already received legislative scrutiny
and have been granted special privileges so that the
legislature may well consider them beneficial rather
than harmful agencies." The third court, after
recognizing "the potentialities of evil in secret
societies," and observing that "the danger of certain
 organizations has been judicially demonstrated," —
meaning in that state, — said: "Benevolent orders,
labor unions and college fraternities have existed for
many years, and, while not immune from hostile
criticism, have on the whole justified their existence."
We assume that the legislature had before it such
information as was readily available including the
published report of a hearing, before a committee of
the House of Representatives of the 57th Congress
relating to the formation, purposes and activities of the
Klu Klux Klan. If so it was advised — putting aside
controverted evidence — that the order was a revival
of the Ku Klux Klan of an earlier time with additional
features borrowed from the Know Nothing and the A.
P. A. orders of other periods; that its memberships was
limited to native-born, gentile, protestant whites; that
in part of its constitution and printed creed it
proclaimed the widest freedom for all and full
adherence to the Constitution of the United States; in
another exacted of its member an oath to shield and
preserve "white supremacy;" and in still another
declared any person actively opposing its principles to
be "a dangerous ingredient in the body politic of our
country and an enemy to the weal of our national
commonwealth;" that it was conducting a crusade
against Catholics, Jews, and Negroes, and stimulating
hurtful religious and race prejudices; that it was
striving for political power and assuming a sort of
guardianship over the administration of local, state and
national affairs; and that at times it was taking into its
own hands the punishment of what some of its
members conceived to be crimes. 27
In the Philippines the character of the Communist Party has been the object
of continuing scrutiny by this Court. In 1932 we found the Communist Party
of the Philippines to be an illegal association. 28 In 1969 we again found that
the objective of the Party was the "overthrow of the Philippine Government
by armed struggle and to establish in the Philippines a communist form of
government similar to that of Soviet Russia and Red China." 29 More
recently, in Lansang vs. Garcia, 30 we noted the growth of the Communist
Party of the Philippines and the organization of Communist fronts among
youth organizations such as the Kabataang Makabayan (KM) and the
emergence of the New People's Army. After meticulously reviewing the
evidence, we said: "We entertain, therefore, no doubts about the existence
of a sizeable group of men who have publicly risen in arms to overthrow the
government and have thus been and still are engaged in rebellion against
the Government of the Philippines.
3. Nor is it enough that the statute specify persons or groups in order that it
may fall within the ambit of the prohibition against bills of attainder. It is
also necessary that it must apply retroactively and reach past conduct. This
requirement follows from the nature of a bill of attainder as a legislative
adjudication of guilt. As Justice Frankfurter observed, "frequently a bill of
attainder was ... doubly objectionable because of its ex post facto features.
This is the historic explanation for uniting the two mischiefs in one
clause — 'No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.' ...
Therefore, if [a statute] is a bill of attainder it is also an ex post facto law. But
if it is not an ex post facto law, the reasons that establish that it is not are
persuasive that it cannot be a bill of attainder." 31
Thus in Gardner vs. Board of Public Works, 32 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld
the validity of the Charter of the City of Los Angeles which provided:
... [N]o person shall hold or retain or be eligible for any
public office or employment in the service of the City
of Los Angeles, in any office or department thereof,
either elective or appointive, who has within five (5)
years prior to the effective date of this section advised,
advocated, or taught, or who may, after this section
becomes effective, become a member of or affiliated
with any group, society, association, organization or
party which advises, advocates or teaches or has within
said period of five (5) years advised, advocated, or
taught the overthrow by force or violence of the
Government of the United States of America or of the
State of California.
In upholding the statute, the Court stressed the prospective application of
the Act to the petitioner therein, thus:
... Immaterial here is any opinion we might have as to
the charter provision insofar as it purported to apply
restrospectively for a five-year period to its effective
date. We assume that under the Federal Constitution
the Charter Amendment is valid to the extent that it
bars from the city's public service persons who,
subsequently to its adoption in 1941, advise, advocate,
or reach the violent overthrow of the Government or
who are or become affiliated with any group doing so.
The provisions operating thus prospectively were a
reasonable regulation to protect the municipal service
by establishing an employment qualification of loyalty
to the State and the United States.
... Unlike the provisions of the charter and ordinance
under which petitioners were removed, the statute in
the Lovett case did not declare general and
prospectively operative standards of qualification and
eligibility for public employment. Rather, by its terms it
prohibited any further payment of compensationto
named individuals or employees. Under these
circumstances, viewed against the legislative
background, the statutewas held to have imposed
penalties without judicial trial.
Indeed, if one objection to the bill of attainder is thatCongress thereby
assumed judicial magistracy, them it mustbe demonstrated that the statute
claimed to be a bill of attainderreaches past conduct and that the penalties
it imposesare inescapable. As the U.S. Supreme Court observedwith respect
to the U.S. Federal Subversive Activities ControlAct of 1950:
Nor is the statute made an act of "outlawry" or of
attainderby the fact that the conduct which it regulates
is describedwith such particularity that, in probability,
few organizationswill come within the statutory terms.
Legislatures may act tocurb behaviour which they
regard as harmful to the public welfare,whether that
conduct is found to be engaged in by manypersons or
by one. So long as the incidence of legislation issuch
that the persons who engage in the regulated conduct,
bethey many or few, can escape regulation merely by
altering thecourse of their own present activities, there
can be no complaintof an attainder. 33
This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of theAnti-Subversion Act.
Section 4 thereof expressly statesthat the prohibition therein applies only to
acts committed"After the approval of this Act." Only those who
"knowingly,willfully and by overt acts affiliate themselves with,become or
remain members of the Communist Party of thePhilippines and/or its
successors or of any subversive association"after June 20, 1957, are
punished. Those whowere members of the Party or of any other subversive
associationat the time of the enactment of the law, weregiven the
opportunity of purging themselves of liability byrenouncing in writing and
under oath their membershipin the Party. The law expressly provides that
such renunciationshall operate to exempt such persons from
penalliability. 34 The penalties prescribed by the Act are thereforenot
inescapable.
III. The Act and the Requirements of Due Process
1. As already stated, the legislative declaration in section 2 of the Act that
the Communist Party of the Philippinesis an organized conspiracy for the
overthrow of theGovernment is inteded not to provide the basis for a
legislativefinding of guilt of the members of the Party butrather to justify
the proscription spelled out in section 4. Freedom of expression and
freedom of association are sofundamental that they are thought by some to
occupy a"preferred position" in the hierarchy of constitutional
values. 35 Accordingly, any limitation on their exercise mustbe justified by
the existence of a substantive evil. This isthe reason why before enacting
the statute in question Congressconducted careful investigations and then
stated itsfindings in the preamble, thus:
... [T]he Communist Party of the Philippines
althoughpurportedly a political party, is in fact an
organized conspiracyto overthrow the Government of
the Republic of the Philippinesnot only by force and
violence but also by deceit, subversionand other illegal
means, for the purpose of establishing in
thePhilippines a totalitarian regime subject to alien
dominationand control;
... [T]he continued existence and activities of the
CommunistParty of the Philippines constitutes a clear,
present andgrave danger to the security of the
Philippines;
... [I]n the face of the organized, systematice and
persistentsubversion, national in scope but
international in direction,posed by the Communist
Party of the Philippines and its activities,there is urgent
need for special legislation to cope withthis continuing
menace to the freedom and security of the country.
In truth, the constitutionality of the Act would be opento question if, instead
of making these findings in enactingthe statute, Congress omitted to do so.
In saying that by means of the Act Congress has assumed judicial
magistracy, the trial courd failed to takeproper account of the distinction
between legislative fact and adjudicative fact. Professor Paul Freund
elucidatesthe crucial distinction, thus:
... A law forbidding the sale of beverages
containingmore than 3.2 per cent of alcohol would
raise a question of legislativefact, i.e., whether this
standard has a reasonable relationto public health,
morals, and the enforcement problem. Alaw forbidding
the sale of intoxicating beverages (assuming itis not so
vague as to require supplementation by rule-
making)would raise a question of adjudicative fact, i.e.,
whether thisor that beverage is intoxicating within the
meaning of the statuteand the limits on governmental
action imposed by the Constitution. Of course what we
mean by fact in each case is itselfan ultimate
conclusion founded on underlying facts and oncriteria
of judgment for weighing them.
A conventional formulation is that legislative facts —
those facts which are relevant to the legislative
judgment — will not be canvassed save to determine
whether there is a rationalbasis for believing that they
exist, while adjudicativefacts — those which tie the
legislative enactment to the litigant — are to be
demonstrated and found according to the
ordinarystandards prevailing for judicial trials. 36
The test formulated in Nebbia vs. new York, 37 andadopted by this Court
in Lansang vs. Garcia, 38 is that 'if laws are seen to have a reasonable
relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial
determination to that effect renders a court functus officio." The recital of
legislative findings implements this test.
With respect to a similar statement of legislative findingsin the U.S. Federal
Subversive Activities Control Actof 1950 (that "Communist-action
organizations" are controlledby the foreign government controlling the
worldCommunist movement and that they operate primarily to"advance the
objectives of such world Communist movement"),the U.S. Supreme Court
said:
It is not for the courts to reexamine the validity of
theselegislative findings and reject them....They are the
productof extensive investigation by Committes of
Congress over morethan a decade and a half. Cf.
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.502, 516, 530. We
certainly cannot dismiss them as unfoundedirrational
imaginings. ... And if we accept them, as we mustas a
not unentertainable appraisal by Congress of the
threatwhich Communist organizations pose not only to
existing governmentin the United States, but to the
United States as asovereign, independent Nation. ...we
must recognize that thepower of Congress to regulate
Communist organizations of thisnature is
extensive. 39
This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of thelegislative findings
articulated in the Anti-Subversion Act.
That the Government has a right to protect itself againstsubversion is a
proposition too plain to require elaboration.Self-preservation is the
"ultimate value" of society. It surpasses and transcendes every other value,
"forif a society cannot protect its very structure from armedinternal attack,
...no subordinate value can be protected" 40 As Chief Justice Vinson so aptly
said in Dennis vs. United States: 41
Whatever theoretical merit there may be to the
argumentthat there is a 'right' to rebellion against
dictatorial governmentsis without force where the
existing structure of government provides for peaceful
and orderly change. We rejectany principle of
governmental helplessness in the face of
preparationfor revolution, which principle, carried to
its logical conclusion,must lead to anarchy. No one
could conceive that it isnot within the power of
Congress to prohibit acts intended tooverthrow the
government by force and violence.
2. By carefully delimiting the reach of the Act to conduct (as explicitly
described in sectin 4 thereof), Congressreaffirmed its respect for the rule
that "even throughthe governmental purpose be legitimate and
substantial,that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly
stiflefundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved." 42 The requirement of knowing membership,as distinguished
from nominal membership, hasbeen held as a sufficient basis for penalizing
membershipin a subversive organization. 43 For, as has been stated:
 Membership in an organization renders aid and
encouragement to the organization; and when
membership is acceptedor retained with knowledge
that the organization is engaged inan unlawful
purpose, the one accepting or retaining
membershipwith such knowledge makes himself a
party to the unlawfulenterprise in which it is
engaged. 44
3. The argument that the Act is unconstitutionallyoverbroad because
section 2 merely speaks of "overthrow"of the Government and overthrow
may be achieved by peaceful means, misconceives the function of the
phrase"knowingly, willfully and by overt acts" in section 4. Section 2 is
merely a legislative declaration; the definitionsof and the penalties
prescribed for the different acts prescribedare stated in section 4 which
requires that membershipin the Communist Party of the Philippines, to be
unlawful, must be acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." Indeed,
the first "whereas" clause makes clear thatthe overthrow contemplated is
"overthrow not only by forceand violence but also be deceit, subversion and
other illegalmeans." The absence of this qualificatio in section 2 appearsto
be due more to an oversight rather than to deliberateomission.
Moreover, the word "overthrow' sufficiently connotesthe use of violent and
other illegal means. Only in a metaphoricalsense may one speak of peaceful
overthrow ofgovernments, and certainly the law does not speak in
metaphors.In the case of the Anti-Subversion Act, the use ofthe word
"overthrow" in a metaphorical sense is hardlyconsistent with the clearly
delineated objective of the "overthrow,"namely, "establishing in the
Philippines a totalitarianregime and place [sic] the Government under
thecontrol and domination of an alien power." What thisCourt once said in a
prosecution for sedition is appropos: "The language used by the appellant
clearly imported anoverthrow of the Government by violence, and it should
beinterpreted in the plain and obvious sense in which it wasevidently
intended to be understood. The word 'overthrow'could not have been
intended as referring to an ordinarychange by the exercise of the elective
franchise. The useof the whip [which the accused exhorted his audience to
useagainst the Constabulary], an instrument designed toleave marks on the
sides of adversaries, is inconsistentwith the mild interpretation which the
appellant wouldhave us impute to the language." 45
IV. The Act and the Guaranty of Free Expression
As already pointed out, the Act is aimed against conspiracies to overthrow
the Government by force, violence orother illegal means. Whatever interest
in freedom of speechand freedom of association is infringed by the
prohibitionagainst knowing membership in the Communist Party ofthe
Philippines, is so indirect and so insubstantial as to beclearly and heavily
outweighed by the overriding considerationsof national security and the
preservartion of democraticinstitutions in his country.
The membership clause of the U.S. Federal Smith Actis similar in many
respects to the membership provision ofthe Anti-Subversion Act. The
former provides:
Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize
anysociety, group, or assembly of persons who teach,
advocate, orencourage the overthrow or destruction of
any such governmentby force or violence; or becomes
or is a member of, or affiliatedwith, any such society,
group or assembly of persons, knowingthe purpose
thereof —
Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned
notmore than twenty years, or both, and shall be
ineligible for emplymentby the United States or any
department or agencythereof, for the five years next
following his conviction.... 46
In sustaining the validity of this provision, the "Court said in Scales vs. United
States: 47
It was settled in Dennis that advocacy with which we
arehere concerned is not constitutionally protected
speech, and itwas further established that a
combination to promote suchadvocacy, albeit under
the aegis of what purports to be a politicalparty, is not
such association as is protected by the
firstAmendment. We can discern no reason why
membership, whenit constitutes a purposeful form of
complicity in a group engagingin this same forbidden
advocacy, should receive anygreater degree of
protection from the guarantees of that Amendment.
Moreover, as was held in another case, where the problemsof
accommodating the exigencies of self-preservationand the values of liberty
are as complex and intricate as inthe situation described in the legislative
findings stated inthe U.S. Federal Subversive Activities Control Act of
1950,the legislative judgment as to how that threat may best bemet
consistently with the safeguards of personal freedomsis not to be set aside
merely because the judgment of judgeswould, in the first instance, have
chosen other methods. 48 For in truth, legislation, "whether it restrains
freedom tohire or freedom to speak, is itself an effort at
compromisebetween the claims of the social order and individual
freedom,and when the legislative compromise in either case isbrought to
the judicial test the court stands one step removedfrom the conflict and its
resolution through law." 49
V. The Act and its Title
The respondent Tayag invokes the constitutional commandthat "no bill
which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which
shall be expressed in the title of the bill." 50
What is assailed as not germane to or embraced in thetitle of the Act is the
last proviso of section 4 which reads:
And provided, finally, That one who conspires with
anyother person to overthrow the Government of the
Republic ofthe Philippines, or the government of any of
its political subdivisionsby force, violence, deceit,
subversion or illegal means,for the purpose of placing
such Government or political subdivisionunder the
control and domination of any lien power, shallbe
punished by prision correccional to prision mayor with
allthe accessory penalties provided therefor in the
same code.
It is argued that the said proviso, in reality, punishes notonly membership in
the Communist Party of the Philippinesor similar associations, but as well
"any conspiracyby two persons to overthrow the national or any local
governmentby illegal means, even if their intent is not to establisha
totalitarian regime, burt a democratic regime, evenif their purpose is not to
place the nation under an aliencommunist power, but under an alien
democratic power likethe United States or England or Malaysia or even an
anti-communistpower like Spain, Japan, Thailand or Taiwanor Indonesia."
The Act, in addition to its main title ("An Act to Outlawthe Communist Party
of the Philippines and SimilarAssociations, Penalizing Membership Therein,
and forOther Purposes"), has a short title. Section 1 providesthat "This Act
shall be known as the
Anti-Subversion Act."Together with the main title, the short title of the
statuteunequivocally indicates that the subject matter is subversionin
general which has for its fundamental purpose the substitutionof a foreign
totalitarian regime in place of theexisting Government and not merely
subversion by Communistconspiracies..

The title of a bill need not be a catalogue or an indexof its contents, and
need not recite the details of the Act. 51 It is a valid title if it indicates in
broad but clear termsthe nature, scope, and consequences of the proposed
lawand its operation. 52 A narrow or technical construction isto be avoided,
and the statute will be read fairly and reasonablyin order not to thwart the
legislative intent. We holdthat the Anti-Subversion Act fully satisfies these
requirements.

VI. Conclusion and Guidelines

In conclusion, even as we uphold the validity of theAnti-Subversion Act, we

cannot overemphasize the needfor prudence and circumspection in its
enforcement, operatingas it does in the sensitive area of freedom of
expressionand belief. Accordingly, we set the following basic guidelines to
be observed in any prosecution under the Act.The Government, in addition
to proving such circumstancesas may affect liability, must establish the
following elementsof the crime of joining the Communist Party of the
Philippinesor any other subversive association:

(1) In the case of subversive organizations other thanthe Communist Party

of the Philippines, (a) that thepurpose of the organization is to overthrow
the presentGovernment of the Philippines and to establish in thiscountry a
totalitarian regime under the domination of aforeign power; (b) that the
accused joined such organization;and (c) that he did so knowingly, willfully
and byovert acts; and

(2) In the case of the Communist Party of the Philippines,(a) that the CPP
continues to pursue the objectiveswhich led Congress in 1957 to declare it
to be an organizedconspiracy for the overthrow of the Government by
illegalmeans for the purpose of placing the country under thecontrol of a
foreign power; (b) that the accused joined theCPP; and (c) that he did so
willfully, knowingly and byovert acts.

We refrain from making any pronouncement as to thecrime or remaining a

member of the Communist Party ofthe Philippines or of any other
subversive association: weleave this matter to future determination.

ACCORDINGLY, the questioned resolution of September15, 1970 is set

aside, and these two cases are herebyremanded to the court a quo for trial
on the merits. Costs de oficio.

Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee, Barredo and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., concurs in the result.

Makasiar and Antonio, JJ., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 448 | September 20, 1901
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,
vs.
PHILIP K. SWEET, defendant-appellant.
Theofilus B. Steele, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellee.
LADD, J.:
The offense charged in the complaint is punishable under the Penal Code
now in force by arresto mayor and a fine of from 325 to 3,250 pesetas. (Art.
418.) By Act No. 136 of the United States Philippine Commission, section 56
(6), Courts of First Instance are given original jurisdiction "in all criminal
cases in which a penalty of more than six months' imprisonment or a fine
exceeding one hundred dollars may be imposed." The offense was therefore
cognizable by the court below unless the fact that the appellant was at the
time of its alleged commission an employee of the United States military
authorities in the Philippine Islands, and the further fact that the person
upon whom it is alleged to have been committed was a prisoner of war in
the custody of such authorities, are sufficient to deprive it of jurisdiction.
We must assume that both these facts are true, as found, either upon
sufficient evidence or upon the admissions of the prosecuting attorney, by
the court below.
Setting aside the claim that the appellant was "acting in the line of duty" at
the time the alleged offense was committed, which is not supported by the
findings or by any evidence which appears in the record, the contention that
the court was without jurisdiction, as we understand it, is reducible to two
propositions: First, that an assault committed by a soldier or military
employee upon a prisoner of war is not an offense under the Penal Code;
and second, that if it is an offense under the Code, nevertheless the military
character sustained by the person charged with the offense at the time of
its commission exempts him from the ordinary jurisdiction of the civil
tribunals.
As to the first proposition, it is true, as pointed out by counsel, that an
assault of the character charged in the complaint committed in time of war
by a military person upon a prisoner of war is punishable as an offense
under the Spanish Code of Military Justice (art. 232), and it is also true that
under the provisions of the same Code (arts. 4, 5) the military tribunals
have, with certain exceptions which it is not material to state, exclusive
cognizance of all offenses, whether of a purely military nature or otherwise,
committed by military persons. But the fact that the acts charged in the
complaint would be punishable as an offense under the Spanish military
legislation does not render them any less an offense under the article of the
Penal Code above cited. There is nothing in the language of that article to
indicate that it does not apply to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction
of the law. Under articles 4 and 5 of the Code of Military Justice above cited
a military person could not be brought to trial before a civil tribunal for an
assault upon a prisoner of war, but by the commission of that offense he
incurred a criminal responsibility for which he was amenable only to the
military jurisdiction. That criminal responsibility, however, arose from an
infraction of the general penal laws, although the same acts, viewed in
another aspect, might also, if committed in time of war, constitute an
infraction of the military code. We are unable to see how these provisions of
the Spanish Military Code, no longer in force here and which indeed never
had any application to the Army of the United States, can in any possible
view have the effect claimed for them by counsel for the appellant.
The second question is, Does the fact that the alleged offense was
committed by an employee of the United States military authorities deprive
the court of jurisdiction? We have been cited to no provision in the
legislation of Congress, and to none in the local legislation, which has the
effect of limiting, as respects employees of the United States military
establishment, the general jurisdiction conferred upon the Courts of First
Instance by Act No. 136 of the United States Philippine Commission above
cited, and we are not aware of the existence of any such provision. The case
is therefore open to the application of the general principle that the
jurisdiction of the civil tribunals is unaffected by the military or other special
character of the person brought before them for trial, a principle firmly
established in the law of England and America and which must, we think,
prevail under any system of jurisprudence unless controlled by express
legislation to the contrary. (United States vs. Clark, 31 Fed. Rep., 710.) The
appellant's claim that the acts alleged to constitute the offense were
performed by him in the execution of the orders of his military superiors
may, if true, be available by way of defense upon the merits in the trial in
the court below, but can not under this principle affect the right of that
court to take jurisdiction of the case.
Whether under a similar state of facts to that which appears in this case a
court of one of the United States would have jurisdiction to try the offender
against the State laws (see In re Fair, 100 Fed. Rep., 149), it is not necessary
to consider. The present is not a case where the courts of one government
are attempting to exercise jurisdiction over the military agents or employees
of another and distinct government, because the court asserting jurisdiction
here derives its existence and powers from the same Government under the
authority of which the acts alleged to constitute the offense are claimed to
have been performed.
It may be proper to add that there is no actual conflict between the two
jurisdictions in the present case nor any claim of jurisdiction on the part of
the military tribunals. On the contrary it appears from the findings of the
court below that the complaint was entered by order of the commanding
general of the Division of the Philippines, a fact not important, perhaps, as
regards the technical question of jurisdiction, but which relieves the case
from any practical embarrassment which might result from a claim on the
part of the military tribunals to exclusive cognizance of the offense.
The order of the court below is affirmed with costs to the appellant.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Willard, and Mapa, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
COOPER, J., concurring:
I concur in the result of the decision of the court, but am not prepared to
assent to all that is said in the opinion. An offense charged against a military
officer, acting under the order of his superior, unless the illegality of the
order is so clearly shown on its face that a man of ordinary sense and
understanding would know when he heard it read or given that the order
was illegal, and when the alleged criminal act was done within the scope of
his authority as such officer, in good faith and without malice, and where
the offense is against the military law — that is, such law as relates to the
discipline and efficiency of the Army, or rules and orders promulgated by
the Secretary of War to aid military officers in the proper enforcement of
the custody of prisoners — is not within the jurisdiction of the courts of the
Civil Government. (In re Fair, 100 Fed. Rep., 149.) The civil courts, however,
may examine the evidence for the purpose of determining whether the act
alleged to be criminal was done in the performance of duty under the
circumstances above indicated, but should cease to exercise jurisdiction
upon such facts appearing.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-246 March 27, 1946
SILVERIO VALDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO G. LUCERO, Judge of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, and CELESTINO
JIMENEZ, Provincial Warden of Ilocos Sur, respondents.
Severino D. Dagdag for petitioner.
Respondent judge in his own behalf.
No appearance for respondent Warden.
JARANILLA, J.:
The above-entitled case came up to be regularly heard in this court by virtue
of a petition filed by Silverio Valdez praying that the judgment be rendered
"(a) annulling the proceedings of the lower court, (b) declaring the
respondent judge without jurisdiction of the case, (c) commanding the
respondent judge to desist from further proceeding in the cause, (d)
ordering the provincial warden, Celestino Jimenez, to discharge the
defendant, Silverio Valdez, from jail, (e) granting preliminary injunction
enjoining the respondent judge from hearing the case on the merits
pending proceedings in the case, (f) assessing costs against the respondents,
and (g) granting such other or further relief or reliefs as may be just or
equitable."
The undisputed facts are:
That Silverio Valdez was prosecuted for murder under an information filed
by the provincial fiscal in the justice of the peace court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur,
which information, in part, reads as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of January, 1945, in the barrio of
San Julian, municipality of Bantay, province of Ilocos Sur,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Hon. Court, the
above-named defendant, Silverio Valdez, with intent to kill, and
with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with cruelty, by deliberately
and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of one Juan Ponce, kill
the latter with bolo, dagger and other weapons and died
instantly.
That said Silverio Valdez moved for the dismissal of the foregoing
information in the justice of the peace court, alleging that the fiscal had no
authority to file it and that the court acquired no jurisdiction of the
defendant, which motion was denied by the justice of the peace on
September 5, 1945; and that since that date accused has been detained as a
provincial prisoner in the provincial jail in Vigan, Ilocos Sur;
That on September 13, 1945, the provincial fiscal reproduced the said
information in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur; and that the
defendant filed a motion to quash it on December 18, 1945, which motion
was denied by the court on December 20, 1945;
That on December 29, 1945, a petition for the reconsideration of the denial
of the motion to quash was filed but was also denied on January 7, 1946.
The main issue here is whether the civil courts have jurisdiction to take
cognizance of and try the case for murder filed against petitioner Silverio
Valdez, as above stated, because, he alleges, he was not only a member of a
recognized guerrilla and hence a member of the United States armed forces
in the Philippines, in North Luzon, but was also later on absorbed into the
Philippine Army and therefore, he claims, he should be tried by a general
court martial, which has jurisdiction over the crime charged and the person
of the accused pursuant to article 93 of the Articles of War (Commonwealth
Act No. 408).
Petitioner also contends that the whole of Ilocos Sur was at the time
imputed in the information overrun by the enemy and that any place of
hiding of the guerrillas in the province was a military reservation for the
safety of the Philippine and American armed forces within the purview of
the Articles of War.
During the oral argument of this case, we understood from counsel
appearing for petitioner that neither the United States Army nor the
Philippine Army was claming precedence or priority in the trial of the herein
petitioner, nor that either was demanding that he be tried by a court
martial. In fact, no allegation to that effect may be found in this petition.
The petitioner relies mainly on the provision of article 93 of the Articles of
War (Commonwealth Act No. 408) which reads:
1. ART. 93. Murder. — Any person subject to military law who
commits murder in time of war shall suffer death or
imprisonment for life, as a court-martial may direct.
He argues that pursuant to said article 93 of the Articles of War only a court
martial can have jurisdiction to try his case for murder, he being a person
subject to military law and the crime having been committed in time of war.
Granting all the facts alleged by the petitioner and that he was a regular
member of the guerrilla duly recognized by the United States Army and
granting further that his unit was incorporated into the United States Army,
thus giving him the standing of a regular member of the United States
armed forces, and that he was subsequently incorporated into the
Philippine Army, we are of the opinion, nevertheless, that the civil courts of
the Commonwealth of the Philippines are not deprived of their jurisdiction
over the petitioner herein, but have concurrent jurisdiction with the military
courts or general courts martial to try and take cognizance of the case of
murder against the petitioner herein, for the reason that said article 93 of
the Articles of War is almost identical with the 92d Article of War of the
United States Army, and the latter has been interpreted by the courts to
mean that even in time of war the civil courts are not deprived of their
jurisdiction over murder cases committed by persons subject to military law.
Such was the holding in Cadwell vs.. Parker (Ala., 1920; 40 Sup. Ct., 388; 252
U. S., 376; 64 Law. ed., 621):
That section 1564 of this Article (Art. 92), providing for
punishment of murder or rape as the court-martial may direct,
but prohibiting trial by courts-martial in time of peace, section
1565 of this Article (Art. 93), providing for the punishment of
various other offenses as a court-martial may direct, and this
section (Art. 74), requiring military authorities to deliver accused
persons to the civil authorities, except in time of war, do not give
military courts exclusive jurisdiction in time of war over offenses
committed in violation of state laws by person in the military
service, and a state court has jurisdiction over such offenses.
(Emphasis added.)
Identical doctrines holding that the civil courts have concurrent jurisdiction
over cases of murder committed by persons subject to military law were laid
down in the following cases:
Articles of War enacted August 29, 1916, do not deprive the civil
courts, either in time of peace or war, of the concurrent
 jurisdiction previously vested in them over crimes against either
federal or state law, committed within the United States, by
persons subject to military law. (United States vs. Hirsch [D.C.,
N.Y., 1918], 254 F., 109; emphasis added.)
Prisoners of war are amenable for offenses malum in se and may
be tried by the ordinary tribunals in the country in which the
crime is committed; and this though they may also be triable by
courts-martial. (Govt. vs.McGregory [1780], 14 Mass., 499.)
A court of oyer and terminer had jurisdiction to try all cases
of murder committed within the country, and that a murder
committed by a soldier in the military service of the United
States, in time of war, insurrection, or rebellion, forms no
exception. (People vs.. Gardiner [N.Y., 1865], 6 Parker Cr. R., 143;
emphasis added.).
Any changes in Articles of War in years 1913 and 1916 did not
alter rule that courts-martial do not have exclusive jurisdiction for
trial of a soldier for murder committed in time of war, but that
the state courts have jurisdiction until it is assumed by military
authorities. (People vs.. Denman [1918], 177 P., 461; 179 Cal.,
497.)
Although under this section (Art. 92), military authorities have the
prior right to try soldier who has murdered a citizen, the soldier
who has committed the crime cannot object to being tried by a
state court, where the military authorities have not asserted any
right. (Emphasis added.)
In view of all the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so hold that the Court
of First Instance of Ilocos Sur has jurisdiction over the murder case against
the petitioner and cannot be deprived of such jurisdiction. This being our
conclusion, it is unnecessary to pass upon the other questions of law raised
by the petition.
Being without any merit whatsoever, the petition is hereby dismissed, with
costs against the petitioner.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, De Joya, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, Bengzon,
and Briones, JJ., concur.

In the instant case it also appears that when the information for murder was
filed the Philippines had already been liberated and the actual hostilities had
already ceased. It is claimed, however, that up to the present time a status
of war still exists for the reason that the treaty of peace has not yet been
signed. But this contention cannot be upheld because, although the formal
termination of war by means of the signing of the treaty has not yet been
effected, at the time when the petitioner was prosecuted for murder in the
civil courts the actual fighting or hostilities were no longer going on; in other
words, the actual fighting had already ceased and the Philippines had
already been liberated. Thus it was held in the following decision:

Notwithstanding this section (Art. 74), requiring a soldier to be

delivered to civil authorities for trial for an alleged crime except in
time of war, the jurisdiction of the military courts over a soldier is
not exclusive of the civil court even during time of war, if the
soldier was stationed within one of the states where the civil
courts were functioning and where no actual hostilities were in
progress. (Ex parte Koester [1922], 206 P., 166; 56 Cal. App., 621;
emphasis added.)

It clearly appears also in the present case as aforesaid that the military
authorities are not claiming priority to try the petitioner herein as provided
in the Articles of War. Such being the case, we are of the opinion that the
petitioner cannot raise and invoke the right to be tried by a court martial
without the military authorities' claiming to try him in accordance with the
military law or the Articles of War. To this effect was the ruling in People vs..
Denman (supra):

Conceding paramount right of military authorities in the time of

war to custody of soldier notwithstanding criminal charges
against him in the courts of a state, the right inures solely to
military authorities and cannot be raised by the
offender. (Emphasis added.).

In Funk vs.. State ([1919], 208 S.W., 509; 84 Tex. Cr. R., 402), the following
doctrines were also laid down:

A soldier of the United States who murders a citizen of the state

offends against both the military and the state laws and may be
tried in the state courts.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4663 May 30, 1951
FERDINAND E. MARCOS and MANUEL CONCORDIA, petitioners,
vs.
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-4671 May 30, 1951
MANUEL A. CONCORDIA and FERDINAND E. MARCOS, petitioners,
vs.
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., respondents.
Petitioners in their own behalf.
Judge Advocate General Fred Ruiz Castro and Leonardo R. Lucena for
respondents.
FERIA, J.:
These are two special civil actions of mandamus instituted by the same
petitioners against the respondents General Court-Martials composed each
of different members or officers of the Philippine Army, in which it is alleged
that the respondents Military Tribunals excluded unlawfully the petitioners
from the enjoyment of their right to appear as counsel for the accused
prosecuted before said tribunals, to which the petitioners are entitled
because they are attorneys duly admitted to practice law in the Philippine
Courts, on the ground that they are disqualified or inhibited by section 17,
Article 17 of the Constitution to appear as counsel for said defendants. Said
Section 17 reads as follows:
SEC. 17. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
shall directly or indirectly be financially interested in any contract
with the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality
thereof, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the
Congress during his term of office. He shall not appear as counsel
before the Electoral Tribunals or before any court in any civil case
wherein the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality
thereof is the adverse party, or in any criminal case wherein an
offer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense
committed in relation to his office. . . ..
The only question for this Court to determine in these two cases is whether
the prohibition contained in the above quoted section 17 of our
Constitution is applicable to the petitioners.
We are of the opinion and therefore hold that it is applicable, because the
words "any court" includes the General Court-Martial, and a court-martial
case is a criminal case within the meaning of the above quoted provisions of
our Constitution.
It is obvious that the words "any court," used in prohibiting members of
Congress to appear as counsel "in any criminal case in which an officer or
employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation
to his office," refers, not only to a civil, but also to a military court or a
Court-Martial. Because, in construing a Constitution, "it must be taken as
established that where words are used which have both a restricted and a
general meaning, the general must prevail over the restricted unless the
nature of the subject matter of the context clearly indicates that the limited
sense is intended." (11 American Jurisprudence, pp. 680-682).
In the case of Ramon Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army,* 43 Off.
Gaz., 855, we did not hold that the word "court" in general used in our
Constitution does not include a Court-Martial; what we held is that the
words "inferior courts" used in connection with the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court to "review on appeal certiorari or writ of error, as the
law or rules of court may provide, final judgments of inferior courts in all
criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment,"
as provided for in section 2, Article VIII, of the Constitution, do not refer to
Courts-Martial or Military Courts.
Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, quoted by the petitioners and by
this Court in the case of Ramon Ruffy et al vs. Chief of Staff of the Philippine
Army, supra, has to say in this connection the following:
Notwithstanding that the court-martial is only an instrumentality
of the executive power having no relation or connection, in law,
with the judicial establishments of the country, it is yet, so far as
it is a court at all, and within its field of action, as fully a court of
law and justice as is any civil tribunal. As a court of law, it is
bound, like any court, by the fundamental principles of law, and,
in the absence of special provision of the subject in the military
code, it observes in general the rules of evidence as adopted in
the common-law courts. As a court of justice, it is required by the
terms of its statutory oath, (art. 84.) to adjudicate between the
U.S. an the accused "without partiality, favor, or affection," and
according, not only to the laws and customs of the service, but to
its "conscience," i.e. its sense of substantial right and justice
unaffected by technicalities. In the words of the Attorney
General, court-martial are thus, "in the strictest sense courts of
justice. (Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, Vol. 1 and 2,
2nd Ed., p. 54.)
In re Bogart, 3 Fed. Cas., 796, 801, citing 6 Op. Attys. Gen. 425, with
approval, the court said:
In the language of Attorney General Cushing, a court-martial is a
lawful tribunal existing by the same authority that any other
exists by, and the law military is a branch of law as valid as any
other, and it differs from the general law of the land in authority
only in this: that it applies to officers and soldiers of the army but
not to other members of the body politic, and that it is limited to
breaches of military duty.
And in re Davison, 21 F. 618, 620, it was held:
That court-martial are lawful tribunals existing by the same
authority as civil courts of the United States, have the same
plenary jurisdiction in offenses by the law military as the latter
courts have in controversies within their cognizance, and in their
special and more limited sphere are entitled to as untrammeled
an exercise of their powers.
And lastly, American Jurisprudence says:
SEC. 99. Representation by Counsel. — It is the general rule that
one accused of the crime has the right to be represented before
the court by counsel, and this is expressly so declared by the
statues controlling the procedure in court-martial. It has been
held that a constitutional provision extending that right to one
accused in any trial in any court whatever applies to a court-
martial and gives the accused the undeniable right to defend by
counsel, and that a court-martial has no power to refuse an
attorney the right to appear before it if he is properly licensed to
 practice in the courts of the state. (Citing the case of State ex rel House of Representatives as counsel for the accused in court-martial, as for
Huffaker vs.Crosby, 24 Nev. 115, 50 Pac. 127; 36 American inhibiting them to appear as such in civil courts, because the independence
Jurisprudence 253) of civil court's judges is guaranteed by our Constitution. Ubi eadem ibi
eadem lex.
The fact that a judgment of conviction, not of acquittal, rendered by a court-
martial must be approved by the reviewing authority before it can be Wherefore, as the petitioners are disqualified to appear as counsel for the
executed (Article of War 46), does not change or affect the character of a accused in court-martial, the respondents did not unlawfully exclude them
court-martial as a court. A judgment of the Court of First Instance imposing from the enjoyment of any right, and hence the petitions for mandamus in
death penalty must also be approved by the Supreme Court before it can be these two cases are denied with costs against the petitioners.
executed.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Reyes, Jugo, and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.
That court-martial cases are criminal cases within the meaning of Section
17, Article VI, of the Constitution is also evident, because the crimes and
misdemeanors forbidden or punished by the Articles of War are offenses MONTEMAYOR, J.:
against the Republic of the Philippines. According to section 1, Rule 106, of
the Rules of Court, a criminal action or case is one which involves a wrong or
injury done to the Republic, for the punishment of which the offender is I disqualify myself.
prosecuted in the name of the People of the Philippines; and pursuant to
Article of War 17, "the trial advocate of a general or special court-martial
shall prosecute (the accused) in the name of the People of the Philippines."

Winthtrop, in his well known work "Military Law and Precedents' says the
following:

In regard to the class of courts to which it belongs, it is lastly to be

noted that the court-martial is strictly a criminal court. It has no
civil jurisdiction whatever; cannot enforce a contract, collect a
debt, or award damages in favor of an individual. . . . Its judgment
is a criminal sentence not a civil verdict; its proper function is to
award punishment upon the ascertainment of guilt. (Winthrop's
Military Law and Precedents, Vols. 1 & 2, 2nd Ed., p. 55.)

In N. Y. it was held that the term "criminal case," used in the

clause, must be allowed some meaning, and none can be
conceived, other than a prosecution for a criminal offense. Ex
parte Carter. 66 S. W. 540, 544, 166 No. 604, 57 L.R.A. 654,
quoting People vs. Kelly, 24 N.Y. 74; Counselman vs. Hitchcock, 12
S. Ct. 195; 142 U.S. 547, L. Ed. 111o. (Words and Phrases, Vol. 10,
p. 485.)

Besides, that a court-martial is a court, and the prosecution of an accused

before it is a criminal and not an administrative case, and therefore it would
be, under certain conditions, a bar to another prosecution of the defendant
for the same offense, because the latter would place the accused in
jeopardy, is shown by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in the case of Grafton vs. United States, 206 U. S. 333; 51 Law. Ed.,
1088, 1092, in which the following was held:

If a court-martial has jurisdiction to try an officer or soldier for a

crime, its judgment will be accorded the finality and
conclusiveness as to the issues involved which attend the
judgment of a civil court in a case of which it may legally take
cognizance; and restricting our decision to the above question of
double jeopardy, we judge that, consistently with the above act
of 1902, and for the reasons stated, the plaintiff in error, a soldier
in the Army, having been acquitted of the crime of homicide,
alleged to have been committed by him in the Philippines, by a
military court of competent jurisdiction, proceeding under the
authority of the United States, could not be subsequently tried
for the same offense in a civil court exercising authority in that
territory.

Furthermore, taking into consideration the apparent intention or purpose of

the framers of our Constitution in enacting section 17, Article VI of the
Philippine Constitution, it is obvious that there exist the same if not more
reason for prohibiting the appearance of members of the Senate and the
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-492 June 28, 1946
TEODORO CANTOS (TEODORO TATISHI), petitioner,
vs.
WILHELM D. STYER, Commanding General, United States Army Forces,
Western Pacific, respondent.
Capt. John J. Greer, 1st Lt. John J. Berry, jr., 1st Lt. Everett W. Thode, and 2d
Lt. John McCullough for petitioner.
MORAN, C.J.:
This is a petition for habeas corpus filed by petitioner Teodoro Cantos
(Teodoro Tatishi) against Lieutenant General Wilhelm D. Syer, Commanding
General of the United States Army Forces, Western Pacific, upon the ground
that petitioner is a Filipino citizen, residing in Ilang, Davao City, and is now
confined by order of the respondent at the residence of the High
Commissioner in Manila, Philippines, with no legal cause whatsoever.
Petitioner Japanese and his mother, Filipino. At the age of 27 he elected to
become a Filipino citizen under the name of Teodoro Cantos, and was given
Philippine citizenship by the Court of First Instance of Davao on September
17, 1939. On March 25, 1946, he was indicted for war crimes before the
military commission duly constituted by order of General Styer, respondent.
The charges are as follows:
SPECIFICATIONS
1. In that Teodoro Tatishi, a Japanese civilian, and other persons
connected and acting with Japan, did, at or near Tibungko, Davao
City, Mindanao, Philippine Islands, on or about 28 December
1941, during a time of war between the United States of America,
its allies and Japan, willfully and unlawfully kill Sixto Babao,
Dalmacio Babao, Francisco Cobling and Martin Marquez,
unarmed, non-combatant Filipino civilians, by striking them with a
saber, and by shooting them, in violation of the laws of war.
2. In that Teodoro Tatishi, a Japanese civilian, and other persons
connected and acting with Japan, did, at or near Ilang, Davao City,
Mindanao, Philippine Islands, on or about 7 January 1942, during
a time of war between the United States of America, its allies and
Japan, willfully, unlawfully and forcibly take and loot personal
property of Justina Larracoecha Babao, in violation of the laws of
war.
Dated; 25 March 1946
The military commission, after hearing, found petitioner guilty of the
charges and sentenced him to death by hanging.
There seems to be no question that petitioner is charged with war crimes
before a military commission duly constituted. It is maintained, however,
that the petitioner being a Filipino civilian when he allegedly committed the
crimes charged and the Philippine courts being open and capable to
administer justice, the military commission has no jurisdiction to try him. It
is well settled that war crimes may be committed not only by lawful
belligerents but by any "men and bodies of men, who, without being lawful
belligerents" "nevertheless commit hostile acts of any kind." (Par. 351, Rules
of Land Warfare.) "Persons of the enemy territory who steal within the lines
of hostile army for the purpose of robbing, killing, etc." are also war
criminals subject to the jurisdiction of military commissions. (Par. 352, id.,
id.) And in the preamble to the Hague Convention it is declared that "until a
more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High
Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included
in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents
remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of
nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples,
from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience."
All this goes to show that war crimes may be committed by any person
regardless of his nationality. Thus, the Supreme Court of the United States,
in Ex parte Quirin (317 U.S., No. 1 [Off. Rep. Sup. Ct.], pp. 37, 38), said that
"citizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent does not relieve
him from the consequences of a belligerency which is unlawful because in
violation of the law of war. Citizen who associate themselves with the
military army of the enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and
direction enter this country bent on hostile acts, are enemy belligerents
within the meaning of the Hague Convention and the law of war."
Here, the petitioner is a Filipino citizen though of a Japanese father, and
associating himself with Japan in the war against the United States of
America and the Philippines, committed atrocities against unarmed and
noncombatant Filipino civilians and looted Filipino property. He is, indeed, a
war criminal subject to the jurisdiction of the military commission, and his
confinement by the respondent is not illegal. (In re Yamashita, 66 Sup. Ct.,
340; 90 Law. ed., 499.)
It is argued that, by direction of the President of the United States of
America, the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the America Military Forces, on
September 12, 1945, instructed General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in
Chief of the United States Army Forces, Pacific, to proceed with the trial
before appropriate military tribunals of such Japanese war criminals as have
been or may be apprehended, and that, therefore, the petitioner, who is a
Filipino citizen, cannot be a Japanese war criminal subject to the jurisdiction
of the Military commission constituted under such presidential authority.
There is before us no conclusive evidence that General Douglas MacArthur's
authority is thus limited. At any rate, we believe that the military
commission may look through the naturalization papers into the real
nationality of a person with Japanese blood charged with war crimes. After
due hearing the military commission found the petitioner to be a
Japanese mestizo. The certificate of Filipino citizenship was issued in his
favor after he had sworn to have renounced his allegiance and fidelity to
Japan and pledged faith and allegiance to the United States of America and
the Philippines. But there is evidence before the military commission to the
effect that during the war he was a member of the Japanese civilian army
and committed atrocities against unarmed and noncombatant Filipino
civilians. In his oath of naturalization he swore that he owned real property
in the Philippines worth P1,200 as required by the Naturalization Law. It
appears, however, from his sworn testimony before the military commission
that he never owned any property in the Philippines. If the military
commission believes, as it apparently does, that, by reason of the above
circumstances, the petitioner never acquired Filipino citizenship or he
already lost it, we certainly find no reason to interfere.
Fore all the foregoing, petition is dismissed, without costs.
Paras, Feria, De Joya, Pablo, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
Respondent failed to appear in this case or to answer the petition for a writ
of habeas corpus.
The main question in this case is whether the military commission set up by
respondent under the authority of General MacArthur, Commander in
Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, has jurisdiction to try and convict
petitioner for an alleged war crime, when petitioner is a naturalized Filipino
citizen and not a Japanese.
Chief Justice Stone, in his majority opinion in the case of In re Yamashita (66
Sup. Ct., 340; 90 Law. ed., 499, 507), speaking for the United States
Supreme Court, stated:
By direction of the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the
American Military Forces, on September 12, 1945, instructed
General MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief, United States Army
Forces, Pacific, to proceed with the trial, before appropriate
military tribunals, of such Japanese war criminals `as have been or
may be apprehended.' By order of General MacArthur of
September 24, 1945, General Styer was specifically directed to
proceed with the trial of petitioner upon the charge here
involved. This order was accompanied by detailed rules and
regulations which General MacArthur prescribed for the trial of
war criminals. These regulations directed, among other things,
that review of the sentence imposed by the commission should
be by the officer convening it, with `authority to approve,
mitigate, remit, commute, suspend, reduce or otherwise alter the
sentence imposed', and directed that no sentence of death
should be carried into effect until confirmed by the Commander-
in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific.
801; Payson vs. People, 175 Ill., 267; 51 N.E., 588; Haywood vs.
Collins, 60 Ill., 328.) Whatever the rank of the court exercising a
special statutory jurisdiction, it is governed by the same rules as
courts of limited jurisdiction. (Cases cited.) Keal vs. Rhyderck, 148
N.E., 54.)
This court has often held that, where jurisdiction is conferred on
a court by special statute, which is to be exercised in a special
manner therein prescribed, the record of such court must show
the facts essential to give the court jurisdiction; otherwise no
presumption as to its jurisdiction will be indulged. The statute, in
such cases, must be strictly pursued, and the jurisdiction must be
made to appear in the mode pointed out by the statute. (Morris
vs. Dooley, 59 Ark., 483; 28 S.W., 30, 430; Hindman vs. O'Connor,
54 Ark., 643; 16 S.W. 1052; 13 L.R.A., 490; Gibney vs. Crawford,
51 Ark., 35; 9 S.W., 309; See, also, Cross vs. Wilson, 52 Ark., 312;
12 S.W., 576; Lusk vs. Perkins, 48 Ark., 238; 2 S. W., 847. (Reeves
vs. Conger, 147 S.W., 438, 439.)
If petitioner is amenable to be prosecuted and convicted for any crime
allegedly committed during the war, the proceeding can not take place
before the commission set up by respondent, but before either a special
tribunal with the proper jurisdiction or the ordinary civil courts of the
Philippines.
Under the facts on record, petitioner is entitled to be discharged from
confinement, and we vote that the writ of habeas corpus prayed for be
issued.
Briones, J., concurs.

From the foregoing, it is evident that the jurisdiction of the military

commission is limited by the instructions given to General MacArthur, under
whose authority the military commission has been set up, such jurisdiction
not extending to any person except "Japanese war criminals."

It appearing from the record that petitioner Teodoro Cantons is a Filipino

citizen, the military commission can not legally exercise jurisdiction over
him, and all acts of said commission outside of its jurisdiction are null and
void.

Judicial proceedings without or in excess of jurisdiction are without any legal

effect.

Courts created by statute and not by the Constitution are

tribunals of special and limited and jurisdiction only. They can
exercise only such powers as are directly conferred on them by
legislative enactment and such as may be incidentally necessary
to the execution of those powers. Therefore, unless authority for
the exercise of jurisdiction in a given case can be found in the
statutes, given either expressly or by necessary implication, their
proceedings are void; for the rule is that such a court can only
take cognizance of such matters as are clearly within its
jurisdiction. (14 Am. Jur., p. 369.)

When a court or judicial officer exercises a special statutory

power outside the scope of the usual jurisdiction of courts of
general powers, the record of the proceedings must show that
the statutory authority has been pursued. (Cowdrey vs. Town of
Caneadea, 16 Fed., 532.)

Where a court is exercising a special statutory jurisdiction, the

record must show upon its face that the case is one where the
court has authority to act. Jurisdiction in such cases is never
presumed, and it does not appear the judgment will be void and
subject to collateral attack. (Rice vs. Travis, 216 Ill., 249; 74 N.E.,
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2662 March 26, 1949
SHIGENORI KURODA, petitioner,
vs.
Major General RAFAEL JALANDONI, Brigadier General CALIXTO DUQUE,
Colonel MARGARITO TORALBA, Colonel IRENEO BUENCONSEJO, Colonel
PEDRO TABUENA, Major FEDERICO ARANAS, MELVILLE S. HUSSEY and
ROBERT PORT, respondents.
Pedro Serran, Jose G. Lukban, and Liberato B. Cinco for petitioner.
Fred Ruiz Castro Federico Arenas Mariano Yengco, Jr., Ricardo A. Arcilla and
S. Melville Hussey for respondents.
MORAN, C.J.:
Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial
Army and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in The
Philippines during a period covering 19433 and 19444 who is now charged
before a military Commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed
forces of the Philippines with having unlawfully disregarded and failed "to
discharge his duties as such command, permitting them to commit brutal
atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and
prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces in violation of the laws and
customs of war" — comes before this Court seeking to establish the
illegality of Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the Philippines: to
enjoin and prohibit respondents Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port from
participating in the prosecution of petitioner's case before the Military
Commission and to permanently prohibit respondents from proceeding with
the case of petitioners.
In support of his case petitioner tenders the following principal arguments.
First. — "That Executive Order No. 68 is illegal on the ground that it violates
not only the provision of our constitutional law but also our local laws to say
nothing of the fact (that) the Philippines is not a signatory nor an adherent
to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare
and therefore petitioners is charged of 'crimes' not based on law, national
and international." Hence petitioner argues — "That in view off the fact that
this commission has been empanelled by virtue of an unconstitutional law
an illegal order this commission is without jurisdiction to try herein
petitioner."
Second. — That the participation in the prosecution of the case against
petitioner before the Commission in behalf of the United State of America
of attorneys Melville Hussey and Robert Port who are not attorneys
authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines is a
diminution of our personality as an independent state and their
appointment as prosecutor are a violation of our Constitution for the reason
that they are not qualified to practice law in the Philippines.
Third. — That Attorneys Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecution
the United State not being a party in interest in the case.
Executive Order No. 68, establishing a National War Crimes Office
prescribing rule and regulation governing the trial of accused war criminals,
was issued by the President of the Philippines on the 29th days of July, 1947
This Court holds that this order is valid and constitutional. Article 2 of our
Constitution provides in its section 3, that —
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy
and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law
as part of the of the nation.
In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of
the present day including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention
and significant precedents of international jurisprudence established by the
United Nation all those person military or civilian who have been guilty of
planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of
crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the
laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held accountable
therefor. Consequently in the promulgation and enforcement of Execution
Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with
the generally accepted and policies of international law which are part of
the our Constitution.
The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President of
his power as Commander in chief of all our armed forces as upheld by this
Court in the case of Yamashita vs. Styer (L-129, 42 Off. Gaz., 664) 1 when we
said —
War is not ended simply because hostilities have ceased. After
cessation of armed hostilities incident of war may remain pending
which should be disposed of as in time of war. An importance
incident to a conduct of war is the adoption of measure by the
military command not only to repel and defeat the enemies but
to seize and subject to disciplinary measure those enemies who in
their attempt to thwart or impede our military effort have
violated the law of war. (Ex parte Quirin 317 U.S., 1; 63 Sup. Ct.,
2.) Indeed the power to create a military commission for the trial
and punishment of war criminals is an aspect of waging war. And
in the language of a writer a military commission has jurisdiction
so long as a technical state of war continues. This includes the
period of an armistice or military occupation up to the effective
of a treaty of peace and may extend beyond by treaty agreement.
(Cowles Trial of War Criminals by Military Tribunals, America Bar
Association Journal June, 1944.)
Consequently, the President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to
consummate this unfinished aspect of war namely the trial and punishment
of war criminal through the issuance and enforcement of Executive Order
No. 68.
Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no Jurisdiction
to try petitioner for acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention
and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the
first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules
and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and are
wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international law. In
facts these rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nation
the United State and Japan who were signatories to the two Convention,
Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if
the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for
our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope
and is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of international
law as continued inn treaties to which our government may have been or
shall be a signatory.
Furthermore when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly
committed the Philippines was under the sovereignty of United States and
thus we were equally bound together with the United States and with Japan
to the right and obligation contained in the treaties between the belligerent
countries. These rights and obligation were not erased by our assumption of
full sovereignty. If at all our emergency as a free state entitles us to enforce
the right on our own of trying and punishing those who committed crimes
against crimes against our people. In this connection it is well to remember
what we have said in the case of Laurel vs. Misa (76 Phil., 372):
 . . . The change of our form government from Commonwealth to
Republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged with
the crime of treason committed during then Commonwealth
because it is an offense against the same sovereign people. . . .

By the same token war crimes committed against our people and our
government while we were a Commonwealth are triable and punishable by
our present Republic.

Petitioner challenges the participation of two American attorneys namely

Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port in the prosecution of his case on the
ground that said attorney's are not qualified to practice law in Philippines in
accordance with our Rules of court and the appointment of said attorneys
as prosecutors is violative of our national sovereignty.

In the first place respondent Military Commission is a special military

tribunal governed by a special law and not by the Rules of court which
govern ordinary civil court. It has already been shown that Executive Order
No. 68 which provides for the organization of such military commission is a
valid and constitutional law. There is nothing in said executive order which
requires that counsel appearing before said commission must be attorneys
qualified to practice law in the Philippines in accordance with the Rules of
Court. In facts it is common in military tribunals that counsel for the parties
are usually military personnel who are neither attorneys nor even possessed
of legal training.

Secondly the appointment of the two American attorneys is not violative of

our nation sovereignty. It is only fair and proper that United States, which
has submitted the vindication of crimes against her government and her
people to a tribunal of our nation should be allowed representation in the
trial of those very crimes. If there has been any relinquishment of
sovereignty it has not been by our government but by the United State
Government which has yielded to us the trial and punishment of her
enemies. The least that we could do in the spirit of comity is to allow them
representation in said trials.

Alleging that the United State is not a party in interest in the case petitioner
challenges the personality of attorneys Hussey and Port as prosecutors. It is
of common knowledge that the United State and its people have been
equally if not more greatly aggrieved by the crimes with which petitioner
stands charged before the Military Commission. It can be considered a
privilege for our Republic that a leader nation should submit the vindication
of the honor of its citizens and its government to a military tribunal of our
country.

The Military Commission having been convened by virtue of a valid law with
jurisdiction over the crimes charged which fall under the provisions of
Executive Order No. 68, and having said petitioner in its custody, this Court
will not interfere with the due process of such Military commission.

For all the foregoing the petition is denied with costs de oficio.

Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-44896 July 31, 1936
RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER, petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL V. MORAN, Judge of First Instance of Manila, respondent.
Cardenas and Casal for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for respondent.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
The petitioner was duly accredited honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila,
Philippine Islands on June 11, 1934. He was subsequently charged in the
Court of First Instance of Manila with the crime of falsification of a private
document. He objected to the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that
both under the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the
Philippines the court below had no jurisdiction to try him. His objection
having been overruled, he filed this petition for a writ of prohibition with a
view to preventing the Court of First Instance of Manila from taking
cognizance of the criminal action filed against him.
In support of this petition counsel for the petitioner contend (1) That the
Court of First Instance of Manila is without jurisdiction to try the case filed
against the petitioner for the reason that under Article III, section 2, of the
Constitution of the United States, the Supreme Court of the United States
has original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers, and consuls, and such jurisdiction excludes the courts of the
Philippines; and (2) that even under the Constitution of the Philippines
original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers, and consuls, is conferred exclusively upon the Supreme Court of
the Philippines.
This case involves no question of diplomatic immunity. It is well settled that
a consul is not entitled to the privileges and immunities of an ambassador or
minister, but is subject to the laws and regulations of the country to which
he is accredited. (Ex parte Baiz, 135 U. S., 403; 34 Law. ed., 222.) A consul is
not exempt from criminal prosecution for violations of the laws of the
country where he resides. (U. S. vs. Ravara, 2 Dall., 297; 1 Law. ed., 388;
Wheaton's International Law [2d ed.], 423.) The substantial question raised
in this case is one of jurisdiction.
1. We find no merit in the contention that Article III, section 2, of
the Constitution of the United States governs this case. We do
not deem it necessary to discuss the question whether the
constitutional provision relied upon by the petitioner extended ex
propio vigore over the Philippines. Suffice it to say that the
inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth on November 15,
1935, has brought about a fundamental change in the political
and legal status of the Philippines. On the date mentioned the
Constitution of the Philippines went into full force and effect. This
Constitution is the supreme law of the land. Not only the
members of this court but all other officers, legislative, executive
and judicial, of the Government of the Commonwealth, are
bound by oath to support the Constitution. (Article XIII, section
2.) This court owes its own existence to the great instrument, and
derives all its powers therefrom. In the exercise of its powers and
jurisdiction, this court is bound by the provisions of the
Constitution. The Constitution provides that the original
jurisdiction of this court "shall include all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls." In deciding the
instant case this court cannot go beyond this constitutional
provision.
2. It remains to consider whether the original jurisdiction thus
conferred upon this court by the Constitution over cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is exclusive.
The Constitution does not define the jurisdiction of this court in
specific terms, but merely provides that "the Supreme Court shall
have such original and appellate jurisdiction as may be possessed
and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at
the time of the adoption of this Constitution." It then goes on to
provide that the original jurisdiction of this court "shall include all
cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls."
In the light of the constitutional provisions above adverted to, the question
arises whether the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the
Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution was exclusive.
The original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of
the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was
derived from section 17 of Act No. 136, which reads as follows: The
Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue writs
of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus, and quo warrantoin
the cases and in the manner prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure, and
to hear and determine the controversies thus brought before it, and in
other cases provided by law." Jurisdiction to issue writs of quo
warranto, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and habeas corpus was also
conferred on the Courts of First Instance by the Code of Civil Procedure. (Act
No. 190, secs. 197, 217, 222, 226, and 525.) It results that the original
jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was not exclusive of,
but concurrent with, that of the Courts of First Instance. Inasmuch as this is
the same original jurisdiction vested in this court by the Constitution and
made to include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and
consuls, it follows that the jurisdiction of this court over such cases is not
exclusive.
The conclusion we have reached upon this branch of the case finds support
in the pertinent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. The
Constitution of the United States provides that the Supreme Court shall
have "original jurisdiction" in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers, and consuls. In construing this constitutional provision, the
Supreme Court of the United States held that the "original jurisdiction thus
conferred upon the Supreme Court by the Constitution was not exclusive
jurisdiction, and that such grant of original jurisdiction did not prevent
Congress from conferring original jurisdiction in cases affecting consuls on
the subordinate courts of the Union. (U. S. vs. Ravara, supra;
Bors vs. Preston, 111 U. S., 252; 28 Law. ed., 419.)
3. The laws in force in the Philippines prior to the inauguration of the
Commonwealth conferred upon the Courts of the First Instance original
jurisdiction in all criminal cases to which a penalty of more than six months'
imprisonment or a fine exceeding one hundred dollars might be imposed.
(Act No. 136, sec. 56.) Such jurisdiction included the trial of criminal actions
brought against consuls for, as we have already indicated, consuls, not being
entitled to the privileges and immunities of ambassadors or ministers, are
subject to the laws and regulations of the country where they reside. By
Article XV, section 2, of the Constitution, all laws of the Philippine Islands in
force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution were to continue in
force until the inauguration of the Commonwealth; thereafter, they were to
remain operative, unless inconsistent with the Constitution until amended,
altered, modified, or repealed by the National Assembly. The original
jurisdiction granted to the Courts of First Instance to try criminal cases was
not made exclusively by any, law in force prior to the inauguration of the
Commonwealth, and having reached the conclusion that the jurisdiction
conferred upon this court by the Constitution over cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is not an exclusive
jurisdiction, the laws in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution,
granting the Courts of First Instance jurisdiction in such cases, are not
inconsistent with the Constitution, and must be deemed to remain
operative and in force, subject to the power of the National Assembly to
amend alter, modify, or repeal the same. (Asiatic P. Co. vs. Insular Collector
of Customs, U. S. Supreme Court [Law. ed.], Adv. Ops., vol. 80, No. 12, pp.
620, 623.)

We conclude, therefore, that the Court of First Instance of Manila has

jurisdiction to try the petitioner, an that the petition for a writ of prohibition
must be denied. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, and Recto, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-44 September 13, 1945
LILY RAQUIZA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
LT. COL. L.J. BRADFORD, ET AL., respondents.
Guillermo B. Guevarra for petitioners.
J.A. Wolfson for respondents.
HILADO, J.:
Alleging in their petition for a writ of habeas corpus, dated August 30, 1945,
that they have been and are being "confined, restrained and deprived" of
their liberty in the Correctional Institution for Women, petitioners, Lily
Raquiza, Haydee Tee Han Kee and Emma Link Infante, pray that the officers
therein named, to wit, Lt. Col. L.J. Bradford and Capt. Inez L. Twindle of the
CIC, U.S. Army, "or whoever acts in her place or stead," be directed to
appear before this Court and produce the bodies of petitioners, and to show
cause why petitioners should not forthwith be set at liberty.
Respondent Lt. Col., Bradford, having been served with this Court's order to
show cause dated August 31, 1945, made return thereto dated September
5, 1945, to which are attached as parts thereof certain commitment orders
marked Schedules A, A-1 and A-2, the first and last emanating from the
Headquarters of the Sixth Army, 306th Counter Intelligence Corps
Detachment, and the second from that of the United States Army Forces in
the Far East, 493rd Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment.
Respondent Captain Caroline De Eason, WAC, having been served with this
Court's order to show cause dated September 7, 1945, made return thereto
dated on the same day, incorporating therein by reference Schedules A, A-1
and A-2 of her co-respondents' return above mentioned.
It appears from these returns, as well as from the arguments of counsel,
that by virtue of the proclamation issued by General of the Army MacArthur
on December 29, 1944, petitioner Lily Raquiza was on March 13, 1945,
arrested by the 306th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment of the U.S.
Sixth Army, and detained under Security Commitment Order No. 385
(Schedule A), wherein she was charged as follows:
Commitment Order. — The person named and described above is
deemed a risk to the security of the U.S. Forces for the reasons
set forth above. The commanding officer of any military stockade,
jail, or comparable installation in which this person may be
confined is authorized and directed to detain him in custody until
released by competent military authority.
In said Schedule A the specific complaint or charge against complaint or
charge against petitioner Lily Raquiza is "Espionage activity for Japanese."
As to petitioner Haydee Tee Han Kee, it appears that by virtue of the
aforesaid proclamation she, on February 25, 1945, was arrested by the
same 306th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, and detained under
Security Commitment Order No. 286 (Schedule A-2) wherein the
Commitment Order is in exactly the same terms as in Schedule A. The
specific complaint or charge against petitioner Tee Han Kee in Schedule A-2
is "Active collaboration with the enemy."
With regard to petitioner Emma Link Infante, it appears that by virtue of the
same proclamation she, on April 10, 1945, was arrested by the 493rd
Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment of the United States Army Forces in
the Far East, and detained under Commitment of that date (Schedule A-1),
wherein she was charged with "Active collaboration with the Japanese." Her
previous association with the enemy constitutes a present security risk to
the United States Armed Forces.
The said proclamation reads:
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
PROCLAMATION
PROVIDING FOR MILITARY MEASURES TO BE TAKEN UPON THE
APPREHENSION OF CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES WHO
VOLUNTARILY HAVE GIVEN AID, COMFORT AND SUSTENANCE TO
THE ENEMY.
WHEREAS evidence is before me that certain citizens of the
Philippines voluntarily have given aid, comfort and sustenance to
the enemy in violation of allegiance due the Governments of the
United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines; and
WHEREAS military necessity requires that such persons be enemy
in violation of allegiance due the Governments of the United
States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines; and
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Douglas MacArthur, General of the Army,
United States Army, as Commander-in-Chief Southwest Pacific
Area, hereby do publish and declare it to be my purpose to
remove such persons, when apprehended, from any position of
political and economic influence in the Philippines and to hold
them in restraint for the duration of the war; whereafter I shall
release them to the Philippine Government for its judgment upon
their respective cases.
Done at General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, in the
field, this twenty-ninth day of December, 1944.
DOUGLAS MACARTHUR
General of the Army
United States Army
Commander-in-Chief
Of course, the power of the Commander in Chief of the United States Army
to issue the foregoing proclamation cannot be seriously questioned. It has
not been questioned in this case. Where opinions are divided as to its
interpretation and effects.
General of the Army MacArthur therein published and declared it to be his
purpose, among other things, to hold in restraint the persons referred to,
when apprehended, "for the duration of the war; whereafter, I shall release
them to the Philippine Government for its judgment upon their respective
cases." He premised his proclamation upon two grave reasons, to wit, (1)
that evidence was before him "that certain citizens of the Philippines
voluntarily have given aid, comfort and sustenance to the enemy in violation
of allegiance due the Government of the United States and the
Commonwealth of the Philippines;" and (2) that "military necessity requires
that such persons be removed from any opportunity to threaten the
security of our military forces or the success of our military operations."
In the very nature of things, the Commander in Chief of the Army of
liberation at the time of issuing that proclamation had to act upon the
evidence then before him. The exigencies of the mighty military operations
that he had then but recently begun for the destruction or defeat of the
powerful enemy who was at that time occupying the Islands, did not permit
of any other procedure. And to deny him the exclusive power and
competency to determine the strength and sufficiency of such evidence
would have been destructive of that military efficieny with which, in the
interest of all the citizens of the Philippines themselves, not excluding the
herein petitioners, the operations for their liberation had to be conducted.
And once having apprehended the persons to whom the proclamation
referred, the same exigencies required that the said Commander in Chief be
invested with the exclusive power and authority to decide when he should
deliver them to the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
Has the war terminated within the meaning of that part of his proclamation
wherein the Commander in Chief declared his purpose to hold such persons
in restraint "for the duration of the war"? We are of opinion that it has not.
In the case of United States vs. Tubig (3 Phil., 244, 254), this Court said:
From that day the fighting continued, and the insurrection did not
end officially until the President proclaimed it an end, July 4,
1902. It is necessary to refer to a public act of the Executive
Department to fix the date of the closing of the war.
(Freeborn vs. The Protector, 79 U.S., 700.)
If it be alleged that, notwithstanding the insurrection, there were
no actual hostilities in Nueva Ecija at the times above mentioned,
the answer is that the condition of hostility remained impressed
on the whole island until it was removed by the proclamation of
the President. . . .
War, in the legal sense, continues until, and terminates at the
time of, some formal proclamation of peace by an authority
competent to proclaim it. It is the province of the political
department, and not of the judicial department, of government
to determine when war is at an end. . . . (67 C.J., 429, sec. 195.)
And even if the war had terminated, we are of opinion that under the
aforesaid proclamation the petitioners, who are held in restraint
thereunder, would continue legally under custody of the proper military
authorities of General of the Army MacArthur's or his successors' command,
for a reasonable time after termination of the war.
If General of the Army MacArthur had, in express terms, declared in his
aforesaid proclamation that after termination of the war he will release the
persons therein named to the Philippine Government within a reasonable
time, we think that he could have done so within his legitimate powers as
Commander in Chief of the United States Army; and not only this, but that
for obvious reasons he should be the best and, therefore, the only judge of
how long or how short that time should be under the circumstances. And in
order to give his proclamation a reasonable construction, we are of opinion
that this should be implied from the context. Otherwise, we would be giving
to this solemn document the irrational interpretation that said Commander
in Chief thereby announced a purpose which would be physically impossible
for him to carry out; namely, to make delivery to the Philippine
Government immediately upon termination of the war of persons under
restraint whose number he could not then foresee but which he could
reasonably expect to be more or less considerable, with their respective
charges and pertinent evidence, papers, and the like. It was not a matter of
delivering a certain quantity or amount of personal property but human
beings who although under custody, had to be properly housed, maintained
and otherwise treated as becoming the "dignity of the human person,"
which is one of the cardinal principles of democracy for which the United
Nations have fought in this war.
The fact that, as this Court can take judicial notice of, delivery of certain
persons under custody of the United States Army pursuant to the said
proclamation has already begun does not mean that the war has, in the
legal sense, already terminated, which it clearly has not. Such delivery is
undoubtedly within the power of the proper military authorities to make
even before the termination of the war. The existence of the military
necessity to which General of the Army MacArthur refers in his
proclamation, as well as its continuance, is a question exclusively for the
military authorities to determine, as regards each and every person under
detention. For obvious reasons, the civil courts should not here interfere,
and it is to be presumed that in the judgment of said military authorities
that necessity no longer requires the detention by them of the persons
whom they have already delivered to the Philippine Government.
In the case of Coleman vs. Tennessee (97 U.S., 509), the Supreme Court of
the United States, among other things, said:
It is well settled that a foreign army, permitted to march through
a friendly country or to be stationed in it, by permission of its
government or sovereign, is exempt from the civil and the
criminal jurisdiction of the place. The sovereign is understood,
said this court in the celebrated case of The Exchange, 7 Cranch,
139, to cede a portion of his territorial jurisdiction when he allows
the troops of a foreign prince to pass through his dominions: "In
such case, without any express declaration waiving jurisdiction
over the army to which this right of passage has been granted, it
would certainly be considered as violating his faith. By exercising
it, the purpose for which the free passage was granted would be
defeated, and a portion of the military force of a foreign
independent nation would be diverted from those national
objects and duties to which it was applicable, and would be
withdrawn from the control of the sovereign whose power and
whose safety might greatly depend on retaining the exclusive
command and disposition of this force. The grant of a free
passage, therefore, implies a waiver of all jurisdiction over the
troops during their passage, and permits the foreign general to
use that discipline and to inflict those punishments which the
government of this army may require." (Emphasis ours.)
In the case of the United States Army of liberation, not only has the
Commonwealth Government asked, and the United States Government
agreed, that it come and be stationed in the Philippines, but it is here for the
very realization of the overruling and vehement desire and dream of the
Filipino to be freed from the shackles of Japanese tyranny, and to see this
was brought to a victorious end. If a foreign army permitted to be stationed
in a friendly country, "by permission of its government or sovereign," is
exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place, with much more
reason should the Army of the United States which is not only permitted by
the Commonwealth Government to be stationed here but has come to the
islands and stayed in them for the express purpose of liberating them, and
further prosecuting the war to a successful conclusion, be exempt from the
civil and criminal jurisdiction of this place, at least for the time covered by
said agreement of the two Governments. By analogy, an attempt of our civil
courts to exercise jurisdiction over the United States Army before such
period expires, would be considered as a violation of this country's faith,
which this Court should not be the last to keep and uphold. By exercising it,
paraphrasing the foregoing quotation, the purpose for which the stationing
of the army in the islands was requested or agreed upon may be hampered
or prejudiced, and a portion of said military force would be withdrawn from
the control of the sovereign to whom they belong. And, again, by analogy,
the agreement, for the stationing of the United States Army or a part of its
forces in the Philippines implies as a waiver of all jurisdiction over their
troops during the time covered by such agreement, and permits the allied
general or commander in chief to retain that exclusive control and discipline
which the government of his army may require.
Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of the Schooner Exchange (7 Cranch, 139), Whether the doctrine here laid down would be applicable to cases arising in
gave the reasons underlying the doctrine of mutual waiver of jurisdiction time of peace, we do not decide.
between nations in the following paragraphs:
In conclusion, we hold that the petition should be dismissed. No special
The world being composed of distinct sovereignties, possessing pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
equal rights and equal independence, whose mutual benefit is
promoted by intercourse with each other, and by an interchange Moran, C. J., Jaranilla, Feria, De Joya and Pablo, JJ., concur.
of those good offices which humanity dictates and its wants
require, all sovereigns have consented to a relaxation in practice,
in cases under certain peculiar circumstances, of that absolute
and complete jurisdiction within their respective territories which
sovereignty confers.

xxx xxx xxx

This perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns,

and this common interest impelling them to mutual intercourse,
and interchange of good offices with each other, have given rise
to a class of cases in which every sovereign is understood to
waive the exercise of a part of that complete exclusive territorial
jurisdiction, which has been stated to be the attribute of every
nation.

Furthermore, we are of the opinion that the present petitioners, while

under the custody of the United States military forces, may be considered as
prisoners of war. In volume II, Hydee International Law, page 345, section
676, we read:

. . . It should be borne in mind that an army in the field, in the

course of any operation in any locality . . . may also avail itself, of
the right to make civilians prisoners of war.

The author cites from the Rules of Land Warfare which contain an
enumeration of civilians who may be made prisoners of war. This
enumeration includes:

(c) Persons whose services are of a particular use and benefit to

the hostile army or its government, such as the higher civil
officials, diplomatic agents, couriers, guides, etc. . . . (Emphasis
ours.)

We think that the petitioners would prima facie come within this
classification under the charges of "Espionage activity for Japanese," "Active
collaboration with the Japanese," and "Active collaboration with the
enemy."

We are not unmindful of the fact that the detention of the petitioners may
have subjected them to hardships, but this situation is one of those born of
all wars where hardships of all description are visited upon even the most
innocent people. At any rate, we do not think that the petitioners are totally
without remedy. We think they may have recourse to the proper military
authorities by making due representation to them.

These military authorities, we can safely presume, will not deny to the
petitioners any remedy which may be available under the military laws and
under the prevailing circumstances. The United States army forces which
have come to the Philippines for the express purpose of liberating the
Filipinos and to restore them the blessings of liberty under a democratic
government, just as fast as the military situation would permit, would not be
— we can justly assume — the very ones to take from them any of those
liberties without legal reason or justification. But the present state of the
world is such that military exigencies or military necessity may, under
certain circumstances, still require some limitation on the restoration or
enjoyment of those liberties. The present case is, in our opinion, one such
situation.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 97765. September 24, 1992.]
KHOSROW MINUCHER, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
and ARTHUR W. SCALZO, JR., Respondents.
De Leon, De Leon, Casanova Associates for Petitioner.
Luna, Sison, & Manas for Private Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI; DISMISSAL OF
ACTION BASED ON ERRONEOUS ASSUMPTION, A GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION. — While the trial court correctly denied the motion to dismiss,
the public respondent gravely abused its discretion in dismissing Civil Case
No. 88-45691 on the basis of an erroneous assumption that simply because
of the Diplomatic Note, the private respondent is clothed with diplomatic
immunity, thereby divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over his person.
Private respondent himself, in his Pre-trial Brief filed on 13 June 1990,
unequivocally states that he would present documentary evidence
consisting of DEA records on his investigation and surveillance of plaintiff
and on his position and duties as DEA special agent in Manila. Having thus
reserved his right to present evidence in support of his position, which is the
basis for the alleged diplomatic immunity, the barren self-serving claim in
the belated motion to dismiss cannot be relied upon for a reasonable,
intelligent and fair resolution of the issue of diplomatic immunity. The public
respondent then should have sustained the trial court’s denial of the motion
to dismiss. Verily, such should have been the most proper and appropriate
recourse. It should not have been overwhelmed by the self-serving
Diplomatic Note whose belated issuance is even suspect and whose
authenticity has not yet been proved. The undue haste with which
respondent Court yielded to the private respondent’s claim is arbitrary.
2. ID.; ACTIONS; MOTION TO DISMISS; GROUNDS; LACK OF CAUSE OF
ACTION WHERE DEFENDANT IS A DIPLOMAT. — It may at once be stated
that even if the private respondent enjoys diplomatic immunity, a dismissal
of the case cannot be ordered on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over his
person, but rather for lack of a cause of action because even if he
committed the imputed act and could have been otherwise made liable
therefor, his immunity would bar any suit against him in connection
therewith and would prevent recovery of damages arising therefrom.
3. ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON, HOW ACQUIRED; CASE AT BAR.
— Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired either by his
voluntary appearance or by the service of summons upon him. While in the
instant case, private respondent’s counsel filed, on 26 October 1988, a
motion to quash summons because being outside the Philippines and being
a non-resident alien, he is beyond the processes of the court, which was
properly denied by the trial court, he had in effect already waived any
defect in the service of the summons by earlier asking, on two (2) occasions,
for an extension of time to file an answer, and by ultimately filing an Answer
with Counterclaim. There is no question that the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the private Respondent.
4. ID.; ID.; MOTION TO DISMISS; CASE SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED WHERE
THERE IS SUFFICIENT ALLEGATION OF PERSONAL LIABILITY OF DEFENDANT;
CASE AT BAR. — And now to the core issue — the alleged diplomatic
immunity of the private Respondent. Setting aside for the moment the issue
of authenticity raised by the petitioner and the doubts that surround such a
claim, in view of the fact that it took private respondent one (1) year, eight
(8) months and seventeen (17) days from the time his counsel filed on 12
September 1988 a Special Appearance and Motion asking for a first
extension of time to file the Answer because the Departments of State and
Justice of the United States of America were studying the case for the
purpose of determining his defenses, before he could secure the Diplomatic
Note from the U.S. Embassy in Manila, and even granting for the sake of
argument that such note is authentic, the complaint for damages filed by
the petitioner still cannot be peremptorily dismissed. Said complaint
contains sufficient allegations which indicate that the private respondent
committed the imputed acts in his personal capacity and outside the scope
of his official duties and functions. As described in the complaint, he
committed criminal acts for which he is also civilly liable. In the Special
Appearance to Quash Summons earlier alluded to, on the other hand,
private respondent maintains that the claim for damages arose "from an
alleged tort." Whether such claim arises from criminal acts or from tort,
there can be no question that private respondent was sued in his personal
capacity for acts committed outside his official functions and duties. In the
decision acquitting the petitioner in the criminal case involving the violation
of the Dangerous Drugs Act, copy of which is attached to his complaint for
damages and which must be deemed as an integral part thereof, the trial
court gave full credit to petitioner’s theory that he was a victim of a frame-
up instigated by the private Respondent. Thus, there is a prima facie
showing in the complaint that indeed private respondent could be held
personally liable for the acts committed beyond his official functions or
duties.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
May a complaint for damages be dismissed on the sole basis of a statement
contained in a Diplomatic Note, belatedly issued after an answer to the said
complaint had already been filed, that the defendant was a member of the
diplomatic staff of the United States Diplomatic Mission in the Philippines at
the time the cause of action accrued?
This is the issue in the instant petition.
On 3 August 1988, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila a complaint for damages against private respondent Arthur Scalzo,
Jr. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 88-45691 and was raffled off to
Branch 19 of said court. 1 Petitioner alleges therein that he was the Labor
Attache of the Embassy of Iran in the Philippines "prior to the Ayatollah
Khomeini regime." On 13 May 1986, private respondent, then connected
with the American Embassy in Manila, was introduced to him by a certain
Jose Iñigo, an informer belonging to the military intelligence community,
with whom petitioner had several business transactions involving Iranian
products like carpets, caviar and others. Iñigo had previously sought
petitioner’s assistance in connection with charges of illegal recruitment.
According to Iñigo, private respondent was purportedly interested in buying
Iranian products, namely caviar and carpets. On this same occasion,
petitioner complained to the private respondent about the problems the
former was then encountering with the American Embassy regarding the
expired visas of his wife and fellow Iranian, Abbas Torabian. Offering his
help, private respondent gave the petitioner a calling card showing that the
former is an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA),
Department of Justice, of the United States of America assigned to the
American Embassy in Manila with official contacts with a certain Col.
Dumlao; head of the Anti-Narcotics Command, Philippine Constabulary.
Private respondent also expressed his intent to purchase two (2) kilos of
caviar worth P10,000.00 and informed the petitioner that he might have
prospective buyers for these goods; he further promised to arrange for the
renewal of the aforesaid visas for a $2,000.00 fee. On 19 May 1986, private
respondent invited petitioner to dinner at Mario’s Restaurant in Makati,
Metro Manila; the petitioner accepted. During the said dinner held the very
next day, both discussed politics and business. Specifically, private
respondent told petitioner that he wanted to purchase an additional two
hundred (200) grams of caviar and inquired about his commission for selling
petitioner’s carpets; petitioner promised a 10% commission based on
profits.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
In the evening of 26 May 1986, private respondent came to petitioner’s
residence and asked to be entrusted with a pair of Persian silk carpets with a
floor Price of $24,000.00 each, for which he had a buyer. The following day,
private respondent returned to petitioner’s residence, took the carpets and
gave the latter $24,000.00; after about an hour, private respondent
returned, claimed that he had already made arrangements with his contacts
at the American Embassy concerning the visas and asked for $2,000.00. He
was given this amount. It turned out, however, that private respondent had
prepared an elaborate plan to frame-up the petitioner and Abbas Torabian
for alleged heroin trafficking; both were falsely arrested by private
respondent and some American and Filipino police officers, and were taken
to Camp Crame in their underwear. Private respondent and his companions
took petitioner’s three (3) suitcases containing various documents, his
wallet containing money and the keys to his house and car, as well as the
$24,000.00 which private respondent had earlier delivered to him.
Petitioner and Torabian were handcuffed together for three (3) days and
were not given food and water; they were asked to confess to the
possession of heroin or else they would be jailed or even executed by
Iranian terrorists. Consequently, the two were charged for the violation of
Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig. They were, however, acquitted by the said
court on 8 January 1988. Private respondent testified for the prosecution in
the said case.
Petitioner further alleges in his complaint that private respondent falsely
testified against him in the criminal case. The former also avers that charges
of unlawful arrest, robbery and estafa or swindling have already been filed
against the private Respondent.
He therefore prays for actual and compensatory damages of not less than
P480,000,00 ($24,000.00) representing the fair market value of the Persian
silk carpet and $2,000.00 representing the refund of the amount he had
given for the visas; moral damages in the amount of P5 million; exemplary
damages in the sum of P100,000.00 and attorney’s fees of at least
P200,000.00 to answer for litigation expenses incurred for his defense in the
criminal case and for the prosecution of the civil case.chanrobles law library
On 14 September 1988, private respondent’s counsel, the law firm LUNA,
SISON AND MANAS, filed a Special Appearance and Motion alleging therein
that since the private respondent is an agent of the Drug Enforcement
Administration of the United States of America, and the acts and omissions
complained of were performed by him in the performance of official
functions, the case is now under study by the Departments of State and
Justice in Washington, D.C. for the purpose of determining what defenses
would be appropriate; said counsel also prayed that the period to answer be
extended to 13 October 1988. 2 This prayer was granted in the 16
September 1988 order of the court.
On 12 October 1988, private respondent’s aforesaid counsel filed another
Special Appearance and Motion seeking a further extension of the period to
answer to 28 October 1988 because the law firm had not yet received the
decision of the Departments of State and Justice. 3
On 27 October 1988, private respondent’s counsel filed a Special
Appearance to Quash Summons 4 alleging therein that: "The action being a
personal action for damages arising from an alleged tort, the defendant
being outside the Philippines and not being a resident of the Philippines,
Defendant is beyond the processes of this court," and praying that the
summons issued be quashed. The trial court denied the motion in its Order
of 13 December 1988. 5 Unsatisfied with the said order, private respondent
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which was docketed
as C.A.-G R. SP No 17023. In its Decision promulgated on 6 October 1989,
the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit. 6 Respondent
thus sought a review of the said decision by filing a petition with this Court
which was docketed as G.R. No. 91173. Said petition was however,
dismissed by this Court in the Resolution of 20 December 1989 for non-
compliance with paragraph 2 of Circular No. 1-88; moreover, respondent
failed to show that the Court of Appeals had committed any reversible error
in the questioned judgment. 7
On 9 March 1990, private respondent filed with the trial court his Answer in
Civil Case No. 88-46591 8 wherein he denies the material allegations in the
complaint, sets forth the following Affirmative
Defenses:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Complaint fails to state a cause of action: in having plaintiff and Abbas
Torabian arrested on May 27, 1986 and detained at Camp Crame; a quantity
of heroin, seized from plaintiff by Philippine police authorities and in seizing
the money used in the drug transaction, defendant acted in the discharge of
his official duties or otherwise in the performance of his official functions as
agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Department of Justice."
9
and interposes a counterclaim for P100,000.00 to answer for attorney’s fees
and the expenses of litigation.chanrobles law library : red
On 13 June 1990, private respondent filed with the trial court the
Defendant’s Pre-Trial Brief, 10 the pertinent portions of which
read:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x
"DEFENSES
1. Plaintiff’s complaint is false and malicious;
2. In having a quantity of heroin and the money used in the drug transaction
between him and plaintiff seized from plaintiff by P.C. NARCOM, plaintiff
(sic) was acting in the discharge of his official functions as special agent of
the Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Department of Justice and was
then a member of the U.S. diplomatic mission in the Philippines.
DEFENDANT’S EVIDENCE
Defendant will present:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. His testimony by deposition upon written interrogatories because
defendant lives and works outside the Philippines and is not a resident of
the Philippines.
2. Documentary evidence, consisting of DEA records on his investigation and
surveillance of plaintiff and on his position and duties as DEA special agent
in May 1980 in Manila; these will be identified by defendant and possibly by
another DEA official." 11
On 14 June 1990, private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss 12 the case
on the ground that as per the copy of Diplomatic Note No. 414 issued by the
Embassy of the United States of America, 13 dated 29 May 1990 and
certified to be a true and faithful copy of the original by one Donald K.
Woodward, Vice-Consul of the United States of America on 11 June 1990,
14 the Embassy advised the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
the Philippines that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . Arthur W. Scalzo, was a member of the diplomatic staff of the United
States diplomatic mission from his arrival in the Philippines on October 14,
1985 until his departure on August 10, 1988. . . .
. . . in May 1986, with the cooperation of Philippine law enforcement
officials and in the exercise of his functions as a member of the mission, Mr.
Scalzo investigated Mr. Khosrow Minucher, the plaintiff in the
aforementioned case for allegedly trafficking in a prohibited drug. It is this
investigation which has given rise to the plaintiff’s complaint. The Embassy
takes note of the provisions of Article 39(2) of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, which provides that Mr. Scalzo retains immunity from
civil suit for acts performed in the exercise of his functions, as is the case
here, even though he has departed (sic) the country." chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary

Petitioner opposed the motion.
On 25 June 1990, the trial court issued an order denying the motion for
being "devoid of merit." 15
Private respondent then filed with the public respondent Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari, docketed therein as C.A.-G.R. SP No. 22505, to nullify
the aforesaid Order of 25 June 1990.
On 31 October 1990, public respondent promulgated a Decision 16 ordering
the dismissal of Civil Case No. 88-45691 due to the trial court’s lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant because the latter possessed
diplomatic immunity.
Petitioner’s motion to reconsider the decision was denied in the public
respondent’s Resolution of 8 March 1991 because:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"When therefore Mr. Scalzo testified in the Criminal Case against Khosrow
Minucher it was in connection with his official functions as an agent of the
Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States and member (sic) of
the American Mission charged with cooperating with the Philippine law
enforcement agency. He therefore, enjoys immunity from criminal and civil
jurisdiction of the receiving State under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations." 17
Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner declares that the public respondent erred:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"I. . . . IN NOT DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY SCALZO.
II. . . . IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT SCALZO IS A DIPLOMAT
IMMUNE FROM CIVIL SUIT CONFORMABLY WITH THE VIENNA CONVENTION
ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.
III. . . . IN NOT FINDING THAT SCALZO’S PARTICIPATION IN THE BUY-BUST
OPERATION IS OUTSIDE OF HIS OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS, HENCE, THAT HE IS
NOT IMMUNE FROM SUIT UNDER THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS." 18
After private respondent filed his Comment to the petition and the
petitioner submitted his Reply thereto, this Court gave due course to the
same and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda,
which they subsequently did.
We find merit in the petition.
While the trial court correctly denied the motion to dismiss, the public
respondent gravely abused its discretion in dismissing Civil Case No 88-
45691 on the basis of an erroneous assumption that simply because of the
Diplomatic Note, the private respondent is clothed with diplomatic
immunity, thereby divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over his person. It
may at once be stated that even if the private respondent enjoys diplomatic
immunity, a dismissal of the case cannot be ordered on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction over his person, but rather for lack of a cause of action
because even if he committed the imputed act and could have been
otherwise made liable therefor, his immunity would bar any suit against him
in connection therewith and would prevent recovery of damages arising
therefrom. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired either
by his voluntary appearance or by the service of summons upon him. While
in the instant case, private respondent’s counsel filed, on 26 October 1988,
a motion to quash summons because being outside the Philippines and
being a non-resident alien, he is beyond the processes of the court, which
was properly denied by the trial court, he had in effect already waived any
defect in the service of the summons by earlier asking, on two (2) occasions,
for an extension of time to file an answer, and by ultimately filing an Answer
with Counterclaim. There is no question that the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the private Respondent.cralawnad
And now to the core issue — the alleged diplomatic immunity of the
private Respondent. Setting aside for the moment the issue of authenticity
raised by the petitioner and the doubts that surround such a claim, in view
of the fact that it took private respondent one (1) year, eight (8) months and
seventeen (17) days from the time his counsel filed on 12 September 1988 a
Special Appearance and Motion asking for a first extension of time to file the
Answer because the Departments of State and Justice of the United States
of America were studying the case for the purpose of determining his
defenses, before he could secure the Diplomatic Note from the U.S.
Embassy in Manila, and even granting for the sake of argument that such
note is authentic, the complaint for damages filed by the petitioner still
cannot be peremptorily dismissed. Said complaint contains sufficient
allegations which indicate that the private respondent committed the
imputed acts in his personal capacity and outside the scope of his official
duties and functions. As described in the complaint, he committed criminal
acts for which he is also civilly liable. In the Special Appearance to Quash
Summons earlier alluded to, on the other hand, private respondent
maintains that the claim for damages arose "from an alleged tort." Whether
such claim arises from criminal acts or from tort, there can be no question
that private respondent was sued in his personal capacity for acts
committed outside his official functions and duties. In the decision
acquitting the petitioner in the criminal case involving the violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, copy of which is attached to his complaint for
damages and which must be deemed as an integral part thereof, the trial
court gave full credit to petitioner’s theory that he was a victim of a frame-
up instigated by the private Respondent. Thus, there is a prima facie
showing in the complaint that indeed private respondent could be held
personally liable for the acts committed beyond his official functions or
duties.
In Shauf v. Court of Appeals, 19 after citing pertinent authorities, 20 this
Court ruled:chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
"The aforecited authorities are clear on the matter. They state that the
doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be involved
where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as
an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents
of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual
capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without
authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled
principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private
capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with
malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction
(Dumlao v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., 114 SCRA 247 [1982])."cralaw virtua1aw
library
Even Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations admits of
exceptions. It reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of
the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and
administrative jurisdiction except in the case of:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
x x x
(c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by
the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions.
(Emphasis supplied).
There is of course the claim of private respondent that the acts imputed to
him were done in his official capacity. Nothing supports this self-serving
claim other than the so-called Diplomatic Note. In short, insofar as the
records are concerned, private respondent did not come forward with
evidence to prove that indeed, he had acted in his official capacity. It does
not appear that an actual hearing on the motion to dismiss was conducted
and that private respondent offered evidence in support thereof. Thus, it is
apropos to quote what this Court stated in United States of America v.
Guinto: 21

"But even as we are certain that the individual petitioners in G.R. No. 80018
were acting in the discharge of their official functions, we hesitate to make
the same conclusion in G.R. No. 80258. The contradictory factual allegations
in this case deserve in our view a closer study of what actually happened to
the plaintiffs. The record is too meager to indicate if the defendants were
really discharging their official duties or had actually exceeded their
authority when the incident in question occurred. Lacking this information,
this Court cannot directly decide this case. The needed inquiry must first be
made by the lower court so it may assess and resolve the conflicting claims
of the parties on the basis of the evidence that has yet to be presented at
the trial. Only after it shall have determined in what capacity the petitioners
were acting at the time of the incident in question will this Court determine,
if still necessary, if the doctrine of state immunity is applicable."cralaw
virtua1aw library

It may be mentioned in this regard that private respondent himself, in his

Pre-trial Brief filed on 13 June 1990, unequivocally states that he would
present documentary evidence consisting of DEA records on his
investigation and surveillance of plaintiff and on his position and duties as
DEA special agent in Manila. Having thus reserved his right to present
evidence in support of his position, which is the basis for the alleged
diplomatic immunity, the barren self-serving claim in the belated motion to
dismiss cannot be relied upon for a reasonable, intelligent and fair
resolution of the issue of diplomatic immunity.

The public respondent then should have sustained the trial court’s denial of
the motion to dismiss. Verily, such should have been the most proper and
appropriate recourse. It should not have been overwhelmed by the self-
serving Diplomatic Note whose belated issuance is even suspect and whose
authenticity has not yet been proved. The undue haste with which
respondent Court yielded to the private respondent’s claim is arbitrary.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of public respondent of 31 October

1990 in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 22505 is SET ASIDE and the Order of 25 June 1990
of Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 88-45691
denying private respondent’s Motion to Dismiss is hereby REINSTATED.

Costs against private Respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines admiralty or maritime cases, this is not true with respect to criminal cases. If
SUPREME COURT any doubt could arise concerning the true meaning of the law applicable to
Manila the case, Act No. 400 effectively dissipates such doubts.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-496 December 31, 1902
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellant,
vs.
WILLIAM FOWLER, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Assistant Attorney-General Constantino, for appellant.
William Lane O'Neill, for appellees.
TORRES, J.:
The two defendants have been accused of the theft of sixteen bottles of
champagne of the value of $20, on the 12th August, 1901, while on board
the transport Lawton, then navigating the high seas, which said bottles of
champagne formed part of the cargo of the said vessel and were the
property of Julian Lindsay, and which were taken lucri causa, and with the
intent to appropriate the same, without violence or intimidation, and
without the consent of the owner, against the statute in the case made and
provided.
This law, which is an addition to Act No. 136, by which the courts of justice
of the Philippine Islands were organized, in article 1 adds to article 56,
consisting of seven paragraphs, another paragraph numbered 8, which
reads as follows: "Of all crimes and offenses committed on the high seas or
beyond the jurisdiction of any country, or within any of the navigable waters
of the Philippine Archipelago, on board a ship or water craft of any kind
registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands in accordance with the laws
thereof." The purpose of this law was to define the jurisdiction of the courts
of First Instance in criminal cases for crimes committed on board vessels
registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands. The transport Lawton not
being a vessel of this class, our courts are without jurisdiction to take
cognizance of a crime committed on board the same.
Upon these grounds we consider that the order appealed should be
affirmed, with the costs de oficio. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Cooper, Smith, Willard, Mapa, and Ladd, JJ., concur.

The accused having been brought before the court, the prosecuting
attorney being present on behalf of the Government, counsel for the
defendants presented a demurrer, alleging that the Court of First Instance
was without jurisdiction to try the crime charged, inasmuch as it appeared
from the information that the crime was committed on the high seas, and
not in the city of Manila, or within the territory comprising the Bay of
Manila, or upon the seas within the 3-mile limit to which the jurisdiction of
the court extends, and asked, upon these grounds, that the case be
dismissed.

This contention was opposed by the prosecuting attorney, who alleged that
the court has original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which the penalty
exceeds six month's imprisonment, or a fine of over $100; that, in
accordance with the orders of the Military Governor and the Civil
Commission admiralty jurisdiction over all crimes committed on board
vessel flying the flag of the United States has been vested in the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila. Among other laws and orders he cited
the order of August 14, 1898, and Acts Nos. 76 and 186 of the United States
Civil Commission. He argued that the President of the United States had
unquestionable authority to authorize the commanding general and the Civil
Commission to establish a judicial system with authority to take cognizance
of maritime and admiralty causes, citing a decision of the Supreme Court of
the United States in support of this doctrine, which was applicable to this
Archipelago, which is now analogous to the status of some of the States of
the Union during the Mexican war and the war of secession.

The judge, however, by an order of the 14th of September, 1901, held that
the court was without jurisdiction to try the accused for the theft alleged to
have been committed on the high seas, sustained the demurrer, and
ordered the discharge of the defendants, with the costs to the Government.
Against this order the prosecuting attorney appealed, and the case was
brought before this court.

This case deals with a theft committed on board a transport while

navigating the high seas. Act No. 136 of the organic law, as well as Act No.
186 passed by the Civil Commission, and which repealed the former law, Act
No. 76, do not expressly confer jurisdiction or authority upon this court to
take cognizance of all crimes committed on board vessels on the high seas.
While the provisions of the law are clear and precise with respect to civil
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5270 January 15, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
H. N. BULL, defendant-appellant.
Bruce & Lawrence, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.
ELLIOTT, J.:
The appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of a violation of
section 1 of Act No. 55, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 275, and from
the judgment entered thereon appealed to this court, where under proper
assignments of error he contends: (1) that the complaint does not state
facts sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court; (2) that under the
evidence the trial court was without jurisdiction to hear and determine the
case; (3) that Act No. 55 as amended is in violation of certain provisions of
the Constitution of the United States, and void as applied to the facts of this
case; and (4) that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction.
The information alleges:
That on and for many months prior to the 2d day of December,
1908, the said H. N. Bull was then and there master of a steam
sailing vessel known as the steamship Standard, which vessel was
then and there engaged in carrying and transporting cattle,
carabaos, and other animals from a foreign port and city of
Manila, Philippine Islands; that the said accused H. N. Bull, while
master of said vessel, as aforesaid, on or about the 2d day of
December, 1908, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
wrongly carry, transport, and bring into the port and city of
Manila, aboard said vessel, from the port of Ampieng, Formosa,
six hundred and seventy-seven (677) head of cattle and carabaos,
without providing suitable means for securing said animals while
in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the
said animals, in this, to wit, that the said H. N. Bull, master, as
aforesaid, did then and there fail to provide stalls for said animals
so in transit and suitable means for trying and securing said
animals in a proper manner, and did then and there cause some
of said animals to be tied by means of rings passed through their
noses, and allow and permit others to be transported loose in the
hold and on the deck of said vessel without being tied or secured
in stalls, and all without bedding; that by reason of the aforesaid
neglect and failure of the accused to provide suitable means for
securing said animals while so in transit, the noses of some of said
animals were cruelly torn, and many of said animals were tossed
about upon the decks and hold of said vessel, and cruelly
wounded, bruised, and killed.
All contrary to the provisions of Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the
Philippine Commission.
Section 1 of Act No. 55, which went into effect January 1, 1901, provides
that —
The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying
or transporting cattle, sheep, swine, or other animals, from one
port in the Philippine Islands to another, or from any foreign port
to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall carry with them,
upon the vessels carrying such animals, sufficient forage and
fresh water to provide for the suitable sustenance of such
animals during the ordinary period occupied by the vessel in
passage from the port of shipment to the port of debarkation,
and shall cause such animals to be provided with adequate forage
and fresh water at least once in every twenty-four hours from the
time that the animals are embarked to the time of their final
debarkation.
By Act No. 275, enacted October 23, 1901, Act No. 55 was amended by
adding to section 1 thereof the following:
The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying
or transporting cattle, sheep, swine, or other animals from one
port in the Philippine Islands to another, or from any foreign port
to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall provide suitable
means for securing such animals while in transit so as to avoid all
cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the animals, and suitable
and proper facilities for loading and unloading cattle or other
animals upon or from vessels upon which they are transported,
without cruelty or unnecessary suffering. It is hereby made
unlawful to load or unload cattle upon or from vessels by
swinging them over the side by means of ropes or chains
attached to the thorns.
Section 3 of Act No. 55 provides that —
Any owner or master of a vessel, or custodian of such animals,
who knowingly and willfully fails to comply with the provisions of
section one, shall, for every such failure, be liable to pay a penalty
of not less that one hundred dollars nor more that five hundred
dollars, United States money, for each offense. Prosecution under
this Act may be instituted in any Court of First Instance or any
provost court organized in the province or port in which such
animals are disembarked.
1. It is contended that the information is insufficient because it does not
state that the court was sitting at a port where the cattle were disembarked,
or that the offense was committed on board a vessel registered and
licensed under the laws of the Philippine Islands.
Act No. 55 confers jurisdiction over the offense created thereby on Courts
of First Instance or any provost court organized in the province or port in
which such animals are disembarked, and there is nothing inconsistent
therewith in Act No. 136, which provides generally for the organization of
the courts of the Philippine Islands. Act No. 400 merely extends the general
jurisdiction of the courts over certain offenses committed on the high seas,
or beyond the jurisdiction of any country, or within any of the waters of the
Philippine Islands on board a ship or water craft of any kind registered or
licensed in the Philippine Islands, in accordance with the laws thereof.
(U.S. vs. Fowler, 1 Phil. Rep., 614.) This jurisdiction may be exercised by the
Court of First Instance in any province into which such ship or water upon
which the offense or crime was committed shall come after the commission
thereof. Had this offense been committed upon a ship carrying a Philippine
registry, there could have been no doubt of the Jurisdiction of the court,
because it is expressly conferred, and the Act is in accordance with well
recognized and established public law. But the Standard was a Norwegian
vessel, and it is conceded that it was not registered or licensed in the
Philippine Islands under the laws thereof. We have then the question
whether the court had jurisdiction over an offense of this character,
committed on board a foreign ship by the master thereof, when the neglect
and omission which constitutes the offense continued during the time the
ship was within the territorial waters of the United States. No court of the
Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offenses or crime committed on
the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but when
she came within 3 miles of a line drawn from the headlines which embrace
the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new set
of principles became applicable. (Wheaton, Int. Law (Dana ed.), p. 255, note
105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., sec 490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The
ship and her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial
sovereign subject through the proper political agency. This offense was
committed within territorial waters. From the line which determines these
waters the Standard must have traveled at least 25 miles before she came
to anchor. During that part of her voyage the violation of the statue
continued, and as far as the jurisdiction of the court is concerned, it is
immaterial that the same conditions may have existed while the vessel was
on the high seas. The offense, assuming that it originated at the port of
departure in Formosa, was a continuing one, and every element necessary
to constitute it existed during the voyage across the territorial waters. The
completed forbidden act was done within American waters, and the court
therefore had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the offense and the
person of the offender.
The offense then was thus committed within the territorial jurisdiction of
the court, but the objection to the jurisdiction raises the further question
whether that jurisdiction is restricted by the fact of the nationality of the
ship. Every. Every state has complete control and jurisdiction over its
territorial waters. According to strict legal right, even public vessels may not
enter the ports of a friendly power without permission, but it is now
conceded that in the absence of a prohibition such ports are considered as
open to the public ship of all friendly powers. The exemption of such vessels
from local jurisdiction while within such waters was not established until
within comparatively recent times. In 1794, Attorney-General Bradford, and
in 1796 Attorney-General Lee, rendered opinions to the effect that "the
laws of nations invest the commander of a foreign ship of war with no
exemption from the jurisdiction of the country into which he comes." (1, Op.
U.S. Attys. Gen., 46, 87.) This theory was also supported by Lord Stowell in
an opinion given by him to the British Government as late as 1820. In the
leading case of the Schooner Exchange vs. McFadden (7 Cranch (U.S.), 116,
144), Chief Justice Marshall said that the implied license under which such
vessels enter a friendly port may reasonably be construed as "containing
exemption from the jurisdiction of the sovereign within whose territory she
claims the rights of hospitality." The principle was accepted by the Geneva
Arbitration Tribunal, which announced that "the priviledge of exterritoriality
accorded to vessels of war has been admitted in the law of nations; not as
an absolute right, but solely as a proceeding founded on the principle of
courtesy and mutual deference between nations."
(2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., secs. 252 and 254; Hall, Int. Law, sec. 55; Taylor, Int.
Law, sec. 256; Ortolan, Dip de la Mer, 2. C.X.)
Such vessels are therefore permitted during times of peace to come and go
freely. Local official exercise but little control over their actions, and
offenses committed by their crew are justiciable by their own officers acting
under the laws to which they primarily owe allegiance. This limitation upon
the general principle of territorial sovereignty is based entirely upon comity
and convenience, and finds its justification in the fact that experience shows
that such vessels are generally careful to respect local laws and regulation
which are essential to the health, order, and well-being of the port. But
comity and convenience does not require the extension of the same degree
of exemption to merchant vessels. There are two well-defined theories as to
extent of the immunities ordinarily granted to them, According to the
French theory and practice, matters happening on board a merchant ship
which do not concern the tranquillity of the port or persons foreign to the
crew, are justiciable only by the court of the country to which the vessel
belongs. The French courts therefore claim exclusive jurisdiction over crimes
committed on board French merchant vessels in foreign ports by one
member of the crew against another. (See Bonfils, Le Droit Int. (quat. ed.),
secs. 624-628; Martens, Le Droit Int., tome 2, pp. 338, 339; Ortolan, Dip. de
la Mer, tit. 1, p. 292; Masse, Droit Int., tome 2, p. 63.) Such jurisdiction has
never been admitted or claim by Great Britain as a right, although she has
frequently conceded it by treaties. (Halleck, Int. Law (Baker's ed.), vol. 1,
231; British Territorial Waters Act, 1878.) Writers who consider
exterritoriality as a fact instead of a theory have sought to restrict local
jurisdiction, but Hall, who is doubtless the leading English authority, says
that —
It is admitted by the most thoroughgoing asserters of the
territoriality of merchant vessels that so soon as the latter enter
the ports of a foreign state they become subject to the local
jurisdiction on all points in which the interests of the country are
touched. (Hall, Int. Law, p. 263.)
The United States has adhered consistently to the view that when a
merchant vessel enters a foreign port it is subject to the jurisdiction of the
local authorities, unless the local sovereignty has by act of acquiescence or
through treaty arrangements consented to waive a portion of such
jurisdiction. (15 Op. Attys. Gen., U. S., 178; 2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. 204;
article by Dean Gregory, Mich. Law Review, Vol. II, No. 5.) Chief Justice
Marshall, in the case of the Exchange, said that —
When merchant vessels enter for the purpose of trade, in would
be obviously in convinient and dangerous to society and would
subject the laws to continual infraction and the government to
degradation if such individual merchants did not owe temporary
and local allegiance, and were not amendable to the jurisdiction
of the country.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently said that the merchant
vessels of one country visiting the ports of another for the purpose of trade,
subject themselves to the laws which govern the ports they visit, so long as
they remain; and this as well in war as in peace, unless otherwise provided
by treaty. (U. S. vs. Diekelman, 92 U. S., 520-525.)
Certain limitations upon the jurisdiction of the local courts are imposed by
article 13 of the treaty of commerce and navigation between Sweden and
Norway and the United States, of July 4, 1827, which concedes to the
consul, vice-consuls, or consular agents of each country "The right to sit as
judges and arbitrators in such differences as may arise between the captains
and crews of the vessels belonging to the nation whose interests are
committed to their charge, without the interference of the local authorities,
unless the conduct of the crews or of the captains should disturb the order
or tranquillity of the country." (Comp. of Treaties in Force, 1904, p. 754.)
This exception applies to controversies between the members of the ship's
company, and particularly to disputes regarding wages. (2 Moore, Int. Law
Dig., sec. 206, p. 318; Tellefsen vs. Fee, 168 Mass., 188.) The order and
tranquillity of the country are affected by many events which do not
amount to a riot or general public disturbance. Thus an assault by one
member of the crew upon another, committed upon the ship, of which the
public may have no knowledge whatever, is not by this treaty withdrawn
from the cognizance of the local authorities.
In 1876 the mates of the Swedish bark Frederike and Carolina engaged in a
"quarrel" on board the vessel in the port of Galveston, Texas. They were
prosecuted before a justice of the peace, but the United States district
attorney was instructed by the Government to take the necessary steps to
have the proceedings dismissed, and the aid of the governor of Texas was
invoked with the view to "guard against a repetition of similar proceedings."
(Mr. Fish, Secretary of State, to Mr. Grip, Swedish and Norwegian charged,
May 16, 1876; Moore, Int. Law Dig.) It does not appear that this "quarrel"
was of such a nature as to amount to a breach of the criminal laws of Texas,
but when in 1879 the mate for the Norwegian bark Livingston was
prosecuted in the courts of Philadelphia County for an assault and battery
committed on board the ship while lying in the port of Philadelphia, it was
held that there was nothing in the treaty which deprived the local courts of
jurisdiction. (Commonwealth vs. Luckness, 14 Phila. (Pa.), 363.)
Representations were made through diplomatic channels to the State
Department, and on July 30, 1880, Mr. Evarts, Secretary of State, wrote to
Count Lewenhaupt, the Swedish and Norwegian minister, as follows:
 I have the honor to state that I have given the matter careful
consideration in connection with the views and suggestion of
your note and the provisions of the thirteenth article of the treaty
of 1827 between the United States and Sweden and Norway. The
stipulations contained in the last clause of that article . . . are
those under which it is contended by you that jurisdiction is
conferred on the consular officers, not only in regard to such
differences of a civil nature growing out of the contract of
engagement of the seamen, but also as to disposing of
controversies resulting from personal violence involving offense
for which the party may be held amenable under the local
criminal law.
This Government does not view the article in question as
susceptible of such broad interpretation. The jurisdiction
conferred upon the consuls is conceived to be limited to their
right to sit as judges or abitrators in such differences as may arise
between captains and crews of the vessels, where such differences
do not involve on the part of the captain or crew a disturbance of
the order or tranquillity of the country. When, however, a
complaint is made to a local magistrate, either by the captain or
one or more of the crew of the vessel, involving the
disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the country, it is
competent for such magistrate to take cognizance of the matter
in furtherance of the local laws, and under such circumstances in
the United States it becomes a public duty which the judge or
magistrate is not at liberty voluntarily to forego. In all such cases
it must necessarily be left to the local judicial authorities whether
the procedure shall take place in the United States or in Sweden
to determine if in fact there had been such disturbance of the
local order and tranquillity, and if the complaint is supported by
such proof as results in the conviction of the party accused, to
visit upon the offenders such punishment as may be defined
against the offense by the municipal law of the place." (Moore,
Int. Law Dig., vol. 2, p. 315.)
The treaty does not therefore deprive the local courts of jurisdiction over
offenses committed on board a merchant vessel by one member of the
crew against another which amount to a disturbance of the order or
tranquillity of the country, and a fair and reasonable construction of the
language requires un to hold that any violation of criminal laws disturbs the
order or traquillity of the country. The offense with which the appellant is
charged had nothing to so with any difference between the captain and the
crew. It was a violation by the master of the criminal law of the country into
whose port he came. We thus find that neither by reason of the nationality
of the vessel, the place of the commission of the offense, or the prohibitions
of any treaty or general principle of public law, are the court of the
Philippine Islands deprived of jurisdiction over the offense charged in the
information in this case.
It is further contended that the complaint is defective because it does not
allege that the animals were disembarked at the port of Manila, an
allegation which it is claimed is essential to the jurisdiction of the court
sitting at that port. To hold with the appellant upon this issue would be to
construe the language of the complaint very strictly against the
Government. The disembarkation of the animals is not necessary in order to
constitute the completed offense, and a reasonable construction of the
language of the statute confers jurisdiction upon the court sitting at the port
into which the animals are bought. They are then within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court, and the mere fact of their disembarkation is
immaterial so far as jurisdiction is concerned. This might be different if the
disembarkation of the animals constituted a constitutional element in the
offense, but it does not.
It is also contended that the information is insufficient because it fails to
allege that the defendant knowingly and willfully failed to provide suitable
means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and
unnecessary suffering. The allegation of the complaint that the act was
committed willfully includes the allegation that it was committed knowingly.
As said in Woodhouse vs. Rio Grande R.R. Company (67 Texas, 416), "the
word 'willfully' carries the idea, when used in connection with an act
forbidden by law, that the act must be done knowingly or intentionally; that,
with knowledge, the will consented to, designed, and directed the act." So in
Wong vs. City of Astoria (13 Oregon, 538), it was said: "The first one is that
the complaint did not show, in the words of the ordinance, that the
appellant 'knowingly' did the act complained of. This point, I think, was fully
answered by the respondent's counsel — that the words 'willfully' and
'knowingly' conveyed the same meaning. To 'willfully' do an act implies that
it was done by design — done for a certain purpose; and I think that it
would necessarily follow that it was 'knowingly' done." To the same effect
is Johnson vs. The People (94 Ill., 505), which seems to be on all fours with
the present case.
The evidence shows not only that the defendant's acts were knowingly
done, but his defense rests upon the assertion that "according to his
experience, the system of carrying cattle loose upon the decks and in the
hold is preferable and more secure to the life and comfort of the animals." It
was conclusively proven that what was done was done knowingly and
intentionally.
In charging an offense under section 6 of General Orders, No. 58, paragraph
3, it is only necessary to state the act or omission complained of as
constituting a crime or public offense in ordinary and concise language,
without repitition. It need not necessarily be in the words of the statute, but
it must be in such form as to enable a person of common understanding to
know what is intended and the court to pronounce judgment according to
right. A complaint which complies with this requirement is good.
(U.S. vs. Sarabia, 4 Phil. Rep., 556.)
The Act, which is in the English language, impose upon the master of a
vessel the duty to "provide suitable means for securing such animals while
in transit, so as to avoid all cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the
animals." The allegation of the complaint as it reads in English is that the
defendant willfully, unlawfully, and wrongfully carried the cattle "without
providing suitable means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to
avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the said animals in this . . . that
by reason of the aforesaid neglect and failure of the accused to provide
suitable means for securing said animals were cruelty torn, and many of said
animals were tossed about upon the decks and hold of said vessels, and
cruelty wounded, bruised, and killed."
The appellant contends that the language of the Spanish text of the
information does not charge him with failure to provide "sufficient" and
"adequate" means. The words used are "medios suficientes" and "medios
adecuados." In view of the fact that the original complaint was prepared in
English, and that the word "suitable" is translatable by the words
"adecuado," "suficiente," and "conveniente," according to the context and
circumstances, we determine this point against the appellant, particularly in
view of the fact that the objection was not made in the court below, and
that the evidence clearly shows a failure to provide "suitable means for the
protection of the animals."
2. The appellant's arguments against the constitutionality of Act No. 55 and
the amendment thereto seems to rest upon a fundamentally erroneous
conception of the constitutional law of these Islands. The statute penalizes
acts and ommissions incidental to the transportation of live stock between
foreign ports and ports of the Philippine Islands, and had a similar statute
regulating commerce with its ports been enacted by the legislature of one
of the States of the Union, it would doubtless have been in violation of
Article I, section 3, of the Constitution of the United States.
(Stubbs vs. People (Colo.), 11 L. R. A., N. S., 1071.)
But the Philippine Islands is not a State, and its relation to the United States
is controlled by constitutional principles different from those which apply to
States of the Union. The importance of the question thus presented
requires a statement of the principles which govern those relations, and
consideration of the nature and extent of the legislative power of the
Philippine Commission and the Legislature of the Philippines. After much
discussion and considerable diversity of opinion certain applicable
constitutional doctrines are established.
The Constitution confers upon the United States the express power to make
war and treaties, and it has the power possessed by all nations to acquire
territory by conquest or treaty. Territory thus acquired belongs to the
United States, and to guard against the possibility of the power of Congress
to provide for its government being questioned, the framers of the
Constitution provided in express terms that Congress should have the
power "to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting
territory and other property belonging to the United States." (Art. IV, sec. 3,
par. 3.) Upon the acquisition of the territory by the United States, and until
it is formally incorporated into the Union, the duty of providing a
government therefor devolves upon Congress. It may govern the territory
by its direct acts, or it may create a local government, and delegate thereto
the ordinary powers required for local government. (Binns vs. U. S., 194 U.
S., 486.) This has been the usual procedure. Congress has provided such
governments for territories which were within the Union, and for newly
acquired territory not yet incorporated therein. It has been customary to
organize a government with the ordinary separation of powers into
executive, legislative, and judicial, and to prescribe in an organic act certain
general conditions in accordance with which the local government should
act. The organic act thus became the constitution of the government of the
territory which had not been formally incorporated into the Union, and the
validity of legislation enacted by the local legislature was determined by its
conformity with the requirements of such organic act. (National
Bank vs. Yankton, 11 Otto (U. S.), 129.) To the legislative body of the local
government Congress has delegated that portion of legislative power which
in its wisdom it deemed necessary for the government of the territory,
reserving, however, the right to annul the action of the local legislature and
itself legislate directly for the territory. This power has been exercised
during the entire period of the history of the United States. The right of
Congress to delegate such legislative power can no longer be seriously
questioned. (Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138; U. S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U. S., 370,
385.)
The Constitution of the United States does not by its own force operate
within such territory, although the liberality of Congress in legislating the
Constitution into contiguous territory tended to create an impression upon
the minds of many people that it went there by its own force.
(Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 289.) In legislating with reference to this
territory, the power of Congress is limited only by those prohibitions of the
Constitution which go to the very root of its power to act at all, irrespective
of time or place. In all other respects it is plenary. (De Lima vs. Bidwell, 182
U. S., 1; Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 244; Hawaii vs. Mankichi, 190 U. S.,
197; Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138; Rassmussen vs. U. S., 197 U. S., 516.)
This power has been exercised by Congress throughout the whole history of
the United States, and legislation founded on the theory was enacted long
prior to the acquisition of the present Insular possessions. Section 1891 of
the Revised Statutes of 1878 provides that "The Constitution and all laws of
the United States which are not locally inapplicable shall have the same
force and effect within all the organized territories, and in every Territory
hereafter organized, as elsewhere within the United States." When
Congress organized a civil government for the Philippines, it expressly
provided that this section of the Revised Statutes should not apply to the
Philippine Islands. (Sec. 1, Act of 1902.)
In providing for the government of the territory which was acquired by the
United States as a result of the war with Spain, the executive and legislative
authorities have consistently proceeded in conformity with the principles
above state. The city of Manila was surrendered to the United States on
August 13, 1898, and the military commander was directed to hold the city,
bay, and harbor, pending the conclusion of a peace which should determine
the control, disposition, and government of the Islands. The duty then
devolved upon the American authorities to preserve peace and protect
person and property within the occupied territory. Provision therefor was
made by proper orders, and on August 26 General Merritt assumed the
duties of military governor. The treaty of peace was signed December 10,
1898. On the 22d of December, 1898, the President announced that the
destruction of the Spanish fleet and the surrender of the city had practically
effected the conquest of the Philippine Islands and the suspension of the
Spanish sovereignty therein, and that by the treaty of peace the future
control, disposition, and government of the Islands had been ceded to the
United States. During the periods of strict military occupation, before the
treaty of peace was ratified, and the interim thereafter, until Congress acted
(Santiago vs. Noueral, 214 U.S., 260), the territory was governed under the
military authority of the President as commander in chief. Long before
Congress took any action, the President organized a civil government which,
however, had its legal justification, like the purely military government
which it gradually superseded, in the war power. The military power of the
President embraced legislative, executive personally, or through such
military or civil agents as he chose to select. As stated by Secretary Root in
his report for 1901 —
The military power in exercise in a territory under military
occupation includes executive, legislative, and judicial authority. It
not infrequently happens that in a single order of a military
commander can be found the exercise of all three of these
different powers — the exercise of the legislative powers by
provisions prescribing a rule of action; of judicial power by
determination of right; and the executive power by the
enforcement of the rules prescribed and the rights determined.
President McKinley desired to transform military into civil government as
rapidly as conditions would permit. After full investigation, the organization
of civil government was initiated by the appointment of a commission to
which civil authority was to be gradually transferred. On September 1, 1900,
the authority to exercise, subject to the approval of the President. "that part
of the military power of the President in the Philippine Islands which is
legislative in its character" was transferred from the military government to
the Commission, to be exercised under such rules and regulations as should
be prescribed by the Secretary of War, until such time as complete civil
government should be established, or congress otherwise provided. The
legislative power thus conferred upon the Commission was declared to
include "the making of rules and orders having the effect of law for the
raising of revenue by taxes, customs duties, and imposts; the appropriation
and expenditure of public funds of the Islands; the establishment of an
educational system to secure an efficient civil service; the organization and
establishment of courts; the organization and establishment of municipal
and departmental government, and all other matters of a civil nature which
the military governor is now competent to provide by rules or orders of a
legislative character." This grant of legislative power to the Commission was
to be exercised in conformity with certain declared general principles, and
subject to certain specific restrictions for the protection of individual rights.
The Commission were to bear in mind that the government to be instituted
was "not for our satisfaction or for the expression of our theoretical views,
but for the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine
Island, and the measures adopted should be made to conforms to their
customs, their habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest extent
consistent with the accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just
and effective government." The specific restrictions upon legislative power
were found in the declarations that "no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law; that private property shall
not be taken for public use without just compensation; that in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted
with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense;
that excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishment inflicted; that no person shall be put twice in
jeopardy for the same offense or be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself; that the right to be secure against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; that neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude shall exist except as a punishment for crime; that no
bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed; that no law shall be
passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of
the people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for a
redress of grievances; that no law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that
the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship without
discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed."
To prevent any question as to the legality of these proceedings being raised,
the Spooner amendment to the Army Appropriation Bill passed March 2,
1901, provided that "all military, civil, and judicial powers necessary to
govern the Philippine Islands . . . shall until otherwise provided by Congress
be vested in such person and persons, and shall be exercised in such
manner, as the President of the United States shall direct, for the
establishment of civil government, and for maintaining and protecting the
inhabitants of said Islands in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property,
and religion." Thereafter, on July 4, 1901, the authority, which had been
exercised previously by the military governor, was transferred to that
official. The government thus created by virtue of the authority of the
President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy continued to
administer the affairs of the Islands under the direction of the President
until by the Act of July 1, 1902, Congress assumed control of the situation by
the enactment of a law which, in connection with the instructions of April 7,
1900, constitutes the organic law of the Philippine Islands.
The Act of July 1, 1902, made no substancial changes in the form of
government which the President had erected. Congress adopted the system
which was in operation, and approved the action of the President in
organizing the government. Substantially all the limitations which had been
imposed on the legislative power by the President's instructions were
included in the law, Congress thus extending to the Islands by legislative act
nor the Constitution, but all its provisions for the protection of the rights
and privileges of individuals which were appropriate under the conditions.
The action of the President in creating the Commission with designated
powers of government, in creating the office of the Governor-General and
Vice-Governor-General, and through the Commission establishing certain
executive departments, was expressly approved and ratified. Subsequently
the action of the President in imposing a tariff before and after the
ratification of the treaty of peace was also ratified and approved by
Congress. (Act of March 8, 1902; Act of July 1, 1902; U.S. vs. Heinszen, 206
U.S., 370; Lincoln vs. U.S., 197 U.S., 419.) Until otherwise provided by law
the Islands were to continue to be governed "as thereby and herein
provided." In the future the enacting clause of all statutes should read "By
authority of the United States" instead of "By the authority of the
President." In the course of time the legislative authority of the Commission
in all parts of the Islands not inhabited by Moros or non-Christian tribes was
to be transferred to a legislature consisting of two houses — the Philippine
Commission and the Philippine Assembly. The government of the Islands
was thus assumed by Congress under its power to govern newly acquired
territory not incorporated into the United States.
This Government of the Philippine Islands is not a State or a Territory,
although its form and organization somewhat resembles that of both. It
stands outside of the constitutional relation which unites the States and
Territories into the Union. The authority for its creation and maintenance is
derived from the Constitution of the United States, which, however,
operates on the President and Congress, and not directly on the Philippine
Government. It is the creation of the United States, acting through the
President and Congress, both deriving power from the same source, but
from different parts thereof. For its powers and the limitations thereon the
Government of the Philippines looked to the orders of the President before
Congress acted and the Acts of Congress after it assumed control. Its
organic laws are derived from the formally and legally expressed will of the
President and Congress, instead of the popular sovereign constituency
which lies upon any subject relating to the Philippines is primarily in
Congress, and when it exercise such power its act is from the viewpoint of
the Philippines the legal equivalent of an amendment of a constitution in
the United States.
Within the limits of its authority the Government of the Philippines is a
complete governmental organism with executive, legislative, and judicial
departments exercising the functions commonly assigned to such
departments. The separation of powers is as complete as in most
governments. In neither Federal nor State governments is this separation
such as is implied in the abstract statement of the doctrine. For instance, in
the Federal Government the Senate exercises executive powers, and the
President to some extent controls legislation through the veto power. In a
State the veto power enables him to exercise much control over legislation.
The Governor-General, the head of the executive department in the
Philippine Government, is a member of the Philippine Commission, but as
executive he has no veto power. The President and Congress framed the
government on the model with which Americans are familiar, and which has
proven best adapted for the advancement of the public interests and the
protection of individual rights and priviliges.
In instituting this form of government of intention must have been to adopt
the general constitutional doctrined which are inherent in the system.
Hence, under it the Legislature must enact laws subject to the limitations of
the organic laws, as Congress must act under the national Constitution, and
the States under the national and state constitutions. The executive must
execute such laws as are constitutionally enacted. The judiciary, as in all
governments operating under written constitutions, must determine the
validity of legislative enactments, as well as the legality of all private and
official acts. In performing these functions it acts with the same
independence as the Federal and State judiciaries in the United States.
Under no other constitutional theory could there be that government of
laws and not of men which is essential for the protection of rights under a
free and orderly government.
Such being the constitutional theory of the Government of the Philippine
Islands, it is apparent that the courts must consider the question of the
validity of an act of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature,
as a State court considers an act of the State legislature. The Federal
Government exercises such powers only as are expressly or impliedly
granted to it by the Constitution of the United States, while the States
exercise all powers which have not been granted to the central government.
The former operates under grants, the latter subject to restrictions. The
validity of an Act of Congress depends upon whether the Constitution of the
United States contains a grant of express or implied authority to enact it. An
act of a State legislature is valid unless the Federal or State constitution
expressly or impliedly prohibits its enaction. An Act of the legislative
authority of the Philippines Government which has not been expressly
disapproved by Congress is valid unless its subject-matter has been covered
by congressional legislation, or its enactment forbidden by some provision
of the organic laws.
The legislative power of the Government of the Philippines is granted in
general terms subject to specific limitations. The general grant is not alone
of power to legislate on certain subjects, but to exercise the legislative
power subject to the restrictions stated. It is true that specific authority is
conferred upon the Philippine Government relative to certain subjects of
legislation, and that Congress has itself legislated upon certain other
subjects. These, however, should be viewed simply as enactments on
matters wherein Congress was fully informed and ready to act, and not as
implying any restriction upon the local legislative authority in other matters.
(See Opinion of Atty. Gen. of U. S., April 16, 1908.)
The fact that Congress reserved the power to annul specific acts of
legislation by the Government of the Philippine tends strongly to confirm
the view that for purposes of construction the Government of the
Philippines should be regarded as one of general instead of enumerated
legislative powers. The situation was unusual. The new government was to
operate far from the source of its authority. To relieve Congress from the
necessity of legislating with reference to details, it was thought better to
grant general legislative power to the new government, subject to broad
and easily understood prohibitions, and reserve to Congress the power to
annul its acts if they met with disapproval. It was therefore provided "that
all laws passed by the Government of the Philippine Islands shall be
reported to Congress, which hereby reserves the power and authority to
annul the same." (Act of Congress, July 1, 1902, sec. 86.) This provision does
not suspend the acts of the Legislature of the Philippines until approved by
Congress, or when approved, expressly or by acquiescence, make them the
laws of Congress. They are valid acts of the Government of the Philippine
Islands until annulled. (Miners Bank vs. Iowa, 12 How. (U. S.), 1.)
In order to determine the validity of Act No. 55 we must then ascertain
whether the Legislature has been expressly or implication forbidden to
enact it. Section 3, Article IV, of the Constitution of the United States
operated only upon the States of the Union. It has no application to the
Government of the Philippine Islands. The power to regulate foreign
commerce is vested in Congress, and by virtue of its power to govern the
territory belonging to the United States, it may regulate foreign commerce
with such territory. It may do this directly, or indirectly through a legislative
body created by it, to which its power in this respect if delegate. Congress
has by direct legislation determined the duties which shall be paid upon
goods imported into the Philippines, and it has expressly authorized the
Government of the Philippines to provide for the needs of commerce by
improving harbors and navigable waters. A few other specific provisions
relating to foreign commerce may be found in the Acts of Congress, but its
general regulation is left to the Government of the Philippines, subject to
the reserved power of Congress to annul such legislation as does not meet
with its approval. The express limitations upon the power of the
Commission and Legislature to legislate do not affect the authority with
respect to the regulation of commerce with foreign countries. Act No. 55
was enacted before Congress took over the control of the Islands, and this
act was amended by Act No. 275 after the Spooner amendment of March 2,
1901, was passed. The military government, and the civil government
instituted by the President, had the power, whether it be called legislative
or administrative, to regulate commerce between foreign nations and the
ports of the territory. (Cross vs. Harrison, 16 How. (U.S.), 164, 190;
Hamilton vs. Dillin, 21 Wall. (U.S.), 73, 87.) This Act has remained in force
since its enactment without annulment or other action by Congress, and
must be presumed to have met with its approval. We are therefore satisfied
that the Commission had, and the Legislature now has, full constitutional
power to enact laws for the regulation of commerce between foreign
countries and the ports of the Philippine Islands, and that Act No. 55, as
amended by Act No. 275, is valid.
3. Whether a certain method of handling cattle is suitable within the
meaning of the Act can not be left to the judgment of the master of the
ship. It is a question which must be determined by the court from the
evidence. On December 2, 1908, the defendant Bull brought into and
disembarked in the port and city of Manila certain cattle, which came from
the port of Ampieng, Formosa, without providing suitable means for
securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary
suffering to said animals, contrary to the provisions of section 1 of Act No.
55, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 275. The trial court found the
following facts, all of which are fully sustained by the evidence:
That the defendant, H. N. Bull, as captain and master of the
Norwegian steamer known as the Standard, for a period of six
months or thereabouts prior to the 2d day of December, 1908,
was engaged in the transportation of cattle and carabaos from
Chines and Japanese ports to and into the city of Manila,
Philippine Islands.
That on the 2d day of December, 1908, the defendant, as such
master and captain as aforesaid, brought into the city of Manila,
aboard said ship, a large number of cattle, which ship was
anchored, under the directions of the said defendant, behind the
breakwaters in front of the city of Manila, in Manila Bay, and
within the jurisdiction of this court; and that fifteen of said cattle
then and there had broken legs and three others of said cattle
were dead, having broken legs; and also that said cattle were
transported and carried upon said ship as aforesaid by the
defendant, upon the deck and in the hold of said ship, without
suitable precaution and care for the transportation of said
animals, and to avoid danger and risk to their lives and security;
and further that said cattle were so transported abroad said ship
by the defendant and brought into the said bay, and into the city
of Manila, without any provisions being made whatever upon said
decks of said ship and in the hold thereof to maintain said cattle
in a suitable condition and position for such transportation.
That a suitable and practicable manner in which to transport
cattle abroad steamship coming into Manila Bay and unloading in
the city of Manila is by way of individual stalls for such cattle,
providing partitions between the cattle and supports at the front
sides, and rear thereof, and cross-cleats upon the floor on which
they stand and are transported, of that in case of storms, which
are common in this community at sea, such cattle may be able to
stand without slipping and pitching and falling, individually or
collectively, and to avoid the production of panics and hazard to
the animals on account or cattle were transported in this case.
Captain Summerville of the steamship Taming, a very intelligent
and experienced seaman, has testified, as a witness in behalf of
the Government, and stated positively that since the introduction
in the ships with which he is acquainted of the stall system for the
transportation of animals and cattle he has suffered no loss
whatever during the last year. The defendant has testified, as a
witness in his own behalf, that according to his experience the
system of carrying cattle loose upon the decks and in the hold is
preferable and more secure to the life and comfort of the
animals, but this theory of the case is not maintainable, either by
the proofs or common reason. It can not be urged with logic that,
for instance, three hundred cattle supports for the feet and
without stalls or any other protection for them individually can
safely and suitably carried in times of storm upon the decks and
in the holds of ships; such a theory is against the law of nature.
One animal falling or pitching, if he is untied or unprotected,
might produce a serious panic and the wounding of half the
animals upon the ship if transported in the manner found in this
case.
The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of two
hundred and fifty pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs. The sentence and judgment is affirmed. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5887 December 16, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LOOK CHAW (alias LUK CHIU), defendant-appellant.
Thos. D. Aitken for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.
ARELLANO, C. J.:
The first complaint filed against the defendant, in the Court of First Instance
of Cebu, stated that he "carried, kept, possessed and had in his possession
and control, 96 kilogrammes of opium," and that "he had been surprised in
the act of selling 1,000 pesos worth prepared opium."
The defense presented a demurrer based on two grounds, the second of
which was the more than one crime was charged in the complaint. The
demurrer was sustained, as the court found that the complaint contained
two charges, one, for the unlawful possession of opium, and the other, for
the unlawful sale of opium, and, consequence of that ruling, it ordered that
the fiscal should separated one charge from the other and file a complaint
for each violation; this, the fiscal did, and this cause concerns only the
unlawful possession of opium. It is registered as No. 375, in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, and as No. 5887 on the general docket of this court.
The facts of the case are contained in the following finding of the trial court:
The evidence, it says, shows that between 11 and 12 o'clock a. m.
on the present month (stated as August 19, 1909), several
persons, among them Messrs. Jacks and Milliron, chief of the
department of the port of Cebu and internal-revenue agent of
Cebu, respectively, went abroad the steamship Erroll to inspect
and search its cargo, and found, first in a cabin near the saloon,
one sack (Exhibit A) and afterwards in the hold, another sack
(Exhibit B). The sack referred to as Exhibit A contained 49 cans of
opium, and the other, Exhibit B, the larger sack, also contained
several cans of the same substance. The hold, in which the sack
mentioned in Exhibit B was found, was under the defendant's
control, who moreover, freely and of his own will and accord
admitted that this sack, as well as the other referred to in Exhibit
B and found in the cabin, belonged to him. The said defendant
also stated, freely and voluntarily, that he had bought these sacks
of opium, in Hongkong with the intention of selling them as
contraband in Mexico or Vera Cruz, and that, as his hold had
already been searched several times for opium, he ordered two
other Chinamen to keep the sack. Exhibit A.
It is to be taken into account that the two sacks of opium, designated as
Exhibits A and B, properly constitute the corpus delicti. Moreover, another
lot of four cans of opium, marked, as Exhibit C, was the subject matter of
investigation at the trial, and with respect to which the chief of the
department of the port of Cebu testified that they were found in the part of
the ship where the firemen habitually sleep, and that they were delivered to
the first officer of the ship to be returned to the said firemen after the
vessel should have left the Philippines, because the firemen and crew of
foreign vessels, pursuant to the instructions he had from the Manila
custom-house, were permitted to retain certain amounts of opium, always
provided it should not be taken shore.
And, finally, another can of opium, marked "Exhibit D," is also corpus
delicti and important as evidence in this cause. With regard to this the
internal-revenue agent testified as follows:itc-alf
FISCAL. What is it?
WITNESS. It is a can opium which was bought from the defendant
by a secret-service agent and taken to the office of the governor
to prove that the accused had opium in his possession to sell.
On motion by the defense, the court ruled that this answer might be
stricken out "because it refers to a sale." But, with respect to this answer,
the chief of the department of customs had already given this testimony, to
wit:
FISCAL. Who asked you to search the vessel?
WITNESS. The internal-revenue agent came to my office and said
that a party brought him a sample of opium and that the same
party knew that there was more opium on board the steamer,
and the agent asked that the vessel be searched.
The defense moved that this testimony be rejected, on the ground of its
being hearsay evidence, and the court only ordered that the part thereof
"that there was more opium, on board the vessel" be stricken out.
The defense, to abbreviate proceedings, admitted that the receptacles
mentioned as Exhibits A, B, and C, contained opium and were found on
board the steamship Erroll, a vessel of English nationality, and that it was
true that the defendant stated that these sacks of opium were his and that
he had them in his possession.
According to the testimony of the internal-revenue agent, the defendant
stated to him, in the presence of the provincial fiscal, of a Chinese
interpreter (who afterwards was not needed, because the defendant spoke
English), the warden of the jail, and four guards, that the opium seized in
the vessel had been bought by him in Hongkong, at three pesos for each
round can and five pesos for each one of the others, for the purpose of
selling it, as contraband, in Mexico and Puerto de Vera Cruz; that on the
15th the vessel arrived at Cebu, and on the same day he sold opium; that he
had tried to sell opium for P16 a can; that he had a contract to sell an
amount of the value of about P500; that the opium found in the room of the
other two Chinamen prosecuted in another cause, was his, and that he had
left it in their stateroom to avoid its being found in his room, which had
already been searched many times; and that, according to the defendant,
the contents of the large sack was 80 cans of opium, and of the small one,
49, and the total number, 129.
It was established that the steamship Erroll was of English nationality, that it
came from Hongkong, and that it was bound for Mexico, via the call ports of
Manila and Cebu.
The defense moved for a dismissal of the case, on the grounds that the
court had no jurisdiction to try the same and the facts concerned therein
did not constitute a crime. The fiscal, at the conclusion of his argument,
asked that the maximum penalty of the law be imposed upon the
defendant, in view of the considerable amount of opium seized. The court
ruled that it did not lack jurisdiction, inasmuch as the crime had been
committed within its district, on the wharf of Cebu.
The court sentenced the defendant to five years' imprisonment, to pay a
fine of P10,000, with additional subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, though not to exceed one third of the principal penalty, and to
the payment of the costs. It further ordered the confiscation, in favor of the
Insular Government, of the exhibits presented in the case, and that, in the
event of an appeal being taken or a bond given, or when the sentenced
should have been served, the defendant be not released from custody, but
turned over to the customs authorities for the purpose of the fulfillment of
the existing laws on immigration.

From this judgment, the defendant appealed to this court.lawphi1.net

The appeal having been heard, together with the allegations made therein
by the parties, it is found: That, although the mere possession of a thing of
prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of
their ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the
courts of this country, on account of such vessel being considered as an
extension of its own nationality, the same rule does not apply when the
article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the present
case a can of opium, is landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus
committing an open violation of the laws of the land, with respect to which,
as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of
the crime, only the court established in that said place itself had competent
jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an international treaty.

It is also found: That, even admitting that the quantity of the drug seized,
the subject matter of the present case, was considerable, it does not appear
that, on such account, the two penalties fixed by the law on the subject,
should be imposed in the maximum degree.

Therefore, reducing the imprisonment and the fine imposed to six months
and P1,000, respectively, we affirm in all other respects the judgment
appealed from, with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So
ordered.

Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson, Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13005 October 10, 1917
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AH SING, defendant-appellant.
Antonio Sanz for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
finding the defendant guilty of a violation of section 4 of Act No. 2381 (the
Opium Law), and sentencing him to two years imprisonment, to pay a fine of
P300 or to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs.
The following facts are fully proven: The defendant is a subject of China
employed as a fireman on the steamship Shun Chang. The Shun Chang is a
foreign steamer which arrived at the port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, after a
voyage direct from the port of Saigon. The defendant bought eight cans of
opium in Saigon, brought them on board the steamship Shun Chang, and
had them in his possession during the trip from Saigon to Cebu. When the
steamer anchored in the port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, the authorities on
making a search found the eight cans of opium above mentioned hidden in
the ashes below the boiler of the steamer's engine. The defendant
confessed that he was the owner of this opium, and that he had purchased
it in Saigon. He did not confess, however, as to his purpose in buying the
opium. He did not say that it was his intention to import the prohibited drug
into the Philippine Islands. No other evidence direct or indirect, to show that
the intention of the accused was to import illegally this opium into the
Philippine Islands, was introduced.
Has the crime of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine Islands
been proven?
Two decisions of this Court are cited in the judgment of the trial court, but
with the intimation that there exists inconsistently between the doctrines
laid down in the two cases. However, neither decision is directly a
precedent on the facts before us.
In the case of United States vs. Look Chaw ([1910], 18 Phil., 573), in the
opinion handed down by the Chief Justice, it is found —
That, although the mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in
these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their
ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the
courts of this country, on account of such vessel being considered
as an extension of its own nationality, the same rule does no
apply when the article, whose use is prohibited within the
Philippine Islands, in the present case a can of opium, is landed
from the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an open
violation of the laws of the land, with respect to which, as it is a
violation of the penal law in force at the place of the commission
of the crime, only the court established in the said place itself has
competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an
international treaty.1awphil.net
A marked difference between the facts in the Look Chaw case and the facts
in the present instance is readily observable. In the Look Chaw case, the
charge case the illegal possession and sale of opium — in the present case
the charge as illegal importation of opium; in the Look Chaw case the
foreign vessel was in transit — in the present case the foreign vessel was
not in transit; in the Look Chaw case the opium was landed from the vessel
upon Philippine soil — in the present case of United States vs. Jose ([1916],
34 Phil., 840), the main point, and the one on which resolution turned, was
that in a prosecution based on the illegal importation of opium or other
prohibited drug, the Government must prove, or offer evidence sufficient to
raise a presumption, that the vessel from which the drug is discharged came
into Philippine waters from a foreign country with the drug on board. In the
Jose case, the defendants were acquitted because it was not proved that
the opium was imported from a foreign country; in the present case there is
no question but what the opium came from Saigon to Cebu. However, in the
opinion in the Jose case, we find the following which may be obiter dicta,
but which at least is interesting as showing the view of the writer of the
opinion:
The importation was complete, to say the least, when the ship
carrying it anchored in Subic Bay. It was not necessary that the
opium discharged or that it be taken from the ship. It was
sufficient that the opium was brought into the waters of the
Philippine Islands on a boat destined for a Philippine port and
which subsequently anchored in a port of the Philippine Islands
with intent to discharge its cargo.
Resolving whatever doubt was exist as to the authority of the views just
quoted, we return to an examination of the applicable provisions of the law.
It is to be noted that section 4 of Act No. 2381 begins, "Any person who
shall unlawfully import or bring any prohibited drug into the Philippine
Islands." "Import" and "bring" are synonymous terms. The Federal Courts of
the United States have held that the mere act of going into a port, without
breaking bulk, is prima facie evidence of importation. (The Mary [U. S.], 16
Fed. Cas., 932, 933.) And again, the importation is not the making entry of
goods at the custom house, but merely the bringing them into port; and the
importation is complete before entry of the Custom House. (U. S. vs. Lyman
[U. S.], 26, Fed. Cas., 1024, 1028; Perots vs. U. S., 19 Fed. Cas., 258.) As
applied to the Opium Law, we expressly hold that any person unlawfully
imports or brings any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands, when the
prohibited drug is found under this person's control on a vessel which has
come direct from a foreign country and is within the jurisdictional limits of
the Philippine Islands. In such case, a person is guilty of illegal importation of
the drug unless contrary circumstances exist or the defense proves
otherwise. Applied to the facts herein, it would be absurb to think that the
accused was merely carrying opium back and forth between Saigon and
Cebu for the mere pleasure of so doing. It would likewise be impossible to
conceive that the accused needed so large an amount of opium for his
personal use. No better explanation being possible, the logical deduction is
that the defendant intended this opium to be brought into the Philippine
Islands. We accordingly find that there was illegal importation of opium
from a foreign country into the Philippine Islands. To anticipate any possible
misunderstanding, let it be said that these statements do not relate to
foreign vessels in transit, a situation not present.
The defendant and appellant, having been proved guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt as charged and the sentence of the trial court being
within the limits provided by law, it results that the judgment must be
affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Carson, Araullo and Street, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18924 October 19, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
WONG CHENG (alias WONG CHUN), defendant-appellee.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellant.
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
In this appeal the Attorney-General urges the revocation of the order of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, sustaining the demurrer presented by the
defendant to the information that initiated this case and in which the
appellee is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant
vessel Changsa of English nationality while said vessel was anchored in
Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of the city.
The demurrer alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court,
which so held and dismissed the case.
The question that presents itself for our consideration is whether such
ruling is erroneous or not; and it will or will not be erroneous according as
said court has or has no jurisdiction over said offense.
The point at issue is whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction
over crime, like the one herein involved, committed aboard merchant
vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters. 1awph!l.net
There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection
with International Law; to wit, the French rule, according to which crimes
committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not be prosecuted in
the courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were
committed, unless their commission affects the peace and security of the
territory; and the English rule, based on the territorial principle and followed
in the United States, according to which, crimes perpetrated under such
circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the country within
territory they were committed. Of this two rules, it is the last one that
obtains in this jurisdiction, because at present the theories and
jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this matter are authority in
the Philippines which is now a territory of the United States.
In the cases of The Schooner Exchange vs. M'Faddon and Others (7 Cranch
[U. S.], 116), Chief Justice Marshall said:
. . . When merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it
would be obviously inconvenient and dangerous to society, and
would subject the laws to continual infraction, and the
government to degradation, if such individuals or merchants did
not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not amenable
to the jurisdiction of the country. . . .
In United States vs. Bull (15 Phil., 7), this court held:
. . . No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an
offense or crime committed on the high seas or within the
territorial waters of any other country, but when she came within
three miles of a line drawn from the headlands, which embrace
the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and
a new set of principles became applicable. (Wheaton,
International Law [Dana ed.], p. 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit
Int., secs. 490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her
crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial
sovereign subject to such limitations as have been conceded by
that sovereignty through the proper political agency. . . .
It is true that in certain cases the comity of nations is observed, as in Mali
and Wildenhus vs. Keeper of the Common Jail (120 U.., 1), wherein it was
said that:
. . . The principle which governs the whole matter is this: Disorder
which disturb only the peace of the ship or those on board are to
be dealt with exclusively by the sovereignty of the home of the
ship, but those which disturb the public peace may be
suppressed, and, if need be, the offenders punished by the
proper authorities of the local jurisdiction. It may not be easy at
all times to determine which of the two jurisdictions a particular
act of disorder belongs. Much will undoubtedly depend on the
attending circumstances of the particular case, but all must
concede that felonious homicide is a subject for the local
jurisdiction, and that if the proper authorities are proceeding with
the case in the regular way the consul has no right to interfere to
prevent it.
Hence in United States vs. Look Chaw (18 Phil., 573), this court held that:
Although the mere possession of an article of prohibited use in
the Philippine Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit in any
local port, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable
by the courts of the Islands, such vessels being considered as an
extension of its own nationality, the same rule does not apply
when the article, the use of which is prohibited in the Islands, is
landed from the vessels upon Philippine soil; in such a case an
open violation of the laws of the land is committed with respect
to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place
of the commission of the crime, no court other than that
established in the said place has jurisdiction of the offense, in the
absence of an agreement under an international treaty.
As to whether the United States has ever consented by treaty or otherwise
to renouncing such jurisdiction or a part thereof, we find nothing to this
effect so far as England is concerned, to which nation the ship where the
crime in question was committed belongs. Besides, in his work "Treaties,
Conventions, etc.," volume 1, page 625, Malloy says the following:
There shall be between the territories of the United States of
America, and all the territories of His Britanic Majesty in Europe, a
reciprocal liberty of commerce. The inhabitants of the two
countries, respectively, shall have liberty freely and securely to
come with their ships and cargoes to all such places, ports and
rivers, in the territories aforesaid, to which other foreigners are
permitted to come, to enter into the same, and to remain and
reside in any parts of the said territories, respectively; also to hire
and occupy houses and warehouses for the purposes of their
commerce; and, generally, the merchants and traders of each
nation respectively shall enjoy the most complete protection and
security for their commerce, but subject always to the laws and
statutes of the two countries, respectively. (Art. 1, Commerce and
Navigation Convention.)
We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in
transit was held by this court not triable by or courts, because it being the
primary object of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the
Philippines against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its
mere possession in such a ship, without being used in our territory, does not
being about in the said territory those effects that our statute contemplates
avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not considered a disturbance of
the public order.

But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a
foreign merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here
established, because it causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects
within our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our
Legislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute.
Moreover, as the Attorney-General aptly observes:

. . . The idea of a person smoking opium securely on board a

foreign vessel at anchor in the port of Manila in open defiance of
the local authorities, who are impotent to lay hands on him, is
simply subversive of public order. It requires no unusual stretch
of the imagination to conceive that a foreign ship may come into
the port of Manila and allow or solicit Chinese residents to smoke
opium on board.

The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the
court of origin for further proceedings in accordance with law, without
special findings as to costs. So ordered.

Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand and Johns, JJ.,
concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-922 November 8, 1902
TRINIDAD H. PARDO DE TAVERA, complainant-appellee,
vs.
VICENTE GARCIA VALDEZ, defendant-appellant.
Vicente Garcia Valdez, appellant.
Felipe G. Calderon, for appellee.
LADD, J.:
Both the private prosecutor and the defendant have appealed from the
judgment of the court below, finding the defendant guilty of the offense
of injurias graves under article 457 and 458 of the Penal Code, and
sentencing him to pay a fine of 4,000 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment
and costs.
(1) No brief has been filed by the defendant, nor did he appear, either
personally or by counsel, on the day fixed for the argument, and under the
rules of this court the motion that his appeal be dismissed for lack of
prosecution might be granted, but we have nevertheless deemed it proper
to consider the whole case upon the merits. The evidence shows that the
defendant was in September, 1901, the editor of "Miau," a periodical
published and circulated in Manila, and that an article containing the alleged
injurious matter was published in the issue of that periodical of September
15, 1901. The article is couched throughout in grossly abusive language, and
in terms not capable of being misunderstood; charges the private
prosecutor, who had been then recently appointed a member of the United
States Philippine Commission, with having displayed cowardice at the time
of the murder of his mother and sister and with having subsequently
entered into intimate political relations with the assassin. The article
contains other statements and imputations of a derogatory character, but
we base our opinion upon that portion to which reference has been
made. Injurias graves are classified by article 457 of the Penal Code under
four heads, as follows: "(1) The imputation of a crime of the class not
subject to prosecution de oficio. (2) That of a vice or moral shortcoming, the
consequences of which might seriously injure the reputation, credit, or
interests of the person offended. (3) Injurias which by reason of their
nature, occasion, or circumstances are commonly regarded as insulting. (4)
Those which may be reasonably classified as grave in view of the condition,
dignity, and personal circumstances of the injured party and the offender."
The statements in question do not involve the imputation of a crime, and,
possibly, not of a vice or moral shortcoming in the strict sense, but they are
obviously of a character calculated to bring the person attacked into public
obloquy and contempt, and specially so in the present case in view of the
position of the private prosecutor as a high official of the Government, and
they are therefore clearly comprehended under Nos. 3 and 4 or the article
cited. The defendant's offer to prove the truth of the statements was
properly rejected. (Penal Code, art. 460.) The conviction must be sustained.
act provides as follows: "All laws and parts of laws now in force, so far as the
same may be in conflict herewith, are hereby repealed: Provided, That
nothing herein contained shall operate as a repeal of existing laws in so far
as they are applicable to pending actions or existing causes of action, but as
to such causes of action or pending actions existing laws shall remain in full
force and effect." This act went into effect October 24, 1901, subsequent to
the publication of the article in question, and during the pendency of the
prosecution. By article 22 of the Penal Code "Penal laws shall have a
retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a crime of
misdemeanor," etc. The court below in fixing the punishment proceeded
upon the theory that by the operation of this general rule the penalty
prescribed in the Penal Code for the offense in question was necessarily
modified and could not be inflicted in its full extension. In so doing we think
the court overlooked or improperly construed the proviso in the section of
Act No. 277, above cited, by virtue of which the previously existing law on
the subject covered by the act is left intact in all its parts as respects
pending actions or existing causes of action. The language is general and
embraces, we think, all actions, whether civil, criminal, or of a mixed
character. In this view of the case we have no occasion to consider the
question argued by counsel for the private prosecutor as to whether the
provisions of Act No. 277 respecting the penalty are more favorable to the
accused than those of the former law or otherwise. The punishment must
be determined exclusively by the provisions of the former law.
It is urged by counsel that the official position of the private prosecutor
should be considered as an aggravating circumstance under Penal Code,
article 10, No. 20. We are inclined to think that in the view we have taken of
the case this circumstance is qualificative rather than generic. (Penal Code,
art. 78.)lawphi1.net
The result, then, is that the penalty prescribed by article 458, paragraph 1,
of the Penal Code should be applied in its medium grade, and in view of all
the circumstances of the case we fix the penalty as four years
of destierro and a fine of 4,000 pesetas, with subsidiary liability to one day's
banishment for every 12 ½ pesetas not paid, and the costs of both
instances. The judgment of the court below will be modified in accordance
with this opinion, and the record will be returned to that court for the
execution of the sentence as thus modified. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Cooper, Smith, Willard, and Mapa, JJ., concur.

2. The question raised by the appeal of the private prosecutor relates solely
to the propriety of the punishment imposed by the court below. Article 458
of the Penal Code provides that "injurias graves, put into writing and made
public [which is the present case] shall be punished with the penalty
of destierro in its medium to its maximum degree, and a fine of from 625 to
6,250 pesetas." Act No. 277 of the United States Philippine Commission
"defining the law of libel." etc., and reforming the preexisting Spanish law on
the subject of calumnia and injurias affixes to the offense of publishing a
libel as defined in the act the punishment of "a fine not exceeding $2,000 or
imprisonment for not exceeding one year, or both." Section 13 of the same
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-41423 March 19, 1935

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CRISANTO TAMAYO, defendant-appellant.

Juan Amor and Simeon J. Tolentino for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.

HULL, J.:

Appellant was convicted in the justice of the peace court of Magsingal,

Province of Ilocos Sur, of a violation of section 2, municipal ordinance No. 5,
series of 1932, of said municipality. Upon appeal to the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Sur conviction resulted and a fine was imposed. From that
decision this appeal was brought.

While this appeal was pending, the municipal council repealed section 2 in
question, which repeal was duly approved by the provincial board, and the
act complained of, instead of being a violation of the municipal ordinances,
is now legal in that municipality.

Appellant has moved for a dismissal of the action against him on account of
that repeal.

In the leading cases of the United States vs. Cuna (12 Phil., 241), and
Wing vs. United States (218 U.S., 272), the doctrine was clearly established
that in the Philippines repeal of a criminal Act by its reenactment, even
without a saving clause, would not destroy criminal liability. But not a single
sentence in either decision indicates that there was any desire to hold that a
person could be prosecuted, convicted, and punished for acts no longer
criminal.

There is no question that a common law and in America a much more

favorable attitude towards the accused exists relative to statutes that have
been repealed than has been adopted here. Our rule is more in conformity
with the Spanish doctrine, but even in Spain, where the offense ceases to be
criminal, prosecution cannot be had. (1 Pacheco Commentaries, 296.)

The repeal here was absolute, and not a reenactment and repeal by
implication. Nor was there any saving clause. The legislative intent as shown
by the action of the municipal council is that such conduct, formerly
denounced, is no longer deemed criminal, and it would be illogical for this
court to attempt to sentence appellant for an offense that no longer exists.

We are therefore of the opinion that the proceedings against appellant

must be dismissed. So ordered. Costs de oficio.

Avanceña, C.J., Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Vickers, Imperial, Butte,

Goddard, and Diaz, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4504 December 15, 1908
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
EL CHINO CUNA (alias SY CONCO), defendant-appellee.
Attorney-General Araneta, for appellant.
No appearance for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
On the 12th of August, 1907, the provincial fiscal filed in the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Isabela, an information charging the defendant
Chinaman Cuna (alias Sy Conco), with a violation of section 5 of Act No.
1461 of the Philippine Commission, committed as follows:
That the said Chinaman Cuna (alias Sy Conco), on or about the
30th day of June, 1907, in the municipality of Echague, in the
Province of Isabela, in the Philippine Islands, sold for ten cents,
Philippine currency, a small quantity of opium, to Apolinaria
Gumpal, a Filipino woman, who was neither a doctor, pharmacist,
vender of opium with license, nor an inveterate user of opium
duly registered; all contrary to the law.
Thereafter the defendant demurred to the information on the ground:
1. That the information alleges that on the 30th day of June,
1907, in the town of Echague, Province of Isabela, in the
Philippine Islands, the accused violated the provisions of section 5
of Act No. 1461.
2. That the said Act No. 1461 was repealed by Act No. 1761,
enacted on the 10th day of October, 1907, and in effect on the
17th day of October, 1907, during the pendency of this case.
3. That the said Act No. 1461 having been repealed during the
pendency of this case, and the repealing law not containing any
exception touching pending cases, there is no law in force which
penalizes the alleged offense. Wherefore, this court has no
jurisdiction over the case.
The trial court in its order sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the
information held as follows:lawphil.net
After hearing he arguments of counsel and examining the record,
the court finds that at the time when it is alleged this accused
committed the offense with which he is charged, Act No. 1461,
known as the "Opium Law" was in force, and continued to be in
force until the 17th day of October, 1907, when it was
superseded by a new Act, No. 1761, which, in section 33 thereof,
repeals Act No. 1461, without excepting from the provisions of
the repealing clause cases pending at the time of its enactment,
for the infraction of Act. No. 1461, and without prescribing what
disposition should be made of such cases. This being true, the
court is of opinion that this case should be dismissed, there being
at this time no law in force, in accordance with which this
accused, if he be tried and convicted, can be punished for the
offense committed in June, 1907. (U.S. vs.Tynen, 11 Wal., 88
Mongeon vs. People, 55 N.Y., 613; State vs. Wilder, 47 Ga., 522).
The court, therefore, sustains this demurrer, and dismisses the
case, declaring the costs de oficio.
From the judgment sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the information,
the Government appealed, and the only question submitted for
consideration is whether the provisions of section 33 of Act No. 1761, which
in express terms appeal Act No. 1461, should be construed so as to deprive
the courts of jurisdiction, after the date when the repealing Act went into
effect, to try, convict, and sentence persons guilty of violations of Act No.
1461, committed prior to that date.
The cases cited by the trial court, as well as many others of like tenor and
effect which are to be found in the reports, leave no room for doubt as to
the American and English common-law doctrine touching the effect of a
repeal of a law prescribing penalties; most if not all of the state courts
holding that, in accord with this doctrine, the repeal of a law prescribing
penalties has the effect of remitting or extinguishing any penalty, loss or
rights, or responsibility incurred under such law as to all persons who have
not been convicted and sentenced under the provisions of such law prior to
the enactment of the repealing law; the Supreme Court of the United States
declaring that "under the general principles of the common law, the repeal
of a penal statute operates as a remission of all penalties for violations of it
committed before its repeal, and a release from prosecution therefor after
said repeal, unless there be either a clause in the repealing statute, or a
provision of some other statute, expressly authorizing such prosecution."
(U.S. vs. Reisinger, 128 U.S. Rep., 398, 401.)
But neither English nor American common law is in force in these Islands,
nor are the doctrines derived therefrom binding upon our courts, save only
in so far as they founded on sound principles applicable to local conditions,
and are not in conflict with existing law; and, in our opinion, the common-
law rule of interpretation just cited is in conflict with existing law in these
Islands, and directly opposed to the rule of interpretation laid down by the
supreme court of Spain and the learned commentators on Spanish written
law; and, in the language of a learned American judge, "the rule is an
arbitrary one, and never had anything to commend it, except in the United
States an undue sympathy for wrongdoers, and in England an early
prejudice among common-law judges against "statute-made law." (Opinion
of Judge Deady, Eastman vs. Clackamas Co., 32 Fed. Rep., 24, 33.)
Article 1 of the Penal Code in force in these Islands defines crimes and
misdemeanors as voluntary acts or omissions penalized by the law; and
complementary to this provision, article 21 provides that no crime or
misdemeanor shall be punished with a penalty of which has not been
prescribed by law prior to its commission. In accordance with these
provisions the question whether an act is punishable or not depends upon
the question whether or not at the time of its commission, there was a law
in force which penalized it; this rule being modified, however, by article 22
of the same code, which provides that penal laws shall have a retroactive
effect in so far as they favor persons convicted of a crime or misdemeanor,
and this notwithstanding the fact that at the time of the enactment of such
laws, final and judgment may have been pronounced and the convict may
entered upon the execution of his sentence.
The courts of Spain and learned commentators on Spanish law have
construed these provisions to mean that penal laws are to be given a
retroactive effect only in so far as they favor the defendant charged with a
crime or a misdemeanor, and that, when a penal law is enacted repealing a
prior law, such repeal does not have the effect of relieving an offender in
the whole or in part of penalties already incurred under the old law, unless
the new law favors the defendant by diminishing the penalty or doing away
with it altogether, and then only by extent to which the new law is favorable
to the offender. In other words, that the enactment of new penal law,
notwithstanding the fact that they contain general repealing clauses, does
not deprive the courts jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence persons
charged with violations of the old law prior to the date when the repealing
law goes into effect, unless the new law wholly fails to penalize the acts
which constituted the offense defined and penalized in the repealed law.
Thus Pacheco, commenting upon the new Penal Code of 1848-1850, of
which article 506 provided that all general penal laws were repealed by its
publication, says:
At this time when the Penal Code is being put into effect and
given force, we have in fact two criminal laws in Spain, and close
attention is necessary to apply them properly. There may be
prosecutions which it is necessary to dismiss, as, for example,
those for sodomy; others which it may be necessary to decide in
conformity with the provisions of the new code, as, for example,
those for carrying concealed weapons; and others which must be
judged in accordance with the old provisions, as, for example,
many cases of robbery. The rules of procedure in one or other
manner being furnished us by the former article (article 19 of the
Penal Code of Spain identical with article 21 of the Penal Code of
the Philippines), and the present article (article 20 of the Penal
Code of Spain and article 22 of the Philippine Code). Has the code
increased the penalty? Then it is not applicable to crimes
committed prior to its enactment. Has it extinguished or
diminished them? Then it is clearly applicable to them. (1
Pacheco, 296.)
And a similar construction was placed upon the provisions of the Penal Code
of 1870 by the supreme court of Spain. Article 626 of this code (which is
substantially identical with article 506 of the Penal Code of 1848 and article
611 of the Penal Code of the Philippine Islands) repealed all general penal
laws prior to its promulgation, but the court held that, where a crime was
committed prior to the publication of the reformed code, the penalty
prescribed by the code of 1850 (the code prior to that of 1870) being more
favorable to the accused, that must be applied. (Decision of the supreme
court of Spain, 17th of January, 1873.)
It is contended, however, that the general provisions of the Penal Code thus
construed are not applicable to Acts of the Commission or of the Philippine
Legislature defining and penalizing offenses, these provisions being limited
in their application to the subject-matter embraced in the code itself. In
answer to this suggestion it is said that, while all the provisions of the Penal
Code may not be applicable to special Acts defining and penalizing offenses,
article 22 of that code prescribes a rule of general application, and in the
absence of other provisions this rule is universally applicable in all cases
where new penal law repeal former laws touching the same subject-matter.
For the purposes of this decision, however, it is not necessary to determine
this question, because the penalty prescribed in both Acts under
consideration is the same, and, even if the rule prescribed in article 22 of
the code were not applicable to Acts of the Commission or of the Philippine
Legislature, article 3 of the preliminary title of the Spanish Civil Code, still in
force in the Philippines, which treats of laws in general, their effect, and
general rules of application, provides that laws in general shall not have a
retroactive effect, if the contrary is not expressly provided; so that, if it be
granted that the express provision of article 22, prescribing that penal laws
shall not have retroactive effect save only where favorable to the offender,
is not applicable to Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine
Legislature, then it must be held under this provision of the Civil Code that
such Acts can have no retroactive effect whatever; and the reasoning
advanced in support of the Spanish doctrine as to the effect of general
repealing clauses in the code, which is based upon a comparative
examination of the limited retroactive effect given its provisions in article
22, read together with articles 3 and 21 (which undoubtedly declare the
principles of universal application), applies to such Acts with equal if not
greater force and cogency, since, unless article 22 be held to apply to them,
these Acts can have no retroactive force whatever.
We conclude, therefore, that the doctrine of English and American common
law relied upon by counsel for defendant is not and has not been the
accepted doctrine in this jurisdiction, and that, in accordance with the
accepted doctrine, the courts in these Islands are not deprived of
jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence offenders who have violated the
provisions of Act No. 1461 prior to the date when Act No. 1761 went into
effect, notwithstanding the provision of the latter Act repealing Act No.
1461; and that the penalty prescribed by the repealing Act for violation
charged in the information not being more favorable to the accused than
that prescribed in the old law, the penalty to be imposed is that prescribed
by the old law. But we expressly reserve our opinion as to which penalty
would properly be imposed in case wherein a later Act of the Commission of
the Philippine Legislature imposed more favorable penalty than that
prescribed in a repealed Act.
The reason originally advanced in support of the common law of
interpretation, was that the former law, defining and penalizing certain acts
committed prior to the enactment of the new law, having been repealed,
there is no law in force after the date of the repeal by virtue of which the
court can impose the penalties prescribed in the repealed law. This
proposition will not bear close scrutiny. Either it assumes that the repeal of
a law defining and penalizing an offense has the retroactive effect of
remitting penalties already incurred under the repealed law, and
assumption which if carried to its logical conclusion would require the
discharge of all offenders against the old law, whether actually convicted or
not; or else it assumes that, when the legislator repeals a law defining and
penalizing an offense, there is an implied derogation of the jurisdiction of
the court to try and convict persons who have already incurred penalties
under the repealed law, but not have been tried and sentenced therefor. No
satisfactory reason can be assigned for reading such provisions into the
repealing law. Where the repealing law itself penalizes the acts penalized in
the repealed law, it is absurd to say that the legislator, although continuing
in force the penal provisions of the old law, intended to remit the penalties
as to certain persons guilty of the very acts which the new law itself
penalizes, because of the mere accident that they might had not been
brought to trial and sentenced before the enactment of the repealing law;
and the court by the laws creating them and defining their powers, are
clothed with power to try, convict and sentence all persons guilty of a
violation of law which constitutes a crime or a misdemeanor, and unless this
jurisdiction is expressly taken away from them by the repealing law, or
unless penalties incurred under the old law are expressly remitted, there is
no ground for denying to the courts jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence
violations of the old law. All persons who violated the provisions of the old
law prior to its repeal thereby incurred the penalties therein prescribed, and
thereafter the jurisdiction of the courts to try, convict, and sentence such
offenders does not depend upon the continuance in favor of that law as to
future offenders, but upon those provisions of law which clothe the courts
with power to hear and decide complaints charging the commission of
violation of law, and upon the observance of those rules of procedural law
which prescribe the steps to be taken in prosecuting criminal offenses. The
mere repeal of a penal statute is by no means equivalent to a declaration
that the statute was invalid from the date of its enactment. On the contrary,
it continues on the statute book as the law of the land touching the subject-
matter of which it treats; so that, unless the contrary expressly appears, a
repealed penal statute loses none of its force and effect as a law defining
and penalizing certain acts committed prior to its repeal, and the courts may
and should find in the repealed statute that the rule whereby to determine
whether penalties have been incurred thereunder, and the nature and
extent of such penalties as may have been incurred.
We the more readily accept the doctrine laid down by the Spanish
authorities, because it leads to a conclusion which appears to be in
consonance with the dictates of good sense and sound judgment, while the
rule of interlaw authorities results in a construction of repealing statutes
which it is difficult to believe the law maker has in mind when these statutes
are enacted. A rule of interpretation which results in a conclusion manifestly
contrary to the intention of the legislator and which, as was well said by
Judge Deady, is an arbitrary rule, with nothing to commend it, should not be
adopted in this jurisdiction where it is not supported by those binding
precedents which alone have kept it alive in England and the United States.

We are confirmed in our conclusions by a review of modern American

legislation modifying and restricting the application of the common-law
doctrine;lawphil.net for it appears that the Congress of the United States,
and many if not most of the States have adopted statutory provisions for
the express purpose of escaping the absurd and unreasonable
consequences flowing from a strict application of the common law doctrine,
and it appears that American courts of last resort have never hesitated to
give full force and effect of these statutory modification of the common law
doctrine. (U.S. vs. Jacobus, 96 Fed. Rep., 260; Lang vs. U.S., 133 Fed. Rep.,
201, 206; Daggy vs. Ball, 7 Ind. App., 64, 34 N.E., 246; Art. 13, Rev. Stat.,
U.S.)

The judgment of the trial court sustaining the demurrer to the complaint
interposed by the accused is reversed, and the record will be returned to
that court for further proceedings in accordance with the law.itc@alf So
ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Willard, and Tracy, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-335 February 12, 1947
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
GERONIMA SINDIONG DE PASTOR and SANTOS T. PASTOR, defendants-
appellees.
Assistant Solicitor General Gianzon and Solicitor Feria for appellant.
Enrique Medina for appellees.
HILADO, J.:
The question presented here is whether or not, in view of the express repeal
of sections 1458 and 1459, in relation with section 2723, of the Revised
Administrative Code, and of Act No. 3243, by section 369 of Commonwealth
Act No. 466, otherwise known as the National Internal Revenue Code, and in
view of the later enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 503 (vide section 5),
violations of the provisions of the repealed acts, while they were in force,
could be legally prosecuted after the repeal but also after the enactment of
Commonwealth Act No. 503.
The accused Geronima Sindiong de Pastor and Santos T. Pastor were, on
June 4, 1941, charged by the Provincial Fiscal of Oriental Negros in an
information filed with the Justice of the Peace Court of Dumaguete, capital
of the province, with a violation of sections 1458 and 1459 of the Revised
Administrative Code, in relation with Act No. 3243, and section 2723 of the
same Code. The accused waived their right to a preliminary investigation,
whereupon the proper information was lodged against them with the Court
of First Instance of the province on July 11, 1941. Probably as a
consequence of the Pacific war having supervened, no further proceedings
were taken until January 27, 1946, when the accused filed a motion to
quash. The motion was upheld by the trial court in its order dated February
12, 1946 (Appendix A of appellant's brief).
The Government, not agreeing with such order, interposed this appeal.
The business of the accused in connection with which they are thus being
prosecuted was that of owners, managers or administrators of the
"Magazine Center", an establishment devoted to the selling of newspapers,
magazines and stationery, according to the information.
The information alleges that these defendants during the period comprised
between January, 1936, and March 31, 1938, being such owners, managers
and administrators of said "Magazine Center", with the deliberate purpose
to evade the payment of the percentage tax upon their receipts, voluntarily,
illegally, and criminally neglected to make a return of their sales within the
time prescribed by law.
Counsel for appellant makes the following express admission in his brief (p.
3):
It is an admitted fact that the provisions of law under which the
accused are being prosecuted, namely, sections 1458 and 1459 in
relation with section 2723, of the Revised Administrative Code
and Act No. 3243, had been expressly repealed by section 369 of
Commonwealth Act No. 466. It is likewise admitted that the
above-mentioned provisions of the Revised Administrative Code
were no longer in force at the time the present action was
instituted.
The trial court, in passing upon the motion to quash, inter alia, said (trial
court's order, appendix A, appellant's brief):
This kind of business not being now subject to the payment of
percentage tax, and for that matter not being required under the
present law to file a quarterly return of their receipts and sales, is
no longer within the penal provisions of section 209 of the
Internal Revenue Code which supersedes the provisions of
section 2725 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Appellant's counsel says (brief, pp. 6-7):
Without the enactment of amendatory Act No. 503, the
conclusion reached by the trial court would be correct, because it
would then be clear that under Commonwealth Act No. 466, only
the manufacturer, producer or importer is liable for the payment
of the percentage tax. But with the enactment of the above-
mentioned amendatory Act, the intention of the legislature to
subject all merchants to the payment of the privilege tax, in the
same way that they were subject thereto under the provisions of
the Revised Administrative Code, becomes perfectly clear.
It results from this that according to the Government itself, without the
enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 503, the present defendants would
not have been liable to prosecution under the facts alleged in the
information for the reason that under the National Internal Revenue Code
only the manufacturer, producer or importer is liable for the payment of the
privilege tax. But it is contended for the prosecution that in the enactment
of said Commonwealth Act No. 503 the intention of the legislature was "to
subject all merchants to the payment of the privilege tax, in the same way
that they were subject thereto under the provisions of the Revised
Administrative Code". The section of Commonwealth Act No. 503
particularly relied upon by the prosecution is the following:
SEC. 5. As used in sections 184, 185 and 186 of Commonwealth
Act Numbered Four hundred sixty-six, the phrase "original sale,
barter, or exchange" shall be construed to mean the first sale,
barter, or exchange of article by every manufacturer, producer,
or importer: Provided, however, That where the taxes prescribed
in said sections have not been collected on articles, the original
sales of which are subject to tax, in the possession of any
merchant, the first sale, barter, or exchange of said articles on or
after the approval of this Act shall be considered as an original
sale, barter, or exchange and shall be subject to tax at the rates
prescribed in said sections 184, 185, and 186. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The underscored portion of the proviso of the aforequoted section
determines what sale, barter or exchange of articles subject to the taxes
prescribed in sections 184, 185 and 186 of Commonwealth Act No. 466 shall
be considered as an original sale, barter or exchange and shall be subject to
the tax, and it determines the question by saying that it shall be the first
sale, barter or exchange on or after the approval of said Act. Commonwealth
Act No. 503 was approved on October 16, 1939. Therefore, the sales made
by the present defendants between January, 1936, and March 31, 1938,
were not covered by the provisions of section 5 of said Commonwealth Act
No. 503 which was not in existence when they took place.
Under sections 1458 and 1459 of the Revised Administrative Code and
section 1 of Act No. 3243, defendants were required to make a return of
their sales and to pay the percentage tax therein provided for.
With respect to the newspapers, magazines and stationery sold by them, as
"merchants" under the definition of section 1459, during the period alleged
in the information, the penalty for their failure to make the required return
was fixed by section 2723 of the same Code at a fine not exceeding P2,000
or imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, or both. Those
provisions were, however, expressly repealed by section 369 of
Commonwealth Act No. 466.
While it is true that under section 186 of Commonwealth Act No. 466 those
newspapers, magazines and stationery would come within the meaning of
the term "articles" used therein (Webster's International Dictionary, p. 131,
definition No. 6 of "article"), the fact is that by the said section the one
made liable to pay the tax is the manufacturer, producer or importer and the
tax is therein expressly made collectible only once, i. e., on every original
sale, barter, exchange and similar transaction intended to transfer
ownership of, or title to, the articles therein referred to. And, as regards the
newspapers and magazines, persons, like defendants, engaged in the
business of selling them, but who were not the printers or publishers
thereof, could not have made the original sale, barter, exchange or similar
transaction within the meaning of the oft-repeated section 186. Moreover,
even the printer or publisher can hardly be considered as the "manufacturer
or producer" thereof. And even if we direct attention to section 191 of
Commonwealth Act No. 466, in so far as it relates to publishers, we will find
that the tax of 1½ per cent thereby imposed is only upon the publishers who
are not covered by the exception therein made, and not upon the merchant
or by the person who acquires the newspapers, magazines, reviews or
bulletins therein spoken of from the publisher for purposes of resale. This
means that defendants herein would not come under the purview of said
section 191 either.
From the foregoing it results that neither under section 186 nor under
section 191 of the National Internal Revenue Code — nor under any other
sections of said Code for that matter — would defendants liable for the
percentage tax therein created.
Radical changes from the aforesaid and other provisions of the former
Internal Revenue Law, upon the enactment of the National Internal Revenue
Code, are: (a) the increased rate from 1½ per cent under section 1459 of
the Revised Administrative Code and section 1 of Act No. 3243 to 3½ per
cent under section 186 of the National Internal Revenue Code; (b) the
change in the incidence of the tax, namely, its imposition only upon
the manufacturer,producer or importer on the original sale, barter,
exchange, etc. effected by him, pursuant to section 186 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, instead of upon every person making any sale,
barter, exchange, etc., no matter how many times these transactions were
successively repeated, under sections 1458 and 1459 of the Revised
Administrative Code and section 1 of Act No. 3243; (c) the increase from 1
per cent under section 1461 of the Revised Administrative Code to 1½ per
cent under section 191 of the National Internal Revenue Code in the tax or
publishers, lithographers and printers; etc.
Consequently, we are of opinion that the provisions of sections 1458 and
1459 of the Revised Administrative Code and section 1 of Act No. 3243 were
not reenacted, even substantially, in the National Internal Revenue Code.
But it is contended for the Government that the order appealed from is
erroneous because of the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 503,
particularly section 5 thereof, transcribed in appellant's brief and also in an
earlier part of this decision. However, we must not lose sight of the proviso
of said section 5 which is in the words and figures following:
Provided, however, that where the taxes described in said
sections (sections 184, 185, and 186 of Commonwealth Act No.
466) have not been collected on articles, the original sales of
which are subject to the tax, in the possession of any merchant,
the first sale, barter, or exchange of said articles on or after the
approval of this Act shall be considered as an original sale, barter,
or exchange and shall be subject to the tax. . . .
This proviso was evidently designed to cover the case of those articles on
whose original sale, barter, or exchange the percentage tax would have
been collectible from the manufacturer, producer or importer if it had been
effected upon or after the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 466, but
which were so sold, bartered or exchanged before said enactment: and for
such a case it was provided that the first sale, barter, or exchange of said
articles on or after the approval of the Act (No. 503) shall be considered as
the original sale, barter or exchange thereof and shall be accordingly
taxable. The sales made by the herein defendants, having taken place
between January, 1936, and March 31, 1938, we effected more than one
year before the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 503, that is, October
16, 1939.
It will, therefore, appear from the foregoing considerations that upon the
enactment of the National Internal Revenue Code defendants herein ceased
to be bound to make a return of their sales in question or to pay the
percentage tax under consideration. And not only this, but even after the
enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 503, such obligation could not in any
sense be considered as reviewed — hypothetically supposing that such
revival would have been valid — since by the express terms of the proviso of
section 5 of the last mentioned act, the sales thus made by defendants
would not, at any rate, have been considered as "the first sale, barter, or
exchange" of the aforesaid newspaper, magazines and stationary. In other
words, after the approval of the National Internal Revenue Code the
continuity of the obligation, and therefore of the penal sanction for its
violation, was broken. In consequence, the authorities cited by the Solicitor
General on page 8 of his brief, predicated upon the re-enactment, literal or
substantial, of the repealed provision by the repealing act, are not in point.
In Ong Chang Wing and Kwong Fok vs. United States (40 Phil., 1046; 218
U.S., 272; 54 Law ed., 1040, 1041)), wherein the United States Supreme
Court affirmed a judgment of conviction by this Court, the former tribunal
said:
It appears that the new Act No. 1757, which took the place of the
repealed act, article No. 343 of the Philippine Penal Code, did not
undertake to wipe out the offense of gambling, or keeping a
gambling house in the Philippine Islands, but substantially re-
enacted the former law with more elaboration and detail in its
provisions than were contained in the former law. (Emphasis
supplied.)
On the following page of the report, the same tribunal had the following to
say of the effect of the decision of this Court:
. . . The effect of the decision of the Philippine Supreme Court is
to hold that under the law and local statutes, the repealing act re-
enacting substantially the former law, and not increasing the
punishment of the accused, the right still exists to punish the
accused for an offense of which they were convicted and
sentenced before the passage of the later act. . . . (Emphasis
supplied.)
In the case of United States vs. Cuna (12 Phil., 241), the earliest Philippine
case cited in the Solicitor General's brief, this Court declared (p. 245):
. . . In other words, that the enactment of new penal laws,
notwithstanding the fact that they contain general repealing
clauses, does not deprive the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict,
and sentence persons charged with violations of the old law prior
to the date when the repealing law goes into effect, unless the
new law wholly fails to penalize the acts which constituted the
offense defined and penalized in the repealed law.
In accordance with this doctrine, where the repealing law wholly fails to
penalize the acts which constituted the offense defined and penalized in the
repealed law, the repeal carries with it the deprivation of the courts of
jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence persons charged with violations of
the old law prior to the repeal. This is our case, since, as already seen, the
National Internal Revenue Code, and for that matter even Commonwealth
Act No. 503, wholly fails to penalize the acts imputed upon the herein
defendants.

Wherefore, it is the judgment of this Court that the order appealed from be,
as it is hereby, affirmed with costs de officio. So ordered.

Moran, Bengzon, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Perfecto, Briones, Hontiveros, Padilla

and Tuason, JJ., concur.
EN BANC by conducting International Simple Resale (ISR), which
is a method of routing and completing international
long distance calls using lines, cables, antenae, and/or
LUIS MARCOS P. LAUREL, G.R. No. 155076 air wave frequency which connect directly to the local
Petitioner, or domestic exchange facilities of the country where
Present: the call is destined, effectively stealing this business
Puno, C.J., from PLDT while using its facilities in the estimated
Quisumbing, amount of P20,370,651.92 to the damage and
Ynares-Santiago, prejudice of PLDT, in the said amount.
Carpio,
- versus - Austria-Martinez, CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Corona,
Carpio Morales,
Azcuna,
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash (with Motion to Defer
Tinga,
Chico-Nazario, Arraignment), on the ground that the factual allegations in the Amended
Velasco, Jr.,
Nachura, Information do not constitute the felony of theft. The trial court denied the
Leonardo-De Castro, and
Brion, JJ. Motion to Quash the Amended Information, as well petitioners subsequent
HON. ZEUS C. ABROGAR,
Motion for Reconsideration.
Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 150,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Promulgated:
& PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE Petitioners special civil action for certiorari was dismissed by the
TELEPHONE COMPANY,
Respondents. January 13, 2009 Court of Appeals. Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition for review with

this Court.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

RESOLUTION
In the above-quoted Decision, this Court held that the Amended
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Information does not contain material allegations charging petitioner with

theft of personal property since international long distance calls and the
On February 27, 2006, this Courts First Division rendered judgment in this business of providing telecommunication or telephone services are not
case as follows: personal properties under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the

petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders of the Respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT)
Regional Trial Court and the Decision of the Court of
Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Refer the Case to the
Trial Court is directed to issue an order granting the
Supreme Court En Banc. It maintains that the Amended Information
motion of the petitioner to quash the Amended
Information. charging petitioner with theft is valid and sufficient; that it states the names

SO ORDERED.[1] of all the accused who were specifically charged with the crime of theft of

PLDTs international calls and business of providing telecommunication or

By way of brief background, petitioner is one of the accused in telephone service on or about September 10 to 19, 1999 in Makati City by

Criminal Case No. 99-2425, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, conducting ISR or International Simple Resale; that it identifies the

Branch 150. The Amended Information charged the accused with theft international calls and business of providing telecommunication or

under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows: telephone service of PLDT as the personal properties which were unlawfully

taken by the accused; and that it satisfies the test of sufficiency as it enabled
On or about September 10-19, 1999, or prior thereto
in Makati City, and within the jurisdiction of this a person of common understanding to know the charge against him and the
Honorable Court, the accused, conspiring and
court to render judgment properly.
confederating together and all of them mutually
helping and aiding one another, with intent to gain and
without the knowledge and consent of the Philippine
Long Distance Telephone (PLDT), did then and there PLDT further insists that the Revised Penal Code should be
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and use
the international long distance calls belonging to PLDT interpreted in the context of the Civil Codes definition of real and personal
property. The enumeration of real properties in Article 415 of the Civil Code electric current or impulses. Hence, it may not be considered as personal

is exclusive such that all those not included therein are personal property susceptible of appropriation. Petitioner claims that the analogy

properties. Since Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code used the words between generated electricity and telephone calls is misplaced. PLDT does

personal property without qualification, it follows that all personal not produce or generate telephone calls. It only provides the facilities or

properties as understood in the context of the Civil Code, may be the services for the transmission and switching of the calls. He also insists that

subject of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. PLDT alleges business is not personal property. It is not the business that is protected but

that the international calls and business of providing telecommunication or the right to carry on a business. This right is what is considered as

telephone service are personal properties capable of appropriation and can property. Since the services of PLDT cannot be considered as property, the

be objects of theft. same may not be subject of theft.

PLDT also argues that taking in relation to theft under the Revised The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) agrees with respondent

Penal Code does not require asportation, the sole requisite being that the PLDT that international phone calls and the business or service of providing

object should be capable of appropriation. The element of taking referred to international phone calls are subsumed in the enumeration and definition of

in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code means the act of depriving another personal property under the Civil Code hence, may be proper subjects of

of the possession and dominion of a movable coupled with the intention, at theft. It noted that the cases of United States v. Genato,[3]United States v.

the time of the taking, of withholding it with the character of Carlos[4] and United States v. Tambunting,[5] which recognized intangible

permanency. There must be intent to appropriate, which means to deprive properties like gas and electricity as personal properties, are deemed

the lawful owner of the thing. Thus, the term personal properties under incorporated in our penal laws. Moreover, the theft provision in the Revised

Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code is not limited to only personal Penal Code was deliberately couched in broad terms precisely to be all-

properties which are susceptible of being severed from a mass or larger encompassing and embracing even such scenario that could not have been

quantity and of being transported from place to place. easily anticipated.

PLDT likewise alleges that as early as the 1930s, international According to the OSG, prosecution under Republic Act (RA) No.

telephone calls were in existence; hence, there is no basis for this Courts 8484 or the Access Device Regulations Act of 1998 and RA 8792 or

finding that the Legislature could not have contemplated the theft of the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000does not preclude prosecution under

international telephone calls and the unlawful transmission and routing of the Revised Penal Code for the crime of theft. The latter embraces

electronic voice signals or impulses emanating from such calls by unlawfully unauthorized appropriation or use of PLDTs international calls, service and

tampering with the telephone device as within the coverage of the Revised business, for personal profit or gain, to the prejudice of PLDT as owner

Penal Code. thereof. On the other hand, the special laws punish the surreptitious and

advanced technical means employed to illegally obtain the subject service

According to respondent, the international phone calls which are and business. Even assuming that the correct indictment should have been

electric currents or sets of electric impulses transmitted through a medium, under RA 8484, the quashal of the information would still not be

and carry a pattern representing the human voice to a receiver, are personal proper. The charge of theft as alleged in the Information should be taken in

properties which may be subject of theft. Article 416(3) of the Civil Code relation to RA 8484 because it is the elements, and not the designation of

deems forces of nature (which includes electricity) which are brought under the crime, that control.

the control by science, are personal property.

Considering the gravity and complexity of the novel questions of law

In his Comment to PLDTs motion for reconsideration, petitioner involved in this case, the Special First Division resolved to refer the same to

Laurel claims that a telephone call is a conversation on the phone or a the Banc.

communication carried out using the telephone. It is not synonymous to

 We resolve to grant the Motion for Reconsideration but remand

the case to the trial court for proper clarification of the Amended Cognizant of the definition given by jurisprudence and the Civil Code of

Information. Spain to the term personal property at the time the old Penal Code was

being revised, still the legislature did not limit or qualify the definition of

Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code provides: personal property in the Revised Penal Code. Neither did it provide a

restrictive definition or an exclusive enumeration of personal property in

Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. Theft is committed
by any person who, with intent to gain but without the Revised Penal Code, thereby showing its intent to retain for the term an
violence against, or intimidation of persons nor force
extensive and unqualified interpretation. Consequently, any property which
upon things, shall take personal property of another
without the latters consent. is not included in the enumeration of real properties under the Civil Code

and capable of appropriation can be the subject of theft under the Revised

Penal Code.
The elements of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal

Code are as follows: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that
The only requirement for a personal property to be the object of theft
said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to
under the penal code is that it be capable of appropriation. It need not be
gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5)
capable of asportation, which is defined as carrying away.[7] Jurisprudence is
that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or
settled that to take under the theft provision of the penal code does not
intimidation of persons or force upon things.
require asportation or carrying away.[8]

Prior to the passage of the Revised Penal Code on December 8, 1930, the
To appropriate means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing.[9] The word
definition of the term personal property in the penal code provision on theft
take in the Revised Penal Code includes any act intended to transfer
had been established in Philippine jurisprudence. This Court, in United
possession which, as held in the assailed Decision, may be committed
States v. Genato, United States v. Carlos, and United States v. Tambunting,
through the use of the offenders own hands, as well as any mechanical
consistently ruled that any personal property, tangible or intangible,
device, such as an access device or card as in the instant case. This includes
corporeal or incorporeal, capable of appropriation can be the object of
controlling the destination of the property stolen to deprive the owner of
theft.
the property, such as the use of a meter tampering, as held in Natividad v.

Court of Appeals,[10]use of a device to fraudulently obtain gas, as held

Moreover, since the passage of the Revised Penal Code on December 8,
in United States v. Tambunting, and the use of a jumper to divert electricity,
1930, the term personal property has had a generally accepted definition in
as held in the cases of United States v. Genato, United States v. Carlos,
civil law. In Article 335 of the Civil Code of Spain, personal property is
and United States v. Menagas.[11]
defined as anything susceptible of appropriation and not included in the

foregoing chapter (not real property). Thus, the term personal property in
As illustrated in the above cases, appropriation of forces of nature which are
the Revised Penal Code should be interpreted in the context of the Civil
brought under control by science such as electrical energy can be achieved
Code provisions in accordance with the rule on statutory construction that
by tampering with any apparatus used for generating or measuring such
where words have been long used in a technical sense and have been
forces of nature, wrongfully redirecting such forces of nature from such
judicially construed to have a certain meaning, and have been adopted by
apparatus, or using any device to fraudulently obtain such forces of
the legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a particular statute, in
nature. In the instant case, petitioner was charged with engaging in
which they are used, the words used in such statute should be construed
International Simple Resale (ISR) or the unauthorized routing and
according to the sense in which they have been previously used.[6] In fact,
completing of international long distance calls using lines, cables, antennae,
this Court used the Civil Code definition of personal property in interpreting

the theft provision of the penal code in United States v. Carlos.

and/or air wave frequency and connecting these calls directly to the local or In the instant case, the act of conducting ISR operations by illegally

domestic exchange facilities of the country where destined. connecting various equipment or apparatus to private respondent PLDTs

telephone system, through which petitioner is able to resell or re-route

As early as 1910, the Court declared in Genato that ownership over international long distance calls using respondent PLDTs facilities constitutes

electricity (which an international long distance call consists of), as well all three acts of subtraction mentioned above.

as telephone service, is protected by the provisions on theft of the Penal

Code. The pertinent provision of the Revised Ordinance of the City The business of providing telecommunication or telephone service is

of Manila, which was involved in the said case, reads as follows: likewise personal property which can be the object of theft under Article

308 of the Revised Penal Code.Business may be appropriated under Section

Injury to electric apparatus; Tapping current;
Evidence. No person shall destroy, mutilate, deface, or 2 of Act No. 3952 (Bulk Sales Law), hence, could be object of theft:
otherwise injure or tamper with any wire, meter, or
other apparatus installed or used for generating,
Section 2. Any sale, transfer, mortgage, or
containing, conducting, or measuring electricity,
assignment of a stock of goods, wares, merchandise,
telegraph or telephone service, nor tap or otherwise
provisions, or materials otherwise than in the ordinary
wrongfully deflect or take any electric current from
course of trade and the regular prosecution of the
such wire, meter, or other apparatus.
business of the vendor, mortgagor, transferor, or
assignor, or any sale, transfer, mortgage, or
No person shall, for any purpose
assignment of all, or substantially all, of the business or
whatsoever, use or enjoy the benefits of any device by
trade theretofore conducted by the vendor,
means of which he may fraudulently obtain any
mortgagor, transferor or assignor, or all, or
current of electricity or any telegraph or telephone
substantially all, of the fixtures and equipment used in
service; and the existence in any building premises of
and about the business of the vendor, mortgagor,
any such device shall, in the absence of satisfactory
transferor, or assignor, shall be deemed to be a sale
explanation, be deemed sufficient evidence of such use
and transfer in bulk, in contemplation of the Act. x x x.
by the persons benefiting thereby.

In Strochecker v. Ramirez,[12] this Court stated:

It was further ruled that even without the above ordinance the acts of

subtraction punished therein are covered by the provisions on theft of the

With regard to the nature of the property
Penal Code then in force, thus: thus mortgaged which is one-half interest in the
business above described, such interest is a personal
property capable of appropriation and not included in
Even without them (ordinance), the right of the enumeration of real properties in article 335 of the
the ownership of electric current is secured by articles Civil Code, and may be the subject of mortgage.
517 and 518 of the Penal Code; the application of
these articles in cases of subtraction of gas, a fluid used
for lighting, and in some respects resembling
electricity, is confirmed by the rule laid down in the
Interest in business was not specifically enumerated as personal property in
decisions of the supreme court of Spain of January 20,
1887, and April 1, 1897, construing and enforcing the the Civil Code in force at the time the above decision was rendered. Yet,
provisions of articles 530 and 531 of the Penal Code of
that country, articles 517 and 518 of the code in force interest in business was declared to be personal property since it is capable
in these islands.
of appropriation and not included in the enumeration of real

properties. Article 414 of the Civil Code provides that all things which are or
The acts of subtraction include: (a) tampering with any wire, meter, or other
may be the object of appropriation are considered either real property or
apparatus installed or used for generating, containing, conducting, or
personal property. Business is likewise not enumerated as personal property
measuring electricity, telegraph or telephone service; (b) tapping or
under the Civil Code. Just like interest in business, however, it may be
otherwise wrongfully deflecting or taking any electric current from such
appropriated. Following the ruling in Strochecker v. Ramirez, business
wire, meter, or other apparatus; and (c) using or enjoying the benefits of
should also be classified as personal property. Since it is not included in the
any device by means of which one may fraudulently obtain any current of
exclusive enumeration of real properties under Article 415, it is therefore
electricity or any telegraph or telephone service.
personal property.[13]

As can be clearly gleaned from the above disquisitions,
petitioners acts constitute theft of respondent PLDTs business and service,
committed by means of the unlawful use of the latters facilities. In this
regard, the Amended Information inaccurately describes the offense by
making it appear that what petitioner took were the international long
distance telephone calls, rather than respondent PLDTs business.
A perusal of the records of this case readily reveals that petitioner and
respondent PLDT extensively discussed the issue of ownership of telephone
calls. The prosecution has taken the position that said telephone calls
belong to respondent PLDT. This is evident from its Comment where it
defined the issue of this case as whether or not the unauthorized use or
appropriation of PLDT international telephone calls, service and facilities, for
the purpose of generating personal profit or gain that should have
otherwise belonged to PLDT, constitutes theft.[14]
In discussing the issue of ownership, petitioner and respondent PLDT gave
their respective explanations on how a telephone call is generated.[15] For its
part, respondent PLDT explains the process of generating a telephone call as
follows:
38. The role of telecommunication
companies is not limited to merely providing the
medium (i.e. the electric current) through which the
human voice/voice signal of the caller is
transmitted. Before the human voice/voice signal can
be so transmitted, a telecommunication company,
using its facilities, must first break down or decode the
human voice/voice signal into electronic impulses and
subject the same to further augmentation and
enhancements. Only after such process of conversion
will the resulting electronic impulses be transmitted by
a telecommunication company, again, through the use
of its facilities. Upon reaching the destination of the
call, the telecommunication company will again break
down or decode the electronic impulses back to
human voice/voice signal before the called party
receives the same. In other words, a
telecommunication company both converts/reconverts
the human voice/voice signal and provides the medium
for transmitting the same.
39. Moreover, in the case of an international
telephone call, once the electronic impulses originating
from a foreign telecommunication company country
(i.e. Japan) reaches the Philippines through a local
telecommunication company (i.e. private respondent
PLDT), it is the latter which decodes, augments and
enhances the electronic impulses back to the human
voice/voice signal and provides the medium (i.e.
electric current) to enable the called party to receive
the call. Thus, it is not true that the foreign
telecommunication company provides (1) the electric
current which transmits the human voice/voice signal
of the caller and (2) the electric current for the called
party to receive said human voice/voice signal.
40. Thus, contrary to petitioner Laurels
assertion, once the electronic impulses or electric
current originating from a foreign telecommunication
company (i.e. Japan) reaches private respondent PLDTs
network, it is private respondent PLDT which decodes,
augments and enhances the electronic impulses back
to the human voice/voice signal and provides the
medium (i.e. electric current) to enable the called party
to receive the call. Without private respondent PLDTs
network, the human voice/voice signal of the calling
party will never reach the called party.[16]
In the assailed Decision, it was conceded that in making the international
phone calls, the human voice is converted into electrical impulses or electric
current which are transmitted to the party called. A telephone call,
therefore, is electrical energy. It was also held in the assailed Decision that
intangible property such as electrical energy is capable of appropriation
because it may be taken and carried away. Electricity is personal property
under Article 416 (3) of the Civil Code, which enumerates forces of nature
which are brought under control by science.[17]
Indeed, while it may be conceded that international long distance calls, the
matter alleged to be stolen in the instant case, take the form of electrical
energy, it cannot be said that such international long distance calls were
personal properties belonging to PLDT since the latter could not have
acquired ownership over such calls. PLDT merely encodes, augments,
enhances, decodes and transmits said calls using its complex
communications infrastructure and facilities. PLDT not being the owner of
said telephone calls, then it could not validly claim that such telephone calls
were taken without its consent. It is the use of these communications
facilities without the consent of PLDT that constitutes the crime of theft,
which is the unlawful taking of the telephone services and business.
Therefore, the business of providing telecommunication and the
telephone service are personal property under Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code, and the act of engaging in ISR is an act of subtraction penalized
under said article. However, the Amended Information describes the thing
taken as, international long distance calls, and only later mentions stealing
the business from PLDT as the manner by which the gain was derived by the
accused. In order to correct this inaccuracy of description, this case must be
remanded to the trial court and the prosecution directed to amend the
Amended Information, to clearly state that the property subject of the theft

are the services and business of respondent PLDT. Parenthetically, this

amendment is not necessitated by a mistake in charging the proper offense,

which would have called for the dismissal of the information under Rule

110, Section 14 and Rule 119, Section 19 of the Revised Rules on Criminal

Procedure. To be sure, the crime is properly designated as one of theft. The

purpose of the amendment is simply to ensure that the accused is fully and

sufficiently apprised of the nature and cause of the charge against him, and

thus guaranteed of his rights under the Constitution.

ACCORDINGLY, the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The

assailed Decision dated February 27, 2006 is RECONSIDERED and SET

ASIDE. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68841

affirming the Order issued by Judge Zeus C. Abrogar of the Regional Trial

Court of Makati City, Branch 150, which denied the Motion to Quash (With

Motion to Defer Arraignment) in Criminal Case No. 99-2425 for theft,

is AFFIRMED. The case is remanded to the trial court and the Public

Prosecutor of Makati City is hereby DIRECTED to amend the Amended

Information to show that the property subject of the theft were services

and business of the private offended party.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-
SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
EN BANC Two critical issues emerge in this case. The first relates to whether the Court

should affirm the conviction of appellant Alfredo Bon (appellant) for six

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 166401 counts of rape and two counts of attempted rape, the victims being his

then-minor nieces. On that score, we affirm. As a consequence though, we

Appellee, [Formerly G.R. Nos. 158660-67]
are ultimately impelled to confront a question much broader in both scope

and import. While the Court had previously declined to acknowledge the
Pr constitutional abolition of the death penalty through the 1987
esent:
Constitution,[1] we now find it necessary to determine whether the
PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 resulted in the statutory interdiction of
PUNO, the death penalty.

- versus - QUISUMBING,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,
The second issue arises as we are compelled to review the
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
maximum term of reclusion temporal in the sentence imposed on appellant

CARPIO, by the Court of Appeals for the two counts of attempted rape. The sentence

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, was prescribed by the appellate court prior to the enactment of Republic

Act No. 9346 which ended the imposition of the death penalty in
ALFREDO BON, CORONA,
the Philippines. The proximate concern as to appellant is whether his
Appellant. CARPIO MORALES,
penalty for attempted qualified rape, which under the penal law should be
CALLEJO, SR., two degrees lower than that of consummated qualified rape, should be

AZCUNA, computed from death or reclusion perpetua.

TINGA,

CHICO-NAZARIO,
First, the antecedent facts.

GARCIA, an
d

VELASCO, JR., JJ.

I.

Promulgated:

Eight (8) Informations[2] were filed within the period

October 30, 2006
from 21 August 2000 to 23 February 2001 by the Assistant Provincial

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------- x Prosecutor of Gumaca, Quezon against appellant, charging him with the

rape of AAA[3] and BBB,[4] the daughters of his older brother. Appellant was

accused of raping AAA in Criminal Case Nos. 6899-G, 6902-G, 6906-G, and
DECISION
6908-G; while he was accused of raping BBB in Criminal Case Nos. 6689-G,

6903-G, 6905-G, and 6907-G.[5] All these cases were consolidated for trial.
TINGA, J.: The rapes were alleged to have been committed in several instances over a

span of six (6) years.

 Both AAA and BBB testified against appellant, their uncle, and BBB, on the other hand, testified that she was first raped by appellant in

both identified him as the man who had raped them. During trial, their 1997 when she was ten (10) years old, also at the house appellant shared

respective birth certificates and the medical certificates executed by the with her grandmother. While alone in the house, appellant poked a knife at

doctor who physically examined them were entered as documentary her, removed her clothes and inserted his penis in her vagina. Despite the

evidence. pain she felt, she could not resist appellant as he was holding a knife. She

did not report the rape to her parents out of fear of appellants threat that

he would kill her.[14] BBB further testified that in 1998 and 1999, she was

raped again by appellant on several occasions, the rapes occurring under

threat of a bladed weapon, and regardless of the time of day.[15]

BBB stated that she was last raped by appellant on 15 January

AAA testified that she was only six (6) years old when she was first molested 2000.[16] On that night, she was sleeping beside her sister AAA in the house

in 1994 in the house appellant had shared with her grandmother.[6] She of her grandmother when she felt appellant touching her body. She pushed

recounted that the incident took place when she and appellant were alone him away but appellant pulled her three (3) meters away from AAA towards

in the house. Appellant touched her thighs and vagina, removed her clothes the door. As appellant was holding a knife, BBB could not make any noise to

and inserted his penis into her vagina. Appellant threatened that she and alert her sister. Appellant ordered her to remove her clothes and forced her

her parents would be killed should she disclose the incident to anyone. She to lie down. After he took off his clothes, appellant placed himself on top of

thereafter stopped sleeping in the house of her grandmother. It was only BBB and stayed there for three (3) minutes moving up and down.

three (3) years after, in 1997, that she slept in the said house, yet again she Thereafter, she put on her clothes and returned to where her sister was.

was sexually abused by appellant. She was then nine (9) years old.[7] She added that although it was dark, she knew it was appellant who had

molested her as she was familiar with his smell. Since then, she never slept

in her grandmothers house again.[17]

AAA recounted that at age eleven (11) in 1999, she was raped by

appellant for the third time, again at the house of her grandmother.[8] The

following year, when she was twelve (12), she was abused for the fourth
It was on 14 June 2000 that BBB disclosed her harrowing
time by appellant. This time, she was raped in an outdoor clearing[9] after
experience to her mother. Prior to that, however, she had already revealed
having been invited there by appellant to get some vegetables. While at the
the sexual abuses she had underwent to her sister AAA. Upon learning of
clearing, appellant forced her to lie down on a grassy spot and tried to insert
the same, her mother brought her to the police station and her statement
his penis in her vagina. As she cried in pain, appellant allegedly stopped.[10]
was taken. Thereafter, she was brought to the hospital to be examined.

Furthermore, BBB explained that she only reported the abuses done to her

on 14 June 2000 or five (5) months after the last rape because she was
It was only on 12 June 2000 that she decided to reveal to her
afraid of appellants threat of killing her and her family.[18]
mother, CCC,[11] the brutish acts appellant had done to her.[12] Her mother

thus filed a complaint against her uncle. AAA identified appellant in open

court and presented as documentary evidence her birth certificate to prove

The third witness for the prosecution was the mother, CCC. She testified
that she was born on 3 September 1988.[13]
that she only knew of the abuses done on her daughters on 15 June 2000.

Five months earlier, CCC became concerned after observing that BBB, on

the pretext of preparing clothes for a game, was packing more than enough

clothes. She asked her other daughter, DDD, to dig into the matter and the
latter told her that BBB was planning to leave their house. Upon learning

this, she sent somebody to retrieve BBB. However, it was only five months
Only appellant testified for his defense, offering denial and alibi as his
after that incident that BBB confided to her mother that she was raped by
defense. He averred in court that from 1994 to 2000, he lived in the house
appellant. CCC lost no time in reporting the matter to the authorities and
of his parents which was about thirty (30) arm stretches away from the
had BBB and AAA examined in the hospital. After examination, it was
house of BBB and AAA. He denied having raped BBB on 15 January
confirmed that BBB was indeed sexually molested.[19]
2000 because on said date he was at the house of his sister, two (2)

kilometers away from the house of his parents where the rape occurred,

from 11:30 in the morning and stayed there until early morning of the
CCC initially did not tell her husband about what had happened to
following day.[24]
their daughters because she was afraid that her husband might kill

appellant. It was only after appellant was arrested that she disclosed such

fact to her husband. After the arrest of appellant, his relatives became angry

at CCC, and her mother-in-law avoided talking to her since then.[20]

The physician who examined BBB and AAA also testified for the prosecution.

Dr. Purita T. Tullas (Dr. Tullas), medical officer of Gumaca District Hospital, He offered a general denial of the other charges against him by BBB and
testified that she was the one who examined BBB and AAA, and thereafter, AAA. He claimed that he seldom saw the two minors. He further asserted
issued medical certificates for each child. These medical certificates were that prior to the institution of the criminal case against him he had a smooth
presented in court.[21] relationship with his nieces and the only reason the case was filed against

him was that CCC, his sister-in-law and the mother of his nieces, harbored

ill-feelings towards his deceased father, who would call CCC lazy within

The medical certificate of BBB revealed that at the time of examination, earshot of other family members.[25]

there were no external sign of physical injury found on her body. However,

Dr. Tullas found that the labia majora and minora of BBB was slightly gaping,

her vaginal orifice was admitting two fingers without resistance and there
were hymenal lacerations at three (3) oclock and eight (8) oclock which
might have happened a long time before her examination. Dr. Tullas
concluded that there might have been sexual penetration caused by a male
sex organ for several times.[22]
The RTC convicted appellant on all eight (8) counts of rape.[26] The RTC
pronounced appellants defense of denial and alibi as unconvincing, citing
jurisprudence declaring denial and alibi as intrinsically weak defenses. The
RTC concluded that appellant failed to controvert the clear, candid and
straightforward testimonies of his nieces. It further considered the

qualifying circumstances of minority of the victims and the relationship of

AAAs medical certificate stated that at the time of examination,
the victims and appellant, the latter being the formers relative by
there were no external physical injuries apparent on her body. AAAs labia
consanguinity within the third degree.
majora and minora were well coaptated and the hymen was still intact. On

direct examination, Dr. Tullas said that it could happen that the hymen

would still be intact despite sexual penetration with a person having an

As the penalty imposed consisted of eight (8) death sentences, the records
elastic hymen. On the other hand, when asked on cross-examination, she
of the case were automatically elevated to this Court for review. However,
stated that there was also the possibility that no foreign body touched the
in the aftermath of the pronouncement of the Court in People v.
labia of the pudendum of AAA.[23]
Mateo[27] the present case was transferred to the Court of Appeals for
appropriate action and disposition.
On 29 December 2004, the Court of Appeals agreed with the rulings of the
RTC in regard to six (6) of the eight (8) death sentences imposed on
appellant.[28] The appellate court ratiocinated, thus:
We have painstakingly gone over the record of these
cases and find no cogent reason to deviate from the
findings of the trial court except in at least two (2)
cases. The prosecutions case which was anchored
mainly on the testimonies of private complainants [BBB]
and [AAA], deserve full faith and credit for being clear,
precise and straightforward. Like the trial court, We find
no reason to disbelieve the private complainants. It was
established with certitude that the accused on several
occasions sexually assaulted his nieces. The
perpetration of the crimes and its authorship were
proved by the victims candid and unwavering
testimonies both of whom had the misfortune of
sharing the same fate in the hands of their own uncle.
The sincerity of [AAA] was made more evident when
she cried on the witness stand in obvious distress over
what their uncle had done to her and her sister.[29]
The Court of Appeals downgraded the convictions in Criminal Case Nos.
6906 and 6908 to attempted rape. In these two (2) cases, it was alleged that
appellant had raped AAA in 1999 and on 11 June 2000, respectively.
According to the appellate court, it could not find evidence beyond
reasonable doubt in those two (2) cases that appellant had accomplished
the slightest penetration of AAAs vagina to make him liable for
consummated rape. It stressed that there was not even moral certainty that
appellants penis ever touched the labia of the pudendum, quoting portions
of the transcript of the stenographic notes where AAA was asked if
appellant was then successful in inserting his penis into her vagina and she
answered in the negative.[30] Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reduced the
penalties attached to the two (2) counts of rape from death for
consummated qualified rape to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years
of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for attempted rape.
Appellant, in his Supplemental Brief[31] before this Court, assails the findings
of the Court of Appeals. He cites inconsistencies in the testimony of BBB as
to what really transpired on 15 January 2000. Particularly, appellant
observes that BBB testified on 6 June 2001 as to her rape on 15 January
2000. BBB, her sister and appellant had been sleeping side by side.
However, when BBB again testified on 3 July 2002, this time she stated that
on that night, as she and her sister AAA were sleeping in their room at their
parents house (and not at her grandmothers), the accused passed through a
window, entered their room and raped her again.[32] Appellant also latches
on the inconsistencies in BBBs testimony as to the length of the duration of
her rape on that day. In BBBs testimony on 6 June 2001, she said that
appellant was atop her for three (3) minutes while in the 3 July
2002 hearing, BBB stated that the rape lasted for only half a minute.
It must be observed though that BBB was at a tender age when she was
raped in 2001. Moreover, these inconsistencies, which the RTC and the
Court of Appeals did not consider material, were elicited while BBB was
testifying in open court. Our observations in People v. Perez[33] on the
appreciation of alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of rape victims who
happen to be minors are instructive, thus:
We note that these alleged inconsistencies
refer, at best, only to trivial, minor, and insignificant
details. They bear no materiality to the commission of
the crime of rape of which accused-appellant was
convicted.[[34]] As pointed out by the Solicitor General in
the Appellee's Brief, the seeming inconsistencies were
brought about by confusion and merely represent
minor lapses during the rape victim's direct examination
and cannot possibly affect her credibility. Minor lapses
are to be expected when a person is recounting details
of a traumatic experience too painful to recall. The rape
victim was testifying in open court, in the presence of
strangers, on an extremely intimate matter, which,
more often than not, is talked about in hushed tones.
Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that her
narration was less than letter-perfect.[[35]] "Moreover,
the inconsistency may be attributed to the well-known
fact that a courtroom atmosphere can affect the
accuracy of testimony and the manner in which a
witness answers questions."[[36]][37]
 given credence by this Court. If we are to thread this line of reasoning,

Further, the public prosecutor offered a convincing explanation on why BBB appellant could have easily left his sisters house in the middle of the night,

was confused on some points of her two testimonies. Particularly in the raped BBB, and then returned to his sisters house without much difficulty

Memorandum for the People[38] filed with the RTC, the public prosecutor and without anybody noticing his absence.

creditably explained the inconsistencies, thus:

[BBB]s testimony on July 3, 2002 might be

Well-settled is the rule that a categorical and positive
contradictory to her first testimony on June 6, 2001,
with respect to the last rape on January 15, 2000, as identification of an accused, without any showing of ill-motive on the part of
regards the place of commissionhouse of her parents or
house of accused; and the length of time he stayed on the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial.[41] The
her top 3 minutes or half-minute. But she remained defenses of denial and alibi deserve scant consideration when the
consistent in her declaration that on January 15, 2000,
her uncle inserted his penis into her vagina, and he was prosecution has strong, clear and convincing evidence identifying appellant
moving while on her top then she felt something came as the perpetrator.[42] In this case, both BBB and AAA, minors and relatives
out from him. He was able to rape her because he
threatened her with a knife or bladed weapon. Further, of appellant, positively identified him as their rapist in open court. The lower
the first she took the witness stand on June 6, 2001, she courts found no issue detracting from the credibility of such identification.
was made to recall the last rape, the first rape and
many acts of sexual abuses [sic] against her. She was
even confused about her age when she was first raped
by her uncle. After she testified on November 14, 2001,
for the separate charges of rapes in 1997, 1998 and It is worthy to note that the alibi presented by appellant is limited to the 15
1999, she was able to recall more clearly the last rape
January 2000 rape of BBB. He offers nothing to counteract the accusations
on January 15, 2000, which happened in her own
house. These noted discrepancies as to the exact place against him involving the seven (7) other specific acts of rape other than the
of commission accuseds house or victims house is not
averment that he did not know anything about the allegations propounded
an essential element of the crime of rape and both
houses are situated in Brgy. Villa Padua Ilaya, Gumaca, on him, an infinitesimal defense considering the evidence against him.
Quezon, which is within the territorial jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court. x x x [39]

Appellant does claim that the present case was merely instituted because of

the grudge of CCC towards his deceased father. It is outrageous to even

suggest that a mother will subject her daughters to the humiliating

In addition, we share the lower courts disbelief of appellants proffered experience of coming before the court and narrating their harrowing

defenses of denial and alibi. These two defenses are inherently the weakest experience just because she was tagged by her father-in-law as lazy. In

as they are negative defenses. Mere denials of involvement in a crime addition, CCCs father-in-law had died several years before the criminal

cannot take precedence over the positive testimony of the offended party. charges against appellant were ever instituted. If CCC truly wanted to

For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the defendant to prove that he was retaliate and damage the reputation of her father-in-law, she could have

somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must likewise done so when the latter was still alive. No member of a rape victims family

demonstrate that it is physically impossible for him to have been at the would dare encourage the victim to publicly expose the dishonor of the

scene of the crime at the time.[40] family, more specifically if such accusation is against a member of the

family, unless the crime was in fact committed.[43]

In the case at bar, appellants alibi that he was at his sisters house barely two Besides, no sane woman, least of all a child, would concoct a story of

(2) kilometers away when the rape took place on 15 January 2000 cannot be defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and subject herself to

public trial or ridicule if she has not in truth, been a victim of rape and
impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her. Testimonies of child-

victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a woman, more

so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is

necessary to show that rape has been committed. Youth and immaturity are

generally badges of truth and sincerity.[44] The weight of such testimonies

may be countered by physical evidence to the contrary, or indubitable proof

that the accused could not have committed the rape, but in the absence of At the same time, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the two counts of
such countervailing proof, these testimonies shall be accorded utmost rape in Criminal Case Nos. 6906-G and 6908-G were not proven beyond
value. reasonable doubt, but only the two separate incidents of attempted rape.

The twin aggravating circumstances of minority and relationship were It is to be noted that there is an attempt to commit rape when the offender

properly appreciated in this case. The minority of the victims and their commences its commission directly by overt acts but does not perform all

relationship with appellant were aptly established acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause

or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.[47] In Criminal Case

No. 6906-G, the records show that there was no penetration or any

indication that the penis of appellant touched the labia of the pudendum of

AAA. This was evident in AAAs testimony at the hearing on 17 October 2001,

in the lower court proceedings. Not only did the prosecution allege in the to wit:

Informations the ages of the victims when they were raped but the

prosecution also presented the birth certificates of BBB and AAA in court as
Q Do you remember of any unusual incident that
documentary evidence to prove that they were both minors when appellant
happened to you when you were eleven
raped them. Appellant, in open court, also admitted that that he was the years old?

uncle of both victims being the brother of the victims father, and thus, a A Yes, Mam. [sic]
relative of the victims within the third degree of consanguinity.

Q What was that?

A He also touched my vagina and my other private

Furthermore, the delay in reporting the repulsive acts of appellant to BBB
parts and he inserted also his penis (into) my
and AAA is understandably justified, considering that appellant repeatedly vagina. [sic]

threatened to kill them and their family should they disclose the incidents to Q Was he able to insert his penis into your vagina?
anyone. It has been held time and again that delay in revealing the
A No, Mam. [sic]
commission of rape is not an indication of a fabricated charge.[45] Such

intimidation must be viewed in light of the victims perception and judgment

at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast Q Why?

rule. It is enough that the intimidation produces a fear that if the victim A It was painful, Mam. [sic]
does not yield to the perverse impulses of the accused, something would

happen to her at the moment, or even thereafter, as when she is

xxxx
threatened with death if she would report the incident.[46]
Q How many times did he try to insert his penis into
your vagina?
 A Many times, Mam.[48] [sic]
AAA also testified in the same vein in Criminal Case No. 6908-G.
Q I am now through with Criminal Case No. 6906-G. In
Criminal Case No. 6908-G, also for Rape.
When was the last time that this sexual
abuse was committed by your Uncle?
A June 11, Mam. [sic]
Q What year?
A June 11, 2000, Mam. [sic]
xxxx
In downgrading the offense committed and consequently decreasing the
penalty, the CA declared:
Q What did your Uncle do to you on June 11, 2000?
A He also removed my clothes, Mam. [sic]
Q And after removing your clothes, what did he do to
you?
A He was trying to insert his penis into my vagina, Mam.
[sic]
xxxx
Q And what did you feel when he was trying to insert
his penis in your vagina?
A Painful, Mam. [sic]
Q And what did you do when you feel painful?
A I cried, Mam. [sic]
Q When you cried, what did your Uncle do, if any?
A He did not pursue what he was doing, Mam. [sic]
xxxx
Q And your Uncle was not able to penetrate his penis to
your vagina?
A No, Mam.[49] [sic]
It is carnal knowledge, not pain, that is the element to
consummate rape. Indeed pain may be deduced from
the sexual act but accused cannot be convicted of rape
by presuming carnal knowledge out of pain. It is well-
settled that complete penetration of the penis into the
vagina is not necessary to convict for consummated
rape since the slightest penetration of one into the
other will suffice. However, in People v. Campuhan, the
term slightest penetration was clarified to mean that
there must be sufficient and convincing proof of the
penis indeed touching at the very least the labias of the
female organ. Mere epidermal contact between the
penis and the external layer of the victims vagina (the
stroking and the grazing of the male organ upon the
female organ or the mons pubis) categorizes the crime
as attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness. There must
be positive proof of even the slightest penetration,
more accurately, the touching of the labias by the penis,
before rape could be deemed consummated. We,
therefore, take exception to the finding of the trial
court that when the accused was trying to insert his
penis into the childs vagina, the act proved painful to
[AAA,] which made the accused stop from further
executing the act. From the testimony of private
complainant, [AAA] in the afore-numbered cases, the
prosecution failed to demonstrate beyond any shadow
of doubt that accused-appellants penis reached the
labia of the pudendum of AAAs vagina. There is no basis
 then to apply the rule that the introduction of the penis
into the aperture of the female organ (thereby touching
the labia of the pudendum) already consummates the
case of rape. x x x [50]
It should be added that under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, there is
an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony
directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than
his own spontaneous desistance. In the crime of rape, penetration is an
essential act of execution to produce the felony. Thus, for there to be an
attempted rape, the accused must have commenced the act of penetrating
his sexual organ to the vagina of the victim but for some cause or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance, the penetration, however
slight, is not completed.[51]
The Court thus affirms the conclusions of the Court of Appeals that it has
been established beyond reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty of six (6)
counts of rape and two (2) counts of attempted rape. However, in light of
Rep. Act No. 9346, the appropriate penalties for both crimes should be
amended.
II.
We shall not dwell at length on the proper penalty imposable on appellant
for the six (6) counts of rape. The sentence of death imposed by the RTC
and affirmed by the Court of Appeals can no longer be affirmed in view of
Rep. Act No. 9346, titled An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty
in the Philippines. Section 2 of the law mandates that in lieu of the death
penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed.
Correspondingly, the Court can no longer uphold the death sentences
imposed by lower courts, but must, if the
guilt of the accused is affirmed, impose instead the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment when appropriate. Since the passage of Rep.
Act No. 9346, the Court has had occasion to effectuate such reduction in
recent cases such as People v. Tubongbanua[52] and People v. Cabalquinto.[53]
III.
The question of what should be the appropriate penalty for the two (2)
counts of attempted rape proves to be the more challenging but interesting
question facing the Court.
The Court of Appeals had sentenced appellant, for the attempted rape of
AAA, to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal as maximum, for each count of attempted rape. There is no doubt
as to the validity of this sentence at the time it was meted prior to the
enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346. Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code
establishes the penalty to be imposed upon the principals of an attempted
felony:
ART. 51. xxx A penalty lower by two degrees than that
prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be
imposed upon the principals in an attempt to commit a
felony.[54]
What is the penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for
attempted rape? Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, which
incorporates the amendments introduced by Rep. Act No. 8353, prescribes:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of
rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
 1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age The courts, in applying such lower or higher penalty,
and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, shall observe the following graduated scales:
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within
the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of
the parent of the victim. x x x[55]
SCALE NO. 1

1. Death

2. Reclusion perpetua
The prescribed penalty for the consummated rape of a victim duly proven to

have been under eighteen years of age and to have been raped by her 3. Reclusion temporal

uncle, is death under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. The 4. Prision mayor
determination of the penalty two degrees lower than the death penalty
5. Prision correctional
entails the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal Code:
6. Arresto mayor

7. Destierro

8. Arresto menor
Art. 61. Rules of graduating penalties.For the purpose
of graduating the penalties which, according to the 9. Public censure
provisions of Articles 50 to 57, inclusive, of this Code,
are to be imposed upon persons guilty as principals of 10. Fine[57]
any frustrated or attempted felony, or as accomplices
or accessories, the following rules shall be observed:

xxxx

1. When the penalty prescribed for the felony is single

and indivisible, the penalty next lower in degree shall
be that immediately following that indivisible penalty
in the respective graduated scale prescribed in Article
71 of this Code.[56]
Following the scale prescribed in Article 71, the penalty two

degrees lower than death is reclusion temporal, which was the maximum

xxxx penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals on appellant for attempted

rape. Reclusion temporal is a penalty comprised of three divisible periods, a

Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code (Article 71) warrants special attention,
minimum, a medium and a maximum.
crucial as it is to our disposition of this question. The provision reads:

Art. 71. Graduated scales. In the case in which the law

prescribes a penalty lower or higher by one or more
degrees than another given penalty, the rules
prescribed in Article 61 shall be observed in graduating
such penalty. At the same time, the Indeterminate Sentence Law prescribes

that the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the

maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending

The lower or higher penalty shall be taken from the
graduated scale in which is comprised the given circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code,
penalty:
and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower

to that prescribed by the Code for the offense. The purpose of the
prescription of minimum and maximum periods under the Indeterminate automatic and exclusive penalty. Death as the automatic penalty was

Sentence Law is to effect the privilege granted under the same law, for mandated for the crimes of qualified bribery if it is the public officer who

prisoners who have served the minimum penalty to be eligible for parole asks or demands such gift or present;[60] kidnapping or detention for the

per the discretion of the Board of Indiscriminate Sentence.[58] Thus, convicts purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other

sentenced to suffer death penalty or life-imprisonment are ineligible under person;[61] destructive

that law, as are persons sentenced to reclusion perpetua, an indivisible

penalty without minimum or maximum periods.[59]

Hence, the Court of Appeals sentenced appellant to suffer the arson wherein death results;[62] and rape qualified by any of the several

penalty for attempted rape, with a maximum penalty within the range circumstances enumerated under the law.

of reclusion temporal, and a minimum penalty within the range of the

penalty next lower, or prision mayor. If Rep. Act No. 9346 had not been

enacted, the Court would have affirmed such sentence without On the other hand, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death

complication. However, the enactment of the law has given rise to the was imposable on several crimes, including murder,[63] qualified

problem concerning the imposable penalty. Appellant was sentenced to a piracy,[64] and treason.[65] The imposition of the death penalty for crimes

maximum term within reclusion temporal since that is the penalty two punishable by reclusion perpetua to death depended on the appreciation of

degrees lower than death. With the elimination of death as a penalty, does the aggravating and mitigating circumstances generally outlined in Articles

it follow that appellant should now be sentenced to a penalty two degrees 13 and 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Reference to those two provisions was

lower than reclusion perpetua, the highest remaining penalty with the unnecessary if the penalty imposed was death, as opposed to reclusion

enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346? If it so followed, appellant would be perpetua to death.

sentenced to prision mayorin lieu of reclusion temporal.

There is no need for now to discuss the effects of Rep. Act No.
IV.
9346 on the penalties for frustrated and attempted felonies which were

punishable by reclusion perpetua to death if consummated, or on

accomplices and accessories to such felonies. Such situations do not relate

Obviously, our ruling on the appropriate penalty on appellant for to the case of appellant, who was convicted of two (2) counts of attempted
attempted rape will affect not only appellant, but several classes of convicts rape, which, if consummated, of course would have carried prior to the
as well. Before we proceed with the discussion, the Court finds it necessary enactment of Rep. Act 9346 the penalty of death, and not reclusion
to make the following qualification. perpetua to death.

Prior to the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346, the death penalty

was imposable under two different frames of reference. This was especially

made clear with the 1993 amendments to the Revised Penal Code through

Rep. Act No. 7659, or the Death Penalty Law. Under the Revised Penal Code,

as amended, the death penalty was provided for in two ways, namely: as

the maximum penalty for reclusion perpetua to death, and death itself as an The Court also recognizes that the graduation of penalties

reckoned from reclusion perpetua to death differs from that based on the
 the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period
exclusive penalty of death. For example, it has been held that the penalty pursuant to Article 64 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.[70]
two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua to death is prision mayor.[66] In

contrast, the Court has likewise held that for qualified rape in the attempted

stage, the penalty x x x two (2) degrees lower than the imposable penalty of

death for the offense charged x x x is reclusion temporal.[67] In People v.

This dichotomy results from the application of Article 61 of the
Tolentino,[68] we ruled that the accused, who had been sentenced to die for
Revised Penal Code. Both reclusion perpetua and death are indivisible
the rape of his nine (9)-year old stepdaughter, was guilty only of attempted
penalties. Under Article 61 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, [w]hen the
rape. In explaining that reclusion temporal was the proper penalty, the
penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two indivisible penalties the
Court, through then Chief Justice Davide, explained:
penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following the lesser

of the penalties prescribed in the respective graduated scale. Hence, in

passing sentence on those convicted of attempted felonies which warranted

Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code,
the penalty for an attempted felony is the "penalty the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death if consummated, the Court has
lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for
consistently held that penalty two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua to
the consummated felony." In this case, the penalty for
the rape if it had been consummated would have been death is prision mayor. In contrast, if the penalty for the consummated
death, pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal
crime is the single indivisible penalty of death, as was prescribed for several
Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, since [RT[69]] was
eight years old and TOLENTINO was the common-law crimes under Rep. Act No. 7659, Article 61(1) of the Revised Penal Code
spouse of [RTs] mother. The last paragraph thereof
provides that the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible,
provides:
the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following that

indivisible penalty in the respective graduated scale prescribed in Article

The death penalty shall 71. Thus, the proper penalty two degrees lower than death is reclusion
also be imposed if the crime of temporal.
rape is committed with any of the
following attendant
circumstances:

It is also for this reason that the controversy we are now

addressing did not similarly arise after the enactment of the 1987
1. When the victim is
under eighteen (18) years of age Constitution, which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty subject to
and the offender is a parent,
its subsequent readoption at the choice of Congress. Generally, the highest
ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or penalty imposed under the Revised Penal Code was reclusion perpetua to
affinity within the third civil
death, a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties. As a result, the Court
degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the had no occasion, after the passage of the 1987 Constitution, to consider the
victim.
effect of the charter on penalties downgraded from a single indivisible

penalty. It was under Rep. Act No. 7659, passed in 1993, that some

xxxx commonly occurring crimes, such as qualified rape and kidnapping for

ransom, were penalized with the single indivisible penalty of death.

The penalty in this case should have

been reclusion temporal, which is the penalty lower by
two degrees than death. However, with the application
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, TOLENTINO may
be sentenced to an indeterminate imprisonment
penalty whose minimum shall be within the range
of prision mayor and whose maximum shall be within
The discussion for purposes of this decision will only center on
crimes, such as qualified rape as defined in the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, for which the imposable penalty was death alone. Thus, our
ruling will bear no direct effect on the sentencing of accomplices and
accessories or persons guilty of the attempted or frustrated stage of Section 1 arguably presents more problems in that regard with its

felonies for which the imposable penalty was reclusion perpetua to death. utilization of the particular phrase insofar as they impose the death

penalty. We can entertain two schools of thought in construing this

Hence, it should be understood that any reference forthwith to the
provision, both of them rooted in literalist interpretations. First, it can be
penalty of death does not refer to the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
claimed that the present application of the penalties for attempted rape of
V.
a minor (among many examples) does not impose the death penalty, since

none of the convicts concerned would face execution through the

If there was a clear intent in Rep. Act No. 9346 to downgrade the
application of the penalty for attempted rape. Hence, the statutory
penalties for convicts whose sentences had been graduated beginning from
provisions enforced in determining the penalty for attempted rape, or other
death pursuant to Article 71, the Court would not hesitate to enforce such
crimes not punishable by death, are not amended by Rep. Act No. 9346.
downgrading based on clear statutory intent. However, nothing in Rep. Act

No. 9346 expressly refers to those penalties imposed on frustrated or

attempted felonies, or on accessories and accomplices.

On the other hand, the operation of the provisions imposing the

penalty for attempted rape of a minor necessarily calls for the application, if

Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 9346 bears examination: not its literal imposition, of death as a penalty, in the context of applying the

graduated scale of penalties under Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code. If

we were to construe impose as to mean apply, then it could be argued that

SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of
death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act Article 71 was indeed amended by Rep. Act No. 9346. After all, the
No. Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A.
application of Article 71 to crimes such as attempted rape of a minor call for
No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act Designating
Death by Lethal Injection, is hereby repealed. Republic the actual operation of the death penalty not only in theory, but as a means
Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A.
of determining the proper graduated penalty.
No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law,
and all other laws, executive orders and decrees,
insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby
repealed or amended accordingly.
On face value, the attractive worth of the firstly offered line of

thinking is enhanced by its innate conservatism, limiting as it would the

effects of Rep. Act No. 9346. It also can be understood if confronted with

the option of employing either a liberal or a conservative construction,

If the penalties for attempted rape of a minor,[71] among others, were
there is a natural tendency to employ the conservative mode. Further, the
deemed to have been amended by virtue of Rep. Act No. 9346, such
reasoning is seemingly consistent with that employed by the Court in People
amendment can be justified under the ambit of the repealing clause, which
v. Muoz,[72] a decision which will be thoroughly analyzed in the course of this
reads, all other laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they impose
discussion.
the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly. While this

clause may, given its breadth, initially impress as the nature of a general

repealing clause, it is in actuality an express repealing clause. Section 1

specifically repeals all laws, executive orders and decrees insofar as they If the true intent of Rep. Act No. 9346 was to limit the extent of

impose the death penalty, and not merely such enactments which are the imposition of the death penalty to actual executions, this could have

inconsistent with Rep. Act No. 9346. been accomplished with more clarity. For example, had Section 1 read

instead insofar as they sentence an accused to death, there would have

been no room for doubt that only those statutory provisions calling for

actual executions would have been repealed or amended. The inability of

Congress to shape the repealing clause in so specific a fashion does leave

open the question whether Congress did actually intend to limit the

operation of Rep. Act No. 9346 to actual executions only.

It might be countered that part of the legislative intent of Rep.

But let us for now test that premise by assuming for the nonce
Act No. 9346, by retaining the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71,
that the legislative intent of Rep. Act No. 9346 was to limit the prohibition of
was to equalize the penalties of principals and accomplices for crimes
the law to the physical imposition of the death penalty, without extending
previously punishable by death. We do not doubt that the legislature has
any effect to the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71 of the
the theoretical capability to amend the penal law in such fashion. Yet given
Revised Penal Code.
the drastic effects of equalizing the penalties for principals and accomplices,

a step that runs contrary to entrenched thought in criminal law, one could

reasonably assume that a legislature truly oriented to enact such change

VI.
would have been candid enough to have explicitly stated such intent in the

law itself. Of course, nothing in Rep. Act No. 9346, either in the caption or in

the provisions, explicates the intention to equalize the penalties for

There are troubling results if we were to uphold, based on
principals and accomplices in any crime at all.
legislative intent, the interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346 that limits its

effects only to matters relating to the physical imposition of the death

penalty.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that it would, at bare minimum,

seem strange that the penalties for principals and accomplices are equalized

in some crimes, and not in others. Let us return to our previous example of
Illustrations are necessary. The easy demonstration of iniquitous
X and Y, but this time, assume that they were charged for simple
results is in the case of accomplices. Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
kidnapping, with no qualifying circumstance that would have resulted in the
Code, as amended, kidnapping for ransom was punishable by death. Let us
imposition of the death penalty. Since the crime is not punishable by death,
say X and Y were tried for the crime. X was charged as a principal for having
Rep. Act No. 9346 would have no effect in the imposition of the penalty for
directly participated in the kidnapping. Y was charged as an accomplice for
simple kidnapping. Accordingly, X would have been sentenced to reclusion
having allowed X to use his house to detain the victim, even though Y was
perpetua as the principal, while Y would have been sentenced to reclusion
abroad at the time of the crime and otherwise had no other participation
temporal as an accomplice.
therein. Both X and Y were convicted by final judgment. Since X could no

longer be meted the death penalty, he is sentenced instead to reclusion

perpetua. Ordinarily, Y as an accomplice should receive the penalty next

lower in degree, or reclusion temporal. Yet following the conservative

interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346, the graduation of penalties remains

unaffected with the enactment of the new law. Thus, under Article 71,

which would still take into account the death penalty within the graduated

scale, Y, as an accomplice, would be sentenced to reclusion perpetua, the Since simple kidnapping is a comparatively lighter crime than
same penalty as the principal. kidnapping for ransom, the lesser penalties are justified. Since Y was merely

an accomplice to the crime of simple kidnapping, the imposition on him of a

lighter penalty than X is in accord with the Revised Penal Code and
established juridical and legal thought. Less justifiable would be the notion
that in kidnapping for ransom, the principal and the accomplice would
receive the same penalty, while in simple kidnapping, the principal suffers a
higher penalty than the accomplice. Frankly, there is no rational explanation
for such a disparity, and no legal justification other than the recognition that
Congress has the power to will it so.
Admittedly, the impact of Rep. Act No. 9346 is less dramatic in
relation to frustrated and attempted felonies which were punishable by
death if consummated. The consummated felony previously punishable by
death would now be punishable by reclusion perpetua. At the same time,
the same felony in its frustrated stage would, under the foregoing premise
in this section, be penalized one degree lower from death, or also reclusion
perpetua. It does not seem right, of course, that the same penalty
of reclusion perpetua would be imposed on both the consummated and
frustrated felony. However, the anomaly would be mainly in theory, as we
recognize that those felonies previously punishable by death are improbable
of commission in their frustrated stage, unlike several felonies punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death,[73] such as murder, which may be frustrated.
Still, it cannot be denied that these felonies previously punishable
by death are capable of commission in their attempted stages and that the
Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for attempted felonies is a
penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the
consummated felony. The Court has thus consistently imposed reclusion
temporal, the penalty two degrees lower than death, as the maximum term
for attempted felonies which, if consummated, would have warranted the
death penalty.[74]If it were to be insisted that Rep. Act No. 9346 did not
affect at all the penalties for attempted felonies, then those found guilty of
the subject attempted felonies would still be sentenced to reclusion
temporal, even though the penalty lower by two degrees than that
prescribed by law for the consummated felony would now be prision mayor.
It should be pointed out that the interpretation of Rep. Act No.
9346 that would sanction a penalty for some attempted felonies that is only
one degree lower than the consummated crime would, again, be
disharmonious and inconsistent with the Revised Penal Code and
established thought in criminal law. Conceding again that the legislature has
the discretion to designate the criminal penalties it sees fit, a regime that
foists a differential theoretical basis for the punishment of different
attempted felonies resulting in discriminatory penalties is not only irrational
but also, to say the least, highly suspect. Considering that physical liberties
are at stake, it would be a most cruel joke if such discriminatory effects
ensued not from deliberate legislative will, but from oversight.
VII.
The implementation of Rep. Act No. 9346 in a way that leaves
extant the penalties for accomplices, accessories, frustrated and attempted
felonies, clearly results in illogical, iniquitous and inconsistent effects. In
contrast, no similar flaws ensue should we construe Rep. Act No. 9346
instead as not having barred the application of the death penalty even as a
means of depreciating penalties other than death. In particular, the
operative amendment that would assure the integrity of penalties for
accomplices, accessories, frustrated and attempted felonies lies in Article
71, which ranks death at the top of the scale for graduated penalties.
Simply put, the negation of the word death as previously
inscribed in Article 71 will have the effect of appropriately downgrading the
proper penalties attaching to accomplices, accessories, frustrated and
attempted felonies to the level consistent with the rest of our penal
laws. Returning to our previous examples, Y, the convicted accomplice in
kidnapping for ransom, would now bear the penalty of reclusion temporal,
the penalty one degree lower than that the principal X would bear (reclusion
perpetua). Such sentence would be consistent with Article 52 of the Revised
Penal Code, as well as Article 71, as amended, to remove the reference to
death. Moreover, the prospect of the accomplice receiving the same
sentence as the principal, an anomalous notion within our penal laws, would
be eliminated. Thus, the same standard would prevail in sentencing
principals and accomplices to the crime of kidnapping in ransom, as that
prescribed to the crime of simple kidnapping.
 The harmonization that would result if Rep. Act No. 9346 were

construed as having eliminated the reference to death in Article 71 would

Resort to the aforementioned principles in statutory construction
run across the board in our penal laws. Consistent with Article 51 of the
would not have been necessary had Rep. Act No. 9346 ineluctably stated
Revised Penal Code, those convicted of attempted qualified rape would
that the repeal of all laws imposing the death penalty did not engender the
receive the penalty two degrees lower than that prescribed by law, now
corresponding modification of penalties other than death, dependent as
Rep. Act No. 9346, for qualified rape.
these are on death as a measure under the graduated scale of penalties

under Article 71. Admittedly, if this were indeed the intent of Congress, and

There are principles in statutory construction that will sanction, such intent were unequivocally expressed in Rep. Act No. 9346, the

even mandate, this expansive interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346. The resulting inequities and inconsistencies we had earlier pointed out would

maxim interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus have remained. If that were to be the case, we would have acknowledged,

interpretandi embodies the principle that a statute should be so construed perhaps tacitly, that such inequities and inconsistencies fell part of the

not only to be consistent with itself, but also to harmonize with other laws legislative intent. It does not speak well of a Congress to be deliberately

on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible inconsistent with, or ignorant of its own prior enactments. Yet ultimately,

systema uniform system of jurisprudence.[75] Interpreting and harmonizing Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 9346 is not expressive of such rash or injudicious

laws with laws is the best method of interpretation. x x x x This manner of notions, as it is susceptible to a reading that would harmonize its effects

construction would provide a complete, consistent and intelligible system to with the precepts and practices that pervade our general penal laws, and in

secure the rights of all persons affected by different legislative and quasi- a manner that does not defy the clear will of Congress.

VIII.

legislative acts.[76] There can be no harmony between Rep. Act No. 9346 and

the Revised Penal Code unless the later statute is construed as having One who would like to advocate that Rep. Act No. 9346 did not

downgraded those penalties attached to death by reason of the graduated correspondingly amend any of the penalties other than death in our penal

scale under Article 71. Only in that manner will a clear and consistent rule laws would most certainly invoke our ruling in People v. Muoz,[80] decided in

emerge as to the application of penalties for frustrated and attempted 1989. Therein, a divided Court ruled in that the constitutional bar on the

felonies, and for accessories and accomplices. imposition of the death penalty did not enact a corresponding modification

in the other periods [in penalties], there being no expression of such a

requirement in Article III, Section

It is also a well-known rule of legal hermeneutics that penal or
19(1) of the Constitution or indicat[ion] therein by at least
criminal laws are strictly construed against the state and liberally in favor of

the accused.[77] If the language of the law were ambiguous, the court will

lean more strongly in favor of the defendant than it would if the statute

were remedial, as a means of effecting substantial justice.[78]The law is

tender in favor of the rights of an individual.[79] It is this philosophy of clear and unmistakable implication.[81] In so concluding, the Court made the
caution before the State may deprive a person of life or liberty that oft-cited pronouncement that there was nothing in the 1987 Constitution
animates one of the most fundamental principles in our Bill of Rights, that which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty.[82]
every person is presumed innocent until proven guilty.
 It is time to re-examine Muoz and its continued viability in light of hereafter provides for it. Muoz and its progenies, have interpreted that

Rep. Act No. 9346. More precisely, would Muoz as precedent deter the provision as prohibiting the actual imposition of the death penalty, as

Court from ruling that Rep. Act No. 9346 consequently downgraded opposed to enacting an amendatory law that eliminates all references and

penalties other than death? applications of the death penalty in our statutes. It can also be understood

and appreciated that at the time Muoz was decided, it would have been

polemical to foster an unequivocal pronouncement that Section 19(1),

It can be recalled that the accused in Muoz were found guilty of Article III abolished the death penalty, since the very provision itself

murder, which under the Revised Penal Code, carried the penalty acknowledged that Congress may nonetheless subsequently provide for the

of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. The subject murders penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, as Congress very

therein were not attended by any modifying circumstance, and thus well did just four (4) years after Muoz. No such language exists in Rep. Act

penalized in the penaltys medium term. Jurisprudence previous No. 9346. Of course, the legislature has the inherent and constitutional

to Muozheld that the proper penalty in such instances should be the higher power to enact laws prescribing penalties for crimes, and the Constitution

half of reclusion temporal maximum, with reclusion temporal maximum, will not prohibit Congress from reenacting the death penalty for compelling

divided into two halves for that purpose. Muoz rejected this formulation, reasons involving heinous crimes. Yet it was that express stipulation in the

holding instead that the penalty should be reclusion perpetua. Towards this Constitution that dissuaded the Court from recognizing the constitutional

conclusion, the Court made the above-cited conclusions relating to the abolition of the death penalty; and there is no similar statutory expression in

constitutional abolition of the death penalty, and the charters effects on the Rep. Act No. 9346, which could be construed as evocative of intent similar

other periods. Six justices dissented from that ruling, and as recently as to that of the Constitution.

1997, a member of the Court felt strongly enough to publish a view urging

the reexamination of Muoz.[83]

The doctrine in Muoz that the constitutional prohibition on the

imposition of the death penalty did not enact a corresponding modification

It would be disingenuous to consider Muoz as directly settling the of other penalties is similarly irrelevant to this case, which calls for an

question now befacing us, as the legal premises behind Muoz are different examination as to whether such corresponding modifications of other

from those in this case. Most pertinently, Muoz inquired into the effects of penalties arose as a consequence of Rep. Act No. 9346, and not the

the Constitution on the proper penalty for murder; while herein, we are Constitution.

ascertaining the effects of Rep. Act No. 9346 on the proper penalty for

attempted qualified rape. Muoz may have pronounced that the Constitution

did not abolish the death penalty, but that issue no longer falls into For purposes of legal hermeneutics, the critical question is

consideration herein, the correct query now being whether Congress has whether Rep. Act No. 9346 intended to delete the word death as expressly

banned the death penalty through Rep. Act No. 9346. Otherwise provided for in the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71. Muoz did

framed, Muoz does not preclude the Court from concluding that with the not engage in an analogous inquiry in relation to Article 71 and the

express prohibition of the imposition of the death penalty Congress has Constitution, for what was relevant therein was not the general graduated

unequivocally banned the same. scale of penalties, but the range of the penalties for murder. Herein, at bare

minimum, no provision in Rep. Act No. 9346 provides a context within which

the concept of death penalty bears retentive legal effect, especially in

Muoz made hay over the peculiar formulation of Section 19(1), relation to Article 71. Unlike the Constitution, Rep. Act No. 9346 does

Article III, which provided that [n]either shall death penalty be imposed, expressly stipulate the amendment of all extant laws insofar as they called

unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress for the imposition of the penalty of death.

The impression left by Muoz was that the use of the word
imposition in the Constitution evinced the framers intent to retain the
operation of penalties under the Revised Penal Code. In the same vein, one
might try to construe the use of imposition in Rep. Act No. 9346 as a means
employed by Congress to ensure that the death penalty, as applied in Article
71, remain extant. If the use of imposition was implemented as a means of
retaining death under Article 71, it would have been a most curious,
roundabout means indeed. The Court can tolerate to a certain degree the
deliberate vagueness sometimes employed in legislation, yet constitutional
due process demands a higher degree of clarity when infringements on life
or liberty are intended. We have ruled, on due process grounds, as arbitrary
and oppressive a tax assessed on a standard characterized as nothing but
blather in search of meaning.[84] In the matter of statutes that deprive a
person of physical liberty, the demand for a clear standard in sentencing is
even more exacting.
Yet in truth, there is no material difference between imposition
and application, for both terms embody the operation in law of the death
penalty. Since Article 71 denominates death as an element in the graduated
scale of penalties, there is no question that the operation of Article 71
involves the actual application of the death penalty as a means of
determining the extent which a persons liberty is to be deprived. Since Rep.
Act No. 9346 unequivocally bars the application of the death penalty, as well
as expressly repeals all such statutory provisions requiring the application of
the death penalty, such effect necessarily extends to its relevance to the
graduated scale of penalties under Article 71.
We cannot find basis to conclude that Rep. Act No. 9346 intended
to retain the operative effects of the death penalty in the graduation of the
other penalties in our penal laws. Munoz cannot enjoin us to adopt such
conclusion. Rep. Act No. 9346 is not swaddled in the same restraints
appreciated by Muoz on Section 19(1), Article III. The very Congress
empowered by the Constitution to reinstate the imposition of the death
penalty once thought it best to do so, through Rep. Act No. 7650. Within the
same realm of constitutional discretion, Congress has reversed itself. It must
be asserted that today, the legal status of the suppression of the death
penalty in the Philippines has never been more secure than at any time in
our political history as a nation.
Following Muoz, the sovereign people, through the 1987
Constitution, might not have willed the abolition of the death penalty and
instead placed it under a suspensive condition. As such, we affirmed the
characterization of the death penalty during the interregnum between the
1987 Constitution and its reimposition through law as being in a state of
hibernation.[85] No longer. It reawakened then it died; because the sovereign
people, through Rep. Act No. 9346, banned the death penalty. Only by an
Act of Congress can it be reborn. Before that day, the consideration of death
as a penalty is bereft of legal effect, whether as a means of depriving life, or
as a means of depriving liberty.
Despite our present pronouncement on the ban against of the
death penalty, we do not acknowledge that Muoz lacked legal justification
when it was decided; that its application as precedent prior to Rep. Act No.
9346 was erroneous; or that previous sentences imposed on convicts on the
basis of Muoz were wrong. Muoz properly stood as the governing precedent
in the matter of sentences that passed finality prior to Rep. Act No. 9346;
and the consistent reliance by the courts on its doctrines entrenched its
footing in criminal law jurisprudence.
IX.
Rep. Act No. 7659, in the course of reintroducing the death
penalty in the Philippines, also effectively classified the crimes listed therein
as heinous, within constitutional contemplation. Such reclassification under
Rep. Act No. 7659 was accompanied by certain legal effects other than the
imposition of the death penalty, such as the increase in imposable fines
attached to certain heinous crimes.[86] The categorization of certain crimes
as heinous, constituting as it does official recognition that some crimes are
more odious than others, has also influenced this Court in adjudging the
proper pecuniary indemnities awarded to the victims of these crimes.
Hence, a general inclination persists in levying a greater amount of damages
on accused found guilty of heinous crimes.
It should be understood that the debarring of the death penalty
through Rep. Act No. 9346 did not correspondingly declassify those crimes
previously catalogued as heinous. The amendatory effects of Rep. Act No.
9346 extend only to the application of the death penalty but not to the
definition or classification of crimes. True, the penalties for heinous crimes
have been downgraded under the aegis of the new law. Still, what remains
extant is the recognition by law that such crimes, by their abhorrent nature,
constitute a special category by themselves. Accordingly, Rep. Act No. 9346
does not serve as basis for the reduction of civil indemnity and other
damages that adhere to heinous crimes.
X.
Having pronounced the statutory disallowance of the death
penalty through Rep. Act No. 9346 and the corresponding modification of
penalties other than death through that statute, we now proceed to discuss
the effects of these rulings.
As to sentences not yet handed down, or affirmed with finality,
the application is immediate. Henceforth, death, as utilized in Article 71 of
the Revised Penal Code, shall no longer form part of the equation in the
graduation of penalties. For example, in the case of appellant, the
determination of his penalty for attempted rape shall be reckoned not from
two degrees lower than death, but two degrees lower than reclusion
perpetua. Hence, the maximum term of his penalty shall no longer
be reclusion temporal, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, but instead, prision
mayor.
There should be little complication if the crime committed was
punishable by the free-standing penalty of death, as utilized in Rep. Act No.
7659, as opposed to the ranged penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, as
often used in the Revised Penal Code and other penal laws. The facts of the
present case do not concern the latter penalty, hence our reluctance to
avail of an extended discussion thereof. However, we did earlier observe
that both reclusion perpetua and death are indivisible penalties. Under
Article 61 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, [w]hen the penalty prescribed for
the crime is composed of two indivisible penalties x x x x the penalty next
lower in degree shall be that immediately following the lesser of the
penalties prescribed in the respective graduated scale. Hence, as we earlier
noted, our previous rulings that the penalty two degrees lower
than reclusion perpetua to death is prision mayor.
Then there is the matter of whether retroactive effect should be
extended to this new ruling, favorable as it is to persons previously
convicted of crimes which, if consummated or participated in as a principal,
would have warranted the solitary penalty of death. We see no choice but
to extend the retroactive benefit. Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code
states that [p]enal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor
the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal[[87]]
x x x x although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence
has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same. Given that we
have ruled that Rep. Act No. 9346 downgraded the penalties for such
crimes, the benefit of Article 22 has to apply, except as to those persons
defined as habitual criminal[s]. Indeed, Rep. Act No. 9346 expressly
recognized that its enactment would have retroactive beneficial effects,
referring as it did to persons x x x whose sentences were reduced
to reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act.[88]
It cannot be discounted that by operation of Rep. Act No. 9346
and Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, there may be convicts presently
serving their original sentences whose actual served terms exceed their
reduced sentences. It should be understood that this decision does not make
operative the release of such convicts, especially as there may be other
reasons that exist for their continued detention. There are remedies under
law that could be employed to obtain the release of such prisoners, if
warranted. Offices such as the Public Attorneys Office and non- parole for each of the six (6) counts of consummated rape committed

governmental organizations that frequently assist detainees possess the against AAA in Criminal Case Nos. 6699, 6902, and against BBB in Criminal

capacity and acumen to help implement the release of such prisoners who Case Nos. 6689, 6903, 6905, and 6907. Appellant is further ORDERED to

are so entitled by reason of this ruling. indemnify AAA and BBB for the crime of consummated rape, in the amounts

of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages

and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of them.

XI.

For the two (2) counts of attempted rape of AAA in Criminal

We close by returning to the matter of appellant Alfredo Bon. By Cases No. 6906 and 6908, appellant is hereby SENTENCED to an

reason of Rep. Act No. 9346, he is spared the death sentence, and entitled indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day

to the corresponding reduction of his penalty as a consequence of the of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1)

downgrading of his offense from two (2) counts consummated rape to two of prision mayor as maximum for each count of attempted rape. In addition,

(2) counts of attempted rape. For the six (6) counts of rape, we downgrade appellant is ORDERED to indemnify AAA for each of the two (2) counts of

the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole, attempted rape in the amounts of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P25,000.00

pursuant to Rep. Act No. 9346. For each of the two (2) counts of attempted as moral damages and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages.

rape, we downgrade by one degree lower the penalty imposed by the Court

of Appeals. We hold that there being no mitigating or aggravating

circumstances, the penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in it medium SO ORDERED.

period. Consequently, we impose the new penalty of two (2) years, four (4)

months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8)

years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.

Lastly, as to damages, the Court awards AAA P30,000.00 as civil

indemnity, P25,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as exemplary

damages for each count of attempted rape, it being the prevailing rate of

indemnity as pronounced in the recent case of People v. Miranda.[89]

Separately, the Court applies prevailing jurisprudence[90] in awarding to BBB

and AAA P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages

and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count of consummated

rape.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals

is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The Court sentences appellant

Alfredo J. Bon to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with no possibility of

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-55130 January 17, 1983
PEDRO SANTOS TO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ERNANI CRUZ-PAÑO, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City Branch XVIII, and JUAN Y. OCAMPO, respondents.
Dakila F. Castro & Associates for petitioner.
Abundio J. Macarañas for private respondent.
DE CASTRO, J.:
Petitioner was convicted by respondent judge of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal (Quezon City Branch) of the crime of estafa for having issued a
bouncing check for P5,000.00, and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
of from seven years and eight months of prision mayor as minimum, to nine
years and four months of prision mayor, as maximum.1 He appealed to the
Court of Appeals which reduced the penalty to one year and one day
of prision correccional as minimum, to one year and eight months as
maximum.2
Upon the Court of Appeals' decision becoming final, petitioner not having
appealed therefrom, he filed a petition for probation 3 with respondent
judge, who, despite the favorable recommendation of the Probation Office,
denied the petition on July 24, 1980, on the following grounds:
(a) to grant probation to petitioner will depreciate the
seriousness of the offense committed, and
(b) petitioner is not a penitent offender.
A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner having been denied by the
respondent judge, the present proceeding was resorted to, petitioner
averring that the respondent judge erred in denying his petition for
probation despite the recommendation for its approval by the Probation
Office.
We find for the petitioner.
At the outset, it might be stated that the Solicitor General whose comment
was required by this Court, recommends the granting of probation. As he
points out, petitioner is not among the offenders enumerated in the
probation law (Presidential Decree No. 968) from availing of the benefits of
probation. Under Section 9 of said law, the disqualified offenders are the
following:
(a) those sentenced to serve a maximum term of
imprisonment of more than six years;
(b) those convicted of any offense against the security
of the State;
(c) those who have previously been convicted by final
judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of
not less than one month and one day and/or a fine of
not less than two hundred pesos;
(d) those who have been once on probation under the
provisions of the decree; and
(e) those who were already serving sentence at the
time the substantive provisions of the decree became
applicable, pursuant to Section 33.
Under the abovequoted provision, petitioner may not be disqualified from
being entitled to the benefits of probation. Some other provisions have to
be sought, if any, upon which to deny petitioner the benefits of probation
which, from a reading of the law in its entirety, should with liberality, rather
than undue strictness, be extended to anyone not listed as disqualified. In
expressly enumerating offenders not qualified to enjoy the benefits of
probation, the clear intent is to allow said benefits to those not included in
the enumeration.
If only for the above observation as to how the law should be applied in
order that its objective could be realized and achieved, We cannot but find
respondent judge's reasons for his denial of the petition for probation
insufficient to justify a deviation from a policy of liberality with which the
law should be applied.
The first reason given by the judge is that "probation win depreciate the
seriousness of the offense committed." According to him, the State has
shown serious concern with the above of checks as a commercial paper, as
shown by various measures taken to curb the pernicious practice of issuing
bouncing checks.
For purpose of probation, what the law gives more importance to is the
offender, not the crime. The inquiry is more on whether probation will help
the offender along the lines for which the probation system has been
established, such as giving the first-time offender a second chance to
maintain his place in society through a process of reformation, which is
better achieved, at least as to one who has not committed a very serious
offense, when he is not mixed with hardened criminals in an atmosphere
not conducive to soul-searching as within prison walls. The consciousness of
the State's benignity in giving him that second chance to continue in
peaceful and cordial association with his fellowmen will advance, rather
than retard, the process of reformation in him.
If, therefore, reformation is what the law is more, if not solely, concerned
with, not the prevention by means of punitive measures, of the commission
of the offense, it is readily seen that the respondent judge has fallen into a
wrong obsession. He would, in effect, disqualify all those who commit estafa
through bouncing cheeks from enjoying the benefits of probation. He would
thereby add to the crimes expressly mentioned in the law which are not
subject to probation. Thus, the only crimes mentioned in the law based on
the nature thereof are those against national security (Section 9, paragraph
b), the other crimes being those punished by more than six years
imprisonment. Respondent judge would thus be writing into the law a new
ground for disqualifying a first-offender from the benefits of probation,
based on the nature of the crime, not on the penalty imposed as is the main
criterion laid down by the law in determining who may be granted
probation. That crime would be estafa only by issuing bouncing check, but
not all forms of estafa, which, incidentally, is one offense the criminal
liability for which is generally separated by a thin line from mere civil
liability.
For those who would commit the offense a second time or oftener, or
commit an offense of manifest gravity, it is the long prison term which must
be served that will act as deterrent to protect society. In protecting society,
the family of the offender which might be dependent or the latter to a
greater or lesser extent for support or other necessities of life should not be
lost sight of, it being the basic unit of that society. By the relative lightness
of the offense, as measured by the penalty imposed, more than by its
nature, as the law so ordains, the offender is not such a serious menace to
society as to be wrested away therefrom, as the more dangerous type of
criminals should be.

The second reason of respondent judge for denying petition petitioner's bid
for probation, is that petitioner is allegedly not a penitent offender, as
shown by his protestation of innocence even after his conviction by the trial
court and the affirmance of his conviction by the Court of Appeals.

We find the respondent judge, likewise, in error in assuming that petitioner

has not shown repentance in committing the crime of which he has been
found guilty by both the trial and appellate courts. If petitioner appealed the
decision of the respondent judge to the Court of Appeals, he cannot be
blamed for insisting on his version by which he could hope either to be
acquitted or at least given a lighter penalty that would entitle him to the
benefits of probation.1äwphï1.ñët The recourse he took has, indeed, proved
to be well worth the effort. His penalty was reduced on appeal which placed
him within the benign purpose of the Probation Law. By the move he took
by which to achieve this objective, acquittal not quite being within reach,
petitioner cannot be said to be a non-penitent offender, under serving of
probation benefits. Once the opportunity was laid open to him, he grasped
it; for instead of appealing further to the Supreme Court, he promptly
applied for probation, made possible only by the reduced penalty imposed
by the Court of Appeals. The penalty imposed by respondent court placed
petitioner beyond the pale of the Probation Law. How can he be said to be a
non-penitent offender, as the law would judge one to be so, just because he
appealed, as he could not have them applied for probation even if he
wanted to? Who knows but that if the penalty imposed by the trial court is
that imposed by the Court of Appeals petitioner would have applied for
probation forthwith?

Under the circumstances as just pointed out, We find no sufficient

justification for respondent judge's holding petitioner to be a non-penitent
offender. We find, instead, that the liberality with which the Probation Law
should be applied in favor of the applicant for its benefits affords the better
means of achieving the purpose of the law, as indicated in Our decision in
the case of Balleta Jr. vs. Hon. Leviste, G.R. No. L-49907, August 21, 1979, 92
SCRA 719, cited by the Solicitor-General who, as earlier stated, recommends
granting of the instant petition for probation.

WHEREFORE, the order of the respondent judge denying probation is set

aside, and petitioner is hereby declared admitted to probation, subject to
the terms and conditions as are prescribed by the law, and recommended
by the probation officer.

Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.

Aquino and Escolin, JJ., concur in the result.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-38725 October 31, 1933
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. PEDRO
MANABA, Defendant-Appellant.
Jose Ma. Cavanna for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
VICKERS, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of Judge Eulalio Garcia in this Court of First
Instance of Oriental Negros in criminal case No. 1827 dated November 15,
1932, finding the defendant guilty of rape and sentencing him to suffer
seventeen years and four months of reclusion temporal, and the accessory
penalties of the law, to indemnify the offended party, Celestina Adapon, in
the amount of P500, to maintain the offspring, if any, at P5 a month until
said offspring should become of age, and to pay the
costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The defendant appealed to this court, and his attorney de oficio now makes
the following assignments of error:
1. El juzgado a quo erro al no estimar en favor del acusado apelante la
defensa de double jeopardy o legal jeopardy que ha
interpuesto.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
2. El Juzgado a quo erro al no declarar insuficientes las pruebas de
identificacion del acusado apelante.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
3. El Juzgado a quo tambien erro al pasar por alto las incoherencias de los
testigos de la acusacion y al no declarar que no se ha establecido fuera de
toda duda la responsabilidad del
apelante.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
4. El Juzgado a quo erro al condenar al acusado apelante por el delito de
violacion y al no acceder a su mocion de nueva vista.
It appears that on May 10, 1932, the chief of police of Dumaguete
subscribed and swore to a criminal complaint wherein he charged Pedro
Manaba with the crime of rape, committed on the person of Celestina
Adapon. This complaint was filed with the justice of the peace of
Dumaguete on June 1, 1932 and in due course the case reached the Court
of First Instance. The accused was tried and convicted, but on motion of the
attorney for the defendant the judgment was set aside and the case
dismissed on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant or the subject matter of the action, because the complaint
had not been filed by the offended party, but by the chief of police (criminal
case No. 1801).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On August 17, 1932, the offended girl subscribed and swore to a complaint
charging the defendant with the crime of rape. This complaint was filed in
the Court of First Instance (criminal case No. 1872), but was referred to the
justice of the peace of Dumaguete for preliminary investigation. The
defendant waived his right to the preliminary investigation, but asked for
the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that he had previously been
placed in jeopardy for the same offense. This motion was denied by the
justice of the peace, and the case was remanded to the Court of First
Instance, where the provincial fiscal in an information charged the
defendant with having committed the crime of rape as follows:
Que en o hacia la noche del dia 9 de mayo de 1932, en el Municipio de
Dumaguete, Provincia de Negros Oriental, Islas Filipinas, y dentro de la
jurisdiccion de este Juzgado. el referido acusado Pedro Manaba,
aprovechandose de la oscuridad de la noche y mediante fuerza, violencia e
intimidacion, voluntaria, ilegal y criminalmente yacio y tuvo acceso carnal
con una niña llamada Celestina Adapon, contra la voluntad de esta. El
acusado Pedro Manaba ya ha sido convicto por Juzgado competente y en
sentencia firme por este mismo delito de
violacion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Hecho cometido con infraccion de la ley.
The defendant renewed his motion for dismissal in the case on the ground
of double jeopardy, but his motion was denied; and upon the termination of
the trial the defendant was found guilty and sentenced as hereinabove
stated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Whether the defendant was placed in jeopardy for the second time or not
when he was tried in the present case depends on whether or not he was
tried on a valid complaint in the first case. The offense in question was
committed on May 9, 1932, or subsequent to the date when the Revised
Penal Code became effective.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The third paragraph of the article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, which
relates to the prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage,
seduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness reads as follows:
The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall
not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or
her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has
been expressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be.
The Spanish text of this paragraph is as follows:
Tampoco puede procederse por causa de estupro, rapto, violacion o abusos
deshonestos, sino en virtud de denuncia de la parte agraviada, o de sus
padres, o abuelos o tutor, ni despues de haberse otorgado al ofensor,
perdon expreso por dicha partes, segun los casos.
It will be observed that the Spanish equivalent of the word "filed" is not
found in the Spanish text, which is controlling, as it was the Spanish text of
the Revised Penal Code that was approved by the
Legislature.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The first complaint filed against the defendant was signed and sworn to by
the chief of police of Dumaguete. As it was not the complaint of the
offended party, it was not a valid complaint in accordance with the law. The
judgment of the court was therefore void for lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, and the defendant was never in
jeopardy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It might be observed in this connection that the judgment was set aside and
the case dismissed on the motion of defendant's attorney, who
subsequently set up the plea of double jeopardy in the present
case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The other assignments of error relate to the sufficiency of the evidence,
which in our opinion fully sustains the findings of the trial
judge.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The recommendation of the Solicitor-General is erroneous in several
respects, chiefly due to the fact that it is based on the decision of July 30,
1932 that was set aside, and not on the decision now under consideration.
The accused should not be ordered to acknowledge the offspring, if should
there be any, because the record shows that the accused is a married
man.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It appears that the lower court should have taken into consideration the
aggravating circumstances of nocturnity. The defendant is therefore
sentenced to suffer seventeen years, four months, and one day ofreclusion
temporal, to indemnify the offended party, Celestina Adapon, in the sum of
P500, and to support the offspring, if any. As thus modified, the decision
appealed from is affirmed, with the costs of both instances against the
appellant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Street, Abad Santos, Imperial, and Butte, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 80762 March 19, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FAUSTA GONZALES, AUGUSTO GONZALES, CUSTODIO GONZALES, SR.,
CUSTODIO GONZALES, JR., NERIO GONZALES and ROGELIO LANIDA, accused,
CUSTODIO GONZALES, SR., accused-appellant.
SARMIENTO, J.:
In a decision 1 dated October 31, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo,
Branch XXXVIII (38), in Criminal Case No. 13661, entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Fausta Gonzales, Augusto Gonzales, Custodia Gonzales,
Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales and Rogelio Lanida," found all the
accused, except Rogelio Lanida who eluded arrest and up to now has remain
at large and not yet arrained, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of murder as defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. They
were sentenced "to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years
and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim in the amount of
P40,000.00, plus moral damages in the sum of P14,000.00 and to pay the
costs." 2 The victim was Lloyd Peñacerrada, 44, landowner, and a resident of
Barangay Aspera, Sara, Iloilo.
Through their counsel, all the accused, except of course Rogelio Lanida, filed
a notice of appeal from the trial court's decision. During the pendency of
their appeal and before judgment thereon could be rendered by the Court
of Appeals, however, all the accused-appellants, except Custodio Gonzales,
Sr., withdrew their appeal and chose instead to pursue their respective
applications for parole before the then Ministry, now Department, of
Justice, Parole Division. 3
On October 27, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 4 on the
appeal of Custodio Gonzales, Sr. It modified the appealed decision in that
the lone appellant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify
the heirs of Lloyd Peñacerrada in the amount of P30,000.00. In all other
respect, the decision of the trial court was affirmed. Further, on the basis of
our ruling in People vs. Ramos, 5 the appellate court certified this case to us
for review.6
The antecedent facts are as follows:
At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of February 21, 1981, Bartolome Paja,
the barangay captain of Barangay Tipacla, Ajuy, Iloilo, was awakened from
his sleep by the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. Augusto informed
Paja that his wife had just killed their landlord, Lloyd Peñacerrada, and thus
would like to surrender to the authorities. Seeing Augusto still holding the
knife allegedly used in the killing and Fausta with her dress smeared with
blood, Paja immediately ordered a nephew of his to take the spouses to the
police authorities at the Municipal Hall in Poblacion, Ajuy. As instructed,
Paja's nephew brought the Gonzales spouses, who "backrode" on his
motorcycle, to the municipal building. 7 Upon reaching the Ajuy Police sub-
station, the couple informed the police on duty of the incident. That same
night, Patrolman Salvador Centeno of the Ajuy Police Force and the
Gonzales spouses went back to Barangay Tipacla. Reaching Barangay Tipacla
the group went to Paja's residence where Fausta was made to stay, while
Paja, Patrolman Centeno, and Augusto proceeded to the latter's residence
at Sitio Nabitasan where the killing incident allegedly occurred. 8 There they
saw the lifeless body of Lloyd Peñacerrada, clad only in an underwear,
sprawled face down inside the bedroom. 9 The group stayed for about an
hour during which time Patrolman Centeno inspected the scene and started
to make a rough sketch thereof and the immediate surroundings. 10 The
next day, February 22, 1981, at around 7:00 o'clock in the morning,
Patrolman Centeno, accompanied by a photographer, went back to the
scene of the killing to conduct further investigations. Fausta Gonzales, on
the other hand, was brought back that same day by Barangay Captain Paja
to the police substation in Ajuy. When Patrolman Centeno and his
companion arrived at Sitio Nabitasan, two members of the 321st P.C.
Company stationed in Sara, Iloilo, who had likewise been informed of the
incident, were already there conducting their own investigation. Patrolman
Centeno continued with his sketch; photographs of the scene were likewise
taken. The body of the victim was then brought to the Municipal Hall of Ajuy
for autopsy.
The autopsy of Lloyd Peñacerrada's cadaver was performed at about 11:20
a.m. on February 22, 1981; after completed, a report was made with the
following findings:
PHYSICAL FINDINGS
1. Deceased is about 5 ft. and 4 inches in height, body
moderately built and on cadaveric rigidity.
EXTERNAL FINDINGS
1. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 9 cm. in length,
located at the lower 3rd anterior aspect of the arm,
right, directed upward to the right axillary pit.
2. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the proximal
3rd, forearm right, posterior aspect with an entrance
of 5 cm. in width and 9 cm. in length with an exit at the
middle 3rd, posterior aspect of the forearm, right, with
1 cm. wound exit.
3. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the middle
3rd, posterior aspect of the forearm right, 1 cm. in
width.
4. Incised wound, 4 cm. long, depth visualizing the right
lateral border of the sternum, 6th and 7th ribs, right
located 1.5 inches below the right nipple.
5. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 10.5 cm. in depth,
directed inward to the thoracic cavity right, located at
the left midclavicular line at the level of the 5th rib left.
6. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 9.5 cm. in depth
directed toward the right thoracic cavity, located at the
mid left scapular line at the level of the 8th intercostal
space.
7. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, located at the base
of the left armpit directed toward the left thoracic
cavity.
8. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 11 cm. in length,
directed toward the left deltoid muscle, located at the
upper 3rd axilla left.
9. Puncture wound, 3 cm in width, 11.5 cm in length,
located at the anterior aspect, proximal 3rd arm left,
directed downward.

10. Stab wound, thru and thru, 2.5 cm. in width, and 5
cm. in length, medial aspect, palm right.

11. Stabwound, 4 cm.in width, iliac area, right, directed

inward with portion of large intestine and mysentery
coming out.

12. Stab wound, 4 cm. in width, located at the

posterior portion of the shoulder, right, directed
downward to the aspex of the light thoracic cavity.

13. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 10 cm. in length,

located at the medial portion of the medial border of
the right scapula.

14. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 4.5 cm. in length,

located at the posterior aspect of the right elbow.

15. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 2 cm. in length,

located at the posterior portion, middle 3rd, forearm,
right.

16. Lacerated wound at the anterior tantanelle with

fissural fracture of the skull.

INTERNAL FINDINGS:

1. Stab wound No. 5, injuring the

left ventricle of the heart.

2. Stab wound No. 6, severely

injuring the right lower lobe of
the lungs.

3. Stab wound No. 7, injuring the

right middle lobe of the lungs.

4. Stab wound No. 11, injuring the

descending colon of the large
intestine, thru and thru.

5. Stab wound No. 12, severely

injuring the apex of the right
lungs (sic).

CAUSE OF DEATH:

MASSIVE
HEMMORRH
AGE DUE TO
MULTIPLE
LACERATED,
STABBED The autopsy report thus showed that Dr. Rojas "found sixteen (16) wounds,
(sic), five (5) of which are fatal because they penetrated the internal organs,
INCISED AND heart, lungs and intestines of the deceased." 12
PUNCTURED
WOUNDS.
On February 23, two days after the incident, Augusto Gonzales appeared
before the police sub-station in the poblacion of Ajuy and voluntarily
surrendered to Police Corporal Ben Sazon for detention and protective
custody for "having been involved" in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada. He
requested that he be taken to the P.C. headquarters in Sara, Iloilo where his
wife, Fausta, was already detained having been indorsed thereat by the Ajuy
police force. 13
Based on the foregoing and on the investigations conducted by the Ajuy
police force and the 321st P.C. Company, an information for murder dated
August 26, 1981, was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo against the
spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. The information read as follows:
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses FAUSTA
GONZALES and AUGUSTO GONZALES of the crime of
MURDER committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of February, 1981, in the
Municipality of Ajuy, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named
accused with four other companions whose identities
are still unknown and are still at large, armed with
sharp-pointed and deadly weapons, conspiring,
confederating and helping each other, with treachery
and evident premeditation, with deliberate intent and
decided purpose to kill, and taking advantage of their
superior strength and number, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab,
hack, hit and wound Lloyd D. Peñacerrada, with the
weapons with which said accused were provided at the
time, thereby inflicting upon said Lloyd D. Peñacerrada
multiple wounds on different parts of his body as
shown by autopsy report attached to the record of this
case which multifarious wounds caused the immediate
death of said Lloyd D. Peñacerrada.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Iloilo City, August 26, 1981. 14
When arraigned on September 16, 1981, Augusto and Fausta both entered
a plea of not guilty. Before trial, however, Jose Huntoria 15 who claimed to
have witnessed the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, presented himself to Nanie
Peñacerrada, the victim's widow, on October 6, 1981, and volunteered to
testify for the prosecution. A reinvestigation of the case was therefore
conducted by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo on the basis of which an
Amended Information, 16 dated March 3, 1982, naming as additional
accused Custodio Gonzales, Sr. (the herein appellant), Custodio Gonzales,
Jr., Nerio Gonzales, and Rogelio Lanida, was filed. Again, all the accused
except as earlier explained, Lanida, pleaded not guilty to the crime.
At the trial, the prosecution presented Dr. Jesus Rojas, the Rural Health
physician of Ajuy who conducted the autopsy on the body of the victim;
Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of Barangay Tipacla; Patrolman
Salvador Centeno and Corporal Ben Sazon of the Ajuy Police Force; Sgt. (ret)
Nicolas Belicanao and Sgt. Reynaldo Palomo of the 321st P.C. Company
based in Sara, Iloilo; Jose Huntoria; and Nanie Peñacerrada, the widow.
Dr. Jesus Rojas testified that he performed the autopsy on the body of the
deceased Lloyd Penacerrada at around 11:20 a.m. on February 22, 1981
after it was taken to the municipal hall of Ajuy. 17 His findings revealed that
the victim suffered from 16 wounds comprising of four (4) punctured
wounds, seven (7) stab wounds, four (4) incised wounds, and one (1)
lacerated wound. In his testimony, Dr. Rojas, while admitting the possibility
that only one weapon might have caused all the wounds (except the
lacerated wound) inflicted on the victim, nevertheless opined that due to
the number and different characteristics of the wounds, the probability that
at least two instruments were used is high. 18 The police authorities and the
P.C. operatives for their part testified on the aspect of the investigation they
respectively conducted in relation to the incident. Nanie Peñacerrada
testified mainly on the expenses she incurred by reason of the death of her
husband while Barangay Captain Bartolome Paja related the events
surrounding the surrender of the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales to
him, the location of the houses of the accused, as well as on other matters.
By and large, the prosecution's case rested on Huntoria's alleged eyewitness
account of the incident. According to Huntoria, who gave his age as 30 when
he testified on July 27, 1982, 19 at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon on February
21, 1981, he left his work at Barangay Central, in Ajuy, Iloilo where he was
employed as a tractor driver by one Mr. Piccio, and walked home; 20 he took
a short-cut route. 21 While passing at the vicinity of the Gonzales spouses'
house at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, he heard cries for
help. 22 Curiosity prompted him to approach the place where the shouts
were emanating. When he was some 15 to 20 meters away, he hid himself
behind a clump of banana
trees. 23 From where he stood, he allegedly saw all the accused ganging
upon and takings turns in stabbing and hacking the victim Lloyd
Peñacerrada, near a "linasan" or threshing platform. He said he clearly
recognized all the accused as the place was then awash in
moonlight. 24 Huntoria further recounted that after the accused were
through in stabbing and hacking the victim, they then lifted his body and
carried it into the house of the Gonzales spouses which was situated some
20 to 25 meters away from the "linasan". 25 Huntoria then proceeded on his
way home. Upon reaching his house, he related what he saw to his mother
and to his wife 26 before he went to sleep. 27Huntoria explained that he did
not immediately report to the police authorities what he witnessed for fear
of his life. 28 In October 1981 however, eight months after the extraordinary
incident he allegedly witnessed, bothered by his conscience plus the fact
that his father was formerly a tenant of the victim which, to his mind, made
him likewise a tenant of the latter, he thought of helping the victim's widow,
Nanie Peñacerrada. Hence, out of his volition, he travelled from his place at
Sitio Nabitasan, in Barangay Tipacla Municipality of Ajuy, to Sara, Iloilo
where Mrs. Peñacerrada lived, and related to her what he saw on February
21, 1981. 29
Except Fausta who admitted killing Lloyd Peñacerrada in defense of her
honor as the deceased attempted to rape her, all the accused denied
participation in the crime. The herein accused-appellant, Custodio Gonzales,
Sr., claimed that he was asleep 30 in his house which was located some one
kilometer away from the scene of the crime 31 when the incident happened.
He asserted that he only came to know of it after his grandchildren by
Augusto and Fausta Gonzales went to his house that night of February 21,
1981 to inform him. 32
The trial court disregarded the version of the defense; it believed the
testimony of Huntoria.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Custodia Gonzales, Sr., the lone
appellant, contended that the trial court erred in convicting him on the basis
of the testimony of Jose Huntoria, the lone alleged eyewitness, and in not
appreciating his defense of alibi.
The Court of Appeals found no merit in both assigned errors. In upholding
Huntoria's testimony, the appellate court held that:
. . . Huntoria positively identified all the accused,
including the herein accused-appellant, as the
assailants of Peñacerrada. (TSN, p. 43, July 27, 1982)
The claim that Huntoria would have difficulty
recognizing the assailant at a distance of 15 to 20
meters is without merit, considering that Huntoria
knew all the accused. (Id., pp. 37-39) If Huntoria could
not say who was hacking and who was stabbing the
deceased, it was only because the assailant were
moving around the victim.
 As for the delay in reporting the incident to the
authorities, we think that Huntoria's explanation is
satisfactory. He said he feared for his life. (Id., pp. 50-
51, 65) As stated in People vs. Realon, 99 SCRA 442,
450 (1980): "The natural reticence of most people to
get involved in a criminal case is of judicial notice. As
held in People v. Delfin, '. . . the initial reluctance of
witnesses in this country to volunteer information
about a criminal case and their unwillingness to be
involved in or dragged into criminal investigations is
common, and has been judicially declared not to affect
credibility.'"
It is noteworthy that the accused-appellant self
admitted that he had known Huntoria for about 10
years and that he and Huntoria were in good terms
and had no misunderstanding whatsoever. (TSN, p. 33,
July 18, 1984) He said that he could not think of any
reason why Huntoria should implicate him. (Id., p. 34)
Thus, Huntoria's credibility. is beyond question. 33
The Court of Appeals likewise rejected the appellant's defense of
alibi. 34 The appellate court, however, found the sentence imposed by the
trial court on the accused-appellant erroneous. Said the appellate court:
Finally, we find that the trial court erroneously
sentenced the accused-appellant to 12 years and 1 day
to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal. The
penalty for murder under Article 248 is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death. As there was
no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the
imposible penalty should be reclusion perpetua.
Consequently, the appeal should have been brought to
the Supreme Court. With regard to the indemnity for
death, the award of P40,000.00 should be reduced to
P30,000.00, in accordance with the rulings of the
Supreme Court. (E.g., People v. De la Fuente, 126 SCRA
518 (1983); People v. Atanacio, 128 SCRA 31 (1984);
People v. Rado, 128 SCRA 43 (1984); People v. Bautista,
G.R. No. 68731, Feb. 27, 1987).35
The case, as mentioned earlier, is now before us upon certification by the
Court of Appeals, the penalty imposed being reclusion perpetua.
After a careful review of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, we find
the same insufficient to convict the appellant of the crime charged.
To begin with, the investigation conducted by the police authorities leave
much to be desired. Patrolman Centeno of the Ajuy police force in his sworn
statements 36 even gave the date of the commission of the crime as "March
21, 1981." Moreover, the sketch 37 he made of the scene is of little help.
While indicated thereon are the alleged various blood stains and their
locations relative to the scene of the crime, there was however no
indication as to their quantity. This is rather unfortunate for the prosecution
because, considering that there are two versions proferred on where the
killing was carried out, the extent of blood stains found would have provided
a more definite clue as to which version is more credible. If, as the version
of the defense puts it, the killing transpired inside the bedroom of the
Gonzales spouses, there would have been more blood stains inside the
couple's bedroom or even on the ground directly under it. And this
circumstance would provide an additional mooring to the claim of
attempted rape asseverated by Fausta. On the other hand, if the
prosecution's version that the killing was committed in the field near the
linasan is the truth, then blood stains in that place would have been more
than in any other place.
The same sloppiness characterizes the investigation conducted by the other
authorities. Police Corporal Ben Sazon who claimed that accused Augusto
Gonzales surrendered to him on February 23, 1981 failed to state clearly the
reason for the "surrender." It would even appear that Augusto
"surrendered" just so he could be safe from possible revenge by the victim's
kins. Corporal Sazon likewise admitted that Augusto never mentioned to
him the participation of other persons in the killing of the victim. Finally,
without any evidence on that point, P.C. investigators of the 321st P.C.
Company who likewise conducted an investigation of the killing mentioned
in their criminal complaint 38 four other unnamed persons, aside from the
spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales, to have conspired in killing Lloyd
Peñacerrada.
Now on the medical evidence. Dr. Rojas opined that it is possible that the
sixteen wounds described in the autopsy report were caused by two or
more bladed instruments. Nonetheless, he admitted the possibility that one
bladed instrument might have caused all. Thus, insofar as Dr. Rojas'
testimony and the autopsy report are concerned, Fausta Gonzales'
admission that she alone was responsible for the killing appears not at all
too impossible. And then there is the positive testimony of Dr. Rojas that
there were only five wounds that could be fatal out of the sixteen described
in the autopsy report. We shall discuss more the significance of these
wounds later.
It is thus clear from the foregoing that if the conviction of the appellant by
the lower courts is to be sustained, it can only be on the basis of the
testimony of Huntoria, the self-proclaimed eyewitness. Hence, a meticulous
scrutiny of Huntoria's testimony is compelling.
To recollect, Huntoria testified that he clearly saw all the accused, including
the appellant, take turns in hacking and stabbing Lloyd Peñacerrada, at
about 8:00 o'clock in the evening, on February 21, 1981, in the field near a
"linasan" while he (Huntoria) stood concealed behind a clump of banana
trees some 15 to 20 meters away from where the crime was being
committed. According to him, he recognized the six accused as the
malefactors because the scene was then illuminated by the moon. He
further stated that the stabbing and hacking took about an hour. But on
cross-examination, Huntoria admitted that he could not determine who
among the six accused did the stabbing and/or hacking and what particular
weapon was used by each of them.
ATTY. GATON (defense counsel on
cross-examination):
Q And you said that the moon
was bright, is it correct?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And you would like us to
understand that you saw the
hacking and the stabbing, at that
distance by the herein accused as
identified by you?
A Yes, sir, because the moon was
brightly shining.
Q If you saw the stabbing and the
hacking, will you please tell this
Honorable Court who was hacking
the victim?
A Because they were surrounding
Peñacerrada and were in constant
 movement, I could not determine
who did the hacking.
ATTY. GATON:
The interpretation is not clear.
COURT:
They were doing it rapidly.
A The moving around or the
hacking or the "labu" or "bunu" is
rapid. I only saw the rapid
movement of their arms, Your
Honor, and I cannot determine
who was hacking and who was
stabbing. But I saw the hacking
and the stabbing blow.
ATTY. GATON:
Q You cannot positively identify
before this Court who really
hacked Lloyd Peñacerrada?
A Yes sir, I cannot positively tell
who did the hacking.
Q And likewise you cannot
positively tell this Honorable Court
who did the stabbing?
A Yes sir, and because of the rapid
movements.
Q I noticed in your direct
testimony that you could not even
identify the weapons used
because according to you it was
just flashing?
A Yes, sir.39
(Emphasis supplied)
From his very testimony, Huntoria failed to impute a definite and specific act
committed, or contributed, by the appellant in the killing of Lloyd
Peñacerrada.
It also bears stressing that there is nothing in the findings of the trial court
and of the Court of Appeals which would categorize the criminal liability of
the appellant as a principal by direct participation under Article 17,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. Likewise, there is nothing in the
evidence for the prosecution that inculpates him by inducement, under
paragraph 2 of the same Article 17, or by indispensable cooperation under
paragraph 3 thereof. What then was the direct part in the killing did the
appellant perform to support the ultimate punishment imposed by the
Court of Appeals on him?
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides how criminal liability is
incurred.
Art. 4. Criminal liability — Criminal liability shall be
incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although
the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.
2. By any person performing an act which would be an
offense against persons or property, were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on
account of the employment of inadequate or
ineffectual means.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, one of the means by which criminal liability is incurred is through the
commission of a felony. Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other
hand, provides how felonies are committed.
Art. 3. Definition — Acts and omissions punishable by
law are felonies (delitos).
Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit
(dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa).
There is deceit when the act is performed with
deliberate intent; and there is fault when the wrongful
act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of
foresight, or lack of skill.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the elements of felonies in general are: (1) there must be an act or
omission; (2) the act or omission must be punishable under the Revised
Penal Code; and (3) the act is performed or the omission incurred by means
of deceit or fault.
Here, while the prosecution accuses, and the two lower courts both found,
that the appellant has committed a felony in the killing of Lloyd
Peñacerrada, forsooth there is paucity of proof as to what act was
performed by the appellant. It has been said that "act," as used in Article 3
of the Revised Penal Code, must be understood as "any bodily movement
tending to produce some effect in the external world." 40 In this instance,
there must therefore be shown an "act" committed by the appellant which
would have inflicted any harm to the body of the victim that produced his
death.
Yet, even Huntoria, as earlier emphasized, admitted quite candidly that he
did not see who "stabbed" or who "hacked" the victim. Thus this principal
witness did not say, because he could not whether the appellant "hacked or
"stabbed" victim. In fact, Huntoria does not know what specific act was
performed by the appellant. This lack of specificity then makes the case fall
short of the test laid down by Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code previously
discussed. Furthermore, the fact that the victim sustained only five fatal
wounds out of the total of sixteen inflicted, as adverted to above, while
there are six accused charged as principals, it follows to reason that one of
the six accused could not have caused or dealt a fatal wound. And this one
could as well be the appellant, granted ex gratia argumenti that he took
part in the hacking and stabbing alleged by Huntoria. And why not him? Is
he not after all the oldest (already sexagenarian at that time) and practically
the father of the five accused? And pursuing this argument to the limits of
its logic, it is possible, nay even probable, that only four, or three, or two of
the accused could have inflicted all the five fatal wounds to the exclusion of
two, three, or four of them. And stretching the logic further, it is possible,
nay probable, that all the fatal wounds, including even all the non-fatal
wounds, could have been dealt by Fausta in rage against the assault on her
womanhood and honor. But more importantly, there being not an iota of
evidence that the appellant caused any of the said five fatal wounds,
coupled with the prosecution's failure to prove the presence of conspiracy
beyond reasonable doubt, the appellant's conviction can not be sustained.
Additionally, Huntoria's credibility as a witness is likewise tarnished by the
fact that he only came out to testify in October 1981, or eight long months
since he allegedly saw the killing on February 21, 1981. While ordinarily the
failure of a witness to report at once to the police authorities the crime he
had witnessed should not be taken against him and should not affect his
credibility,41 here, the unreasonable delay in Huntoria's coming out
engenders doubt on his veracity. 42 If the silence of coming out an alleged
eyewitness for several weeks renders his credibility doubtful, 43 the more it
should be for one who was mute for eight months. Further, Huntoria's long
delay in reveiling what he allegedly witnessed, has not been satisfactorily
explained. His lame excuse that he feared his life would be endangered is
too pat to be believed. There is no showing that he was threatened by the
accused or by anybody. And if it were true that he feared a possible
retaliation from the accused, 44 why did he finally volunteer to testify
considering that except for the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales who
were already under police custody, the rest of the accused were then still
free and around; they were not yet named in the original
information, 45 thus the supposed danger on Huntoria's life would still be
clear and present when he testified.
Moreover, Huntoria is not exactly a disinterested witness as portrayed by
the prosecution. He admitted that he was a tenant of the deceased. In fact,
he stated that one of the principal reasons why he testified was because the
victim was also his landlord.
presented himself to the victim's widow, he was taken under the protective
wings of the victim's uncle, one Dr. Biclar, who gave him employment and
provided lodging for his family. 48 Given all the foregoing circumstances, we
can not help but dismiss Huntoria as an unreliable witness, to say the least.
At any rate, there is another reason why we find the alleged participation of
the appellant in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada doubtful — it is contrary to
our customs and traditions. Under the Filipino family tradition and culture,
aging parents are sheltered and insulated by their adult children from any
possible physical and emotional harm. It is therefore improbable for the
other accused who are much younger and at the prime of their manhood, to
summon the aid or allow the participation of their 65-year old 49 father, the
appellant, in the killing of their lone adversary, granting that the victim was
indeed an adversary. And considering that the appellant's residence was
about one kilometer from the scene of the crime, 50 we seriously doubt that
the appellant went there just for the purpose of aiding his three robust male
sons (Custodia Jr., Nerio, and Augusta), not to mention the brother and
sister, Rogelio and Fausta, in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, even if the
latter were a perceived enemy.
Finally, while indeed alibi is a weak defense, 51 under appropriate
circumstances, like in the instant case in which the participation of the
appellant is not beyond cavil it may be considered as exculpatory. Courts
should not at once look with disfavor at the defense of alibi for if taken in
the light of the other evidence on record, it may be sufficient to acquit the
accused. 52
In fine, the guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable
doubt.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET

xxx xxx xxx ASIDE and the appellant is hereby ACQUITTED. Costs de oficio.

Q Now, Mr. Huntoria, why did it SO ORDERED.

take you so long from the time
you saw the stabbing and hacking
of Lloyd Peñacerrada when you
told Mrs. Peñacerrada about what
happened to her husband?

A At first I was then afraid to tell

anybody else but because I was
haunted by my conscience
and secondly the victim was also
my landlord I revealed what I saw
to the wife of the victim.46

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis ours.)

At this juncture, it may be relevant to remind that under our socioeconomic

set-up, a tenant owes the very source of his livelihood, if not existence itself,
from his landlord who provides him with the land to till. In this milieu,
tenants like Huntoria are naturally beholden to their landlords and seek
ways and means to ingratiate themselves with the latter. In this instance,
volunteering his services as a purported eyewitness and providing that
material testimony which would lead to the conviction of the entire family
of Augusto Gonzales whose wife, Fausta, has confessed to the killing of
Lloyd Peñacerrada, would, in a perverted sense, be a way by which Huntoria
sought to ingratiate himself with the surviving family of his deceased
landlord. This is especially so because the need to get into the good graces
of his landlord's family assumed a greater urgency considering that he
ceased to be employed as early as May 1981. 47 Volunteering his services
would alleviate the financial distress he was in. And Huntoria proved quite
sagacious in his choice of action for shortly after he volunteered and
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-35748 December 14, 1931
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROMANA SILVESTRE and MARTIN ATIENZA, defendants-appellants.
Teofilo Mendoza for appellants.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
Martin Atienza and Romana Silvestre appeal to this court from the judgment
of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan convicting them upon the
information of the crime of arson as follows: The former as principal by
direct participation, sentenced to fourteen years, eight months, and one day
of cadena temporal, in accordance with paragraph 2 of article 550, Penal
Code; and the latter as accomplice, sentenced to six years and one day
of presidio mayor; and both are further sentenced to the accessories of the
law, and to pay each of the persons whose houses were destroyed by the
fire, jointly and severally, the amount set forth in the information, with
costs.
Counsel appointed by the court to defend the accused- appellants de oficio,
after delivering his argument, prayed for the affirmance of the judgment
with reference to the appellant Martin Atienza, and makes the following
assignments of error with reference to Romana Silvestre, to wit:
1. The lower court erred in convincing Romana Silvestre as
accomplice of the crime charged in the information.
2. Finally, the court erred in not acquitting said defendant from
the information upon the ground of insufficient evidence, or at
the least, of reasonable doubt.
The following facts were proved at the hearing beyond a reasonable doubt:
Romana Silvestre, wife of Domingo Joaquin by her second marriage,
cohabited with her codefendant Martin Atienza from the month of March,
1930, in the barrio of Masocol, municipality of Paombong, Province of
Bulacan. On May 16, 1930, the complaining husband, Domingo Joaquin,
filed with the justice of the peace for that municipality, a sworn complaint
for adultery, supported by affidavits of Gerardo Cabigao and Castor de la
Cruz (Exhibit B). On the same date, May 16, 1930, the said accused were
arrested on a warrant issued by said justice of the peace. On the 20th of the
month, they were released on bail, each giving a personal bond of P6,000.
Pending the preliminary investigation of the case, the two defendants
begged the municipal president of Paombong, Francisco Suerte Felipe, to
speak to the complaint, Domingo Joaquin, urging him to withdraw the
complaint, the two accused binding themselves to discontinue cohabitation,
and promising not to live again in the barrio of Masocol; Martin Atienza
voluntarily signed the promise (Exhibit A). The municipal president
transmitted the defendants' petition to the complaining husband, lending it
his support. Domingo Joaquin acceded to it, and on May 20, 1930, filed a
motion for the dismissal of his complaint. In consideration of this petition,
the justice of the peace of Paombong dismissed the adultery case
commenced against the accused, and cancelled the bonds given by them,
with the costs against the complainant.
The accused then left the barrio of Masocol and went to live in that of Santo
Niño, in the same municipality of Paombong.
About November 20, 1930, the accused Romana Silvestre met her son by
her former marriage, Nicolas de la Cruz, in the barrio of Santo Niño, and
under pretext of asking him for some nipa leaves, followed him home to the
village of Masocol, and remained there. The accused, Martin Atienza, who
had continued to cohabit with said Romana Silvestre, followed her and lived
in the home of Nicolas de la Cruz. On the night of November 25, 1930, while
Nicolas de la Cruz and his wife, Antonia de la Cruz, were gathered together
with the appellants herein after supper, Martin Atienza told said couple to
take their furniture out of the house because he was going to set fire to it.
Upon being asked by Nicolas and Antonia why he wanted to set fire to the
house, he answered that that was the only way he could be revenged upon
the people of Masocol who, he said, had instigated the charge of adultery
against him and his codefendant, Romana Silvestre. As Martin Atienza was
at that time armed with a pistol, no one dared say anything to him, not even
Romana Silvestre, who was about a meter away from her codefendant.
Alarmed at what Martin Atienza had said, the couple left the house at once
to communicate with the barrio lieutenant, Buenaventura Ania, as to what
they had just heard Martin Atienza say; but they had hardly gone a hundred
arms' length when they heard cries of "Fire! Fire!" Turning back they saw
their home in flames, and ran back to it; but seeing that the fire had
assumed considerable proportions, Antonia took refuge in the schoolhouse
with her 1 year old babe in her arms, while Nicolas went to the home of his
parents-in-law, took up the furniture he had deposited there, and carried it
to the schoolhouse. The fire destroyed about forty-eight houses. Tomas
Santiago coming from the barrio artesian well, and Tomas Gonzalez, teacher
at the barrio school of Masocol, and Felipe Clemente, an old man 61 years
of age, coming from their homes, to the house on fire, saw Martin Atienza
going away from the house where the fire started, and Romana Silvestre
leaving it.lawphil.net
As stated in the beginning, counsel appointed by this court to defend the
accused-appellant de oficio, prays for the affirmance of the judgment
appealed from with reference to defendant Martin Atienza. The facts
related heretofore, proved beyond a reasonable doubt at the hearing,
justify this petition of the de oficio counsel, and establish beyond a
reasonable doubt said defendant's guilt of arson as charged, as principal by
direct participation.
With respect to the accused-appellant Romana Silvestre, the only evidence
of record against her are: That, being married, she lived adulterously with
her codefendant Martin Atienza, a married man; that both were denounced
for adultery by Domingo Joaquin, Romana Silvestre's second husband; that
in view of the petition of the accused, who promised to discontinue their life
together, and to leave the barrio of Masocol, and through the good offices
of the municipal president of Paombong, the complaining husband asked for
the dismissal of the complaint; that in pursuance of their promise, both of
the accused went to lived in the barrio of Santo Niño, in the same
municipality; that under pretext for some nipa leaves from her son by her
former marriage, Nicolas de la Cruz, who had gone to the barrio of Santo
Niño, Romana Silvestre followed him to his house in the barrio of Masocol
on November 23, 1930, and remained there; that her codefendant, Martin
Atienza followed her, and stayed with his coaccused in the same house; that
on the night of November 25, 1930, at about 8 o'clock, while all were
gathered together at home after supper, Martin Atienza expressed his
intention of burning the house as the only means of taking his revenge on
the Masocol resident, who had instigated Domingo Joaquin to file the
complaint for adultery against them, which compelled them to leave the
barrio of Masocol; that Romana Silvestre listened to her codefendant's
threat without raising a protest, and did not give the alarm when the latter
set fire to the house. Upon the strength of these facts, the court below
found her guilty of arson as accomplice.
Article 14 of the Penal Code, considered in connection with article 13,
defines an accomplice to be one who does not take a direct part in the
commission of the act, who does not force or induce other to commit it, nor
cooperates in the commission of the act by another act without which it
would not have been accomplished, yet cooperates in the execution of the
act by previous or simultaneous actions.
complicity in the commission of the crime witnessed passively, or with
regard to which one has kept silent; and (2) he who desiring to burn the
houses in a barrio, without knowing whether there are people in them or
not, sets fire to one known to be vacant at the time, which results in
destroying the rest, commits the crime of arson, defined and penalized in
article 550, paragraph 2, Penal Code.

Now then, which previous or simultaneous acts complicate Romana
Silvestre in the crime of arson committed by her codefendant Martin
Atienza? Is it her silence when he told the spouses, Nicolas de la Cruz and
Antonia de la Cruz, to take away their furniture because he was going to set
fire to their house as the only means of revenging himself on the barrio
residents, her passive presence when Martin Atienza set fire to the house,
where there is no evidence of conspiracy or cooperation, and her failure to
give the alarm when the house was already on fire?
By virtue wherefore, the judgment appealed from is modified as follows: It is
affirmed with reference to the accused-appellant Martin Atienza, and
reversed with reference to the accused-appellant Romana Silvestre, who is
hereby acquitted with
one-half of the costs de oficio. So ordered.

The complicity which is penalized requires a certain degree of cooperation,

whether moral, through advice, encouragement, or agreement, or material,
through external acts. In the case of the accused-appellant Romana
Silvestre, there is no evidence of moral or material cooperation, and none of
an agreement to commit the crime in question. Her mere presence and
silence while they are simultaneous acts, do not constitute cooperation, for
it does not appear that they encouraged or nerved Martin Atienza to
commit the crime of arson; and as for her failure to give the alarm, that
being a subsequent act it does not make her liable as an accomplice.

The trial court found the accused-appellant Martin Atienza guilty of arson,
defined and penalized in article 550, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code, which
reads as follows:

ART. 550. The penalty of cadena temporal shall be imposed upon:

xxx xxx xxx

2. Any person who shall set fire to any inhabited house or any
building in which people are accustomed to meet together,
without knowing whether or not such building or house was
occupied at the time, or any freight train in motion, if the damage
caused in such cases shall exceed six thousand two hundred and
fifty pesetas.

While the defendant indeed knew that besides himself and his codefendant,
Romana Silvestre, there was nobody in De la Cruz's house at the moment of
setting fire to it, he cannot be convicted merely arson less serious than what
the trial court sentenced him for, inasmuch as that house was the means of
destroying the others, and he did not know whether these were occupied at
the time or not. If the greater seriousness of setting fire to an inhabited
house, when the incendiary does not know whether there are people in it at
the time, depends upon the danger to which the inmates are exposed, not
less serious is the arson committed by setting fire to inhabited houses by
means of another inhabited house which the firebrand knew to be empty at
the moment of committing the act, if he did not know whether there were
people or not in the others, inasmuch as the same danger exists.

With the evidence produced at the trial, the accused-appellant Martin

Atienza might have been convicted of the crime of arson in the most serious
degree provided for in article 549 of the Penal Code, if the information had
alleged that at the time of setting fire to the house, the defendant knew
that the other houses were occupied, taking into account that barrio
residents are accustomed to retire at the tolling of the bell for the souls in
purgatory, i.e., at 8 o'clock at night.

For all the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold, that:
(1) Mere passive presence at the scene of another's crime, mere silence and
failure to give the alarm, without evidence of agreement or conspiracy, do
not constitute the cooperation required by article 14 of the Penal Code for
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 152133 February 9, 2006
ROLLIE CALIMUTAN, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court, petitioner Rollie Calimutan prays for the reversal of the Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23306, dated 29 August
2001,1affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, of
Masbate, Masbate, in Criminal Case No. 8184, dated 19 November
1998,2 finding petitioner Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Information3 filed with the RTC charged petitioner Calimutan with the
crime of homicide, allegedly committed as follows –
That on or about February 4, 1996, in the morning thereof, at sitio Capsay,
Barangay Panique, Municipality of Aroroy, Province of Masbate, Philippines
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and throw a stone at PHILIP CANTRE, hitting him at the back
left portion of his body, resulting in laceration of spleen due to impact which
caused his death a day after.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Masbate, Masbate, September 11, 1996.
Accordingly, the RTC issued, on 02 December 1996, a warrant4 for the arrest
of petitioner Calimutan. On 09 January 1997, however, he was provisionally
released5 after posting sufficient bailbond.6 During the arraignment on 21
May 1997, petitioner Calimutan pleaded not guilty to the crime of homicide
charged against him.7
In the course of the trial, the prosecution presented three witnesses,
namely: (1) Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez, a Senior Medico-Legal Officer of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI); (2) Belen B. Cantre, mother of the
victim, Philip Cantre; and (3) Rene L. Sañano, companion of the victim
Cantre when the alleged crime took place. Their testimonies are collectively
summarized below.
On 04 February 1996, at around 10:00 a.m., the victim Cantre and witness
Sañano, together with two other companions, had a drinking spree at a
videoke bar in Crossing Capsay, Panique, Aroroy, Masbate. From the
videoke bar, the victim Cantre and witness Sañano proceeded to go home to
their respective houses, but along the way, they crossed paths with
petitioner Calimutan and a certain Michael Bulalacao. Victim Cantre was
harboring a grudge against Bulalacao, suspecting the latter as the culprit
responsible for throwing stones at the Cantre’s house on a previous night.
Thus, upon seeing Bulalacao, victim Cantre suddenly punched him. While
Bulalacao ran away, petitioner Calimutan dashed towards the backs of
victim Cantre and witness Sañano. Petitioner Calimutan then picked up a
stone, as big as a man’s fist, which he threw at victim Cantre, hitting him at
the left side of his back. When hit by the stone, victim Cantre stopped for a
moment and held his back. Witness Sañano put himself between the victim
Cantre and petitioner Calimutan, and attempted to pacify the two, even
convincing petitioner Calimutan to put down another stone he was already
holding. He also urged victim Cantre and petitioner Calimutan to just go
home. Witness Sañano accompanied victim Cantre to the latter’s house, and
on the way, victim Cantre complained of the pain in the left side of his back
hit by the stone. They arrived at the Cantre’s house at around 12:00 noon,
and witness Sañano left victim Cantre to the care of the latter’s mother,
Belen.8
Victim Cantre immediately told his mother, Belen, of the stoning incident
involving petitioner Calimutan. He again complained of backache and also of
stomachache, and was unable to eat. By nighttime, victim Cantre was
alternately feeling cold and then warm. He was sweating profusely and his
entire body felt numb. His family would have wanted to bring him to a
doctor but they had no vehicle. At around 3:00 a.m. of the following day, 05
February 1996, Belen was wiping his son with a piece of cloth, when victim
Cantre asked for some food. He was able to eat a little, but he also later
vomited whatever he ate. For the last time, he complained of backache and
stomachache, and shortly thereafter, he died.9
Right after his death, victim Cantre was examined by Dr. Conchita S.
Ulanday, the Municipal Health Officer of Aroroy, Masbate. The Post-Mortem
Examination Report10 and Certification of Death,11 issued and signed by Dr.
Ulanday, stated that the cause of death of victim Cantre was cardio-
respiratory arrest due to suspected food poisoning. The body of victim
Cantre was subsequently embalmed and buried on 13 February 1996.
Unsatisfied with the findings of Dr. Ulanday, the Cantre family, with the help
of the Lingkod Bayan-Circulo de Abogadas of the ABS-CBN Foundation,
requested for an exhumation and autopsy of the body of the victim Cantre
by the NBI. The exhumation and autopsy of the body of the victim Cantre
was conducted by Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez on 15 April 1996,12 after which, he
reported the following findings –
Body; fairly well-preserved with sign of partial autopsy; clad in white Barong
Tagalog and blue pants placed inside a wooden golden-brown coffin and
buried in a concrete niche.
Contused-abrasion, 2.3 x 1.0 cms., posterior chest wall, left side.
Hematoma, 16.0 x 8.0 cms., abdomen, along mid-line.
Hemoperitoneum, massive, clotte [sic].
Laceration, spleen.
Other visceral organ, pale and embalmed.
Stomach contains small amount of whitish fluid and other partially digested
food particles.
xxxx
CAUSE OF DEATH: TRAUMATIC INJURY OF THE ABDOMEN.
In his testimony before the RTC, Dr. Mendez affirmed the contents of his
exhumation and autopsy report. He explained that the victim Cantre
suffered from an internal hemorrhage and there was massive accumulation
of blood in his abdominal cavity due to his lacerated spleen. The laceration
of the spleen can be caused by any blunt instrument, such as a stone.
Hence, Dr. Mendez confirmed the possibility that the victim Cantre was
stoned to death by petitioner Calimutan.13
To counter the evidence of the prosecution, the defense presented the sole
testimony of the accused, herein petitioner, Calimutan.
According to petitioner Calimutan, at about 1:00 p.m. on 04 February 1996,
he was walking with his house helper, Michael Bulalacao, on their way to
Crossing Capsay, Panique, Aroroy, Masbate, when they met with the victim
Cantre and witness Sañano. The victim Cantre took hold of Bulalacao and
punched him several times. Petitioner Calimutan attempted to pacify the
victim Cantre but the latter refused to calm down, pulling out from his waist
an eight-inch Batangas knife and uttering that he was looking for trouble,
either "to kill or be killed." At this point, petitioner Calimutan was about ten
meters away from the victim Cantre and was too frightened to move any
closer for fear that the enraged man would turn on him; he still had a family
to take care of. When he saw that the victim Cantre was about to stab
Bulalacao, petitioner Calimutan picked up a stone, which he described as
approximately one-inch in diameter, and threw it at the victim Cantre. He
was able to hit the victim Cantre on his right buttock. Petitioner Calimutan
and Bulalacao then started to run away, and victim Cantre chased after
them, but witness Sañano was able to pacify the victim Cantre. Petitioner
Calimutan allegedly reported the incident to a kagawad of Barangay
Panique and to the police authorities and sought their help in settling the
dispute between Bulalacao and the victim Cantre. Bulalacao, meanwhile,
refused to seek medical help despite the advice of petitioner Calimutan and,
instead, chose to go back to his hometown.14
Petitioner Calimutan was totally unaware of what had happened to the
victim Cantre after the stoning incident on 04 February 1996. Some of his
friends told him that they still saw the victim Cantre drinking at a videoke
bar on the night of 04 February 1996. As far as he knew, the victim Cantre
died the following day, on 05 February 1996, because of food poisoning.
Petitioner Calimutan maintained that he had no personal grudge against the
victim Cantre previous to the stoning incident.15
On 19 November 1998, the RTC rendered its Decision,16 essentially adopting
the prosecution’s account of the incident on 04 February 1996, and
pronouncing that –
It cannot be legally contended that the throwing of the stone by the
accused was in defense of his companion, a stranger, because after the
boxing Michael was able to run. While it appears that the victim was the
unlawful aggressor at the beginning, but the aggression already ceased after
Michael was able to run and there was no more need for throwing a stone.
The throwing of the stone to the victim which was a retaliatory act can be
considered unlawful, hence the accused can be held criminally liable under
paragraph 1 of Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
The act of throwing a stone from behind which hit the victim at his back on
the left side was a treacherous one and the accused committed a felony
causing physical injuries to the victim. The physical injury of hematoma as a
result of the impact of the stone resulted in the laceration of the spleen
causing the death of the victim. The accused is criminally liable for all the
direct and natural consequences of this unlawful act even if the ultimate
result had not been intended. (Art. 4, Par. 1, Revised Penal Code; People vs.
Narciso, CA-G.R. No. 03532-CR, Jan. 13, 1964)
One is not relieved from criminal liability for the natural consequences of
one’s illegal acts merely because one does not intend to produce such
consequences (U.S. vs. Brobst, 14 Phil. 310).
The crime committed is Homicide as defined and penalized under Art. 249
of the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and so holds that accused ROLLIE CALIMUTAN
is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide defined and
penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code with no mitigating or
aggravating circumstance and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law
hereby imposes the penalty of imprisonment from EIGHT (8) YEARS of
Prision Mayor as minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of
Reclusion Temporal as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of Philip Cantre
the sum of Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos as compensatory damages
and the sum of Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos as moral damages,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Petitioner Calimutan appealed the Decision of the RTC to the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 29 August
2001,17 sustained the conviction of homicide rendered by the RTC against
petitioner Calimutan, ratiocinating thus –
The prosecution has sufficiently established that the serious internal injury
sustained by the victim was caused by the stone thrown at the victim by the
accused which, the accused-appellant does not deny. It was likewise shown
that the internal injury sustained by the victim was the result of the impact
of the stone that hit the victim. It resulted to a traumatic injury of the
abdomen causing the laceration of the victim’s spleen.
This is clearly shown by the autopsy report prepared by Dr. Ronaldo
Mendez, a Senior Medico Legal Officer of the NBI after the exhumation of
the victim’s cadaver…
The Court cannot give credence to the post mortem report prepared by
Municipal Health Officer Dr. Conchita Ulanday stating that the cause of the
victim’s death was food poisoning. Dr. Ulanday was not even presented to
testify in court hence she was not even able to identify and/or affirm the
contents of her report. She was not made available for cross-examination on
the accuracy and correctness of her findings.
Dr. Conchita Ulanday’s post mortem report cannot prevail over the autopsy
report (Exh. "C") of the Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI who testified and
was cross-examined by the defense.
Besides, if accused-appellant was convinced that the victim indeed died of
food poisoning, as reported by Dr. Conchita Ulanday, why did they not
present her as their witness to belie the report of the Medico-Legal Officer
of the NBI.
The trial court’s evaluation of the testimony of Dr. Mendez is accorded the
highest respect because it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and
demeanor of said witness.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Masbate, Branch 46, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide is hereby AFFIRMED.
The Court of Appeals, in its Resolution, dated 15 January 2002,18 denied the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner Calimutan for lack of merit
since the issues raised therein had already been passed and ruled upon in its
Decision, dated 29 August 2001.
Comes now petitioner Calimutan, by way of the present Petition for Review
on Certiorari, seeking (1) the reversal of the Decisions of the RTC, dated 19
November 1998, and of the Court of Appeals, dated 29 August 2001,
convicting him of the crime of homicide; and, (2) consequently, his acquittal
of the said crime based on reasonable doubt.
Petitioner Calimutan contended that the existence of the two autopsy
reports, with dissimilar findings on the cause of death of the victim Cantre,
constituted reasonable doubt as to the liability of petitioner Calimutan for
the said death, arguing that –
x x x [I]t was Dra. Conchita Ulanday, Municipal Health Officer of Aroroy,
Masbate was the first physician of the government who conducted an
examination on the cadaver of the victim Philip Cantre whose findings was
that the cause of his death was due to food poisoning while the second
government physician NBI Medico Legal Officer Dr. Ronaldo Mendez whose
findings was that the cause of the death was due to a traumatic injury of the
abdomen caused by a lacerated spleen and with these findings of two (2)
government physicians whose findings are at variance with each other
materially, it is humbly contended that the same issue raised a reasonable
doubt on the culpability of the petitioner.
As there are improbabilities and uncertainties of the evidence for the
prosecution in the case at bar, it suffices to reaise [sic] reasonable doubt as
to the petitioner’s guilt and therefore, he is entitled to acquittal (People vs.
Delmendo, G.R. No. 32146, November 23, 1981).19
In this jurisdiction, an accused in a criminal case may only be convicted if his
or her guilt is established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt requires only a moral certainty or that degree of proof
which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind; it does not demand
absolute certainty and the exclusion of all possibility of error.20
In the Petition at bar, this Court finds that there is proof beyond reasonable
doubt to hold petitioner Calimutan liable for the death of the victim Cantre.
Undoubtedly, the exhumation and autopsy report and the personal
testimony before the RTC of prosecution witness, NBI Senior Medico-Legal
Officer Dr. Mendez, are vital pieces of evidence against petitioner
Calimutan. Dr. Mendez determined that the victim Cantre died of internal
hemorrhage or bleeding due to the laceration of his spleen. In his testimony,
Dr. Mendez clearly and consistently explained that the spleen could be
lacerated or ruptured when the abdominal area was hit with a blunt object,
such as the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the victim Cantre.
It bears to emphasize that Dr. Mendez was presented by the prosecution as
an expert witness, whose "competency and academic qualification and
background" was admitted by the defense itself.21 As a Senior Medico-Legal
Officer of the NBI, Dr. Mendez is presumed to possess sufficient knowledge
of pathology, surgery, gynecology, toxicology, and such other branches of
medicine germane to the issues involved in a case.22
Dr. Mendez’s testimony as an expert witness is evidence,23 and although it
does not necessarily bind the courts, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals
had properly accorded it great weight and probative value. Having testified
as to matters undeniably within his area of expertise, and having performed
a thorough autopsy on the body of the victim Cantre, his findings as to the
cause of death of the victim Cantre are more than just the mere
speculations of an ordinary person. They may sufficiently establish the
causal relationship between the stone thrown by the petitioner Calimutan
and the lacerated spleen of the victim Cantre which, subsequently, resulted
in the latter’s death. With no apparent mistake or irregularity, whether in
the manner by which Dr. Mendez performed the autopsy on the body of the
victim Cantre or in his findings, then his report and testimony must be
seriously considered by this Court.
Moreover, reference to other resource materials on abdominal injuries
would also support the conclusion of Dr. Mendez that the stone thrown by
petitioner Calimutan caused the death of the victim Cantre.
One source explains the nature of abdominal injuries24 in the following
manner –
The skin may remain unmarked inspite of extensive internal injuries with
bleeding and disruption of the internal organs. The areas most vulnerable
are the point of attachment of internal organs, especially at the source of its
blood supply and at the point where blood vessels change direction.
The area in the middle superior half of the abdomen, forming a triangle
bounded by the ribs on the two sides and a line drawn horizontally through
the umbilicus forming its base is vulnerable to trauma applied from any
direction. In this triangle are found several blood vessels changing direction,
particularly the celiac trunk, its branches (the hepatic, splenic and gastric
arteries) as well as the accompanying veins. The loop of the duodenum, the
ligament of Treitz and the pancreas are in the retroperitoneal space, and
the stomach and transverse colon are in the triangle, located in the
peritoneal cavity. Compression or blow on the area may cause detachment,
laceration, stretch-stress, contusion of the organs (Legal Medicine 1980,
Cyril H. Wecht et., p. 41).
As to injuries to the spleen, in particular,25 the same source expounds that –
The spleen usually suffers traumatic rupture resulting from the impact of a
fall or blow from the crushing and grinding effects of wheels of motor
vehicles. Although the organ is protected at its upper portion by the ribs and
also by the air-containing visceral organs, yet on account of its superficiality
and fragility, it is usually affected by trauma. x x x.
Certainly, there are some terms in the above-quoted paragraphs difficult to
comprehend for people without medical backgrounds. Nevertheless, there
are some points that can be plainly derived therefrom: (1) Contrary to
common perception, the abdominal area is more than just the waist area.
The entire abdominal area is divided into different triangles, and the spleen
is located in the upper triangle, bounded by the rib cage; (2) The spleen and
all internal organs in the same triangle are vulnerable to trauma from all
directions. Therefore, the stone need not hit the victim Cantre from the
front. Even impact from a stone hitting the back of the victim Cantre, in the
area of the afore-mentioned triangle, could rupture the spleen; and (3)
Although the spleen had already been ruptured or lacerated, there may not
always be a perceptible external injury to the victim. Injury to the spleen
cannot, at all times, be attributed to an obvious, external injury such as a cut
or bruise. The laceration of the victim Cantre’s spleen can be caused by a
stone thrown hard enough, which qualifies as a nonpenetrating trauma26 –
Nonpenetrating Trauma. The spleen, alone or in combination with other
viscera, is the most frequently injured organ following blunt trauma to the
abdomen or the lower thoracic cage. Automobile accidents provide the
predominating cause, while falls, sledding and bicycle injuries, and blows
incurred during contact sports are frequently implicated in children. x x x
The sheer impact of the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the back of
the victim Cantre could rupture or lacerate the spleen – an organ described
as vulnerable, superficial, and fragile – even without causing any other
external physical injury. Accordingly, the findings of Dr. Mendez that the
victim Cantre died of internal hemorrhage from his lacerated spleen, and
the cause of the laceration of the spleen was the stone thrown by petitioner
Calimutan at the back of the victim Cantre, does not necessarily contradict
his testimony before the RTC that none of the external injuries of the victim
Cantre were fatal.
Based on the foregoing discussion, the prosecution was able to establish
that the proximate cause of the death of the victim Cantre was the stone
thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan. Proximate cause has been defined
as "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred."27
The two other witnesses presented by the prosecution, namely Sañano and
Belen Cantre, had adequately recounted the events that transpired on 04
February 1996 to 05 February 1996. Between the two of them, the said
witnesses accounted for the whereabouts, actions, and physical condition of
the victim Cantre during the said period. Before the encounter with
petitioner Calimutan and Bulalacao, the victim Cantre seemed to be
physically fine. However, after being hit at the back by the stone thrown at
him by petitioner Calimutan, the victim Cantre had continuously complained
of backache. Subsequently, his physical condition rapidly deteriorated, until
finally, he died. Other than being stoned by petitioner Calimutan, there was
no other instance when the victim Cantre may have been hit by another 10. Q: Now, is it possible that if somebody be hit by a hard object on that
blunt instrument which could have caused the laceration of his spleen. part of his body, his SPLEEN could be injured?

Hence, this Court is morally persuaded that the victim Cantre died from a A: Yes, sir. But that would depend on how strong or forceful the impact was.
lacerated spleen, an injury sustained after being hit by a stone thrown at
him by petitioner Calimutan. Not even the post-mortem report of Dr. In contrast, Dr. Mendez described in his testimony before the RTC31 how he
Ulanday, the Municipal Health Officer who first examined the body of the conducted the autopsy of the body of the victim Cantre, as follows –
victim Cantre, can raise reasonable doubt as to the cause of death of the
victim Cantre. Invoking Dr. Ulanday’s post-mortem report, the defense
insisted on the possibility that the victim Cantre died of food poisoning. The Q What specific procedure did you do in connection with the exhumation of
post-mortem report, though, cannot be given much weight and probative the body of the victim in this case?
value for the following reasons –
A We opened the head, chest and the abdomen.
First, a closer scrutiny of the words used by Dr. Ulanday in her post-mortem
report, as well as in the death certificate of the victim Cantre, reveals that Q That was part of the autopsy you have conducted?
although she suspected food poisoning as the cause of death, she held back
from making a categorical statement that it was so. In the post-mortem A Yes, sir.
report, 28 she found that "x x x the provable (sic) cause of death was due to
cardio-respiratory arrest. Food poisoning must be confirm (sic) by laboratory
e(x)am." In the death certificate of the victim Cantre, 29 she wrote that the Q Aside from opening the head as well as the body of the victim Philip
immediate cause of death was "Cardio-Respiratory Arrest" and the Cantre, what other matters did you do in connection therewith?
antecedent cause was "Food Poisoning Suspect." There was no showing that
further laboratory tests were indeed conducted to confirm Dr. Ulanday’s A We examined the internal organs.
suspicion that the victim Cantre suffered from food poisoning, and without
such confirmation, her suspicion as to the cause of death remains just that –
Q What in particular internal organs you have examined?
a suspicion.

A The brain, the heart, the lungs, the liver, the kidneys, the pancreas plus
Second, Dr. Ulanday executed before the NBI a sworn statement30 in which
the intestines.
she had explained her findings in the post-mortem report, to wit –

xxxx
05. Q: Did you conduct an autopsy on his cadaver?

A: I did sir, but not as exhaustive as that done by the NBI Medico-legal.
06. Q: Now, what do you want to state regarding your certification on the
death of PHILIP B. CANTRE?
A: I stated in the certification and even in the Death Certificate about "Food
Poisoning". What I stated in the Death Certificate was that CANTRE was a
SUSPECTED victim of food poisoning. I didn’t state that he was a case of
food poisoning. And in the Certification, I even recommended that an
examination be done to confirm that suspicion.
Q The cause of death as you have listed here in your findings is listed as
traumatic injury of the abdomen, will you kindly tell us Doctor what is the
significance of this medical term traumatic injury of the abdomen?
A We, medico-legal officers of the NBI don’t do what other doctors do as
they make causes of death as internal hemorrhage we particularly point to
the injury of the body like this particular case the injury was at the abdomen
of the victim.
Q Will you tell as Doctor what particular portion of the abdomen of the
victim this traumatic injury is located?

07. Q: What gave you that suspicion of poisoning?

A Along the midline but the damaged organ was at the left.

A: As there were no external signs of fatal injuries except that of the

Q What particular organ are you referring to?
contusion or abrasion, measuring as that size of a 25 centavo coin, I based
my suspicion from the history of the victim and from the police
investigation. A The spleen, sir.

08. Q: You also mentioned in your Certification that there was no internal
hemorrhage in the cadaver. Did you open the body of the cadaver?
A: As I have already stated sir, I did not conduct an exhaustive autopsy. I
made an incision on the abdomen and I explored the internal organs of the
cadaver with my hand in search for any clotting inside. But I found none. I
did not open the body of the cadaver.
The difference in the extent of the examinations conducted by the two
doctors of the body of the victim Cantre provides an adequate explanation
for their apparent inconsistent findings as to the cause of death. Comparing
the limited autopsy conducted by Dr. Ulanday and her unconfirmed
suspicion of food poisoning of the victim Cantre, as opposed to the
exhaustive autopsy performed by Dr. Mendez and his definitive finding of a
ruptured spleen as the cause of death of the victim Cantre, then the latter,
without doubt, deserves to be given credence by the courts.

09. Q: You mentioned about a contusion you have observed on the cadaver.
Third, that the prosecution no longer presented Dr. Ulanday before the RTC
Where was it located?
despite being included in its list of witnesses did not amount to a willful
suppression of evidence that would give rise to the presumption that her
A: On the left portion of his back, sir. testimony would be adverse to the prosecution if produced.32 As this Court
already expounded in the case of People v. Jumamoy33 –
The prosecution's failure to present the other witnesses listed in the
information did not constitute, contrary to the contention of the accused,
suppression of evidence. The prosecutor has the exclusive prerogative to
determine the witnesses to be presented for the prosecution. If the
prosecution has several eyewitnesses, as in the instant case, the prosecutor
need not present all of them but only as many as may be needed to meet
the quantum of proof necessary to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. The testimonies of the other witnesses may, therefore,
be dispensed with for being merely corroborative in nature. This Court has
ruled that the non-presentation of corroborative witnesses would not
constitute suppression of evidence and would not be fatal to the
prosecution's case. Besides, there is no showing that the eyewitnesses who
were not presented in court as witnesses were not available to the accused.
We reiterate the rule that the adverse presumption from a suppression of
evidence is not applicable when (1) the suppression is not willful; (2) the
evidence suppressed or withheld is merely corroborative or cumulative; (3)
the evidence is at the disposal of both parties; and (4) the suppression is an
exercise of a privilege. Moreover, if the accused believed that the failure to
present the other witnesses was because their testimonies would be
unfavorable to the prosecution, he should have compelled their
appearance, by compulsory process, to testify as his own witnesses or even
as hostile witnesses.
It was a judgment call for the prosecution to no longer present Dr. Ulanday
before the RTC, perhaps believing that it had already presented sufficient
evidence to merit the conviction of petitioner Calimutan even without her
testimony. There was nothing, however, preventing the defense from calling
on, or even compelling, with the appropriate court processes, Dr. Ulanday
to testify in court as its witness if it truly believed that her testimony would
be adverse to the case presented by the prosecution.
While this Court is in accord with the factual findings of the RTC and the
Court of Appeals and affirms that there is ample evidence proving that the
death of the victim Cantre was caused by his lacerated spleen, an injury
which resulted from being hit by the stone thrown at him by petitioner
Calimutan, this Court, nonetheless, is at variance with the RTC and the Court
of Appeals as to the determination of the appropriate crime or offense for
which the petitioner should have been convicted for.
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code classifies felonies according to the
means by which they are committed, in particular: (1) intentional felonies,
and (2) culpable felonies. These two types of felonies are distinguished from
each other by the existence or absence of malicious intent of the offender –
In intentional felonies, the act or omission of the offender is malicious. In
the language of Art. 3, the act is performed with deliberate intent (with
malice). The offender, in performing the act or in incurring the omission, has
the intention to cause an injury to another. In culpable felonies, the act or
omission of the offender is not malicious. The injury caused by the offender
to another person is "unintentional, it being simply the incident of another
act performed without malice." (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil. 939). As stated in
Art. 3, the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of
foresight or lack of skill.34
In the Petition at bar, this Court cannot, in good conscience, attribute to
petitioner Calimutan any malicious intent to injure, much less to kill, the
victim Cantre; and in the absence of such intent, this Court cannot sustain
the conviction of petitioner Calimutan for the intentional crime of homicide,
as rendered by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Instead, this
Court finds petitioner Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
culpable felony of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code.
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code expressly provides for the definition of
reckless imprudence –
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or
failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or
failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
There are several circumstances, discussed in the succeeding paragraphs,
that demonstrate petitioner Calimutan’s lack of intent to kill the victim
Cantre, and conversely, that substantiate the view of this Court that the
death of victim Cantre was a result of petitioner Calimutan’s reckless
imprudence. The RTC and the Court of Appeals may have failed to
appreciate, or had completely overlooked, the significance of such
circumstances.
It should be remembered that the meeting of the victim Cantre and witness
Sañano, on the one hand, and petitioner Calimutan and his helper
Bulalacao, on the other, was a chance encounter as the two parties were on
their way to different destinations. The victim Cantre and witness Sañano
were on their way home from a drinking spree in Crossing Capsay, while
petitioner Calimutan and his helper Bulalacao were walking from the market
to Crossing Capsay. While the evidence on record suggests that a running
grudge existed between the victim Cantre and Bulalacao, it did not establish
that there was likewise an existing animosity between the victim Cantre and
petitioner Calimutan.1avvphil.net
In both versions of the events of 04 February 1996 submitted by the
prosecution and the defense, it was the victim Cantre who was the initial
aggressor. He suddenly punched Bulalacao, the helper and companion of
petitioner Calimutan, when they met on the road. The attack of the victim
Cantre was swift and unprovoked, which spurred petitioner Calimutan into
responsive action. Given that this Court dismisses the claim of petitioner
Calimutan that the victim Cantre was holding a knife, it does take into
account that the victim Cantre was considerably older and bigger, at 26
years of age and with a height of five feet and nine inches, compared to
Bulalacao, the boy he attacked, who was only 15 years old and stood at
about five feet. Even with his bare hands, the victim Cantre could have hurt
Bulalacao. Petitioner Calimutan sought only to protect Bulalacao and to stop
the assault of the victim Cantre against the latter when he picked up a stone
and threw it at the victim Cantre. The stone was readily available as a
weapon to petitioner Calimutan since the incident took place on a road.
That he threw the stone at the back of the victim Cantre does not
automatically imply treachery on the part of petitioner Calimutan as it is
highly probable that in the midst of the fray, he threw the stone rashly and
impulsively, with no regard as to the position of the victim Cantre. When the
victim Cantre stopped his aggression after being hit by the stone thrown by
petitioner Calimutan, the latter also desisted from any other act of violence
against the victim Cantre.
The above-described incident could not have taken more than just a few
minutes. It was a very brief scuffle, in which the parties involved would
hardly have the time to ponder upon the most appropriate course of action
to take. With this in mind, this Court cannot concur in the declaration made
by the Court of Appeals that petitioner Calimutan threw the stone at the
victim Cantre as a retaliatory act. It was evidently a swift and spontaneous
reaction to an unexpected and unprovoked attack by the victim Cantre on
Bulalacao. That Bulalacao was already able to run away from the victim
Cantre may have escaped the notice of the petitioner Calimutan who, under
the pressure of the circumstances, was forced to act as quickly as possible.
The prosecution did not establish that petitioner Calimutan threw the stone
at the victim Cantre with the specific intent of killing, or at the very least, of
harming the victim Cantre. What is obvious to this Court was petitioner
Calimutan’s intention to drive away the attacker who was, at that point, the
victim Cantre, and to protect his helper Bulalacao who was, as earlier
described, much younger and smaller in built than the victim Cantre.35
Granting that petitioner Calimutan was impelled by a lawful objective when
he threw the stone at the victim Cantre, his act was committed with
inexcusable lack of precaution. He failed to consider that a stone the size of
a man’s fist could inflict substantial injury on someone. He also
miscalculated his own strength, perhaps unaware, or even completely
disbelieving, that he could throw a stone with such force as to seriously
injure, or worse, kill someone, at a quite lengthy distance of ten meters.

Since it is irrefragable that the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the

victim Cantre was the proximate cause of the latter’s death, despite being
done with reckless imprudence rather than with malicious intent, petitioner
Calimutan remains civilly liable for such death. This Court, therefore, retains
the reward made by the RTC and the Court of Appeals to the heirs of the
victim Cantre of the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity for his death
and another ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.

23306, dated 29 August 2001, affirming the Decision of the RTC in Criminal
Case No. 8184, dated 19 November 1998, is hereby MODIFIED. Petitioner
Calimutan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide, under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, and is
accordingly sentenced to imprisonment for a minimum period of 4 months
of arresto mayor to a maximum period of two years and one day of prision
correccional. Petitioner Calimutan is further ORDERED to pay the heirs of
the victim Cantre the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the
latter’s death and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1477 January 18, 1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JULIO GUILLEN, defendant-appellant.
Mariano A. Albert for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Francisco A.
Carreon for appellee.
PER CURIAM, J.:
This case is before us for review of, and by virtue of appeal from, the
judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila in case No.
2746, whereby Julio Guillen y Corpus, or Julio C. Guillen, is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and multiple frustrated
murder, as charged in the information, and is sentenced to the penalty of
death, to indemnify the of the deceased Simeon Valera (or Barrela) in the
sum of P2,000 and to pay the costs.
Upon arraignment the accused entered a plea of not guilty to the charges
contained in the information.
Then the case was tried in one of the branches of the Court of First Instance
of Manila presided over by the honorable Buenaventura Ocampo who, after
the submission of the evidence of the prosecution and the defense,
rendered judgment as above stated.
In this connection it should be stated that, at the beginning of the trial and
before arraignment, counsel de oficio for the accused moved that the
mental condition of Guillen be examined. The court, notwithstanding that it
had found out from the answers of the accused to questions propounded to
him in order to test the soundness of his mind, that he was not suffering
from any mental derangement, ordered that Julio Guillen be confined for
Hospital, there to be examined by medical experts who should report their
findings accordingly. This was done, and, according to the report of the
board of medical experts, presided over by Dr. Fernandez of the National
Psychopathic Hospital, Julio Guillen was not insane. Said report (Exhibit L),
under the heading "Formulation and Diagnosis," at pages 13 and 14, reads:
FORMULATION AND DIAGNOSIS
Julio C. Guillen was placed under constant observation since
admission. There was not a single moment during his whole 24
hours daily, that he was not under observation.
The motive behind the commission of the crime is stated above.
The veracity of this motivation was determined in the
Narcosynthesis. That the narco-synthesis was successful was
checked up the day after the test. The narco-synthesis proved not
only reveal any conflict or complex that may explain a delusional
or hallucinatory motive behind the act.
Our observation and examination failed to elicit any sign or
symptom of insanity in Mr. Julio C. Guillen. He was found to be
intelligent, always able to differentiate right from wrong, fully
aware of the nature of the crime he committed and is equally
decided to suffer for it in any manner or form.
His version of the circumstances of the crime, his conduct and
conversation relative thereto, the motives, temptations and
provocations that preceded the act, were all those of an
individual with a sound mind.
On the other hand he is an man of strong will and conviction and
once arriving at a decision he executes, irrespective of
consequences and as in this case, the commission of the act at
Plaza Miranda.
What is of some interest in the personality of Julio C. Guillen is his
commission of some overt acts. This is seen not only in the
present instance, but sometime when an employee in la
Clementina Cigar Factory he engaged in a boxing bout Mr.
Manzano, a Span-wanted to abuse the women cigar makers, and
felt it his duty to defend them. One time he ran after a policeman
with a knife in hand after being provoked to a fight several times.
He even challenged Congressman Nueno to a fight sometime
before when Mr. Nueno was running for a seat in the Municipal
Board of the City of Manila, after hearing him deliver one of his
apparently outspoken speeches.
All these mean a defect in his personality characterized by a
weakness of censorship especially in relation to rationalization
about the consequences of his acts.
In view of the above findings it is our considered opinion that
Julio C. Guillen is not insane but is an individual with a personality
defect which in Psychiatry is termed, Constitutional Psychopathic
Inferiority.
Final Diagnosis
Not insane: Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority, without psychosis.
In view of the above-quoted findings of the medical board, and
notwithstanding the contrary opinion of one Dr. Alvarez, who was asked by
the defense to give his opinion on the matter, the court ruled that Guillen,
not being insane, could be tired, as he was tired, for the offenses he
committed on the date in question.
THE FACTS
Upon careful perusal of the evidence and the briefs submitted by counsel
for the accused, the Solicitor General and their respective memoranda, we
find that there is no disagreement between the prosecution and the
defense, as to the essential facts which caused the filing of the present
criminal case against this accused. Those facts may be stated as follows:
On the dates mentioned in this decision, Julio Guillen y Corpus, although not
affirmed with any particular political group, has voted for the defeated
candidate in the presidential elections held in 1946. Manuel A. Roxas, the
successful candidate, assumed the office of President of the Commonwealth
and subsequently President of the President of the Philippine Republic.
According to Guillen, he became disappointed in President Roxas for his
alleged failure to redeem the pledges and fulfill the promises made by him
during the presidential election campaign; and his disappointment was
aggravated when, according to him, President Roxas, instead of looking
after the interest of his country, sponsored and campaigned for the
approval of the so-called "parity" measure. Hence he determined to
assassinate the President.
After he had pondered for some time over the ways and means of
assassinating President Roxas, the opportunity presented itself on the night
of March 10, 1947, when at a popular meeting held by the Liberal Party at
Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo, Manila attended by a big crowd, President Roxas,
accompanied by his wife and daughter and surrounded by a number of
ladies and gentlemen prominent in government and politics, stood on a
platform erected for that purpose and delivered his speech expounding and
trying to convince his thousand of listeners of the advantages to be gained
by the Philippines, should the constitutional amendment granting American
citizens the same rights granted to Filipino nationals be adopted.
Guillen had first intended to use a revolver for the accomplishment of his
purpose, but having lost said firearm, which was duly licensed, he thought of
two hand grenades which were given him by an American soldier in the
early days of the liberation of Manila in exchange for two bottles of whisky.
He had likewise been weighing the chances of killing President Roxas, either
by going to Malacañan, or following his intended victim in the latter's trips
to provinces, for instance, to Tayabas (now Quezon) where the President
was scheduled to speak, but having encountered many difficulties, he
decided to carry out his plan at the pro-parity meeting held at Plaza de
Miranda on the night of March 10, 1947.
On the morning of that he went to the house of Amando Hernandez whom
he requested to prepare for him a document (Exhibit B), in accordance with
their pervious understanding in the preceding afternoon, when they met at
the premises of the Manila Jockey Club on the occasion of an "anti-parity"
meeting held there. On account of its materially in this case, we deem it
proper to quote hereunder the contents of said document. An English
translation (Exhibit B-2) from its original Tagalog reads:
FOR THE SAKE OF A FREE PHILIPPINES
I am the only one responsible for what happened. I conceived it, I
planned it, and I carried it out all by myself alone. It took me
many days and nights pondering over this act, talking to my own
conscience, to my God, until I reached my conclusion. It was my
duty.
I did not expected to live long; I only had on life to spare. And had
I expected to lives to spare, I would not have hesitated either ton
sacrifice it for the sake of a principle which was the welfare of the
people.
Thousands have died in Bataan; many more have mourned the
loss of their husbands, of their sons, and there are millions now
suffering. Their deeds bore no fruits; their hopes were frustrated.
I was told by my conscience and by my God that there was a man
to be blamed for all this: he had deceived the people, he had
astounded them with no other purpose than to entice them; he
even went to the extent of risking the heritage of our future
generations. For these reasons he should not continue any
longer. His life would mean nothing as compared with the welfare
of eighteen million souls. And why should I not give up my life too
if only the good of those eighteen million souls.
These are the reasons which impelled me to do what I did and I
am willing to bear up the consequences of my act. I t matters not
if others will curse me. Time and history will show, I am sure, that
I have only displayed a high degree of patriotism in my
performance of my said act.
Hurrah for a free Philippines.
Cheers for the happiness of every Filipino home.
May God pity on me.
Amen.
JULIO C. GUILLEN
A copy (Exhibit B-1) of the original in Tagalog (Exhibit B), made at the
request of Guillen by his nephew, was handed to him only at about 6 o'clock
in the afternoon of March 10, 1947, for which reason said Exhibit B-1
appears unsigned, because he was in a hurry for that meeting at Plaza de
Miranda.
When he reached Plaza de Miranda, Guillen was carrying two hand
grenades concealed in a paper bag which also contained peanuts. He buried
one of the hand grenades (Exhibit D), in a plant pot located close to the
platform, and when he decided to carry out his evil purpose he stood on the
chair on which he had been sitting and, from a distance of about seven
meters, he hurled the grenade at the President when the latter had just
closed his speech, was being congratulated by Ambassador Romulo and was
about to leave the platform.
General Castañeda, who was on the platform, saw the smoking, hissing,
grenade and without losing his presence of mind, kicked it away from the
platform, along the stairway, and towards an open space where the general
thought the grenade was likely to do the least harm; and, covering the
President with his body, shouted to the crowd that everybody should lie
down. The grenade fell to the ground and exploded in the middle of a group
of persons who were standing close to the platform. Confusion ensued, and
the crowd dispersed in a panic. It was found that the fragments of the
grenade had seriously injured Simeon Varela (or Barrela ) — who died on
the following day as the result of mortal wounds caused by the fragments of
the grenade (Exhibits F and F-1) — Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo
and Emilio Maglalang.
Guillen was arrested by members of the Police Department about two hours
after the occurrence. It appears that one Angel Garcia, who was one
spectators at that meeting, saw how a person who was standing next to him
hurled an object at the platform and, after the explosion, ran away towards
a barber shop located near the platform at Plaza de Miranda. Suspecting
that person was the thrower of the object that exploded, Garcia went after
him and had almost succeeded in holding him, but Guillen offered stiff
resistance, got loose from Garcia and managed to escape. Garcia pursued
him, but some detectives, mistaking the former for the real criminal and the
author of the explosion, placed him under arrest. In the meantime, while
the City Mayor and some agents of the Manila Police Department were
investigating the affair, one Manuel Robles volunteered the information that
the person with whom Angel Garcia was wrestling was Julio Guillen; that he
(Manuel Robles) was acquainted with Julio Guillen for the previous ten years
and had seen each other in the plaza a few moments previous to the
explosion.
The police operatives interrogated Garcia and Robles, and Julio Guillen was,
within two hours after the occurrence, found in his home at 1724 Juan Luna
Street, Manila, brought to the police headquarters and identified by Angel
Garcia, as the same person who hurled towards the platform the object
which exploded and whom Garcia tried to hold when he was running away.
During the investigation conducted by the police he readily admitted his
responsibility, although at the same time he tried to justify his action in
throwing the bomb at President Roxas. He also indicated to his captors the
place where he had hidden his so called last will quoted above and marked
Exhibit B, which was then unsigned by him and subsequently signed at the
police headquarters.
Re-enacting the crime (Exhibit C), he pointed out to the police where he had
buried (Exhibit C-1) the other hand grenade (Exhibit D), and, in the presence
of witnesses he signed a statement which contained his answers to question
propounded to him by Major A. Quintos of the Manila Police, who
investigated him soon after his arrest (Exhibit E). From a perusal of his
voluntary statement, we are satisfied that it tallies exactly with the
declarations and made by him on the witness stand during the trial of this
case.
THE ISSUES
In the brief submitted by counsel de oficio for this appellant, several errors
are assigned allegedly committed by the trial court, namely: first, "in finding
the appellant guilty of murder for the death of Simeon Varela"; second, "in
declaring the appellant guilty of the complex crime of murder and multiple
frustrated murder"; third, "in applying sub-section 1 of article 49 of the
Revised Penal Code in determining the penalty to be imposed upon the
accused"; andfourth, "in considering the concurrence of the aggravating
circumstances of nocturnity and of contempt of public authorities in the
commission of crime."
The evidence for the prosecution, supported by the brazen statements
made by the accused, shows beyond any shadow of doubt that, when
Guillen attended that meeting, carrying with him two hand grenades, to put
into execution his preconceived plan to assassinate President Roxas, he
knew fully well that, by throwing one of those two hand grenades in his
possession at President Roxas, and causing it to explode, he could not
prevent the persons who were around his main and intended victim from
being killed or at least injured, due to the highly explosive nature of the
bomb employed by him to carry out his evil purpose.
Guillen, testifying in his own behalf, in answer to questions propounded by
the trial judge (page 96 of transcript) supports our conclusion. He stated
that he performed the act voluntarily; that his purpose was to kill the
President, but that it did not make any difference to him if there were some
people around the President when he hurled that bomb, because the killing
of those who surrounded the President was tantamount to killing the
President, in view of the fact that those persons, being loyal to the President
being loyal to the President, were identified with the latter. In other word,
although it was not his main intention to kill the persons surrounding the
President, he felt no conjunction in killing them also in order to attain his
main purpose of killing the President.
The facts do not support the contention of counsel for appellant that the
latter is guilty only of homicide through reckless imprudence in regard to
the death of Simeon Varela and of less serious physical injuries in regard to
Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang, and that he
should be sentenced to the corresponding penalties for the different
felonies committed, the sum total of which shall not exceed three times the
penalty to be imposed for the most serious crime in accordance with article
70 in relation to article 74 of the Revised Penal Code.
In throwing hand grenade at the President with the intention of killing him,
the appellant acted with malice. He is therefore liable for all the
consequences of his wrongful act; for in accordance with article 4 of the
Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing
felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which
he intended. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be
unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without
malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939.) In the words of Viada, "in order that
an act may be qualified as imprudence it is necessary that either malice nor
intention to cause injury should intervene; where such intention exists, the
act should qualified by the felony it has produced even though it may not
have been the intention of the actor to cause an evil of such gravity as that
produced.' (Viada's Comments on the Penal Code, vol. 7, 5th ed., p.7.) And,
as held by this Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially
inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. (People vs. Nanquil, 43
Phil., 232.) Where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the
identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless
imprudence. (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605)
Squarely on the point by counsel is the following decision of the Supreme
Court of Spain:
Cuestion 62. Se presenta A, a las ocho de la noche, en el estanco
de B a comprar tabaco, y habiendose negado este a darselo al
fiado, se retira a quel sin mediar entre ambos disputa alguna;
pero; trnscurrido un cuarto de hora, hallandose el estanquero
despachando a C, se oye la detonacion de un arma de fuego
disparada por A desde la calle, quedando muertos en el acto C y
el estanquero; supuesta la no intencion en A de matar a C y si
solo al estanquero, cabe calificar la muerte de este de homicidio y
la de c de imprudencia temeraria? — La Sala de lo Criminal de la
Auudiencia de Granada lo estimo asi, y condeno al procesado a
catorse anos de reclusion por el homivcidio y a un año de prision
correctional por la imprudencia. Aparte de que la muerte del
estanquero debio calificarse de assesinato y no de homicidio, por
haberse ejecutado con aleviosa. es evidente que la muerte de C,
suponiendo que no se propusiera ejecutaria el procesado, no
pudo calificarse de imprudencia teme raria, sino que tambien
debio declararsele responsable de la misma, a tenor de lo puesto
en este apartado ultimo del articulo; y que siendo ambas muertes
producidas por un solo hecho, o sea por un solo disparo, debio
imponerse al reo la pena del delito de asesinato en el grado
maximo, a tenor de lo dispuesto en el art. 90 del Codigo, o sea la
pena de muerte. Se ve, pues, claramente que en el antedicha
sentencia, aparte de otros articulos del Codigo, se infringio por la
Sala la disposicion de este apartado ultimo del articulo muy
principalmente, y asi lo declaro el Tribunal Supremo en S. de 18
junio de 1872. (Gaceta de 1,0 de agosto.) (I Viada, 5th Ed., p. 42.)
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:
Art. 48. Penalty for Complex Crimes. — When a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to
be applied in its maximum period.
We think it is the above-quoted article and not paragraph 1 of article 49 that
is applicable. The case before us is clearly governed by the first clause of
article 48 because by a single act, that a throwing highly explosive hand
grenade at President Roxas, the accused committed two grave felonies,
namely: (1) murder, of which Simeon Varela was the victim; and (2) multiple
attempted murder, of which President Roxas, Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro
Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang were the injured parties.
The killing of Simeon Varela was attended by the qualifying circumstance of
treachery. In the case of People vs. Mabug-at, supra, this court held that the
qualifying circumstance of treachery may be properly considered, even
when the victim of the attack was not the one whom the defendant
intended to kill, if it appears from the evidence that neither of the two
persons could in any manner put up defense against the attack, or become
aware of it. In the same case it was held that the qualifying circumstance of
premeditation may not be properly taken into the account when the person
whom the defendant proposed to kill was different from the one who
became his victim.
There can be no question that the accused attempted to kill President Roxas
by throwing a hand grenade at him with the intention to kill him, thereby
commencing the commission of a felony by over acts, but he did not
succeed in assassinating him "by reason of some cause or accident other
than his own spontaneous desistance." For the same reason we qualify the
injuries caused on the four other persons already named as merely
attempted and not frustrated murder.
In this connection, it should be stated that , although there is abundant
proof that , in violation of the provisions of article 148 of the Revised Penal
Code, the accused Guillen has committed among others the offense of
assault upon a person in authority, for in fact his efforts were directed
towards the execution of his main purpose of eliminating President Roxas
for his failure to redeem his electoral campaign promises, by throwing at
him in his official capacity as the Chief Executive of the nation the hand
grenade in question, yet, in view of the appropriate allegation charging
Guillen with the commission of said offense, we shall refrain making a
finding to that effect.

The complex crimes of murder and multiple attempted murder committed

by the accused with the single act of throwing a hand grenade at the
President, was attended by the various aggravating circumstances alleged in
the information, without any mitigating circumstance. But we do not deem
it necessary to consider said aggravating circumstances because in any
event article 48 of the Revised Penal Code above-quoted requires that the
penalty for the most serious of said crimes be applied in its maximum
period. The penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to death. (Art. 248.)

It is our painful duty to apply the law and mete out to the accused the
extreme penalty provided by it upon the facts and circumstances
hereinabove narrated.

The sentence of the trial court being correct, we have no alternative but to
affirm it, and we hereby do so by a unanimous vote. The death sentence
shall be executed in accordance with article 81 of the Revised Penal Code,
under authority of the Director of Prisons, on such working day as the trial
court may fix within 30 days from the date the record shall have been
remanded. It is so ordered.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor,

Reyes and Torres, JJ., concur.