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[G.R. No. 155080. February 5, 2004] On appeal by the respondent, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts decision
SOLEDAD CALICDAN, represented by her guardian GUADALUPE CASTILLO, petitioner, and declared that the donation was valid. Furthermore, it held that petitioner lost her
vs. SILVERIO CENDAA, substituted by his legal heir CELSA CENDAA-ALARAS, respondent. ownership of the property by prescription.
DECISION
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following issues:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
(1) whether or not the donation inter vivos is valid; and
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the April 4, 2002 decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67266,[1] which set aside the November 12, 1996 decision of the (2) whether or not petitioner lost ownership of the land by prescription.
Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 44 in Civil Case No. D-10270.[2]

The instant controversy involves a 760 square meter parcel of unregistered land As a rule, our jurisdiction in cases brought from the Court of Appeals is limited to the
located in Poblacion, Mangaldan, Pangasinan. The land was formerly owned by Sixto review and revision of errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court. This is
Calicdan, who died intestate on November 4, 1941. He was survived by his wife, Fermina, and because its findings of fact are deemed conclusive and we are not duty-bound to analyze and
three children, namely, petitioner Soledad, Jose and Benigno, all surnamed Calicdan.[3] weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below.[9]

On August 25, 1947, Fermina executed a deed of donation inter vivos whereby she The rule, however, admits of the following exceptions:
conveyed the land to respondent Silverio Cendaa,[4] who immediately entered into
possession of the land, built a fence around the land and constructed a two-storey residential (1) when the findings are grounded on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
house thereon sometime in 1949, where he resided until his death in 1998.[5]

On June 29, 1992, petitioner, through her legal guardian Guadalupe Castillo, filed a (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
complaint for Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages against the respondent,
alleging that the donation was void; that respondent took advantage of her incompetence in (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
acquiring the land; and that she merely tolerated respondents possession of the land as well
as the construction of his house thereon.[6] (4) when the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts are conflicting;
In his Answer with Motion to Dismiss, respondent alleged, by way of affirmative
defenses, that the land was donated to him by Fermina in 1947; and that he had been (5) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, has gone beyond the issues of the case
publicly, peacefully, continuously, and adversely in possession of the land for a period of 45 and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
years. Moreover, he argued that the complaint was barred by prior judgment in the special
proceedings for the Inventory of Properties of Incompetent Soledad Calicdan, where the court (6) when the judgment of the appellate court is premised on a misapprehension of facts or
decreed the exclusion of the land from the inventory of properties of the petitioner.[7] when it has failed to consider certain relevant facts which, if properly taken into account, will
justify a different conclusion;
On November 12, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
(7) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence upon which
they are based; and
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant as follows:

(8) when findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence
1. Ordering defendant Silverio Cendaa to vacate the land in question and
but are contradicted by the evidence on record.[10]
surrender ownership and possession of the same to plaintiff; and

In the case at bar, the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are
2. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P20,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00
conflicting; thus, we are constrained to review the findings of facts.
as exemplary damages, P10,000.00 by way of attorneys fees and other
litigation expenses, plus cost of suit. The trial court found the donation of the land void because Fermina was not the owner
thereof, considering that it was inherited by Sixto from his parents. Thus, the land was not
SO ORDERED.[8] part of the conjugal property of the spouses Sixto and Fermina Calicdan, because under the
Spanish Civil Code, the law applicable when Sixto died in 1941, the surviving spouse had a
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right of usufruct only over the estate of the deceased spouse. Consequently, respondent, The Court of Appeals thus erred in ruling based on respondents bare hearsay testimony
who derived his rights from Fermina, only acquired the right of usufruct as it was the only as evidence of the donation made by Fermina.
right which the latter could convey.
Notwithstanding the invalidity of the donation, we find that respondent has become
After a review of the evidence on record, we find that the Court of Appeals ruling that the rightful owner of the land by extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
the donation was valid was not supported by convincing proof. Respondent himself admitted
during the cross examination that he had no personal knowledge of whether Sixto Calicdan in Prescription is another mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over
fact purchased the subject land from Felomino Bautista. Pertinent portions of his testimony immovable property. It is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions
read: laid down by law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public,
peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. Acquisitive prescription is either ordinary or
Q. And Sixto Calicdan inherited this property from his parents? extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with
just title for ten years. In extraordinary prescription ownership and other real rights over
A. No, sir. immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for
Q. What do you mean by no? thirty years without need of title or of good faith.[13]

A. To my knowledge and information, Sixto Calicdan bought the property from The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person from
his cousin, I think Flaviano or Felomino Bautista. whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership.[14] For
purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession
Q. So, in other words, you have no personal knowledge about how Sixto Calicdan of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership
acquired this property? or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right.[15]
A. I think it was by purchase. Assuming arguendo that ordinary acquisitive prescription is unavailing in the case at
bar as it demands that the possession be in good faith and with just title, [16] and there is no
Q. According to information, so you have no actual personal knowledge how evidence on record to prove respondents good faith, nevertheless, his adverse possession of
Sixto Calicadan acquired this property? the land for more than 45 years aptly shows that he has met the requirements for
A. Yes, because when the property was bought by my uncle, I was not yet born, extraordinary acquisitive prescription to set in.
so information only. The records show that the subject land is an unregistered land. When the petitioner
Q. So when you were born, you came to know already that Sixto Calicdan is the filed the instant case on June 29, 1992, respondent was in possession of the land for 45 years
owner of this property? counted from the time of the donation in 1947. This is more than the required 30 years of
uninterrupted adverse possession without just title and good faith. Such possession was
A. Yes, thru the son of Felomino Bautista who is now, I think, in Baguio. public, adverse and in the concept of an owner. Respondent fenced the land and built his
house in 1949, with the help of Guadalupes father as his contractor.His act of cultivating and
Q. You have not seen any document to show that Sixto Calicdan purchased the
reaping the fruits of the land was manifest and visible to all. He declared the land for taxation
property from one Felomino Bautista?
purposes and religiously paid the realty taxes thereon.[17]Together with his actual possession
A. None, sir.[11] of the land, these tax declarations constitute strong evidence of ownership of the land
occupied by him. As we said in the case of Heirs of Simplicio Santiago v. Heirs of Mariano
In People v. Guittap,[12] we held that: Santiago:[18]

Under Rule 130, Section 36 of the Rules of Court, a witness can testify only to those facts Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of
which he knows of his own personal knowledge, i.e., which are derived from his own ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no
perception; otherwise, such testimony would be hearsay. Hearsay evidence is defined as one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or
evidence not of what the witness knows himself but of what he has heard from others. The constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title
hearsay rule bars the testimony of a witness who merely recites what someone else has told over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes
him, whether orally or in writing. In Sanvicente v. People, we held that when evidence is manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and
based on what was supposedly told the witness, the same is without any evidentiary weight announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the
for being patently hearsay. Familiar and fundamental is the rule that hearsay testimony is intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens
inadmissible as evidence. ones bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.
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Moreover, the deed of donation inter vivos, albeit void for having been executed by
one who was not the owner of the property donated, may still be used to show the exclusive
and adverse character of respondents possession. Thus, in Heirs of Segunda Maningding v.
Court of Appeals,[19] we held:

Even assuming that the donation propter nuptias is void for failure to comply with formal
requisites, it could still constitute a legal basis for adverse possession. With clear and
convincing evidence of possession, a private document of donation may serve as basis for a
claim of ownership. In Pensader v. Pensader we ruled that while the verbal donation under
which the defendant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the lands in
question is not effective as a transfer of title, still it is a circumstance which may explain the
adverse and exclusive character of the possession. (Underscoring ours)

In sum, the Court of Appeals correctly ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. D-10270
before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 44, and declared respondent the
rightful owner of the subject property, not on the basis of the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos,
which is hereby declared void, but on extraordinary acquisitive prescription.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated April 4, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 67266, which ordered the dismissal of
Civil Case No. D-10270 before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 44, is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 45664 January 29, 1993 Registration "to comply with Section 41 of Act 496 as amended by Section 21 of Act
2347." 9 Thereafter, the Chief Surveyor and Chief of the Division of Original Registration,
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, acting for the Commissioner, rendered a report stating that "the platting of said Lots 1 to 6 of
vs. Psu-162460-Amd., on our Municipal Index Map, shows that they are inside Proclamation No.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALEJANDRO MAMOT, respondents. 599 (National Power Corporation)."10

The Solicitor General for petitioner. The lower court then summoned the National Power Corporation (NPC for brevity) to a
Hill & Associates Law Offices for respondent. hearing on the report. Upon learning at the hearing that a decision had been rendered in
favor of Mamot, on February 25, 1970, the NPC filed a petition for relief from
judgment.11 The NPC alleged therein that the hearing for the application for registration was
ROMERO, J.:
conducted without proper notice having been given it; that Mamot committed fraud in
failing to allege in his application that the lots he applied for are covered by Proclamation No.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of February 2, 1977 of the Court of 599, that the Angat access road traversed the lots he applied for, and that NPC had rights and
Appeals affirming the Order of November 25, 1971 of the then Court of First Instance of interests over the properties involved; that had Mamot not committed said fraudulent act,
Bulacan which denied the National Power Corporation's petition for the review of the decree the court would have discovered that he had no lawful rights over the property; and that it
of registration previously issued by the said lower court. had good and strong evidence to counteract Mamot's claim.

On August 21, 19681 private respondent Alejandro Mamot filed with the then Court of First Alleging that the NPC had no personality to file a petition for relief from judgment because
Instance of Bulacan at Malolos, 2 an application for registration of title over six parcels of land an order of general default had been issued in the case and that the decision of the lower
or Lots Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Psu-162460-Amd. with a total area of 417,251 square court having become final and executory, what remained to be done was the ministerial act
meters situated in San Mateo, Norzagaray Bulacan (Land Registration Case No. N-2581-M). of the Land Registration Commissioner to issue the decree of registration, Mamot moved to
Copies of the application were thereafter duly published and posted in conspicuous places in strike out the petition for relief from judgment.12
the municipality. As no one opposed the application, on May 6, 1969, the court issued an
order of general default. 3
However, finding merit in the said petition, the lower court granted the prayer for relief from
judgment in its Order of March 17, 1970 which also lifted the general order of default and
Mamot then submitted his evidence ex-parte before the Deputy Clerk of Court who had been directed the NPC to file its opposition.13Consequently, the NPC filed its opposition to the
so commissioned by the lower court. On June 23, 1969, the same court promulgated a application for registration alleging that neither the applicant nor his predecessors-in-interest
decision confirming the order of general default and ordering the registration of the six possessed sufficient title over the parcels of land involved as they had not acquired them
parcels of land in favor of Mamot and the issuance of the corresponding decree of either by composition title from the Spanish government or by possessory information title
registration after the decision shall have become final. 4 under the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894; that neither Mamot nor his predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
On the same date, however, one Pedro Sarmiento filed a motion praying that he be allowed the land for at least thirty years immediately preceding the application, and that the parcels
to file an opposition to Mamot's application for registration of title. 5 Mamot moved to strike of land involved are within the Angat Reservation pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No.
the motion from the records. Later, Sarmiento filed a motion to set aside the order of 599 and as such, they are under the administration of the NPC. 14 The Solicitor General,
general default. Acting on these motions, the lower court issued the Order of September 23, appearing for the Director of Lands, also filed an opposition to the application alleging
1969 granting Sarmiento ten days within which to file his written opposition. 6 In the basically the same grounds as the NPC.15
meantime, however, Mamot and Sarmiento tried to settle amicably the dispute between
them. Their effort resulted in the execution of a deed of sale involving Lot 4 in favor of Mamot objected to these oppositions and moved for the reconsideration of the Order of
Sarmiento. Accordingly, Sarmiento withdrew his opposition and moved that the Decision of March 17, 1970. Another claimant to the land, one Fabian Castillo, filed a motion to lift the
June 23, 1969 be amended by adjudicating Lot 4 to him. 7 general order of default.

Thus, on November 13, 1969, the lower court rendered an amended decision awarding Lots On February 3, 1971, the lower court issued an order denying Castillo's motion and
Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 to Mamot and Lot No. 4 to Sarmiento. 8 dismissing the petition for relief from judgment filed by the NPC. 16 The order is premised on
the following:
Mamot having moved for the issuance of a decree of registration, on December 17, 1969, the
lower court issued an "Order for the Issuance of Decree" directing the Commissioner of Land
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Movants Fabian Castillo, et al. may advance the argument that, at this This Court also noted that the petition for review was filed after the lapse
stage, the judgment in this case is considered reopened because the of one year from the issuance of the decree, and on this score alone, the
Court granted the petition for relief from judgment of oppositor National petition could be dismissed.
Power Corporation. It appears, however, that the Court was not aware
yet of any decree in the instant application when it granted the petition Its motion for reconsideration of the Order of November 25, 1971 having been denied, NPC
for relief of the National Power Corporation on March 17, 1970, for the appealed to the Court of Appeals. It assailed as erroneous the trial court's holding that: (a)
decree in this case was issued by the Land Registration Commission on the registration of the parcels of land was not procured through fraud; (b) the decree of
May 7, 1970. The petition for relief from judgment is, therefore, also no registration was valid even if it was based on a decision which had been set aside, and (c) the
longer available at this stage. However, oppositor National Power parcels of land are registerable under Sec. 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended.
Corporation may likewise resort to a petition for review which it can file
within one year from the issuance of the decree on the ground of actual
In its decision of February 2, 1977, the Court of Appeals19 affirmed the decision of the lower
fraud.
court. Noting that the appeal was from the Order of the trial court denying the NPC's petition
for review of decree and not from the judgment decreeing the registration of the subject
Heeding the court's advice, the NPC filed a petition for the review of the decree of parcels of land in favor of Mamot and Sarmiento, the Court of Appeals found it unnecessary
registration. 17 Dated May 7, 1971, the petition reiterated the NPC's allegations in its petition to discuss the second and third assigned errors as "they do not relate to the dismissal of the
for relief from judgment charging Mamot with fraud. Mamot moved for the dismissal of the petition for review of decree."
said petition.
Thus, the Court of Appeals ruled that actual fraud alone does not warrant the review of a
On November 25, 1971, the lower court issued an Order denying NPC's petition for review of decree of registration as it must be coupled with a showing of the petitioner's dominical right
the decree of registration.18 Pertinent portions of the over the subject properties. Emphasizing that Proclamation No. 599 is "not an absolute grant
two-page Order states: of reservation" as it is subject to private rights, the Court of Appeals held that the NPC "failed
to show its real dominical right over the subject lots" and that, on such failure alone, the
Assuming that applicant Alejandro C. Mamot failed to notify the National appeal could not succeed. The Court of Appeals added that the issue of actual fraud had
Power Corporation of the filing of his application for original registration become moot and academic because "whether there is actual fraud or none, this Court
of title to land, such failure or omission does not constitute actual fraud cannot order the reopening of the final decree."
as contemplated under Act 496. Besides, it cannot be claimed by the
National Power Corporation that it was not notified of said application Dissatisfied, the NPC instituted the instant petition for review on certiorari based on the
since there was proper publication. following grounds: (a) the Court of First Instance of Bulacan as land registration court lacked
jurisdiction to decree the registration of the six parcels of land as they are within the Angat
As regards the claim of the National Power Corporation that the lots River Watershed Reservation reserved to the NPC by presidential proclamation; (b) the
involved are covered by Proclamation No. 599 dated June 23, 1951, in its procurement of a decree over lands which are non-alienable is equivalent to actual fraud in
favor, said proclamation expressly provides that the land described the procurement of a decree, and (c) the decree of registration based on a decision
therein is withdrawn "from sale of (sic) settlement and reserved for the previously set aside by the court is absolutely null and void.20
Angat River Project of the National Power Corporation under its
administration, subject to private rights, if any there be . . . ." (Emphasis We opt to settle first the third ground for the petition, a procedural one, to facilitate the
supplied) determination of the substantive issues raised herein.

It appearing that applicant Alejandro C. Mamot was in actual possession Petitioner contends that since the decree of registration was issued on May 7, 1970 by the
of the subject lots long before the Proclamation, his rights are respected Land Registration Commission (LRC) after the amended Decision of November 13, 1969 had
and recognized by the very proclamation, not to mention the fact that been set aside by the allowance of its petition for relief from judgment by the lower court on
the National Power Corporation has instituted Civil Case No. 2526 before March 17, 1970, the decree of registration was a complete nullity. Although this contention
Branch II of this Court, an action for eminent domain, against several appears to be meritorious on its face, the circumstances of the case point to a negative
persons occupying the area covered by the proclamation. conclusion.

Rule 38, Sec. 7 of the Rules of Court provides that where a judgment is set aside or when a
petition for relief from judgment is granted, the court "shall proceed to hear and determine
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the case as if timely motion for a new trial had been granted therein." Thus, an The bases for the NPC's petition for relief from judgment being unmeritorious, the lower
order granting a petition for relief is interlocutory unlike an order denying such petition court correctly denied it. However, by upholding the lower court's second and belated action
which is final and appealable.21 When the LRC issued the decree of registration, the decision on the said petition, the Court does not stamp its approval on the manner by which the said
directing such issuance had been set aside by virtue of the granting of the petition for relief petition was handled. A thorough study of its grounds would have prevented the court's
from judgment. It should be recalled that when a new trial is granted, "the original judgment clearly
shall be vacated, and the action shall stand for trial de novo."22 Consequently, the instant flip-flopping stand on the matter, particularly because the petition was one for relief from
case reverted back to its status prior to the promulgation of the amended decision. It follows, judgment. It bears stressing that a petition for relief from judgment, being an "act of grace,"
therefore, that no valid decree of registration could have sprung from the proceedings in the is not regarded with favor and it should be availed of only in exceptional circumstances or
lower court because the situation became one where there was as yet no existing decision when the demands of equity and justice should prompt the court to give the petitioner a last
directing the issuance of such decree. chance to defend his right or to protect his interest. 25 The petitioner must satisfactorily show
that he has faithfully and strictly complied with the provisions of Rule 38.26 Moreover, to
However, when the lower court subsequently denied the same petition for relief from obtain relief from judgment, it is necessary to determine not only the existence of any of the
judgment, an action which was still well within its discretion to take as no new judgment had grounds relied on, whether it be fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, but also
as yet been rendered subsequent to the grant of said petition, the case returned to its status whether the petitioner has a good cause of
of being a decided one. Was the denial based on a valid ground? According to the action.27 In this case, the substantive issues raised by the NPC in its petition for relief from
aforequoted portion of the February 3, 1971 Order, the denial or "dismissal" of the petition judgment are similar, if not identical to those raised in its petition for review of the decree of
was based on the LRC's issuance of the May 7, 1970 decree of registration, which, to the registration, the denial of which is the very subject of the instant petition for review
mind of the court, terminated the proceeding before it. While this may not be a valid ground on certiorari. It is proper, therefore, that they be discussed simultaneously.
as it only shows that the LRC issued the decree of registration because it had not been
notified of the Order granting the petition for relief from judgment, the denial nonetheless is Proclamation No. 599, which was issued by then President Carlos P. Garcia on June 23, 1959,
proper: a close scrutiny of the records reveals that the NPC's petition for relief from provides:
judgment should have been denied in the first instance.
Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
The NPC raised therein the issue of lack of due process by its allegation that no proper notice Resources and pursuant to the provisions of Section 83 of
about the registration proceedings had been given it. Lack of personal notice in a registration Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, I, CARLOS P. GARCIA, President
proceeding to persons who may claim certain rights or interests in the property, however, of the Philippines, do hereby withdraw from sale or settlement and
cannot vitiate or invalidate the decree or title issued therein because proceedings to register reserve for the Angat River Project of the National Power Corporation
land under Act No. 496 are in rem and not in personam.23 Defendants by publication, under its administration, subject to private rights, if any there be, a
including the Government and its branches and instrumentalities, are bound by a decree of certain parcel of the public domain situated partly in the municipality of
registration because all interested parties are considered as notified by the publication Norzagaray, and partly in the municipality of San Jose, province of
required by law.24 Moreover, the NPC's contention that it had not been given proper notice Bulacan, Island of Luzon, and more particularly described as follows: . . . .
appears to be grounded on its stand that Mamot knew that the land he was trying to register (Emphasis supplied.)
was embraced by Proclamation No. 599. This contention does not, however, substantiate the
NPC's claim of lack of due process in view of the uncontroverted fact of publication of As correctly interpreted by the Court of Appeals, this provision of the presidential
Mamot's application for registration. proclamation does not bestow upon the NPC absolute dominical or proprietary rights. The
NPC's powers over the area designated as the Angat River reserve are "subject to private
By alleging that Mamot committed fraud in failing to state in his application that the lots are rights, if any there be." This particular provision cannot but be interpreted to mean that the
covered by Proclamation No. 599 despite his knowledge of NPC's rights and interests on the NPC's administrative jurisdiction over the area is delimited by then existing private rights.
land, the NPC appears to have forgotten the established fact that Mamot had been in Was the claim of Mamot "existing" at the time of the issuance of the proclamation? We
possession of the property long before the issuance of Proclamation No. 599. In the absence quote from the uncontroverted findings of the lower court in its November 13, 1969
of any evidence that the omission was deliberate, Mamot cannot be faulted for his failure to decision:
allege in the complaint that the parcels of land are within the area covered by said
proclamation. That Mamot was indeed a prior possessor of the land is best shown by the fact From the evidence presented, it appears that portions of the parcels of land which
that, as found by the trial court, the NPC even made Mamot one of the respondents in the are sought to be registered were originally owned and possessed publicly,
eminent domain case it had filed to pursue its purposes under said proclamation by peacefully, continuously and adversely by Domingo Mamot and Damasa Calubag,
constructing the Angat access road. parents of the herein applicant, for more than seven (7) years until the death of
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Domingo Mamot on July 22, 1924, whereupon his ownership and possession domain proceeding that the NPC had filed. While the filing of such proceeding may be
thereof was (sic) continued by his wife, Damasa Calubag, and the herein applicant construed as a recognition on the part of the government that the land is indeed privately
who immediately succeeded him; that Damasa Calubag and the herein applicant, owned, the fact that the land is part of the watershed area reserved for the Angat River
commonly possessed the portions of the subject parcels of land which were left by Project should be the paramount consideration. As such, extreme caution should be
Domingo Mamot, peacefully, publicly and continuously, adversely and in the exercised in the determination of claims of ownership by private persons which the
concept of owners until January 23, 1944, when Damasa Calubag died and was proclamation itself recognizes. All claimants must prove by clear, positive and absolute
immediately succeeded in the possession and ownership thereof by the herein evidence that they have complied with all the requirements of the law for confirmation of an
applicant who continued the possession of the same, peacefully, notoriously, imperfect title to the land applied for.31
publicly and uninterruptedly up to the present and who executed an affidavit of
adjudication of the property unto himself (Exhibit "I"); that the other portion of Hence, Mamot bears the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land still forms
said parcels of land was acquired by the herein applicant thru cultivation and part of the nondisposable public domain. The classification of public lands being an exclusive
peaceful, adverse, open, and continuous possession thereof from 1928 to the prerogative of the Executive Department,32presentation of evidence issued by the Director of
present which is now more than thirty (30) years; that there are some persons who Lands that the land he sought to be confirmed as his has been classified as disposable for
tried to claim the subject parcels of land but they have never been in possession of private ownership would have helped Mamot in obtaining approval of his application. Since
the same, and Isidro Ordoña, Pedro Sarmiento, Consolacion Duya and Simeon he failed to present such evidence, whatever possession he might have had, and however
Patawaran were even named in the application and were served with copies of the long, cannot ripen into private ownership.33
Notice of Initial Hearing (Exhibit "A") by ordinary mail on January 9, 1969, by the
Commissioner of Land Registration (Exhibit "B") but have not interposed any
This case has been pending for more than twenty-four years. To remand it below for a
opposition to the present application with the exception of Pedro Sarmiento who,
determination of the validity of NPC's claims under its petition for review of decree would
however, later withdrew his opposition for Lot 4 of plan Psu-162460-Amd. which
not serve any purpose except to further delay the resolution of the application for
was being claimed by him (and) was conveyed to him by the applicant, Alejandro
registration.34 Moreover, the peculiar circumstances attending this case demand its
Mamot, as evidenced by the Deed of Sale which was executed and entered into by
immediate resolution. As discussed above, the NPC has no vested absolute dominical right
applicant Alejandro Mamot and said Pedro Sarmiento on September 25, 1969, and
over the whole area reserved for the Angat River Project. Its administrative authority over
acknowledged on the same date before Nicasio Bartolome, a notary public of
lands embraced by the proclamation is delimited by vested private rights. On the other hand,
Norzagaray, Bulacan, and registered in his notarial book as Document No. 644,
Mamot had not satisfactorily proven his right to a confirmation of his imperfect title and to
Page No. 51, Book No. II and Series of 1969; that the subject parcel of land is not
the registration of the land in his name subject to the rights of Sarmiento who had acquired
within any military or naval reservation; and that the land tax for the current year
Lot 4 by virtue of a deed of sale. Nor had he presented any proof that the said land has been
has been paid (Exhibit "J").
declared disposable by the proper government authority. The land in question must,
therefore, remain where it can be of better use to the general public — as part of the
With these factual findings, the lower court cannot be faulted for confirming Mamot's inalienable public domain.
imperfect title because under Sec. 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by
Republic Act No. 1942,28 proven occupation and cultivation for more than thirty (30) years by
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE insofar as it affirms the
an applicant and by his predecessors-in-interest, vest title on such applicant so as to
order of the lower court allowing the issuance of a decree of registration in favor of private
segregate the land from the mass of public land. When the conditions set by law are
respondent Alejandro Mamot. No costs.
complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a
government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. As such, the
land ceases to be part of the public domain and goes beyond the authority of the Director of SO ORDERED.
Lands to dispose of. An application for confirmation of title, therefore, becomes a mere
formality.29 28 As amended by Republic Act No. 1942 which took effect on June 22, 1957, Section 48(b)
states:
The law, however, may not be applied in all cases. The circumstances of a particular case may
require an applicant for confirmation of an imperfect title under Sec. 48 of Commonwealth "(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
Act No. 141, to prove that the land involved no longer forms part of the inalienable public continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
domain.30 Such is the case in this instant petition. The land sought to be confirmed as under public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
the ownership of private respondent is within the area covered by Proclamation No. 599 immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
creating a reservation for the Angat River Project of the NPC. Mamot knew about the NPC's prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
authority over the area inasmuch as he had even been named a respondent in the eminent
8
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter."
9
[G. R. No. 158449. October 22, 2004] represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed the decision of the trial court to
LUNINGNING P. DEL ROSARIO-IGTIBEN, JOSE REYES IGTIBEN, JOSE DEL ROSARIO IGTIBEN, the Court of Appeals.
JR. and THERESA TOPACIO MEDINA, petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. In its appeal, the Republic alleged that the trial court erred in approving the application
DECISION for registration despite petitioners failure to prove open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the Subject Property since 12 June 1945, or earlier, as required
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: by Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as
amended by PD No. 1073. Moreover, petitioners also failed to produce muniments of title to
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the tack their possession to those of their predecessors-in-interest in compliance with the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68546,[1] which set aside the decision of prescriptive period required by law.[9]
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Silang-Amadeo, Cavite in LRC Case No. 98-133 (LRA On 20 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision finding the appeal
Record No. N-69787)[2] and dismissed petitioners application for registration of a parcel of meritorious, setting aside the decision of the trial court, and dismissing the application for
land. registration of petitioners.[10] The Court of Appeals denied petitioners Motion for
On 08 January 1998, petitioners filed with the trial court an application for registration Reconsideration in its resolution dated 22 May 2003.[11]
of land under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Petitioners filed this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Registration Decree. The application covered a parcel of land with an area of 2,988 square Court praying that the decision of the Court of Appeals be set aside and that the decision of
meters, situated in Barangay Malabag, Silang, Cavite, and more particularly described as Lot the trial court, approving petitioners application for registration of the Subject Property, be
5442, Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre, Ap-04-007007 (hereinafter referred to as the Subject reinstated.[12]
Property). Petitioners alleged that they acquired the Subject Property by purchase, and that
they, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in actual, In the original application filed by petitioners before the trial court, they claim that they
continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, and adverse possession of the Subject Property in are entitled to confirmation and registration of their title to the Subject Property in
the concept of owner for more that 30 years.[3] accordance with Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, although they had not
identified under which specific paragraph of the said Section.[13]
No opposition was filed against the application and so petitioners proceeded with the
presentation of their evidence. The State was represented in the proceedings by Assistant Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree reads
Provincial Prosecutor Jose M. Velasco, Jr.[4]

Based on the testimonial and documentary evidence presented, the trial court traced SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
the history of possession of the Subject Property back to 1958, when the Subject Property an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
was first declared for tax purposes by Justina Hintog.[5] authorized representatives:

Teodoro Calanog came into possession of the Subject Property in 1968. In the same (1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
year, the Subject Property was transferred to spouses Alfredo Tonido and Agatona Calanog. continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
Agatona Calanog allegedly inherited the Subject Property from Teodoro Calanog, her father; lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
on the other hand, Alfredo Tonido supposedly purchased the same property also from earlier.
Teodoro Calanog, his father-in-law. Alfredo Tonido planted the Subject Property with palay,
sayote, coffee, guyabano and other fruit bearing trees. After the demise of Agatona Calanog,
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions
the rest of the Tonido family, consisting of Alfredo and his children, Samuel, Elizabeth,
of existing laws.
Benjamin, Imelda and Esther, shared possession of the Subject Property.[6]

On 21 November 1995, the Tonido family sold the Subject Property to petitioners, as (3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale.[7] accession or accretion under the existing laws.
The history of possession of the Subject Property, as related above, was supported by
tax declarations in the name of petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest from 1958 to (4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.
1998.[8]
By the allegation of petitioners in their application of actual, continuous,
On 15 August 2000, the trial court rendered a decision approving petitioners uninterrupted, open, public, and adverse possession of the Subject Property in the concept
application for registration of the Subject Property. The Republic of the Philippines, of owner, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, for a given period of
10
time, it can be logically presumed that their claim to the right to register the Subject Property Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by PD No. 1073, presently requires,
was based on Section 14, paragraph (1) of the Property Registration Decree. for judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title, the possession and occupation
of the piece of land by the applicants, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
However, subsequent pleadings filed by both petitioners and respondent Republic interest, since 12 June 1945 or earlier. This provision is in total conformity with Section 14(1)
before the Court of Appeals and this Court, discuss mainly the Public Land Act, thus, of the Property Registration Decree heretofore cited.
establishing that the application for registration filed by petitioners before the trial court is
essentially an application for judicial confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete title over In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that petitioners have failed to
the Subject Property, governed by Sections 47 to 57 of the Public Land Act. comply with the period of possession and occupation of the Subject Property, as required by
both the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act. In its decision, the Court of
Proceedings under the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act are the Appeals held that
same in that both are against the whole world, both take the nature of judicial proceedings,
and the decree of registration issued for both is conclusive and final. They differ mainly in
that under the Property Registration Decree, there already exists a title which the court only Indeed, the earliest period that the applicants could claim ownership over the property is in
needs to confirm. On the other hand, under the Public Land Act, there exists a presumption 1958, which is the earliest date Justina Hintog, the previous owner/occupant, declared the
that the land applied for still pertains to the State, and that the occupants and possessors can property for taxation purposes. This is far later than June 12, 1945, the date prescribed by
only claim an interest in the land by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open, and law that the applicants possession under claim of ownership should have begun at the
notorious possession thereof. Nonetheless, in the end, the two laws arrive at the same goal, latest.[17]
namely, a Torrens title, which aims at complete extinguishment, once and for all, of rights
adverse to the record title.[14] Petitioners maintain, however, that RA No. 6940, enacted on 28 March 1990, has
repealed by implication Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by PD No. 1073,
In general, an applicant for judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title and has effectively reduced the required period of possession and occupation of the land to
under the Public Land Act must be able to prove that: (1) the land is alienable public land; thirty years prior to the filing of the application for confirmation of an imperfect or
and (2) his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same incomplete title.
must either be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act.[15]
Petitioners arguments are without merit. This Court has already laid down the standard
The finding of fact of the trial court that the Subject Property is alienable public land is for repeals by implication, as follows
undisputed. What is to be determined herein is whether petitioners have complied with the
period of possession and occupation required by the Public Land Act.
It has been the constant holding of this Court that repeals by implication are not favored and
The provision of the Public Land Act that is particularly relevant to petitioners will not be so declared unless it be manifest that the legislature so intended. Such a doctrine
application is Section 48(b). Through the years, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act has been goes as far back as United States v. Reyes, a 1908 decision. It is necessary then before such a
amended several times. The case of Republic v. Doldol[16] provides a summary of these repeal is deemed to exist, that it be shown that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with
amendments, as follows the same subject matter and that the latter be inconsistent with the former. There must be a
showing of repugnancy clear and convincing in character. The language used in the latter
statute must be such as to render it irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. An
x x x. The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession and occupation of
inconsistency that falls short of that standard does not suffice. What is needed is a manifest
lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No. 1942, which
indication of the legislative purpose to repeal.[18]
provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977. As amended, Section 48(b) now In herein case, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and the provisions of RA No. 6940
reads: do not even address the same subject matter.

In the Public Land Act, the ways by which the State may dispose of agricultural lands is
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, enumerated, to wit
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or
SEC. 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows
earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except
when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a 1. For homestead settlement;
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
2. By sale;
11
3. By lease; and incomplete titles, RA No. 6940 does not touch on the other provisions under Chapter VIII of
the Public Land Act, such as Section 48(b) and the prescriptive period provided therein.
4. By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles: Consequently, applying the standard provided by this Court on repeal by implication,
there can be no conflict or inconsistency between Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and
(a) By judicial legalization; the provisions of RA No. 6940 that would give rise to a repeal of the former by the latter.

The subsequent effectivity of RA No. 9176 on 01 January 2001 does not affect the
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
position of this Court on the issues discussed herein. Once again, Section 47 is the only
provision under Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act amended by RA No. 9176 by further
Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by separate chapters of the Public extending the period for filing of applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
Land Act since the specific requirements and application procedure differ for every mode. incomplete titles to 31 December 2020. The other provisions of the Public Land Act amended
More particularly, the confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles may be done two ways, by RA No. 9176, such as Sections 44 and 45, already refer to free patents under Chapter VII.
either by: (a) administrative legalization or free patents under Chapter VII of the Public Land Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by PD No. 1073, and the prescriptive period
Act; or (b) judicial legalization or judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles under provided therein still remain unchanged.
Chapter VIII of the same Act. Having filed their application before the courts, petitioners have
pursued a judicial legalization or judicial confirmation of their title to the Subject Property. IN ALL:

Petitioners primarily base their arguments on the amendment by RA No. 6940 of (1) Section 44 of the Public Land Act, as amended by RA No. 6940, which provides for a
Section 44 of the Public Land Act, to read as follows prescriptive period of thirty (30) years possession, applies only to applications for free
patents;
SEC. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more than twelve (2) The case at bar is a judicial application for confirmation of an imperfect or
(12) hectares and who, for at least thirty (30) years prior to the effectivity of this amendatory incomplete title over the Subject Property covered by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act;
Act, has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors- and
in-interest a tract or tracts of agricultural public land subject to disposition, who shall have
paid the real estate tax thereon while the same has not been occupied by any person shall be (3) Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act requires for judicial confirmation of an
entitled, under the provisions of this Chapter, to have a free patent issued to him for such imperfect or incomplete title the continuous possession of the land since 12 June 1945, or
tract or tracts of such land not to exceed twelve (12) hectares. earlier, which petitioners herein failed to comply with.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Court AFFIRMS the
While the above-quoted provision does provide for a 30-year period of occupation and assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68546, which reversed the
cultivation of the land, Section 44 of the Public Land Act applies to free patents, and not to decision of the lower court in LRC Case No. 98-133 (LRA Record No. N-69787) and dismissed
judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title to which Section 48(b) applies. the application for land title of petitioners. No cost.
The distinction between Sections 44 and 48(b) of the Public Land Act was recognized by SO ORDERED.
Mr. Justice Puno, in his separate opinion in the case of Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources,[19] in which he discussed the development of the Regalian doctrine in the
Philippine legal system

Registration under the Public Land Act and Land Registration Act recognizes the concept of
ownership under the civil law. This ownership is based on adverse possession for a specified
period, and harkens to Section 44 of the Public Land Act on administrative legalization (free
patent) of imperfect or incomplete titles and Section 48(b) and (c) of the same Act on the
judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.

The remaining provisions of RA No. 6940 amend Sections 44 and 47 of the Public Land
Act by extending the periods for filing of applications for free patents and for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, respectively, to 31 December 2000. Except for
extending the period for filing of applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
12
[G.R. No. 156117. May 26, 2005] thereon to their sons and respondents herein, Jeremias and David,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JEREMIAS AND DAVID for P1,000. Lot No. 8422 was sold to Jeremias, while Lot No. 8423 was
HERBIETO, respondents. sold to David.[10]

DECISION On 11 December 1998, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed an
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Opposition to the respondents application for registration of the Subject Lots arguing that:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules (1) Respondents failed to comply with the period of adverse possession of the Subject Lots
of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV required by law; (2) Respondents muniments of title were not genuine and did not constitute
No. 67625, dated 22 November 2002,[1] which affirmed the Judgment of the Municipal Trial competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition of the Subject Lots; and (3) The
Court (MTC) of Consolacion, Cebu, dated 21 December 1999,[2]granting the application for Subject Lots were part of the public domain belonging to the Republic and were not subject
land registration of the respondents. to private appropriation.[11]

Respondents in the present Petition are the Herbieto brothers, Jeremias and David, The MTC set the initial hearing on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m.[12] All owners of the
who filed with the MTC, on 23 September 1998, a single application for registration of two land adjoining the Subject Lots were sent copies of the Notice of Initial Hearing.[13] A copy of
parcels of land, Lots No. 8422 and 8423, located in Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu (Subject the Notice was also posted on 27 July 1999 in a conspicuous place on the Subject Lots, as
Lots). They claimed to be owners in fee simple of the Subject Lots, which they purchased well as on the bulletin board of the municipal building of Consolacion, Cebu, where the
from their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June Subject Lots were located.[14] Finally, the Notice was also published in the Official Gazette on
1976.[3] Together with their application for registration, respondents submitted the following 02 August 1999[15] and The Freeman Banat News on 19 December 1999.[16]
set of documents: During the initial hearing on 03 September 1999, the MTC issued an Order of Special
Default,[17] with only petitioner Republic opposing the application for registration of the
(a) Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8422, in the name of respondent Jeremias; Subject Lots. The respondents, through their counsel, proceeded to offer and mark
and Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8423, in the name of respondent documentary evidence to prove jurisdictional facts. The MTC commissioned the Clerk of
David;[4] Court to receive further evidence from the respondents and to submit a Report to the MTC
after 30 days.
(b) The technical descriptions of the Subject Lots;[5] On 21 December 1999, the MTC promulgated its Judgment ordering the registration
and confirmation of the title of respondent Jeremias over Lot No. 8422 and of respondent
(c) Certifications by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources David over Lot No. 8423. It subsequently issued an Order on 02 February 2000 declaring its
(DENR) dispensing with the need for Surveyors Certificates for the Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, final and executory, and directing the Administrator of
Subject Lots;[6] the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue a decree of registration for the Subject Lots.[18]

Petitioner Republic appealed the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, to the
(d) Certifications by the Register of Deeds of Cebu City on the absence of
Court of Appeals.[19] The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 22 November 2002, affirmed
certificates of title covering the Subject Lots;[7]
the appealed MTC Judgment reasoning thus:

(e) Certifications by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office


In the case at bar, there can be no question that the land sought to be registered has been
(CENRO) of the DENR on its finding that the Subject Lots are alienable and
classified as within the alienable and disposable zone since June 25, 1963. Article 1113 in
disposable, by virtue of Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated
relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code, respectively provides that All things which are
25 June 1963;[8]
within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided.
Property of the State or any of its subdivisions of patrimonial character shall not be the
(f) Certified True Copies of Assessment of Real Property (ARP) No. object of prescription and that Ownership and other real rights over immovables also
941800301831, in the name of Jeremias, covering Lot No. 8422, issued in prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of
1994; and ARP No. 941800301833, in the name of David, covering Lot No. title or of good faith.
8423, also issued in 1994;[9] and
As testified to by the appellees in the case at bench, their parents already acquired the
(g) Deed of Definite Sale executed on 25 June 1976 by spouses Gregorio Herbieto subject parcels of lands, subject matter of this application, since 1950 and that they
and Isabel Owatan selling the Subject Lots and the improvements cultivated the same and planted it with jackfruits, bamboos, coconuts, and other trees
13
(Judgment dated December 21, 1999, p. 6). In short, it is undisputed that herein appellees or Jurisdiction
their predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed the subject land openly,
continuously, exclusively, and adversely since 1950. Consequently, even assuming arguendo Addressing first the issue of jurisdiction, this Court finds that the MTC had no
that appellees possession can be reckoned only from June 25, 1963 or from the time the jurisdiction to proceed with and hear the application for registration filed by the respondents
subject lots had been classified as within the alienable and disposable zone, still the but for reasons different from those presented by petitioner Republic.
argument of the appellant does not hold water. A. The misjoinder of causes of action and parties does not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC to
hear and proceed with respondents application for registration.
As earlier stressed, the subject property, being alienable since 1963 as shown by CENRO
Report dated June 23, 1963, may now be the object of prescription, thus susceptible of Respondents filed a single application for registration of the Subject Lots even though
private ownership. By express provision of Article 1137, appellees are, with much greater they were not co-owners. Respondents Jeremias and David were actually seeking the
right, entitled to apply for its registration, as provided by Section 14(4) of P.D. 1529 which individual and separate registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively.
allows individuals to own land in any manner provided by law. Again, even considering that Petitioner Republic believes that the procedural irregularity committed by the
possession of appelless should only be reckoned from 1963, the year when CENRO declared respondents was fatal to their case, depriving the MTC of jurisdiction to proceed with and
the subject lands alienable, herein appellees have been possessing the subject parcels of land hear their application for registration of the Subject Lots, based on this Courts
in open, continuous, and in the concept of an owner, for 35 years already when they filed the pronouncement in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,[22] to wit:
instant application for registration of title to the land in 1998. As such, this court finds no
reason to disturb the finding of the court a quo.[20]
. . . In view of these multiple omissions which constitute non-compliance with the above-
cited sections of the Act, We rule that said defects have not invested the Court with the
The Republic filed the present Petition for the review and reversal of the Decision of authority or jurisdiction to proceed with the case because the manner or mode of obtaining
the Court of Appeals, dated 22 November 2002, on the basis of the following arguments: jurisdiction as prescribed by the statute which is mandatory has not been strictly followed,
First, respondents failed to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had thereby rendering all proceedings utterly null and void.
been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of
owners since 12 June 1945 or earlier. According to the petitioner Republic, possession of the This Court, however, disagrees with petitioner Republic in this regard. This procedural
Subject Lots prior to 25 June 1963 cannot be considered in determining compliance with the lapse committed by the respondents should not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC to proceed
periods of possession required by law. The Subject Lots were classified as alienable and with and hear their application for registration of the Subject Lots.
disposable only on 25 June 1963, per CENROs certification. It also alleges that the Court of
Appeals, in applying the 30-year acquisitive prescription period, had overlooked the ruling The Property Registration Decree[23] recognizes and expressly allows the following
in Republic v. Doldol,[21] where this Court declared that Commonwealth Act No. 141, situations: (1) the filing of a single application by several applicants for as long as they are co-
otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended and as it is presently phrased, requires owners of the parcel of land sought to be registered;[24] and (2) the filing of a single
that possession of land of the public domain must be from 12 June 1945 or earlier, for the application for registration of several parcels of land provided that the same are located
same to be acquired through judicial confirmation of imperfect title. within the same province.[25] The Property Registration Decree is silent, however, as to the
present situation wherein two applicants filed a single application for two parcels of land, but
Second, the application for registration suffers from fatal infirmity as the subject of the are seeking the separate and individual registration of the parcels of land in their respective
application consisted of two parcels of land individually and separately owned by two names.
applicants. Petitioner Republic contends that it is implicit in the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, as amended, that Since the Property Registration Decree failed to provide for such a situation, then this
the application for registration of title to land shall be filed by a single applicant; multiple Court refers to the Rules of Court to determine the proper course of action. Section 34 of the
applicants may file a single application only in case they are co-owners. While an application Property Registration Decree itself provides that, [t]he Rules of Court shall, insofar as not
may cover two parcels of land, it is allowed only when the subject parcels of land belong to inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree, be applicable to land registration and
the same applicant or applicants (in case the subject parcels of land are co-owned) and are cadastral cases by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and
situated within the same province. Where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred convenient.
by a statute and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, it must be strictly Considering every application for land registration filed in strict accordance with the
complied with or the proceedings will be utterly void. Since the respondents failed to comply Property Registration Decree as a single cause of action, then the defect in the joint
with the procedure for land registration under the Property Registration Decree, the application for registration filed by the respondents with the MTC constitutes a misjoinder of
proceedings held before the MTC is void, as the latter did not acquire jurisdiction over it. causes of action and parties. Instead of a single or joint application for registration,
I
14
respondents Jeremias and David, more appropriately, should have filed separate applications Even as this Court concedes that the aforequoted Section 23(1) of the Property
for registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively. Registration Decree expressly provides that publication in the Official Gazette shall be
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court, it still affirms its declaration
Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a question of jurisdiction of in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals[30] that publication in a newspaper of general
the court to hear and proceed with the case.[26] They are not even accepted grounds for circulation is mandatory for the land registration court to validly confirm and register the title
dismissal thereof.[27] Instead, under the Rules of Court, the misjoinder of causes of action and of the applicant or applicants. That Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree
parties involve an implied admission of the courts jurisdiction. It acknowledges the power of enumerated and described in detail the requirements of publication, mailing, and posting of
the court, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or on its own initiative, to order the the Notice of Initial Hearing, then all such requirements, including publication of the Notice
severance of the misjoined cause of action, to be proceeded with separately (in case of in a newspaper of general circulation, is essential and imperative, and must be strictly
misjoinder of causes of action); and/or the dropping of a party and the severance of any complied with. In the same case, this Court expounded on the reason behind the compulsory
claim against said misjoined party, also to be proceeded with separately (in case of publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation, thus
misjoinder of parties).

The misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition may have been It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed
corrected by the MTC motu propio or on motion of the petitioner Republic. It is regrettable, mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette as well
however, that the MTC failed to detect the misjoinder when the application for registration as by mailing and posting, all of which have already been complied with in the case at hand.
was still pending before it; and more regrettable that the petitioner Republic did not call the The reason is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and
attention of the MTC to the fact by filing a motion for severance of the causes of action and circulated as newspaper and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices
parties, raising the issue of misjoinder only before this Court. published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such
parties may not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real
B. Respondents, however, failed to comply with the publication requirements mandated by estate. In sum, the all encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the
the Property Registration Decree, thus, the MTC was not invested with jurisdiction as a consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the objective of
land registration court. disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction
Although the misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition did not of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting.[31]
affect the jurisdiction of the MTC over the land registration proceeding, this Court,
nonetheless, has discovered a defect in the publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing, which In the instant Petition, the initial hearing was set by the MTC, and was in fact held, on
bars the MTC from assuming jurisdiction to hear and proceed with respondents application 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m. While the Notice thereof was printed in the issue of the
for registration. Official Gazette, dated 02 August 1999, and officially released on 10 August 1999, it was
published in The Freeman Banat News, a daily newspaper printed in Cebu City and circulated
A land registration case is a proceeding in rem,[28] and jurisdiction in rem cannot be in the province and cities of Cebu and in the rest of Visayas and Mindanao, only on 19
acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the land through publication and service of December 1999, more than three months after the initial hearing.
notice.[29]
Indubitably, such publication of the Notice, way after the date of the initial hearing,
Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree requires that the public be given Notice would already be worthless and ineffective. Whoever read the Notice as it was published
of the Initial Hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1) publication; (2) in The Freeman Banat News and had a claim to the Subject Lots was deprived of due process
mailing; and (3) posting. Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing shall be made in the for it was already too late for him to appear before the MTC on the day of the initial hearing
following manner: to oppose respondents application for registration, and to present his claim and evidence in
support of such claim. Worse, as the Notice itself states, should the claimant-oppositor fail to
1. By publication. appear before the MTC on the date of initial hearing, he would be in default and would
forever be barred from contesting respondents application for registration and even the
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner registration decree that may be issued pursuant thereto. In fact, the MTC did issue an Order
of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official of Special Default on 03 September 1999.
Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the newspaper of general
that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the circulation is tantamount to no publication at all, having the same ultimate result. Owing to
court. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land such defect in the publication of the Notice, the MTC failed to constructively seize the
involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and to all whom it may concern. Subject Lots and to acquire jurisdiction over respondents application for registration thereof.
Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and Therefore, the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, ordering the registration and
time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted. confirmation of the title of respondents Jeremias and David over Lots No. 8422 and 8423,
15
respectively; as well as the MTC Order, dated 02 February 2000, declaring its Judgment of 21 reasonably inferred that they are seeking the judicial confirmation or legalization of their
December 1999 final and executory, and directing the LRA Administrator to issue a decree of imperfect or incomplete title over the Subject Lots.
registration for the Subject Lots, are both null and void for having been issued by the MTC
without jurisdiction. Judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title to land, not
exceeding 144 hectares,[40] may be availed of by persons identified under Section 48 of the
II Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, which reads
Period of Possession

Respondents failed to comply with the required period of possession of the Subject Lots for Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
the judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title. domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
While this Court has already found that the MTC did not have jurisdiction to hear and the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
proceed with respondents application for registration, this Court nevertheless deems it thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
necessary to resolve the legal issue on the required period of possession for acquiring title to
public land. (a) [Repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1073].
Respondents application filed with the MTC did not state the statutory basis for their
title to the Subject Lots. They only alleged therein that they obtained title to the Subject Lots (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been
by purchase from their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
1976. Respondent Jeremias, in his testimony, claimed that his parents had been in possession agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
of the Subject Lots in the concept of an owner since 1950.[32] acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title, except
Yet, according to the DENR-CENRO Certification, submitted by respondents themselves, when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
the Subject Lots are within Alienable and Disposable, Block I, Project No. 28 per LC Map No. presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
2545 of Consolacion, Cebu certified under Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
June 25, 1963. Likewise, it is outside Kotkot-Lusaran Mananga Watershed Forest Reservation this chapter.
per Presidential Proclamation No. 932 dated June 29, 1992.[33] The Subject Lots are thus
clearly part of the public domain, classified as alienable and disposable as of 25 June 1963.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through
As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired by private their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government;[34] and it is notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable
indispensable that the person claiming title to public land should show that his title was to agriculture whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of
acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law.[35] ownership since June 12, 1945 shall be entitled to the rights granted in
subsection (b) hereof.
The Public Land Act, as amended, governs lands of the public domain, except timber
and mineral lands, friar lands, and privately-owned lands which reverted to the State.[36] It
Not being members of any national cultural minorities, respondents may only be
explicitly enumerates the means by which public lands may be disposed, as follows:
entitled to judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. Section 48(b), as amended, now requires
(1) For homestead settlement; adverse possession of the land since 12 June 1945 or earlier. In the present Petition, the
(2) By sale; Subject Lots became alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963. Any period of possession
(3) By lease; prior to the date when the Subject Lots were classified as alienable and disposable is
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles; inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession;
such possession can never ripen into ownership and unless the land had been classified as
(a) By judicial legalization; or alienable and disposable, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).[37] thereto.[41] It is very apparent then that respondents could not have complied with the
period of possession required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, to acquire
Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by separate chapters of the Public Land imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots that may be judicially confirmed or legalized.
Act because there are specific requirements and application procedure for every The confirmation of respondents title by the Court of Appeals was based on the
mode.[38] Since respondents herein filed their application before the MTC, [39] then it can be erroneous supposition that respondents were claiming title to the Subject Lots under the
16
Property Registration Decree. According to the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 22 [25] Section 18 of the Property Registration Decree reads
November 2002, Section 14(4) of the Property Registration Decree allows individuals to own
land in any other manner provided by law. It then ruled that the respondents, having SEC. 18. Application covering two or more parcels. An application may
possessed the Subject Lots, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, since include two or more parcels of land belonging to the applicant/s provided they are
25 June 1963 to 23 September 1998, when they filed their application, have acquired title to situated within the same province or city. The court may at any time order an
the Subject Lots by extraordinary prescription under Article 1113, in relation to Article 1137, application to be amended by striking out one or more of the parcels or by a
both of the Civil Code.[42] severance of the application.
[27] Significant provisions of the Rules of Court are quoted below
The Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between the Property Registration
Decree and the Public Land Act. Under the Property Registration Decree, there already exists RULE 2, SEC. 6. Misjoinder of causes of action. Misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground
a title which is confirmed by the court; while under the Public Land Act, the presumption for dismissal of an action. A misjoined cause of action may, on motion of a party or
always is that the land applied for pertains to the State, and that the occupants and on the initiative of the court, be severed and proceeded with separately.
possessors only claim an interest in the same by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous,
open, and notorious possession.[43] As established by this Court in the preceding paragraphs, RULE 3, SEC. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. Neither misjoinder nor non-
the Subject Lots respondents wish to register are undoubtedly alienable and disposable lands joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of action. Parties may be dropped or
of the public domain and respondents may have acquired title thereto only under the added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any
provisions of the Public Land Act. stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined
party may be severed and proceeded with separately.
However, it must be clarified herein that even though respondents may acquire
imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots under the Public Land Act, their application [38] Del Rosario-Igtiben v. Rebublic, G.R. No. 158449, 22 October 2004, p. 11.
for judicial confirmation or legalization thereof must be in accordance with the Property [39]
Registration Decree, for Section 50 of the Public Land Act reads Section 34 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980, as amended, allows the inferior courts (i.e., Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts), duly assigned by the
SEC. 50. Any person or persons, or their legal representatives or successors in right, claiming Supreme Court, to hear and determine cadastral and land registration cases
any lands or interest in lands under the provisions of this chapter, must in every case present covering lots where there is no controversy or opposition, or contested lots with
an application to the proper Court of First Instance, praying that the validity of the alleged values not exceeding P100,000. Decisions of the inferior courts in such cases shall
title or claim be inquired into and that a certificate of title be issued to them under the be appealable in the same manner as decisions of the Regional Trial Courts.
provisions of the Land Registration Act.[44] Accordingly, the Supreme Court issued Administrative Circular No. 6-93-A, dated 15
November 1995, authorizing the inferior courts to hear and decide the cadastral or
Hence, respondents application for registration of the Subject Lots must have complied land registration cases as provided for by the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
with the substantial requirements under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and the as amended.
procedural requirements under the Property Registration Decree.
[42] The complete text of these provisions are reproduced below, for reference
Moreover, provisions of the Civil Code on prescription of ownership and other real
rights apply in general to all types of land, while the Public Land Act specifically governs lands ART. 1113. All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of
of the public domain. Relative to one another, the Public Land Act may be considered a prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its
special law[45] that must take precedence over the Civil Code, a general law. It is an subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.
established rule of statutory construction that between a general law and a special law, the ART. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe
special law prevails Generalia specialibus non derogant.[46] through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of title or of good faith.
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22 November 2002, is REVERSED. The
Judgment of the MTC of Consolacion, Cebu in LRC Case No. N-75, dated 21 December 1999,
and its Order, dated 02 February 2000 are declared NULL AND VOID. Respondents
application for registration is DISMISSED.SO ORDERED.
[24] Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree provides that, Where the land is owned in
common, all the co-owners shall file the application jointly.
17
G.R. No. 157306 November 25, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, Upon the recommendation of the Secretary
- versus - of Agriculture and Commerce and pursuant to the
ANATALIA ACTUB TIU ESTONILO and ANDREA ACTUB TIU PO (in Substitution of NAZARIA provision of section eighty-three of Commonwealth
BOMBEO), Respondents. Act Number One Hundred and Forty-one, I hereby
withdraw from sale of settlement and reserve for the
DECISION use of the Philippine Army, under the administration
PANGANIBAN, J.: of the Chief of Staff subject to private rights, if any
thereby, the following described parcels of public
To segregate portions of the public domain as reservations for the use of the Republic of the domain, situated in the barrios of Bulua and Carmen,
Philippines or any of its branches, like the Armed Forces of the Philippines, all that is needed Municipality of Cagayan, Province of Misamis
is a presidential proclamation to that effect. A court judgment is not necessary to make the Oriental, Island of Mindanao, and particularly
proclamation effective or valid. described in Bureau of Lands SWO-15234, to wit:
The Case
Lot No. 4318. x x x.
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
reverse and set aside the February 21, 2003 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR Containing an area of 354,377 square
CV No. 66807. The assailed CA Decision disposed as follows: meters.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the ruling of During the initial hearing set on February 12, 1955, an Order of
the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.[3] General Default was issued by the lower court. On July 29, 1959, Bombeo
The Facts died and was substituted by her daughter Cipriana Actub Tiu who
The antecedents were summarized by the CA as follows: eventually died on December 5, 1990. Thereafter, due to intervening
deaths of the parties, the case literally went to slumber until it was re-
This case originated from an application for registration of a raffled to the Regional Trial Court (Branch 17) of Misamis Oriental on
parcel of land known as Lot No. 4318 of the cadastral survey of Cagayan de October 16, 1991 and was pursued anew by the daughters of Cipriana
Oro consisting [of] an area of 357,866 square meters, filed by [the] original Actub Tiu, namely, Anatalia Actub Tiu Estonilo and Andrea Actub Tiu Po.
[a]pplicant, Nazaria Bombeo with the defunct Court of First Instance of On the other hand, Oppositors Bureau of Lands and Chief of Staff of the
Misamis Oriental on July 22, 1954. In her application, Bombeo claimed Armed Forces of the Philippines, in behalf of the Republic of the
that said parcel of land was previously owned and possessed by a certain Philippines; were represented by the Provincial Prosecutor Florencia Abbu
Rosendo Bacas since 1894 until it was sold to her by the heirs of Rosendo and Major Raul Llacuna of JAGO [Judge Advocate Generals Office]. On May
Bacas, represented by their attorney-in-fact and heir himself, Calistro 27, 1994, the trial court confirmed title over Lot 4318 to Nazaria Bombeo
Bacas by virtue of an Absolute Sale of Realty (Exhibit A) on June 14, 1954. substituted by her heirs Anatalia Actub Tiu Estonilo and Andrea Actub Tiu
Po and ordered registration thereof under the names of the latter.
After due notice and publication of said application, only the Consequently, Oppositors Bureau of Lands and Chief of Staff of Armed
Provincial Fiscal of Misamis Oriental, in behalf of the Chief of Staff of the Forces of the Philippines, through the Solicitor Generals Office; filed an
Armed Forces of the Philippines [AFP] and the Director of [the] Bureau of appeal to said decision x x x.
Land[s] filed its opposition thereto, alleging that Lot 4318 is not a
registrable land pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 265, which took During the pendency of the appeal, however, Presidential
effect on March 31, 1938, and which declared Lot 4318 reserved for the Proclamation No. 330[4] took effect on June 20, 2000, excluding Lot 4318
use of the Philippine Army, to wit: from the operation of Presidential Proclamation No. 265[.]

PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 265. RESERVING xxxxxxxxx


FOR THE USE OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMY THREE
PARCELS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN SITUATED IN THE In view of the aforesaid decree, x x x [respondents urged the CA]
BARRIOS OF BULUA AND CARMEN, MUNICIPALITY OF to finally put to rest the controversy in their favor considering that the
CAGAYAN, PROVINCE OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL, ISLAND opposition of the Republic has no longer any basis.[5]
OF MINDANAO.
18
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals ruled that Presidential Proclamation No. 265 (Proc 265) failed After a meticulous review of the Decisions of both the trial and the appellate
to segregate effectively Lot 4318 as part of the military reservation. The CA said that the courts, as well as of the evidence on record, the Court finds that respondents failed to satisfy
proclamation was not self-executory and self-adjudicating considering that there is a need to the above legal requirements.
determine private rights of claimants over lands sought to be reserved.
Nature of Lot 4318
Moreover, the appellate court agreed with the trial court that respondents were
able to establish with sufficient evidence their right to have the land registered under their It is not disputed that Proc 265 specifically reserved Lot 4318 for the use of the
names. It acknowledged that possession by respondents predecessors-in-interest had Philippine Army. Respondents maintain, though, that the land was not effectively segregated
ripened into an imperfect title of ownership, subject to judicial confirmation. It added that as a military reservation by the Proclamation. Relying on Baloy v. CA,[11] they allege that a
ownership of the land would still be deemed vested in respondents, in view of their almost petition for reservation or a court judgment declaring the reservation is necessary to make
half a century of open, continuous, adverse and peaceful possession, even if possession by Proc 265 effective. They maintain that the provision in the Proclamation subjecting the
their predecessors-in-interest were not taken into consideration. reservation to private rights presumes that notice and hearing will be afforded to all persons
claiming ownership rights over the land. Otherwise, the reservation would amount to a
Hence, this Petition.[6] deprivation of property without due process of law. They further allege that the AFP failed to
Issues observe these requirements, thus causing the reservation to be ineffectual.
Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
I. Petitioner, however, argues that the Public Land Act does not require a judicial
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that order to create a military reservation. It contends that the proviso requiring the reservation
Presidential Proclamation No. 265 did not effectively segregate Lot 4318 to be subject to private rights means that persons claiming rights over the reserved land are
from the public domain. not precluded from proving their claims. It contends further that respondents were afforded
due process when their application for registration of title to Lot 4318 was heard by the
II. lower courts.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding that
respondents were able to establish that they have already acquired We agree with petitioner. The segregation of land for a public purpose is governed
private right over Lot 4318 which already amounted to a title. by the Public Land Act, the pertinent provisions of which are as follows:

III. SECTION 83. Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of


Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that the Agriculture and Natural Resources, the President may designate by
passage of Presidential Proclamation No. 330 which excludes from the proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public domain as
operation of Presidential Proclamation No. 265 Lot 4318 negates the reservations for the use of the Republic of the Philippines or of any of its
claim of the AFP that the land in dispute is actively possessed and used by branches, or of the inhabitants thereof, in accordance with regulations
it.[7] prescribed for this purposes, or for quasi-public uses or purposes when
the public interest requires it, including reservations for highways, rights
In short, the main issue is whether respondents have duly proven their title to the of way for railroads, hydraulic power sites, irrigation systems, communal
subject land and may thus register it under the Public Land Act. pastures or leguas comunales,
public parks, public quarries, public fishponds, workingmen's village and
The Courts Ruling other improvements for the public benefit.
The Petition is meritorious. SECTION 86. A certified copy of every proclamation of the
President issued under the provisions of this title shall be forwarded to
Main Issue:Validity of Respondents Title the Director of Lands for record in his office, and a copy of this record
shall be forwarded to the Register of Deeds of the province or city where
The Public Land Act[8] requires applicants for confirmation of imperfect titles to the land lies. Upon receipt of such certified copy, the Director of Lands
prove (1) that the land is alienable public land;[9] and (2) that their open, continuous, shall order the immediate survey of the proposed reservation if the land
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the property has taken place either has not yet been surveyed, and as soon as the plat has been completed,
since time immemorial or for the period prescribed by law. When the legal conditions are he shall proceed in accordance with the next following section.
complied with, the possessor of the land -- by operation of law -- acquires a right to a
government grant, without necessitating the issuance of a certificate of title.[10]
19
SECTION 87. If all the lands included in the proclamation of the Notwithstanding the reservation in 1938 of Lot 4318 for military use, respondents
President are not registered under the Land Registration Act, the Solicitor maintain their entitlement to have it registered under their names. They allege that their
General, if requested to do so by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural predecessors-in-interest were already in adverse, open, peaceful and continuous possession
Resources, shall proceed in accordance with the provision of Section fifty- of the property for over 30 years prior to 1938. Thus, they conclude that their imperfect title
three of this Act. had already attached long before the issuance of the Proclamation segregating the land as a
military reservation.
SECTION 53. It shall be lawful for the Director of Lands,
whenever in the opinion of the President the public interests shall require We are not convinced. As a rule, the factual findings of the trial court, when
it, to cause to be filed in the proper Court of First Instance, through the affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive and binding on this Court. To this rule,
Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, a petition against the however, there are settled exceptions; for instance, when the judgment assailed is not
holder, claimant, possessor, or occupant of any land who shall not have supported by sufficient evidence or is based on a misapprehension of facts. [15] We find that
voluntarily come in under the provisions of this chapter or of the Land these exceptions apply here.
Registration Act, stating in substance that the title of such holder,
claimant, possessor, or occupant is open to discussion; or that the Land that has not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by
boundaries of any such land which has not been brought into court as grant, belongs to the State as part of the public domain.[16] For this reason, imperfect titles to
aforesaid are open to question; or that it is advisable that the title to such agricultural lands are subjected to rigorous scrutiny before judicial confirmation is
lands be settled and adjudicated, and praying that the title to any such granted.[17] In the same manner, persons claiming the protection of private rights in order to
land or the boundaries thereof or the right to occupancy thereof be exclude their lands from military reservations must show by clear and convincing evidence
settled and adjudicated. The judicial proceedings under this section shall that the pieces of property in question have been acquired by a legal method of acquiring
be in accordance with the laws on adjudication of title in cadastral public lands.[18]
proceedings. In granting respondents judicial confirmation of their imperfect title, the trial and
the appellate courts gave much weight to the tax declarations presented by the former.
Clearly, under the above provisions, only a positive act of the President is needed However, while the tax declarations were issued under the names of respondents
to segregate a piece of land for a public purpose. It must be noted that while Section 53 predecessors-in-interest, the earliest one presented was issued only in 1954.[19] The Director,
grants authority to the director of lands -- through the solicitor general -- to file a petition Lands Management Bureau v. CA[20] held thus:
against claimants of the reserved land, the filing of that petition is not mandatory. The
director of lands is required to file a petition only whenever in the opinion of the President x x x. Tax receipts and tax declarations are not incontrovertible
public interest requires it. evidence of ownership. They are mere indicia of [a] claim of ownership.
In Director of Lands vs. Santiago:
Inapplicable is the ruling in Baloy v. CA[12] requiring, after due notice and hearing, a
judicial declaration of reservation. The subject of the application for registration in Baloy was x x x [I]f it is true that the original owner
originally private land, as evidenced by a possessory information title issued in the applicants and possessor, Generosa Santiago, had been in
favor during the Spanish era. As will be explained shortly, Lot 4318 in the present case is possession since 1925, why were the subject lands
unquestionably public land. The only issue is whether respondents have acquired title to the declared for taxation purposes for the first time only
property. in 1968, and in the names of Garcia and Obdin? For
although tax receipts and declarations of ownership
Moreover, the governing law in Baloy was Act 627.[13] Under the provisions of that for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible
law, the private character of the land shall be respected absent any court order declaring evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof
that the property has become public. In the case before us, Proc 265 was issued pursuant to that the holder had a claim of title over the
Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141. Accordingly, only a positive act of the President is required property.[21]
to create a government reservation.
Verily, the Proclamation successfully segregated Lot 4318 as a military reservation. In addition, the lower courts credited the alleged prior possession by Calixto and
Consequently, respondents could not have validly occupied it in 1954, because it was Rosendo Bacas, from whom respondents predecessors had purportedly bought the property.
considered inalienable[14] since its reservation in 1938. This alleged prior possession, though, was totally devoid of any supporting
evidence on record. Respondents evidence hardly supported the conclusion that their
Respondents Period of Possession predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since time immemorial.
20
Moreover, as correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the evidence
on record merely established the transfer of the property from Calixto Bacas to Nazaria
Bombeo. The evidence did not show the nature and the period of the alleged possession by
Calixto and Rosendo Bacas. It is important that applicants for judicial confirmation of
imperfect titles must present specific acts of ownership to substantiate their claims; they
cannot simply offer general statements that are mere conclusions of law rather than factual
evidence of possession.[22]

It must be stressed that respondents, as applicants, have the burden of proving


that they have an imperfect title to Lot 4318. Even the absence of opposition from the
government does not relieve them of this burden.[23] Thus, it was erroneous for the trial and
the appellate courts to hold that the failure of the government to
dislodge respondents, judicially or extrajudicially, from the subject land since 1954 already
amounted to a title.

In this connection, the Court reiterates the following ruling in Director of Lands v.
Agustin:[24]

x x x. The petitioner is not necessarily entitled to have the land


registered under the Torrens system simply because no one appears to
oppose his title and to oppose the registration of his land. He must show,
even though there is no opposition, to the satisfaction of the court, that he
is the absolute owner, in fee simple. Courts are not justified in registering
property under the Torrens system, simply because there is no opposition
offered. Courts may, even in the absence of any opposition, deny the
registration of the land under the Torrens system, upon the ground that the
facts presented did not show that the petitioner is the owner, in fee simple,
of the land which he is attempting to have registered.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The segregation of Lot 4318 as part of a military
reservation is declared VALID. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
21
[G.R. No. 118436. March 21, 1997] other with an area of 10,674 square meters, as supported and shown by the corresponding
HEIRS OF MANUEL A. ROXAS and TRINIDAD DE LEON VDA. DE ROXAS (in substitution of technical descriptions now forming part of the records, in the name of Maguesun
original petitioner), petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MAGUESUN MANAGEMENT & Management and Development Corporation, with office address at 521 Edsa, Quezon City,
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents. free from all liens and encumbrances and from any other adverse claims of any kind and
DECISION nature.

ROMERO, J.:
Upon finality of this Decision, the same ipso facto becomes executory, upon which
eventuality the corresponding decree of registration may thus be issued.SO ORDERED."
Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas, substituted by her heirs,[1] instituted this petition for
review of the Court of Appeals decision dated December 8, 1994 in "Trinidad de
Consequently, the Regional Trial Court issued the Order for Issuance of the Decree on
Leon Vda. de Roxas v. Maguesun Management and Development: Corporation," (CA G.R. CV
March 14, 1991, after the afore-mentioned Decision in LRC No. TG-373 became final[5] but
No. 38328), alleging reversible error committed by respondent appellate court when it
not before it ordered, on February 14, 1991, Land Registration Case No. 500 (GLRO Record
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite. The issue presented before us is
No. 55072) applied for by Manuel A Roxas and Trinidad de Leon, dismissed.
whether or not private respondent Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud in
obtaining a decree of registration over two unregistered parcels of land in Tagaytay City, It was only when the caretaker of the property was being asked to vacate the land that
actual fraud being the only ground to reopen or review a decree of registration. petitioner Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas learned of its sale and the registration of the lots in
Maguesun Corporation's name.
The facts of the case are narrated below:
Hence, on April 21, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for review before the Regional Trial
On July 2, 1990, herein private respondent Maguesun Management and Development Court, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-1183 to set aside the decree of registration on the
Corporation (Maguesun Corporation) filed an Application for Registration of two parcels of ground that Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud. She alleged that the lots were
unregistered land located in Barangay Sungay, Tagaytay City (Lot Nos. 7231 and 7239, Cad- among the properties she inherited from her husband, former President Manuel A. Roxas,
355, Tagaytay Cadastre) with an area of 3,641 and 10,674 square meters respectively. The who died on April 15, 1946 and that her family had been in open, continuous, adverse and
original registration case was docketed as Case No. TG-373 before the Regional Trial Court of uninterrupted possession of the subject property in the concept of owner for more than
Cavite, Branch 18, presided over by Judge Julieto Tabiolo. In support of its application for thirty years before they applied for its registration under the Torrens System of land titling.
registration, Maguesun Corporation presented a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 10, 1990, Petitioner further denied that she sold the lots to Zenaida Melliza whom she had never met
executed by Zenaida Melliza as vendor and indicating the purchase price to be P170,000.00. before and that her signature was forged in both the Deed of Sale and the Affidavit of Self-
Zenaida Melliza in turn, bought the property from the original petitioner herein, Trinidad de Adjudication. In support of her claims, she also listed a number of irregularities in the
Leon vda. de Roxas for P200,000.00 two and a half months earlier, as evidenced by a Deed of documents to prove actual fraud. In addition, and perhaps more significantly, she claimed
Sale dated March 26, 1990 and an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication dated March 24, 1990. that Maguesun Corporation intentionally omitted her name as an adverse claimant, occupant
or adjoining owner in the application for registration submitted to the Land Registration
Notices of the initial hearing were sent by the Land Registration Authority (the National Land Authority such that the latter could not send her a Notice of Initial Hearing. As result, an
Titles and Deeds Registration Authority or NALTDRA) to Hilario Luna, Jose Gil and Leon Luna order of general default was issued and Maguesun Corporation's application for registration
on the basis of Maguesun Corporation's application for registration. Since Trinidad de Leon was granted. She charged Maguesun Corporation with knowledge or authorship of the fraud
vda. de Roxas was not named as an adjoining owner, occupant or adverse claimant, she was owing to the fact that Maguesun Corporation's president, Manolita Guevarra Suntay after
not sent a notice of the proceedings. Publication was made in the Official Gazette and the whom the corporation was named, was her niece. Manolita Suntay is the daughter of
Record Newsweekly.[2] After an Order of general default was issued, the trial court Lourdes Guevarra Suntay, a deceased cousin of petitioner Vda. de Roxas who used to help
proceeded to hear the land registration case. On October 4, 1990, the Land Registration with the latter's business affairs. Manolita Suntay used to take care of the registration and
Authority reported, among other things, that the subject parcels of land had previously been insurance of the latter's cars.[6]
applied for registration in Land Registration Case No. 500, GLRO Record No. 55072 at the The sole issue of the case, as laid down by the trial court after the pre-trial, was
Court of First Instance of Cavite by Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon but no decision has whether or not Vda. de Roxas' signatures on the Deed of Absolute Sale and the Affidavit of
been rendered thereon.[3] Eventually, on February 13, 1991 the Regional Trial Court granted Self-Adjudication in favor of Zenaida Melliza were forged. [7] Petitioner, who was then already
Maguesun Corporation's application for registration (Land Registration Case No. TG-373) in a 92 years of age, testified in open court on February 11, 1992 that she has never met Zenaida
three-page decision with the following dispositive portion:[4] Melliza, that she did not sell the subject lots and that her signatures on the Deed of Sale and
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication were forged.[8] A document examiner from the Philippine
"WHEREFORE, this Court gives imprimatur to the application for registration of said lands National Police (PNP) concluded that there was no forgery.[9] Upon petitioner's motion, the
described in plan As-04-000108? Lot Nos. 7231 and 7239, one with an area of 3,641 and the signatures were re-examined by another expert from the National Bureau of Investigation
22
The latter testified that the signatures on the questioned and sample documents were not that a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration be filed within one year
written by the same person.[10] Despite the foregoing testimonies and pronouncements, the from the date of entry of said decree, that the petitioner has a real and dominical right and
trial court dismissed the petition for review of decree of registration on April 15, the property has not yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser.[18]
1992.[11] Placing greater weight on the findings and testimony of the PNP document
examiner, it concluded that the questioned documents were not forged and if they were, it Fraud is of two kinds: actual or constructive. Actual or positive fraud proceeds from an
was Zenaida Melliza, and not Maguesun Corporation, who was responsible. Accordingly, intentional deception practiced by means of the misrepresentation or concealment of a
Maguesun Corporation did not commit actual fraud. The court further noted that petitioner material fact.[19] Constructive fraud is construed as a fraud because of its detrimental effect
Mrs. Trinidad Roxas had not been paying taxes for several years, which fact "exhibited what upon public interests and public or private confidence, even though the act is not done or
appeared to be unmistakeable signs of not actually owning (the lots) any more," and that her committed with an actual design to commit positive fraud or injury upon other persons.[20]
application for registration was "previously dismissed and abandoned," thus indicating that Fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud is regarded as intrinsic where the
"petitioner herself is aware that she had already lost . x x interest, if not actually her rights, fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action, or where the acts
over the property in question."[12] constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated therein, and is regarded as extrinsic
In a decision dated December 8, 1994,[13] respondent court denied the petition for where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court,
review and affirmed the findings of the trial court. The Court of Appeals held that petitioner or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in
failed to demonstrate that there was actual or extrinsic fraud, not merely constructive or which it is procured, so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy.[21]Extrinsic
intrinsic fraud, a prerequisite for purposes of annuling a judgment or reviewing a decree of fraud is also actual fraud, but collateral to the transaction sued upon.[22]
registration. Additionally, respondent court stated that the discrepancies or irregularities in The distinctions are significant because only actual fraud or extrinsic fraud has been
the Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Self-Adjudication pointed out by petitioner are not patent or accepted as grounds for a judgment to be annulled or, as in this case, a decree of registration
obvious, involve matters that are too trivial, requiring knowledge of the intricacies of the law reopened and reviewed.[23] In the oft-cited Macabingkil v. People's Homesite and Housing
and are "not necessarily and exclusively indicia of extrinsic fraud and/or bad faith especially Corporation case, the Court drew from American jurisprudence stating that "relief has been
when considered in the light of circumstances hereinafter discussed." The records also show, granted on the ground that, by some fraud practiced directly upon the party seeking relief
according to the appellate court, that Maguesun Corporation had not concealed from the against the judgment or decree, (and) that party has been prevented from presenting all of
court either the existence of petitioner or any interest she may have had in the registration his case to the court."[24] The "fraud" contemplated by the law in this case (Section 32, P.D.
proceedings. Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that publication of the initial hearing in the No. 1529) is actual and extrinsic, which includes, an intentional omission of fact required by
Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.[14] law.[25] For fraud to justify a review of a decree, it must be extrinsic or collateral, and the
Hence, the instant petition for review where it is alleged that the Court of Appeals facts upon which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in the case where the
erred in ruling that Maguesun Corporation did not commit actual fraud warranting the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered.[26] Persons who were fraudulently deprived of
setting aside of the registration decree and in resolving the appeal on the basis of Maguesun their opportunity to be heard in the original registration case are entitled to a review of a
Corporation's good faith. Petitioners pray that the registration of the subject lots in the name decree of registration.
of Maguesun Corporation be cancelled, that said property be adjudicated in favor of In Ramirez v. CA,[27] this Court adopted the Court of Appeals' ruling that the
petitioners and that respondent corporation pay moral damages not less than P100,000.00, suppression of the fact that the applicant spouses possessed the subject ricefield merely as
exemplary damages not less than P36,000.00 and attorney's fees of P60,000.00. antichretic creditors and the fraudulent concealment and misrepresentation in the
We find the petition for review impressed with merit. application that no other persons had any claim or interest in the said land, constitute
specific allegations of extrinsic fraud supported by competent proof. Failure and intentional
1. Registration of untitled land under the Torrens System is done pursuant to omission of the applicants to disclose the fact of actual physical possession by another
Presidential Decree No. 1529, the Property Registration Decree which amended and codified person constitutes an allegation of actual fraud.[28] Likewise, it is fraud to knowingly omit or
laws relative to registration of property.[15] Adjudication of land in a registration (or cadastral) conceal a fact, upon which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a third person. [29]
case does not become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after the
entry of the final decree. Before such time, the decision remains under the control and sound The Court here finds that respondent Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud in
discretion of the court rendering the decree, which court after hearing, may set aside the obtaining the decree of registration sought to be reviewed by petitioner.
decision or decree and adjudicate the land to another party. [16] Absence, minority or other Petitioner Vda. de Roxas contended that Maguesun Corporation intentionally omitted
disability of any person affected, or any proceeding in court for reversing judgments, are not their name, or that of the Roxas family, as having a claim to or as an occupant of the subject
considered grounds to reopen or revise said decree. However, the right of a person deprived property. In the corporation's application for registration filed with the trial court in LRC No.
of land or of any estate or interest therein by adjudication or confirmation of title obtained TG-373, the following declaration appears:
by actual fraud is recognized by law (Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529) as a valid
and legal basis for reopening and revising a decree of registration. [17] It is further required
23
"6. That the names in full and addresses, as far as known to the undersigned, of the owners petitioner was made principally in the Formal Offer of Exhibits for respondent corporation, in
of all adjoining properties; of the persons mentioned in paragraphs 3 and 5 (mortgagors, a Copy of Plan of Lots 7231 and 7239, tax declarations and as predecessor-in-interest.
encumbrancers, and occupants) and of the person shown on the plan as claimants are as However, this is not sufficient compliance with what the law requires to be stated in the
follows: application for registration. Disclosure of petitioner's adverse interest, occupation and
possession should be made at the appropriate time, i.e., at the time of the application for
Hilario Luna, Jose Gil. Leon Luna. Provincial Road all at Tagaytay City (no house No.)"[30] registration, otherwise, the persons concerned will not be sent notices of the initial hearing
and will, therefore, miss the opportunity to present their opposition or claims.
The highlighted words are typed in with a different typewriter, with the first five letters of 3. Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing was made in the Official Gazette and in
the word "provincial" typed over correction fluid. Magesun Corporation, however, annexed a the Record Newsweekly, admittedly not a newspaper of general circulation. The Court of
differently-worded application for the petition to review case (Civil Case No. TG-1183, Appeals held that pursuant to Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, publication in the
"Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas v. Maguesun Management and Development Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Said provision of law expressly states that
Corporation, et al."). In the copy submitted to the trial court, the answer to the same number "the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published
is as follows: once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer
Hilario Luna, Jose Gil, Leon Luna, Roxas.[31] jurisdiction upon the court. x x x"

While publication of the notice in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction
The discrepancy which is unexplained appears intentional. If the word "Roxas" were indeed upon the court, publication in a newspaper of general circulation remains an indispensable
erased and replaced with "Provincial Road all at Tagaytay City (no house No.)" in the original procedural requirement. Couched in mandatory terms, it is a component of procedural due
application submitted in LRC No. TG-373 but the copy with the word "Roxas" was submitted process and aimed at giving "as wide publicity as possible" so that all persons having an
to the trial court in Civil Case No. TG-1183, it is reasonable to assume that the reason is to adverse-interest in the land subject of the registration proceedings may be notified
mislead the court into thinking that "Roxas" was placed in the original application as an thereof.[34] Although jurisdiction of the court is not affected, the fact that publication was not
adjoining owner, encumbrancer, occupant or claimant, the same application which formed made in a newspaper of general circulation is material and relevant in assessing the
the basis for the Land Registration Authority in sending out notices of initial hearing. Section applicant's right or title to the land.
15 of Presidential Decree No 1529 also requires the applicant for registration to state the full
names and addresses of all occupants of the land and those of adjoining owners, if known 4. The allegations of forgery and the discrepancies in the documentary, as well as in the
and if not known, the extent of the search made to find them. Respondent corporation testimonial evidence regarding this issue which are all crucial to this case, compelled the
likewise failed to comply with this requirement of law. Court to undertake a careful review of the facts of the case.[35] A close scrutiny of the
evidence on record leads the Court to the irresistible conclusion that forgery was indeed
The truth is that the Roxas family had been in possession of the property attendant in the case at bar. Although there is no proof of respondent Maguesun
uninterruptedly through their caretaker, Jose Ramirez.[32] Respondent Maguesun Corporation Corporation's direct participation in the execution and preparation of the forged
also declared in number 5 of the same application that the subject land was unoccupied instruments, there are sufficient indicia which proves that Maguesun Corporation is not the
when in truth and in fact, the Roxas family caretaker resided in the subject property. "innocent purchaser for value" who merits the protection of the law.
Respondent corporation is likewise charged with the knowledge of such possession and
occupancy, for its President, who signed the Deed of Sale over the property, knew fully well In response to the questions fielded by the trial counsel and by counsel for petitioner,
that her grandaunt Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas owned the property. It is reasonable to PNP Document Examiner Zacarias Semacio sought to explain all the differences pointed out
expect her as a buyer to have inspected the property prior to the sale such that the in the questioned signatures and in the sample signatures as having been caused merely by
ascertainment of the current possessors or occupants could have been made facilely. "natural variation."[36] He concluded that the questioned signatures were not forged. In
Respondent corporation's intentional concealment and representation of petitioner's contrast, Chief of the Questioned Documents Division of the National Bureau of
interest in the subject lots as possessor, occupant and claimant constitutes actual fraud Investigation, Arcadio Ramos testified with more specificity as befits an expert that the
justifying the reopening and review of the decree of registration. Through such misfeasance, questioned and sample signatures were not written by one and the same person because of
the Roxas family was kept ignorant of the registration proceedings involving their property, "(t)he manner of execution of strokes the personalized proportional characteristics of letters;
thus effectively depriving them of their day in court. the linking/connecting between letters the structural pattern of letters and other minute
details x x x."[37] Moreover, petitioner Trinidad de Leon vda. deRoxas categorically declared
2. Respondent Court of Appeals held that Maguesun Corporation had not concealed that she has never met Zenaida Melliza and did not sell the subject property. [38] Petitioner,
from the court either the existence of Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas or any interest she may then over ninety years old, has no motive to attest to a falsehood. Petitioner and her family
have in the registration proceedings for the records are replete with references by Maguesun also own several other pieces of property, some of which are leased out as restaurants, e.g.
Corporation itself to petitioner.[33] Mention of the late President's name as well as that of Leo's Restaurant and Ma Mon Luk Restaurant.[39] This is an indication that petitioner is not
24
unaware of the value of her properties. Hence, it is unlikely that she would sell over thirteen Management & Development Corporation, et al.") promulgated on December 8, 1994 is
thousand square meters of prime property in Tagaytay City to a stranger for a hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Accordingly, registration of title over the subject parcels of
measly P200,000.00. Finally, even to a layman's eye, the documents, as well as the enlarged land, described in Plan AS-04-000108, Lot Nos. 7231 and 7239, with an area of 3,461 and
photographic exhibit of the signatures, reveal forgery. The questioned signatures taken from 10,674 square meters, respectively, as shown and supported by the corresponding technical
the Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Self-Adjudication are starkly different from the sample descriptions now forming part of the Records of LRC No. TG-373, is awarded to herein
signatures in several documents executed by petitioner. The questioned signatures are petitioner Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas and her heirs, herein substituted as petitioners.
smooth and rounded, and have none of the jagged and shaky character of petitioner's Upon finality of this Decision, the Land Registration Authority is hereby directed to ISSUE
signatures, characteristic of the penmanship of elderly persons. with reasonable dispatch the corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title
pursuant to Section 39 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.SO ORDERED.
There are also added considerations reflective of the dubious character of the Affidavit
of Self-Adjudication purportedly executed by petitioner.[40] In it she declares that she is a [17] Presidential Decree No. 1529, Section 32 provides :
resident of 22 8th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, when she actually lives in 2 Park Road,
North Forbes Park, Makati. She also states that she is the "sole heir of the late Manuel De "SEC. 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value. The decree of
Roxas who died sometime on the year 1944 at Manila." Petitioner's husband is President registration shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or
Manuel A. Roxas and she refers to herself as Trinidad de Leon vda. deRoxas. President Roxas other disability of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in
was survived by petitioner and their two children, Ma. Rosario Roxas and Gerardo Roxas any court for reversing judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person,
(who predeceased petitioner). The fact that petitioner was not the sole heir was known to including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any
the general public, as well as the demise of the late President on April 15, 1946 while estate or interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by
delivering a speech at Clark Field, Pampanga. The aforementioned irregularities are too actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial
glaring to have been ignored. If petitioner did in fact execute said Affidavit, there is no reason Court) a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not later
why she should state facts other than the unadulterated truth concerning herself and her than one year from and after the date of the entry of such decree of registration,
family. but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent
purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may
Additionally, Zenaida Melliza's non-appearance raises doubt as to her existence. Her be prejudiced. x x x" (Emphasis and words in parenthesis supplied.)
given address was Matina, Davao City. How was she related to petitioner and what led her to
purchase the subject property? Respondent corporation could very well have presented her The section is similar to the provision it replaced, Section 38, Act No. 496 as amended by Sec.
to prove the legitimacy of their transaction. If petitioner were selling said property, would 3, Act 3621 and Sec. 1, Act 3630.
she not have offered them first to interested relatives such as Manolita G. Suntay? Would an [37] TSN, February 18, 1992 in Civil Case No. TG-1183, p. 30. He explained in part that "(t)he
ordinary person sell more than thirteen thousand square meters of prime property first difference that I have mentioned here in this particular portion of combination
for P170,000.00 when it was earlier purchased for P200,000.00? These questions highlight of capital letter "T" and "R" in the questioned signature, the initial stroke of letter
several implausibilities in the alleged sale of the subject property by herein petitioner. As "T" is much lower to the base line and the small letter "r" is much higher; whereas,
Maguesun Corporation's President who is related to petitioner, Manolita G. Suntay should in the series of standards, it is either reverse or a little bit farther from the base
have verified the sale of the subject property by Zenaida Melliza. Manolita G. Suntay's line. The second difference is the placement of the "i" dot or the formation of the
closeness to petitioner Vda. de Roxas, as one who even registered the latter's car, suggests "i" dot is always starting to the right. This is the formation, and the location is
acquaintance with the late petitioner's properties as well as the possibility that she took below or before the small letter "i" and the other one is just above the small letter
advantage of such knowledge. "I"; whereas, in the series of standards, the formation is either starting to the right
From the foregoing, it is quite clear that respondent corporation cannot tack its or it is like a comma and then stubbing straight, stubbing to the right, stubbing to
possession to that of petitioner as predecessor-in-interest. Zenaida Melliza conveyed no title the right, but very seldom, but you can see the formation of the said "I" dot
over the subject parcels of land to Maguesun Corporation as she was not the owner stubbing to the left as exhibited here in the questioned signature. The next
thereof.[41] Maguesun Corporation is thus not entitled to the registration decree which the difference is the formation of the hump of small letter "m." The hump, your Honor,
trial court granted in its decision. Palpably, petitioner has not been interrupted in her more here is rounded; whereas, in the series of standards, it is angular, which is very
than thirty years of open, uninterrupted, exclusive and notorious possession in the concept much different, and that is significant in handwriting. The next difference is the
of an owner over the subject lots by the irregular transaction to Zenaida Melliza. She small letter "d." The small letter "d" in the questioned signature, the body is bigger
therefore retains title proper and sufficient for original registration over the two parcels of and the stem is shorter, as well as in small letter "d"; whereas, in the series of
land in question pursuant to Section 14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.[42] standards, it is the reverse or the opposite. The body is smaller and the stem is
much longer. Then, the particular portion there, the terminal stroke of letter "d" in
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of the first letter "d", it deviates or separates from the body on the base line which is
Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 38328 ("Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas v. Maguesun a little bit or half way from the body of small letter "d"; whereas, in the series of
25
standards, this is not curving but going straight and even beyond the base line and
it is angular in form. x x x" ( pp. 12-14 of the same TSN).
[42]
Sec. 14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 reads in part: "The following persons may file in
the proper Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court) an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.xxx xxx xxx."
26
[G.R. No. 151212. September 10, 2003] came to know that Barbara Galino sold the same property on April 24, 1998 to Cruz, who
TEN FORTY REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., Represented by its President, VERONICA G. immediately occupied the property and which occupation was merely tolerated by
LORENZANA, petitioner, vs. MARINA CRUZ, respondent. petitioner; on October 16, 1998, a complaint for ejectment was filed with the Barangay East
Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City but for failure to arrive at an amicable settlement, a Certificate to
DECISION File Action was issued; on April 12, 1999 a demand letter was sent to [respondent] to vacate
and pay reasonable amount for the use and occupation of the same, but was ignored by the
PANGANIBAN, J.: latter; and due to the refusal of [respondent] to vacate the premises, petitioner was
constrained to secure the services of a counsel for an agreed fee of P5,000.00 as attorneys
In an ejectment suit, the question of ownership may be provisionally ruled upon for the fee and P500.00 as appearance fee and incurred an expense of P5,000.00 for litigation.
sole purpose of determining who is entitled to possession de facto. In the present case, both
parties base their alleged right to possess on their right to own. Hence, the Court of Appeals In respondents Answer with Counterclaim, it was alleged that: petitioner is not qualified to
did not err in passing upon the question of ownership to be able to decide who was entitled own the residential lot in dispute, being a public land; according to Barbara Galino, she did
to physical possession of the disputed land. not sell her house and lot to petitioner but merely obtained a loan from Veronica
Lorenzana; the payment of the capital gains tax does not necessarily show that the Deed of
The Case Absolute Sale was at that time already in existence; the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter because the complaint was filed beyond the one (1) year period after the
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to alleged unlawful deprivation of possession; there is no allegation that petitioner had been in
nullify the August 31, 2001 Decision[2] and December 19, 2001 Resolution[3] of the Court of prior possession of the premises and the same was lost thru force, stealth or violence;
Appeals (CA) in CA- GR SP No. 64861. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision is as evidence will show that it was Barbara Galino who was in possession at the time of the sale
follows: and vacated the property in favor of respondent; never was there an occasion when
petitioner occupied a portion of the premises, before respondent occupied the lot in April
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the Decision dated 1998, she caused the cancellation of the tax declaration in the name of Barbara Galino and a
May 4, 2001 is hereby AFFIRMED.[4] new one issued in respondents name; petitioner obtained its tax declaration over the same
property on November 3, 1998, seven (7) months [after] the respondent [obtained hers]; at
the time the house and lot [were] bought by respondent, the house was not habitable, the
The assailed Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
power and water connections were disconnected; being a public land, respondent filed a
miscellaneous sales application with the Community Environment and Natural Resources
The Facts
Office in Olongapo City;and the action for ejectment cannot succeed where it appears that
respondent had been in possession of the property prior to the petitioner.[5]
The facts of the case are narrated by the CA as follows:

In a Decision[6] dated October 30, 2000, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC)
A complaint for ejectment was filed by [Petitioner Ten Forty Realty and Development ordered respondent to vacate the property and surrender to petitioner possession thereof. It
Corporation] against x x x [Respondent Marina Cruz] before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities also directed her to pay, as damages for its continued unlawful use, P500 a month from April
(MTCC) of Olongapo City, docketed as Civil Case 4269, which alleged that: petitioner is the 24, 1999 until the property was vacated, P5,000 as attorneys fees, and the costs of the suit.
true and absolute owner of a parcel of lot and residential house situated in #71 18th Street,
E.B.B. Olongapo City, particularly described as: On appeal, the Regional Trial Court[7] (RTC) of Olongapo City (Branch 72) reversed the
MTCC. The RTC ruled as follows: 1) respondents entry into the property was not by mere
A parcel of residential house and lot situated in the above-mentioned address containing an tolerance of petitioner, but by virtue of a Waiver and Transfer of Possessory Rights and Deed
area of 324 square meters more or less bounded on the Northeast by 041 (Lot 255, Ts-308); of Sale in her favor; 2) the execution of the Deed of Sale without actual transfer of the
on the Southeast by 044 (Lot 255, Ts-308); on the Southwest by 043 (Lot 226-A & 18th street) physical possession did not have the effect of making petitioner the owner of the property,
and on the Northwest by 045 (Lot 227, Ts-308) and declared for taxation purposes in the because there was no delivery of the object of the sale as provided for in Article 1428 of the
name of [petitioner] under T.D. No. 002-4595-R and 002-4596. Civil Code; and 3) being a corporation, petitioner was disqualified from acquiring the
property, which was public land.
having acquired the same on December 5, 1996 from Barbara Galino by virtue of a Deed of Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Absolute Sale; the sale was acknowledged by said Barbara Galino through a 'Katunayan';
payment of the capital gains tax for the transfer of the property was evidenced by a Sustaining the RTC, the CA held that petitioner had failed to make a case for unlawful
Certification Authorizing Registration issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue; petitioner detainer, because no contract -- express or implied -- had been entered into by the parties
27
with regard to possession of the property. It ruled that the action should have been for A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word tolerance confirms our view
forcible entry, in which prior physical possession was indispensable -- a circumstance heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession
petitioner had not shown either. sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer not of
forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two
The appellate court also held that petitioner had challenged the RTCs ruling on the reasons. First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the
question of ownership for the purpose of compensating for the latters failure to counter such possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress in the inferior court provided
ruling. The RTC had held that, as a corporation, petitioner had no right to acquire the for in the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then
property which was alienable public land. the remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to
Hence, this Petition.[8] seek relief in the inferior court. Second, if a forcible entry action in the inferior court is
allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that no action for
Issues forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in physical
possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court upon a plea of
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration: tolerance to prevent prescription to set in and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a
conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals had clearly erred in not holding that forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that the one year time bar
[r]espondents occupation or possession of the property in question was to suit is but in pursuance of the summary nature of the action.[14]
merely through the tolerance or permission of the herein [p]etitioner;
In this case, the Complaint and the other pleadings do not recite any averment of
[2.] The Honorable Court of Appeals had likewise erred in holding that the fact that would substantiate the claim of petitioner that it permitted or tolerated the
ejectment case should have been a forcible entry case where prior occupation of the property by Respondent Cruz. The Complaint contains only bare
physical possession is indispensable; and allegations that 1) respondent immediately occupied the subject property after its sale to
her, an action merely tolerated by petitioner;[15] and 2) her allegedly illegal occupation of the
[3.] The Honorable Court of Appeals had also erred when it ruled that the herein premises was by mere tolerance.[16]
[r]espondents possession or occupation of the said property is in the
These allegations contradict, rather than support, petitioners theory that its cause of
nature of an exercise of ownership which should put the herein
action is for unlawful detainer. First, these arguments advance the view that respondents
[p]etitioner on guard.[9]
occupation of the property was unlawful at its inception. Second, they counter the essential
requirement in unlawful detainer cases that petitioners supposed act of sufferance or
The Courts Ruling tolerance must be present right from the start of a possession that is later sought to be
The Petition has no merit. recovered.[17]
First Issue:Alleged Occupation by Tolerance
As the bare allegation of petitioners tolerance of respondents occupation of the
Petitioner faults the CA for not holding that the former merely tolerated respondents premises has not been proven, the possession should be deemed illegal from the
occupation of the subject property. By raising this issue, petitioner is in effect asking this beginning.Thus, the CA correctly ruled that the ejectment case should have been for forcible
Court to reassess factual findings. As a general rule, this kind of reassessment cannot be done entry -- an action that had already prescribed, however, when the Complaint was filed on
through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, because this May 12, 1999. The prescriptive period of one year for forcible entry cases is reckoned from
Court is not a trier of facts; it reviews only questions of law. [10] Petitioner has not given us the date of respondents actual entry into the land, which in this case was on April 24, 1998.
ample reasons to depart from the general rule.

On the basis of the facts found by the CA and the RTC, we find that petitioner failed to Second Issue:Nature of the Case
substantiate its case for unlawful detainer. Admittedly, no express contract existed between Much of the difficulty in the present controversy stems from the legal characterization
the parties. Not shown either was the corporations alleged tolerance of respondents of the ejectment Complaint filed by petitioner. Specifically, was it for unlawful detainer or for
possession. forcible entry?
While possession by tolerance may initially be lawful, it ceases to be so upon the The answer is given in Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which we reproduce
owners demand that the possessor by tolerance vacate the property.[11] To justify an action as follows:
for unlawful detainer, the permission or tolerance must have been present at the beginning
of the possession.[12] Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for
unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy. Sarona v. Villegas[13] elucidates thus:
28
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. - Subject to the provisions of the next However, what was actually proven by petitioner was that possession by respondent
succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, had been illegal from the beginning. While the Complaint was crafted to be an unlawful
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against detainer suit, petitioners real cause of action was for forcible entry, which had already
whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or prescribed. Consequently, the MTCC had no more jurisdiction over the action.
termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or
the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, The appellate court, therefore, did not err when it ruled that petitioners Complaint for
at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, unlawful detainer was a mere subterfuge or a disguised substitute action for forcible entry,
bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully which had already prescribed. To repeat, to maintain a viable action for forcible entry,
withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for plaintiff must have been in prior physical possession of the property; this is an essential
the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs. element of the suit.[29]

Third Issue:Alleged Acts of Ownership


While both causes of action deal only with the sole issue of physical or de
facto possession,[18] the two cases are really separate and distinct, as explained below: Petitioner next questions the CAs pronouncement that respondents occupation of the
property was an exercise of a right flowing from a claim of ownership. It submits that the
appellate court should not have passed upon the issue of ownership, because the only
x x x. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means of
question for resolution in an ejectment suit is that of possession de facto.
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully
withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold Clearly, each of the parties claimed the right to possess the disputed property because
possession under any contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal of alleged ownership of it. Hence, no error could have been imputed to the appellate court
from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto. In when it passed upon the issue of ownership only for the purpose of resolving the issue of
unlawful detainer, the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the possession de facto.[30] The CAs holding is moreover in accord with jurisprudence and the
expiration or termination of the right to possess, hence the issue of rightful possession is law.
decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiffs cause of
action is the termination of the defendants right to continue in possession. Execution of a Deed of Sale Not Sufficient as Delivery

In a contract of sale, the buyer acquires the thing sold only upon its delivery in any of
What determines the cause of action is the nature of defendants entry into the land. If the
the ways specified in Articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other manner signifying an agreement
entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the intruder within one year
that the possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee.[31] With respect to
therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the other hand, the entry is legal but the possession
incorporeal property, Article 1498 lays down the general rule: the execution of a public
thereafter became illegal, the case is one of unlawful detainer which must be filed within one
instrument shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing that is the object of the contract if,
year from the date of the last demand.[19]
from the deed, the contrary does not appear or cannot be clearly inferred.

It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has However, ownership is transferred not by contract but by tradition or
jurisdiction over it are the allegations in the complaint[20] and the character of the relief delivery.[32] Nowhere in the Civil Code is it provided that the execution of a Deed of Sale is
sought.[21] a conclusivepresumption of delivery of possession of a piece of real estate.[33]

In its Complaint, petitioner alleged that, having acquired the subject property from This Court has held that the execution of a public instrument gives rise only to a prima
Barbara Galino on December 5, 1996,[22] it was the true and absolute owner[23] thereof; that facie presumption of delivery. Such presumption is destroyed when the delivery is not
Galino had sold the property to Respondent Cruz on April 24, 1998;[24] that after the sale, the effected because of a legal impediment.[34] Pasagui v. Villablanca[35] had earlier ruled that
latter immediately occupied the property, an action that was merely tolerated by such constructive or symbolic delivery, being merely presumptive, was deemed negated by
petitioner;[25] and that, in a letter given to respondent on April 12, 1999,[26] petitioner had the failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the land sold.
demanded that the former vacate the property, but that she refused to do so.[27]Petitioner
It is undisputed that petitioner did not occupy the property from the time it was
thereupon prayed for judgment ordering her to vacate the property and to pay reasonable
allegedly sold to it on December 5, 1996 or at any time thereafter. Nonetheless, it maintains
rentals for the use of the premises, attorneys fees and the costs of the suit.[28]
that Galinos continued stay in the premises from the time of the sale up to the time
The above allegations appeared to show the elements of unlawful detainer. They also respondents occupation of the same on April 24, 1998, was possession held on its behalf and
conferred initiatory jurisdiction on the MTCC, because the case was filed a month after the had the effect of delivery under the law.[36]
last demand to vacate -- hence, within the one-year prescriptive period.
Both the RTC and the CA disagreed. According to the RTC, petitioner did not gain
control and possession of the property, because Galino had continued to exercise ownership
29
rights over the realty. That is, she had remained in possession, continued to declare it as her Earlier, we ruled that the subject property had not been delivered to petitioner; hence,
property for tax purposes and sold it to respondent in 1998. it did not acquire possession either materially or symbolically. As between the two buyers,
therefore, respondent was first in actual possession of the property.
For its part, the CA found it highly unbelievable that petitioner -- which claims to be the
owner of the disputed property -- would tolerate possession of the property by respondent Petitioner has not proven that respondent was aware that her mode of acquiring the
from April 24, 1998 up to October 16, 1998. How could it have been so tolerant despite its property was defective at the time she acquired it from Galino. At the time, the property --
knowledge that the property had been sold to her, and that it was by virtue of that sale that which was public land -- had not been registered in the name of Galino; thus, respondent
she had undertaken major repairs and improvements on it? relied on the tax declarations thereon. As shown, the formers name appeared on the tax
declarations for the property until its sale to the latter in 1998. Galino was in fact occupying
Petitioner should have likewise been put on guard by respondents declaration of the the realty when respondent took over possession. Thus, there was no circumstance that
property for tax purposes on April 23, 1998,[37] as annotated in the tax certificate filed could have placed the latter upon inquiry or required her to further investigate petitioners
seven months later.[38] Verily, the tax declaration represented an adverse claim over the right of ownership.
unregistered property and was inimical to the right of petitioner.

Indeed, the above circumstances derogated its claim of control and possession of the
property. Disqualification from Ownership of Alienable Public Land
Order of Preference in Double Sale of Immovable Property Private corporations are disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain, as
The ownership of immovable property sold to two different buyers at different times is provided under Section 3 of Article XII of the Constitution, which we quote:
governed by Article 1544 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows:
Sec. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral
Article 1544. x x x lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by
law according to the uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public
domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding
in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property. twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the
Philippines may not lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant. x x x. (Italics supplied)
was first in possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest
title, provided there is good faith. While corporations cannot acquire land of the public domain, they can however
acquire private land.[46] Hence, the next issue that needs to be resolved is the determination
Galino allegedly sold the property in question to petitioner on December 5, 1996 and, of whether the disputed property is private land or of the public domain.
subsequently, to respondent on April 24, 1998. Petitioner thus argues that being the first
buyer, it has a better right to own the realty. However, it has not been able to establish that According to the certification by the City Planning and Development Office of Olongapo
its Deed of Sale was recorded in the Registry of Deeds of Olongapo City.[39] Its claim of an City, the contested property in this case is alienable and disposable public land. [47] It was for
unattested and unverified notation on its Deed of Absolute Sale[40] is not equivalent to this reason that respondent filed a miscellaneous sales application to acquire it.[48]
registration. It admits that, indeed, the sale has not been recorded in the Registry of
On the other hand, petitioner has not presented proof that, at the time it purchased
Deeds.[41]
the property from Galino, the property had ceased to be of the public domain and was
In the absence of the required inscription, the law gives preferential right to the buyer already private land. The established rule is that alienable and disposable land of the public
who in good faith is first in possession. In determining the question of who is first in domain held and occupied by a possessor -- personally or through predecessors-in-interest,
possession, certain basic parameters have been established by jurisprudence. openly, continuously, and exclusively for 30 years -- is ipso jure converted to private property
by the mere lapse of time.[49]
First, the possession mentioned in Article 1544 includes not only material but also
symbolic possession.[42] Second, possessors in good faith are those who are not aware of any In view of the foregoing, we affirm the appellate courts ruling that respondent is
flaw in their title or mode of acquisition.[43] Third, buyers of real property that is in the entitled to possession de facto. This determination, however, is only provisional in
possession of persons other than the seller must be wary -- they must investigate the rights nature.[50]Well-settled is the rule that an award of possession de facto over a piece of
of the possessors.[44] Fourth, good faith is always presumed; upon those who allege bad faith property does not constitute res judicata as to the issue of its ownership.[51]
on the part of the possessors rests the burden of proof.[45]
30
WHEREFORE, this Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against well as technical description and other documents presented, that the land sought to be
petitioner. registered is agricultural and not within any forest zone or public domain; and that tacking
her predecessors-in-interests possession to hers, applicant appears to be in continuous and
SO ORDERED. public possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years.[4]
[G.R. No. 150413. July 1, 2003]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ALEXANDRA LAO, respondent. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

DECISION WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places
under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Registration Law, the land described in Plan Ap-04-007770 and containing an area of nine
thousand three hundred forty-nine (9,349) square meters as supported by its technical
This petition for review assails the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced
56230, which affirmed the judgment[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, in the name of ALEXANDRA A. LAO, of legal age, married to NELSON O. LAO, Filipino citizen,
in Land Registration Case No. TG-719. with residence at 1648 Yakal Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila.
On September 4, 1995, respondent Alexandra Lao filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Tagaytay City, Branch 18, an application for the registration of title over a parcel of land Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration
designated as Lot No. 3951, Cad. 452-D, Silang Cadastre, Plan Ap-04-007770, consisting of shall forthwith issue.
nine thousand three hundred forty nine (9,349) square meters under Presidential Decree No.
1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. Respondent alleged that she SO ORDERED.[5]
acquired the land by purchase from the siblings Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria A.
Valenzuela, who inherited it from Generosa Medina. The latter, in turn, inherited the land
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
from her father, Jose Medina, who acquired the same from Edilberto Perido by transfer.
General, appealed to the Court of Appeals which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 56230.On
In the alternative, respondent prayed that the land be awarded to her under the October 15, 2001, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.[6] Hence, this
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, also known as the Public Land Act, petition for review raising the following errors:
based on her and her predecessors open, public, actual, continuous, exclusive, notorious and
adverse possession and occupancy under bona fide claim of ownership for more than thirty THERE IS NO SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO WARRANT THE ORIGINAL REGISTRATION OF TITLE OF
(30) years. SUBJECT PROPERTY IN THE NAME OF RESPONDENT.[7]
At the hearing in the lower court, respondent presented the following witnesses:
Candido Amoroso, who testified on the ownership of the land by Edilberto Perido in 1932; A. RESPONDENT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE LEGALLY REQUIRED PERIOD AND
Vicente Laudato, who testified on respondents purchase of the property from Raymundo and ACTS OF POSSESSION.[8]
Ma. Victoria; and Fina Victoria So-Liwanag, who assisted respondent in her application for B. THE TAX DECLARATIONS PRESENTED BY RESPONDENT DO NOT CORROBORATE
registration. Respondent likewise presented in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale [3] dated HER CLAIM OF THE LEGALLY REQUIRED PERIOD OF POSSESSION.[9]
April 19, 1994 executed by Raymundo and Victoria in her favor, the survey plan and technical
description of the property, and the tax declarations in the name of respondent as well as C. RESPONDENT FAILED TO PRESENT A CERTIFICATION FROM THE APPROPRIATE
her predecessors-in-interest. GOVERNMENT AGENCY THAT THE LAND SUBJECT OF HER APPLICATION FOR
REGISTRATION IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LAND OF THE PUBLIC
On June 28, 1996, the trial court made the following findings, to wit: DOMAIN.[10]

x x x the applicant acquired the subject parcel of land by purchase from Raymundo Noguera In sum, the issues presented before us are (a) whether or not respondent was able to
and Ma. Victoria A. Valenzuela in 1994, and that applicant and her predecessors-in-interest prove, by the quantum of evidence mandated by law, that she met the required period of
have been in continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, adverse and in the concept of an open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession, in the concept of an owner, of the
owner possession of the subject parcel of land for more than thirty (30) years now; and that subject parcel of land; and (b) whether or not respondent was able to show that the land
the same parcel was declared for taxation purposes; that the realty taxes due thereon have subject of her application was disposable and alienable land of the public domain.
been duly paid; that the land involved in this case is not covered by any land patent. Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 states:
Likewise, this Court could well-discern from the survey plan covering the same property, as
31
Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an The aforequoted ruling was reiterated in Republic v. Court of Appeals,[12] thus:
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives: This Court has held in Republic vs. Doldol [295 SCRA 359, (1998)] that, originally, Section
48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of the public domain
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessor-in-interest have been in open, since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No. 1942 which provided for a simple thirty-
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or title. The same, however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073,
earlier. approved on January 25, 1977. As amended Section 48 (b) now reads:

On the other hand, Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1073, provides: continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or
The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except
hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have
disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in- certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.
Petitioner argues that respondent failed to prove by incontrovertible evidence that she
Thus, before one can register his title over a parcel of land, the applicant must show had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
that (a) he, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous, subject land, in the concept of an owner, since June 12, 1945 or earlier. According to
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona petitioner, respondents witnesses did not state the exact period when respondents
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier; and (b) the land subject of the predecessors-in-interest started occupying the subject land. They only made sweeping
application is alienable and disposable land of the public domain. statements to the effect that respondent had been in possession of the property for more
than thirty years. Hence, it can not be conclusively determined whether respondent and her
Respondent submits that Section 48 (b) of CA 141 was amended by Republic Act No. predecessors-in-interest have truly been in possession of the property since June 12, 1945 or
6940, which reduced the required period of possession to thirty years immediately prior to earlier. Furthermore, respondent failed to show how the property was transferred from
the filing of the application. Said law became effective on April 15, 1990. However, petitioner Generosa Medina to Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria A. Valenzuela. No extrajudicial
maintains that the required period of possession remained the same. RA 6940 explicitly settlement of property was established. Consequently, respondent can not tack her
states that its provisions amended sections 44, 45 and 47 of CA 141. Nothing in RA 6940 possession with those of Generosa Medina and her predecessors-in-interest.
amends Section 48 (b). In other words, the requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title set forth therein remains the same, namely, (1) possession of the subject There is merit in the petition.
land from June 12, 1945, and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable Candido Amoroso, respondents first witness, testified that he first knew of the
land of the public domain. In Public Estates Authority v. Court of Appeals,[11] we held that: property in 1932 and that it was owned by a certain Edilberto Perido. However, no evidence
was presented to support his claim. Respondent submitted the tax declarations in the name
Under the public land act, judicial confirmation of imperfect title required possession en of her predecessors-in-interest, including that of Edilberto. However, the earliest of these
concepto de dueo since time immemorial, or since July 26, 1894. Under C.A. No. 141, this documents pertained to the year 1948 only, three years short of the required
requirement was retained. However, on June 22, 1957, Republic Act No. 1942 was enacted period. Respondents other witness, Vicente Laudato, claimed that he had known about the
amending C.A. No. 141. This later enactment required adverse possession for a period of only property since he was ten years old, which was in 1945, and that Edilberto Perido owned the
thirty (30) years. On January 25, 1977, the President enacted P.D. No. 1073, further property. On cross-examination, however, he testified that he based his information on
amending C.A. No. 141, extending the period for filing applications for judicial confirmation Edilbertos ownership of the land on the fact that the latter used to greet him and his family
of imperfect or incomplete titles to December 31, 1987. Under this decree, the provisions of whenever he passed by their house. Vicente later on admitted that he did not know with
Section 48 (b) and Section 48 (c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in certainty whether Edilberto was indeed the owner and possessor of the property. [13]
the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable land of the public
domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and Finally, respondent failed to present the extrajudicial settlement or other document
occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide evidencing the transfer of the land from Generosa Medina to Raymundo Noguera and Ma.
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945. Victoria A. Valenzuela. She likewise did not show the relationship between these parties. She
only presented the deed of sale between her and the latter, where it was stated that
32
Raymundo and Ma. Victoria inherited the property from Generosa. Hence, respondent can It was rather sweeping for the appellate court to rule that after an applicant files his
not tack her possession with those of Generosa and her predecessors-in-interest. At most, application for registration, the burden shifts totally to the government to prove that the
respondents possession can only be reckoned from the time that Raymundo and Ma. Victoria land forms part of the unclassified forest zone. The ruling in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director
claimed possession of the property. of Forestry (126 SCRA 69) governs applications for confirmation of imperfect title. The
applicant shoulders the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be
Respondent having thus failed to show by incontrovertible evidence that her registered forms part of the public domain.
possession of the land commenced on June 12, 1945 or earlier, she failed to meet the first
requisite under the pertinent provisions of PD 1529 and CA 141.
Moreover, the absence of opposition from the government agencies is of no moment
Petitioner further submits that respondent failed to show that the land subject of her because the State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or
application is classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Under the agents.[22]
Regalian doctrine which is embodied in our Constitution,[14] all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. [15] All It bears stressing at this point that declassification of forest land and its conversion into
lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes requires an express and
State.[16] Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private positive act from the government.[23] It cannot be presumed; but must be established by
person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain.[17] To overcome this convincing proof.[24]
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the
application is alienable or disposable.[18] Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 56230 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application for
In De Ocampo v. Arlos,[19] it was held that: original registration of title over Lot No. 3951, Cad. 452-D, Silang Cadastre, Plan Ap-04-
007770, which was docketed as Land Registration Case No. TG-719 before the Regional Trial
Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, is DENIED.
x x x a title may be judicially confirmed under Section 48 of the Public Land Act only if it
pertains to alienable lands of the public domain. Unless such assets are reclassified and SO ORDERED.
considered disposable and alienable, occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter
how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. Verily, Presidential Decree
No. 1073 clarified Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act by specifically declaring that the latter
applied only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.

In the case at bar, no certification from the appropriate government agency or official
proclamation reclassifying the land as alienable and disposable was presented by
respondent. Respondent merely submitted the survey map and technical descriptions of the
land, which contained no information regarding the classification of the property.These
documents are not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the land sought to be
registered forms part of the public domain.

Respondent argues that she was not required to present any certification stating that
the land is open for disposition because no opposition to her application was ever made by
the appropriate government agencies. She claims that in the absence of any proof to the
contrary, lands of the public domain are agricultural in nature and thus susceptible to private
ownership.

As an applicant for registration of a parcel of land, respondent had the initial obligation
to show that the property involved is agricultural. Being the interested party, it was
incumbent upon her to prove that the land being registered is indeed alienable or
disposable. She cannot rely on the mere presumption that it was agricultural and, therefore,
alienable part of the public domain.[20] Thus, in Director of Lands v. Funtilar,[21] we held:
33
[G.R. No. 107427. January 25, 2000] On May 3, 1989, the lower court issued an Order granting the application of petitioner. [9] The
Solicitor General promptly appealed to respondent Court which, on June 29, 1992, reversed
JAMES R. BRACEWELL, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF and set aside the lower courts Order.[10] It also denied petitioners Motion for
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Reconsideration in its Resolution of September 30, 1992.[11]

DECISION Hence, the instant Petition anchored upon the following grounds -

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: "I. The Honorable Court of Appeals ERRED in finding that the
commencement of thirty 30) year period mandated under Sec. 48 (b )
shall commence only on March 27, 1972 in accordance with the
Before us is a petition to affirm the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 58, in
classification made by the Bureau of Forestry in First (1st) Indorsement
LRC Case No. M-77,[1] which was reversed by respondent Court of Appeals in its Decision
dated August 20, 1986.
dated June 29, 1992 in CA-G.R. CV No. 26122.[2] Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was
denied by respondent court on September 30, 1992.[3]
II. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed an ERROR in DRAWING
conclusion and inference that prior to the declaration by the Bureau of
The controversy involves a total of nine thousand six hundred fifty-seven (9,657) square
Forestry in Marc 27; 1972, the parcels of land sought to be registered by
meters of land located in Las Pias, Metro Manila. The facts show that sometime in 1908,
Applicant was part of the forest land or forest reserves.
Maria Cailles, married to James Bracewell, Sr., acquired the said parcels of land from the
Dalandan and Jimenez families of Las Pias; after which corresponding Tax Declarations were
issued in the name of Maria Cailles. On January 16, 1961, Maria Cailles sold the said parcels III. The Honorable Court of Appeals ERRED and failed to consider VESTED
of land to her son, the petitioner, by virtue of a Deed of Sale which was duly annotated and RIGHTS of the applicant-appellant and his predecessors-in-interest land
registered with the Registry of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal. Tax Declarations were thereafter issued occupied from 1908."[12]
in the name of petitioner, cancelling the previous Tax Declarations issued to Maria Cailles.
The controversy is simple. On one hand, petitioner asserts his right of title to the subject land
On September 19, 1963, petitioner filed before the then Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal under Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, having by himself and through his
an action for confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. predecessors-in-interest been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
141.[4]The case was docketed as L.R.C. Case No.4328. On February 21, 1964, the Director of occupation of the subject parcels of land, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
Lands, represented by the Solicitor General, opposed petitioners application on the grounds ownership, since 1908. On the other hand it is the respondents position that since the
that neither he nor his predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the subject land subject parcels of land were only classified as alienable or disposable on March 27,
nor have they been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation 1972,[13] petitioner did not have any title to confirm when he filed his application in 1963.
of the same for at least thirty (30) years prior to the application, and that the subject land is Neither was the requisite thirty years possession met.
part of the public domain.[5]
We agree with respondents.
The registration proceedings were meanwhile suspended on account of an action filed by
Crescencio Leonardo against Maria Cailles before the then Court of First Instance of Pasig, In Republic vs. Doldol,[14] the requisites to acquire title to public land were laid down, as
Rizal. The case was finally disposed of by this Court in G.R. No. 5263 where the rights of follows --
Maria Cailles were upheld over those of the oppositor Leonardo.[6]
"x x x. The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession
On March 26, 1985, the entire records of the registration case were forwarded to the Makati and occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This
Regional Trial Court[7] where it was docketed as Land Registration Case No. M-77. The was superseded b R.A. No. 1942 which provided for a simple thirty-year
Solicitor General resubmitted his opposition to the application on July 22, 1985, [8] this time prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation
alleging the following additional grounds: (1) the failure of petitioner to prosecute his action of imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended by
for an unreasonable length of time; and (2) that the tax declarations attached to the Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977. As
complaint do not constitute acquisition of the lands applied for. Manikx amended, Section 48(b) now reads: Maniks
34
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest We have stated earlier that at the time the homestead patent was issued
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and to petitioners predecessor-in-interest, the subject land belong to the
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona inalienable and undisposable portion of the public domain. Thus, any title
fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, issued in their name by mistake or oversight is void ab initio because at
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of the time the homestead parent was issued to petitioners, as successors-
title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be in-interest of the original patent applicant, the Director of Lands was not
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a then authorized to dispose of the same because the area was not yet
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the classified as disposable public land. Consequently, the title issued to
provisions of this chapter." (italicized in the original) herein petitioners by the Bur au of Lands is void ab initio."

Thus, in the aforecited Republic vs. CA case, we stated that the Public Prior to March 27, 1972, when the subject parcels of land were classified as inalienable or
Land Act requires that the applicant must prove (a) that the land is indisposable, therefore, the same could not be the subject of confirmation of imperfect title.
alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and There can be no imperfect title to be confirmed over lands not yet classified as disposable or
notorious possession and occupation of the same must be since time alienable.[17] In the absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified public land
immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the until released therefrom and open to disposition.[18] Indeed, it has been held that the rules
conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by on the confirmation of imperfect title do not apply unless and until the land classified as
operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
the necessity of a certificate of title being issued." disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.[19]

Clear from the above is the requirement that the applicant must prove that the land is Neither has petitioner shown proof that the subject Forestry Administrative Order recognizes
alienable public land. On this score, we agree with respondents that petitioner failed to show private or vested rights under which his case may fall. We only find on record the
that the parcels of land subject of his application are alienable or disposable. On the Indorsement of the Bureau of Forest Development[20] from which no indication of such
contrary, it was conclusively shown by the government that the same were only classified as exemption may be gleaned.
alienable or disposable on March 27, 1972. Thus, even granting that petitioner and his
predecessors-in-interest had occupied the same since 1908, he still cannot claim title thereto Having found petitioner to have no cause of action for his application for confirmation of
by virtue of such possession since the subject parcels of land were not yet alienable land at imperfect title, we see no need to discuss the other errors raised in this petition.
that time nor capable of private appropriation. The adverse possession which may be the
basis of a grant of title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
disposable portions of the public domain.[15]
No pronouncement as to costs.

A similar situation existed in the case of Reyes v. Court of Appeals,[16] where a homestead
SO ORDERED.
patent issued to the petitioners predecessor-in-interest was cancelled on the ground t at at
the time it was issued, the subject land was still part of the public domain. In the said case,
this Court ruled as follows --

"Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership
in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. This same
doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State (Director
of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 219 SCRA 340). Manikan

Hence, the burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State


ownership of lands of the public domain is on the person applying for
registration. The applicant must show that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable. This petitioners failed to do.
35
G.R. No. 177947 November 27, 2008
SPS. GABRIEL LLANES and MARIA LLANES,Petitioners, In 1965, Gabriels brother, Servillano Llanes (Servillano), purchased the subject property from
- versus - Eugenia. Servillano personally cultivated the subject property by planting it with rice, and
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondent.
then later with coconut.[10] Servillano, together with his wife, Rita Valencia (Rita), declared
DECISION the subject property for taxation purposes under Tax Declarations No. 14051[11] (1966), No.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
1788[12] (1969), No. 1341[13] (1974), No. 0220[14] (1980), No. 00645[15] (1982), and No. 011-
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised
00310[16](1994).
Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision[1] dated 31 January

2007 and Resolution[2] dated 11 April 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
On 29 December 1995, the subject property came into the possession of the Spouses Llanes
80021. In its assailed Decision, the appellate court granted the appeal of herein respondent,
when they purchased the same from Servillano and Rita. The said transaction was evidenced
Republic of the Philippines (Republic), and dismissed the Application for Registration of Title
by a Kasulatan ng Bilihan.[17] Gabriel himself cultivated the subject property and planted it
of herein petitioners, Spouses Gabriel and Maria Llanes (Spouses Llanes); consequently, it set
with rice, coffee, and black pepper.[18] The Spouses Llanes religiously paid[19] real property
aside the Decision[3] dated 10 July 2003 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Malvar-
taxes on the subject property, as evidenced by their current Tax Declaration No. 011-
Balete, Batangas, in LRC Case No. N-073. In its assailed Resolution, the appellate court denied
00474[20] and Tax Clearance[21] issued by the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Malvar,
the Spouses Llanes Motion for Reconsideration.
Batangas.

The facts of this case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
In 1996, however, the Spouses Llanes conveyed the subject property to ICTSI Warehousing,

Inc. (ICTSI), by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale.[22]


The Spouses Llanes applied for registration of their title over a parcel of land known as Lot

No. 5812 of Plan AP-04-009967, Malvar Cadastre, with an area of 4,014 square meters,
On 10 April 1997, ICTSI filed an application for registration of title over the subject
located in San Juan, Malvar, Batangas (subject property).
property before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tanauan, Batangas, where the case was

docketed as LRC Case No. T-349.[23]


The subject property had been in the possession of Gabriels grandmother, Eugenia Valencia

(Eugenia), since the 1930s. She declared the said property for taxation purposes as evidenced
On 12 May 1999, ICTSI filed before the RTC a Motion with Leave of Court to Amend
by Tax Declarations No. 3470[4] (1948); No. 8942[5] (1955); and No. 12338,[6] No. 12365,[7] and
Application for Registration of Title together with the Amended Application. It alleged that
No. 12371[8] (1963). It was classified as agricultural land and was being cultivated by Eugenias
due to technicality, the sale between ICTSI and the Spouses Llanes could not push
son and Gabriels father, Francisco Llanes (Francisco). Francisco planted the subject property
through. The tax declaration covering the subject property was still in the names of the
with rice.[9]
Spouses Llanes and could not be transferred and declared in the name of ICTSI. Hence, there

was a need to amend the application for registration of title to substitute ICTSI with the

Spouses Llanes as party applicants.[24] In an Order dated 24 May 1999,[25] as modified by the
36
Order dated 15 June 1999,[26] the RTC granted the Motion with Leave of Court to Amend the Spouses Llanes application to the MCTC, where the case was docketed as LRC Case No. N-

Application for Registration of Title and admitted the Amended Application for Registration 073.

of Title, thus substituting the Spouses Llanes as the party applicants in LRC Case No. T-349.[27]
The Spouses Llanes filed their formal offer of evidence before the MCTC. Among

When LRC Case No. T-349 was called for initial hearing, the Spouses Llanes presented several the evidence they submitted were the Certifications issued by the Department of

documents[28] to show compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of notice, posting, Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) IV, Forest Management Bureau (FMB) [34] dated 9

and publication, which were admitted by the RTC. March 2000 and by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO),

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed before the RTC its Notice of Batangas City[35] dated 15 June 2000, both declaring the subject property as alienable and

Appearance[29] as counsel for the Republic and deputized the public prosecutor to assist it in disposable.

the proceedings in LRC Case No. T-349.

On 10 July 2003, the MCTC rendered a Decision granting the Application for Registration of

The Republic submitted to the RTC its Opposition[30] to the Spouses Llanes Title of the Spouses Llanes, the decretal portion of which reads:

application, anchored on the grounds that (1) neither the Spouses Llanes nor their
WHEREFORE, and confirming the [O]rder of [G]eneral [D]efault, this Court hereby
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession adjudicates and decrees the parcel Lot No. 5812 subject matter of this
and occupation of the subject property since 12 June 1945 or earlier; and (2) the muniments application in the names of applicants, [Spouses Llanes], both of legal
age, Filipinos, with residence and postal address at Brgy. Paligawan,
of title and/or tax declaration(s) and tax payment receipt(s) of the Spouses Llanes appeared Balete, Batangas as the true and absolute owners thereof.
to be of recent vintage and cannot constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona
Once this DECISION shall have become final let the corresponding decree of
fide acquisition of the land or of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and registration be issued.[36]

occupation of the land in the concept of an owner.[31]

Unsatisfied with the aforesaid Decision, the Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals,
Considering that no private opposition to the Spouses Llanes application was arguing that the MCTC erred in granting the Application for Registration of Title of the
registered, an Order of General Default was issued by the RTC against the whole world with Spouses Llanes because the latter failed to comply with the statutory requirement of
the exception of the Director of Lands (on behalf of the Republic), as represented by the possession for 30 years, the subject property becoming alienable and disposable only on 22
OSG.[32] December 1997 per the CENRO Certification. The appeal of the Republic was docketed as CA-

G.R. CV No. 80021.


On 21 April 1993, the Court issued Administrative Circular No. 64-93 delegating to first level

courts the jurisdiction to hear and decide cadastral and land registration cases. Pursuant It was only at this point that the Spouses Llanes realized that the Certifications issued to
thereto, the RTC issued an Order dated 5 November 2001[33] remanding the entire records of them by the government agencies concerned stated different dates when the subject

property became alienable and disposable. Based on the DENR-FMB Certification, the subject
37
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in- interest have
property became alienable and disposable on 26 March 1928. However, according to the been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
CENRO Certification, the subject property became alienable and disposable only on 22 alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
December 1997. The Spouses Llanes then verified the correctness of the CENRO Certification
and found that CENRO committed a mistake therein. CENRO itself rectified its gaffe by
From the aforequoted provisions, the three requisites for the filing of an
issuing another Certification dated 20 July 2004,[37] consistent with the DENR Certification, application for registration of title are: (1) that the property in question is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain; (2) that the applicants by themselves or through their
that the subject property became alienable and disposable on 26 March 1928. The Spouses predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation; and (3) that such possession has been under a bona fide claim of ownership
Llanes attached the corrected CENRO Certification as Annex A to their Appellees Brief
since 12 June 1945 or earlier. Thus, Section 14(1) requires that the property sought to be
submitted to the Court of Appeals, but the appellate court, without providing any reason, did registered should already be alienable and disposable at the time the application for
registration of title is filed.[39]
not consider the same.
On 31 January 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision granting the appeal To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an
of the Republic, setting aside the MCTC Decision dated 10 July 2003, and dismissing the applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the government such
Application for Registration of Title of the Spouses Llanes. The appellate court referred to the as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, or an administrative action,
CENRO Certification stating that the subject property became alienable and disposable only investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator or a legislative act or statute. A
on 22 December 1997 and, on the basis thereof, found that the subject property became certification by the CENRO of the DENR stating that the land subject of an application is
alienable and disposable only after the original application for registration was filed on 10 found to be within the alienable and disposable site per a land classification project map is
April 1997. The Court of Appeals further held that the evidence presented by the sufficient evidence to show the real character of the land subject of the application. [40]
Spouses Llaneson the nature of their possession could hardly be considered
incontrovertible. The Spouses Llanes failed to discharge the burden of proving that the
subject property was already alienable and disposable at the time they filed their application
In the instant case, the Spouses Llanes submitted to the MCTC Certifications from DENR
for registration of title. Similarly, the Spouses Llanes failed to establish that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had occupied the subject property in the concept of an owner Region IV and CENRO, Batangas City, to prove the alienability and disposability of the subject
since 12 June 1945 or for the period required by law.
property. However, the two Certifications contained different dates as to when the subject
The Spouses Llanes moved for the reconsideration of the aforesaid Court of Appeals Decision
property became alienable and disposable: 26 March 1928 per the DENR Certification, but 22
but their motion was denied by the appellate court in its Resolution dated 11 April 2007.
December 1997 according to the CENRO Certification. The discrepancy between the two
Hence, the present Petition raising the sole issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred [38] in
reversing and setting aside the grant by the MCTC of the Spouses Llanes Application for Certifications was overlooked by the parties during the trial stage of the case before the
Registration of Title based on its finding that the subject property became alienable and MCTC. The MCTC granted the Spouses Llanes Application for Registration of Title without
disposable only on 22 December 1997.
mentioning the said discrepancy between the two Certifications. The discrepancy was
The Court rules in the affirmative and, thus, finds merit in the Petition at bar.
discovered only when the present case was already before the Court of Appeals. The Spouses
Primarily, the Spouses Llanes Application for Registration of Title was filed under Llanes immediately verified and secured a corrected Certification from the CENRO, which
Presidential Decree No. 1529 otherwise known as Property Registration Decree.
confirmed the DENR Certification that the subject property became alienable and disposable
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing original registration proceedings,
on 26 March 1928. The appellate court, however, did not consider the corrected CENRO
expressly provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of Certification and, in ruling against the Spouses Llanes application, still relied on the first
First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:
38
CENRO Certification which incorrectly stated that the subject property became alienable and

disposable only on 22 December 1997.


Since both the DENR Certification and the corrected CENRO Certification state that

the subject property became alienable and disposable on 26 March 1928, and there is no
To determine whether the Court of Appeals properly disregarded the corrected CENRO
evidence to the contrary, then the Court accepts it to be so.
Certification as evidence for the Spouses Llanes, the Court refers to the relevant rules on

evidence. Section 34, Rule 132 the Rules of Court explicitly provides:
Reviewing the evidence on record, the Court finds that the subject property has
SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. The court shall consider no evidence which has not been been in the possession of the Spouses Llanes and their predecessors-in-interest even prior
formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be
specified. to 12 June 1945. The Spouses Llanes presented the testimony of Servillano to support

this. Servillano, Gabriels brother, was born in 1927 and was already 73 years old by the time

he testified before the RTC.[42] By 1935, he was already 8 years old and capable of perceiving
If the Court strictly applies the aforequoted provision of law, it would simply pronounce that
the concept of ownership. To his knowledge, the subject property was then owned by his
the Court of Appeals could not have admitted the corrected CENRO Certification because it
grandmother, Eugenia, and cultivated and planted with rice by his father, Francisco. The
was not formally offered as evidence before the MCTC during the trial stage. Nevertheless,
perimeter of the subject property was also planted with madre cacao and acacia trees.[43] He
since the determination of the true date when the subject property became alienable and
personally knew of these information because he was always with his father during the time
disposable is material to the resolution of this case, it behooves this Court, in the interest of
that the latter cultivated the subject property. The subject property was subsequently
substantial justice, fairness, and equity, to consider the corrected CENRO Certification even
transferred by way of sale from Eugenia to Servillano and his wife, Rita, in 1965;[44] and
though it was only presented during the appeal to the Court of Appeals. Since rules of
from Servillano and Rita to the Spouses Llanes in 1995.[45] Servillanos testimony is
procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, it is well recognized
evidence. He is testifying as the former owner of the subject property and Gabriels
that the Court is empowered to suspend its rules or to exempt a particular case from the
predecessor-in-interest. His testimony was coherent and detailed, and contained no
application of a general rule, when the rigid application thereof tends to frustrate rather than
implausible claims. His relationship alone with Gabriel does not render his testimony suspect,
promote the ends of justice.[41]
and his credibility as a witness was not at all impeached by the Republic, which did not

bother at all to cross-examine him.


Moreover, the Spouses Llanes should not be made to suffer the grave consequences, which
In addition, generations of Gabriels family have declared the subject property under their
include the possibility of losing their right to their property, arising from the mistake of
names and paid real property taxes thereon. The earliest tax declaration was in the name of
CENRO, a government agency. CENRO itself admitted its blunder and willingly issued a Eugenia, issued as early as 1948. While tax declarations and receipts are not incontrovertible

corrected Certification. Very conspicuously, no other objection to the corrected CENRO evidence of ownership, they constitute, at the least, proof that the holder has a claim of title

Certification was raised except as to its late presentation; its issuance and authenticity were over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes not

only manifests ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property, but also
not challenged or placed in doubt.
39
announces an adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties with an

intention to contribute needed revenues to the government. Such an act strengthens

ones bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.[46] Tax declarations are good indicia of
possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for

a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession.[47] Moreover, while tax

declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership and do not prove title to

the land, nevertheless, when coupled with actual possession, they constitute evidence of

great weight and can be the basis of a claim of ownership through prescription.[48]

The evidence submitted by the Spouses Llanes, taken as a whole, establishes that the subject

property became alienable and disposable as early as 26 March 1928; and the Spouses Llanes

and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious

possession of the subject property, in the concept of an owner, even prior to 12 June 1945. In

contrast, the Republic did not present any evidence to refute that of the Spouses Llanes. To

the Court, therefore, the Spouses Llanes were able to sufficiently discharge the burden of

proof that they have an imperfect title to the subject property capable of judicial

confirmation.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision

and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 31 January 2007 and 11 April 2007,

respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 80021, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision

dated 10 July 2003 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Malvar-Balete, Batangas, in LRC Case

No. N-073, granting the application for registration of title to the subject property of the

Spouses Gabriel and Maria Llanes, is hereby REINSTATED. No costs.


SO ORDERED.
40
[G.R. No. 76371. January 20, 2000] the Philippine National Bank in the sum of P1,000.00; and to Lot 2 in the
same plan, with an area of 22,141 square meters, without liens or
MARIANO TURQUESA, ABRAHAM LALUGAN and LAYAO, MANUEL MAGALA substituted by encumbrances, as conjugal partnership property with her husband, Juan
his Heirs, OTILIO DAMASEN and SEGUNDINA DAMASEN, ANTONIO ESCALANTE, METODIO Valera.
TULLAS, FLORA LABUGUEN and JUANA LABUGUEN, LOURDES SINDON BAYUBAY, MANUEL
MEDRANO and JOSE MEDRANO,** petitioners, vs., ROSARIO VALERA and the HONORABLE After this decision has become final, let the corresponding decree be
COURT of APPEALS, respondents. entered and the corresponding title issue in accordance with law.[4]

DECISION Oppositors appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) insofar only as Lot 1 is concerned, arguing,
among others, that the trial court erred in not granting their motion for new trial and their
YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.: demand for ocular inspection. On March 15, 1966, the Court of Appeals set aside the
appealed decision and remanded the case to the lower court for further proceedings, and
ordered the conduct of an ocular inspection. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
More than half a century ago,[1] private respondent applied for the registration of two parcels
of land located in Barrio Pulot, Laguyan, Abra described in Plan PSU-119561 with a total land
area of 232,908 square meters. The first lot (hereinafter referred to as Lot 1) has an area of WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside. This
210,767 square meters whereas the other lot (Lot 2) has an area of 22,141 square meters. In case shall be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings which
support of her application, private respondent presented documents showing that when she shall include an ocular inspection of the land applied with a view to
was still single, she bought Lot 1 during the years 1929-1932 from Cristeta Trangued and the determine its identity, location and boundary limits whether the latter
heirs of Juan Valera Rufino who were allegedly in possession thereof since the Spanish have been included in Lot 1 of the applicants plan to warrant their
regime in the concept of owners and who declared it in their name for taxation purposes. exclusion from the plan, or their registration in the names of the
From 1929, she continued possession of said land in the concept of owner and continued to oppositors who have presented evidence in support of their claim.
pay the tax thereon in her name. Notices of the application for registration were published in Thereafter judgment shall be accordingly rendered.[5]
the Official Gazette, with copies thereof sent to persons mentioned therein and posted in the
proper places. In accordance with the CA directive, three commissioners were appointed by the trial court
to conduct the ocular inspection. The commissioners found:
The Director of Lands together with petitioners and other persons [2] opposed the application
of private respondent. These oppositors were excluded from the order of general default That the property sought to be registered under survey plan Psu-119561
issued by the lower court on June 16, 1950.[3] In the course of the hearing, the oppositors was relocated and the extent and bounds of the portions claimed by the
(except the Director of Lands) aver that their lands were included in Lot 1 which private oppositors were pointed to by them personally or by their supposed
respondent sought to register in her name. In support thereof, they contend that the land representative, the results of which are clearly shown in the
embraced by Lot 1 at the time it was bought by private respondent is not the same land accompanying sketch plan marked as Annex "A" of their report by the
covered in her application for registration. To avoid confusion, oppositors moved for an corresponding names, area and dimensions.
ocular inspection in order to determine the correct boundary limits of the lands they
respectively claim, however, the same was not allowed by the court a quo. For his part, the That the survey of the claims was continued the following day, January
Director of Lands opposition was denied for failure to substantiate his claim that the subject 29, 1967.
lands were part of the public domain. The opposition of the oppositors other than the herein
petitioners were likewise denied for various reasons including failure to present their
OBSERVATIONS AND FINDINGS
evidence.

1. The claims of Manuel Magala, Abraham Lalugan, and Layao, Juan


After trial, in a decision dated April 23, 1956, the lower court disposed of the application for
Medrano and Eugenio Medrano as shown now in the sketch plan Annex
registration as follows:
"A" are not shown in the original survey plan Psu-119561;

In view of all the foregoing, the applicant Rosario Valera married to Juan
2. That claims of Otilio Damasen, Nicolas Bigornia, Ricardo Bersamira,
Valera, a resident of Bangued, Abra, has proven that she has a
Bonifacio Brangan, Cristeta Medrano, Matias Turdil, Mariano Turqueza,
registerable title to Lot 1, Psu-119561, with an area of 210,767 square
Flora Labuguen, Cornelio Bayubay, Ponce Talape, and Metodio Tullar,
meters as her exclusive property, subject to the encumbrance in favor of
41
appeared in the original survey plan Psu-119561 and likewise in sketch WHEREFORE, this Court reiterates its former decision ordering the
plan Annex "A" although three of these claims bear different identifying registration of Lot 1 of Plan Psu-119561, Exh. D, with an area of 210,767
names in the sketch Annex "A"; square meters in the name of applicant ROSARIO VALERA of Bangued,
Abra, and a conjugal property with her husband Juan Valera of the same
3. That out of the original area of 210,767 square meters in original municipality. The encumbrance with the Philippine National Bank in the
survey plan Psu-119561, the remaining portion not subject of opposition amount of P1,000.00 having already been settled (Exh. JJ-1) same shall no
as appearing in sketch plan Annex "A" is 69,683 square meters; longer be annotated on the title henceforth to be issued.

4. That the "Calle para Collago" which according to the decision of the Upon this decision becoming final, let the corresponding decree
Court of Appeals and is stoutly maintained until the present by the issue.
oppositors to be the extent or boundary of the property of the applicant
on the South side is existing and still is the boundary on the South and on The applicant Rosario Valera is hereby directed to pay within seventy two
the Southeast side, as shown in the Sketch Plan, Exh. "A"; hours from notice hereof the sum of P182.00 as fees for the
commissioner Santiago Alejandre who made the relocation survey. [9]
That the property of Francisco Santua abound also the applicants
property sought to be registered on the South sides, at present as was The case was again appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR. 40796-R) by the oppositors,
the case during the original survey.[6] some of whom are now the petitioners in this case.[10] They argue that the lower court erred
in not excluding the areas they claimed as their own which were wrongfully included in Lot 1
The oppositors filed an opposition to the commissioners report, whereupon a second ocular but was ordered registered in private respondents name. Disposing of the appeal, the CA
inspection was ordered by the trial court. After the second inspection, the trial court, on ruled:
August 28, 1967 again rendered judgment reiterating its original decision ordering the
registration of the aforesaid Lot 1 of PSU 119561 with an area of 210,767[7] square meters in WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, with the modification that the
the name of private respondent. The judge made the following observations based on the registration of Lot 1 of appellees (private respondent herein) should be
ocular inspection: confined to the extent only as indicated in the sketch annexed to the
Commissioners report, Exhibit HH, and excluding therefrom the
The Commissioners and the Presiding Judge, upon their ocular inspection, landholding of the oppositors, as indicated in the same sketch, the
found out a visible boundary on the South-east side of Lot 1 known as judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED. Without costs.
"Calle para Collago" which is represented in the relocation plan Exh. HH
running from the intersection to Lagayan between points 22 and 21 down SO ORDERED.[11]
to point 18. This, in the opinion of the Court, is the extension of the "Calle
para Collago" referred to by the applicant Rosario Valera as boundary This decision became final and executory for which a corresponding entry of judgment was
exactly on the South but which was converted into ricefields by Francisco issued by the Court of Appeals.[12] Later, private respondent filed with the trial court a
Santua. This circumstance now could explain the presence of Francisco motion for the issuance of writ of possession over two lots respectively tenanted by Trium
Santua as boundary owner on the South which the parties stoutly Donato and Rudy Donato which were likewise respectively claimed by Santiago Partolan (not
maintained in the former proceedings that the "Calle para Collago" was an oppositor in the land registration case) and Crispin Baltar (one of the oppositors). [13] In an
on the South but which oppositors now repudiate claiming that the "Calle Order issued on September 14, 1981, the court a quo denied the motion.[14] When her
para Collago" is on the East. Taking a good view over Lot 1, it could safely subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied in another Order dated November
be concluded that the existing "Calle para Collago" is more to the South 25, 1981,[15] private respondent appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)
than to the East. which reversed the said two orders and forthwith issued a decision with the following
disposition:
With respect to the claim of the Damasens over Lot A mentioned in Exh.
D which the Court inadvertently failed to pass upon, the Court has found WHEREFORE, PREMISES, CONSIDERED, the ORDERS appealed from are
that it is within the property of the applicant.[8] hereby REVERSED and judgment is hereby entered ordering:

The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:


42
1. The issuance of a WRIT OF POSSESSION in favor of applicant-appellant Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, private respondent is not entitled to a writ of
covering the landholding claimed by oppositor Crispin Baltar and possession of that portion of Lot I occupied by Partolan and Baltar. No evidence was shown
tenanted by Rudy Donato; that private respondent had a rightful claim whether possessory or proprietary with respect
to those areas. Even if Partolan was excluded by the order of general default and Baltar did
2. Confirming the word "Landholding" in the dispositive portion of the not appeal from the trial courts decision of April 23, 1956, the applicant must still prove and
decision in CA-G.R. No. 40796-R as singular and referring only to the establish that she has registrable rights over the land which must be grounded on
landholding opposed by oppositors Segundina and Otilio Damasen as the incontrovertible evidence and based on positive and absolute proof. The declaration by the
only landholding excluded from lot 1; and applicant that the land applied for has been in the possession of her predecessor-in-interest
for a certain period, does not constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible" and "conclusive"
evidence required in land registration.[26] Allegations of her predecessors ownership of the
3. Ordering the issuance of the WRIT OF POSSESSION in favor of the
lot during the Spanish period is self-serving[27] and the declaration of ownership for purposes
applicant-appellant covering the landholdings opposed by the other
of assessment on the payment of tax is not sufficient evidence to prove ownership. [28] It
oppositors who did not appeal the decision of the lower court dated
should be noted that tax declaration, by itself, is not considered conclusive evidence of
August 28, 1967.
ownership in land registration cases.[29] Private respondent should have substantiated her
claim with clear and convincing evidence specifically showing the nature of her claim. Her
Without any special pronouncement as to cost. description of the circumstances of her own possession in relation to that of her
predecessor-in-interest are mere conclusions of law which require further factual support
SO ORDERED.[16] and substantiation. If an applicant does not have any rightful claim over real property, the
Torrens system of registration can confirm or record nothing.[30]
Oppositors filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the Court of
Appeals.[17] Hence this petition for review initiated by some of the oppositors in the trial Private respondent, being the applicant for registration of land and one who relies on some
court. The petition was initially denied by the Court. On motion for reconsideration filed by documents enforcing her alleged title thereto, must prove not only the genuineness of said
petitioners, the case was reinstated and respondent was required to submit her comment to title but also the identity of the land therein referred to,[31] inasmuch as this is required by
the petition.[18] law. The dispute in this case pertains to the correctness of the survey of specific areas of
lands. It must be borne in mind that what defines a piece of land is not the size or area
After a painstaking review of the vintage records of this case and after deciphering the mentioned in its description, but the boundaries therein laid down, as enclosing the land and
ambiguous discussions in the petition,[19] the assailed ruling of the respondent court cannot indicating its limits.[32] Considering that the writ of possession was sought by private
be sustained. The burden of proof in land registration cases is incumbent on the respondent against persons who were in "actual possession under claim of ownership," the
applicant[20] who must show that he is the real and absolute owner in fee simple of the land latters possession raises a disputable presumption of ownership.[33] This unrebutted
applied for.[21] On him also rests the burden to overcome the presumption that the land presumption militates against the claim of private respondent, especially considering the
sought to be registered forms part of the public domain[22] considering that the inclusion in a evidentiary rule under Article 434 of the Civil Code that a claimant of a parcel of land, such as
title of a part of the public domain nullifies the title. [23] Undoubtedly, a land registration private respondent, must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the
proceeding is one which is in rem in character, so that the default order issued by the court defendants claim.[34]
binds the whole world and all persons whether known or unknown, [24] except those who
have appeared and filed their pleadings in the registration case. [25] In the case at bar, those Private respondents contention that the dispositive portion of the CA decision on April 30,
exempted from the order of general default are the petitioners and the other oppositors 1979 in CA GR 40796-R which mentioned only "landholding" and not "landholdings", thus
mentioned in footnote number 2. referring only to that area claimed by the Damasen spouses, is too trivial. A reading of the
said decision and the foregoing discussions clearly indicates that the land to be registered in
There is no dispute that the lands occupied and claimed by oppositors-petitioners Segundina private respondents name is limited to a certain area stated in the sketch annexed to the
and Otilio Damasen were already finally adjudged excluded from Lot 1 and cannot be Commissioners report. It categorically excluded those portions pertaining to the oppositors.
registered in private respondents name. In other words, the Damasens were declared to Since private respondent failed to show that she has a proprietary right over the excluded
have a rightful and registrable right over their claims of specific portions of Lot 1. What areas, such as the portions occupied by those against whom the writ of possession was
private respondent wants is that she be installed in possession of the area claimed by sought for, then the trial court was correct in refusing to grant the writ as the same has no
Santiago Partolan and Crispin Baltar. Of these two, only Baltar entered his opposition to basis.
private respondents application for land registration. Being a proceeding in rem, Partolan is
charged with knowledge of the application of private respondent since the notice was
published in accordance with law.
43
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and the two orders of the trial court dated September 14, 1981 and November 25,
1981 are REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
44
[G.R. No. 142913. August 9, 2005] ACCORDINGLY, the petitions are GRANTED. The questioned order of the respondent Court of
ESTATE OF SALVADOR SERRA SERRA (SPEC. PROC. NO. 242) AND ESTATE OF GREGORIO Appeals lifting the writ of preliminary injunction is SET ASIDE. The writ of possession issued in
SERRA SERRA (SPEC. PROC. NO. 240), BOTH REPRESENTED BY THE JUDICIAL CO- Cadastral Case No. 17, GLRO Records No. 163 is declared NULL and VOID. The records of this
ADMINISTRATOR LUIS ISASI, MARGARITA SERRA SERRA, FRANCISCA TERESA SERRA SERRA case and of CA-G.R. No. 00139 are remanded to the trial court for hearing of the motion for
and FRANCISCO JOSE SERRA SERRA, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF PRIMITIVO HERNAEZ, cancellation of the reconstituted titles. Private respondents are ordered to return to
REPRESENTED BY PRESENTACION HERNAEZ BELBAR, HEIRS OF LUISA HERNAEZ, petitioners the possession of the properties in question. The temporary restraining order
REPRESENTED BY WILFREDO GAYARES, LOLITA GAYARES, JULIETA FORTALEZA AND issued by this Court on February 15, 1972, enjoining private respondents from interfering in
ROSAURO FORTALEZA, HEIRS OF ROGACIANA HERNAEZ, REPRESENTED BY LOURDES any manner, with petitioners right of possession of the properties in question, shall remain
MONCERA, respondents. effective until the issue of ownership and/or possession of the properties is finally settled by
a competent court.SO ORDERED.[5]
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Pursuant thereto, the trial court heard petitioners motion for cancellation of
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil certificates of title and on November 25, 1998, rendered judgment the dispositive portion of
Procedure assails the March 3, 2000 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. which reads:
52817, and its April 17, 2000 resolution denying reconsideration thereof.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises and considerations, the court hereby renders
The factual antecedents are as follows: judgment in favor of the oppositors and hereby orders the following:
On December 27, 1967, a petition for reconstitution of alleged lost original certificates
of title (OCT) and owners duplicate copies in the name of Eleuterio Hernaez covering Lot No. 1) The petition filed by movants Serra Serra dated November 4, 1968 is hereby DISMISSED for
1316 of Kabankalan Cadastre and Lot Nos. 2685 and 717 of Ilog Cadastre, in the Province of lack of merit;
Negros Occidental, was filed by his successors-in-interest Primitivo, Rogaciana and Luisa, all
surnamed Hernaez (Hernaez) with then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Bacolod City. 2) Declaring the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27644 covering Lot No. 1316, Kabankalan
Cadastre and Lot No. 2685, Ilog Cadastre, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-22344 covering
On April 6, 1968, the CFI granted the petition and ordered the reconstitution of the
Lot No. 717-A, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-22351, Ilog Cadastre, all issued in the
subject OCTs and its duplicate copies.[1] Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Negros
name of movants Serra Serra NULL and VOID for being issued to foreigners;
Occidental issued reconstituted OCT Nos. RO-10173, RO-10174, and RO-10175, for Lot Nos.
1316, 2685, and 717, respectively. These reconstituted OCTs were cancelled on May 29, 1969
upon presentation by Hernaez of a declaration of heirship and in lieu thereof, Transfer 3) Declaring the oppositors Hernaez as owners of Lot No. 1316, Kabankalan Cadastre,
Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-51546, T-51547, and T-51548 were issued in their names. covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 51546; Lot No. 2685, Ilog Cadastre, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-51547; and Lot No. 717, Ilog Cadastre, covered by Transfer
Upon learning of the existence of the above TCTs, Salvador Serra Serra, for and in Certiticate of Title No. T-51548; and
behalf of his co-heirs, registered their adverse claim and moved for the cancellation of the
reconstituted titles. They averred that they are holders of valid and existing certificates of 4) Ordering the movants Serra Serra to return possession of said lots to the oppositors
title over the subject properties and have been in continuous and actual possession thereof. Hernaez.SO ORDERED.[6]
The trial court denied petitioners motion to cancel the reconstituted titles and granted
instead Hernaez prayer that they be placed in possession of the subject properties, which Without filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioners assailed the lower courts
petitioners challenged before the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari docketed as CA- decision before the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari. On March 3, 2000, the
G.R. No. SP-00139.[2] appellate court rendered the herein assailed judgment which dismissed the petition for lack
of merit, pertinent portion of which reads:
On June 7, 1971, the appellate court issued a writ of preliminary injunction[3] which was
ordered lifted in a resolution dated August 3, 1971. Petitioners motion for reconsideration
was denied, hence they filed before this Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition and In the case at bench, We find no cogent reason to disturb the assailed decision denying
mandamus, docketed as G.R. No. L-34080 and consolidated with G.R. No. L-34693,[4] seeking petitioners motion for cancellation of the reconstituted titles, especially after the court a
to annul the resolution lifting the writ of preliminary injunction. quo found that the evidence presented is sufficient and proper to uphold the reconstituted
certificates of title in question. A perusal of the assailed order shows that the trial court
On March 22, 1991, this Court rendered judgment the decretal portion of which reads: correctly applied the established legal principle that in cases of annulment and/or
45
reconveyance of title, a party seeking it should establish not merely by a preponderance of deprived the trial court of the opportunity to rectify an error unwittingly committed or to
evidence but by clear and convincing evidence that the land sought to be reconveyed is his. vindicate itself of an act unfairly imputed. Besides, a motion for reconsideration under the
present circumstances is the plain, speedy and adequate remedy to the adverse judgment of
Petitioners (Serra Serra), however, as noted by the court a quo in its Order dated November the trial court.
25, 1998, failed to present in court as evidence the original certificates of title of the Granting arguendo that certiorari is the proper remedy, the Court of Appeals
aforementioned lots, Lot No. 1316, Lot No. 2685 and Lot No. 717. Petitioners were also nevertheless did not err in dismissing the petition.
found to be of Spanish citizenship and, hence, as aliens, disqualified to acquire lands in the
Philippines under the 1935 Constitution.[7] Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioners are Spanish citizens
and as such, disqualified from acquiring lands in the Philippines. As a rule, only a Filipino
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied, hence the instant citizen can acquire private lands in the Philippines and the only instances when a foreigner
petition based on the following assigned errors: can own private lands are by hereditary succession and if he was formerly a natural-born
Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship. The records are bereft of any showing that
I petitioners derived their title by any mode which would qualify them to acquire private lands
in the country. Petitioners bare allegation that they acquired the subject lots from Salvador
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS ... DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF Serra Serra has no probative value lacking sufficient proof that the latter is not disqualified to
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AS TO CALL FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF SUPERVISION BY own or hold private property and was able to legally transmit to petitioners title thereto.
THIS HONORABLE COURT, IN THAT:
Petitioners alleged possession of TCTs and actual possession of the subject lands,
although strong proof of ownership, are not necessarily conclusive where the assertion of
THE RULE THAT THE PETITIONER SHOULD HAVE PREVIOUSLY FILED A MOTION FOR proprietary rights is founded on dubious claim of ownership. They claimed that their title
RECONSIDERATION WITH THE LOWER COURT BEFORE HE MAY AVAIL HIMSELF OF THE WRIT over the subject properties emanated from Salvador Serra Serra; yet they failed to present in
OF CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT IS SUBJECT TO WELL-SETTLED evidence the OCT in the name of the latter. Since petitioners impugn the proprietary claim of
EXCEPTIONS ... Hernaez over the properties, the burden rests on them to establish their superior right over
the latter. To recall, the trial court found that the evidence they presented have not
II established superior proprietary rights over the respondents on the subject lots. It held that
the non-presentation of the OCTs cast doubt on the veracity of their claim. He who asserts
THE COURT OF APPEALS ... HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY PROBABLY must prove.
NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 26, OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISION OF It is also undisputed that petitioners are all Spanish citizens. Under Philippine law,
THIS HONORABLE COURT IN SERRA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-34080, MARCH 22, foreigners can acquire private lands only by hereditary succession or when they were
1991.[8] formerly natural-born Filipinos who lost their Philippine citizenship. In this case, petitioners
did not present proof that they acquired the properties by inheritance. Neither did they claim
Petitioners assail the dismissal of their petition on the ground that they failed to file a to be former natural-born Filipinos. On the contrary, they declare in this petition that they
motion for reconsideration with the lower court before filing a petition for certioraribefore are all Spanish citizens residing in Mallorca, Spain.
the Court of Appeals. While admitting procedural lapse on their part, they argue that the rule
is subject to well-settled exceptions, such as, when the questions raised before the Supreme It is axiomatic that factual findings of trial courts, when adopted and confirmed by the
Court are the same as those which have been squarely raised and passed upon by the trial Court of Appeals, are binding and conclusive and will not be disturbed on appeal. This Court
court, or when the petitioner has been deprived of due process of law, or when the writ is is not a trier of facts. It is not its function to examine and determine the weight of the
urgent under the circumstances.[9] evidence supporting the assailed decision. Moreover, well entrenched is the prevailing
jurisprudence that only errors of law and not of facts are reviewable by this Court in a
The petition is denied. Other than citing general exceptions to the rule requiring a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, which applies
motion for reconsideration as a pre-condition to instituting a petition for certiorari, the with greater force to the petition under consideration because the factual findings of the
petitioners did not offer valid reason why their particular case fall under any of the specified Court of Appeals are in full agreement with what the trial court found.[11]
exceptions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The March 3, 2000 decision and the April 17, 2000
The settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a sine qua non condition for the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52817 are AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.
filing of a petition for certiorari. The purpose is to grant an opportunity to public respondent
to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and
factual circumstances of the case.[10] Petitioners failure to file a motion for reconsideration
46
G.R. No. 173088 June 25, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, At the hearing, Ricardo Santos, respondents legal researcher and duly authorized attorney-in-
- versus -
fact, testified on the fact of respondents actual possession through its
IMPERIAL CREDIT CORPORATION, Respondent.
caretaker, Teodisia Palapus, who had been overseeing said property since its acquisition from
DECISION
TINGA, J.: Jose Tajon. Palapus also corroborated Santos testimony and added that except for some

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, assailing trespassers, no one else had laid possessory claim on the property. Aside from the transfer
the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78240. The Court of Appeals
Decision affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch documents, the other documentary evidence submitted consisted of a 1993 tax declaration,
74, Antipolo City which granted respondents application for land registration in LRC Case No.
the tracing cloth plan, survey description, a certification from the Land Management Sector
00-2493.
in lieu of the geodetic engineers certificate and the report by the Community Environment
The following factual antecedents are matters of record.
and Natural Resources Office that the property falls within the alienable and disposable
Herein respondent Imperial Credit Corporation is a corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines. On 07 March 1966, respondent purchased from a certain zone.
Jose Tajon a parcel of land situated in
Barrio Colaique (now Barangay San Roque), Antipolo City, Rizal for the sum of P17,986.00 as
On 21 November 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting respondents application for
evidenced by a Deed of Sale with Mortgage. Upon full payment of the balance of P1,909.00
through judicial consignation, ownership of the property was consolidated in the name of registration. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
respondent and the mortgage constituted thereon released in December 1997. The property
was thereafter privately surveyed under PSU-178075 and approved on 25 January 2000.
WHEREFORE, from the evidence presented both testimonial and
documentary, the Court is satisfied that the applicant has
On 14 February 2000, respondent filed before the RTC of Antipolo City an application for a registerable title over the parcel of land applied for and after affirming
the order of general default against the whole world, hereby adjudicates
registration of a parcel of land, as shown on Plan PSU-178075 containing an area of 8,993
the parcel of land more specifically identified in Plan Psu 178075
square meters. The application was docketed as LRC Case No. 00-2493 and raffled off to containing an area of EIGHT THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED NINETY THREE
(8,993) SQUARE METERS in favor of the applicant IMPERIAL CREDIT
Branch 74 of said RTC. The application alleged, among others, that respondent subrogated CORPORATION with business address at Unit 3-C-2, JMT Corporate
Condominium, ADB Ave., Ortigas Center, Pasig City, Metro Manila.
former owner Jose Tajon, who has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
Once this decision becomes final, let an Order issue directing the
possession and occupation of the parcel of land, being a part of the alienable and disposable
Administrator of the Land Registration Authority, Quezon City, to issue
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945, by the corresponding Decree of Registration.

virtue of Deed of Sale with Mortgage executed on 07 March 1966, SO ORDERED.[2]

After respondent presented evidence establishing the jurisdiction facts, the RTC
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
issued an order of general default against the whole world allowing respondent to present its
seasonably appealed from the RTCs Decision to the Court of Appeals, contending that
evidence ex parte.
respondent failed to present incontrovertible evidence that respondent and its predecessor-
47

in-interest have been in open continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation applicant for confirmation of imperfect title bears the burden of proving that he is qualified

of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. to have the land titled in his name.[4]

The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision on 02 June 2006, dismissing the appeal The reckoning date under the Public Land Act for the acquisition of ownership of

by the OSG. public lands is June 12, 1945 or earlier, and that evidence of possession from that date or

earlier is essential for a grant of an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.[5]
Hence, the instant petition, assigning the lone error, to wit:

While a tax declaration by itself is not sufficient to prove ownership, it may serve as
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RTC
DECISION WHICH GRANTED RESPONDENTS APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL sufficient basis for inferring possession.[6] However,
REGISTRATION OF TITLE, HOLDING AS BASIS THEREOF PARAGRAPHS (2)
AND (4) OF SECTION 14 OF PD 1529 (THE PROPERTY REGISTRATION
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED and the
DECREE).[3]
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78240 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
Petitioner argues that contrary to the Court of Appeals ruling that respondent was

able to prove its claim under paragraphs (2) and (4) of Section 14, Presidential Decree (P.D.)

No. 1529, respondents application for registration was actually based on paragraph (1) of

Section 14, P.D. No. 1529, the conditions under which were not sufficiently established by

respondents evidence. Although petitioner concedes that respondent was able to show that

the land applied for has been declassified from the forest or timber zone and is an alienable

public agricultural land, respondents evidence failed to satisfy the requirement under

paragraph (1) of Section 14, P.D. No. 1529, that is, respondents possession and occupation of

the property for the length of time and in the manner required by law.

The petition is meritorious.

Under the Regalian doctrine, the State is the source of any asserted right to

ownership of land. This is premised on the basic doctrine that all lands not otherwise

appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Any
48
[G.R. No. 151259. October 13, 2004] - A party who fails to appear at a pretrial conference may be non-suited or considered as in
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioner vs. HON. NAZAR[1] U. CHAVES, RTC, BR. 18, MISAMIS default.
ORIENTAL, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY and SPS. JUANITO & AGUSTINA
OBEDENCIO, respondents. To be relieved of the effects of the order of default, Sec. 3, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court
provides that the defendant must file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default;
DECISION that he must show that his failure to appear at the pre-trial was due to fraud, accident,
QUISUMBING, J.: mistake or excusable neglect and accompany the motion with affidavit of merit.

A motion to lift order of default should be under oath, verified and accompanied with an
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the Decision[2] dated February 29,
affidavit of merit.
2000 and the Resolution[3] dated December 12, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 38152.
Aside from the requirements of Sec. 3, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, the motion to lift the
Private respondents, spouses Juanito and Agustina Obedencio, filed Civil Case No. 94- order of default must further show that the defendant has a meritorious defense or that
211 for Specific Performance at the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro something would be gained by having the order of default set aside. Otherwise, and if the
City, Branch 18. They prayed that the Social Security System (SSS) be ordered (1) to cancel motion is not accompanied by affidavits of merits, it may properly be denied.
the mortgage on the properties of the spouses; (2) to release the documents covering the
said properties; and (3) to pay the spouses moral damages in the sum of P80,000; litigation
A perusal of petitioners motion to lift order of default shows that it is neither under oath nor
expenses in the sum of P5,000; and attorneys fees in the sum of P20,000.
accompanied by an affidavit of merit. There was no notice of hearing. There was also no
The petitioner filed its Answer with Counterclaim alleging that the private respondents showing, save in the instant petition, that it has meritorious defense or that something
had an unpaid obligation in the amount of P48,188.72 as of September 1, 1994.[4] would be gained by having the order of default set aside. Thus, the trial Court correctly
denied petitioners motion.
After the issues were joined, a pre-trial conference was scheduled on February 16,
1995. Atty. Rodrigo B. Filoteo, acting assistant branch manager of the SSS in Cagayan de Oro
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED.
City and allegedly the only lawyer of the said branch, entered his appearance as counsel for
the petitioner. He manifested that he had filed his pre-trial brief through registered mail. The
hearing was, however, cancelled because the respondent judge was indisposed. The hearing SO ORDERED.[7]
of the case was reset on April 18, 1995. This time, Atty. Filoteo failed to attend because of an
official mission to Zamboanga City from April 7 to May 8, 1995 involving SSS cases. On March 16, 2000, the petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied.

On motion of Atty. Alberto Bacal, counsel of the respondent spouses, respondent judge Hence, petitioner through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) now assails the
issued an Order dated April 18, 1995 declaring petitioner in default and allowed private Decision and Resolution of the appellate court, alleging that,
respondents to present their evidence ex-parte.

The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying for the lifting of the order of THE COURT OF APPEALS, BY ISSUING THE ASSAILED DECISION HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF
default. The motion was denied for lack of merit in an Order dated May 22, 1995. On August SUBSTANCE WHICH WAS NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF
16, 1995, the petitioner appealed the Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration to the THE HONORABLE COURT CONSIDERING THAT:
Court of Appeals by way of a petition for certiorari.[5]
A. Rules of Procedure should be liberally construed pursuant to Section 2, Rule 1
In its Decision of February 29, 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.[6] of the Rules of Court in order to protect the substantive rights of the parties.

We deny the petition. B. Petitioner has the right to have its day in court in order to present its
meritorious defense against the unfounded and baseless claim of respondent
spouses.[8]
There is no question that it is the discretion of the trial judge to declare a party-defendant as
in default for failure to appear at a pre-trial conference. The declaration of default for non- The core issue particular to this case is whether the default order of the lower court
appearance at a pre-trial conference is sanctioned by Rule 20, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court, should be lifted, so that substantial justice would prevail over technical rules.
thus:
49
Seeking relief from Section 2, Rule 1 (now Section 6[9]), and Section 2, Rule 20 (now presentation of evidence every time the other party is declared in default. If it were so, a
Section 4, Rule 18[10]) of the Revised Rules of Court, and invoking our pronouncements decision would then automatically be rendered in favor of the non-defaulting party and
in Rinconada Telephone Company, Inc. v. Buenviaje,[11] Balagtas Multi-Purpose Cooperative, exactly to the tenor of his prayer.[22] The law also gives the defaulting parties some measure
Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[12] and Alonso v. Villamor,[13] the petitioner asserts that although of protection because plaintiffs, despite the default of defendants, are still required to
respondent judge has the discretion to declare a defendant in default for failure to appear substantiate their allegations in the complaint.[23]
during pre-trial conference, the strict, rigid and arbitrary application thereof denied the
petitioner a reasonable opportunity to present its meritorious defense, refute the evidence In the instant case, private respondents claim that they had fully paid their obligation
of the private respondents, present his own, and exercise his right to due process. The with the SSS. They allege that they already paid P63,000, an amount that exceeded their
petitioner contends that the rules should be liberally construed in order to protect the supposed accountability of P56,427. In their prayer in Civil Case No. 94-211 for Specific
substantive rights of the parties. Performance filed before the Regional Trial Court, they ask that petitioner be ordered to
cancel the mortgage on their properties, to release the documents covering the said
Citing further Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete[14] and Lucero v. Dacayo,[15] petitioner suggests properties and to pay them damages, litigation expenses and attorneys fees.
that its Motion for Reconsideration was in substance legally adequate, whether or not it was
verified with an affidavit of merit since the form of the motion by which the default was We note, though, that petitioner had earlier filed an answer stating that the private
sought to be lifted is secondary and the requirements of Section 3, Rule 18 [16] of the Rules of respondent spouses had an unpaid obligation amounting to P48,188.72 as of September 1,
Court need not be strictly complied with, unlike in cases of default for failure to answer. In 1994. Likewise, before the petitioner was declared in default its counsel, Atty. Filoteo, had
sum, petitioner begs for the liberal construction of the rules. manifested that he had filed his pre-trial brief by registered mail. We also note that when the
respondent judge issued the default order, it allowed private respondents to present their
Petitioner further avers that contrary to the unsubstantiated claim of private evidence ex parte. With the pre-trial brief and answer of petitioner, the trial court could then
respondents, their obligation amounting to P48,188.72 as of September 1, 1994, remains proceed to evaluate the evidence like receipts, if any, of the private respondents against the
outstanding. This is evidenced by the statement of account prepared by the SSS Real Estate allegations of the petitioner, to determine the private respondents outstanding obligation, a
Loans Department. Consequently, petitioner concludes, private respondents had yet no legal crucial factual question in this case. The petitioners averment that the private respondents
right to demand from petitioner the release of the mortgage over their property. outstanding balance is P48,188.72 as of September 1, 1994 should be weighed against the
private respondents own evidence that they had fully paid their obligation to petitioner.
Private respondents, in turn, insist that petitioner violated Section 2, Rule 20, (now
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 18[17]) of the Revised Rules of Court and Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 as In a civil case, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his case through a
amended on July 1, 1997.[18] preponderance of evidence. If he claims a right granted or created by law, he must prove his
claim by competent evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on
Sadly, the records reveal that petitioner failed to comply not only with one rule. Other the weakness of that of his opponent.[24] The private respondents cannot railroad the release
than failing to appear during pre-trial, petitioner does not deny that its Motion for of the mortgage through a default order. The determination of the accurate outstanding
Reconsideration to lift the order of default lacked verification, notice of hearing and affidavit balance of the private respondents should first be resolved before the release of the subject
of merit. If not accompanied by affidavits of merit, the trial court has no authority to consider mortgage can be demanded. In this case, when the evidence during trial proves
the same. [19] A motion to lift an order of default is fatally flawed and the trial court has no unsatisfactory and inconclusive as to the full payment of private respondents obligation to
authority to consider the same where it was not under oath and unaccompanied by an SSS, then the mortgage should not yet be cancelled prematurely.
affidavit of merit. In effect, the petitioner failed to set aside the order of default and must
suffer the consequences thereof.[20] WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated February 29,
2000, and the Resolution dated December 12, 2001 of the Court of Appeals,
Procedural rules are not to be disregarded or dismissed simply because their non- are AFFIRMED. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental,
observance may have resulted in prejudice to a partys substantive rights. Like all rules they Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 18, for further proceedings.SO ORDERED.
are to be followed, except only when for the most persuasive of reasons they may be relaxed
to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness [9] Rule 1, SEC. 6. Construction.These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote
in not complying with the procedure prescribed.[21] Here, the petitioner has not shown any their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every
persuasive reason why he should be exempt from abiding by the rules. Accordingly, the order action and proceeding. (2a)
declaring the petitioner in default and the denial of the motion to lift the order of default are
[10] Rule 18, SEC. 4. Appearance of parties.It shall be the duty of the parties and their counsel
juridically unassailable.
to appear at the pre-trial. The non-appearance of a party may be excused only if a
We must stress, however, that a judgment of default against the petitioner who failed valid cause is shown therefor or if a representative shall appear in his behalf fully
to appear during pre-trial or, for that matter, any defendant who failed to file an answer, authorized in writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative
does not imply a waiver of all of their rights, except their right to be heard and to present modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts
evidence to support their allegations. Otherwise, it would be meaningless to request and of documents. (n)
50
[16] Rule 18, SEC. 3. Relief from order of default.A party declared in default may at any time
after discovery thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside
the order of default upon proper showing that his failure to answer was due to
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect and that he has a meritorious
defense. In such case the order of default may be set aside on such terms and
conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of justice. [Now Section 3 (b),
Rule 9.]

SEC. 5. Effect of failure to appear.The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required
pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the action.
The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. A
similar failure on the part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to
present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis
thereof. (2a R20)
[18] Rule 15

SEC. 4. Hearing of motion.Except for motions which the court may act upon without
prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for
hearing by the applicant.

Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be
served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3)
days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing
on shorter notice. (4a)

SEC. 5. Notice of hearing.The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned,
and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten
(10) days after the filing of the motion. (5a)
51
G.R. No. 172102 July 2, 2010 On August 7, 1997, the RTC rendered its Decision[3] approving Hanovers application for
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,Petitioner, registration of the subject lot. It held that from the documentary and oral evidence
- versus - presented by Hanover, the trial court was convinced that Hanover and its predecessors-in-
HANOVER WORLWIDE TRADING CORPORATION,Respondent. interest had been in open, public, continuous, notorious and peaceful possession, in the
concept of an owner, of the land applied for registration of title, and that it had registrable
DECISION title thereto in accordance with Section 14 of P.D. 1529.
PERALTA, J.:
On appeal by the State, the judgment of the RTC was affirmed by the CA via the presently
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailed Decision and Resolution.
seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Decision[1] dated May 6, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 70077, which affirmed the August 7, 1997 Decision of the Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds:
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City, Branch 56, in LAND REG. CASE NO. N-281. I
Petitioner also assails the CA Resolution[2] dated March 30, 2006, denying its Motion for THE DEFECTIVE AND/OR WANT OF NOTICE BY PUBLICATION OF THE INITIAL HEARING OF THE
Reconsideration. CASE A QUO DID NOT VEST THE TRIAL COURT WITH JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE
THEREOF.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On October 15, 1993, Hanover Worldwide Trading Corporation filed an application for II
Registration of Title over Lot No. 4488 of Consolacion Cad-545-D (New) under Vs-072219- DEEDS OF SALE AND TAX DECLARATIONS/CLEARANCES DID NOT CONSTITUTE THE WELL-
000396, situated in Barrio Sacsac, Consolacion, Cebu, containing an area of One Hundred NIGH INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE NECESSARY TO ACQUIRE TITLE THROUGH ADVERSE
Three Thousand Three Hundred Fifty (103,350) square meters, more or less, pursuant to OCCUPATION.[4]
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree.
The application stated that Hanover is the owner in fee simple of Lot No. 4488, its title Petitioner claims that the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case. It avers that the
thereto having been obtained through purchase evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. RTC set the initial hearing of the case on September 25, 1995 in an Order dated June 13,
1995. Petitioner contends, however, that, pursuant to Section 23 of P.D. 1529, the initial
Attached to the petition are: 1) a Verification Survey Plan; 2) a copy of the approved hearing of the case must be not earlier than forty-five (45) days and not later than ninety (90)
Technical Description of Lot 4488; 3) a copy of the Deed of Sale in favor of Hanovers days from the date of the Order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing. Since the RTC
President and General Manager; 4) a copy of a Waiver executed by the President and Order was issued on June 13, 1995, the initial hearing should have been set not earlier than
General Manager of Hanover in favor of the latter; 5) a Geodetic Engineer's Certificate July 28, 1995 (45 days from June 13, 1995) and not later than September 11, 1995 (90 days
attesting that the property was surveyed; 6) a Tax Declaration; 7) a tax clearance; 8) a from June 13, 1995). Unfortunately, the initial hearing was scheduled and actually held on
Municipal Assessor's Certification stating, among others, the assessed value and market September 25, 1998, some fourteen (14) days later than the prescribed period.
value of the property; and 9) a CENRO Certification on the alienability and disposability of the
property. Petitioner also argues that respondent failed to present incontrovertible evidence in the
form of specific facts indicating the nature and duration of the occupation of its predecessor-
Except for the Republic, there were no other oppositors to the application. The Republic in-interest to prove that the latter has been in possession of the subject lot under a bona
contended, among others, that neither Hanover nor its predecessors-in-interest are in open, fide claim of acquisition of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since
June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; the muniments of title, tax declarations and receipts of tax The petition is meritorious.
payments attached to or alleged in the application do not constitute competent and
sufficient evidence of a bona fideacquisition of the lands applied for; Hanover is a private As to the first assigned error, however, the Court is not persuaded by petitioners contention
corporation disqualified under the Constitution to hold alienable lands of the public domain; that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case. It is true that in land registration
the parcels of land applied for are portions of the public domain belonging to the Republic cases, the applicant must strictly comply with the jurisdictional requirements. In the instant
and are not subject to private appropriation. case, though, there is no dispute that respondent complied with the requirements of the law
The case was then called for trial and respondent proceeded with the presentation for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the case.
of its evidence. The Republic was represented in the proceedings by officers from the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources With respect to the setting of the initial hearing outside the 90-day period set forth under
(DENR). Section 23 of P.D. 1529, the Court agrees with the CA in ruling that the setting of the initial
hearing is the duty of the land registration court and not the applicant. Citing Republic v.
52
Manna Properties, Inc.,[5] this Court held in Republic v. San Lorenzo Development
Corporation[6] that: (1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
The duty and the power to set the hearing date lie with the land
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
registration court. After an applicant has filed his application, the law
public domain under a bona fide claim of
requires the issuance of a court order setting the initial hearing date. The
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.[7]
notice of initial hearing is a court document. The notice of initial hearing
is signed by the judge and copy of the notice is mailed by the clerk of Likewise, Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by Section 4 of P.D. 1073,
court to the LRA [Land Registration Authority]. This involves a process to
which the party-applicant absolutely has no participation. x x x states:

x x x a party to an action has no control over the Administrator or the Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
Clerk of Court acting as a land court; he has no right to meddle unduly lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
with the business of such official in the performance of his duties. A party interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
cannot intervene in matters within the exclusive power of the trial court. may apply to the Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] of the
No fault is attributable to such party if the trial court errs on matters province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and
within its sole power. It is unfair to punish an applicant for an act or the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration
omission over which the applicant has neither responsibility nor control, Act, to wit:
especially if the applicant has complied with all the requirements of the xxxx
law. (b) Those who by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
Moreover, it is evident in Manna Properties, Inc. that what is more continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
important than the date on which the initial hearing is set is the giving of occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
sufficient notice of the registration proceedings via publication. x x x under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
In the instant case, there is no dispute that sufficient notice of the registration proceedings immediately preceding the filing of the application for
via publication was duly made. confirmation of title except when prevented by war
or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
Moreover, petitioner concedes (a) that respondent should not be entirely faulted if the initial presumed to have performed all the conditions
hearing that was conducted on September 25, 1995 was outside the 90-day period set forth essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled
under Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, and (b) that respondent substantially to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
complied with the requirement relating to the registration of the subject land. chapter.[8]

Hence, on the issue of jurisdiction, the Court finds that the RTC did not commit any error in As the law now stands, a mere showing of possession and occupation for 30 years or more is
giving due course to respondents application for registration. not sufficient. Therefore, since the effectivity of P.D. 1073 on January 25, 1977, it must now
be shown that possession and occupation of the piece of land by the applicant, by himself or
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court agrees with petitioner on the more important issue through his predecessors-in-interest, started on June 12, 1945 or earlier. This provision is in
that respondent failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that it or its predecessors-in- total conformity with Section 14 (1) of P.D. 1529.[9]
interest possessed and occupied the subject property for the period required by law.
Thus, pursuant to the aforequoted provisions of law, applicants for registration of title must
Section 14 (1) of P.D. 1529, as amended, provides: prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public
domain, and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to earlier.
land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives: It is true, as respondent argues, that an examination of these requisites involve delving into
questions of fact which are not proper in a petition for review on certiorari. Factual findings
53
of the court a quo are generally binding on this Court, except for certain recognized starting 1965 gives rise to the presumption that respondents predecessors-in-interest
exceptions,[10] to wit: claimed ownership or possession of the subject lot only in that year.
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises and conjectures; Settled is the rule that the burden of proof in land registration cases rests on the applicant
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd who must show by clear, positive and convincing evidence that his alleged possession and
or impossible; occupation of the land is of the nature and duration required by law. [14] Unfortunately, as
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; petitioner contends, the pieces of evidence presented by respondent do not constitute the
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; well-nigh incontrovertible proof necessary in cases of this nature.
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went Lastly, the Court notes that respondent failed to prove that the subject lot had been declared
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions alienable and disposable by the DENR Secretary.
of both appellant and appellee;
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial Court; The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation dominion presumably belong to the State.[15] The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible
of specific evidence on which they are based; evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the and disposable rests with the applicant.[16]
petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents;
and In the present case, to prove the alienability and disposability of the subject property,
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are Hanover submitted a Certification issued by the Community Environment and Natural
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the Resources Offices (CENRO) attesting that lot 4488, CAD-545-D, containing an area of ONE
evidence on record.[11] HUNDRED THREE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FIFTY (103,350) square meters, more or less,
situated at Sacsac, Consolacion, Cebu was found to be within Alienable and Disposable Block-
The Court finds that the instant case falls under the third and ninth exceptions. 1, land classification project no. 28, per map 2545 of Consolacion, Cebu. However, this
certification is not sufficient.
A careful reading of the Decisions of the RTC and the CA will show that there is neither
finding nor discussion by both the trial and appellate courts which would support their In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.[17] this Court held that it is not enough for the
conclusion that respondents predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive and Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) or CENRO to certify that a
notorious possession and occupation of the disputed parcel of land since June 12, 1945 or land is alienable and disposable, thus:
earlier.
x x x The applicant for land registration must prove that the
No testimonial evidence was presented to prove that respondent or its predecessors-in- DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the
interest had been possessing and occupying the subject property since June 12, 1945 or land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land
earlier. Hanovers President and General Manager testified only with respect to his claim that subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area
he was the former owner of the subject property and that he acquired the same from the per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the
heirs of a certain Damiano Bontoyan; that he caused the payment of realty taxes due on the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original
property; that a tax declaration was issued in favor of Hanover; that Hanover caused a survey classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy
of the subject lot, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands; and that his and Hanovers by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be
possession of the property started in 1990.[12] established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable x x x.[18]

The pieces of documentary evidence submitted by respondent neither show that its In the instant case, even the veracity of the facts stated in the CENRO Certification
predecessors possession and occupation of the subject land is for the period or duration was not confirmed as only the President and General Manager of respondent corporation
required by law. The earliest date of the Tax Declarations presented in evidence by identified said Certification submitted by the latter. It is settled that a document or writing
respondent is 1965, the others being 1973, 1980, 1992 and 1993. Respondent failed to admitted as part of the testimony of a witness does not constitute proof of the facts stated
present any credible explanation why the realty taxes due on the subject property were only therein.[19] In the present case, Hanovers President and General Manager, who identified the
paid starting in 1965. While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they CENRO Certification, is a private individual. He was not the one who prepared the
constitute proof of claim of ownership.[13] In the present case, the payment of realty taxes Certification. The government official who issued the Certification was not presented before
the RTC so that he could have testified regarding its contents. Hence, the RTC should not
54
have accepted the contents of the Certification as proof of the facts stated therein. The N-18887. The motion alleged that Sandoval and Ozaeta sold the lots subject of the
contents of the Certification are hearsay, because Hanovers President and General Manager application to the late Eugenio Lopez, Sr. on 23 September 1970. Petitioners prayed that the
was incompetent to testify on the truth of the contents of such Certification. Even if the court consider in the land registration case the Deed of Absolute Sale[7] over the lots
subject Certification is presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, it has no probative executed by Sandoval and Ozaeta and their respective spouses in favor of Eugenio Lopez, Sr.
value in establishing that the land is alienable and disposable.[20] Invoking Section 22 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529),[8] petitioners also prayed that
the court issue the decree of registration in their names as the successors-in-interest of
Moreover, the CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the
Eugenio Lopez, Sr.
issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring the alienability and disposability of public
lands.[21] Thus, the CENRO Certification should have been accompanied by an official The land registration court gave due course to the motion and conducted hearings.[9]
publication of the DENR Secretarys issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable.
The Register of Deeds of Marikina City issued the corresponding OCT Nos. O-1603 and
Respondent, however, failed to comply with the foregoing requirements. O-1604 in favor of Sandoval and Ozaeta and their spouses only on 18 August 1998. [10] The
pertinent entries[11] in the Decrees read:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The May 6, 2005 Decision and March 30, 2006
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 70077 and the August 7, 1997 Decision This Decree is issued pursuant to the Decision dated 31st day of May, 1966 of the Hon. Pedro
of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 56 in Land Registration Case No. N-281 C. Navarro, Judge of [Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Rizal], and the
are SET ASIDE. Respondent Hanover Worldwide Trading Corporations application for Honorable Briccio C. Ygaa, this 3rd day of July, 1998.
registration of Lot No. 4488 of Consolacion Cad-545-D (New), under Vs-072219-000396,
Barrio Sacsac, Consolacion, Cebu, is DENIED.SO ORDERED. Issued at the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration, Quezon City,
this 20th day of October, in the year of Our Lord nineteen hundred and ninety-seven at 8:01
a.m.
[G.R. No. 146262. January 21, 2005]
HEIRS OF EUGENIO LOPEZ, SR., petitioners, vs. HON. ALFREDO R. ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity
(signed)
as Administrator of the Land Registration Authority and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
MARIKINA CITY, respondents. ALFREDO R. ENRIQUEZ
ADMINISTRATOR
National Land Titles and
DECISION
Deeds
CARPIO, J.:
Registration
The Case
Administration
This is a petition for review[1] to reverse the Decision[2] dated 29 November 2000 of the
Court of Appeals (appellate court) in CA-G.R. SP No. 55993. The appellate court affirmed the
Resolution[3] dated 21 May 1999 issued by the Land Registration Authority (LRA) in Consulta Entered in the Registration Book for Marikina,
No. 2879. The LRA ruled that a notice of lis pendens based on a motion is not registrable. pursuant to the provisions of section 39 of PD No. 1529, on
The Facts the 18th day of August nineteen hundred and ninety-
eight, at 1:16 p.m.
Alfonso Sandoval (Sandoval) and Roman Ozaeta, Jr. (Ozaeta) filed an application for
registration of title before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 152 (land registration
(signed)
court), docketed as Case No. 2858, Land Registration Case No. N-18887 (LRC No. N-18887).
EDGAR D. SANTOS
The land registration court issued an order of general default and hearings on the application
Register of Deeds
followed. On 31 May 1966, the land registration court granted the application. The decision
(Emphasis added)
became final and executory, and the land registration court issued a certificate of finality
dated 8 March 1991.[4] Petitioners filed another motion on 25 November 1998 to declare void Decree Nos. N-
217643 and N-217644 and Original Certificate of Title (OCT) Nos. O-1603 and O-1604.
The National Land Titles and Deeds Administration (now LRA) issued on 20 October
Petitioners pointed out that the OCTs show that incumbent Administrator Alfredo R.
1977 Decree Nos. N-217643 and N-217644 in the names of Sandoval and his wife Rosa Ruiz,
Enriquez signed the Decrees on 20 October 1997, before he assumed office on 8 July 1998
and Ozaeta and his wife Ma. Salome Lao.[5]
and even before Hon. Briccio C. Ygaa issued the Order of 3 July 1998.[12]
On 16 July 1997, petitioners Eugenio Lopez, Jr., Manolo Lopez, Oscar Lopez, and
Presentacion L. Psinakis (petitioners), heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr., filed a motion [6] in LRC No.
55
Petitioners questioned the inconsistencies in the dates and requested the LRA to recall released by the Registrar of Deeds concerned, it is now beyond our authority to recall them
the decrees. The LRA Administrator denied the request and explained the inconsistencies in unless duly authorized by the court.
the dates in a letter[13] dated 1 December 1998. The entire letter states:

Republic of the Philippines We hope that we have satisfactorily disposed of the concerns raised in your letter.
Department of Justice
LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY Very truly
Quezon City yours,
(sign
1 December 1998 ed)
ALFREDO R.
ENRIQUEZ
Atty. Crisostomo A. Quizon Admini
Quiason Makalintal Barot Torres & Ibarra Law Offices strator
2nd Floor Benpres Building
Exchange Road corner Meralco Ave. On 25 November 1998, petitioners filed with the Register of Deeds of Marikina City an
Ortigas Center, Pasig City application to annotate the notice of lis pendens at the back of OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604
on the ground that petitioners have filed with the land registration court a motion to declare
Sir: OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 void.[14] Petitioners attached to the application a copy of the 25
November 1998 motion and the pertinent OCTs.
This concerns your letter requesting the recall of Decree Nos. N-217643 and N-217644 issued In a letter[15] dated 15 December 1998, the Register of Deeds of Marikina City denied
in Land Registration Case No. N-2858, LRC Record No. N-18887, both in the names of Alfonso the application to annotate the notice of lis pendens. The entire letter states:
Sandoval and his wife, Rosa Ruiz, and Roman Ozaeta, Jr., and his wife, Ma. Salome Lao.
Republic of the Philippines
Department of Justice
Records of this Authority show that aforesaid decrees of registration were prepared on
LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY
October 20, 1977 pursuant to the decision of the court dated May 31, 1966 and the order for
Registry of Deeds, Marikina City
issuance of decree dated August 24, 1993. Said decrees were forwarded to the Office of the
Administrator on August 8, 1998 and was [sic] released therefrom on August 13, 1998.
Consequently, said decrees were signed sometime between August 8 and 13 1998 and 15 December 1998
definitely not on October 20, 1997 as what is reflected thereon because the undersigned
Administrator assumed office only on July 8, 1998. Apparently, at the time the decrees were Atty. Crisostomo A. Quizon
signed it was not noticed, through oversight, that they were dated October 20, 1977. It is 2nd Floor, Benpres Bldg.
therefore hereby clarified that Decree Nos. N-217643 and N-217644 were actually issued Exchange Road cor. Meralco Avenue
sometime between August 8 and 13 1998 and not on October 20, 1997. Pasig City

Regarding the claim that these decrees were prematurely issued as the motion for the Sir:
issuance of the decrees in favor of the Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, the properties involved having
been sold to him by the applicants, is still pending with the court, it is informed that no copy This is in connection to [sic] your application to have a Notice of Lis Pendens [annotated] at
of said motion nor of the order directing this Office to comment thereon appears on file in the back of OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 issued in the name of ALFONSO SANDOVAL AND
the records of the case. Hence, these matters could not have been taken into consideration SPOUSE.
in the issuance of the decrees. Had the Administration been apprised of these incidents,
perhaps the issuance of the decrees could have been held in abeyance until the court has
Pursuant to Sec. 76, PD No. 1529[,] the contents of the notice are the name[s] of the parties,
resolved the same.
the court where the action is pending, the date the action was instituted and a copy of the
compalint [sic] in order to determine if the person named in the title is impleaded.
As to the recall of the decrees of registration, we regret to inform you that since the
certificates of title transcribed pursuant to said decrees have already been issued and
56
We regret to inform you that the application, bereft of the original petition or compaint [sic] Undaunted, petitioners filed before the appellate court a petition for review of the
upon which this office will base its action, is DENIED. LRAs decision. Petitioners filed the petition on the ground of manifest error and grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the LRA Administrator when he ruled in Consulta No. 2879 that
If you do not agree with our findings, you can, without withdrawing the documents you the notice of lis pendens is not registrable.
submitted, elevate the matter en consulta five (5) days from receipt hereof to the Office of The appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The appellate court
the Administrator, Land Registration Authority, East Avenue cor. NIA Road, Quezon City. reiterated the LRAs ruling that only a party to a case has the legal personality to file a notice
of lis pendens. Petitioners have no legal personality because they failed to file a motion to lift
Very truly yours, the order of general default in the land registration case.

Issues
(signed
) Petitioners present the following issues for resolution of this Court:
EDGAR
D. SANTOS 1. WHETHER PETITIONERS MOTION TO DECLARE VOID THE DECREES ISSUED BY
Registe THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY IS A PROPER BASIS FOR FILING THE
r of Deeds NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS, and

On 14 January 1999, three days after receipt of the letter, petitioners elevated the 2. WHETHER PETITIONERS CAN FILE THE MOTION TO DECLARE VOID THE
denial in consulta to the LRA. The case was docketed as Consulta No. 2879. DECREES ISSUED BY THE LAND REGISTRATION COURT IN LRC CASE NO. N-
18887 DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE COURT HAS NOT LIFTED THE GENERAL
The Ruling of the Land Registration Authority ORDER OF DEFAULT.[18]
In its resolution[16] dated 21 May 1999, the LRA stated that the sole question for The Ruling of the Court
resolution is whether a notice of lis pendens is registrable based on a motion to declare void
the decrees and titles. The LRA agreed with the Register of Deeds that a notice of lis pendens The petition has no merit.
based on a motion is not registrable. Relying on Section 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the
We agree with the observation of the appellate court that the pleadings filed by
LRA ruled that only a party to a case has the legal personality to file a notice of lis
petitioners, public respondents and the Office of the Solicitor General cite more or less the
pendens relative to the pending case.
same provisions of the laws as applicable in support of their respective contentions but differ
The LRA focused on petitioners standing in LRC No. N-18887. The LRA declared that x x x only with respect to their interpretation thereof.[19] With this observation in mind, we
petitioners are not parties in LRC No. N-18887. Since a land registration case is a quote the pertinent provisions of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and of PD 1529.
proceeding in rem, an order of general default binds the whole world as a party in the case.
Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Petitioners are mere movants whose personality the court has not admitted. Based on
Section 26 of PD 1529, the LRA ruled that petitioners should have filed a motion to lift the
order of general default. Pertinent portions of the LRA decision read: SECTION 14. Notice of lis pendens. In an action affecting the title or the right of possession of
real property, the plaintiff and the defendant, when affirmative relief is claimed in his
answer, may record in the office of the registry of deeds of the province in which the
Until and after the Order of General Default in LRC Case No. 18887 is lifted, petitioners
property is situated a notice of the pendency of the action. Said notice shall contain the
cannot be clothed with personality as oppositors in said land registration case by merely
names of the parties and the object of the action or defense, and a description of the
filing a motion after a judgement has been rendered. Such being the case, a notice of lis
property in that province affected thereby. Only from the time of filing such notice for record
pendens on the basis of the motion filed by petitioners cannot be admitted for registration.
shall a purchaser, or encumbrancer of the property affected thereby, be deemed to have
To rule otherwise would preempt the judgment of the Court in so far as the personalities of
constructive notice of the pendency of the action, and only of its pendency against the
the movants as oppositors in the land registration case is concerned.
parties designated by their real names.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Authority is of the opinion and so holds that the
The notice of lis pendens hereinabove mentioned may be cancelled only upon order of the
notice of lis pendens is not registrable.
court, after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party,
or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded.
SO ORDERED.[17]
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals Section 76 of PD 1529 states:
57
SECTION 76. Notice of lis pendens. No action to recover possession of real estate, or to quiet Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[26] enumerated the cases where a notice
title thereto, or to remove clouds upon the title thereof, or for partition or other proceedings of lis pendens is appropriate:
of any kind in court directly affecting the title to land or the use or occupation thereof or the
buildings thereon, and no judgment, and no proceeding to vacate or reverse any judgment, [A] notice of lis pendens is proper in the following cases, viz:
shall have any effect upon registered land as against persons other than the parties thereto,
unless a memorandum or notice stating the institution of such action or proceeding and the
a) An action to recover possession of real estate;
court wherein the same is pending, as well as the date of the institution thereof, together
with a reference to the number of the certificate of title, and an adequate description of the
land affected and the registered owner thereof, shall have been filed and registered. b) An action to quiet title thereto;

Notice of Lis Pendens


c) An action to remove clouds thereon;
Lis pendens literally means a pending suit. The doctrine of lis pendens refers to the
jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over property involved in a suit, pending d) An action for partition; and
the continuance of the action, and until final judgment.[20]

The purposes of lis pendens are (1) to protect the rights of the party causing the e) Any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting the title to the
registration of the lis pendens, and (2) to advise third persons who purchase or contract on land or the use or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon.
the subject property that they do so at their peril and subject to the result of the pending
litigation.[21] On the other hand, the doctrine of lis pendens has no application in the following cases:
The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect. First, it keeps the subject
matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment to a) Preliminary attachments;
prevent the defeat of the final judgment by successive alienations. Second, it binds a
purchaser, bona fide or not, of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree b) Proceedings for the probate of wills;
that the court will promulgate subsequently. However, the filing of a notice of lis
pendens does not create a right or lien that previously did not exist.[22] c) Levies on execution;
Without a notice of lis pendens, a third party who acquires the property after relying
only on the certificate of title is a purchaser in good faith. Against such third party, the d) Proceedings for administration of estate of deceased persons; and
supposed rights of a litigant cannot prevail, because the former is not bound by the property
owners undertakings not annotated in the transfer certificate of title. [23] Thus, we have e) Proceedings in which the only object is the recovery of a money judgment.[27]
consistently held that
As decreed by Section 76 of PD 1529, a notice of lis pendens should contain a
The notice of lis pendens x x x is ordinarily recorded without the intervention of the court statement of the institution of an action or proceeding, the court where the same is pending,
where the action is pending. The notice is but an incident in an action, an extrajudicial one, to and the date of its institution. A notice of lis pendens should also contain a reference to the
be sure. It does not affect the merits thereof. It is intended merely to constructively advise, number of the certificate of title of the land, an adequate description of the land affected
or warn, all people who deal with the property that they so deal with it at their own risk, and and its registered owner.
whatever rights they may acquire in the property in any voluntary transaction are subject to
the results of the action, and may well be inferior and subordinate to those which may be The Register of Deeds denied registration of the notice of lis pendens because the
finally determined and laid down therein. The cancellation of such a precautionary notice is application was bereft of the original petition or complaint upon which this office will base its
therefore also a mere incident in the action, and may be ordered by the Court having action.[28] In consulta to the LRA, petitioners pointed out that they have complied with the
jurisdiction of it at any given time. And its continuance or removal x x x is not contingent on requirements for the registration of the notice of lis pendens, as follows:
the existence of a final judgment in the action, and ordinarily has no effect on the merits
thereof.[24] 7.2.1 The Notice of Lis Pendens contains a statement of the filing by the Heirs of Eugenio
Lopez of a motion to declare Original Certificates of Title Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 null and
A notice of lis pendens may involve actions that deal not only with title or possession of void;
a property, but also with the use or occupation of a property.[25] The litigation must directly
involve a specific property which is necessarily affected by the judgment. Magdalena
58
7.2.2 It contains the name of the court wherein the motion is pending which is the In its comment,[32] the LRA states that under Section 26 of PD 1529 the order of default
registration court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 152, Pasig City. The date of the filing of the includes petitioners. Therefore, petitioners failure to move to lift the default order did not
motion is shown on the motion itself wherein the receipt of said motion by the land give them standing in the case. As long as the court does not lift the order of general default,
registration court on November 25, 1998 is duly stamped; petitioners have no legal standing to file the motion to declare void the decrees of
registration issued to the applicant. Section 26 of PD 1529 provides thus:
7.2.3 The numbers of the Original Certificates of Title Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 are clearly
indicated in the notice; Sec. 26. Order of default; effect. If no person appears and answers within the time allowed,
the court shall, upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing, order a
7.2.4 There is adequate description of the land affected in the Notice of Lis Pendens; default to be recorded and require the applicant to present evidence. By the description in
the notice To All Whom It May Concern, all the world are made parties defendant and shall
be concluded by the default order.
7.2.5 The names of the registered owners are indicated in Paragraph 4 of the Motion
attached to the Notice;
Where an appearance has been entered and an answer filed, a default order shall be entered
against persons who did not appear and answer.
7.2.6 A copy of the motion to declare OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 null and void, dated
November 25, 1998 upon which the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal will base its
action is attached as Annex A of the Notice of Lis Pendens. (Emphasis in the original)[29] Petitioners justification for filing a motion to annul the decrees and titles, as opposed
to filing a motion to lift the order of general default, rests on two related assumptions. First,
with the filing of the 16 July 1997 motion and giving of due course to the motion by the land
Petitioners enumeration readily reveals that they have not complied with the
registration court, petitioners assert that they acquired legal standing in the registration
requisites. Both the LRA and the appellate court denied the application for a notice of lis
proceedings. Second, buyer Eugenio Lopez, Sr. stepped into the shoes of the sellers-
pendens because petitioners are mere movants, and not original parties, in LRC No. N-18887.
applicants Sandoval and Ozaeta when applicants sold the property to him. As successors-in-
As petitioners are not parties to an action as contemplated in Section 76 of PD 1529, they
interest of the buyer, petitioners contend that they are not strangers to the proceedings.
failed to present the requisite pleading to the Register of Deeds of Marikina City. We hold
that the Register of Deeds correctly denied the application for a notice of lis pendens. To justify their two assumptions, petitioners traced the antecedent of Section 22 of PD
1529 to Section 29 of Act 496[33] and its judicial interpretation in Mendoza v. Court of
Reconveyance
Appeals.[34]
Petitioners committed a fatal procedural error when they filed a motion in LRC No. N-
18887 on 16 July 1997. The remedy of petitioners is an action for reconveyance against Section 22 of PD 1529 provides:
Sandoval, Ozaeta and their spouses. Reconveyance is based on Section 55 of Act No. 496, as
amended by Act No. 3322, which states that xxx in all cases of registration procured by fraud
SECTION 22. Dealings with land pending original registration.After the filing of the
the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud,
application and before the issuance of the decree of registration, the land therein described
without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of
may still be the subject of dealings in whole or in part, in which case the interested party
title xxx.
shall present to the court the pertinent instruments together with the subdivision plan
An action for reconveyance is an action in personam available to a person whose approved by the Director of Lands in case of transfer of portions thereof, and the court, after
property has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in anothers name. notice to the parties, shall order such land registered subject to the conveyance or
Although the decree is recognized as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, the encumbrance created by said instruments, or order that the decree of registration be issued
registered owner is not necessarily held free from liens. As a remedy, an action for in the name of the person to whom the property has been conveyed by said instruments.
reconveyance is filed as an ordinary action in the ordinary courts of justice and not with the
land registration court.[30] Reconveyance is always available as long as the property has not The pertinent portion of Section 29 of Act 496 provides:
passed to an innocent third person for value. A notice of lis pendens may thus be annotated
on the certificate of title immediately upon the institution of the action in court. The notice SECTION 29. After the filing of the application and before the issuance of the decree of title
of lis pendens will avoid transfer to an innocent third person for value and preserve the claim by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, the land therein described may be dealt
of the real owner.[31] with and instruments relating thereto shall be recorded in the office of the register of deeds
Necessity of a Motion to Lift the Order of General Default at any time before issuance of the decree of title, in the same manner as if no application
had been made. The interested party may, however, present such instruments to the Court
of First Instance instead of presenting them to the office of the Register of Deeds, together
59
with a motion that the same be considered in relation with the application, and the court, Indeed, in its comment before this Court, the LRA stated thus:
after notice to the parties shall order such land registered subject to the encumbrance
created by said instruments, or order the decree of registration issued in the name of the Under Section 26, PD 1429, petitioners are deemed to have been included by the default
buyer or of the person to whom the property has been conveyed by said instruments. x x x order. Those who did not file an answer should be considered as having lost their standing in
court from that stage (Republic v. Dela Rosa, 173 SCRA 12) except when they file a motion to
Mendoza v. Court of Appeals[35] explains the procedure in cases of conveyance of the set aside the order [of] default on the grounds mentioned in Section 3, Rule 18 of the Rules
land subject of a registration proceeding by an instrument executed between the time of of Court (Toco v. Fay, 80 Phil. 166).
filing of the application for registration and the issuance of the decree of title.
In land registration cases (as in the said LRC No. N-18887), an order of general default was
The law does not require that the application for registration be amended by substituting the deemed to have been issued based on the presumption of regularity in judicial proceedings
buyer or the person to whom the property has been conveyed for the applicant. Neither (Pascual, et al. v. Ortega, et al., 58 O.G. 12 March 1962 C.A.). Petitioners failed to adduce any
does it require that the buyer or the person to whom the property has been conveyed be a evidence showing that the order of general default was lifted. Records disclosed that without
party to the case. He may thus be a total stranger to the land registration proceedings. The first filing a motion to lift the order of general default, petitioners filed a motion to declare as
only requirements of the law are: (1) that the instrument be presented to the court by the null and void the decrees and titles. Until the order of general default is lifted by the court,
interested party together with a motion that the same be considered in relation with the petitioner could not be considered as a party to the action. They are deemed movants whose
application; and (2) that prior notice be given to the parties to the case xxx.[36] personality as far as the case is concerned is not yet admitted by the court considering that
the order of default has not been lifted.[38]
Petitioners also assert that they do not dispute the judgment of the land registration
court. However, this position is in conflict with their 25 November 1998 motion to have the One should be careful, however, to distinguish between movants as mere interested
decree and the titles declared void. Petitioners now assume the roles of both successors-in- parties prescribed under Section 22 of PD 1529 and movants as intervenors-oppositors to the
interest and oppositors. This confusion of roles brought about petitioners grave error in land registration proceedings. It is only in the latter case that a motion to lift the order of
procedure. general default is required. It is only in the latter case that the doctrine pronounced
in Serrano v. Palacio,[39] as repeatedly invoked by the LRA and OSG, is applicable:
The land registration court granted the application in LRC No. N-18887 on 31 May 1966
and issued a certificate of finality dated 8 March 1991. Petitioners filed their motion to
consider the deed of sale in the registration on 16 July 1997. Petitioners filed their motion to x x x [P]etitioners committed an error of procedure when they filed a motion to intervene in
have the decrees and the corresponding certificates of title declared void on 25 November the x x x land registration case for the proper procedure would have been for them to ask
1998. Petitioners filed both motions long after the decision in LRC No. N-18887 became final first for the lifting of the order of general default, and then, if lifted, to file an opposition to
and executory. Neither petitioners nor even the applicants from whom they base their claim the application of the applicants. This is so because proceedings in land registration are
presented the Deed of Sale before the land registration court while the action was pending. in rem, and not in personam, the sole object being the registration applied for, and not the
determination of any right not connected with the registration (Estila vs. Alvero, 37 Phil.
Considering the facts and arguments as presented above, we hold that the motion filed 498).
by petitioners is insufficient to give them standing in the land registration proceedings for
purposes of filing an application of a notice of lis pendens. However, we disagree with the Petitioners are not mere interested parties in this case. By filing their motion to have the
LRA and the appellate courts observation that petitioners need to file a motion to lift the decrees and the corresponding certificates of title declared void, they took the role of
order of general default. A motion to lift the order of general default should be filed before oppositors to the application for land registration.
entry of final judgment. The land registration court granted the application for registration of
title on 31 May 1966 and issued a certificate of finality on 8 March 1991. Petitioners filed The appellate court stated that in as much as it would want to oblige to the plea of
their motion on 16 July 1997. Thus, even if petitioners filed a motion to lift the order of petitioners to hasten or expedite the proceedings and to avoid further expenses on the part
general default, the order of default could not be set aside because the motion was filed out of the petitioners, however[,] (it) could not.[40] Indeed, it requires a delicate balancing act
of time. between the objective of the Rules of Court to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding[41] and the strict requirements for a notice of lis
In Lim Toco v. Go Fay,[37] this Court explained the effect of an order of default to the pendens. The facts in this case show that petitioners have not complied with the
party defaulted. A party declared in default loses his standing in court. As a result of his loss requirements.
of standing, a party in default cannot appear in court, adduce evidence, be heard, or be
entitled to notice. A party in default cannot even appeal from the judgment rendered by the WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
court, unless he files a motion to set aside the order of default under the grounds provided in CA-G.R. SP No. 55993 dated 29 November 2000.
what is now Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
60
[G.R. No. 146262. January 21, 2005] Issued at the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration, Quezon City,
this 20th day of October, in the year of Our Lord nineteen hundred and ninety-seven at 8:01
HEIRS OF EUGENIO LOPEZ, SR., petitioners, vs. HON. ALFREDO R. ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity a.m.
as Administrator of the Land Registration Authority and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
MARIKINA CITY, respondents.
DECISION (signed)
ALFREDO R. ENRIQUEZ
CARPIO, J.: ADMINISTRATOR
The Case National Land Titles and
This is a petition for review[1] to reverse the Decision[2] dated 29 November 2000 of the Deeds
Court of Appeals (appellate court) in CA-G.R. SP No. 55993. The appellate court affirmed the Registration
Resolution[3] dated 21 May 1999 issued by the Land Registration Authority (LRA) in Consulta Administration
No. 2879. The LRA ruled that a notice of lis pendens based on a motion is not registrable.
The Facts Entered in the Registration Book for Marikina,
pursuant to the provisions of section 39 of PD No. 1529, on
Alfonso Sandoval (Sandoval) and Roman Ozaeta, Jr. (Ozaeta) filed an application for the 18th day of August nineteen hundred and ninety-
registration of title before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 152 (land registration eight, at 1:16 p.m.
court), docketed as Case No. 2858, Land Registration Case No. N-18887 (LRC No. N-18887).
The land registration court issued an order of general default and hearings on the application
(signed)
followed. On 31 May 1966, the land registration court granted the application. The decision
EDGAR D. SANTOS
became final and executory, and the land registration court issued a certificate of finality
Register of Deeds
dated 8 March 1991.[4]
(Emphasis added)
The National Land Titles and Deeds Administration (now LRA) issued on 20 October
Petitioners filed another motion on 25 November 1998 to declare void Decree Nos. N-
1977 Decree Nos. N-217643 and N-217644 in the names of Sandoval and his wife Rosa Ruiz,
217643 and N-217644 and Original Certificate of Title (OCT) Nos. O-1603 and O-1604.
and Ozaeta and his wife Ma. Salome Lao.[5]
Petitioners pointed out that the OCTs show that incumbent Administrator Alfredo R.
On 16 July 1997, petitioners Eugenio Lopez, Jr., Manolo Lopez, Oscar Lopez, and Enriquez signed the Decrees on 20 October 1997, before he assumed office on 8 July 1998
Presentacion L. Psinakis (petitioners), heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr., filed a motion [6] in LRC No. and even before Hon. Briccio C. Ygaa issued the Order of 3 July 1998.[12]
N-18887. The motion alleged that Sandoval and Ozaeta sold the lots subject of the
Petitioners questioned the inconsistencies in the dates and requested the LRA to recall
application to the late Eugenio Lopez, Sr. on 23 September 1970. Petitioners prayed that the
the decrees. The LRA Administrator denied the request and explained the inconsistencies in
court consider in the land registration case the Deed of Absolute Sale[7] over the lots
the dates in a letter[13] dated 1 December 1998. The entire letter states:
executed by Sandoval and Ozaeta and their respective spouses in favor of Eugenio Lopez, Sr.
Invoking Section 22 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529), [8] petitioners also prayed that Republic of the Philippines
the court issue the decree of registration in their names as the successors-in-interest of Department of Justice
Eugenio Lopez, Sr. LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY
Quezon City
The land registration court gave due course to the motion and conducted hearings.[9]

The Register of Deeds of Marikina City issued the corresponding OCT Nos. O-1603 and 1 December 1998
O-1604 in favor of Sandoval and Ozaeta and their spouses only on 18 August 1998.[10] The
pertinent entries[11] in the Decrees read: Atty. Crisostomo A. Quizon
Quiason Makalintal Barot Torres & Ibarra Law Offices
This Decree is issued pursuant to the Decision dated 31st day of May, 1966 of the Hon. Pedro 2nd Floor Benpres Building
C. Navarro, Judge of [Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Rizal], and the Exchange Road corner Meralco Ave.
Honorable Briccio C. Ygaa, this 3rd day of July, 1998. Ortigas Center, Pasig City

Sir:
61
This concerns your letter requesting the recall of Decree Nos. N-217643 and N-217644 issued In a letter[15] dated 15 December 1998, the Register of Deeds of Marikina City denied
in Land Registration Case No. N-2858, LRC Record No. N-18887, both in the names of Alfonso the application to annotate the notice of lis pendens. The entire letter states:
Sandoval and his wife, Rosa Ruiz, and Roman Ozaeta, Jr., and his wife, Ma. Salome Lao.
Republic of the Philippines
Department of Justice
Records of this Authority show that aforesaid decrees of registration were prepared on LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY
October 20, 1977 pursuant to the decision of the court dated May 31, 1966 and the order for Registry of Deeds, Marikina City
issuance of decree dated August 24, 1993. Said decrees were forwarded to the Office of the
Administrator on August 8, 1998 and was [sic] released therefrom on August 13, 1998.
Consequently, said decrees were signed sometime between August 8 and 13 1998 and 15 December 1998
definitely not on October 20, 1997 as what is reflected thereon because the undersigned
Administrator assumed office only on July 8, 1998. Apparently, at the time the decrees were Atty. Crisostomo A. Quizon
signed it was not noticed, through oversight, that they were dated October 20, 1977. It is 2nd Floor, Benpres Bldg.
therefore hereby clarified that Decree Nos. N-217643 and N-217644 were actually issued Exchange Road cor. Meralco Avenue
sometime between August 8 and 13 1998 and not on October 20, 1997. Pasig City

Regarding the claim that these decrees were prematurely issued as the motion for the Sir:
issuance of the decrees in favor of the Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, the properties involved having
been sold to him by the applicants, is still pending with the court, it is informed that no copy This is in connection to [sic] your application to have a Notice of Lis Pendens [annotated] at
of said motion nor of the order directing this Office to comment thereon appears on file in the back of OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 issued in the name of ALFONSO SANDOVAL AND
the records of the case. Hence, these matters could not have been taken into consideration SPOUSE.
in the issuance of the decrees. Had the Administration been apprised of these incidents,
perhaps the issuance of the decrees could have been held in abeyance until the court has
Pursuant to Sec. 76, PD No. 1529[,] the contents of the notice are the name[s] of the parties,
resolved the same.
the court where the action is pending, the date the action was instituted and a copy of the
compalint [sic] in order to determine if the person named in the title is impleaded.
As to the recall of the decrees of registration, we regret to inform you that since the
certificates of title transcribed pursuant to said decrees have already been issued and
We regret to inform you that the application, bereft of the original petition or compaint [sic]
released by the Registrar of Deeds concerned, it is now beyond our authority to recall them
upon which this office will base its action, is DENIED.
unless duly authorized by the court.

If you do not agree with our findings, you can, without withdrawing the documents you
We hope that we have satisfactorily disposed of the concerns raised in your letter.
submitted, elevate the matter en consulta five (5) days from receipt hereof to the Office of
the Administrator, Land Registration Authority, East Avenue cor. NIA Road, Quezon City.
Very truly
yours,
Very truly yours,
(sign
ed)
ALFREDO R. (signed
ENRIQUEZ )
Admini EDGAR
strator D. SANTOS
Registe
On 25 November 1998, petitioners filed with the Register of Deeds of Marikina City an r of Deeds
application to annotate the notice of lis pendens at the back of OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604
on the ground that petitioners have filed with the land registration court a motion to declare On 14 January 1999, three days after receipt of the letter, petitioners elevated the
OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 void.[14] Petitioners attached to the application a copy of the 25 denial in consulta to the LRA. The case was docketed as Consulta No. 2879.
November 1998 motion and the pertinent OCTs. The Ruling of the Land Registration Authority
62
In its resolution[16] dated 21 May 1999, the LRA stated that the sole question for The Ruling of the Court
resolution is whether a notice of lis pendens is registrable based on a motion to declare void
the decrees and titles. The LRA agreed with the Register of Deeds that a notice of lis pendens The petition has no merit.
based on a motion is not registrable. Relying on Section 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the We agree with the observation of the appellate court that the pleadings filed by
LRA ruled that only a party to a case has the legal personality to file a notice of lis petitioners, public respondents and the Office of the Solicitor General cite more or less the
pendens relative to the pending case. same provisions of the laws as applicable in support of their respective contentions but differ
The LRA focused on petitioners standing in LRC No. N-18887. The LRA declared that x x x only with respect to their interpretation thereof.[19] With this observation in mind, we
petitioners are not parties in LRC No. N-18887. Since a land registration case is a quote the pertinent provisions of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and of PD 1529.
proceeding in rem, an order of general default binds the whole world as a party in the case. Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Petitioners are mere movants whose personality the court has not admitted. Based on
Section 26 of PD 1529, the LRA ruled that petitioners should have filed a motion to lift the
SECTION 14. Notice of lis pendens. In an action affecting the title or the right of possession of
order of general default. Pertinent portions of the LRA decision read:
real property, the plaintiff and the defendant, when affirmative relief is claimed in his
answer, may record in the office of the registry of deeds of the province in which the
Until and after the Order of General Default in LRC Case No. 18887 is lifted, petitioners property is situated a notice of the pendency of the action. Said notice shall contain the
cannot be clothed with personality as oppositors in said land registration case by merely names of the parties and the object of the action or defense, and a description of the
filing a motion after a judgement has been rendered. Such being the case, a notice of lis property in that province affected thereby. Only from the time of filing such notice for record
pendens on the basis of the motion filed by petitioners cannot be admitted for registration. shall a purchaser, or encumbrancer of the property affected thereby, be deemed to have
To rule otherwise would preempt the judgment of the Court in so far as the personalities of constructive notice of the pendency of the action, and only of its pendency against the
the movants as oppositors in the land registration case is concerned. parties designated by their real names.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Authority is of the opinion and so holds that the The notice of lis pendens hereinabove mentioned may be cancelled only upon order of the
notice of lis pendens is not registrable. court, after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party,
or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded.
SO ORDERED.[17]
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals Section 76 of PD 1529 states:

Undaunted, petitioners filed before the appellate court a petition for review of the SECTION 76. Notice of lis pendens. No action to recover possession of real estate, or to quiet
LRAs decision. Petitioners filed the petition on the ground of manifest error and grave abuse title thereto, or to remove clouds upon the title thereof, or for partition or other proceedings
of discretion on the part of the LRA Administrator when he ruled in Consulta No. 2879 that of any kind in court directly affecting the title to land or the use or occupation thereof or the
the notice of lis pendens is not registrable. buildings thereon, and no judgment, and no proceeding to vacate or reverse any judgment,
shall have any effect upon registered land as against persons other than the parties thereto,
The appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The appellate court unless a memorandum or notice stating the institution of such action or proceeding and the
reiterated the LRAs ruling that only a party to a case has the legal personality to file a notice court wherein the same is pending, as well as the date of the institution thereof, together
of lis pendens. Petitioners have no legal personality because they failed to file a motion to lift with a reference to the number of the certificate of title, and an adequate description of the
the order of general default in the land registration case. land affected and the registered owner thereof, shall have been filed and registered.
Issues Notice of Lis Pendens

Petitioners present the following issues for resolution of this Court: Lis pendens literally means a pending suit. The doctrine of lis pendens refers to the
jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over property involved in a suit, pending
1. WHETHER PETITIONERS MOTION TO DECLARE VOID THE DECREES ISSUED BY the continuance of the action, and until final judgment.[20]
THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY IS A PROPER BASIS FOR FILING THE
NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS, and The purposes of lis pendens are (1) to protect the rights of the party causing the
registration of the lis pendens, and (2) to advise third persons who purchase or contract on
2. WHETHER PETITIONERS CAN FILE THE MOTION TO DECLARE VOID THE the subject property that they do so at their peril and subject to the result of the pending
DECREES ISSUED BY THE LAND REGISTRATION COURT IN LRC CASE NO. N- litigation.[21]
18887 DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE COURT HAS NOT LIFTED THE GENERAL
ORDER OF DEFAULT.[18]
63
The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect. First, it keeps the subject a) Preliminary attachments;
matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment to
prevent the defeat of the final judgment by successive alienations. Second, it binds a b) Proceedings for the probate of wills;
purchaser, bona fide or not, of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree
that the court will promulgate subsequently. However, the filing of a notice of lis
c) Levies on execution;
pendens does not create a right or lien that previously did not exist.[22]

Without a notice of lis pendens, a third party who acquires the property after relying d) Proceedings for administration of estate of deceased persons; and
only on the certificate of title is a purchaser in good faith. Against such third party, the
supposed rights of a litigant cannot prevail, because the former is not bound by the property
e) Proceedings in which the only object is the recovery of a money judgment.[27]
owners undertakings not annotated in the transfer certificate of title. [23] Thus, we have
consistently held that
As decreed by Section 76 of PD 1529, a notice of lis pendens should contain a
statement of the institution of an action or proceeding, the court where the same is pending,
The notice of lis pendens x x x is ordinarily recorded without the intervention of the court
and the date of its institution. A notice of lis pendens should also contain a reference to the
where the action is pending. The notice is but an incident in an action, an extrajudicial one, to
number of the certificate of title of the land, an adequate description of the land affected
be sure. It does not affect the merits thereof. It is intended merely to constructively advise,
and its registered owner.
or warn, all people who deal with the property that they so deal with it at their own risk, and
whatever rights they may acquire in the property in any voluntary transaction are subject to The Register of Deeds denied registration of the notice of lis pendens because the
the results of the action, and may well be inferior and subordinate to those which may be application was bereft of the original petition or complaint upon which this office will base its
finally determined and laid down therein. The cancellation of such a precautionary notice is action.[28] In consulta to the LRA, petitioners pointed out that they have complied with the
therefore also a mere incident in the action, and may be ordered by the Court having requirements for the registration of the notice of lis pendens, as follows:
jurisdiction of it at any given time. And its continuance or removal x x x is not contingent on
the existence of a final judgment in the action, and ordinarily has no effect on the merits 7.2.1 The Notice of Lis Pendens contains a statement of the filing by the Heirs of Eugenio
thereof.[24] Lopez of a motion to declare Original Certificates of Title Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 null and
void;
A notice of lis pendens may involve actions that deal not only with title or possession of
a property, but also with the use or occupation of a property. [25] The litigation must directly 7.2.2 It contains the name of the court wherein the motion is pending which is the
involve a specific property which is necessarily affected by the judgment. Magdalena registration court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 152, Pasig City. The date of the filing of the
Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[26] enumerated the cases where a notice motion is shown on the motion itself wherein the receipt of said motion by the land
of lis pendens is appropriate: registration court on November 25, 1998 is duly stamped;

[A] notice of lis pendens is proper in the following cases, viz: 7.2.3 The numbers of the Original Certificates of Title Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 are clearly
indicated in the notice;
a) An action to recover possession of real estate;
7.2.4 There is adequate description of the land affected in the Notice of Lis Pendens;
b) An action to quiet title thereto;
7.2.5 The names of the registered owners are indicated in Paragraph 4 of the Motion
c) An action to remove clouds thereon; attached to the Notice;

d) An action for partition; and 7.2.6 A copy of the motion to declare OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 null and void, dated
November 25, 1998 upon which the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal will base its
e) Any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting the title to the action is attached as Annex A of the Notice of Lis Pendens. (Emphasis in the original)[29]
land or the use or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon.
Petitioners enumeration readily reveals that they have not complied with the
On the other hand, the doctrine of lis pendens has no application in the following cases: requisites. Both the LRA and the appellate court denied the application for a notice of lis
pendens because petitioners are mere movants, and not original parties, in LRC No. N-18887.
64
As petitioners are not parties to an action as contemplated in Section 76 of PD 1529, they To justify their two assumptions, petitioners traced the antecedent of Section 22 of PD
failed to present the requisite pleading to the Register of Deeds of Marikina City. We hold 1529 to Section 29 of Act 496[33] and its judicial interpretation in Mendoza v. Court of
that the Register of Deeds correctly denied the application for a notice of lis pendens. Appeals.[34]

Reconveyance
Section 22 of PD 1529 provides:
Petitioners committed a fatal procedural error when they filed a motion in LRC No. N-
18887 on 16 July 1997. The remedy of petitioners is an action for reconveyance against SECTION 22. Dealings with land pending original registration.After the filing of the
Sandoval, Ozaeta and their spouses. Reconveyance is based on Section 55 of Act No. 496, as application and before the issuance of the decree of registration, the land therein described
amended by Act No. 3322, which states that xxx in all cases of registration procured by fraud may still be the subject of dealings in whole or in part, in which case the interested party
the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud, shall present to the court the pertinent instruments together with the subdivision plan
without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of approved by the Director of Lands in case of transfer of portions thereof, and the court, after
title xxx. notice to the parties, shall order such land registered subject to the conveyance or
An action for reconveyance is an action in personam available to a person whose encumbrance created by said instruments, or order that the decree of registration be issued
property has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in anothers name. in the name of the person to whom the property has been conveyed by said instruments.
Although the decree is recognized as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, the
registered owner is not necessarily held free from liens. As a remedy, an action for The pertinent portion of Section 29 of Act 496 provides:
reconveyance is filed as an ordinary action in the ordinary courts of justice and not with the
land registration court.[30] Reconveyance is always available as long as the property has not SECTION 29. After the filing of the application and before the issuance of the decree of title
passed to an innocent third person for value. A notice of lis pendens may thus be annotated by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, the land therein described may be dealt
on the certificate of title immediately upon the institution of the action in court. The notice with and instruments relating thereto shall be recorded in the office of the register of deeds
of lis pendens will avoid transfer to an innocent third person for value and preserve the claim at any time before issuance of the decree of title, in the same manner as if no application
of the real owner.[31] had been made. The interested party may, however, present such instruments to the Court
of First Instance instead of presenting them to the office of the Register of Deeds, together
Necessity of a Motion to Lift the Order of General Default
with a motion that the same be considered in relation with the application, and the court,
In its comment,[32] the LRA states that under Section 26 of PD 1529 the order of default after notice to the parties shall order such land registered subject to the encumbrance
includes petitioners. Therefore, petitioners failure to move to lift the default order did not created by said instruments, or order the decree of registration issued in the name of the
give them standing in the case. As long as the court does not lift the order of general default, buyer or of the person to whom the property has been conveyed by said instruments. x x x
petitioners have no legal standing to file the motion to declare void the decrees of
registration issued to the applicant. Section 26 of PD 1529 provides thus: Mendoza v. Court of Appeals[35] explains the procedure in cases of conveyance of the
land subject of a registration proceeding by an instrument executed between the time of
Sec. 26. Order of default; effect. If no person appears and answers within the time allowed, filing of the application for registration and the issuance of the decree of title.
the court shall, upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing, order a
default to be recorded and require the applicant to present evidence. By the description in The law does not require that the application for registration be amended by substituting the
the notice To All Whom It May Concern, all the world are made parties defendant and shall buyer or the person to whom the property has been conveyed for the applicant. Neither
be concluded by the default order. does it require that the buyer or the person to whom the property has been conveyed be a
party to the case. He may thus be a total stranger to the land registration proceedings. The
Where an appearance has been entered and an answer filed, a default order shall be entered only requirements of the law are: (1) that the instrument be presented to the court by the
against persons who did not appear and answer. interested party together with a motion that the same be considered in relation with the
application; and (2) that prior notice be given to the parties to the case xxx.[36]
Petitioners justification for filing a motion to annul the decrees and titles, as opposed
to filing a motion to lift the order of general default, rests on two related assumptions. First, Petitioners also assert that they do not dispute the judgment of the land registration
with the filing of the 16 July 1997 motion and giving of due course to the motion by the land court. However, this position is in conflict with their 25 November 1998 motion to have the
registration court, petitioners assert that they acquired legal standing in the registration decree and the titles declared void. Petitioners now assume the roles of both successors-in-
proceedings. Second, buyer Eugenio Lopez, Sr. stepped into the shoes of the sellers- interest and oppositors. This confusion of roles brought about petitioners grave error in
applicants Sandoval and Ozaeta when applicants sold the property to him. As successors-in- procedure.
interest of the buyer, petitioners contend that they are not strangers to the proceedings.
65
The land registration court granted the application in LRC No. N-18887 on 31 May 1966 general default is required. It is only in the latter case that the doctrine pronounced
and issued a certificate of finality dated 8 March 1991. Petitioners filed their motion to in Serrano v. Palacio,[39] as repeatedly invoked by the LRA and OSG, is applicable:
consider the deed of sale in the registration on 16 July 1997. Petitioners filed their motion to
have the decrees and the corresponding certificates of title declared void on 25 November x x x [P]etitioners committed an error of procedure when they filed a motion to intervene in
1998. Petitioners filed both motions long after the decision in LRC No. N-18887 became final the x x x land registration case for the proper procedure would have been for them to ask
and executory. Neither petitioners nor even the applicants from whom they base their claim first for the lifting of the order of general default, and then, if lifted, to file an opposition to
presented the Deed of Sale before the land registration court while the action was pending. the application of the applicants. This is so because proceedings in land registration are
Considering the facts and arguments as presented above, we hold that the motion filed in rem, and not in personam, the sole object being the registration applied for, and not the
by petitioners is insufficient to give them standing in the land registration proceedings for determination of any right not connected with the registration (Estila vs. Alvero, 37 Phil.
purposes of filing an application of a notice of lis pendens. However, we disagree with the 498).
LRA and the appellate courts observation that petitioners need to file a motion to lift the
order of general default. A motion to lift the order of general default should be filed before Petitioners are not mere interested parties in this case. By filing their motion to have the
entry of final judgment. The land registration court granted the application for registration of decrees and the corresponding certificates of title declared void, they took the role of
title on 31 May 1966 and issued a certificate of finality on 8 March 1991. Petitioners filed oppositors to the application for land registration.
their motion on 16 July 1997. Thus, even if petitioners filed a motion to lift the order of
The appellate court stated that in as much as it would want to oblige to the plea of
general default, the order of default could not be set aside because the motion was filed out
petitioners to hasten or expedite the proceedings and to avoid further expenses on the part
of time.
of the petitioners, however[,] (it) could not.[40] Indeed, it requires a delicate balancing act
In Lim Toco v. Go Fay,[37] this Court explained the effect of an order of default to the between the objective of the Rules of Court to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive
party defaulted. A party declared in default loses his standing in court. As a result of his loss disposition of every action and proceeding[41] and the strict requirements for a notice of lis
of standing, a party in default cannot appear in court, adduce evidence, be heard, or be pendens. The facts in this case show that petitioners have not complied with the
entitled to notice. A party in default cannot even appeal from the judgment rendered by the requirements.
court, unless he files a motion to set aside the order of default under the grounds provided in
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
what is now Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
CA-G.R. SP No. 55993 dated 29 November 2000.
Indeed, in its comment before this Court, the LRA stated thus:
SO ORDERED.

Under Section 26, PD 1429, petitioners are deemed to have been included by the default
order. Those who did not file an answer should be considered as having lost their standing in [G.R. No. 146527. January 31, 2005]
court from that stage (Republic v. Dela Rosa, 173 SCRA 12) except when they file a motion to REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MANNA PROPERTIES, INC., Represented by
set aside the order [of] default on the grounds mentioned in Section 3, Rule 18 of the Rules its President, JOSE TANYAO, respondent.
of Court (Toco v. Fay, 80 Phil. 166). DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
In land registration cases (as in the said LRC No. N-18887), an order of general default was The Case
deemed to have been issued based on the presumption of regularity in judicial proceedings This is a petition for review[1] seeking to set aside the Court of Appeals Decision[2] dated
(Pascual, et al. v. Ortega, et al., 58 O.G. 12 March 1962 C.A.). Petitioners failed to adduce any 20 December 2000. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
evidence showing that the order of general default was lifted. Records disclosed that without Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union (trial court) dated 21 February 1996 in Land Registration
first filing a motion to lift the order of general default, petitioners filed a motion to declare as Case No. N-2352 (LRC No. N-2352) approving the application of respondent Manna
null and void the decrees and titles. Until the order of general default is lifted by the court, Properties, Inc. (Manna Properties) for the registration in its name of a parcel of land located
petitioner could not be considered as a party to the action. They are deemed movants whose in Barangay Pagdaraoan, San Fernando, La Union.
personality as far as the case is concerned is not yet admitted by the court considering that
the order of default has not been lifted.[38] Antecedent Facts

As culled by the Court of Appeals from the evidence, the facts of the case are as
One should be careful, however, to distinguish between movants as mere interested follows:
parties prescribed under Section 22 of PD 1529 and movants as intervenors-oppositors to the
land registration proceedings. It is only in the latter case that a motion to lift the order of
66
On September 29, 1994, applicant-appellee filed an Application for the registration of title of Applicant-appellee presented its president Jose [Tanyao], who testified on the acquisition of
two (2) parcels of land, specifically: the subject property as well as Manuel Sobrepea, co-owner of the subject property, who
testified on the possession of the applicant-appellees predecessors-in-interest.
a) Lot No. 9515, Cad. 539-D of As-013314-001434; and
b) Lot No. 1006, Cad. 539-D of As-013314-001434, located in Barangay The [documentary] evidence presented were:
Pagdaraoan, San Fernando, La Union measuring around 1,480 square meters.
1. Plan AS-013314-001434 of Lots No. 9515 and 1006;
Initial hearing was set on February 16, 1995 by the court a quo. 2. Technical Description of Lot No. 9515;
3. Technical Description of Lot No. 1006;
Copies of the application, postal money orders for publication purposes and record were 4. Certificate in lieu of Lost Surveyors Certificate;
forwarded to the Land Registration Authority by the Court a quo on October 7, 1994. 5. Certificate of Latest Assessment;
6. Notice of Initial Hearing;
7. Certificate of Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing by the LRA;
However, per Report dated November 21, 1994 of the Land Registration Authority, the full
8. Certificate of Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing by the National
names and complete postal addresses of all adjoining lot owners were not stated for
Printing Office;
notification purposes. As a result thereto, per Order dated December 5, 1994, the applicant
9. Certificate of Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing by the
was directed to submit the names and complete postal addresses of the adjoining owners of
Circulation Manager of the Ilocos Herald;
Lots 9514 and 9516. On December 14, 1994, the applicant filed its compliance, which was
10. Clipping of the Notice of Initial Hearing;
forwarded to the Land Registration Authority on December 22, 1994 together with the notice
11. Whole Issue of the Ilocos Herald dated July 12, 1995;
of the Initial Hearing, which was reset to April 13, 1995.
12. Page 3 of Ilocos Herald dated January 12, 1995;
13. Sheriffs Return of Posting;
On January 31, 1995, the Land Registration Authority requested for the resetting of the initial 14. Certificate of Notification of all adjoining owners of the Notice of Initial
hearing since April 13, 1995 fell on Holy Thursday, a non-working day to a date consistent Hearing on July 18, 1995.
with LRC Circular No. 353 or ninety (90) days from date of the Order to allow reasonable time
for possible mail delays and to enable them to cause the timely publication of the notice in
Thereafter, the court a quo rendered a Decision dated February 21, 1996 granting the
the Official Gazette.
application. (sic)[3]

The initial hearing was, accordingly, reset to April 20, 1995 by the court a quo.
The Office of the Solicitor General, appearing on behalf of petitioner Republic of the
Philippines (petitioner), promptly appealed the trial courts decision to the Court of Appeals.
On March 14, 1995, the court a quo received a letter dated March 6, 1995 from the LRA with On 20 December 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners appeal.
the information that the notice can no longer be published in the Official Gazette for lack of
material time since the National Printing Office required submission of the printing materials Hence, this petition.
75 days before the date of the hearing. It was again requested that the initial hearing be The Regional Trial Courts Ruling
moved to a date consistent with LRC Circular No. 353. The trial court found that Manna Properties has substantiated by clear and competent
evidence all its allegations in the application for original land registration. The Land
Registration Authority (LRA) did not present any evidence in opposition to the application.
Per Order dated March 15, 1995, the initial hearing was reset to July 18, 1995.
The trial court ruled in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby approves the application, and orders
The Opposition to the application stated, among others, that the applicant is a private that the parcels of land identified as Lots 9515 and 1006 of Cad. 5[3]9-D San Fernando
corporation disqualified under the new Philippine Constitution to hold alienable lands of Cadastre with a total area of One Thousand Four Hundred Eighty (1,480) square meters,
public domain. situated in Barangay Pagdaraoan, San Fernando, La Union and embraced in Plan AS-1331434
(Exh. A and the technical description described in Exhibit B and B-1) shall be registered in
Per Certificate of Publication issued by the LRA and the National Printing Office, the Notice of accordance with Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Initial Hearing was published in the June 12, 1995 issue of the Official Gazette officially Decree in the name of the applicant Manna Properties, Inc., represented by its President Jose
released on June 19, 1995. The same notice was published in the July 12, 1995 issue of [Tanyao], Filipino citizen, of legal age, married to Marry [Tanyao] with residence and postal
the The Ilocos Herald. address at Jackivi Enterprises, Pagdaraoan, San Fernando, La Union, pursuant to the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529.[4]
67
The Court of Appeals Ruling The facts reveal that Manna Properties was not at fault why the hearing date was set
The Court of Appeals upheld the trial courts ruling and dismissed petitioners argument beyond the 90-day maximum period. The records show that the Docket Division of the LRA
that the applicant failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirements of Presidential repeatedly requested the trial court to reset the initial hearing date because of printing
Decree No. 1529[5] (PD 1529). The Court of Appeals pointed out that the 90-day period for problems with the National Printing Office, which could affect the timely publication of the
setting the initial hearing under Section 23 of PD 1529 is merely directory and that it is the notice of hearing in the Official Gazette. Indeed, nothing in the records indicates that Manna
publication of the notice of hearing itself that confers jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals Properties failed to perform the acts required of it by law.
stated that the records of the case reveal that the testimony of Manuel Sobrepea was not
the sole basis for the trial courts finding that Manna Propertiess predecessors-in-interest had We have held that a party to an action has no control over the Administrator or the
been in possession of the land in question as early as 1953. The Court of Appeals added that Clerk of Court acting as a land court; he has no right to meddle unduly with the business of
while tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership, they are the best indicia of such official in the performance of his duties.[6] A party cannot intervene in matters within
possession. the exclusive power of the trial court. No fault is attributable to such party if the trial court
The Issues errs on matters within its sole power. It is unfair to punish an applicant for an act or omission
Petitioner raises the following issues for resolution: over which the applicant has neither responsibility nor control, especially if the applicant has
1. WHETHER MANNA PROPERTIES FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE JURISDICTIONAL complied with all the requirements of the law.
REQUIREMENTS FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION; and Petitioner limited itself to assailing the lapse of time between the issuance of the order
2. WHETHER MANNA PROPERTIES HAS SUFFICIENTLY PROVEN POSSESSION OF THE setting the date of initial hearing and the date of the initial hearing itself. Petitioner does not
PROPERTY FOR THE REQUISITE PERIOD. raise any other issue with respect to the sufficiency of the application. Petitioner does not
The Ruling of the Court also question the sufficiency of the publication of the required notice of hearing.
Consequently, petitioner does not dispute the real jurisdictional issue involved in land
On Whether Manna Properties Failedto Comply with the JurisdictionalRequirements for registration cases compliance with the publication requirement under PD 1529. As the
Original Registration records show, the notice of hearing was published both in the Official Gazette and a
Petitioner contends that PD 1529 sets a 90-day maximum period between the court newspaper of general circulation well ahead of the date of hearing. This complies with the
order setting the initial hearing date and the hearing itself. Petitioner points out that in this legal requirement of serving the entire world with sufficient notice of the registration
case, the trial court issued the order setting the date of the initial hearing on 15 March 1995, proceedings.
but the trial court set the hearing date itself on 18 July 1995. Considering that there are 125 On Whether Manna Properties SufficientlyEstablished Possession of the LandFor the Period
days in between the two dates, petitioner argues that the trial court exceeded the 90-day Required by Law
period set by PD 1529. Thus, petitioner concludes the applicant [Manna Properties] failed to
comply with the jurisdictional requirements for original registration. Petitioner asserts that Manna Properties has failed to prove its possession of the land
for the period of time required by law. Petitioner alleges that the trial court and the Court of
The petitioner is mistaken. Appeals based their findings solely on their evaluation of the tax declarations presented by
The pertinent portion of Section 23 of PD 1529 reads: Manna Properties.

Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication etc. The court shall, within five days from filing The jurisdiction of this Court under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is
of the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of initial hearing which shall not limited to the review and revision of errors of law.[7] This Court is not bound to analyze and
be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order. weigh evidence already considered in prior proceedings. Absent any of the established
xxx grounds for exception, this Court is bound by the findings of fact of the trial and appellate
courts.
The duty and the power to set the hearing date lies with the land registration court.
After an applicant has filed his application, the law requires the issuance of a court order The issue of whether Manna Properties has presented sufficient proof of the required
setting the initial hearing date. The notice of initial hearing is a court document. The notice of possession, under a bona fide claim of ownership, raises a question of fact. [8] It invites an
initial hearing is signed by the judge and copy of the notice is mailed by the clerk of court to evaluation of the evidentiary record. Petitioner invites us to re-evaluate the evidence and
the LRA. This involves a process to which the party applicant absolutely has no participation. substitute our judgment for that of the trial and appellate courts. Generally, Rule 45 does not
allow this. Matters of proof and evidence are beyond the power of this Court to review under
Petitioner is correct that in land registration cases, the applicant must strictly comply a Rule 45 petition, except in the presence of some meritorious circumstances.[9] We find one
with the jurisdictional requirements. In this case, the applicant complied with the such circumstance in this case. The evidence on record does not support the conclusions of
jurisdictional requirements. both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
68
Petitioner claimed in its opposition to the application of Manna Properties that, as a The evidence submitted by Manna Properties to prove the required length of
private corporation, Manna Properties is disqualified from holding alienable lands of the possession consists of the testimony of one of its predecessors-in-interest, Manuel Sobrepea
public domain, except by lease. Petitioner cites the constitutional prohibition in Section 3 of (Manuel),[16] transferees affidavits, and several tax declarations covering the land in question.
Article XII in the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner also claims that the land in question is still part
of the public domain. We have ruled that while a tax declaration by itself is not sufficient to prove ownership,
it may serve as sufficient basis for inferring possession.[17] However, the tax declarations
On the other hand, Manna Properties claims that it has established that the land in presented by Manna Properties do not serve to prove their cause. Although Manna
question has been in the open and exclusive possession of its predecessors-in-interest since Properties claimed during trial that they were presenting the tax declaration proving
the 1940s. Thus, the land was already private land when Manna Properties acquired it from possession since 12 June 1945,[18] a scrutiny of the tax declaration reveals that it is not the
its predecessors-in-interest. tax declaration Manna Properties claimed it to be. Exhibit Q-16 was in fact a substitute tax
declaration allegedly issued on 28 November 1950. The annotation at the back of this tax
The governing law is Commonwealth Act No. 141 (CA 141) otherwise known as the declaration indicates that it was issued to replace the 1945 tax declaration covering the land
Public Land Act. Section 48(b) of the said law, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, in question. A substitute is not enough.
provides:
The 1945 tax declaration must be presented considering that the date, 12 June 1945, is
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, material to this case. CA 141 specifically fixes the date to 12 June 1945 or earlier. A tax
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the declaration simply stating that it replaces a previous tax declaration issued in 1945 does not
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or meet this standard. It is unascertainable whether the 1945 tax declaration was issued on,
earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except before or after 12 June 1945. Tax declarations are issued any time of the year. A tax
when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have declaration issued in 1945 may have been issued in December 1945. Unless the date and
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a month of issuance in 1945 is stated, compliance with the reckoning date in CA 141 cannot
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied) be established.

There is another reason why the application for registration of Manna Properties must
Lands that fall under Section 48 of CA 141 are effectively segregated from the public fail. The tax declaration allegedly executed in 1950 and marked as Exhibit Q-16 bears several
domain by virtue of acquisitive prescription. We have held that open, exclusive and irregularities. A small annotation found at the bottom of the back page of Exhibit Q-16 states
undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by CA 141 ipso it cancels a previous tax declaration. Beyond stating that the cancelled tax declaration was
jure converts such land into private land.[10] Judicial confirmation in such cases is only a issued in 1945, Exhibit Q-16 does not provide any of the required information that will enable
formality that merely confirms the earlier conversion of the land into private land, the this Court or any interested party to check whether the original 1945 tax declaration ever
conversion having occurred in law from the moment the required period of possession existed.19 The blanks left by Exhibit Q-16 render any attempt to trace the original tax
became complete.[11] declaration futile. Moreover, on its face Exhibit Q-16 lacks any indication that it is only a
substitute or reconstituted tax declaration. The net effect is an attempt to pass off Exhibit Q-
Under CA 141, the reckoning point is June 12, 1945. If the predecessors-in-interest of
16 as the original tax declaration.
Manna Properties have been in possession of the land in question since this date, or earlier,
Manna Properties may rightfully apply for confirmation of title to the land. Following our The form used to prepare the tax declaration marked as Exhibit Q-16 states that it was
ruling in Director of Lands v. IAC,[12] Manna Properties, a private corporation, may apply for FILED UNDER SECTION 202 OF R.A. 7160. Republic Act No. 7160 is the Local Government
judicial confirmation of the land without need of a separate confirmation proceeding for its Code of 1991. The sworn undertaking by the Deputy Assessor who allegedly prepared the tax
predecessors-in-interest first. declaration reads, Subscribed and sworn before me this 28 (sic) day of Nov. 1950 This means
that the tax declaration was issued more than forty (40) years before the form used came
We rule, however, that the land in question has not become private land and remains
into existence. Manna Properties gave no explanation why its tax declaration used a form
part of the public domain.
that did not exist at the time of the alleged issuance of the tax declaration. The totality of
Under the Regalian doctrine, the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership these circumstances leads this Court to conclude that Exhibit Q-16 was fabricated for the sole
of land. This is premised on the basic doctrine that all lands not otherwise appearing to be purpose of making it appear that Manna Properties predecessors-in-interest have been in
clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.[13] Any applicant for possession of the land in question since 12 June 1945.
confirmation of imperfect title bears the burden of proving that he is qualified to have the
The earliest of the un-cancelled tax declarations presented by Manna Properties is
land titled in his name.[14] Although Section 48 of CA 141 gives rise to a right that is only
dated 1950. This is clearly insufficient to prove possession of the land since 12 June 1945. The
subject to formal recognition, it is still incumbent upon any claimant to first prove open,
same can be said of the transferees affidavit, which was dated 1955. Manna Properties
continuous and adverse possession for the requisite period of time. [15] It is only when the
reliance on Manuels testimony is similarly misplaced. Not only is such evidence insufficient
applicant complies with this condition that he may invoke the rights given by CA 141.
69
and self-serving on its own but, Manuel did not also specifically testify that he, or his parents Assessment Roll; (c) the name of the Assessor who executed the previous tax declaration; (d)
or predecessors-in-interest were in possession of the land since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The the previous owner of the land and its improvements; and (e) the prior assessed value of the
only clear assertion of possession made by Manuel was that his family used to plant rice on land.
that piece of land.20
[G.R. No. 125154. September 28, 2001]
Other than the mentioned pieces of evidence, Manna Properties did not present
sufficient proof that its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and adverse DIGNA VERGEL, EDUARDO SALVACRUZ, BEATRIZ MANACOP, FELICISIMA FLORES,
possession of the land in question since 12 June 1945. At best, Manna Properties can only GENEROSO SALVACRUZ, BLANDINO SALVACRUZ, MILAGROS SALVACRUZ and THE HEIRS OF
prove possession since 1952. Manna Properties relied on shaky secondary evidence like the CORAZON SANTIAGO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and DOROTEA TAMISIN
testimony of Manuel and substitute tax declarations. We have previously cautioned against GONZALES, respondents.
the reliance on such secondary evidence in cases involving the confirmation of an imperfect
title over public land.21 Manna Properties evidence hardly constitutes the well-nigh DECISION
incontrovertible evidence necessary to acquire title through adverse occupation under CA PARDO, J.:
141.22 The Case
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the instant petition. We REVERSE the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 20 December 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 52562. The Application for Registration The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals [1] setting
filed by Manna Properties, Inc. over Lots No. 9515 and 1006 of Cad. 539-D, with a total area aside the orders[2] of the trial court that denied petitioners motion to set aside the order of
of One Thousand Four Hundred Eighty (1,480) square meters situated in Barangay general default[3] in an application for registration of a parcel of land, consisting of one
Pagdaraoan, San Fernando, La Union, is DENIED. thousand, one hundred seventy six (1,176), situated in barrio Batong Malake, municipality of
Los Baos, province of Laguna.[4]
SO ORDERED.
[7]
The Facts
Section 1 of Rule 45 states:
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals,[5] are as follows:
SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to
appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever On May 26, 1994, Digna Vergel, Eduardo Salvacruz, Beatriz Maacop, Felicisima Flores,
authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review Generoso and Blandino Salvacruz, Milagros Evangelista and the heirs of Corazon Santiago,
on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly namely: Leocadio, Jr. and Concepcion Santiago (petitioners herein) filed with the Regional
set forth. Trial Court, Calamba, Laguna an application for registration of a parcel of land (for titling
purposes).
[9] As laid out in Ramos, et al. v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Phils., et al., 125 Phil. 701
(1967): On July 20, 1994, the Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of Lands filed an
1. when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, opposition to the application for registration.
surmises and conjectures;
On December 15, 1994, the trial court issued an order of general default against the whole
2. when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; world with the exception of Republic of the Philippines x x x.
3. where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
On October 3, 1995, respondent Dorotea Tamisin Gonzales filed with the trial court an
4. when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; Urgent Motion to Set Aside the Order of General Default alleging, inter alia, in her affidavit
that she is claiming the land in question subject of this petition as an owner x x x which
5. when the findings of fact are conflicting;
motion was opposed by the petitioners herein.
6. when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both On October 12, 1995, respondent filed with the trial court a reply to the opposition
appellant and appellee. interposed by the petitioners and, at the same time, filed an Urgent Motion praying for the
19 suspension of the proceedings.
Exhibit Q-16 left the following items blank: (a) the year when the previous tax declaration
ceased; (b) the year the previous tax declaration was entered into the Real Property
70
On October 18, 1995, the trial court issued the first assailed order, the dispositive portion of reading the publication of the notice in the Official Gazette[11] or in the newspaper Malaya
which is quoted, as follows: issue of August 8, 1994,[12] in itself may not be considered excusable negligence.

WHEREFORE, the motion to set aside the Order of default as well as the motion to suspend In respondents motion to set aside order of general default, she alleged that
the proceedings filed by the movant through counsel is hereby denied for lack of merit. petitioners were aware of her claim of ownership over the subject property, but did not give
her personal notice of the filing of the application. She learned about the application by
accident. In the petition for certiorari she filed with the Court of Appeals, respondent alleged
On October 20, 1995, petitioners filed with the trial court a Motion to Strike Out Urgent
that petitioners filed the application in bad faith, surreptitiously and without notice to
Motion to Suspend Proceeding.
her.[13] The Court of Appeals did not make a finding on this.
Hence, we find that the appellate court erred in setting aside the order of general
On November 21, 1995, respondent filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of default in the Land Registration Case No. 88-94-C, without making a specific finding of fraud,
the order denying the motion to set aside the order of general default, which motion accident or excusable neglect that prevented respondent from timely opposing the
petitioners opposed. application.
We are not a trier of facts. Consequently, we have to remand the case to the Court of
On November 28, 1995, the trial court issued its second questioned order, the dispositive Appeals for it to make findings of fact constituting fraud, accident or excusable neglect
portion of which reads as follows: sufficient for the court to lift the order of general default in the land registration case
involved.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration, dated November 16, The Fallo
1995, is hereby denied for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP
No. 39239.
On December 13, 1995, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals[6] a petition for certiorari Let the case be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings with
alleging that the trial court judge acted capriciously and without or in excess of his instructions to determine whether there exists facts warranting the lifting of the order of
jurisdiction and gravely abused the exercise of his discretion in issuing the two general default in LRC Case No. 88-94-C of the trial court.No costs.SO ORDERED.
aforementioned orders.[7]

On April 02, 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision annulling the trial
courts orders dated October 18, 1995 and November 28, 1995, and consequently, setting
aside the trial courts order of general default dated December 15, 1994, in Land Registration
Case No. 88-94-C with respect to respondent.[8]

Hence, this appeal.[9]

The Issue

The issue presented is whether the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the trial
courts order of general default in the land registration case involved without making a
specific finding of fraud, negligence, accident or excusable mistake but relying on its view
that substantial justice and speedy determination of the controversy would be better
attained in lifting the order of general default, to enable a claimant to oppose and to
establish a case of ownership in herself.

The Courts Ruling

We grant the petition. The Court of Appeals arbitrarily set aside the trial courts order of
general default without factual basis save for its own gut feeling, ipse dixit.[10] Respondents
failure to file timely opposition to the application for land registration because she missed

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