De La Salle University

College of Liberal Arts

Political Science Department

All Hat and No Cattle:

Assessing the legitimacy of the ASEAN Way in the context of the
Ronghiya Crisis and South China Sea Disputes

Submitted to:
Dr. Salvador Santino Regilme Jr.

In partial fulfillment for the class

INTLORG A52

Submitted by:
SERAPIO, Stephanie A.
11318988
 All Hat and No Cattle
Assessing the legitimacy of the ASEAN Way in the context of the Ronghiya Crisis and
South China Sea Disputes

Introduction:
The Association of the Southeast Asian Nations, generally referred to as the ASEAN, is
composed of countries that are binded by great diversity rather than similarity in terms of their
own political and economic environment and interests. The organization was originally
established by its founding members namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines and
Singapore to serve the following purposes: to promote cooperation in the fields of economic,
social, educational, cultural, among others; and to ensure regional peace and stability. It was
agreed upon by the founding countries that the membership would be inclusive to all nations in
the Southeast Asian region, as long as they identify themselves with the aims and principles of
the organization. Holding so much promises for the region, the organization was successful in
making other countries like Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam
subscribe to the organization and its principles making it the ‘’most high-profile and successful
regional organization in the Third World.’’ (Severino, 2002).
However, despite the efforts of the ASEAN in creating an integrated Southeast Asian
Region, centrifugal tendencies and various domestic and regional issues continue to outweigh
these efforts. Scholars would argue that this was due to one of the fundamental principles of the
organization- the principle of non-interference. The principle was stipulated in the 1976 Treaty
of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia wherein all the member countries concurred that the
organization must not interfere in the domestic affairs of the member countries. This now
becomes problematic and may render the organization as useless and ineffective, especially in
light of the two most prevalent issues in the region today- the Ronghiya Crisis and the territorial
and maritime disputes in the South China Sea.
In line with this, this paper aims to address if the ASEAN is really committed to this
principle of non-interference and assess its relevance in dealing with complicated and important
issues such as the Ronghiya Crisis in Myanmar and the maritime and territorial disputes in the
South China Sea. Moreover, in order to provide a better theoretical and empirical understanding
of the said issues vis-à-vis the principle, this paper would be divided into five parts: the first part
will provide a brief scrutinization of the paradigms in studying international organizations; the
second part will take into account the establishment, fundamental principles, and legitimacy of
the ASEAN, with specific focus on its practice of the non-interference principle by employing
the ideas of both Acharya and Jones; the third and fourth parts will probe into the specifications
of the Ronghiya crisis and the tensions in the South China Sea; and ultimately, the last part will
determine how relevant and effective ASEAN is, given the level of commitment it has for the
principle of non-interference: Does ASEAN still matter or is it nothing but a ‘’regional forum’’
or a talking club?

The Seismic Shift of Paradigms: Arguments and Approaches

The traditional notion of the international relations would center on the debate between
the realists and the liberal-institutionalists, with the former insisting that international institutions
or organizations are created to serve as ‘’means of political control and have minimal influence
on state behavior.’’ (Mearsheimer, 1994, p.7) Adopting this kind of perspective will equate to
saying that the ASEAN was created to serve the interests of the founding countries, namely
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines and Singapore or the organization is a means to an
end for a regional hegemon. While this may be partially true, for the organization was created to
ensure regional peace, security and prosperity, and this will certainly benefit the founding
countries, all other members would benefit or suffer, given the success or failure of the
organization. Unlike in the United Nations wherein special powers are given to the core
members of the Security Council, all members of the ASEAN are co-equal in powers and
responsibilities. Moreover, the principle of non-interference, realists would argue, is a tool that
powerful states can use in order to hinder an important domestic issue from being considered as a
regional crisis that will prompt the ASEAN to send important signals to the instigator, that the
rest of the organization is unitedly opposed to what they are doing. Such case is evident in the
recent meeting in Vientiane, wherein the organization failed to rally behind the Philippines in
utilizing the recent ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration and opted to stay in the middle
ground. In this case, China, being the ‘’undisputed’’ regional hegemon as today, was able to
implicitly influence the decision of the member countries because the latter are cautious of
ruining the strong political and economic ties they share with the former. This is also the case
with the Ronghiya crisis in Myanmar wherein despite the torture against and the displacement of
the Ronghiyas, Myanmar continue to assert its sovereignty as to prevent the organization from
interfering in their current domestic politics.
In contrast, proponents of the liberal institutionalism like Robert Keohane, Robert
Axelrod and Lisa Martin assert that the value of organizations such as ASEAN lies not on
solving domestic issues but rather in fostering cooperation through providing information to all
member-states, lessening transaction costs, making commitments more credible, establishing
focal points for coordination and facilitating the operation of reciprocity. Proponents of this
school of thought place high regard to the on-going shift of interests- from military to economic-
as main determinant of states’ primarily agenda. This paradigm is indeed helpful in explaining
as to why states decide to join and maintain their membership in the international institutions but
failed to capture the complete nature of international organizations, especially given the dynamic
international environment and some factors that may affect the decision-making processes of the
organization itself.
Both paradigms offered important, yet insufficient explanations as to why international or
regional organizations exist and why do member states join and comply? Realists and liberal-
institutionalists treated the IOs as pareto-optimal solutions to the problems of information
asymmetry, and lack of coordination between states. However, building on the cases that cannot
be explained by these two paradigms, students and scholars of international organizations
realized that IOs tend to deviate away from its original mission, defy the will of its principals and
eventually perform pathological/self-destructing behaviors. Recognizing the limits of this two
traditional paradigms, this paper will utilize the third paradigm called constructivism in order to
explain the relevance and the purpose of the ASEAN.
Proponents of constructivism encourage us to treat IOs as bureaucracies, wherein they are
not just mere reflection of the interests and preferences of their principals but they also have the
autonomy and power in their own right. (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004). The autonomy is rooted
from their rational-legal authority wherein states recognize that IOs employ recognized
knowledge to create rules that determine how goals will be pursued. This rational-legal authority,
together with their control over expertise and information, creates an image of depoliticization,
thus making them powerful, sometimes more influential than actual politicians. (Barnett &
Finnemore, 1999). Moreover, these IOs are tasked to perform three vital tasks namely,
classification of issues and actors, fixation of meanings, and diffusion of norms. This paradigm
will help us in explaining as to why the ASEAN is maintaining its silence over the plight of the
Ronghiyas and is opting to stay on what it calls the ‘’middle ground’’ in the issue of territorial
and maritime disputes in the South China Sea. However, by also employing the constructivist
approach, one would come into a realization that what we perceive as weaknesses are considered
by the ASEAN as its greatest assets.
By way of contrast, despite understanding the motivating factors of the ASEAN, one still
cannot deny the shortcomings of its current institutional design. The Secretariat is relatively
handicapped due to limited funding and lack of technocrats and staff. The establishment of the
ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights in 2009 was not taken seriously
because it failed to engage and solve any human rights violations in the region.
All in all, the neo-neo debate between realism and liberalism offers contrasting ways as
to how we should approach and understand regional organizations such as the ASEAN.
However, siding with one side is proven to be futile because the two failed to take into
consideration the importance of identity, ideas and norms in shaping the actual design of the
organization. States participate on the basis of their given identities and interests and try to
realize their self-preferences through strategic behavior. (Risse, 2004). The reality is being
determined by the actors themselves.

The Main Argument:

Is the ASEAN really committed to its principle of non-interference? Adopting a
constructivist view, this paper argues that the principle has prevented the organization in
responding to sensitive and crucial issues, specifically the Ronghiya Crisis and the South China
Sea fiasco. This is due not just because of material interests of states but also their ideas,
identities and norms, that help in shaping the institutional design of the ASEAN. In a similar
fashion, it is premature to use the European Union as the sole gauge in measuring the
accomplishments of ASEAN, given the difference in their own respective regional environments.
One should take into consideration that the ASEAN is comprised of ten countries coming from
different vantage points. The diversity of these countries, as argued by Katja Freistein (2013),
paved the way for the creation of norms that are seen as beneficial to each and every member of
the organization. The ASEAN Charter, which serves as the primary document that guides the
organization, is seen as a mere textual representation of different political demands that can be
viewed as an embodiment of contrasting claims about the future of regional cooperation within
the region. (Freistein, 2013, p.3). However, one cannot deny the crippling effect of the said
principle to the organization itself and thus, there is a need for the member countries to start
reconsidering the application of the non-interference principle and grant the ASEAN the actual
power and the legitimacy to perform its tasks and responsibilities in order to be able to ensure a
peaceful and prosperous region for everyone.
‘’ The point of ASEAN does not hinge on what it is now but on what we, the
Southeast Asian peoples, can make it to be.’’
- Lee, 2016
Making Sense of the ASEAN
Southeast Asia is one of the most diverse regions in the world in terms of religion, type,
race, language and culture. Geographically-speaking, it is divided into two parts- the mainland
and the island zones, with the former comprising of countries like Burma, Cambodia, Laos,
Thailand and Vietnam and the latter includes Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, East
Timor and Singapore. The remarkable variety of formal political institutions and government
types that exist in the region is seen by Beeson (2009) as a potential factor that will slow down -
if not impede in the process of cooperation and formation of common goals and norms between
these countries. Notwithstanding the diversities, Mckinsey & Company (2014) noted that if all
these member-states were combined together, the region would be the 7th largest in the world in
terms of land-area, 3rd largest in terms of its workforce and consumer market and the 4th largest
exporting region following US, European Union and China. Moreover, the region is projected to
be the fourth largest economy in the world by the end of 2050.
And as previously noted, it is a lot easier to name diversities that exist between the
Southeast Asian nations than to pinpoint similarities between them. At the very least, all the
nations have been under the colonial rule, with the exception of Thailand. This shared colonial
experience prompted the creation and the need for an intergovernmental organization in
Southeast Asia as to prevent external powers in trying to impose their will on the said region.
(Khoman, 1992). The Bangkok Declaration, which was signed by the five founding members of
the organization, emphasized the shared primary responsibilities of Southeast Asian nations in
‘’strengthening the economic and social stability of the region and ensuring their peaceful and
progressive national development’. The ASEAN Charter, also referred to as a ‘’living
document’’ and is considered as the legal and institutional framework, featured the central
narratives in the regional discourse of the ASEAN and this includes institutionalization;
accountability and compliance, inclusion of civil societies, and ideas about efficient regional
governance, among others, as well as the principles
In the present time, the organization is known for its three pillars of political-security,
economic and socio-cultural. The first pillar refers to the promotion and of peace and security
within the region in accordance to the principles of democracy, rule of law, good governance,
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. In this aspect, ASEAN was relatively
successful in the prevention of any major wars between two member countries thus earning the
title as the ‘’region’s peacemaker.’’ (Mahbubani, 2008). Secondly, the economic pillar is focused
on achieving ‘’free movement of goods, services, skilled labour and freer flow of capital’’ and is
important in making the ‘’ASEAN economies more dynamic and competitive.’’ (Henderson,
2014). Last but not the least, the socio-cultural pillar of ASEAN aims to ‘’forge a common
identity and build a caring and sharing society which is inclusive and where the well-being,
livelihood, and welfare of the peoples are enhanced.’’ It is because of these promises, together
with a practice called principle of non-interference, that prompted other countries from the
region to join and maintain their membership in ASEAN.

The Principle of Non-Interference: A Leverage or a Deterrent?

‘’ ASEAN countries’ consistent adherence to this principle of non-interference is the
key reason why no military conflict has broken out between any two ASEAN countries
since the founding of ASEAN…’’

– S. Jayakumar, Singaporean Foreign Minister (1997) in Jones (2011)

The concept of sovereignty is one of the more important characteristics of nation-states.

For Stephen Krasner (1999), it defines nationhood. Sovereignty is viewed by Max Weber as the
legitimacy of the state to monopolize the use of force over a specific jurisdiction. Distinctions are
usually made between the internal and external facets of sovereignty, with the former defining ‘’
‘’the ultimate or highest authority within a state, and constitutes a hierarchic relationship
between the sovereign and subordinates, whoever they may be.’’ (Lake, 2003, pp. 305).
Subsequently, the latter talks about a higher form of sovereignty, the one that ‘’entails the
recognition by other similarly recognized states that this entity is ‘‘one of them’’ (Bull 1977 in
Lake 2003, pp.305). The external facet of sovereignty is also referred to as the principle of non-
interference (Krasner, 1999) wherein the relationship between actors is a gridlock situation
wherein ‘‘none is entitled to command; none is required to obey.’’ (Waltz, 1979, 88)
Ideally, when states join international or regional organizations, they surrender a part of
their sovereignty to a higher body in order to achieve common goals and interests. This is highly
evident in the case of the European Union wherein Germany gave up its power to determine its
own currency in pursuit of a common currency within the region. However, scholars like Amitav
Acharya insist that this is not necessarily the case in the ASEAN. According to her, Asian policy
makers tend to reject the ‘’universal multilateralism model by the West’’ and insist on the
importance of regional autonomy in dealing with the problems of the region, employing what
they call as the ‘’ASEAN Way’’ in settlement of the disputes. This code of conduct embodies the
principle of non-interference, non-use of force and respect for sovereignty, among many others.
Unlike its western counterparts, ASEAN has preference for informality, consensus and bilateral
modes of security cooperation and conflict management. (Acharya, 1997, pp. 329). The ASEAN
way is more process-oriented rather than outcome oriented, and this attitude is the reason for the
‘’ineffectiveness’’ of the said organization.
In contrast, Lee Jones (2010) disputed the belief that ASEAN never, or hardly ever
intervened in the domestic affairs of each other. This belief was supported by ASEAN’s former
secretary-general, Rodolfo Severino, insisting that ‘’the application of non-interference is
governed by ‘pragmatic considerations’ and has not been absolute.’’ (Severino 2006 in Jones
2010, pp. 481). Adopting Stephen Krasner’s view of sovereignty as organized hypocrisy, he
insisted that it is the rulers who make rational calculations of both the material and ideational
interests and will violate the principle of non-intervention if it will serve their own interests.
(Jones, 2010, pp. 483). He cited cases wherein the implicitly intervened or help fostered the
restoration of peace and order. (i.e. in countering leftist insurgencies and controlling perceived
military threats). All in all, Jones (2010) argues that the meaning and application of the norm
has, in fact, changed considerably over time, reflecting the changing pressures of social conflict,
economic change, and the international political environment.
In what follows, the researcher will determine the pertinence of the non-interference
principle by taking into account two of the more prevalent and critical issues in the region today:
the plight of the Ronghiyas and the territorial and maritime disputes in the South China Sea.

The Plight of the Ronghiyas, the people who nobody wanted.

“We are talking here of refugees, not migrants, thus people who are escaping not only
from poverty, but from terror.”
-Rosalla Sciortino in Son (2015).

The aggravating situation of the Ronghiyas and the relative silence of Myanmar and the
ASEAN as a region stirred a lot of criticisms from both the human rights advocates and the rest
of the international community. The Ronghiyas are Muslim minorities who reside at the
Northern Rakhine State and have been attempting to flee from all the discriminations and
persecutions that they received at Myanmar. The latter still does not recognize the existence of
this group of people, insisting that they actually come from Bangladesh, another country who
denies being affiliated with the Ronghiyas. This group of people have reportedly ‘’ faced
discrimination for decades. They have been denied citizenship and evicted from their homes,
their land has been confiscated, and they have been attacked by the military. ‘’ (Perlez, 2014).
The displacement and the persecution of the Ronghiyas reflect the deep anti-Muslim sentiments
of Myanmar, due to the ‘’ considerable pent-up frustration and anger under years of
authoritarianism that are now being directed towards Muslims by a populist political force that
cloaks itself in religious respectability and moral authority.’’ (Macaraig, 2015). The harrowing
condition of the Ronghiyas, marked by confinement of thousands of Ronghiyas within
concentration camps that are not well-maintained, extreme violence, starvation and death,
prompted thousands of their kind have submitted themselves to notorious illegal smugglers and
human traffickers, just to escape the on-going nightmare at Myanmar. Unfortunately, only a
limited number of countries within the ASEAN have accepted Ronghiyas as refugees, and one of
which is the Philippines. Other ASEAN governments such as Thailand and Malaysia have been
cautious in approaching the issue as to avoid accusations of violating the non-interference policy
and preventing a backlash from their own Muslim communities for the lack of action with
regards to the worsening plight of the Ronghiyas. As of the writing of this paper, the ASEAN has
done little to help these stateless people and consider this issue not just a simple domestic issue
but an issue of tremendous human rights violations that need to be put into a stop, immediately.

Principle of Non-Interference: A Deterrent

‘’The ASEAN has the capacity to manage this crisis, but its member states lack the
political will resolve it.’’

-Fan in Albert, 2015

In this specific case, it is evident that ASEAN as a whole has religiously subscribed to the
principle of non-interference and has done little in order to extend help and ease the current
plight of the Ronghiyas. As of the time of writing, there is still no unified ASEAN response that
can indicate a proposed solution to the deepening crisis or send a signal to Myanmar that they
should immediately stop all these persecutions and human rights violations. Moreover, ASEAN
has yet to ratify the UN Refugee Convention and its respective protocols. (Albert, 2015). The
organization is still deemed unsuccessful in formulating strong policies that will protect the
safety of its own people. Notwithstanding the concern being expressed by other countries such as
Malaysia and Indonesia, Myanmar is still successful in keeping the issue of the Ronghiyas out of
the ASEAN Summit and its Foreign Ministers ‘meeting. One must understand that the help that
some countries are extending such as temporary shelter and food are not sufficient in securing
the safety and well-being of these people. The ASEAN, with its vision to create a people-
centered community, must take the first step in ensuring that these people would be recognized
as part of One ASEAN Community and be treated as fellow human beings. Most importantly,
the political will of the ASEAN leaders should remain strong in order for them to be able to craft
binding laws in order to address the root causes of the problems. Ultimately, the ASEAN
community must realize the severity and importance of this issue and should pressure their
respective governments to make a stand and put a stop to this unjust treatment of the Ronghiyas.
Southeast Asia’s Cauldron: Territorial and Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea.
“A growing worry is the fragile state of ASEAN unity. The ability of external
parties to shape the positions of ASEAN members on regional issues such as
the competing maritime claims in the South China Sea could undermine efforts
to create an agreed ASEAN view. As China exerts its influence on ASEAN
members to prevent any decisions which could affect its preference for
bilateral negotiations, it will be increasingly difficult to reach an ASEAN
consensus.’’
- Barry Desker, 2015

China’s brash reclamation of the disputed maritime lanes and territorial islands in the
South China Sea emerged as one of the most pressing concerns not just for the region but also for
the rest of the international community. The battle over the islands of the Spratly’s has marked
the history of the past century. Known as the Dangerous Ground in the past, Southeast Asian
nations started to claim the ownership of these islands, due to the possible existence substantial
petroleum and natural deposits underneath its seabed and its strategic location at the West
Philippine Sea or the South China Sea. China is basing its claim on what it calls as the ‘’historic
law’’, asserting that they were the first one to discover these islands and prior to this, the islands
were considered as terra nullius. In contrast, other rival claimants in the Southeast Asia such as
the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam and Brunei, are insisting that it should be the United Nations
Law of the Sea that should be followed and respected. As of writing, only the Philippines and
Vietnam are pursuing their cases, with the former filing a formal case at the Permanent Court of
Arbitration and the latter, openly issuing statements that express strong condemnation of the said
activities by China.
During the 26th ASEAN Summit last April, the issue was addressed and was said to
“undermine peace, security and stability in the South China Sea” (Tiezzi, 2015). Afterwards, the
Chinese officially expressed concern over the statement, citing that the issue was with the
Philippines alone. The issue of contested territory has been going on for decades and China’s
claim of a solitary conflict with the Philippines is an erroneous one. Despite the mention at the
summit, ASEAN as a whole has done little to stop China’s reclamation even though the
increased presence of the Chinese in these territories has the potential to fully make the 26th
ASEAN Summit’s statement a reality. This is primarily because of the increased economic
interdependence between ASEAN and China and Southeast Asian nations are not willing to go
against a rising superpower and to top of that, China made enormous contributions in helping
ASEAN weather the Asian Financial Crisis. Since most of the member states are not claimants,
they cannot find any reason for cooperation that will benefit their own countries. As China exerts
its influence on ASEAN members to prevent any decisions which could affect its preference for
bilateral negotiations, it will be increasingly difficult to reach an ASEAN consensus.” (Desker in
Heydarian, 2015) The least that ASEAN can do now is to force China to speed up the creation of
a binding Code of Conduct that will replace the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in
the South China Sea. (Glaser, 2015).
Principle of Non-Interference: Deterrent
In this specific issue, one can see the undermining factors that fuel the Southeast Asian
Nations to not issue a statement and ‘’hide’’ behind the principle of non-interference. With the
increased economic interdependence between governments in Southeast Asia and China,
together with the latter’s unprecedented growth for the past decade or so, countries are starting to
align their foreign policies and are attempting to stay on China’s good side. However, since the
Philippines are not that economically-dependent on China, and due to the ASEAN’s failure to
issue a joint statement that will help mediate the situation, the Philippines resorted to a legal
warfare in the Permanent Court of Arbitration. This resulted into an ‘’almost clean-sweep’’ in
favor of the Philippines with the PCA rejecting these historical claims by China. However, since
the PCA lack enforcement mechanisms, it is now up to the ASEAN to take charge and rally
behind the cause of the Philippines for this will also benefit states like Indonesia, Malaysia and
Vietnam. By issuing such joint statement, it will give China a message that its neighbors would
not tolerate these brash reclamation activities and this will eventually give them pause.
(Batongbacal, 2016). It is not in the interests of China to have its neighbors colluding against
them, especially that countries like Japan and the United States are meddling into the issue. In
spite of this, ASEAN ‘’has not only fallen way short of ensuring respect for the declaration, but
also failed to craft a rudimentary blue print of a Code of Conduct among disputing parties.’’
(Heydarian, 2016). ASEAN must realize that what is at stake here is not pieces of rocks or
islands but rather the ‘’peace and prosperity in the region.’’ (Heydarian, 2016)

Conclusion:
‘’Either interference becomes legitimate, or the Association will become
meaningless.’’

-Moller, 1998, pp.1104

The ASEAN has been relatively successful in achieving some of its goals, including the
prevention of any major wars between two member-countries. Unlike its Western counterparts, it
is process-oriented, rather than outcome-oriented and has a preference for informality, consensus
and bilateral modes of security cooperation and conflict management. It is also known for its
principle for non-interference that relegates the organization as a mere consultative agency and
or a mere regional forum, with no enforcement mechanisms. The debate between Acharya and
Jones center as to how committed is ASEAN in its principle of non-interference, with the former
arguing that ASEAN hardly, or never intervened in the affairs of the member-states, while the
latter posits that this principle is not absolute and has been violated if it will serve the interests of
the states involved.
By using the cases of the Ronghiyas and the recent territorial spat with China, one can
see that the organization has been religiously subscribed to this principle of non-interference.
This is due to factors like ‘’lack of identity’’ for the Ronghiyas, and economic interdependence
that the member-states share with China. While this occurrence is normal, for states usually
determine and influence the decision-making of international and regional organizations,
ASEAN must realize the need for quasi-governmental and quasi-judicial bodies that will help the
organization in crafting binding agreements and laws that will govern the conduct of all member-
states. In a similar manner, the ASEAN Secretariat must be strengthened by adding more
technocrats that will help in determining the crucial problems in the region.
In a situation wherein sovereignty remains as a substantial barrier in the performance of
the ASEAN, all member countries must realize the importance of having a powerful and
effective regional organization that will serve as the region’s guide in continued peace and
prosperity, given the dynamic international environment. Ultimately, ASEAN member-countries
must choose between legitimation of interference or settle with the organization as a mere
regional forum.

--

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Personal Communication:
J. Batongbacal, personal communication, July 1, 2016.