LG Foods v. Pagapong Agraviador

7/18/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 503
170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED L.G.
Foods Corporation vs. Pagapong-Agraviador
G.R. No. 158995. September 26, 2006.*
L.G. FOODS CORPORATION and VICTORINO GABOR,

VicePresident and General Manager, petitioners, vs.
HON. PHILADELFA B. PAGAPONG-AGRAVIADOR, in
her capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court,
Branch 43, Bacolod City, and SPS. FLORENTINO and
THERESA VALLEJERA, respondents.
Actions; Damages; An act or omission causing damage to

another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of
the offender, i.e., 1) civil liability ex delicto; and, 2) independent
civil liabilities.—Section 2, Rule 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure defines cause of action as the “act or omission by which a
party violates the right of another.” Such act or omission gives rise
to an obligation which may come from law, contracts, quasi
contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts. Corollarily, an act or omission
causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil
liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., 1) civil liability ex delicto;
and 2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising
from an act or omission complained of as felony (e.g., culpa
contractual or obligations arising from law; the intentional torts;
and culpa aquiliana); or (b) where the injured party is granted a
right to file
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
171
VOL. 503, SEPTEMBER 26, 2006 171
L.G. Foods Corporation vs. Pagapong-Agraviador
an action independent and distinct from the criminal action. Either

of these two possible liabilities may be enforced against the
offender.
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000164adb26d12b6e98a14003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/12
Same; Same; Torts; Quasi-Delicts; Negligence; Victims of

negligence or their heirs have a choice between an action to enforce
the civil liability arising from culpa criminal under Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code, and an action for quasi-delict (culpa
aquiliana) under Articles 2176 to 2194 of the Civil Code.—Victims
of negligence or their heirs have a choice between an action to
enforce the civil liability arising from culpa criminal under Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an action for quasi-delict (culpa
aquiliana) under Articles 2176 to 2194 of the Civil Code. If, as here,
the action chosen is for quasi-delict, the plaintiff may hold the
employer liable for the negligent act of its employee, subject to the
employer’s defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of
the family. On the other hand, if the action chosen is for culpa
criminal, the plaintiff can hold the employer subsidiarily liable only
upon proof of prior conviction of its employee. Article 1161 of the
Civil Code provides that civil obligation arising from criminal
offenses shall be governed by penal laws subject to the provision of
Article 2177 and of the pertinent provision of Chapter 2,
Preliminary Title on Human Relation, and of Title XVIII of this
Book, regulating damages. Plainly, Article 2177 provides for the
alternative remedies the plaintiff may choose from in case the
obligation has the possibility of arising indirectly from the
delict/crime or directly from quasi-delict/tort. The choice is with the
plaintiff who makes known his cause of action in his initiatory
pleading or complaint, and not with the defendant who can not ask
for the dismissal of the plaintiff’s cause of action or lack of it based
on the defendant’s perception that the plaintiff should have opted
to file a claim under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Under Article 2180 of the

Civil Code, the liability of the employer is direct or immediate—it is
not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee
and a prior showing of insolvency of such employee.— Under Article
2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the employer is direct or
immediate. It is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the
negligent employee and a prior showing of insolvency of such
employee. Here, the complaint sufficiently alleged that the death of
the couple’s minor son was caused by the negligent act of the
petitioners’ driver; and that the petitioners themselves were civilly
liable for the negligence of their driver for failing “to exercise the
necessary diligence required of a good father of the family in the
selection and supervision of [their] employee, the driver, which
diligence, if exercised, would have prevented said accident.”
172
172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The circumstance that no

reservation to institute a separate civil action for damages was
made when the criminal case was filed is of no moment where the
criminal case was dismissed without any pronouncement having
been made therein—in reality, it is as if there was no criminal case
to speak of in the first place.—Citing Maniago v. CA, 253 SCRA 674
(1996), petitioner would argue that Civil Case No. 99-10845 should
have been dismissed for failure of the respondent spouses to make
a reservation to institute a separate civil action for damages when
the criminal case against the driver was filed. The argument is
specious. To start with, the petitioners’ reliance on Maniago is
obviously misplaced. There, the civil case was filed while the
criminal case against the employee was still pending. Here, the
criminal case against the employee driver was prematurely
terminated due to his death. Precisely, Civil Case No. 99-10845 was
filed by the respondent spouses because no remedy can be obtained
by them against the petitioners with the dismissal of the criminal
case against their driver during the pendency thereof. The
circumstance that no reservation to institute a separate civil action
for damages was made when the criminal case was filed is of no
moment for the simple reason that the criminal case was dismissed
without any pronouncement having been made therein. In reality,
therefor, it is as if there was no criminal case to speak of in the first
place. And for the petitioners to insist for the conviction of their
driver as a condition sine qua non to hold them liable for damages
is to ask for the impossible.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Eufemio Law Offices for petitioners.
Archie S. Baribar for respondents.
GARCIA, J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for

review on certiorari is the Decision1 dated April 25, 2003
of the Court of Appeals
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin with Associate Justices

Ruben T. Reyes (now Presiding Justice) and Elvi John Asuncion,
concurring. Rollo, pp. 17-22.
173
VOL. 503, SEPTEMBER 26, 2006 173

(CA), as reiterated in its Resolution of July 10, 2003,2 in

CA-G.R. SP No. 67600, affirming an earlier Order of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 43,

which denied the petitioners’ motion to dismiss in Civil
Case No. 99-10845, an action for damages arising from a
vehicular accident thereat instituted by the herein private
respondents—the spouses Florentino Vallejera and
Theresa Vallejera—against the petitioners.
The antecedent facts may be briefly stated as follows:
On February 26, 1996, Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old
son of the spouses Florentino Vallejera and Theresa
Vallejera, was hit by a Ford Fiera van owned by the
petitioners and driven at the time by their employee,
Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer. Charles died as a result
of the accident.
In time, an Information for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to Homicide was filed against the driver before
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bacolod City,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 67787, entitled People of
the Philippines v. Vincent Norman Yeneza.
Unfortunately, before the trial could be concluded, the
accused driver committed suicide, evidently bothered by
conscience and remorse. On account thereof, the MTCC, in
its order of September 30, 1998, dismissed the criminal
case.
On June 23, 1999, in the RTC of Bacolod City, the spouses
Vallejera filed a complaint3 for damages against the
petitioners as employers of the deceased driver, basically
alleging that as such employers, they failed to exercise due
diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees.
Thereat docketed as Civil Case No. 99-10845, the complaint
was raffled to Branch 43 of the court.
In their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,4 the
petitioners as defendants denied liability for the death of
the Vallejeras’ 7-year old son, claiming that they had
exercised the required due diligence in the selection and
supervision of their employees, including the deceased
driver. They thus prayed in their Answer for the dismissal
of
_______________
2 Id., at p. 23.
3 Id., at pp. 93-98.
4 Id., at pp. 85-91.
174
the complaint for lack of cause of action on the part of the

Vallejera couple.
During pre-trial, the defendant petitioners insisted that
their dismissal prayer be resolved. Hence, the trial court
required them to file within ten days a memorandum of

authorities supportive of their position.
Instead, however, of the required memorandum of
authorities, the defendant petitioners filed a Motion to
Dismiss, principally arguing that the complaint is basically a
“claim for subsidiary liability against an employer” under the
provision of Article 1035 of the Revised Penal Code.
Prescinding therefrom, they contend that there must first be
a judgment of conviction against their driver as a condition
sine qua non to hold them liable. Ergo, since the driver died
during the pendency of the criminal action, the sine qua non
condition for their subsidiary liability was not fulfilled, hence
the of lack of cause of action on the part of the plaintiffs.
They further argue that since the plaintiffs did not make a
reservation to institute a separate action for damages when
the criminal case was filed, the damage suit in question is
thereby deemed instituted with the criminal action which
was already dismissed.
In an Order dated September 4, 2001,6 the trial court
denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit and set the
case for pre-trial. With their motion for reconsideration
having been denied by the same court in its subsequent
order7 of September 26, 2001, the petitioners then went on
certiorari to the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 67600, imputing
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in
refusing to dismiss the basic complaint for damages in
Civil Case No. 99-10845.
_______________
5 Article 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons.—The subsidiary

liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to
employers, teachers, persons and corporations engaged in any kind of
industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen,
apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
6 Rollo, pp. 71-74.
7 Id., at p. 65.
175
VOL. 503, SEPTEMBER 26, 2006 175

In the herein assailed decision8 dated April 25, 2003, the

CA denied the petition and upheld the trial court. Partly
says the CA in its challenged issuance:
“x x x xxx xxx
It is clear that the complaint neither represents nor implies
that the responsibility charged was the petitioner’s subsidiary
liability under Art. 103, Revised Penal Code. As pointed out [by
the trial court] in the Order of September 4, 2001, the complaint
does not even allege the basic elements for such a liability, like
the conviction of the accused employee and his insolvency. Truly

enough, a civil action to enforce subsidiary liability separate and
distinct from the criminal action is even unnecessary.
xxx xxx xxx
Specifically, Civil Case No. 99-10845 exacts responsibility for
fault or negligence under Art. 2176, Civil Code, which is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Revised Penal Code. Verily, therefore, the
liability under Art. 2180, Civil Code, is direct and immediate, and
not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee
or prior showing of the latter’s insolvency.” (Italics in the original.)
In time, the petitioners moved for a reconsideration but

their motion was denied by the CA in its resolution9 of
July 10, 2003. Hence, the petitioners’ present recourse on
their submission that the appellate court committed
reversible error in upholding the trial court’s denial of
their motion to dismiss.
We DENY.
As the Court sees it, the sole issue for resolution is
whether the spouses Vallejeras’ cause of action in Civil
Case No. 99-10845 is founded on Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code, as maintained by the petitioners, or
derived from Article 218010 of the Civil Code, as ruled by
the two courts below.
_______________
8 Supra note 1.
9 Rollo, p. 23.
10 Article 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable
not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
176
It thus behooves us to examine the allegations of the

complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 99-10845. That
complaint alleged, inter alia, as follows:
“x x x xxx xxx
3 . That defendant [LG Food Corporation] is the registered

owner of a Ford Fiera Van with Plate No. NMS 881 and
employer sometime February of 1996 of one Vincent
Norman Yeneza y Ferrer, a salesman of said corporation;
4. That sometime February 26, 1996 at around 2:00 P.M. at
Rosario St., Bacolod City, the minor son of said plaintiffs
[now respondents], Charles Vallejera, 7 years old, was hit
and bumped by above-described vehicle then driven by
said employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer;
5. That the mishap was due to the gross fault and negligence
of defendant’s employee, who drove said vehicle, recklessly,
negligently and at a high speed without regard to traffic
condition and safety of other road users and likewise to the
fault and negligence of the owner employer, herein
defendants LG Food Corporation who failed to exercise due
diligence in the selection and supervision of his employee,
Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer;
6. That as a result of said incident, plaintiffs’ son suffered
multiple body injuries which led to his untimely demise on
that very day;
7. That a criminal case was filed against the defendant’s
employee, docketed as Criminal Case No. 67787, (earlier
filed as Crim. Case No. 9617570 before RTC) before MTC-
Branch III, entitled “People v. Yeneza” for “Reckless
Imprudence resulting to Homicide,” but the same was
dismissed because pending litigation, then remorse-stricken
[accused] committed suicide;
xxx xxx xxx
8. That the injuries and complications as well as the resultant

death suffered by the late minor Charles Vallejera were due
to the negligence and imprudence of defendant’s employee;
_______________
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees

and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent damage (1903a).
177
VOL. 503, SEPTEMBER 26, 2006 177

9. That defendant LG Foods Corporation is civilly liable for

the negligence/imprudence of its employee since it failed to
exercise the necessary diligence required of a good father of
the family in the selection and supervision of his employee,
Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer which diligence if
exercised, would have prevented said incident.” (Bracketed
words and emphasis ours.)
Nothing in the foregoing allegations suggests, even

remotely, that the herein petitioners are being made to
account for their subsidiary liability under Article 103 of

the Revised Penal Code. As correctly pointed out by the
trial court in its order of September 4, 2001 denying the
petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss, the complaint did not even
aver the basic elements for the subsidiary liability of an
employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code,
such as the prior conviction of the driver in the criminal
case filed against him nor his insolvency.
Admittedly, the complaint did not explicitly state that
plaintiff Vallejeras were suing the defendant petitioners
for damages based on quasi-delict. Clear it is, however,
from the allegations of the complaint that quasi-delict was
their choice of remedy against the petitioners. To stress,
the plaintiff spouses alleged in their complaint gross fault
and negligence on the part of the driver and the failure of
the petitioners, as employers, to exercise due diligence in
the selection and supervision of their employees. The
spouses further alleged that the petitioners are civilly
liable for the negligence/imprudence of their driver since
they failed to exercise the necessary diligence required of
a good father of the family in the selection and
supervision of their employees, which diligence, if
exercised, could have prevented the vehicular accident
that resulted to the death of their 7-year old son.
Section 2, Rule 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
defines cause of action as the “act or omission by which a
party violates the right of another.” Such act or omission
gives rise to an obligation which may come from law,
contracts, quasi contracts, delicts or quasidelicts.11
_______________
11 Article 1157, Civil Code of the Philippines.
178
Corollarily, an act or omission causing damage to another

may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of
the offender, i.e., 1) civil liability ex delicto;12 and 2)
independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising
from an act or omission complained of as felony (e.g.,
culpa contractual or obligations arising from law;13 the
intentional torts;14 and culpa aquiliana15); or (b) where
the injured party is granted a right to file an action
independent and distinct from the criminal action.16
Either of these two possible liabilities may be enforced
against the offender.17
Stated otherwise, victims of negligence or their heirs have
a choice between an action to enforce the civil liability
arising from culpa criminal under Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, and an action for quasi-delict (culpa

aquiliana) under Articles 2176 to 2194 of the Civil Code.
If, as here, the action chosen is for quasi-delict, the
plaintiff may hold the employer liable for the negligent act
of its employee, subject to the employer’s defense of
exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family. On
the other hand, if the action chosen is for culpa criminal,
the plaintiff can hold the employer subsidiarily liable only
upon proof of prior conviction of its employee.18
Article 116119 of the Civil Code provides that civil
obligation arising from criminal offenses shall be governed
by penal laws subject to the provision of Article 217720 and
of the pertinent provision of Chapter 2,
_______________
12 Article 100, Revised Penal Code.

13 Article 31, Civil Code.
14 Articles 32 and 34, Civil Code.
17 Cancio, Jr. v. Isip, G.R. No. 133978, November 12, 2002, 391 SCRA
393.
18 Joaquin, et al. v. Aniceto, et al., 120 Phil. 1100; 12 SCRA 308 (1964).
19 ARTICLE 1161. Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses shall
be governed by the penal laws, subject to the provisions of article 2177, and
of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title, on Human
Relations, and of Title XVIII of this Book, regulating damages. (1092a)
20 ARTICLE 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the
preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability
179
VOL. 503, SEPTEMBER 26, 2006 179

Preliminary Title on Human Relation, and of Title XVIII

of this Book, regulating damages. Plainly, Article 2177
provides for the alternative remedies the plaintiff may
choose from in case the obligation has the possibility of
arising indirectly from the delict/crime or directly from
quasi-delict/tort. The choice is with the plaintiff who
makes known his cause of action in his initiatory pleading
or complaint,21 and not with the defendant who can not
ask for the dismissal of the plaintiff’s cause of action or
lack of it based on the defendant’s perception that the
plaintiff should have opted to file a claim under Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the
employer is direct or immediate. It is not conditioned upon
prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior
showing of insolvency of such employee.22
Here, the complaint sufficiently alleged that the death of
the couple’s minor son was caused by the negligent act of the
petitioners’ driver; and that the petitioners themselves were
civilly liable for the negligence of their driver for failing “to
exercise the necessary diligence required of a good father of
the family in the selection and supervision of [their]
employee, the driver, which diligence, if exercised, would
have prevented said accident.”
Had the respondent spouses elected to sue the petitioners
based on Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, they would
have alleged that the guilt of the driver had been proven
beyond reasonable doubt; that such accused driver is
insolvent; that it is the subsidiary liability of the defendant
petitioners as employers to pay for the damage done by their
employee (driver) based on the principle that every person
criminally liable is also civilly liable.23 Since there was no
conviction in the criminal case against the driver, precisely
because death intervened prior to the termination of the
criminal proceedings, the
_______________
arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. (n)
21 Section 3, Rule 6, 1997 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
22 Kapalaran Bus Lines v. Coronado, G.R. No. 85331, August 25, 1989,
176 SCRA 792.
23 Article 100, Revised Penal Code.
180
spouses’ recourse was, therefore, to sue the petitioners for

their direct and primary liability based on quasi-delict.
Besides, it is worthy to note that the petitioners, in
their Answer with Compulsory Counter-Claim,24
repeatedly made mention of Article 2180 of the Civil Code
and anchored their defense on their allegation that “they
had exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of [their] employees.” The Court views this
defense as an admission that indeed the petitioners
acknowledged the private respondents’ cause of action as
one for quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
All told, Civil Case No. 99-10845 is a negligence suit
brought under Article 2176 - Civil Code to recover damages
primarily from the petitioners as employers responsible for
their negligent driver pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil
Code. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable
not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible. Thus, the employer is
liable for damages caused by his employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their

assigned tasks, even though the former is not engaged in
any business or industry.
Citing Maniago v. CA,25 petitioner would argue that
Civil Case No. 99-10845 should have been dismissed for
failure of the respondent spouses to make a reservation to
institute a separate civil action for damages when the
criminal case against the driver was filed.
The argument is specious.
To start with, the petitioners’ reliance on Maniago is
obviously misplaced. There, the civil case was filed while
the criminal case against the employee was still pending.
Here, the criminal case against the employee driver was
prematurely terminated due to his death. Precisely, Civil
Case No. 99-10845 was filed by the respondent spouses
because no remedy can be obtained by them against the
petitioners with the dismissal of the criminal case against
their driver during the pendency thereof.
_______________
24 Supra note 4.
25 G.R. 104392, February 20, 1996, 253 SCRA 674.
181
VOL. 503, SEPTEMBER 26, 2006 181

The circumstance that no reservation to institute a

separate civil action for damages was made when the
criminal case was filed is of no moment for the simple
reason that the criminal case was dismissed without any
pronouncement having been made therein. In reality,
therefor, it is as if there was no criminal case to speak of
in the first place. And for the petitioners to insist for the
conviction of their driver as a condition sine qua non to
hold them liable for damages is to ask for the impossible.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is DENIED
for lack of merit.
Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona

and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Petition denied.
Notes.—The use of the opaque phrase “among others”

can not confer causes of action other than that specifically
averred. (Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 230 SCRA 710
[1994])
By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of
causes of action, is meant the uniting of two or more
demands or rights of action in one action, the statement of

more than one cause of action in a declaration. (Republic
vs. Hernandez, 253 SCRA 509 [1996])
——o0o——
182
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7/18/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 503

170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED L.G.

Foods Corporation vs. Pagapong-Agraviador

G.R. No. 158995. September 26, 2006.*

L.G. FOODS CORPORATION and VICTORINO GABOR,

Actions; Damages; An act or omission causing damage to

VOL. 503, SEPTEMBER 26, 2006 171

L.G. Foods Corporation vs. Pagapong-Agraviador

an action independent and distinct from the criminal action. Either

Same; Same; Torts; Quasi-Delicts; Negligence; Victims of

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Under Article 2180 of the

172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

L.G. Foods Corporation vs. Pagapong-Agraviador

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The circumstance that no

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for

1 Penned by Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin with Associate Justices

VOL. 503, SEPTEMBER 26, 2006 173

(CA), as reiterated in its Resolution of July 10, 2003,2 in

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 43,

174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED L.G.

Foods Corporation vs. Pagapong-Agraviador

the complaint for lack of cause of action on the part of the

required them to file within ten days a memorandum of

5 Article 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons.—The subsidiary

VOL. 503, SEPTEMBER 26, 2006 175

In the herein assailed decision8 dated April 25, 2003, the

the conviction of the accused employee and his insolvency. Truly

In time, the petitioners moved for a reconsideration but

176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED L.G.

Foods Corporation vs. Pagapong-Agraviador

It thus behooves us to examine the allegations of the

3 . That defendant [LG Food Corporation] is the registered

xxx xxx xxx

8. That the injuries and complications as well as the resultant

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees

VOL. 503, SEPTEMBER 26, 2006 177

9. That defendant LG Foods Corporation is civilly liable for

Nothing in the foregoing allegations suggests, even

account for their subsidiary liability under Article 103 of

11 Article 1157, Civil Code of the Philippines.

178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED L.G.

Foods Corporation vs. Pagapong-Agraviador

Corollarily, an act or omission causing damage to another

Revised Penal Code, and an action for quasi-delict (culpa

12 Article 100, Revised Penal Code.

VOL. 503, SEPTEMBER 26, 2006 179

Preliminary Title on Human Relation, and of Title XVIII

180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED L.G.

Foods Corporation vs. Pagapong-Agraviador

spouses’ recourse was, therefore, to sue the petitioners for

and household helpers acting within the scope of their

VOL. 503, SEPTEMBER 26, 2006 181

The circumstance that no reservation to institute a

Puno (Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona

Notes.—The use of the opaque phrase “among others”

demands or rights of action in one action, the statement of

© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

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