Hunter Hartline

Sept. 16, 2010

UI 368
Assignment 1

There are reasons why one may hold onto the idea of his or her soul (rational mind)

being separate from his or her body. If the mind (soul) were a product of the material

world, (i.e. the body or brain) then the expiration of one’s body would result in the

expiration of one’s mind or soul. For individuals that adhere to most Western religions this

is not a feasible notion, as there would be no continuation of the soul in an afterlife. 1 It’s

likely that these individuals who take the stance of ‘dualism’ are unaware of the Cartesian

doctrine that they’re, in a sense, sustaining. Rene Descartes’ doctrine involving the

conditions of the body and the mind, Substance Dualism, may be considered one of the most

influential theories pertaining to the Philosophy of Mind, but incidentally many problems

are introduced with it.2 The problems that surface are ones that must be acknowledged and

analyzed, as many philosophers since the 17th century have done.

Gilbert Ryle is one of the philosophers who has criticized Descartes’ theory of two

separate entities: the mind (rational soul) and the body. Ryle’s book, Concept of Mind,

explains the concepts of Descartes’ ontological doctrine and exploits the problems

associated with them. The Cartesian theory postulates there are two distinct realities that

exist for a human: the physical, which is governed by the laws of physics, and the mind,

which is not.3

1
Searle, John R. Mind: A Brief Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 29
2
Ibid., pp. 9-11
3
Eckert, Maureen. Theories of Mind: An Introductory Reader. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006, p. 12
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The contents of one’s mind are not observable by any other mind (Ryle called this the

“private” part of life), while the body that corresponds with one’s mind is observable by

others (Ryle called this the “public” part of life). As Ryle elaborates, the body is spatially

extended in the natural world—being the external existence of a human. The mind on the

other hand, not extended in space, is considered metaphorically to be the internal existence

of a human. The indication of “internal” being used as a metaphor, of course, is significant

considering that the mind is metaphysical and, therefore, cannot exist within anything. 4

In analyzing the principles expressed by the ‘Official Doctrine’ it’s obvious that there

are many problems that must be answered. One of these problems is the popular mind-

body problem: how can the immaterial mind affect the physical world and interact with the

material body in which it ‘inhabits’ and vice versa. Descartes explained that the interaction

between the soul and body takes place at the conarium, or pineal gland through some sort

of ‘special process’ .5 This attempt in solving such a problem still fails in explaining what

the actual process of the causal relationship between the mind and body is. And although

there are other problems that Descartes attempted to clarify, Gilbert Ryle viewed the

‘Official Doctrine’ as committing one big mistake—a mistake that he described in Concept

of Mind as being a “category mistake”.6

Ryle explains that a “category mistake” is a presumption that is incorrect in

understanding the relationship between various related things.

4
Ibid., pp. 12-14
5
Searle, John R. op. cit. pp. 22-23
6
Eckert, Maureen. op. cit. pp. 16-18
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The fallacy is in confining a thing into a category that it does not belong to, therefore,

applying certain rules or expectations that are characteristic of that category when a

different set of rules or expectations should be applied. In Concept of Mind, Gilbert Ryle

gives several examples of a “category mistake”. Through his examples Ryle explains as clear

as possible that a “category mistake” involves one believing that an abstraction, conception,

or quality of something (such as ‘Eric Dolphy plays his saxophone with virtuosity’) as being

another physical element in which can be overtly and objectively observed. So when

Shelton asks, “Where is the virtuosity that Dolphy is playing the alto sax with” he is making

a “category mistake”; Shelton is taking the quality or exceptional talent in which the

saxophone is being played and categorizing it as a separate entity, much as the saxophone

is an undivided entity. The specific “category mistake” that Descartes’ ontological doctrine

commits is one derived from analogy with the laws of physics and the role in which these

laws govern the body and other material things. The idea is if the mind and body are

mutually exclusive and laws that are relevant only to the natural world govern the body,

then different and unknown laws exclusively govern the mind (the mind being a “complex

organized unit” like the body).7 The mind and body are significantly different ‘substances’

according to Descartes, yet when describing properties or actions of the mind the terms are

the same as the ones used in describing the physical world, or body. As one may see the

mind is included in the same category as the body, leading to the disputed notion that the

mind is a mysterious, immaterial thing; the mind, being placed in such category, lends itself

to be described as a ‘ghostly machine’.8

7
Eckert, Maureen. op. cit. pp. 16-18
8
Ibid., pp. 20-24
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As an extension of the “category mistake” made by the ‘Official Doctrine’, there is

another logical fallacy that is committed, considering the assumptions made by the

doctrine to be true (namely the chief principle of dualism), when an individual carries out

behavior. The idea that an overtly observable, intelligent act (behavior) must be a product

of or accompanied by a process by the immaterial mind involving facts or enumeration of

‘mental steps’ is a consequence of the separation between physical and mental worlds.

The physical, according to Substance Dualism, could not solely possess qualities

such as “ ‘skilful’, ‘cunning’, or ‘humorous,’ ”as these qualities are reserved for the mental. 9

Ryle disputes this notion, that intelligent behavior requires what he calls a “double

operation of considering and executing.” To view an act as intelligible, one must not assume

that there is a mysterious metaphysical process that occurred in conjunction with the act,

but rather the entity that performed the act has a network or collection of dispositions—

such as skill, competence, and/or knowledge how—which allows the act to be performed

intelligibly, competently, etc. (This view of dispositions can be looked at as If…then…

statements). Ryle elaborates on the “category mistake” casted by viewing the mentioned

dispositions (i.e. skill) as something observable or unobservable; incorrectly categorizing

the dispositions into a logical category results in the notion that abilities such as skill

requires the aforementioned “double operation” in order to be exhibited and considered. 10

Of course, just as Gilbert Ryle has answered, or rather, reacted to the “Official

Doctrine” there are several professionals in the field of philosophy that have refuted Ryle’s

Logical Behaviorist view.

9
Ibid.,pp. 24-25
10
Ibid., pp. 24-26
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John R. Searle, professor of philosophy at Univ. of California-Berkeley, explains in his book,

Mind: A Brief Introduction, that logical behaviorism fails to acknowledge the undeniable

relationship between mental states and observable behavior. For logical behaviorists, such

as Ryle, mental states are reduced to behavioral dispositions and behavior itself. The idea

of mental states is ignored, as logical behaviorists are materialists and specific brain states

are simply one’s arsenal of possible actions relative to stimuli. Furthermore, Searle clarifies

that Ryle’s notion of possible behavior presents a tautology, since the explanation of one’s

supposed mental states as potential actions or various behavioral intentions connotes the

assumption of understanding one’s desires (Searle gives the example of Jones 11), and desire

is a mental phenomenon or process that must be explained, in light of the logical

behaviorist view, as something physical—behavior or disposition of. 12

Jerry A. Fodor, professor of philosophy at Rutgers University (NJ), expresses another

confliction with Ryle’s logical behaviorist stance. Fodor explains that the view that a

particular set of potential behavior (disposition) is simply dependent on a particular

stimulus, or suspicion of a stimulus, does not dismantle or even encroach upon the

mentalist’s—whether dualist or not—idea that either mental states or cognitive processes

are responsible for physical events.13

11
Searle gives an example in which Jones desires must be known to assume contingent behaviors.
12
Searle, John R. op. cit. pp. 36-37
13
Eckert, Maureen. op. cit. pp. 27-31
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Bibliography

Eckert, Maureen. Theories of Mind: An Introductory Reader. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield,

2006.

Searle, John R. Mind: A Brief Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.