1.

X filed for writ of mandamus to compel Y (public officials) to publish

and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations and administrative orders. In invoking the right of the
people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the
Official Gazette Z (The Solicitor General), representing the respondents,
moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners have
no legal personality to bring the instant petition. Does the publication in
the Official Gazette a requirement before any law or statute becomes
valid and enforceable.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, it is mandatory. Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity. In the case at bar, the clear
object of this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of
the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis
for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It
would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen
for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not
even a constructive one. The publication of presidential issuances of
public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process.
It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must
first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court
declared that presidential issuances of general application which have
not been published have no force and effect.

(REFERENCE: Tañada vs. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 April 24, 1985 )

2.

The President signed into law RA 11356 “An Act Giving Legal
Recognition to Marital Unions between Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and
Transgender Persons” or the Marriage Equality Act of 2018. The
effectivity clause states that the law shall become effective fifteen days
after its publication. However, only the title of the law was published
without its full text. Will the law become effective?

Suggested Answer:

No.

Jurisprudence dictates that publication must be made in full or there is

no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the law.
Here, only the title was published without the full text. Therefore, the law
will not become effective for not having satisfied the full publication
requirement. (Reference: Tanada vs Tuvera )

3.

The President of the Philippines enacted EO. 279 which authorized the
DENR to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign owned
corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving
wither technical or financial assistance for large scale exploration,
development and utilization of minerals which upon appropriate
recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the
foreign proponent. . Section 8 of the E.O. states that the same "shall
take effect immediately”. However, X questioned the validity of said
law. X argued that the clause “shall take effect immediately” violates
Art. 2 of the New Civil Code which requires for the publication of Laws
before its effectivity. Is X correct?

Suggested Answer:

NO.
Jurisprudence provides that there is nothing in Art. 2 of the New
Civil Code that prevents a law from taking effect on a date other than
— even before — the 15-day period after its publication. Where a law
provides for its own date of effectivity, such date shall prevail. Indeed,
this is the very essence of the phrase "unless it is otherwise provided”. Art.
2 of the NCC, therefore, applies only when a statute does not provide
for its own date of effectivity. What is mandatory and what due process
requires is the publication of the law, for without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
"ignorance of the law excuses no one”.

4.
J, a construction worker of C Inc.,while working fell from 14 floors which
causes his death. . Y filed her claim for death benefits from the State
Insurance Fund. C, Subsequently, Y, filed a complaint for damages
against C. C argued that Y’s prior availment of the benefits from the
States Insurance Funds precludes her from claiming damages under the
Civil Code and that choice of one remedy is deemed to have waive
the other. The exception in the case of Floresca is that where a
claimant who has already been paid under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act may still sue for damages under the Civil Code on
the basis of supervening facts or developments occurring after he
opted for the first remedy.

Furthermore, C argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code,

ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. As
judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
form part of the Philippine legal system (Article 8, Civil Code), private
respondent cannot claim ignorance of this Court’s ruling in Floresca
allowing a choice of remedies. Hence, Y is barred from claiming
damages under the Civil Code after recovering from State Insurance
Fund. Is the contention of C correct?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. The Supreme Court has already ruled in various cases that a
recovery of damages under the Worker’s Compensation Act is a bar to
a recovery under an ordinary civil action. It ruled that an injured worker
has a choice of either remedies. The Supreme Court allowed some
exceptions.

In the case at bar, the widow had a right to file an ordinary action
for civil actions because she was not aware and ignorant of her rights
and courses of action. She was not aware of her rights and remedies. A
waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the
right waived, with an awareness of its consequences. That a waiver is
made knowingly and intelligently must be illustrated on the record or by
the evidence. Thus, her election to claim from the Insurance Fund does
not waive her claim from the petitioner company.

The argument that ignorance of the law excuses no one is not

applicable in this case because it is only applicable to mandatory and
prohibitory laws.

Therefore, the contention of C is incorrect.

5.
 ABC Bank granted respondents a credit line which was secured by
mortgages on respondents’ real and personal properties. Respondents
failed to pay their obligation thus an action for foreclosure was filed by
ABC Bank. The auction sale was re-scheduled several times without
need of republication of the notice of the sale until finally the auction
sale proceeded. Respondents, feeling aggrieved, filed to annul the
foreclosure sale on the ground of lack of publication of the notice of
sale pursuant to Act No. 3135. Petitioner contended that posting and
publication requirements are not required since the parties waived such
requirements in writing. Is the petitioner correct?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
NO. While it is established that rights may be waived, Article 6 of
the Civil Code explicitly provides that such waiver is subject to the
condition that it is not contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law. The statutory requirements of posting and
publication are mandated, not for the mortgagor's benefit, but for the
public or third persons. As such, it is imbued with public policy
considerations and any waiver thereon would be inconsistent with the
intent and letter of Act No. 3135.

6.

Jose was born and registered as a male. However, since childhood, he

already identified himself with the girls. He underwent sex reassignment
in Bangkok, Thailand, the fact of which was certified here in the
Philippines by virtue of a medical certificate issued by a physician. He
then lived his life as a woman. Subsequetly, Jose filed a petition for the
change of his first name and sex before the RTC of Manila. The court
having underwent the jurisdictional requirements, and there having no
opposition, RTC granted the petition ruling based on equity, that
“petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own
doing and should not be taken against him” and that “no harm, injury
or prejudice will be caused to anybody” if the petition were to be
granted. His name was thus changed to Jane, and sex to “female.” The
Republic through the OSG filed a petition for certiorari in the CA
contending that sex reassignment is not one of the grounds to allow
such petition. Is the contention of the OSG correct?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, OSG’s contention is correct.
 RA 9048 provides in essence that no entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors, which can be changed by concerned city or
municipal civil registrar or consul general.

Further, RA 9048 provides for the grounds for which change of first
name may be allowed, to wit;
1) petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous,
tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and
continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by
that first name or nickname in the community; or
3) The change will avoid confusion.

In the case at bar, since no judicial declaration has been issued

to that effect, Jose’s basis in praying for the change of his first name
and gender which was his sex reassignment is not one of the grounds
provided for by law. No law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in
the civil registry for that reason.

Thus, since there is no legal basis for the said petition for the
correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate, the contention
of the OSG should be given merit.

7.

In January 2006, H’s wife had a miscarriage which caused the death of
their unborn child. H claimed death benefits from his employer which
the latter denied. The issue of denial was submitted for arbitration.
Subsequently the Voluntary Arbitrator assigned granted H’s claim for
death benefits. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
Voluntary Arbitrator.
The issue was elevated to the Supreme Court by the employer
contending that H is not entitled because under the CBA, death
benefits are awarded if an employee’s legitimate dependent has died.
It opined that no “death” has occurred because the fetus died inside
the womb of the mother, that a fetus has no juridical personality
because it was never born pursuant to Article 40 of the Civil Code, that
the fetus was not born hence it is not a legitimate dependent as
contemplated by the CBA nor did it suffer death as contemplated
under civil laws. Was the employer correct in its position that that a fetus
has no juridical personality because it was never born pursuant to
Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code?
Suggested Answer:

No.

Reliance by the employer on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for
the legal definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a
conceived child acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41
defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that
civil personality is extinguished by death.

The issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42
of the Civil Code on natural persons, must be applied in relation to
Article 37 of the same Code, the very first of the general provisions on
civil personality, which reads:

Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal
relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through
death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect,
is acquired and may be lost.

Jurisprudence holds the view that, there’s no need to establish civil

personality of the unborn child herein since his/her juridical capacity
and capacity to act as a person are not in issue. According to the
Supreme Court, it is not a question whether the unborn child acquired
any rights or incurred any obligations prior to his/her death that were
passed on to or assumed by the child’s parents. The rights to
bereavement leave and other death benefits in the instant case
pertain directly to the parents of the unborn child upon the latter’s
death.

8.

Nita met Antonio through her aunt, Paula. Nita became pregnant by
her husband Oscar before they were legally married. To conceal it with
her parents, she had herself aborted by Antonio. On 1953, she became
pregnant while under the employ of Commission on Elections. She had
it aborted again as her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient. Less
than two years later, she again became pregnant and had it aborted
again for 50,000 pesos. His husband, Oscar, did not know and did not
consent to the abortion as she was in the province of Cagayan for his
campaign. Could Oscar recover damages from Antonio, the physician
who caused the abortion?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No.

There was no basis for an award of moral damages, because Oscar’s

indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by
Antonio herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the
frustration of his parental hopes and affections.聽 He appeared to have
taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes and secure the
punishment of Antonio. Even after learning of the third abortion, Oscar
does not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal
cases against Antonio.

REFERENCE:

Geluz vs. Court Of Appeals , G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961

9.

H and W were married. However, due to their strained marital relations,

they decided to execute an agreement consenting to and giving
freedom to either of them to seek and live with any partner, and not to
pursue any case against each other in any courts. This agreement was
then notarized. Because of this, W engaged with an intimate
relationship with X, her co-worker, and bore a child. H later filed a case
against X, being an officer of the court, for immorality. However, X
contented that W can freely enter into other relationships which cannot
be questioned by H since both of them executed the agreement. Will
the case prosper?

Answer:
Yes, the case filed by H will prosper.

Article 1 of the Family Code provides that marriage is an inviolable

social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation. In the present case, the
agreement between H and W had absolutely no force and effect on
the validity of their marriage. Hence, the act of X in entering into
relationship with W who is a married woman is prohibited and
punishable under the law. Also, H, being the husband of W, has the right
to file a case against such illicit relationship.

10.
A is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses
and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society where her conjugal
arrangement with B is in conformity with their religious beliefs. After ten
years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a “Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness” which was approved by the congregation. Such
declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for
a couple to legalize their union. C, a member of the Jehovah’s
Witnesses since 1985 and has been a presiding minister since 1991,
testified and explained the import of and procedures for executing the
declaration which was completely executed by A and B and was
signed by three witnesses and recorded in Watch Tower Central
Office. Will A be held administratively liable for grossly immoral
conduct?

Answer:
No.
The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to
freedom of religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically
articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As
Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights.
The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely
abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a
free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any
concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges
against respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only amounts
to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition.

Reference: A.M. No. P-02-1651 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 00-1021-P) April 4,
2003
ALEJANDRO ESTRADA vs. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR

11.
Petitioners, surviving partners of Atty. Sycip and of Atty. Ozaeta , filed a
petition in court praying that they be allowed to continue using , in the
names of their law firm , the names of partners who had passed away.
Petitioner contended that no local custom prohibits the continued used
of a deceased partner’s name and it has been consistently allowed by
U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice in the legal profession of most
countries in the world. Furthermore, petitioner cited Canon 33 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association in support
in their petition which declares that it does not consider as unethical the
continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner in the firm
name of a law partnership when such a practice is permissible by local
custom. Is the contention of petitioner correct?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
NO.
Article 11 and 12 of the Civil Code states that customs which are
contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be
countenanced and a custom must be proved as a fact, according to
the rules of evidence, respectively.
Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws form part
of the legal system. Thus, the Supreme Court in the Deen and Perkins
cases issued its Resolutions directing lawyers to desist from including the
names of deceased partners in their firm designation, it laid down a
legal rule against which no custom or practice to the contrary, even if
proven, can prevail.
In case at bar, the usage of a deceased partners name in a law firm as
adopted by the American Bar Association cannot be given
countenanced as it runs afoul against the legal rule which prohibits
lawyers to include the names of the deceased partner in their firm
designation.

REFERENCE: 92 SCRA, JULY 30, 1979

PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "SYCIP,
SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO." LUCIANO E. SALAZAR,
FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, BENILDO G. HERNANDEZ. GREGORIO R.
CASTILLO. ALBERTO P. SAN JUAN, JUAN C. REYES. JR., ANDRES G.
GATMAITAN, JUSTINO H. CACANINDIN, NOEL A. LAMAN, ETHELWOLDO E.
FERNANDEZ, ANGELITO C. IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA, TRISTAN A.
CATINDIG, ANCHETA K. TAN, and ALICE V. PESIGAN, petitioners.

12.
Joseph and Marie was previously married with eight children. However,
they got separated after 33 years. Joseph wanted to marry again. He
filed for petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and alleged in his
petition that Marie was a resident of Las Piñas, Manila instead of
Carmona, Cavite. Summons was served, however, through substituted
service to Marie’s son Ven. Marie wasn’t able to file an answer and was
declared in default without any objection from the public prosecutor
appearing as counsel for the state. The petition for nullity of marriage
was granted on the basis of the evidence presented by the petitioner.
Marie filed a Motion for reconsideration on two grounds. One, on the
basis of extrinsic fraud on the part of Joseph and two, lack of jurisdiction.
Was the grant of the petition for nullity of marriage proper?

Answer:
No, the grant of the petition for nullity of marriage was not proper. A
grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught
with the danger of collusion. Article 48 of the Family Code provides in all
cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the
Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to
appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated
or suppressed. If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint,
the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should order
the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the
parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application
for legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own
evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and
fabricated.
13.

X and Y are children of A and B. A predeceased his parents. When A’s

parents died, X’s and Y’s uncles and aunts excluded X and Y alleging
that A was not married to B, and A did not have sons or daughters. X
and Y presented witnesses to prove their parent’s marriage in lieu of
Certificates from the local civil registrar because it was burned during
the war. Their uncles and aunts moved dismiss for lack of sufficient
evidence. As the judge, rule on the matter of marriage.

Answer:
In Pugeda v. Trias, the defendants, who questioned the marriage of the
plaintiffs, produced a photostatic copy of the record of marriages of
the Municipality of Rosario, Cavite for the month of January, 1916, to
show that there was no record of the alleged marriage. Nonetheless,
evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent
to prove the marriage. Indeed, although a marriage contract is
considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure to present it is not
proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented
to prove
marriage.

14..
X, a businessman, placed surveillance cameras in his establishment
facing towards the business establishment of Y. Y saw the surveillance
cameras peeping above his fence towards his own establishment. He
then asked X to remove the said cameras for he felt violated and that
the cameras have no useful purpose in peeping over his fence. X did
not heed to Y’s request. Y then filed a case against X for the violation of
his right to privacy alleging Article 26(1) of the Civil Code which includes
“prying into the privacy of another’s residence”. X argued that Art. 26(1)
does not apply for the law specifically states that the prying must be
done in another’s residence and it does not apply in this case for it was
done in a business establishment, it follows that the case must be
dismissed. Will the case be dismissed?

Suggested Answer:
No, As elucidated by Civil law expert Arturo M. Tolentino: Our Code
specifically mentions "prying into the privacy of another’s residence."
This does not mean, however, that only the residence is entitled to
privacy, because the law covers also "similar acts." Thus, An individual’s
right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be
confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places where he
has the right to exclude the public or deny them access. The phrase
"prying into the privacy of another’s residence," therefore, covers
places, locations, or even situations which an individual considers as
private. It follows that a business office is entitled to the same privacy
when the public is excluded therefrom and only such individuals as are
allowed to enter may come in. Therefore, the case will not be dismissed.
Reference:
G.R. No. 179736 June 26, 2013
SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING vs.
ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN CHOACHUY

15.

S is the owner of a housing unit at Emily Homes, Balulang, Cagayan de

Oro City. S entered entered into a Memorandum of Agreement selling,
transferring and conveying in favor of B all rights and interests to the said
property. The Agreement carries a stipulation that the water and power
bill of the subject property shall be transferred in the name of B. B did
not do so and for four (4) years, B was using and had been paying the
water supply under the name of S. After several occasions of failing to
pay the water bill, S was notified and seeing that the name was still not
changed, requested that the water supply be disconected. The water
supply was then disconnected without notice given to B. Angered B
filed an action for damages against S. S claimed for his defense that he
was merely enforcing his right to force B to change the name in the
water bill pursuant to their agreement. Will the action for damages filed
by B prosper? Explain.

Suggested Answer:
Yes.

The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil

Code provides that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith.

In the present case, intention to harm was evident on the part of S when
he requested for the disconnection of B’s water supply without warning
or informing the latter of such request. S claims that his intention was just
to compel B to comply with their agreement that S’s water bill be
transferred in B’s name. If such was S's only intention, then he should
have advised B before or immediately after submitting his request for
disconnection, telling B that his request was simply to force B to comply
with the obligation under their Memorandum of Agreement. But he did
not.

Hence, the action for damages will prosper.

Reference: JOYCE V. ARDIENTE vs. SPOUSES JAVIER and MA. THERESA

PASTORFIDE, et. al.,
[G.R. No. 161921. July 17, 2013.]

16.
X corporation delivered steel plates for Y’s corporation construction
business, the latter presented checks for payment. Upon presentment
for encashment of the said check, it was dishonored since the said
account was already closed.
X corporation traced the owner of the signature and upon due
investigation before the SEC and Ministry of Trade it was found out that
the owner of the signature is Mr. Z, president of Y corporation. This
prompted X Corporation to file a suit for violation of BP. 22 against Mr. Z,
but the same was denied before the fiscal’s office because he is not
the Mr. Z that X corporation was looking for, as there were another Mr. Z
II and Mr. Z III.
 Mr. Z felt oppressed and vexed; hence he filed a suit for damages
against X Corporation for abuse of rights under Article 19, 20 and 21 of
the Civil Code. Will the suit prosper?
Answer:
NO.
There is no proof or showing that petitioners acted maliciously or
in bad faith in the filing of the case against private respondent.
Consequently, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith
committed by petitioners, they cannot be held liable for damages. No
damages can be awarded in the instant case, whether based on the
principle of abuse of rights, or for malicious prosecution

17.
A and B had sexual intercourse. As a result B got pregnant, whereupon
A promised to marry B. Subsequently, however, A married C. B filed a
complaint for moral damages against A for breach of promise to marry.
Is B’s complaint actionable?
Suggested Answer:
No. Recovery of moral damages for breach of promise to marry is not
sanctioned by the laws of the Philippines. It is the clear and manifest
intent of Congress not to sanction actions for breach of promise to
marry given the history of the abuse of such promise suits.

18.

What are the three phases involved in the judicial resolution of Conflict
problems? Explain each.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

In the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, three consecutive phases

are involved: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and
enforcement of judgments

Where the Court held that the local judicial machinery was adequate
to resolve controversies with a foreign element, the following requisites
had to be proved: (1) JURISDICTION - that the Philippine Court is one to
which the parties may conveniently resort; (2) CHOICE OF LAW - that
the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to
the law and the facts; and (3) RECOGNITION and ENFORCEMENT of
JUDGMENTS - that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have the power
to enforce its decision.

REFERENCES:

KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS CO.,

LTD. VS. MINORU KITAMURA, G.R. No. 149177
The Manila Hotel Corp. v. NLRC, 397 Phil. 1

19.

Marilou, a 22 year old Filipina and a pretty lass of good moral character
and reputation duly respected in her community, was courted by
Gashem, an Iranian exchange student. Marilou eventually accepted
his love on the condition that they would get married after the end of
the school semester. The two lived together and even went to Marilou’s
family in the province to formally arrange their marriage. After some
time, Gashem maltreated her and repudiated their marriage
agreement. Marilou filed for damages based on Article 21 of the Civil
Code on account of breach of promise to marry. Will the action
prosper?

Answer:

Yes.

As a general rule, a breach of promise to marry is not actionable.

However, in the case of Baksh v CA, the Supreme Court ruled that
Article 21 of the New Civil Code may be invoked where a man's
promise to marry and its fulfillment becomes the proximate cause of the
giving of a woman unto him his sexual congress, but in reality, there was
no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle
scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him
and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry
but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to
her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential,
however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
Hence, Article 21 was designed to expand the concept of torts
or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for
the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.

20.
G and B decided to have a lavish outdoor wedding in Shangri-La's
Mactan Resort and Spa. All the wedding preparations have been
made and all the guests of the couple have been invited. Wedding
bells were ringing in the air. However, when the day of the wedding
arrived, G received news that B, his love of a lifetime and bride-to-be,
had ran away. The only thing that was left of her was a small note
containing six heartbreaking words “Sorry. I just can’t do it”.

G, who is still recovering from the humiliation, depression and

devastation caused upon him, sued B for damages. The trial court
rendered a decision in G’s favor. B now appeals the decision arguing
that such judgment is contrary to law as there is no provision of the Civil
Code authorizing an action for breach of promise to marry. Rule on the
appeal.

Suggested Answer:
The appeal should be dismissed.

Under the New Civil Code, breach of a promise to marry is not an

actionable wrong. However, in the case at bar, it does not involve a
mere breach of promise to marry. To go through all the wedding
preparations, publicity and costs only to have it cancelled on the
wedding day is unjustifiably contrary to good customs as enshrined in
Article 21 of the said Code. Thus, B may still be held liable for damages
to compensate for G’s loss.

Reference: G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER VS. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ

21.

X and Y entered into an Agreement and Conditions of Sub-Contract,

wherein Y signified its wilingness to accept and perform for X in any of its
project. Y was not able to finish the entire work with X due to financial
constraint. X partially paid Y for the work done. Y now claims rental from
X, for the latters use of manlift. X did not accede to Y’s demand. Y sues
X for unjust enrichment. Will the claim of Y prosper??

Suggested Answer:
No, the claim of Y will not prosper. In the case of Shinryo Philippines vs
RRN, G.R. No. 172525, Oct. 20, 2010, the Supreme Court held that In
order that accion in rem verso may prosper, the essential elements must
be present: (1) that the defendant has been enriched, (2) that the
plaintiff has suffered a loss, (3) that the enrichment of the defendant is
without just or legal ground, and (4) that the plaintiff has no other action
based on contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict.

In the case at bar, Y failed to prove that X’s use of manlift was without
legal grounds, thus the third requisite is lacking. Also, Y’s claim is based
on contract entered into between him and X, hence, the fourth
requisite − that the plaintiff has no other action based on contract,
quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict − is also absent.

Thus, Y’s claim will not prosper.