PECIAL SECOND DIVISION

COMMISSION ON HUMAN G.R. No. 155336 A Motion for Reconsideration[3] was consequently filed by the
RIGHTS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION respondent to which petitioner filed an Opposition.[4]
(CHREA) Represented by its President, Present:
MARCIAL A. SANCHEZ, JR., In its Motion, respondent prays in the main that this Court
Petitioner, PUNO, reconsiders its ruling that respondent is not among the constitutional bodies
Chairman, clothed with fiscal autonomy.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CALLEJO, SR., To recall, the facts[5] of the case are as follows:
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. On 14 February 1998, Congress passed Republic
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, Act No. 8522, otherwise known as the General
Respondent. Promulgated: Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special
Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices
July 21, 2006 Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. The last portion of Article
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x XXXIII covers the appropriations of the CHR. These
special provisions state:

R E S O L U T I ON 1. Organizational Structure. Any

provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding and within the
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: limits of their respective
appropriations as authorized in this
On 25 November 2004, the Court promulgated its Decision[1] in the Act, the Constitutional
above-entitled case, ruling in favor of the petitioner. The dispositive portion Commissions and Offices enjoying
reads as follows: fiscal autonomy are authorized to
formulate and implement the
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the organizational structures of their
Decision dated 29 November 2001 of the Court of Appeals respective offices, to fix and
in CA-G.R. SP No. 59678 and its Resolution dated 11 determine the salaries, allowances,
September 2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET and other benefits of their
ASIDE. The ruling dated 29 March 1999 of the Civil personnel, and whenever public
Service Commission-National Capital Region is interest so requires, make
REINSTATED. The Commission on Human Rights adjustments in their personal
Resolution No. A98-047 dated 04 September 1998, services itemization including, but
Resolution No. A98-055 dated 19 October 1998 and not limited to, the transfer of item or
Resolution No. A98-062 dated 17 November 1998 without creation of new positions in their
the approval of the Department of Budget and Management respective offices: PROVIDED,
are disallowed. No pronouncement as to costs.[2] That officers and employees whose
 positions are affected by
such reorganization or adjustments
shall be granted retirement
gratuities and separation pay in
accordance with existing laws,
which shall be payable from any
unexpended balance of,
or savings in the appropriations of
their respective offices:
PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the
implementation hereof shall be in
accordance with salary rates,
allowances and other benefits
authorized under compensation
standardization laws.
2. Use of Savings. The Constitutional
Commissions and Offices enjoying
fiscal autonomy are hereby
authorized to use savings in their
respective appropriations for: (a)
printing and/or publication of
decisions, resolutions, and training
information materials; (b) repair,
maintenance and improvement of
central and regional offices,
facilities and equipment; (c)
purchase of books, journals,
periodicals and equipment; (d)
necessary expenses for the
employment of temporary,
contractual and casual employees;
(e) payment of extraordinary and
miscellaneous expenses,
commutable representation and
transportation allowances, and
fringe benefits for their officials and
employees as may be authorized by
law; and (f) other official purposes,
subject to accounting and auditing
rules and regulations. (Emphasis
supplied)
On the strength of this special provisions, the
Commission on Human Rights [or CHR], through its then
Chairperson Aurora P. Navarette-Recia and
Commissioners Nasser A. Marohomsalic, Mercedes V.
Contreras, Vicente P. Sibulo, and Jorge R. Coquia,
promulgated Resolution No. A98-047 on 04 September
1998, adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme
among selected positions in the Commission, to wit:
WHEREAS, the General Appropriations
Act, FY 1998, R.A. No. 8522 has
provided special provisions applicable to
all Constitutional Offices enjoying
Fiscal Autonomy, particularly on
organizational structures and authorizes
the same to formulate and implement the
organizational structures of their
respective offices to fix and determine
the salaries, allowances and other
benefits of their respective personnel and
whenever public interest so requires,
make adjustments in the personnel
services itemization including, but not
limited to, the transfer of item or creation
of new positions in their respective
offices: PROVIDED, That officers and
employees whose positions are affected
by such reorganization or adjustments
shall be granted retirement gratuities and
separation pay in accordance with
existing laws, which shall be payable
from any unexpanded balance of, or
savings in the appropriations of their
respective offices;
WHEREAS, the Commission on Human
Rights is a member of the Constitutional
 Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) and
on July 24, 1998, CFAG passed an
approved Joint Resolution No. 49
adopting internal rules implementing the
special provisions heretoforth
mentioned;
NOW THEREFORE, the Commission
by virtue of its fiscal autonomy hereby
approves and authorizes the upgrading
and augmentation of the commensurate
amount generated from savings under
Personal Services to support the
implementation of this resolution
effective Calendar Year 1998;
Let the Human Resources Development
Division (HRDD) prepare the necessary
Notice of Salary Adjustment and other
appropriate documents to implement this
resolution; x x x (Emphasis supplied).
Annexed to said resolution is the proposed
creation of ten additional plantilla positions, namely: one
Director IV position, with Salary Grade 28 for the Caraga
Regional Office, four Security Officer II with Salary Grade
15, and five Process Servers, with Salary Grade 5 under the
Office of the Commissioners.
On 19 October 1998, CHR issued Resolution No.
A98-055 providing for the upgrading or raising of salary
grade of the following positions in the Commission:
xxxx
To support the implementation of such scheme,
the CHR, in the same resolution, authorized the
augmentation of a commensurate amount generated from
savings under Personnel Services.
By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062 dated 17
November 1998, the CHR collapsed the vacant positions in
the body to provide additional source of funding for said
staffing modification. Among the positions collapsed
were: one Attorney III, four Attorney IV, one Chemist III,
three Special Investigator I, one Clerk III, and one
accounting Clerk II.
The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and
upgrading scheme to the Department of Budget and
Management [DBM] with a request for its approval, but the
DBM secretary Benjamin Diokno denied the request on the
following justification:
. . . Based on the evaluations made the request was
not favorably considered as it effectively involved the
elevation of the field units from divisions to services.
The present proposal seeks further to upgrade the
twelve (12) positions of Attorney VI, SG-26 to Director IV,
SG-28. This would elevate the field units to a bureau or
regional office, a level even higher than the one previously
denied.
The request to upgrade the three (3) positions of
Director III, SG-27 to Director IV, SG-28, in the Central
Office in effect would elevate the services to Office and
change the context from support to substantive without
actual change in functions.
In the absence of a specific provision of law which
may be used as a legal basis to elevate the level of divisions
to a bureau or regional office, and the services to offices,
we reiterate our previous stand denying the upgrading of
the twelve (12) positions of Attorney VI, SG-26 to Director
III, SG-27 or Director IV, SG-28, in the Field Operations
Office (FOO) and three (3) Director III, SG-27 to Director
IV, SG-28 in the Central Office.
 As represented, President Ramos then issued a
Memorandum to the DBM Secretary dated 10 December
1997, directing the latter to increase the number of Plantilla
positions in the CHR both Central and Regional Offices to
implement the Philippine Decade Plan on Human Rights
Education, the Philippine Human Rights Plan
and Barangay Rights Actions Center in accordance with
existing laws. (Emphasis in the original)
Pursuant to Section 78 of the General Provisions
of the General Appropriations Act (GAA) FY 1998, no
organizational unit or changes in key positions shall be
authorized unless provided by law or directed by the
President, thus, the creation of a Finance Management
Office and a Public Affairs Office cannot be given
favorable recommendation.
Moreover, as provided under Section 2 of RA No.
6758, otherwise known as the Compensation
Standardization Law, the Department of Budget and
Management is directed to establish and administer a
unified compensation and position classification system in
the government. The Supreme Court ruled in the case of
Victorina Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119155,
dated January 30, 1996, that this Department has the sole
power and discretion to administer the compensation and
position classification system of the National Government.
Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group
does not vest the agency with the authority to reclassify,
upgrade, and create positions without approval of the
DBM. While the members of the Group are authorized to
formulate and implement the organizational structures of
their respective offices and determine the compensation of
their personnel, such authority is not absolute and must be
exercised within the parameters of the Unified Position
Classification and Compensation System established under
RA 6758 more popularly known as the Compensation
Standardization Law. We therefore reiterate our previous
stand on the matter. (Emphasis supplied)
In light of the DBMs disapproval of the proposed
personnel modification scheme, the CSC-National Capital
Region Office, through a memorandum dated 29 March
1999 recommended to the CSC-Central Office that the
subject appointments be rejected owing to the DBMs
disapproval of the plantilla reclassification.
Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner Commission on
Human Rights Employees Association [CHREA], in
representation of the rank and file employees of the CHR,
requested the CSC-Central office to affirm the
recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office. CHREA
stood its ground in saying that the DBM is the only agency
with appropriate authority mandated by law to evaluate and
approve matters of reclassification and upgrading, as well
as creation of positions.
The CSC-Central Office denied CHREAs request
in a Resolution dated 16 December 1999, and reversed the
recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office that the
upgrading scheme be censured. The decretal portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the request of Ronnie N.
Rosero, Hubert V. Ruiz, Flordeliza A.
Briones, George Q. Dumlao [and],
Corazon A. Santos-Tiu, is hereby
denied.
CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CSC-
Central Office denied the same on 09 June 2000.
Given the cacophony of judgments between the DBM and
the CSC, petitioner CHREA elevated the matter to the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office and upheld the
validity of the upgrading, retitling, and reclassification
scheme in the CHR on the justification that such action is
 within the ambit of CHRs fiscal autonomy.The fallo of the
Court of Appeals decision provides:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, the instant petition is
ordered DISMISSED and the questioned
Civil Service Commission Resolution
No. 99-2800 dated December 16,
1999 as well as No. 001354 dated June
9, 2000, are hereby AFFIRMED. No
cost.
Unfazed, the petitioner elevated its case to this Court and
successfully obtained the favorable action in its Decision dated 25 November
2004. In its Motion for Reconsideration of the said Decision, the respondent
defined the assignment of errors[6] for resolution, namely:
I. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE SECOND
DIVISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT GRAVELY AND SERIOUSLY ERRED
WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE IS NO LEGAL
BASIS TO SUPPORT THE CONTENTION THAT
THE CHR ENJOYS FISCAL AUTONOMY.
II. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE SECOND
DIVISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT ERRED IN STATING THAT THE
SPECIAL PROVISION OF THE REP. ACT. (SIC)
NO. 8522 DID NOT SPECIFICALLY MENTION
CHR AS AMONG THOSE OFFICES TO WHICH
THE SPECIAL PROVISION TO FORMULATE
AND IMPLEMENT ORGANIZATIONAL
STRUCTURES APPLY, BUT MERELY STATES
ITS COVERAGE TO INCLUDE
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS AND
OFFICES ENJOYING FISCAL AUTONOMY;
III. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE SECOND
DIVISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
CHR ALTHOUGH ADMITTEDLY A
CONSTITUTIONAL CREATION IS
NONETHELESS NOT INCLUDED IN THE GENUS
OF THE OFFICES ACCORDED FISCAL
AUTONOMY BY CONSTITUTIONAL OR
LEGISLATIVE FIAT.
IV. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE SECOND
DIVISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT ERRED IN DECIDING TO REINSTATE
THE RULING DATED 29 MARCH 1999 OF THE
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION NATIONAL
CAPITAL REGION;
V. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE SECOND
DIVISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT ERRED IN DECIDING TO DISALLOW
THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
RESOLUTION NO. A98-047 DATED SEPTEMBER
04, 1998, RESOLUTION NO. A98-055 DATED 19
OCTOBER 1998 AND RESOLUTION NO. A98-062
DATED 17 NOVEMBER 1998 WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT.
Although this Court may have been persuaded to take a second look
at this case and partly modify the assailed Decision, such modification shall
not materially affect the dispositive portion thereof.
As already settled in the assailed Decision of this Court, the creation
of respondent may be constitutionally mandated, but it is not, in the strict
sense, a constitutional commission. Article IX of the 1987 Constitution,
plainly entitled Constitutional Commissions, identifies only the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on
Audit. The mandate for the creation of the respondent is found in Section 17
of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution on Human Rights, which reads that
 Sec. 17. (1) There is hereby created an
independent office called the Commission on Human
Rights.
Thus, the respondent cannot invoke provisions under Article IX of the 1987
Constitution on constitutional commissions for its benefit. It must be able to
present constitutional and/or statutory basis particularly pertaining to it to
support its claim of fiscal autonomy.
The 1987 Constitution expressly and unambiguously grants fiscal
autonomy only to the Judiciary, the constitutional commissions, and the
Office of the Ombudsman.
The 1987 Constitution recognizes the fiscal autonomy of the
Judiciary in Article VIII, Section 3, reproduced below
Sec. 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal
autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be
reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated
for the previous year and, after approval, shall be
automatically and regularly released.
Constitutional commissions are granted fiscal autonomy by the 1987
Constitution in Article IX, Part A, Section 5, a provision applied in common
to all constitutional commissions, to wit
Sec. 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal
autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations shall be
automatically and regularly released.
The Office of the Ombudsman enjoys fiscal autonomy by virtue of Article
XI, Section 14, of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that
Sec. 14. The Office of the Ombudsman shall
enjoy fiscal autonomy. Its approved annual appropriations
shall be automatically and regularly released.
Each of the afore-quoted provisions consists of two sentences stating that: (1)
The government entity shall enjoy fiscal autonomy; and (2) its approved
annual appropriation shall be automatically and regularly released. The
respondent anchors its claim to fiscal autonomy on the fourth paragraph of
Article XIII, Section 17, according to which
Sec. 17. x x x
xxxx
(4) The approved annual appropriations of the
Commission shall be automatically and regularly released.
As compared to the previously quoted Article VIII, Section 3; Article IX, Part
A, Section 5; and Article XI, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution on the
Judiciary, the constitutional commissions, and the Office of the Ombudsman,
respectively, Article XIII, Section 17(4) on the Commission of Human Rights
(CHR) evidently does not contain the first sentence on the express grant of
fiscal autonomy, and reproduces only the second sentence on the automatic
and regular release of its approved annual appropriations.Question now arises
as to the significance of such a difference in the way the said provisions are
worded.
To settle this ambiguity, a perusal of the records of the Constitutional
Commission (ConCom) is enlightening.
During the drafting of Article XIII, Section 17(4), of the 1987
Constitution, the ConCom members had the following discussion[7]
MR. BENGZON. I have another paragraph,
Madam President. This could be a separate section or
another paragraph depending on what the committee
desires and what the Committee on Style would wish: THE
COMMISSION SHALL ENJOY FISCAL
AUTONOMY. THE APPROVED ANNUAL
APPROPRIATIONS OF THE COMMISSION SHALL
BE AUTOMATICALLY AND REGULARLY
RELEASED. It will align this Human Rights Commission
with other commissions that we have created in the
Constitution in order to further insure the independence of
the Human Rights Commission.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is
recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. I introduced that particular
amendment yesterday, but there was a proposed
modification presented by Commissioner Maambong to
delete the first sentence. I am in favor of the modification
presented earlier. So, may I propose that the particular
amendment should not carry the first sentence, only the
second sentence which reads: THE APPROVED
ANNUAL APPROPRIATIONS OF THE COMMISSION
SHALL BE AUTOMATICALLY AND REGULARLY
RELEASED.
MR. BENGZON. Why do we want to delete the
sentence which says THE COMMISSION SHALL
ENJOY FISCAL AUTONOMY?
MR. DAVIDE. That would be a surplusage
because the autonomy actually intended is the automatic
release of these appropriations.
MR. BENGZON. If that is the case, then maybe
we should also delete such sentence in the other articles
that we have approved. I will just leave it up to the
Committee on Style, as long as it is in the record that that
is the sense of the Commission, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. What does the committee say
on this point?
MR. SARMIENTO. Accepted, Madam
President. We leave it to the Committee on Style, so long
as the intent is there.
MR. BENGZON. In other words, what we are
really saying is that if the Committee on Style feels that it
would be more elegant and it is a surplusage to include the
first sentence, then so be it as long as it is recorded in the
Journal that it is the sense of the Commission that the
Human Rights Commission will enjoy fiscal autonomy.
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President.
MR. MONSOD. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is
recognized.
MR. GUINGONA. May I respectfully invite the
attention of the honorable Commissioners that there are
two committees that are tasked with the same work and,
therefore, reference can be made not only to the Committee
on Style but also to the Sponsorship Committee.
Thank you, Madam President.
MR. MONSOD. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Monsod is
recognized.
MR. MONSOD. Maybe we should just say that
the minimum condition that the committee agrees to is:
THE APPROVED ANNUAL APPROPRIATIONS OF
THE COMMISSION SHALL BE AUTOMATICALLY
AND REGULARLY RELEASED. That is a minimum
condition and we just allow the committees to add the first
sentence if they wish. But with the second sentence, the
sense is already there.
MR. BENGZON. No problem, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. This was taken up yesterday.
 MR. BENGZON. But it was deferred, I
understand, Madam President. So if we approve this now,
then it will be firmly included.
THE PRESIDENT. So, will the Commissioner
please read it now as it is?
MR. BENGZON. I will read the amendment as
accepted. THE APPROVED ANNUAL
APPROPRIATIONS OF THE COMMISSION SHALL
BE AUTOMATICALLY AND REGULARLY
RELEASED.
THE PRESIDENT. Is there any objection to this
proposed amendment which has been accepted by the
committee?
MR. PADILLA. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Padilla is
recognized.
MR. PADILLA. The wording reminds me of the
provisions under the judiciary and the constitutional
commissions. Is the intention to elevate the position of this
proposed commission which is only investigative and
recommendatory to the high dignity of a constitutional
commission, as well as the independence of the judiciary,
by making a positive statement in the Constitution that its
appropriation shall be released automatically and so
forth? It seems that we are complicating and also
reiterating several provisions that would make our
Constitution not only too long but too complicated. I
wonder if that is the purpose because even other bodies
with semi-judicial functions do not enjoy such kind of
constitutional guarantee. It is just an inquiry.
MR. BENGZON. It is not so much the fact that
we want to elevate this into a constitutional commission as
it is more of an insurance that the independence of the
Human Rights Commission, even though it is not
considered as a constitutional commission as contemplated
and as compared to the Civil Service Commission, the
COMELEC and COA, is maintained. And this is as elegant
as the other sentences. So, we submit the same to the body.
MR. SARMIENTO. The proposed amendment
has been accepted by the committee, but we have this
objection from Commissioner Padilla. So, may we throw
the issue to the body?
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, just for
clarification. Does the amendment of the honorable
Commissioner Bengzon refer only to the release? I was
thinking that although I am very, very strongly in favor of
this commission and would give it one of the top priorities,
there are other top priorities that we may want to address
ourselves to. For example, in the Committee on Human
Resources, we would like to give top priority to education;
therefore, if this does not refer only to an automatic and
regular release but would refer to the matter of priorities in
the preparation of the budget, then I am afraid that we
might already be curtailing too much the discretion on the
part of both the legislature and the executive to determine
the priorities that should be given at a given time.
MR. BENGZON. Madam President, the
sentence means what it says and it is clear.
THE PRESIDENT. Will the Commissioner
please read.
MR. BENGZON. It only refers to the release
which should be automatic and regular.
THE PRESIDENT. Please state it again so that
we will be clarified before we take a vote.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank you, Madam President.
 MR. BENGZON. It will read: THE APPROVED
ANNUAL APPROPRIATIONS OF THE COMMISSION
SHALL BE AUTOMATICALLY AND REGULARLY
RELEASED.
VOTING
THE PRESIDENT. As many as are in favor of this
particular section, please raise their hand. (Several
Members raised their hand.)
As many as are against, please raise their hand. (Few
Members raised their hand.)
As many as are abstaining, please raise their hand. (Two
Members raised their hand.)
The results show 26 votes in favor, 4 against and 2
abstentions; the amendment is approved. (Emphases
supplied.)
The respondent relies on the statement of then Constitutional
Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr. that the first sentence on the express
grant of fiscal autonomy to the respondent was deleted from Article XIII,
Section 17(4) of the 1987 Constitution because it was a
surplusage. Respondent posits that the second sentence, directing the
automatic and regular release of its approved annual appropriations, has the
same essence as the express grant of fiscal autonomy, thus rendering the first
sentence redundant and unnecessary.
This Court, however, believes otherwise. The statement of then
Constitutional Commissioner Davide should be read in full. Referring to the
deletion of the first sentence on the express grant of fiscal autonomy, he
explained that the first sentence would be a surplusage because the
autonomy actually intended is the automatic release of these
appropriations.[8] (Emphasis supplied.)
Even in the latter discussion between Constitutional Commissioners
Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. and Serafin V.C. Guingona, wherein Constitutional
Commissioner Guingona asked for clarification whether respondent shall
also be extended priorities in the preparation of the national budget,
Constitutional Commissioner Bengzon replied that x x x the sentence means
what it says and it is clear,[9] and that [i]t only refers to the release which
should be automatic and regular.[10]
Therefore, after reviewing the deliberations of the ConCom on
Article XIII, Section 17(4), of the 1987 Constitution, in its entirety, not just
bits and pieces thereof, this Court is convinced that the ConCom had intended
to grant to the respondent the privilege of having its approved annual
appropriations automatically and regularly released, but nothing more. While
it may be conceded that the automatic and regular release of approved annual
appropriations is an aspect of fiscal autonomy, it is just one of many others.
This Court has already defined the scope and extent of fiscal
autonomy in the case of Bengzon v. Drilon,[11] as follows
As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal
autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission
on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman
contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and
utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that
their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority
to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation
not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for
compensation and pay plans of the government and
allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law
or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their
functions.
Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside
control. x x x
The foregoing excerpt sufficiently elucidates that the grant of fiscal autonomy
is more extensive than the mere automatic and regular release of approved
annual appropriations of the government entity. It is also worth stressing
herein that in Bengzon v. Drilon, this Court, ruling En Banc, only recognized
the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary; the constitutional commissions, namely,
the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, and the
Commission on Elections; and the Office of the Ombudsman. Respondent is
conspicuously left out of the enumeration.
Moreover, the ConCom had the following deliberations[12] on the meaning of
the fiscal autonomy extended to the constitutional commissions in what is to
become later Article IX, Part A, Section 5, of the 1987 Constitution
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
Treas). Commissioner de Castro is recognized.
MR. DE CASTRO: Thank you.
This morning, I asked the proponent of this
resolution what is included in the term fiscal
autonomy. The answer I got is that it is for the automatic
release of the budget. I propose that the sentence The
Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy be deleted but
the second sentence shall remain. The reason is that it is
already redundant. Fiscal autonomy means the automatic
release of appropriations.
MR. MONSOD. Mr. Presiding Officer, may we
answer the honorable Commissioner.
I think the answer of the Chairman of our
Committee this morning was that it would involve the
automatic and regular release of the funds once
approved. In addition, we are suggesting that fiscal
autonomy include the nonimposition of any other
procedures, for example, a preaudit system in the
commissions or bodies that enjoy fiscal autonomy. So,
actually, the definition of fiscal autonomy would be a bit
broader than just the automatic release.
MR. DE CASTRO. Does the Commissioner mean
that these commissions will not be subjected to preaudit?
MR. MONSOD. Our proposal actually in the
provisions on the Commission on Audit is that they be
subjected to comprehensive postaudit procedures and
where their internal control system is inadequate, in the
opinion of the Commission on Audit, then the commission
may also take such measures as are necessary to correct the
inadequacies which might include special preaudit
systems.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas). The
Chair understands, therefore, that the proposed amendment
of Commissioner de Castro is not acceptable to the
Committee?
MR. DE CASTRO. Not yet, Mr. Presiding
Officer, because we are still on the answer to me this
morning, which stated the record will bear me out that
fiscal autonomy means the automatic release of
appropriations. It means the automatic release and nothing
more. We were in the same Committee and when we asked
the COA about this, they insisted that there must be
preaudit. If fiscal autonomy means that there will be no
preaudit, I do not know what will happen to this.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas). So,
what is the stand of the Committee insofar as the proposed
amendment of Commissioner de Castro is concerned?
MR. DE CASTRO. May I just say one sentence,
Mr. Presiding Officer? If the Committees stand is that
fiscal autonomy means the automatic release of the
appropriations, then I say that the first sentence The
Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy -- should be
deleted because it is a repetition of the second sentence.
Thank you.
MR. MONSOD. Mr. Presiding Officer, the
position of the Committee is that fiscal autonomy may
include other things than just the automatic and regular
release of the funds.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas). With
that explanation, what is the pleasure of Commissioner de
Castro? Does he insist on his amendment?

MR. DE CASTRO. Is the Chairman changing his
answer from this mornings question? If he does, I will ask
some more questions about fiscal autonomy.
MR. MONSOD. Mr. Presiding Officer, I think at
the beginning of this exchange, we already told the
honorable Commissioner that the Chairman of the
Committee had not meant to make it an all-inclusive
definition. And if he was misled into thinking of another
meaning, we apologize for it. But our position is that fiscal
autonomy would include other rights than just merely
automatic and regular disbursement.
MR. DE CASTRO. Does it include exception
from preaudit?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, it would include the
imposition of certain preaudit requirements for release,
because if the preaudit requirements are inserted into the
process of release, it would defeat the objective of
automatic and regular release.
Based on the preceding exchange, it can be derived that the first sentence of
Article IX, Part A, Section 5, of the 1987 Constitution, expressly granting
fiscal autonomy to constitutional commissions, does not have the same
meaning as the second sentence, directing the automatic and regular release
of their approved annual appropriations, hence, the resistance of
Constitutional Commissioner Christian S. Monsod to the suggested
amendment of Constitutional Commissioner Crispino M. De Castro to just
delete the first sentence.
In addition, the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG), to which
respondent avers membership, defined the term fiscal autonomy in its Joint
Resolution No. 49, dated 24 July 1998, as follows
IV. Definition of Terms:
1. Fiscal Autonomy shall mean independence or
freedom regarding financial matters from outside
control and is characterized by self direction or
self determination. It does not mean mere
automatic and regular release of approved
appropriations to agencies vested with such
power in a very real sense, the fiscal autonomy
contemplated in the constitution is enjoyed even
before and, with more reasons, after the release of
the appropriations. Fiscal autonomy
encompasses, among others, budget preparation
and implementation, flexibility in fund utilization
of approved appropriations, use of savings and
disposition of receipts. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
While the assailed Decision and the present Resolution may render
the status of respondents membership in CFAG uncertain, the then
Chairperson of respondent, Aurora P. Navarrete-Recina, duly signed CFAG
Joint Resolution No. 49, and respondent should be held bound by the
definition of fiscal autonomy therein. CFAG Joint Resolution No. 49
categorically declares that fiscal autonomy means more than just the
automatic and regular release of approved appropriation, and also
encompasses, among other things: (1) budget preparation and
implementation; (2) flexibility in fund utilization of approved appropriations;
and (3) use of savings and disposition of receipts. Having agreed to such a
definition of fiscal autonomy, respondent has done a complete turn-about
herein and is now contradicting itself by arguing that the automatic and
regular release of its approved annual appropriations is already tantamount to
fiscal autonomy.
Consequently, this Court concludes that the 1987 Constitution extends to
respondent a certain degree of fiscal autonomy through the privilege of
having its approved annual appropriations released automatically and
regularly. However, it withholds from respondent fiscal autonomy, in its
broad or extensive sense, as granted to the Judiciary, constitutional
commissions, and the Office of the Ombudsman. Operative herein is the rule
of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, wherein the
express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion
of all others.[13] The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature (or in
this case, the ConCom) would not have made specific enumerations in a
statute (or the Constitution) had the intention not been to restrict its meaning
and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.[14]
The provisions of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, on the fiscal autonomy of constitutional
commissions, the Office of the Ombudsman, and the respondent, merely
follow the phraseology used in the corresponding provisions of the 1987
Constitution, thus
Book II, Chapter 5, Section 26. Fiscal
Autonomy. The Constitutional Commissions shall enjoy
fiscal autonomy. The approved annual appropriations shall
be automatically and regularly released.
Book V, Title II, Subtitle B, Section 4. Fiscal
Autonomy. The Office of the Ombudsman shall enjoy
fiscal autonomy. Its approved annual appropriations shall
be automatically and regularly released.
Book V, Title II, Subtitle A, Section 6. Annual
Appropriations. The approved annual appropriations of the
Commission on Human Rights shall be automatically and
regularly released.
While the Administrative Code of 1987 has no reference to the fiscal
autonomy of the Judiciary, it does have provisions on the fiscal autonomy of
the constitutional commissions and the Office of the Ombudsman. It is very
interesting to note that while Book II, Chapter 5, Section 26 (on constitutional
commissions) and Book V, Title 2, Subtitle B, Section 4 (on the Office of the
Ombudsman) of the Code are entitled Fiscal Autonomy, Book V, Title 2,
Subtitle A, Section 6 (on respondent) bears the title Annual
Appropriations.Further, the provisions on the constitutional commissions and
the Office of the Ombudsman in the Administrative Code of 1987, just like
in the 1987 Constitution, are composed of two sentences: (1) The government
entity shall enjoy fiscal autonomy; and (2) Its approved annual appropriation
shall be automatically and regularly released. The provision on respondent in
the same Code is limited only to the second sentence.
Respondent asserts that it is granted fiscal autonomy by Book VI, Chapter 1,
Section 1, paragraph 9, of the Administrative Code of 1987, which reads
SEC. 1. Constitutional Policies on the Budget.
xxxx
(9) Fiscal autonomy shall be enjoyed by the
Judiciary, Constitutional Commissions, Office of the
Ombudsman, Local Government and Commission on
Human Rights.
As its title suggests, the afore-cited provision is supposed to merely re-state
the policies on budget as declared by the 1987 Constitution and, therefore,
cannot grant or extend to the respondent a privilege not found in the 1987
Constitution. Book VI of the Administrative Code of 1987, under which the
said provision is found, pertains to National Government
Budgeting. Respondent may have been included in the enumeration of
fiscally autonomous government entities because it does enjoy an aspect of
fiscal autonomy, that of the automatic and regular release of its approved
annual appropriations from the national budget. The general declaration of
fiscal autonomy of the respondent in Section 1, paragraph 9, of Book V of
the Administrative Code of 1987 on National Government Budgeting, must
be qualified and limited by Section 6 of Book V, Title II, Subtitle A of the
same Code specifically pertaining to respondent. It should be borne in mind
that the general rule is that a word, phrase or provision should not be
construed in isolation, but must be interpreted in relation to other provisions
of the law.[15]
To reiterate, under the Constitution, as well as the Administrative
Code of 1987, respondent enjoys fiscal autonomy only to the extent that its
approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released,
but nothing more.
On the main issue of whether or not the approval by the Department
of Budget and Management (DBM) is a condition precedent to the enactment
of an upgrading, reclassification, creation and collapsing of plantilla positions
in the CHR, this Court staunchly holds that as prescinding from the legal and
jurisprudential yardsticks discussed in length in the assailed Decision, the
imprimatur of the DBM must first be sought prior to implementation of any
reclassification or upgrading of positions in government.
Regardless of whether or not respondent enjoys fiscal autonomy,
this Court shares the stance of the DBM that the grant of fiscal autonomy
notwithstanding, all government offices must, all the same, kowtow to the
Salary Standardization Law. This Court is of the same mind with the
DBM[16] on its standpoint, thus
Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group
does not vest the agency with the authority to reclassify,
upgrade, and create positions without approval of the
DBM. While the members of the Group are authorized to
formulate and implement the organizational structures of
their respective offices and determine the compensation of
their personnel, such authority is not absolute and must be
exercised within the parameters of the Unified Position
Classification and Compensation System established under
RA 6758 more popularly known as the Compensation
Standardization Law. x x x (Emphasis supplied).
To drive home this point, in the special provision covering the
Judiciary as quoted above, the Judiciary was not vested with the power to
formulate and implement organizational structures beyond the salary rates,
allowances and other benefits under the compensation standardization
laws. Stated differently, although the Judiciary is allowed to reorganize, any
such reorganization must, nevertheless, be in strict adherence to the Salary
Standardization Law. Ergo, any reorganization therein must be with the
conformity of the DBM inasmuch as it is the government arm tasked by law
to implement the Salary Standardization Law.
In Republic Act No. 9227, or An Act Granting Additional
Compensation in the Form of Special Allowances for Justices, Judges and
All Other Positions in the Judiciary with the Equivalent Rank of Justices of
the Court of Appeals and Judges of the Regional Trial Court, and for Other
Purposes, the grant of Special Allowances to members of the Judiciary did
not operate to exempt members thereof from the Salary Standardization
Law. In Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9227, the Supreme Court and the
DBM were specifically tasked to issue the necessary guidelines for the proper
implementation of this Act in respect to funds coming from the National
Treasury.[17] Resultantly, the Supreme Court and the DBM issued Joint
Circular No. 2004-1 on 13 January 2004 which provided guidelines on the
funding source for the grant of this special allowance. Thus, although
Administrative Order No. 137, issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
on 27 December 2005, extended to the Chairman and Commissioners or
Members of the CHR the same benefits and privileges enjoyed by members
of constitutional commissions and the Judiciary in the matter of rationalized
rate of allowances and liberalized computation of retirement benefits and
accumulated leave credits, it still does not exempt respondent from the Salary
Standardization Law.
If the Judiciary, a co-equal branch of government, which was
expressly granted by the Constitution with fiscal autonomy, is required to
conform to the Salary Standardization Law and is subject to the scrutiny of
the DBM, sagaciously, the respondent cannot be deemed to enjoy a better
position than the Judiciary. The respondent must, likewise, toe the line.
This Court shall no longer belabor the point it has already delved
upon in length in its Decision that Congress has delegated to the DBM the
power to administer the Salary Standardization Law, which power is part of
the system of checks and balances or system of restraints in the Philippine
government. This Court, thus, reiterates the point that the DBMs exercise of
such authority is not in itself an arrogation inasmuch as it is pursuant to the
1987 Constitution, the paramount law of the land; the Salary Standardization
Law; and the Administrative Code of 1987.
In line with its role to breathe life into the policy behind the Salary
Standardization Law of providing equal pay for substantially equal work and
to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and
responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions, the DBM, in
the case under review, made a determination, after a thorough evaluation, that
the reclassification and upgrading scheme proposed by the respondent lacks
legal rationalization.
The DBM expounded that Section 78 of the General Provisions of
the General Appropriations Act (GAA), FY 1998, which the respondent
heavily relies upon to justify its reclassification scheme, explicitly provides
that no organizational unit or changes in key positions shall be authorized
unless provided by law or directed by the President. Here, the DBM
discerned that there is no law authorizing the creation of a Finance
Management Office and a Public Affairs Office in the CHR. Anent
respondents proposal to upgrade twelve (12) positions of Attorney VI, SG-
28 to Director IV, SG-28, and three (3) positions of Director III, SG-27 to
Director IV, SG-28, in its Central Office, the DBM denied the same as this
would change the context from support to substantive without actual change
in functions.
This view of the DBM, as the laws designated body
to implement and administer a unified compensation system, is beyond
cavil. The interpretation of an administrative government agency, which is
tasked to implement a statute, is accorded great respect and ordinarily
controls the construction of the courts. In Energy Regulatory Board v. Court
of Appeals,[18] the Court echoed the basic rule that the courts will not interfere
in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government
agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special
technical knowledge and training of such agencies.
To be sure, considering his expertise on matters affecting the nations
coffers, the Secretary of the DBM, as the Presidents alter ego, knows from
where he speaks inasmuch as he has the front seat view of the adverse effects
of an unwarranted upgrading or creation of positions in the CHR in particular
and in the entire government in general.
As the final thrust, given this Courts previous pronouncement in the
present Resolution that the fiscal autonomy granted to the respondent by the
1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code of 1987 shall be limited only
to the automatic and regular release of its approved annual appropriations,
respondent is precluded from invoking the Special Provisions Applicable to
All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy in the 1998 GAA. The
said Special Provisions read
Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices
Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy
1. Organization Structure. Any provision of law
to the contrary notwithstanding and within the limits of
their respective appropriations as authorized in this Act, the
Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal
autonomy are authorized to formulate and implement the
organizational structures of their respective offices, to fix
and determine the salaries, allowances, and other benefits
of their personnel, and whenever public interest so
requires, make adjustments in the personal services
itemization including, but not limited to, the transfer of
item or creation of new positions in their respective offices:
PROVIDED, That the officers and employees whose
positions are affected by such reorganization or
adjustments shall be granted retirement gratuities and
separation pay in accordance with existing laws, which
shall be payable from any unexpended balance of, or
savings in the appropriations of their respective offices:
PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the implementation hereof
shall be in accordance with salary rates, allowances and
other benefits authorized under compensation
standardization laws.
2. Use of Savings. The Constitutional
Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy are
hereby authorized to use savings in their respective
appropriations for; (a) printing and/or publication of
decisions, resolutions, and training information materials;
(b) repair, maintenance and improvement of central and
regional offices, facilities and equipment; (c) purchase of
books, journals, periodicals and equipment; (d) necessary
expenses for the employment or temporary, contractual and
casual employees; (e) payment of extraordinary and
miscellaneous expenses, commutable representation and
transportation allowances, and fringe benefits for their
officials and employees as may be authorized by law; and
(f) other official purposes, subject to accounting and
auditing rules and regulations.
It is unequivocal that the afore-quoted Special Provisions of the 1998 GAA
refer to the broad and extensive concept of fiscal autonomy. They already go
beyond ensuring the automatic and regular release of the approved annual
appropriations, but already enumerate the ways by which the named
government entities can use their appropriations to effect changes in their
organizational structure and their savings for certain official purposes. Even
assuming arguendo that the said Special Provisions are applicable to
respondent, it should be noted that the last sentence in paragraph 1 qualifies
the power of a fiscally autonomous government entity to formulate and
implement changes in its organizational structure so that, x x x the
implementation hereof shall be in accordance with salary rates, allowances
and other benefits authorized under compensation standardization laws. And,
as exhaustively expounded in the assailed Decision and the herein Respondents.
Resolution, only the DBM has the authority and the technical expertise to
determine compliance by respondent to the provisions of the Salary x ------------------------------------------------- x
Standardization Law.
JESS DEL PRADO, WILSON
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration FORTALEZA, LEODY DE GUZMAN,
is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision of this Court dated 25 PEDRO PINLAC, CARMELITA
November 2004 is hereby MODIFIED, declaring the respondent CHR as a MORANTE, RASTI DELIZO, PAUL
constitutional body enjoying limited fiscal autonomy, in the sense that it is BANGAY, MARIE JO OCAMPO,
entitled to the automatic and regular release of its approved annual LILIA DELA CRUZ, CRISTETA
appropriations; nonetheless, it is still required to conform to the Salary RAMOS, ADELAIDA RAMOS,
Standardization Law. Accordingly, its entire reclassification scheme remains MARY GRACE GONZALES, MICHAEL
subject to the approval of the DBM. No pronouncement as to costs. TORRES, RENDO SABUSAP,
PRECIOUS BALUTE, ROXANNE
SO ORDERED. MAGBOO, ERNIE BAUTISTA,
JOSEPH DE JESUS, MARGARITA
ESCOBER, DJOANNALYN JANIER,
MAGDALENA SELLOTE, MANNY
EN BANC QUIAZON, ERICSON DIZON,
NENITA CRUZAT, LEONARDO
BAYAN, KARAPATAN, DE LOS REYES, PEDRITO
KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID FADRIGON,
NG PILIPINAS (KMP), Petitioners,
GABRIELA, Fr. Jose Dizon,
Renato Constantino, Jr., Froyel
Yaneza, and Fahima Tajar, - versus - G.R. No. 169848
Petitioners,

- versus - G.R. No. 169838 EDUARDO ERMITA, in his Present:

official capacity as The Executive
Secretary and in his personal PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity, ANGELO REYES, in his PUNO,*
capacity as Executive Secretary, official capacity as Secretary of QUISUMBING,
Manila City Mayor LITO the Interior and Local Governments, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
ATIENZA, Chief of the Philippine ARTURO LOMIBAO, in his SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
National Police, Gen. ARTURO official capacity as the Chief, CARPIO,
M. LOMIBAO, NCRPO Chief Philippine National Police, VIDAL AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
Maj. Gen. VIDAL QUEROL, QUEROL, in his official capacity CORONA,
and Western Police District Chief as the Chief, National Capital CARPIO MORALES,
Gen. PEDRO BULAONG, Regional Police Office (NCRPO), CALLEJO, SR.,
PEDRO BULAONG, in his official AZCUNA, Petitioners come in three groups.
capacity as the Chief, Manila TINGA,
Police District (MPD) AND ALL CHICO-NAZARIO,**
OTHER PUBLIC OFFICERS GARCIA, and The first petitioners, Bayan, et al., in G.R. No. 169838,[1] allege that they are
AND PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS VELASCO, JJ. citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights as organizations
ACTING UNDER THEIR CONTROL, and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on October
SUPERVISION AND INSTRUCTIONS, Promulgated: 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa
Respondents. (B.P.) No. 880.
April 25, 2006
x -------------------------------------------------- x The second group consists of 26 individual petitioners, Jess del Prado, et al.,
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, represented in G.R. No. 169848,[2] who allege that they were injured, arrested and
by its Chairperson ELMER C. LABOG detained when a peaceful mass action they held on September 26, 2005 was
and Secretary General JOEL preempted and violently dispersed by the police. They further assert that
MAGLUNSOD, NATIONAL on October 5, 2005, a group they participated in marched to Malacaang to
FEDERATION OF LABOR protest issuances of the Palace which, they claim, put the country under an
UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO G.R. No. 169881 undeclared martial rule, and the protest was likewise dispersed violently and
(NAFLU-KMU), represented by its many among them were arrested and suffered injuries.
National President, JOSELITO V.
USTAREZ, ANTONIO C. PASCUAL, The third group, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al., petitioners in G.R. No.
SALVADOR T. CARRANZA, GILDA 169881,[3] allege that they conduct peaceful mass actions and that their rights
SUMILANG, FRANCISCO as organizations and those of their individual members as citizens,
LASTRELLA, and ROQUE M. TAN, specifically the right to peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa
Petitioners, No. 880 and the policy of Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR) being
- versus - followed to implement it.

THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE KMU, et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU co-sponsored was
SECRETARY, PNP DIRECTOR to be conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them along C.M.
GENRAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to
HONORABLE MAYOR LITO several of their members. They further allege that on October 6, 2005, a
ATIENZA, and PNP MPD CHIEF multi-sectoral rally which KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed
SUPT. PEDRO BULAONG, along Espaa Avenue in front of the University of Santo Tomas and going
Respondents. towards Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta
Street and prevented them from proceeding further. They were then forcibly
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x dispersed, causing injuries on one of them.[4] Three other rallyists were
arrested.
DECISION
All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them in toto and
AZCUNA, J.: others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of
CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the no permit, no
rally policy and the CPR policy recently announced.

B.P. No. 880, The Public Assembly Act of 1985, provides:
Batas Pambansa Blg. 880
AN ACT ENSURING THE FREE EXERCISE BY THE
PEOPLE OF THEIR RIGHT PEACEABLY TO
ASSEMBLE AND PETITION THE
GOVERNMENT [AND] FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Batasang Pambansa in session
assembled:
SECTION 1. Title. This Act shall be known as The Public
Assembly Act of 1985.
SEC. 2. Declaration of policy. The constitutional right of
the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances is essential and vital
to the strength and stability of the State. To this end, the
State shall ensure the free exercise of such right without
prejudice to the rights of others to life, liberty and equal
protection of the law.
SEC. 3. Definition of terms. For purposes of this Act:
(a) Public assembly means any rally,
demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other
form of mass or concerted action held in a public place for
the purpose of presenting a lawful cause; or expressing an
opinion to the general public on any particular issue; or
protesting or influencing any state of affairs whether
political, economic or social; or petitioning the government
for redress of grievances.
The processions, rallies, parades, demonstrations, public
meetings and assemblages for religious purposes shall be
governed by local ordinances; Provided, however, That the
declaration of policy as provided in Section 2 of this Act
shall be faithfully observed.
The definition herein contained shall not include picketing
and other concerted action in strike areas by workers and
employees resulting from a labor dispute as defined by the
Labor Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and by
the Batas Pambansa Bilang 227.
(b) Public place shall include any highway, boulevard,
avenue, road, street, bridge or other thoroughfare, park,
plaza, square, and/or any open space of public ownership
where the people are allowed access.
(c) Maximum tolerance means the highest degree of
restraint that the military, police and other peace keeping
authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the
dispersal of the same.
(d) Modification of a permit shall include the change of the
place and time of the public assembly, rerouting of the
parade or street march, the volume of loud-speakers or
sound system and similar changes.
SEC. 4. Permit when required and when not required. A
written permit shall be required for any person or persons
to organize and hold a public assembly in a public
place. However, no permit shall be required if the public
assembly shall be done or made in a freedom park duly
established by law or ordinance or in private property, in
which case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled
to its legal possession is required, or in the campus of a
government-owned and operated educational institution
which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said
educational institution. Political meetings or rallies held
during any election campaign period as provided for by law
are not covered by this Act.
SEC. 5. Application requirements. All applications for a
permit shall comply with the following guidelines:
 (a) The applications shall be in writing
and shall include the names of the leaders or organizers;
the purpose of such public assembly; the date, time and
duration thereof, and place or streets to be used for the
intended activity; and the probable number of persons
participating, the transport and the public address systems
to be used.
(b) The application shall incorporate the
duty and responsibility of the applicant under Section 8
hereof.
(c) The application shall be filed with
the office of the mayor of the city or municipality in whose
jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held, at least five
(5) working days before the scheduled public assembly.
(d) Upon receipt of the application,
which must be duly acknowledged in writing, the office of
the city or municipal mayor shall cause the same to
immediately be posted at a conspicuous place in the city or
municipal building.
SEC. 6. Action to be taken on the application.
(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or
any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit
unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the
public assembly will create a clear and present danger to
public order, public safety, public convenience, public
morals or public health.
(b) The mayor or any official acting in
his behalf shall act on the application within two (2)
working days from the date the application was filed,
failing which, the permit shall be deemed granted. Should
for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf
refuse to accept the application for a permit, said
application shall be posted by the applicant on the premises
of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been
filed.
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there
is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil
warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall
immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the
matter.
(d) The action on the permit shall be in
writing and served on the applica[nt] within twenty-four
hours.
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in
his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms
thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision
in an appropriate court of law.
(f) In case suit is brought before the
Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or
the Intermediate Appellate court, its decisions may be
appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48)
hours after receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record
on appeal shall be required. A decision granting such
permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant
shall be immediately executory.
(g) All cases filed in court under this
section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours from
date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately
endorsed to the executive judge for disposition or, in his
absence, to the next in rank.
(h) In all cases, any decision may be
appealed to the Supreme Court.
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed
by formal appeals are hereby allowed.
 SEC. 7. Use of Public throroughfare. Should the
proposed public assembly involve the use, for an
appreciable length of time, of any public highway,
boulevard, avenue, road or street, the mayor or any official
acting in his behalf may, to prevent grave public
inconvenience, designate the route thereof which is
convenient to the participants or reroute the vehicular
traffic to another direction so that there will be no serious
or undue interference with the free flow of commerce and
trade.
SEC. 8. Responsibility of applicant. It shall be the
duty and responsibility of the leaders and organizers of a
public assembly to take all reasonable measures and steps
to the end that the intended public assembly shall be
conducted peacefully in accordance with the terms of the
permit. These shall include but not be limited to the
following:
(a) To inform the participants of their
responsibility under the permit;
(b) To police the ranks of the
demonstrators in order to prevent non-demonstrators
from disrupting the lawful activities of the public
assembly;
(c) To confer with local government
officials concerned and law enforcers to the end that the
public assembly may be held peacefully;
(d) To see to it that the public assembly
undertaken shall not go beyond the time stated in the
permit; and
(e) To take positive steps that
demonstrators do not molest any person or do any act
unduly interfering with the rights of other persons not
participating in the public assembly.
SEC. 9. Non-interference by law enforcement
authorities. Law enforcement agencies shall not interfere
with the holding of a public assembly. However, to
adequately ensure public safety, a law enforcement
contingent under the command of a responsible police
officer may be detailed and stationed in a place at least one
hundred (100) meters away from the area of activity ready
to maintain peace and order at all times.
SEC. 10. Police assistance when requested. It
shall be imperative for law enforcement agencies, when
their assistance is requested by the leaders or organizers, to
perform their duties always mindful that their
responsibility to provide proper protection to those
exercising their right peaceably to assemble and the
freedom of expression is primordial. Towards this end, law
enforcement agencies shall observe the following
guidelines:
(a) Members of the law enforcement
contingent who deal with the demonstrators shall be in
complete uniform with their nameplates and units to which
they belong displayed prominently on the front and dorsal
parts of their uniform and must observe the policy of
maximum tolerance as herein defined;
(b) The members of the law enforcement
contingent shall not carry any kind of firearms but may be
equipped with baton or riot sticks, shields, crash helmets
with visor, gas masks, boots or ankle high shoes with shin
guards;
(c) Tear gas, smoke grenades, water
cannons, or any similar anti-riot device shall not be used
unless the public assembly is attended by actual violence
or serious threats of violence, or deliberate destruction of
property.
SEC. 11. Dispersal of public assembly with
permit. No public assembly with a permit shall be
dispersed. However, when an assembly becomes violent,
the police may disperse such public assembly as follows:
(a) At the first sign of impending
violence, the ranking officer of the law enforcement
contingent shall call the attention of the leaders of the
public assembly and ask the latter to prevent any possible
disturbance;
(b) If actual violence starts to a point
where rocks or other harmful objects from the participants
are thrown at the police or at the non-participants, or at any
property causing damage to such property, the ranking
officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly
warn the participants that if the disturbance persists, the
public assembly will be dispersed;
(c) If the violence or disturbance
prevailing as stated in the preceding subparagraph should
not stop or abate, the ranking officer of the law
enforcement contingent shall audibly issue a warning to the
participants of the public assembly, and after allowing a
reasonable period of time to lapse, shall immediately order
it to forthwith disperse;
(d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or
participant shall also be made during the public assembly
unless he violates during the assembly a law, statute,
ordinance or any provision of this Act. Such arrest shall be
governed by Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended;
(e) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder
or breach of the peace during the public assembly shall not
constitute a ground for dispersal.
SEC. 12. Dispersal of public assembly without
permit. When the public assembly is held without a permit
where a permit is required, the said public assembly may
be peacefully dispersed.
SEC. 13. Prohibited acts. The following shall
constitute violations of the Act:
(a) The holding of any public assembly
as defined in this Act by any leader or organizer without
having first secured that written permit where a permit is
required from the office concerned, or the use of such
permit for such purposes in any place other than those set
out in said permit: Provided, however, That no person can
be punished or held criminally liable for participating in or
attending an otherwise peaceful assembly;
(b) Arbitrary and unjustified denial or
modification of a permit in violation of the provisions of
this Act by the mayor or any other official acting in his
behalf;
(c) The unjustified and arbitrary refusal
to accept or acknowledge receipt of the application for a
permit by the mayor or any official acting in his behalf;
(d) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or
otherwise denying the exercise of the right to peaceful
assembly;
(e) The unnecessary firing of firearms
by a member of any law enforcement agency or any person
to disperse the public assembly;
(f) Acts in violation of Section 10
hereof;
(g) Acts described hereunder if
committed within one hundred (100) meters from the area
of activity of the public assembly or on the occasion
thereof:
1. the carrying of a deadly or
offensive weapon or device
 such as firearm, pillbox, bomb,
and the like; SEC. 15. Freedom parks. Every city and
municipality in the country shall within six months after
2. the carrying of a bladed the effectivity of this Act establish or designate at least one
weapon and the like; suitable freedom park or mall in their respective
3. the malicious burning of jurisdictions which, as far as practicable, shall be centrally
any object in the streets or located within the poblacion where demonstrations and
thoroughfares; meetings may be held at any time without the need of any
prior permit.
4. the carrying of firearms by
members of the law In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the
enforcement unit; respective mayors shall establish the freedom parks within
the period of six months from the effectivity this Act.
5. the interfering with or
intentionally disturbing the SEC. 16. Constitutionality. Should any provision of this
holding of a public assembly by Act be declared invalid or unconstitutional, the validity or
the use of a motor vehicle, its constitutionality of the other provisions shall not be
horns and loud sound systems. affected thereby.

SEC. 14. Penalties. Any person found guilty and SEC. 17. Repealing clause. All laws, decrees, letters of
convicted of any of the prohibited acts defined in the instructions, resolutions, orders, ordinances or parts thereof
immediately preceding section shall be punished as which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are
follows: hereby repealed, amended, or modified accordingly.

(a) violation of subparagraph (a) shall be SEC. 18. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect upon its
punished by imprisonment of one month and one day to six approval.
months;
Approved, October 22, 1985.
(b) violations of subparagraphs (b), (c),
(d), (e), (f), and item 4, subparagraph (g) shall be punished
by imprisonment of six months and one day to six years;
CPR, on the other hand, is a policy set forth in a press release by Malacaang
(c) violation of item 1, subparagraph (g) dated September 21, 2005, shown in Annex A to the Petition in G.R. No.
shall be punished by imprisonment of six months and one 169848, thus:
day to six years without prejudice to prosecution under
Presidential Decree No. 1866; Malacaang Official
Manila, Philippines NEWS
(d) violations of item 2, item 3, or item 5
of subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of Release No. 2 September 21, 2005
one day to thirty days.

STATEMENT OF EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
EDUARDO ERMITA
On Unlawful Mass Actions
In view of intelligence reports pointing to credible plans of
anti-government groups to inflame the political situation,
sow disorder and incite people against the duly constituted
authorities, we have instructed the PNP as well as the local
government units to strictly enforce a no permit, no rally
policy, disperse groups that run afoul of this standard and
arrest all persons violating the laws of the land as well as
ordinances on the proper conduct of mass actions and
demonstrations.
The rule of calibrated preemptive response is now in force,
in lieu of maximum tolerance. The authorities will not
stand aside while those with ill intent are herding a witting
or unwitting mass of people and inciting them into actions
that are inimical to public order, and the peace of mind of
the national community.
Unlawful mass actions will be dispersed. The majority of
law-abiding citizens have the right to be protected by a
vigilant and proactive government.
We appeal to the detractors of the government to engage in
lawful and peaceful conduct befitting of a democratic
society.
The Presidents call for unity and reconciliation stands,
based on the rule of law.
Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a
violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a
signatory.[5]
They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public
assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present
danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the
freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form
part of the message for which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not
content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the
government. The words lawful cause, opinion, protesting or influencing
suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. Also,
the phrase maximum tolerance shows that the law applies to assemblies
against the government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based
legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.
Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is
unconstitutional as it is a curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and
petition for redress of grievances because it puts a condition for the valid
exercise of that right. It also characterizes public assemblies without a permit
as illegal and penalizes them and allows their dispersal.Thus, its provisions
are not mere regulations but are actually prohibitions.
Furthermore, the law delegates powers to the Mayor without providing clear
standards. The two standards stated in the laws (clear and present danger and
imminent and grave danger) are inconsistent.
Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the
standard of maximum tolerance set forth in B.P. No. 880, aside from being
void for being vague and for lack of publication.
Finally, petitioners KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on
the right to assembly and therefore B.P. No. 880 cannot put the prior
requirement of securing a permit. And even assuming that the legislature can
set limits to this right, the limits provided are unreasonable: First, allowing
the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and convincing evidence of a clear and
present danger is too comprehensive. Second, the five-day requirement to
apply for a permit is too long as certain events require instant public
assembly, otherwise interest on the issue would possibly wane.
As to the CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the government
takes action even before the rallyists can perform their act, and that no law,
ordinance or executive order supports the policy. Furthermore, it contravenes
the maximum tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880 and violates the Constitution
as it causes a chilling effect on the exercise by the people of the right to
peaceably assemble.
Respondents in G.R. No. 169838 are Eduardo Ermita, as Executive
Secretary, Manila City Mayor Lito Atienza, Chief, of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Gen. Arturo Lomibao, National Capital Region
Police Office (NCRPO) Chief, PNP Maj. Gen. Vidal Querol, and Manila
Police District (MPD) Chief Gen. Pedro Bulaong.
Respondents in G.R. No. 169848 are Eduardo Ermita as Executive
Secretary and in his personal capacity; Angelo Reyes, as Secretary of the
Interior and Local Governments; Arturo Lomibao, as Chief Vidal Querol,
as Chief, NCRPO; Pedro Bulaong, as Chief, MPD, and all other public
officers and private individuals acting under their control, supervision and
instruction.
Respondents in G.R. No. 169881 are the Honorable Executive Secretary,
PNP Director General Arturo Lomibao, the Honorable Mayor Joselito
Atienza, and PNP MPD Chief Pedro Bulaong.
Respondents argue that:
1. Petitioners have no standing because they have not
presented evidence that they had been injured, arrested or detained because
of the CPR, and that those arrested stand to be charged with violating Batas
Pambansa [No.] 880 and other offenses.
2. Neither B.P. No. 880 nor CPR is void on its
face. Petitioners cannot honestly claim that the time, place and manner
regulation embodied in B.P. No. 880 violates the three-pronged test for such
a measure, to wit: (a) B.P. No. 880 is content-neutral, i.e., it has no reference
to content of regulated speech; (b) B.P. No. 880 is narrowly tailored to serve
a significant governmental interest, i.e., the interest cannot be equally well
served by a means that is less intrusive of free speech interests; and (c) B.P.
No. 880 leaves open alternative channels for communication of the
information.[6]
3. B.P. No. 880 is content-neutral as seen from the text of
the law. Section 5 requires the statement of the public assemblys time, place
and manner of conduct. It entails traffic re-routing to prevent grave public
inconvenience and serious or undue interference in the free flow of commerce
and trade. Furthermore, nothing in B.P. No. 880 authorizes the denial of a
permit on the basis of a rallys program content or the statements of the
speakers therein, except under the constitutional precept of the clear and
present danger test.The status of B.P. No. 880 as a content-neutral regulation
has been recognized in Osmea v. Comelec.[7]
4. Adiong v. Comelec[8] held that B.P. No. 880 is a
content-neutral regulation of the time, place and manner of holding public
assemblies and the law passes the test for such regulation, namely, these
regulations need only a substantial governmental interest to support them.
5. Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court[9] held that
a local chief executive has the authority to exercise police power to meet the
demands of the common good in terms of traffic decongestion and public
convenience. Furthermore, the discretion given to the mayor is narrowly
circumscribed by Sections 5 (d), and 6 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), 13 and 15 of the
law.
6. The standards set forth in the law are not
inconsistent. Clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will
create a clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public health and imminent and grave danger
of a substantive evil both express the meaning of the clear and present danger
test.[10]
7. CPR is simply the responsible and judicious use of
means allowed by existing laws and ordinances to protect public interest and
restore public order. Thus, it is not accurate to call it a new rule but rather it
is a more pro-active and dynamic enforcement of existing laws, regulations
and ordinances to prevent chaos in the streets. It does not replace the rule of
maximum tolerance in B.P. No. 880.
Respondent Mayor Joselito Atienza, for his part, submitted in his
Comment that the petition in G.R. No. 169838 should be dismissed on the
ground that Republic Act No. 7160 gives the Mayor power to deny a permit
independently of B.P. No. 880; that his denials of permits were under the
clear and present danger rule as there was a clamor to stop rallies that disrupt
the economy and to protect the lives of other people; that J. B. L. Reyes v.
Bagatsing,[11] Primicias v. Fugoso,[12] and Jacinto v. CA,[13] have affirmed
the constitutionality of requiring a permit; that the permit is for the use of a
public place and not for the exercise of rights; and that B.P. No. 880 is not a
content-based regulation because it covers all rallies.
The petitions were ordered consolidated on February 14,
2006. After the submission of all the Comments, the Court set the cases for
oral arguments on April 4, 2006,[14]stating the principal issues, as follows:
1. On the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa
No. 880, specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12 13(a)
and 14(a) thereof, and Republic Act No. 7160:
(a) Are these content-neutral or
content-based regulations?
(b) Are they void on grounds of
overbreadth or vagueness?
(c) Do they constitute prior restraint?
(d) Are they undue delegations of
powers to Mayors?
(e) Do they violate international human
rights treaties and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights?
2. On the constitutionality and legality of the
policy of Calibrated Preemptive Response
(CPR):
(a) Is the policy void on its face or due
to vagueness?
(b) Is it void for lack of publication?
(c) Is the policy of CPR void as applied
to the rallies of September 26 and
October 4, 5 and 6, 2005?
During the course of the oral arguments, the following
developments took place and were approved and/or noted by the Court:
1. Petitioners, in the interest of a speedy resolution of the
petitions, withdrew the portions of their petitions raising factual issues,
particularly those raising the issue of whether B.P. No. 880 and/or CPR is
void as applied to the rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005.
2. The Solicitor General agreed with the observation of
the Chief Justice that CPR should no longer be used as a legal term inasmuch
as, according to respondents, it was merely a catchword intended to clarify
what was thought to be a misunderstanding of the maximum tolerance policy
set forth in B.P. No. 880 and that, as stated in the affidavit executed by
Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and submitted to the Ombudsman, it
does not replace B.P. No. 880 and the maximum tolerance policy embodied
in that law.
The Court will now proceed to address the principal issues, taking
into account the foregoing developments.
Petitioners standing cannot be seriously challenged. Their right as
citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise the right of petition, as
guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880 which
requires a permit for all who would publicly assemble in the nations streets
and parks. They have, in fact, purposely engaged in public assemblies
without the required permits to press their claim that no such permit can be
validly required without violating the Constitutional guarantee. Respondents,
on the other hand, have challenged such action as contrary to law and
dispersed the public assemblies held without the permit.
Section 4 of Article III of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances.
The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and
petition for redress of grievances is, together with freedom of speech, of
expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of
constitutional protection. For these rights constitute the very basis of a
functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be
meaningless and unprotected. As stated in Jacinto v. CA,[15] the Court, as
early as the onset of this century, in U.S. v. Apurado,[16] already upheld the
right to assembly and petition, as follows:
 There is no question as to the petitioners rights to
peaceful assembly to petition the government for a redress
of grievances and, for that matter, to organize or form
associations for purposes not contrary to law, as well as to
engage in peaceful concerted activities. These rights are
guaranteed by no less than the Constitution, particularly
Sections 4 and 8 of the Bill of Rights, Section 2(5) of
Article IX, and Section 3 of Article XIII. Jurisprudence
abounds with hallowed pronouncements defending and
promoting the peoples exercise of these rights. As early as
the onset of this century, this Court in U.S. vs. Apurado,
already upheld the right to assembly and petition and even
went as far as to acknowledge:
It is rather to be expected that more or less
disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to
protest against grievances whether real or imaginary,
because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a
high pitch of excitement, and the greater, the grievance and
the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule will
be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their
irresponsible followers. But if the prosecution be permitted
to seize upon every instance of such disorderly conduct by
individual members of a crowd as an excuse to characterize
the assembly as a seditious and tumultuous rising against
the authorities, then the right to assemble and to petition
for redress of grievances would become a delusion and a
snare and the attempt to exercise it on the most righteous
occasion and in the most peaceable manner would expose
all those who took part therein to the severest and most
unmerited punishment, if the purposes which they sought
to attain did not happen to be pleasing to the prosecuting
authorities. If instances of disorderly conduct occur on
such occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out
and punished therefor, but the utmost discretion must be
exercised in drawing the line
between disorderly and seditious conduct and between an
essentially peaceable assembly and a tumultuous uprising.
Again, in Primicias v. Fugoso,[17] the Court likewise sustained the
primacy of freedom of speech and to assembly and petition over comfort and
convenience in the use of streets and parks.
Next, however, it must be remembered that the right, while
sacrosanct, is not absolute. In Primicias, this Court said:
The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully
assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people
recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions of
democratic countries. But it is a settled principle growing
out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the
exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so
regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to
the rights of the community or society. The power to
regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights
is termed the sovereign police power, which is the power
to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare
of the people. This sovereign police power is exercised by
the government through its legislative branch by the
enactment of laws regulating those and other constitutional
and civil rights, and it may be delegated to political
subdivisions, such as towns, municipalities and cities by
authorizing their legislative bodies called municipal and
city councils to enact ordinances for the purpose.[18]
Reyes v. Bagatsing[19] further expounded on the right and its limits,
as follows:
1. It is thus clear that the Court is called upon to
protect the exercise of the cognate rights to free speech and
peaceful assembly, arising from the denial of a permit. The
Constitution is quite explicit: No law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
Government for redress of grievances. Free speech, like
free press, may be identified with the liberty to discuss
publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern
without censorship or punishment. There is to be then no
previous restraint on the communication of views or
subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for
sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings
unless there be a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil that [the State] has a right to prevent. Freedom of
assembly connotes the right of the people to meet
peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters of
public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost
deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much less
denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of
expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil that the state has a right to prevent. Even prior to the
1935 Constitution, Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress
that it is a necessary consequence of our republican
institutions and complements the right of free speech. To
paraphrase the opinion of Justice Rutledge, speaking for
the majority of the American Supreme Court in Thomas v.
Collins, it was not by accident or coincidence that the rights
to freedom of speech and of the press were coupled in a
single guarantee with the rights of the people peaceably to
assemble and to petition the government for redress of
grievances. All these rights, while not identical, are
inseparable. In every case, therefore, where there is a
limitation placed on the exercise of this right, the judiciary
is called upon to examine the effects of the challenged
governmental actuation. The sole justification for a
limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to
the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger,
of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to
public safety, public morals, public health, or any other
legitimate public interest.
2. Nowhere is the rationale that underlies the freedom of
expression and peaceable assembly better expressed than
in this excerpt from an opinion of Justice Frankfurter: It
must never be forgotten, however, that the Bill of Rights
was the child of the Enlightenment. Back of the guaranty
of free speech lay faith in the power of an appeal to reason
by all the peaceful means for gaining access to the mind. It
was in order to avert force and explosions due to
restrictions upon rational modes of communication that the
guaranty of free speech was given a generous scope. But
utterance in a context of violence can lose its significance
as an appeal to reason and become part of an instrument of
force. Such utterance was not meant to be sheltered by the
Constitution. What was rightfully stressed is the
abandonment of reason, the utterance, whether verbal or
printed, being in a context of violence. It must always be
remembered that this right likewise provides for a safety
valve, allowing parties the opportunity to give vent to their
views, even if contrary to the prevailing climate of
opinion. For if the peaceful means of communication
cannot be availed of, resort to non-peaceful means may be
the only alternative. Nor is this the sole reason for the
expression of dissent. It means more than just the right to
be heard of the person who feels aggrieved or who is
dissatisfied with things as they are. Its value may lie in the
fact that there may be something worth hearing from the
dissenter. That is to ensure a true ferment of ideas. There
are, of course, well-defined limits. What is guaranteed is
peaceable assembly. One may not advocate disorder in the
name of protest, much less preach rebellion under the cloak
of dissent. The Constitution frowns on disorder or tumult
attending a rally or assembly. Resort to force is ruled out
and outbreaks of violence to be avoided. The utmost calm
though is not required. As pointed out in an early
Philippine case, penned in 1907 to be precise, United
States v. Apurado: It is rather to be expected that more or
less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people
to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary,
because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a
high pitch of excitement, and the greater the grievance and
the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will
be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their
irresponsible followers. It bears repeating that for the
constitutional right to be invoked, riotous conduct, injury
to property, and acts of vandalism must be avoided. To
give free rein to ones destructive urges is to call for
condemnation. It is to make a mockery of the high estate
occupied by intellectual liberty in our scheme of values.
There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a
clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice
of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would
start. The Philippines is committed to the view expressed
in the plurality opinion, of 1939 vintage, of Justice Roberts
in Hague v. CIO: Whenever the title of streets and parks
may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the
use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the
streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a
part of the privileges, immunities, rights and liberties of
citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to
use the streets and parks for communication of views on
national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it
is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in
subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and
in consonance with peace and good order; but must not, in
the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied. The above
excerpt was quoted with approval in Primicias v.
Fugoso.Primicias made explicit what was implicit
in Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, a 1915 decision, where
this Court categorically affirmed that plazas or parks and
streets are outside the commerce of man and thus nullified
a contract that leased Plaza Soledad of plaintiff-
municipality. Reference was made to such plaza being a
promenade for public use, which certainly is not the only
purpose that it could serve. To repeat, there can be no valid
reason why a permit should not be granted for the proposed
march and rally starting from a public park that is the
Luneta.
4. Neither can there be any valid objection to the
use of the streets to the gates of the US embassy, hardly
two blocks away at the Roxas Boulevard. Primicias v.
Fugoso has resolved any lurking doubt on the matter. In
holding that the then Mayor Fugoso of the City of Manila
should grant a permit for a public meeting at Plaza Miranda
in Quiapo, this Court categorically declared: Our
conclusion finds support in the decision in the case of
Willis Cox v. State of New Hampshire, 312 U.S., 569. In
that case, the statute of New Hampshire P.L. chap. 145,
section 2, providing that no parade or procession upon any
ground abutting thereon, shall be permitted unless a special
license therefor shall first be obtained from the selectmen
of the town or from licensing committee, was construed by
the Supreme Court of New Hampshire as not conferring
upon the licensing board unfettered discretion to refuse to
grant the license, and held valid. And the Supreme Court
of the United States, in its decision (1941) penned by Chief
Justice Hughes affirming the judgment of the State
Supreme Court, held that a statute requiring persons using
the public streets for a parade or procession to procure a
special license therefor from the local authorities is not an
unconstitutional abridgment of the rights of assembly or of
freedom of speech and press, where, as the statute is
construed by the state courts, the licensing authorities are
strictly limited, in the issuance of licenses, to a
consideration of the time, place, and manner of the parade
or procession, with a view to conserving the public
convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide
proper policing, and are not invested with arbitrary
discretion to issue or refuse license, * * *. Nor should the
point made by Chief Justice Hughes in a subsequent
portion of the opinion be ignored: Civil liberties, as
guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an
organized society maintaining public order without which
liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestricted
abuses. The authority of a municipality to impose
regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of
the people in the use of public highways has never been
regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as
one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon
which they ultimately depend. The control of travel on the
streets of cities is the most familiar illustration of this
recognition of social need. Where a restriction of the use of
highways in that relation is designed to promote the public
convenience in the interest of all, it cannot be disregarded
by the attempted exercise of some civil right which in other
circumstances would be entitled to protection.
xxx
6. x x x The principle under American doctrines was given
utterance by Chief Justice Hughes in these words: The
question, if the rights of free speech and peaceable
assembly are to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under
which the meeting is held but as to its purpose; not as to the
relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances
transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the
Constitution protects. There could be danger to public
peace and safety if such a gathering were marked by
turbulence. That would deprive it of its peaceful
character. Even then, only the guilty parties should be held
accountable. It is true that the licensing official, here
respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in
determining whether or not a permit would be granted. It is
not, however, unfettered discretion. While prudence
requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may
possibly occur but of what may probably occur, given all
the relevant circumstances, still the assumption especially
so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public
place is that the permit must be for the assembly being held
there. The exercise of such a right, in the language of
Justice Roberts, speaking for the American Supreme Court,
is not to be abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in
some other place.
xxx
8. By way of a summary. The applicants for a permit to
hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of
the date, the public place where and the time when it will
take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the
owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is
required. Such application should be filed well ahead in
time to enable the public official concerned to appraise
whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the
permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an
indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that
the clear and present danger test be the standard for the
decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the
applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his
decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be
transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so
minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial
authority.Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with
the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our
scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly
stressed that on the judiciary, -- even more so than on the
other departments rests the grave and delicate
responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such
preferred rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase
can, of course, dispense with what has been so felicitiously
termed by Justice Holmes as the sovereign prerogative of
judgment. Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline
the weight of the scales of justice on the side of such rights,
enjoying as they do precedence and primacy. x x x.
B.P. No. 880 was enacted after this Court rendered its decision in Reyes.
The provisions of B.P. No. 880 practically codify the ruling in Reyes:
Reyes v. Bagatsing B.P. No. 880
(G.R. No. L-65366, November 9, 1983,
125 SCRA 553, 569)
8. By way of a summary. The applicants for a SEC. 4. Permit
permit to hold an assembly should inform the when required and
licensing authority of the date, the public when not required.-
place where and the time when it will take - A written permit
place. If it were a private place, only the consent shall be required for
of the owner or the one entitled to its legal any person or
possession is required. Such application should be persons to organize
filed well ahead in time to enable the public and hold a public (a) The
official concerned to appraise whether there may assembly in a public applications shall be
be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to place. However, no in writing and shall
its grant but at another public place. It is an permit shall be include the names of
indispensable condition to such refusal or required if the public the leaders or
modification that the clear and present danger test assembly shall be organizers; the
be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of done or made in a purpose of such
the view that there is such an imminent and grave freedom park duly public assembly; the
danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must established by law or date, time and
be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, ordinance or in duration thereof, and
whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted private property, in place or streets to be
to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so which case only the used for the intended
minded, they can have recourse to the proper consent of the owner activity; and the
judicial authority. or the one entitled to probable number of
its legal possession persons
is required, or in the participating, the
campus of a transport and the
government-owned public address
and operated systems to be used.
educational (b) The
institution which application shall
shall be subject to incorporate the duty
the rules and and responsibility of
regulations of said applicant under
educational Section 8 hereof.
institution. Political (c) The
meetings or rallies application shall be
held during any filed with the office
election campaign of the mayor of the
period as provided city or municipality
for by law are not in whose jurisdiction
covered by this Act. the intended activity
SEC. 5. Applicati is to be held, at least
on requirements.- five (5) working
- All applications for days before the
a permit shall scheduled public
comply with the assembly.
following (d) Upon receipt
guidelines: of the application,
which must be duly
acknowledged in granted. Should for
writing, the office of any reason the
the city or municipal mayor or any official
mayor shall cause acting in his behalf
the same to refuse to accept the
immediately be application for a
posted at a permit, said
conspicuous place in application shall be
the city or municipal posted by the
building. applicant on the
premises of the
SEC. 6. Action to office of the mayor
be taken on the and shall be deemed
application. to have been filed.
(a) It shall be the (c) If the mayor is
duty of the mayor or of the view that there
any official acting in is imminent and
his behalf to issue or grave danger of a
grant a permit unless substantive evil
there is clear and warranting the denial
convincing evidence or modification of
that the public the permit, he shall
assembly will create immediately inform
a clear and present the applicant who
danger to public must be heard on the
order, public safety, matter.
public convenience, (d) The action on
public morals or the permit shall be in
public health. writing and served
(b) The mayor or on the applica[nt]
any official acting in within twenty-four
his behalf shall act hours.
on the application (e) If the mayor or
within two (2) any official acting in
working days from his behalf denies the
the date the application or
application was modifies the terms
filed, failing which, thereof in his permit,
the permit shall be the applicant may
deemed contest the decision
in an appropriate disposition or, in his
court of law. absence, to the next
(f) In case suit is in rank.
brought before the (h) In all cases,
Metropolitan Trial any decision may be
Court, the Municipal appealed to the
Trial Court, the Supreme Court.
Municipal Circuit (i) Telegraphic
Trial Court, the appeals to be
Regional Trial followed by formal
Court, or the appeals are hereby
Intermediate allowed.
Appellate Court, its
decisions may be
appealed to the
appropriate court It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public
within forty-eight assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner
(48) hours after of the assemblies. This was adverted to in Osmea v. Comelec,[20] where the
receipt of the Court referred to it as a content-neutral regulation of the time, place, and
same. No appeal manner of holding public assemblies.[21]
bond and record on
appeal shall be A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers
required. A decision to all kinds of public assemblies[22] that would use public places. The
granting such permit reference to lawful cause does not make it content-based because assemblies
or modifying it in really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be peaceable
terms satisfactory to and entitled to protection. Neither are the words opinion, protesting and
the applicant shall be influencing in the definition of public assembly content based, since they can
immediately refer to any subject. The words petitioning the government for redress of
executory. grievances come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be
(g) All cases filed avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all
in court under this rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally.
section shall be
decided within Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present
twenty-four (24) danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or
hours from date of public health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the right even
filing. Cases filed under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
hereunder shall be Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, thus:
immediately
endorsed to the
executive judge for Universal Declaration of Human Rights

Article 20
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of
peaceful assembly and association.
xxx
Article 29
1. Everyone has duties to the community in which
alone the free and full development of his personality is
possible.
2. In the exercise of his rights and freedoms,
everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are
determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of
others and of meeting the just requirements of morality,
public order and the general welfare in a democratic
society.
3. These rights and freedoms may in no case be
exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the
United Nations.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Article 19.
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions
without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to
freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds,
regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print,
in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided
for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special
duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to
certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are
provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or
reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security
or of public order (ordre public), or of
public health or morals.
Contrary to petitioners claim, the law is very clear and is nowhere vague in
its provisions. Public does not have to be defined. Its ordinary meaning is
well-known. Websters Dictionary defines it, thus:[23]
public, n, x x x 2a: an organized body of people x
x x 3: a group of people distinguished by common interests
or characteristics x x x.
Not every expression of opinion is a public assembly. The law refers to rally,
demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other form of mass or
concerted action held in a public place. So it does not cover any and all kinds
of gatherings.
Neither is the law overbroad. It regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful
assembly and petition only to the extent needed to avoid a clear and present
danger of the substantive evils Congress has the right to prevent.
There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech
is not relevant to the regulation.
As to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law provides a precise and
sufficient standard the clear and present danger test stated in Sec. 6(a). The
reference to imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil in Sec. 6(c)
substantially means the same thing and is not an inconsistent standard. As to
whether respondent Mayor has the same power independently under
Republic Act No. 7160[24] is thus not necessary to resolve in these
proceedings, and was not pursued by the parties in their arguments.

Finally, for those who cannot wait, Section 15 of the law provides
for an alternative forum through the creation of freedom parks where no prior
permit is needed for peaceful assembly and petition at any time:
SEC. 15. Freedom parks. Every city and
municipality in the country shall within six months after
the effectivity of this Act establish or designate at least one
suitable freedom park or mall in their respective
jurisdictions which, as far as practicable, shall be centrally
located within the poblacion where demonstrations and
meetings may be held at any time without the need of any
prior permit.
In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the
respective mayors shall establish the freedom parks within
the period of six months from the effectivity this Act.
This brings up the point, however, of compliance with this provision.
The Solicitor General stated during the oral arguments that, to his knowledge,
only Cebu City has declared a freedom park Fuente Osmea.
That of Manila, the Sunken Gardens, has since been converted into a golf
course, he added.
If this is so, the degree of observance of B.P. No. 880s mandate that
every city and municipality set aside a freedom park within six months from
its effectivity in 1985, or 20 years ago, would be pathetic and regrettable. The
matter appears to have been taken for granted amidst the swell of freedom
that rose from the peaceful revolution of 1986.
Considering that the existence of such freedom parks is an essential
part of the laws system of regulation of the peoples exercise of their right to
peacefully assemble and petition, the Court is constrained to rule that For
without such alternative forum, to deny the permit would in effect be to deny
the right. Advance notices should, however, after thirty (30) days from the
finality of this Decision, no prior permit may be required for the exercise of
such right in any public park or plaza of a city or municipality until that city
or municipality shall have complied with Section 15 of the law. be given to
the authorities to ensure proper coordination and orderly proceedings.
The Court now comes to the matter of the CPR. As stated earlier,
the Solicitor General has conceded that the use of the term should now be
discontinued, since it does not mean anything other than the maximum
tolerance policy set forth in B.P. No. 880. This is stated in the Affidavit of
respondent Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, submitted by the Solicitor
General, thus:
14. The truth of the matter is the policy of
calibrated preemptive response is in consonance with the
legal definition of maximum tolerance under Section 3 (c)
of B.P. Blg. 880, which is the highest degree of restraint
that the military, police and other peacekeeping authorities
shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal
of the same. Unfortunately, however, the phrase maximum
tolerance has acquired a different meaning over the
years. Many have taken it to mean inaction on the part of
law enforcers even in the face of mayhem and serious
threats to public order. More so, other felt that they need
not bother secure a permit when holding rallies thinking
this would be tolerated. Clearly, the popular connotation of
maximum tolerance has departed from its real essence
under B.P. Blg. 880.
15. It should be emphasized that the
policy of maximum tolerance is provided under the same
law which requires all pubic assemblies to have a permit,
which allows the dispersal of rallies without a permit, and
which recognizes certain instances when water cannons
may be used. This could only mean that maximum
tolerance is not in conflict with a no permit, no rally policy
or with the dispersal and use of water cannons under certain
circumstances for indeed, the maximum amount of
tolerance required is dependent on how peaceful or unruly
a mass action is. Our law enforcers should calibrate their
response based on the circumstances on the ground with
the view to preempting the outbreak of violence.
 16. Thus, when I stated that calibrated
preemptive response is being enforced in lieu of
maximum tolerance I clearly was not referring to its
legal definition but to the distorted and much abused
definition that it has now acquired. I only wanted to
disabuse the minds of the public from the notion that
law enforcers would shirk their responsibility of
keeping the peace even when confronted with
dangerously threatening behavior. I wanted to send a
message that we would no longer be lax in enforcing the
law but would henceforth follow it to the letter. Thus I
said, we have instructed the PNP as well as the local
government units to strictly enforce a no permit, no rally
policy . . . arrest all persons violating the laws of the land
. . . unlawful mass actions will be dispersed. None of these
is at loggerheads with the letter and spirit of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 880. It is thus absurd for complainants to
even claim that I ordered my co-respondents to violate any
law.[25]
At any rate, the Court rules that in view of the maximum tolerance
mandated by B.P. No. 880, CPR serves no valid purpose if it means the same
thing as maximum tolerance and is illegal if it means something
else. Accordingly, what is to be followed is and should be that mandated by
the law itself, namely, maximum tolerance, which specifically means the
following:
SEC. 3. Definition of terms. For purposes of this
Act:
xxx
(c) Maximum tolerance means the highest degree of
restraint that the military, police and other peace keeping
authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the
dispersal of the same.
xxx
SEC. 9. Non-interference by law enforcement
authorities. Law enforcement agencies shall not interfere
with the holding of a public assembly. However, to
adequately ensure public safety, a law enforcement
contingent under the command of a responsible police
officer
may be detailed and stationed in a place at least one
hundred (100) meters away from the area of activity ready
to maintain peace and order at all times.
SEC. 10. Police assistance when requested. It
shall be imperative for law enforcement agencies, when
their assistance is requested by the leaders or organizers, to
perform their duties always mindful that their
responsibility to provide proper protection to those
exercising their right peaceably to assemble and the
freedom of expression is primordial. Towards this end, law
enforcement agencies shall observe the following
guidelines:
(a) Members of the law enforcement contingent
who deal with the demonstrators shall be in complete
uniform with their nameplates and units to which they
belong displayed prominently on the front and dorsal parts
of their uniform and must observe the policy of maximum
tolerance as herein defined;
(b) The members of the law enforcement
contingent shall not carry any kind of firearms but may be
equipped with baton or riot sticks, shields, crash helmets
with visor, gas masks, boots or ankle high shoes with shin
guards;
(c) Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or
any similar anti-riot device shall not be used unless the
public assembly is attended by actual violence or serious
threats of violence, or deliberate destruction of property.
Sec. 11. Dispersal of public assembly with permit.
No public assembly with a permit shall be
dispersed. However, when an assembly becomes violent,
the police may disperse such public assembly as follows:
(a) At the first sign of impending violence, the
ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall call
the attention of the leaders of the public assembly and ask
the latter to prevent any possible disturbance;
(b) If actual violence starts to a point where rocks
or other harmful objects from the participants are thrown at
the police or at the non-participants, or at any property
causing damage to such property, the ranking officer of the
law enforcement contingent shall audibly warn the
participants that if the disturbance persists, the public
assembly will be dispersed;
(c) If the violence or disturbance prevailing as
stated in the preceding subparagraph should not stop or
abate, the ranking officer of the law enforcement
contingent shall audibly issue a warning to the participants
of the public assembly, and after allowing a reasonable
period of time to lapse, shall immediately order it to
forthwith disperse;
(d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or
participant shall also be made during the public assembly
unless he violates during the assembly a law, statute,
ordinance or any provision of this Act. Such arrest shall be
governed by Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended;
(d) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder
or breach of the peace during the public assembly shall not
constitute a ground for dispersal.
xxx
SEC. 12. Dispersal of public assembly without
permit. When the public assembly is held without a permit
where a permit is required, the said public assembly may
be peacefully dispersed.
SEC. 13. Prohibited acts. The following shall
constitute violations of the Act:
(e) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or
otherwise denying the exercise of the right to peaceful
assembly;
(f) The unnecessary firing of firearms
by a member of any law enforcement agency or any person
to disperse the public assembly;
(g) Acts described hereunder if committed within
one hundred (100) meters from the area of activity of the
public assembly or on the occasion thereof:
xxx
4. the carrying of firearms by members
of the law enforcement unit;
5. the interfering with or intentionally
disturbing the holding of a
public assembly by the use of a
motor vehicle, its horns and
loud sound systems.
Furthermore, there is need to address the situation adverted to by
petitioners where mayors do not act on applications for a permit and when
the police demand a permit and the rallyists could not produce one, the rally
is immediately dispersed. In such a situation, as a necessary consequence and
part of maximum tolerance, rallyists who can show the police an application
duly filed on a given date can, after two days from said date, rally in
accordance with their application without the need to show a permit, the grant
of the permit being then presumed under the law, and it will be the burden of
the authorities to show that there has been a denial of the application, in which
case the rally may be peacefully dispersed following the procedure of
maximum tolerance prescribed by the law.
In sum, this Court reiterates its basic policy of upholding the
fundamental rights of our people, especially freedom of expression and
freedom of assembly. In several policy addresses, Chief Justice Artemio V. Response (CPR), insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of
Panganiban has repeatedly vowed to uphold the liberty of our people and to maximum tolerance, is NULL and VOID and respondents
nurture their prosperity. He said that in cases involving liberty, the scales of are ENJOINEDto REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY
justice should weigh heavily against the government and in favor of the poor, OBSERVE the requirements of maximum tolerance. The petitions
the oppressed, the marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak. Indeed, laws are DISMISSED in all other respects, and the CONSTITUTIONALITY of
and actions that restrict fundamental rights come to the courts with a heavy Batas Pambansa No. 880 is SUSTAINED.
presumption against their validity. These laws and actions are subjected
to heightened scrutiny.[26] No costs.

For this reason, the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy SO ORDERED.
has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness
that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some
police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be
condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict
freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place
and manner of assemblies. Far from being insidious, maximum tolerance is
for the benefit of rallyists, not the government. The delegation to the mayors
of the power to issue rally permits is valid because it is subject to the
constitutionally-sound clear and present danger standard.

In this Decision, the Court goes even one step further in

safeguarding liberty by giving local governments a deadline of 30 days within
which to designate specific freedom parks as provided under B.P. No. 880. If,
after that period, no such parks are so identified in accordance with Section
15 of the law, all public parks and plazas of the municipality or city
concerned shall in effect be deemed freedom parks; no prior permit of
whatever kind shall be required to hold an assembly therein. The only
requirement will be written notices to the police and the mayors office to
allow proper coordination and orderly activities.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and

respondents, more particularly the Secretary of the Interior and Local
Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the immediate
compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the
establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in
every city and municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from the
finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior
permit shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and
petition in the public parks or plazas of a city or municipality that has not yet
complied with Section 15 of the law. Furthermore, Calibrated Preemptive