A G R A V A W C |1
PPL vs Genosa Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of
FACTS: This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife
Marivic Genosa, appellant herein. During their first year of marriage,
Marivic and Ben lived happily but apparently thereafter, Ben changed
and the couple would always quarrel and sometimes their quarrels
became violent. Appellant testified that every time her husband came
home drunk, he would provoke her and sometimes beat her.
Whenever beaten by her husband, she consulted medical doctors who
testified during the trial. On the night of the killing, appellant and the
victim were quarreled and the victim beat the appellant. However,
appellant was able to run to another room. Appellant admitted having
killed the victim with the use of a gun. The information for parricide
against appellant, however, alleged that the cause of death of the
victim was by beating through the use of a lead pipe. Appellant invoked
self defense and defense of her unborn child. After trial, the Regional
Trial Court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of parricide with an aggravating circumstance of treachery and
imposed the penalty of death.
On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an
URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the Honorable Court allow
(1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause
of his death; (2) the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified
psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the
time she killed her husband; and finally, (3) the inclusion of the said
experts’ reports in the records of the case for purposes of the
automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial re-opening of the case
a quo to take the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists. The
Supreme Court partly granted the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of the
appellant. It remanded the case to the trial court for reception of
expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the “battered
woman syndrome” plea. Testimonies of two expert witnesses on the
“battered woman syndrome”, Dra. Dayan and Dr. Pajarillo, were
presented and admitted by the trial court and subsequently submitted
to the Supreme Court as part of the records.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the “battered
woman syndrome” as constituting self defense.
2. Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.
Ruling: 1. The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove
that she is afflicted with the “battered woman syndrome”.
A battered woman has been defined as a woman “who is repeatedly
subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man
in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without
concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any
form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be
classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the
battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an
abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and
she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.”
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by
the so-called “cycle of violence,” which has three phases: (1) the
tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the
tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense
arising from the battered woman syndrome. First, each of the phases
of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least
two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate
partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing
of the batterer must have produced in the battered person’s mind an
actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest
belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at
the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not
necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused, based
on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter.
self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however,
not all of these elements were duly established.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the “cycle of
violence” supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and
Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents but
appellant failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in
the past, she had gone through a similar pattern. Neither did appellant
proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle.
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not
in itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive
partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-
defense. Settled in our jurisprudence, is the rule that the one who
resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on one’s life; and the
peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely
imaginary. Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides that the following
requisites of self-defense must concur: (1) Unlawful aggression; (2)
Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
and (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It
presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack -- or an imminent
danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person. In the present case,
however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a
sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and
her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from
his violent behavior and escape to their children’s bedroom. During
that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality
or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether.
He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her
life or safety.
The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion and
obfuscation were, however, taken in favor of appellant. It should be
clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well
as passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts.
The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity
of the battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is,
the repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her
psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing
the exercise of her will power without depriving her of consciousness
of her acts.
As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse
so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation, it
has been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is
committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked
by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful
as to overcome reason. To appreciate this circumstance, the following
requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and
sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not
far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable
length of time, during which the accused might recover her normal
equanimity.
Ruling 2. NO. Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery
must be proved as conclusively as the killing itself. Besides, equally
axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or
a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying
circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been
forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant.
Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault
adopted by the aggressor must have been consciously and deliberately
chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act
without risk from any defense that might be put up by the party
attacked.

The appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally
produced passion or obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered
that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact
that she was eight (8) months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed
her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and mental state, which
overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and that of
her unborn child.
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for parricide.
However, considering the presence of two (2) mitigating
circumstances and without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty
is reduced to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum; to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as
maximum. Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the
minimum penalty hereby imposed upon her, the director of the
Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody
upon due determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is
being held for some other lawful cause.
PPL vs Genosa
Story: The Battered Woman Syndrome
The wife had suffered maltreatment from her husband for over eight
years. She was 8 months pregnant when, one evening, her husband
came home drunk and started to batter her. Shouting that his wife
"might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag" him, he dragged
her towards a drawer where he kept a gun, but was not able to open
the drawer because it was locked. So he got out a cutter from his wallet,
but dropped it. She was able to hit his arm with a pipe and escape into
another room. The wife, thinking of all the suffering that her husband
had been inflicting on her, and thinking that he might really kill her and
her unborn child, distorted the drawer and got the gun. She shot her
husband, who was by then asleep on the bed. She was tried and
convicted for parricide, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua (20
years and 1 day to 40 years) to death. On appeal, she alleged "battered
woman syndrome" as a form of self-defense. (For Full Case, just
click here.
FACTS:
That Marivic Genosa, the Appellant on the 15November1995, attacked
and wounded his husband, which ultimately led to his death.
According to the appellant she did not provoke her husband when she
got home that night it was her husband who began the provocation.
The Appellant said she was frightened that her husband would hurt
her and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely. In
fact, The Appelant had to be admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre
as she was suffering from eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby
was born prematurely on December 1, 1995.
The Appellant testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave
her husband at least five (5) times, but that Ben would always follow
her and they would reconcile. The Apellant said that the reason why
Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was because 'he
was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos.
The Appellant after being interviewed by specialists, has been shown
to be suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome.
The appellant with a plea of self defense admitted the killing of her
husband, she was then found guilty of Parricide, with the aggravating
circumstance of treachery, for the husband was attacked while asleep.
ISSUES:
Can Marivic Genosa be granted the Justifying circumstance of Self-
defense, and can she be held liable for the aggravating circumstance of
treachery?
No, Since self- defense since the existence of Battered woman
syndrome, which the appellant has been shown to be suffering in the
relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of the woman to
kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context
A G R A V A W C |2
of self-defense.
In the present case, however, according to the testimony of the
appellant there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful
aggression of the husband and her fatal attack upon him. She had
already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to
their children's bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his
attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the
danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position
that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.
Without continuous aggression there can be no self-defense. And
absence of aggression does not warrant complete or incomplete self-
defense.
No, There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against
persons by employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof without risk to oneself arising from the defense that the
offended party might make.
The circumstances must be shown as indubitably as the killing itself;
they cannot be deduced from mere inferences, or conjectures, which
have no place in the appreciation of evidence. Besides, equally
axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or
a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying
circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been
forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant.
In the present case, however it was not conclusively shown, that the
appellant intentionally chose a specific means of successfully attacking
her husband without any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he
might make. To the contrary, it appears that the thought of using the
gun occurred to her only at about the same moment when she decided
to kill her spouse. In the absence of any convincing proof that she
consciously and deliberately employed the method by which she
committed the crime in order to ensure its execution, the doubt
should be resolved in her favor.
HELD:
The conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is hereby
AFFIRMED. However, there being two (2) mitigating circumstances
and no aggravating circumstance attending her commission of the
offense, her penalty is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of
reclusion temporal as maximum.
ADDENDUM:
When can BWS (Battered Woman Syndrome) as self defense be
appreciated?
Where the brutalized person is already suffering from BWS, further
evidence of actual physical assault at the time of the killing is not
required. Incidents of domestic battery usually have a predictable
pattern. To require the battered person to await an obvious, deadly
attack before she can defend her life "would amount to sentencing her
to 'murder by installment.' Still, impending danger (based on the
conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes) prior to the
defendant's use of deadly force must be shown. Threatening behavior
or communication can satisfy the required imminence of danger.
Considering such circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-defense
may be appreciated.
RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA vs. CA and IRISH SAGUD
This case concerns a claim of commission of the crime of violence
against women when a former boyfriend sent to the girl the picture of
a naked woman, not her, but with her face on it.
The Indictment
The public prosecutor charged petitioner-accused Rustan Ang (Rustan)
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, of violation of
the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act or Republic
Act (R.A.) 9262 in an information that reads:

That on or about June 5, 2005, in the Municipality of Maria Aurora,
Province of Aurora, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
in a purposeful and reckless conduct, sent through the Short
Messaging Service (SMS) using his mobile phone, a pornographic
picture to one Irish Sagud, who was his former girlfriend, whereby the
face of the latter was attached to a completely naked body of another
woman making it to appear that it was said Irish Sagud who is depicted
in the said obscene and pornographic picture thereby causing
substantial emotional anguish, psychological distress and humiliation
to the said Irish Sagud.1
The Facts and the Case
The evidence for the prosecution shows that complainant Irish Sagud
(Irish) and accused Rustan were classmates at Wesleyan University in
Aurora Province. Rustan courted Irish and they became "on-and-off"
sweethearts towards the end of 2004. When Irish learned afterwards
that Rustan had taken a live-in partner (now his wife), whom he had
gotten pregnant, Irish broke up with him.
Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with Irish and
tried to convince her to elope with him, saying that he did not love the
woman he was about to marry. Irish rejected the proposal and told
Rustan to take on his responsibility to the other woman and their child.
Irish changed her cellphone number but Rustan somehow managed to
get hold of it and sent her text messages. Rustan used two cellphone
numbers for sending his messages, namely, 0920-4769301 and 0921-
8084768. Irish replied to his text messages but it was to ask him to
leave her alone.
In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia
message service (MMS) a picture of a naked woman with spread legs
and with Irish’s face superimposed on the figure (Exhibit A).2 The
sender’s cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-
8084768, one of the numbers that Rustan used. Irish surmised that he
copied the picture of her face from a shot he took when they were in
Baguio in 2003 (Exhibit B).3
After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from
Rustan. He boasted that it would be easy for him to create similarly
scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened to spread the picture
he sent through the internet. One of the messages he sent to Irish,
written in text messaging shorthand, read: "Madali lang ikalat yun, my
chatrum ang tarlac rayt pwede ring send sa lahat ng chatter."4
Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who referred
her to the police. Under police supervision, Irish contacted Rustan
through the cellphone numbers he used in sending the picture and his
text messages. Irish asked Rustan to meet her at the Lorentess Resort
in Brgy. Ramada, Maria Aurora, and he did. He came in a motorcycle.
After parking it, he walked towards Irish but the waiting police officers
intercepted and arrested him. They searched him and seized his Sony
Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM cards. While Rustan was
being questioned at the police station, he shouted at Irish: "Malandi
ka kasi!"
Joseph Gonzales, an instructor at the Aurora State College of
Technology, testified as an expert in information technology and
computer graphics. He said that it was very much possible for one to
lift the face of a woman from a picture and superimpose it on the body
of another woman in another picture. Pictures can be manipulated and
enhanced by computer to make it appear that the face and the body
belonged to just one person.
Gonzales testified that the picture in question (Exhibit A) had two
distinct irregularities: the face was not proportionate to the body and
the face had a lighter color. In his opinion, the picture was fake and the
face on it had been copied from the picture of Irish in Exhibit B. Finally,
Gonzales explained how this could be done, transferring a picture from
a computer to a cellphone like the Sony Ericsson P900 seized from
Rustan.
For his part, Rustan admitted having courted Irish. He began visiting
her in Tarlac in October 2003 and their relation lasted until December
of that year. He claimed that after their relation ended, Irish wanted
A G R A V A W C |3
reconciliation. They met in December 2004 but, after he told her that
his girlfriend at that time (later his wife) was already pregnant, Irish
walked out on him.
Sometime later, Rustan got a text message from Irish, asking him to
meet her at Lorentess Resort as she needed his help in selling her
cellphone. When he arrived at the place, two police officers
approached him, seized his cellphone and the contents of his pockets,
and brought him to the police station.
Rustan further claims that he also went to Lorentess because Irish
asked him to help her identify a prankster who was sending her
malicious text messages. Rustan got the sender’s number and,
pretending to be Irish, contacted the person. Rustan claims that he got
back obscene messages from the prankster, which he forwarded to
Irish from his cellphone. This explained, he said, why the obscene
messages appeared to have originated from his cellphone number.
Rustan claims that it was Irish herself who sent the obscene picture
(Exhibit A) to him. He presented six pictures of a woman whom he
identified as Irish (Exhibits 2 to 7).5
Michelle Ang (Michelle), Rustan’s wife, testified that she was sure Irish
sent the six pictures. Michelle claims that she received the pictures and
hid the memory card (Exhibit 8) that contained them because she was
jealous and angry. She did not want to see anything of Irish. But, while
the woman in the pictures posed in sexy clothing, in none did she
appear naked as in Exhibit A. Further, the face of the woman in Exhibits
2, 4, 5 and 6 could not be seen. Irish denied that she was the woman
in those four pictures. As for Exhibits 3 and 7, the woman in the picture
was fully dressed.
After trial, the RTC found Irish’s testimony completely credible, given
in an honest and spontaneous manner. The RTC observed that she
wept while recounting her experience, prompting the court to
comment: "Her tears were tangible expression of pain and anguish for
the acts of violence she suffered in the hands of her former
sweetheart. The crying of the victim during her testimony is evidence
of the credibility of her charges with the verity borne out of human
nature and experience."6 Thus, in its Decision dated August 1, 2001,
the RTC found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A.
9262.
On Rustan’s appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA),7 the latter rendered
a decision dated January 31, 2008,8 affirming the RTC decision. The CA
denied Rustan’s motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated April
25, 2008. Thus, Rustan filed the present for review on certiorari.
The Issues Presented
The principal issue in this case is whether or not accused Rustan sent
Irish by cellphone message the picture with her face pasted on the
body of a nude woman, inflicting anguish, psychological distress, and
humiliation on her in violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.
The subordinate issues are:
1. Whether or not a "dating relationship" existed between Rustan and
Irish as this term is defined in R.A. 9262;
2. Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the sending of the
nude picture in this case, already constitutes a violation of Section 5(h)
of R.A. 9262;
3. Whether or not the evidence used to convict Rustan was obtained
from him in violation of his constitutional rights; and
4. Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene
picture presented in the case.
The Court’s Rulings
Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against women
includes an act or acts of a person against a woman with whom he has
or had a sexual or dating relationship. Thus:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act,

(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a
series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his
wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or
had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common
child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or
without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in
physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse
including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment
or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
xxxx
Section 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute violence against
women and these include any form of harassment that causes
substantial emotional or psychological distress to a woman. Thus:
SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. – The
crime of violence against women and their children is committed
through any of the following acts:
xxxx
h. Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or
through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or
psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but
not be limited to, the following acts:
xxxx
5. Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
The above provisions, taken together, indicate that the elements of
the crime of violence against women through harassment are:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the
offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or
series of acts of harassment against the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or
psychological distress to her.
One. The parties to this case agree that the prosecution needed to
prove that accused Rustan had a "dating relationship" with Irish.
Section 3(e) provides that a "dating relationship" includes a situation
where the parties are romantically involved over time and on a
continuing basis during the course of the relationship. Thus:
(e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the parties live
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or are
romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the
course of the relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary
socialization between two individuals in a business or social context is
not a dating relationship. (Underscoring supplied.)
Here, Rustan claims that, being "romantically involved," implies that
the offender and the offended woman have or had sexual relations.
According to him, "romance" implies a sexual act. He cites Webster’s
Comprehensive Dictionary Encyclopedia Edition which provides a
colloquial or informal meaning to the word "romance" used as a verb,
i.e., "to make love; to make love to" as in "He romanced her."
But it seems clear that the law did not use in its provisions the
colloquial verb "romance" that implies a sexual act. It did not say that
the offender must have "romanced" the offended woman. Rather, it
used the noun "romance" to describe a couple’s relationship, i.e., "a
love affair."9
R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that "violence against women x x x
refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a
woman x x x with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship." Clearly, the law itself distinguishes a sexual relationship
from a dating relationship. Indeed, Section 3(e) above defines "dating
relationship" while Section 3(f) defines "sexual relations." The latter
A G R A V A W C |4
"refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing
of a common child." The dating relationship that the law contemplates
can, therefore, exist even without a sexual intercourse taking place
between those involved.
Rustan also claims that since the relationship between Irish and him
was of the "on-and-off" variety (away-bati), their romance cannot be
regarded as having developed "over time and on a continuing basis."
But the two of them were romantically involved, as Rustan himself
admits, from October to December of 2003. That would be time
enough for nurturing a relationship of mutual trust and love.
An "away-bati" or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is a
common occurrence. Their taking place does not mean that the
romantic relation between the two should be deemed broken up
during periods of misunderstanding. Explaining what "away-bati"
meant, Irish explained that at times, when she could not reply to
Rustan’s messages, he would get angry at her. That was all. Indeed,
she characterized their three-month romantic relation as
continuous.10
Two. Rustan argues that the one act of sending an offensive picture
should not be considered a form of harassment. He claims that such
would unduly ruin him personally and set a very dangerous precedent.
But Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes "any act or series of acts" that
constitutes violence against women. This means that a single act of
harassment, which translates into violence, would be enough. The
object of the law is to protect women and children. Punishing only
violence that is repeatedly committed would license isolated ones.
Rustan alleges that today’s women, like Irish, are so used to obscene
communications that her getting one could not possibly have
produced alarm in her or caused her substantial emotional or
psychological distress. He claims having previously exchanged obscene
pictures with Irish such that she was already desensitized by them.
But, firstly, the RTC which saw and heard Rustan and his wife give their
testimonies was not impressed with their claim that it was Irish who
sent the obscene pictures of herself (Exhibits 2-7). It is doubtful if the
woman in the picture was Irish since her face did not clearly show on
them.
Michelle, Rustan’s wife, claimed that she deleted several other
pictures that Irish sent, except Exhibits 2 to 7. But her testimony did
not make sense. She said that she did not know that Exhibits 2 to 7 had
remained saved after she deleted the pictures. Later, however, she
said that she did not have time to delete them.11 And, if she thought
that she had deleted all the pictures from the memory card, then she
had no reason at all to keep and hide such memory card. There would
have been nothing to hide. Finally, if she knew that some pictures
remained in the card, there was no reason for her to keep it for several
years, given that as she said she was too jealous to want to see
anything connected to Irish. Thus, the RTC was correct in not giving
credence to her testimony.1avvphi1
Secondly, the Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish experienced
based on Rustan’s low regard for the alleged moral sensibilities of
today’s youth. What is obscene and injurious to an offended woman
can of course only be determined based on the circumstances of each
case. Here, the naked woman on the picture, her legs spread open and
bearing Irish’s head and face, was clearly an obscene picture and, to
Irish a revolting and offensive one. Surely, any woman like Irish, who is
not in the pornography trade, would be scandalized and pained if she
sees herself in such a picture. What makes it further terrifying is that,
as Irish testified, Rustan sent the picture with a threat to post it in the
internet for all to see. That must have given her a nightmare.
Three. Rustan argues that, since he was arrested and certain items
were seized from him without any warrant, the evidence presented
against him should be deemed inadmissible. But the fact is that the
prosecution did not present in evidence either the cellphone or the
SIM cards that the police officers seized from him at the time of his
arrest. The prosecution did not need such items to prove its case.
Exhibit C for the prosecution was but a photograph depicting the Sony
Ericsson P900 cellphone that was used, which cellphone Rustan
admitted owning during the pre-trial conference.
 A G R A V A W C |5

Actually, though, the bulk of the evidence against him consisted in

Irish’s testimony that she received the obscene picture and malicious
text messages that the sender’s cellphone numbers belonged to
Rustan with whom she had been previously in communication. Indeed,
to prove that the cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan, Irish and the
police used such numbers to summon him to come to Lorentess Resort
and he did.12 Consequently, the prosecution did not have to present
the confiscated cellphone and SIM cards to prove that Rustan sent
those messages.
Moreover, Rustan admitted having sent the malicious text messages
to Irish.13 His defense was that he himself received those messages
from an unidentified person who was harassing Irish and he merely
forwarded the same to her, using his cellphone. But Rustan never
presented the cellphone number of the unidentified person who sent
the messages to him to authenticate the same. The RTC did not give
credence to such version and neither will this Court. Besides, it was
most unlikely for Irish to pin the things on Rustan if he had merely tried
to help her identify the sender.
Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text
message constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be
authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under
Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-
SC).
The CA denied Rustan’s motion for reconsideration in a resolution
dated April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan filed the present for review on
certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the Rules on Electronic Evidence applies on
criminal cases and thus, the picture sent through a cell phone message
wherein Sagud’s face was attached on the body of a nude woman may
be used as evidence for violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.
Held: The rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal
action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions,
quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.

Four. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a
text message constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be
authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under
Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-
SC).
However, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the
obscene picture, Exhibit A, for the first time before this Court. The
objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of
the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He
should be deemed to have already waived such ground for objection.

But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each
obscene picture, Exhibit A, for the first time before this Court. The and every element of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of
the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He
should be deemed to have already waived such ground for
objection.14

Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action.
The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-
judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.15

In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each
and every element of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 30567 dated January 31, 2008
and its resolution dated April 25, 2008.

SO ORDERED.

RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA vs CA

Facts: This case concerns a claim of commission of the crime of

violence against women when a former boyfriend sent to the girl the
picture of a naked woman, not her, but with her face on it.

The public prosecutor charged petitioner-accused Rustan Ang (Rustan)

before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, of violation of
the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act or Republic
Act (R.A.) 9262 in an information that reads:

On or about June 5, 2005, in the Municipality of Maria Aurora, Province

of Aurora, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, in a
purposeful and reckless conduct, sent through the Short Messaging
Service (SMS) using his mobile phone, a pornographic picture to one
Irish Sagud, who was his former girlfriend, whereby the face of the
latter was attached to a completely naked body of another woman
making it to appear that it was said Irish Sagud who is depicted in the
said obscene and pornographic picture thereby causing substantial
emotional anguish, psychological distress and humiliation to the said
Irish Sagud.

On August 1, 2001, the RTC found Rustan guilty of the violation of

Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.

On Rustan’s appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the latter rendered a

decision dated January 31, 2008, affirming the RTC decision.