Is the Philippine “War on Drugs” an Act of Genocide?

Dahlia Simangan

Abstract
Since the newly elected Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte took office in June 2016 more
than 7,000 deaths have been linked to his ongoing “war on drugs”. Despite international
condemnation of extrajudicial and vigilante killings the statistics show no sign of slowing
down and the administration remains firm in eradicating people engaged in illegal drugs.
This article inquires whether the Philippine “war on drugs” is an act of genocide using
Gregory H. Stanton’s stages of genocide. Based on data drawn from news articles, policy
issuances, government briefings, public speeches, and available drug-related statistics, this
article argues that Duterte’s rhetoric and policies satisfy the stages of classification,
symbolization, dehumanization, organization, polarization, preparation, extermination, and
denial. The analysis in this article hopes to send a message to the international community,
civil society, and the Philippine government that the human rights situation related to the
“war on drugs” in the Philippines needs to be addressed immediately. It also aims to
demonstrate the utility of Stanton’s stages in identifying early warning signs of genocide.

Keywords:

genocide; Philippines; war on drugs; Duterte Introduction

Rodrigo Duterte took oath as the sixteenth president of the Philippines on 30 June 2016. His
campaign platform centered on the eradication of crime in the Philippines, specifically on
eliminating illegal drugs in the country. This attracted voters and gave him his electoral victory.
Known as the heavy-handed mayor who cleaned up the once crimeinfested Davao City,1 Duterte
easily won the votes of a population frustrated by the previous administrations’ inability to address
the problems of crime and drugs.2 Within six months of the start of his presidency, the Philippine
National Police (PNP) reported that the crime rate in the Philippines had dropped by 31.67 per
cent.3 The current administration attributes this decline to Duterte’s campaign against illegal
drugs.4 However, previous years had already recorded a declining trend in the crime rate in the
Philippines.5 The same data also show an increase in murder cases of 18.06 per cent.

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 As of April 2017, Duterte’s “war on drugs” has already claimed more than 7,000 lives and
shows no sign of slowing down.6 Human Rights Watch and international news outlets reported the
same number, while Amnesty International estimates that around 9,000 were killed by both police
and vigilantes.7 According to an investigation conducted by Reuters, 100 were shot dead and three
injured out of 103 drug suspects, leading to a 97 per cent kill rate. Of the three who were not
killed, two played dead and the third was arrested after trying to flee.8 The Philippine government
disputes this number, claiming that it is an exaggeration propagated by fake news media 9 by
including homicides that are still under investigation.10 From their latest data, the PNP announced
that 3,451 drug personalities were killed in anti-drug operations from 1 July 2016 to 26 July 2017,
and out of 12,833 homicide cases from 1 July 2016 to 17 June 2016, 2,098 were drug-related,
2,535 were not, and 8,200 are still under investigation.11 Given this, the numbers related to drugs
presented by the government, the media, and human rights organizations differ. 12
The Philippine “war on drugs” caught international attention when graphic photos of dead
bodies started saturating international and local news. 13 Several international and local
organizations have raised concerns about drug-related killings in the Philippines, which could
amount to crimes against humanity.14 In April 2017, a Filipino filed a complaint against Duterte
and eleven other government officials to the International Criminal Court (ICC) requesting an
investigation into the situation of mass murder in the Philippines. 15 The UN, the EU, and the US
have also condemned Duterte’s “war on drugs.”16 Within the Philippines human rights advocates
are demanding an investigation into extrajudicial killings. Duterte has responded, “I will include
you among [drug users] because you let them multiply.” Duterte has responded, “I will include
you among [drug users] because you let them multiply.”17
Despite international and domestic criticisms and his reputation for cursing and making
rape jokes,18 Duterte still enjoys massive public support. Based on a Pulse Asia survey conducted
in March 2017, seventy-eight per cent of Filipinos appreciate his work and seventy-six per cent
trust him.19 The same survey also revealed that the administration’s fight against crime received
the highest approval rating of seventy-nine per cent among selected national issues.20 Another
survey conducted by Social Weather Stations shows a +66 net rating (very good) out of +100 for
his whole administration and a +41 net rating (good) for the administration’s fight against crime. 21
This article examines Duterte’s “war on drugs” using Gregory H. Stanton’s stages of
genocide. Based on data drawn from news articles, government briefings, public speeches, and
available drug-related statistics, I argue that Duterte’s rhetoric22 and policies satisfy the stages of
classification, symbolization, dehumanization, organization, polarization, preparation,
2
extermination, and denial. The analysis in this article hopes to support concerns raised by the
international community and civil society that the human rights situation related to the Philippine
“war on drugs” needs to be addressed immediately. It also aims to demonstrate the utility of
Stanton’s stages in identifying early warning signs of genocide. This article comes at a time when
Duterte’s violent campaign against illegal drugs continues to escalate and his rhetorical and
practical disregard for human rights is increasingly worrying.

Contextual Background: The Problem of Drugs in the Philippines

My father used to tell me when I was growing up, “You can try anything except drugs.” Whenever
there was news of unimaginable crime on TV my mother would always comment, “Only drug
users can do such horrible things.” My parents’ views reflect the common attitude of Filipinos
towards drugs: an adik (a local derogatory term for drug users) is a good-for-nothing social pest
who has tendencies to commit crimes. Whether this attitude towards drug users is the cause or the
consequence of a nationwide campaign against drugs since the approval of the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972 was approved,23 it is an attitude that persists until today.
Narcotic addiction only emerged in the Philippines during the American period (1901-46)
when American forces introduced opium alkaloids, coca plant, and hemp for medical reasons;
later they were locally cultivated and used for drug addiction purposes. 24
Based on drug-related arrests in 2015 by the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA),
illegal drugs in the market are mainly methamphetamine hydrochloride, locally known as shabu
(95.47 per cent), marijuana (4.29 per cent), and other drugs, such as cocaine, ecstasy, and so on
(0.24 per cent).25 In a survey of residential facilities for rehabilitation in the Philippines conducted
in 2015 by the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) shabu is the primary drug of abuse (96.74 per cent)
followed by marijuana (24.94 per cent) and cocaine (1.11 per cent).26
According to a DDB survey conducted in 2012 it was estimated that there could be 1.3
million current drug users in the Philippines.27 In a 2015 survey by the Nationwide Survey on the
Nature and Extent of Drug Abuse in the Philippines the estimated number of drug users in the
Philippines is 1.8 million or 2.3 per cent of the population.28 According to Duterte, though, there
are three million drug addicts whom he is “happy to slaughter.”29 If there are indeed 1.8 million
drug users (noting that some of them do not regularly use drugs or have tried them only once), this
does not mean that they are all addicts and criminals – a false equivalence that Duterte and his
administration confidently portray as true.30

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 Duterte won the 2016 presidential elections for several reasons. First, he embodies the
Philippine electorate’s concern for order.31 He is known as the mayor who established order and
eliminated crime in Davao City. He allegedly initiated and supported the Davao Death Squad, a
group of vigilantes trained by current and former police officers, which is responsible for
summary executions of suspected criminals.32 Duterte and his supporters claim that Davao City
was able to achieve peace and order because of these executions and this claim was the bedrock of
his presidential campaign. Duterte emphasizes order above law, which is particularly attractive to
voters who are tired of the ineffectiveness of legal institutions in addressing crime and disorder.
This emphasis, however, is particularly dangerous for a country with weak rule of law and even
more dangerous for a politician who has authoritarian tendencies.
Second, Duterte represents public resistance and resentment towards the elite democracy
that came after the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos, the former authoritarian president of the
Philippines who ruled using martial law.33 Duterte’s presidential campaign slogan, “Change is
Coming,” resonated well among Filipinos who felt that the country had stagnated under the
administration of the same political elite. Third, Duterte is considered to be a political outsider
from the Manila-centric elite that has dominated Philippine politics since Marcos’s dictatorship.
His anti-elite and anti-establishment rhetoric convinced more than sixteen million voters that he
was different from the traditional liberal politician. Fourth, Duterte’s electoral win symbolizes the
denouement of the public’s disappointment with the liberal political system’s failure to sustain
socioeconomic development and maintain law and order in the country. The Filipino electorate
now wanted to be led by an iron fist even at the cost of liberal values of human rights and rule of
law.
Duterte’s political style is popular because it challenges liberal principles and
institutions.34 As Walden Bello puts it, he is “both a local expression as well as a pioneer of an
ongoing global phenomenon: the rebellion against liberal democratic values and liberal democratic
discourse.”35 Duterte idolizes the Marcos authoritarian style and raised controversy when he
decided to allow Marcos’s burial in the Heroes’ Cemetery. It is therefore unsurprising that his
supporters have downplayed the atrocities committed during the Marcos dictatorship. Duterte has
significant connections with the Marcos family: his father served in the Marcos administration 36
and he is a friend of Marcos’ son, whom he considered to be his vice-presidential running mate
during the presidential campaign. Duterte’s strongman style, similar to Marcos’s, proved popular
in addressing the crime and order issues in Davao City and he is continuing in the same political
style in the national arena as president of the Philippines.
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 The PNP started their “Campaign Plan Double Barrel” when Duterte took office. PNP
Director General Ronald dela Rosa described it as, “One touch of the barrel, two triggers will be
set off. There is a barrel that will target from above, the high-value targets. And there is a barrel
that will target from below, the street-level personalities.”37 Dela Rosa used to be Duterte’s chief
of the city police force in Davao City where he started “Operation Tokhang,” which is now being
implemented nationwide. In
“Operation Tokhang” police officers approach drug suspects in their homes and talk them out of
their involvement in drugs unless they want to face the consequences. 38 As of April 2017 police
officers have visited 7.9 million houses from which 1.2 million drug suspects have surrendered.39
Independent investigations, however, reveal that “police officers routinely bust down doors in the
middle of the night and then kill in cold blood unarmed [drug suspects]” some of whom were
“yelling they will surrender while on their knees or in another compliant position” before they
were shot dead.40 This alarming situation in the Philippines prompts the question: is the Philippine
“war on drugs” an act of genocide?

Conceptual Background: The Definition of Genocide

Genocide studies have grappled with the boundaries of the definition of genocide.
Raphael Lemkin, the Polish Jewish lawyer who coined the term and initiated the
Genocide Convention, defined genocide in a capacious and generic way: 41 “a coordinated plan of
different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups,
with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves.” 42 Years later, debates over the concept of
genocide covering perpetrators’ intent, the group-based identity of victims, threshold numbers of
victims, and methods of destruction have paved the way for either a broad or narrow application of
the term.43 On the other hand some scholars complain that unnecessarily extended debates on
definitions, which Israel Charny calls “definitionalism,” create emotional distance between those
who study genocide and those who have experienced and are experiencing it.44 By emphasizing the
intent of perpetrators and including victim groups outside the legalistic definition, some studies have
led to a broadening of what constitutes genocide.45 Meanwhile, others argue for a more restricted or
careful application of the term in order to prevent negative consequences for the adjudication of
international crimes and to preserve analytical precision, among other reasons.46
This article is neither an attempt to further muddle the already highly contested concept of
genocide47 nor an addition to existing typologies and categorizations of genocide. 48 I acknowledge

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that imprecise broadening of the definition of genocide may lead to what Giovanni Sartori calls
“conceptual stretching,” an intellectual exercise that unintentionally produces vague and
amorphous conceptualizations that are not helpful in confronting problems based on empirical
evidence.49 I also agree with Luke Glanville’s observation that inaction despite the invocation of
the term genocide dilutes the ideational power and legal responsibilities attached to it. 50 It is not
my deliberate intention to stretch and devalue the definition of genocide based on hypothetical
scenarios. Instead, this article calls for meaningful action to address the ongoing processes of what
seems to be an act of genocide using real events, pronouncement, and policies. It uses an events-
based analysis to inquire whether an act fulfils the stages of genocide.
Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
defines genocide as “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group.”51 This is the most widely used and legal definition of genocide.
Among the acts included in the definition that are applicable to the
Philippine “war on drugs” is obviously the killing of members of the group. The acts of “causing
serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group” and “deliberately inflicting on the group
conditions of life, calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part” may also
be applicable.52 Gross overcrowding of jails and rehabilitation centres53 and illegal detention of
drug suspects in inhumane conditions54 are acts that inflict serious physical and mental harm. Drug
suspects are unlawfully arrested, extorted, and tortured.
Using the Genocide Convention’s definition Duterte’s “war on drugs” may not qualify as
genocide because the drug suspects are not a national, ethnic, racial, or religious grouping.
However, Duterte and his supporters collectively label drug suspects as adik, not human, good for
nothing, criminals, rapists, and murderers, among others. Critical genocide studies veer away from
the liberal underpinnings and a rigid and legalistic understanding of genocide and instead use a
dialectical or holistic approach to shed light on the history and context in which genocide takes
place.55 Alexander Laban Hinton’s anthropological approach to examining genocide proposes that
the Genocide Convention “should have been more broadly defined to include the destruction of
any sort of group defined by the protagonists in the genocide.”56 This echoes Frank Robert Chalk
and Kurt Jonassohn’s formulation of a perpetrator-defined victim group.57 Using a critical
genocide studies lens the adik in the Philippines qualifies as a victim of genocide. The target group
is imagined to be “criminals” rather than an ethnic or religious group. This relates to how A. Dirk
Moses points out the role of fear and security imperatives in the conduct of genocide in his
analysis of the convergence of genocide studies and Holocaust historiography and studies.
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 Security imperatives and fear, rather than race hatred, are the operative logics of
genocide. Far from being a massive hate crime, as commonly supposed, genocide is an
extreme form of counterinsurgency or security measure, marked above all by pre-
emption and collective punishment as well as the destruction of groups suspected of
insurgency and collaboration with enemy forces. It is therefore governed by political
logics, rather than solely by racial logics.58

Using the same definition in the Genocide Convention the intent to destroy is plain and
clear. Duterte has publicly spoken about killing drug suspects on several occasions and even
encouraged others to kill those they suspect to be involved in drugs. Intent is a unique
characteristic of genocide, and one that Duterte’s “war on drugs” satisfies. Duterte’s vocal intent
and ongoing attempts to eradicate drug suspects are indicative of a process that leads to mass
destruction regardless of the number of deaths.59 This proof of intent will be crucial when
assigning guilt and responsibility and establishing historical truth.60 It will support a strong legal
case for implicating Duterte and other government officials involved in implementing this intent.
This article is not the first to analyse the scope and consequences of Duterte’s
“war on drugs” vis-à-vis international law.61 There are also commentaries arguing that Duterte’s
“war on drugs” should be labelled for what it is—an act of genocide.62 This article will add to this
scant but relevant discussion by comparing Duterte’s “war on drugs” with events leading to and
happening after a genocide using Stanton’s stages of genocide.

Eight stages of genocide in the Philippine “war on drugs” context

Classification

Classification is the first stage of genocide. According to Stanton classification uses categories to
distinguish between “us” and “them.”63 He adds that this classification is prominent in a polarized
society. Examples of this classification are German and Jew in Nazi Germany and Hutu and Tutsi
in Rwanda.64 In this article I posit that classification is not limited to racial or ethnic groups. In
Cambodia, the Pol Pot regime weeded out and annihilated intellectuals. In Timor-Leste,
Indonesian forces executed rebel group sympathizers. These examples are social and political
classifications. In the Philippines Duterte and his administration classify users of illegal drugs as
drug addicts, criminals, rapists, and murderers. In one of his campaign rallies prior to his election
he warned, “You drug pushers, hold-up men and do-nothings, you better go out. Because I would

7
kill you.”65 He also labelled them as “sons of whores [who] are destroying [Filipino] children.”66
The false equivalence purported by Duterte and his supporters that drug users are addicts, rapists,
and murderers qualifies as a classification stage of genocide. The government uses the distinction
that drug users are “bad” and therefore different from “us” to justify the killings. Supporters of this
“war on drugs” also invoke this distinction when they express hatred and apathy towards the
victims of these killings. This distinction between “us” and “them” and “good” and “bad” is
evident in public narratives, such as in social media, and official government statements.

Symbolization

Symbolization is the assignment and active application of names or symbols to the classifications
mentioned above in order to distinguish “us” from “them.” Nazis made Jews wear armbands with
a yellow star and the Khmer Rouge regime made people wear a blue scarf. In the Philippines,
however, symbolization takes a different form. Victims are often found in the streets with
cardboard signs on top of or next to their bodies labelling them as drug pushers, users, or rapists.67
Common labels on these cardboard signs include “I am a drug pusher. Do not be like me.” This
has become everyday news in Philippine media, which is populated by undignified images of slain
victims. Aside from a source of threat, these cardboard signs are symbols that distinguish those
who are involved in illegal drugs from those who are not.

Dehumanization

Symbolization is harmless unless it is coupled with dehumanization, according to Stanton. In the

Philippines, alleged drug users and dealers are found dead on streets and roadsides, labelled with
cardboard signs, and sometimes with their faces wrapped in masking tape. These acts can be
interpreted as acts of dehumanization. Danilo Andres Reyes argues that these alleged criminals in
the Philippines are used as a “spectacle of violence” to serve as a threat to others.68 The method of
symbolization and dehumanization applied to the bodies of the victims by both state and non-state
apparatuses “reduces the body to an object as a vehicle to carry political messages” 69 that threats
are real for those who are alleged criminals and that safety is provided for lawabiding citizens.
There is nothing more explicitly dehumanizing than claiming that an individual is not a
human being and therefore is not entitled to human rights. Duterte and his administration have
publicly expressed their rejection of drug users’ humanity and human rights, claiming that they are
not human or less human than law-abiding citizens. In response to international human rights

8
organization and UN condemnations and accusations that the “war on drugs” is tantamount to
crimes against humanity, Philippine Justice Secretary Vitaliano Aguirre II, a vocal ally of the
president, told reporters, “How can that be when your war is only against drug lords, drug addicts,
drug pushers? You consider them humanity? No. I believe not.”70 Duterte also parades his
rejection of human rights in several incidents captured in the following statements.
My order is shoot to kill you. I do not care about human rights, you better believe
me.71

That is why I said, “[W]hat crime against humanity?” In the first place, I would like
to be frank with you, are they [drug users] humans? What is your definition of a
human being? Tell me.72
These human rights [advocates] did not count those who were killed before I
became President—the children who were raped and mutilated [by drug users]. 73

Duterte bases his acts of dehumanization on the belief that drug use, specifically that of
shabu, shrinks the brain and users are therefore beyond redemption.74
Neuroscientist Carl Hart visited Manila in May 2017 to debunk myths that exaggerate the link
between shabu usage and brain damage.75 During his visit, Hart provided information about
fallacies pertaining to drug use and also took a stance on the ineffectiveness of Duterte’s policy.
I have given out hundreds of doses of methamphetamine, approaching thousands.
I have never seen anyone become violent… There are people who rape. And also
take amphetamines. But the vast majority of people who rape do not take
amphetamines. So to simply blame the drug? Not only will you not get to the
bottom of rape. But it is just infant thinking. I do not know what to say to people
whose thinking is so remedial. You certainly do not want them in charge of
policies designed to protect society.76

After his speech Hart received death threats from Duterte’s supporters, and even Duterte described
him as “that black guy…that son of a bitch who has gone crazy” and accused him of peddling
“bullshit.”77

Organization

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“Genocide is always organized, usually by the state, often using militias to provide deniability of
state responsibility.”78 The “war on drugs” in the Philippines is clearly state-sponsored. It is the
cornerstone of Duterte’s policies, carried over from his twentytwo-year stint as the mayor of
Davao City. The “war on drugs” is also highly organized, for which Duterte mobilizes both the
police and the military. As soon as he took office, the police released a “watch list” for drug
suspects. In October 2016 Duterte proudly waved a list containing anywhere from 600,000 to a
million names of people he intends to eradicate.79 He also publicly read out a list of government
officials allegedly involved in the illegal drug trade. After a closer examination, however, the list
appears outdated and lacks verified information, as it is based on hearsay and includes names of
deceased individuals and names without surnames.80
Duterte also encourages non-state apparatuses, such as vigilante and hired killers, to
eradicate alleged individuals involved in drugs. “If you know of any addicts, go ahead and kill
them yourself as getting their parents do it would be too painful,” he said in a public speech just
after his inauguration.81 Police hire members of clandestine groups and issue them with a list of
targets. While Duterte defends the idea that vigilante killings are a myth, despite being known as
the “Death Squad Mayor,” eyewitness reports of the killings and even confessions of hired killers
prove otherwise. This is further illustrated in an excerpt from a report by Human Rights Watch:
Relatives, neighbours, and other witnesses told Human Rights Watch that armed
assailants typically worked in groups of two, four, or a dozen. They would wear
civilian clothes, often all black, and have their faces shielded by balaclava-style
headgear or other masks, and baseball caps, or helmets. They would bang on
doors and barge into rooms, but the assailants would not identify themselves or
provide warrants. Family members reported hearing beatings and their loved
ones begging for their lives. The shooting could happen immediately–behind
closed doors or on the street; or the gunmen might take the suspect away, where
minutes later shots would ring out and local residents would find the body; or the
body would be dumped elsewhere later, sometimes with hands tied or the head
wrapped in plastic. Local residents often said they saw uniformed police on the
outskirts of the incident, securing the perimeter—but even if not visible before a
shooting, special crime scene investigators would arrive within minutes.82

The report concludes that the Philippine police were directly involved in these vigilante
killings and that Duterte’s open endorsement of extrajudicial executions of drug suspects

10
implicates him and his senior officials for crimes against humanity.83 However, the participation
of vigilantes in drug operations allows Duterte and the security officers to claim deniability of
state responsibility.

Polarization

Duterte’s “war on drugs” polarizes Philippine society with regard to human rights, the role of the
media, and regional affiliation in the country. Polarization happens when perpetrators of genocide
use propaganda, hate speech, and laws or decrees to divide society,84 therefore allowing them to
continue their activities amidst a lack of public consensus. In her article examining the logics
among Duterte’s supporters, Nicole Curato points out that Duterte’s domestic policy on drugs
hinges on penal populism.85 According to Julian V. Roberts et al., penal populism “consists of a
pursuit of a set of penal policies to win votes rather than to reduce crime or to promote justice.” 86
They argue that populist penal policies are a consequence of intentional exploitation of “public
anxiety about crime and public resentment toward offenders” or a response to “public opinion
without having undertaken an adequate examination of the true nature of public views.” 87 In the
case of Duterte’s policy on drugs it is a way of addressing this latent public anxiety and fear of
crime without sufficient examination of the root cause of crime and reasons for public emotions.
Duterte’s policy on drugs also echoes John Pratt’s articulation of penal populism as an
instrumentalization of perceived public sentiments that criminals and prisoners are favoured over
their victims and law-abiding citizens.88
Pratt puts forward the idea that “penal populism feeds on division and dissent rather than
consensus.”89 Curato confirms that the consequence of penal populism in the Philippines takes the
form of exclusion and divisiveness, as it silences the plight of drug suspects, and the perspectives
of those who fight for their human rights, for the purpose of attending to public frustrations.90 The
Filipinos are deeply divided over the issue. A populist leader like Duterte is obviously backed up
by a staunch and outspoken support base. Social media platforms became forums for Filipinos to
express their opinions about Duterte’s policies. Those who criticize Duterte on social media are
labelled as intellectual elitists and biased human rights supporters who are out of touch with the
realities Filipinos are facing on a daily basis.
Polarization with regard to the Philippine “war on drugs” is also manifested in how the
government parades propaganda information to justify whatever Duterte does. As Stanton
describes it, “motivations for targeting a group are indoctrinated through mass media.” 91 In the
Philippines, claims that Duterte will solve the crime problem consequently target a group of
11
individuals, specifically drug suspects, and therefore garner support from those who fail to screen
the factuality of these claims. Duterte’s supporters efficiently use social media to attack Duterte’s
critics and to glorify him. There are allegations that Duterte mobilizes a group of online trolls to
push his policies.92 These trolls use fake accounts, pick fights with Duterte’s critics online,
propagate fake news, and constantly promote Duterte’s policies.93 If these allegations are true,
active and intentional polarization of public sentiments about the “war on drugs” in the Philippines
is clearly state-sanctioned.
Online accusations are not one-sided. Duterte’s supporters also accuse mainstream media
and Duterte’s critics of spreading fake news about the president and highlighting the “war on
drugs” victims instead of the victims and would-be victims of drug suspects. Mocha Uson, for
example, a Filipino celebrity and ardent supporter of Duterte with a huge online following, calls
mainstream media “presstitutes” for being biased against the president. Uson was recently
appointed as Assistant Secretary of the Presidential Communications Operations Office as
payback for supporting Duterte’s presidential campaign. Uson vowed to oppose mainstream media
using social media but her appointment is a manifestation of a state-sanctioned polarization of
public sentiment and propagation of unreliable information given that she has been involved in
several fake news controversies.94 Uson and her fellow Die-Hard Duterte Supporters (DDS), as
they call themselves, use social media to present an illusory sense of nationalism and pride by
calling Duterte “father” and “protector.” They brandish their legitimacy and representativeness
based on their claim of a huge social media following.95 Their narratives represent the division
between “us” (the DDS) and “them” (the adik and those who defend the adik’s rights). Opposing
views, accompanied by heated debates, not only polarize the public but also fan hatred.

Preparation

Preparation encompasses the previous stages of classification, symbolization, dehumanization,

organization, and polarization. Stanton offers examples used by perpetrators of genocide that can
qualify as a stage of preparation: usage of euphemisms to downplay grave violations of human
rights, indoctrination of fear into the population using hateful rhetoric and propaganda,
mobilization of weapons and troops or militias, justification based on pre-emptive self-defence,
and the creation of political processes as tools to advance their agenda. 96 The previous sections
have touched on these qualifications.
“War on drugs” is a euphemism for extrajudicial killings. It is mass murder in the name of
an illusory war. It is a euphemism enabling the majority to strip away the humanity of drug
12
suspects and to eradicate them without being held accountable. Duterte mobilizes both the police
and the military to “shoot to kill” drug suspects and employs vigilante groups to water down the
responsibility of officers in their participation in extrajudicial killings. Police and military officers
have become immune to legal obligations since Duterte has promised that he will protect them. No
officers or private individuals have faced charges, while families of the victims and witnesses are
silenced by fear of reprisals.97
Duterte is known for his foul mouth and profanity. He has called drug suspects “sons of
whores.” He spews hateful rhetoric, perpetuates fear, and encourages divisiveness by
maintaining a narrative that the Filipino people will be in a state of constant victimization if
drug suspects are not eradicated. This narrative is similar to Stanton’s example of leaders
claiming that “if we do not kill them, they will kill us.”98 This is justification based on self-
defence, thereby indoctrinating fear and obtaining support for mass killings. The following
statements are excerpts from an interview in which he explains his logic behind mass killings
in the Philippines.99 That is not criminal liability. It could not be negligence because you have
to save your life. It could not be recklessness because you have to defend yourself.

If you destroy my country, I will kill you. That is a legitimate thing. If you destroy
our young children, I will kill you. That is a very correct statement.

Threatening criminals with death is not a crime and if they are killed by the
thousands, that is not my problem. My problem is how to take care of the law-
abiding, god-fearing young persons of this Republic.

What is more dangerous than what came out in the above statements is that Duterte’s
supporters, who constitute a majority of government officials and the population, believe in his
words. A leader will not be able to stay long in a powerful position that encourages, commits, and
condones extrajudicial mass killings without the support of its state apparatus and its people. In
the Philippines, state security forces implements Duterte’s “war on drugs,” which generally enjoys
public support. “War on drugs” supporters whom I talked with accept Duterte’s logic that those
who are killed are merely collateral damage in addressing the larger problem of drugs and crime in
the Philippines. Duterte’s divisive fear-mongering among the population and hateful and
dehumanizing rhetoric against drug suspects and their human rights defenders qualify as a
preparation stage of genocide. Classification and symbolization are natural social activities but
they become dangerous if combined with dehumanization.100
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 A key element, and probably the most dangerous, in the preparation stage is the creation
and utilization of political processes to advance the perpetrators’ agenda. While at a glance this
may not seem obvious in the Philippines Duterte has already shown signs of authoritarianism in
the country.101 There has been a pattern in which critics of Duterte and his policies have been
threatened, demeaned, and even jailed. Former justice secretary and current senator Leila de Lima,
a human rights activist and known to be Duterte’s fiercest critic, is now behind bars for her alleged
financial ties with drug syndicates. In 2009, when she was the chairperson of the Commission on
Human Rights (CHR),102 de Lima investigated Duterte’s links to the Davao Death Squad.103 In
2016 she called for an end to vigilante killings and urged the Philippine senate to investigate the
incidents.104 Her pursuits made her a target of hate speech and misogynistic attacks by Duterte and
his supporters. To discredit de Lima the president exposed her romantic affair with her driver who,
according to Duterte, was a drug user and served as de Lima’s collector of financial bribes when
she was justice secretary.105 De Lima denied all allegations but was arrested in February 2017.106
International condemnation of her arrest followed.107 The independent Inter-Parliamentary Union
(IPU), for example, concluded that Duterte and Aguirre portrayed de Lima’s guilt before legal
proceedings had started and expressed concern that her arrest was politically motivated.108
It is common knowledge among residents of Davao City that Duterte used to direct the
Davao Death Squad. Some members of this squad have come forward and confessed their
activities.109 Duterte has both denied and admitted his connection with the Davao Death Squad,110
and prospects for an impartial investigation of his activities by national legislative bodies filled
with those loyal to him remain bleak.111 On the other hand, de Lima, an opponent of extrajudicial
killings, is now in prison for drug allegations. Duterte swiftly used political processes to silence de
Lima but consistently circumvented them by stating that murdering criminals is not a crime.

Extermination
Hitler massacred three million Jews. Now, there are three million drug addicts. I would
be happy to slaughter them. If Germany had Hitler, the Philippines would have [me]. 112

These are the chilling words of Duterte in response to international condemnation of his
“war on drugs.”113 The administration was quick to defend Duterte’s words, saying that his
remarks were misinterpreted and that, unlike Hitler, he only intends to kill three million criminals
and not innocent people.114 Duterte has publicly ordered police officers to shoot to kill those who

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resist arrested and guaranteed presidential protection of officers involved in killings, as illustrated
in the following statements:
If you resist, show violent resistance, my order to police [will be] shoot to kill.
Shoot to kill for organized crime. You heard that? Shoot to kill for every
organized crime.115

Shoot to kill is to shoot and kill him. I do not want the police wasting bullets.116

For as long as it is done in the performance of the duty by the police and soldiers, that
is my responsibility, that is my official and personal guarantee.117

If there are police involved in an encounter, do not investigate them anymore, that is
my order.118

Duterte has also encouraged ordinary citizens to conduct their own arrests of suspected
criminals and stated that he would award those citizens a medal if they killed those who resisted.
“Those among you in your respective neighbourhoods, feel free to call us, the police, or do it
yourself if you have the gun, you have my support,” he said at a public event in June 2016.119
These statements emboldened not only police and military officers but also ordinary civilians to
carry out law and order duties usually meant for trained officers. The rule of law is no longer
exclusive to state forces but has been disseminated to any armed individual willing to conduct an
arrest or to kill. According to Human Rights Watch, “President Duterte appears to have instigated
unlawful acts by the police, incited citizens to commit serious violence, and made himself
criminal[ly] liable under international law for the unlawful killings as a matter of command
responsibility.”120
In January 2017, the Philippine government had to address the news of the death of a
South Korean businessman, Jee Ick-Joo, at the hands of police officers. Rogue police officers
kidnapped Jee and extorted money from his family based on false allegations that he was
connected to the drug trade in the Philippines.121 Fearing damage to bilateral relations with South
Korea, an important ally for the Philippines, Duterte immediately ordered the suspension of drug-
related police operations.122 While stating that he would continue his “war on drugs” until the end
of his presidential term, the suspension was supposedly designed to internally cleanse the national
police of rogue officers.123 According to one Philippine senator vigilante killings coincidentally
stopped right after the suspension.124 However, in another report, unidentified gunmen on a
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motorcycle rained bullets on a twenty-four-year-old man in one of Manila’s poor neighbourhoods
the night after the suspension.125
In March 2017, dela Rosa announced the resumption of drug-related police operations,
vowing that it would be less bloody with stricter policies to prevent the participation of
vigilantes.126 The government still claims no accountability for the more than 7,000 deaths before
this shift to a stricter policy and supposedly less bloody approach despite international calls for an
independent investigation.127 However, within just twenty-four hours of the lifting of the
suspension, police operations killed eight suspects and “justif[ied] those deaths on the dubious
basis that the suspects ‘fought back,’” according to Phelime Kine, deputy director of Human
Rights Watch’s Asia Division.128 Reuters has reported that, since the relaunch of the “Double
Barrel” operation, police officers have become more creative in skewing the death toll by bringing
dead bodies to hospitals to be declared dead on arrival in order to avoid further investigations that
may reveal the incidents as summary executions.129
Dela Rosa also announced that they would include a member of a parish church to make
their campaign credible.130 He reasoned that this plan was a way to safeguard the operations from
abuses. This announcement was clearly an admission that drug-related police operations before the
suspension were bloody with vague policies and participated in by vigilantes. It also manifests that
they want to ensure the façade of credibility of the “war on drugs” by including priests or
representatives of a church, who are not law enforcement officers, during operations.
Duterte is keeping his promise that he will support and protect officers involved in drug-
related operations.131 To date, the worst punishment for officers proven to be involved in unlawful
killing of drug suspects is a six-month suspension.132 Duterte said that he would pardon and even
promote police officers who were involved in the drugrelated killing of Leyte Mayor Rolando
Espinosa.133 With regard to the police officers involved in Jee’s murder, Duterte ordered their
reassignment to conflict zones instead of suspension during the investigations. 134 Duterte formally
apologized to Jee’s family and to South Korea and assured them that those responsible would be
brought to justice.135 However, Duterte has not apologized to them, or assured justice to them, or
held a memorial for the more than 7,000 Filipinos who mostly lived in poverty and died without
proof of guilt, and whose families will now live in worse situations.136
Duterte’s “war on drugs” has a single method: the eradication of drug-related individuals
for his purpose of protecting the Filipino people from crimes that might be committed by those
individuals. Duterte considers this campaign as an eradication of social ills, and not mass killings,
calling drug suspects mere parts of the “apparatus” of illegal drug use 137 and thereby stripping
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them of their humanity. Disturbingly, most Filipinos buy into his rhetoric of fear and hate, as
manifested in his positive approval ratings and the widespread public support for his “war on
drugs.” It is for this rhetoric that they elected him in the first place. “I do not care if I burn in hell
for as long as the people I serve live in paradise,” he said during the election campaign. Duterte’s
scapegoating and paranoia and his messianic rhetoric of delivering the Filipino people from evil
characterize genocidal regimes in the past. Hitler convinced the Germans that the Jews were the
causes of Germany’s problems in the same way that Duterte blames drug suspects for crimes in
the Philippines. The Turkish government committed genocide against the Armenian population
out of resentment and suspicion. Duterte’s government has organized mass killings of drug
suspects out of resentment for previous crimes committed by drug users and dealers and a
suspicion that individuals related to drugs will also commit crimes.

Denial

Stanton lists denial as the final stage and as always following the act of genocide. It is an indicator
that genocide has happened but perpetrators try to cover up their actions by eliminating evidence,
intimidating witnesses, and blocking investigations.138 Stanton adds that their denial is often
followed by placing blame on the victims. I will go through these components of denial, but it
must be noted that Duterte has denied allegations of extrajudicial killings on the record but at the
same time has admitted to killings. As demonstrated in the previous subsections, he has made
numerous public speeches in which he encouraged both state and non-state actors to participate in
eradicating drugrelated individuals while assuring them of his presidential protection.
Duterte’s administration maintains that the more than 7,000 deaths often quoted by news
agencies and international human rights organizations are bloated numbers because they include
cases that are still under investigation, requiring witnesses and forensic examinations. 139 However,
Human Rights Watch concluded that police reports of suspects being killed because they resisted
depart from eyewitness accounts of murders of unarmed suspects already in custody. Human
Rights Watch also adds that “to bolster their claims, the police routinely planted guns, spent
ammunition, and drug packets next to the victims’ bodies.”140 Moreover, as mentioned earlier,
witnesses and families choose not to speak or press charges out of fear of reprisals. 141 These
incidents satisfy key components of the denial stage: covering up evidence and staging the crime
scene, placing the blame on the victims by claiming that they resisted and officers killed them in
self-defence, and inciting fear of reprisal among families and witnesses.

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 Another component of denial that is present in Duterte’s “war on drugs” is the active
obstruction of an independent investigation. Although Duterte has mentioned that he is ready to
face any complaint against him,142 he has used verbal profanity to threaten the UN, the EU, the
US, and human rights organizations for expressing their concern over the casualties of his “war on
drugs.”143 More recently, Duterte has called for the police to shoot human rights activists for
“obstructing justice” and said that he will also investigate those who demand investigations into
his “war on drugs.”144 Moreover, the government has previously dismissed inquiries into Duterte
and the deaths from his “war on drugs.”145 With a legislative branch filled with Duterte backers,
future investigations seem improbable.146

Summary and Conclusion

This article has analysed Duterte’s “war on drugs” by scoping existing news articles, government
briefings, public speeches, and available drug-related statistics. Duterte’s “war on drugs” is a
textbook case of what the processes of genocide look like. Drug suspects in the Philippines are
classified as “bad” and labelled as criminals through symbolisms. Duterte, his administration, and
his supporters believe that drug suspects are not human, or less human than them. As it is a state-
sanctioned policy the “war on drugs” is highly organized with both state and non-state actors
participating in anti-drug operations. This drug war is also polarizing, with one side of the debate
wanting to get rid of drug suspects by whatever means possible and the other side wanting to
protect their human rights. Duterte’s administration has created enforcement programmes,
mobilized police and military apparatuses, and silenced or threatened political critics in order to
efficiently exterminate drug suspects. He has also encouraged civilians to participate not just in
reporting drug suspects but also in shooting them. Duterte is happy to slaughter millions of drug
suspects, likening himself to Hitler. He has ordered “shoot-to-kill” operations and assured officers
involved in these operations of his support and protection.
Duterte justifies his policies using a rhetoric of fear, hatred, and paranoia in order to deny
accountability for the deaths from his “war on drugs.” Police officers in anti-drug operations
eliminate evidence that drug suspects were unarmed and compliant. Due to this state-sponsored
violence, witnesses and family members are intimidated out of speaking for the victims. Duterte
and his administration continue to block independent investigations and threaten critics of his
policies while putting into positions of power people Duterte feels indebted to despite their lack of
qualifications and experience. Considering all these factors, Duterte’s “war on drugs” satisfies the

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stages of genocide as Stanton describes them. It may not fully satisfy the legal definition of
genocide but it has the characteristics found in stages of classification, symbolization,
dehumanization, organization, polarization, preparation, extermination, and denial. This approach
departs from limiting genocide to its legalistic definition and considers a more contextual analysis
of what constitutes an act of genocide.
The analysis in this article also reveals that stages of genocide can be overlapping,
interconnected, and non-linear. First, in Duterte’s “war on drugs,” symbolization happens
simultaneously with extermination when drug suspects are killed and labelled with cardboard
signs. Second, the dehumanization stage traverses other stages. Drug suspects are dehumanized in
the classification, symbolization, and extermination stages. Third, these stages can also be non-
linear. After the deaths of drug suspects, Duterte and his administration propagate rhetoric that
polarizes the public in their opinions of human rights, crime, and public policy on drugs.
Inquiring whether the Philippine “war on drugs” is an act of genocide produces two
opposing but not mutually exclusive answers. The answer is no if the inquiry is kept within the
confines of the legalistic definition of genocide. The answer is yes based on Stanton’s stages of
genocide and other broader definitions of genocide. Applying Stanton’s stages of genocide is an
alternative approach to explaining genocidal events that may not fall under the traditional or
conventional conceptualization of genocide. The problem with this approach, as Moses warns, is
that “it may identify situations as at least ‘pre-genocidal’ that it does not intend to highlight.”147
However, in the case of the Philippine “war on drugs” the stages of genocide have already all been
fulfilled. Some may also argue that Duterte may be responsible for crimes against humanity but
not genocide. While this may be true, how does one reconcile the fact that the Philippine “war on
drugs” fulfils all the stages of genocide? Perhaps it is at this point that it is more rational to depart
from definitionalism and instead focus on what must be done to avert this humanitarian crisis,
whatever name one prefers to give it. As Stanton laments, “debating whether mass killing fits the
conventional definition of genocide is most often an excuse for non-action.”148 Even if one does
not accept that the Philippine “war on drugs” is an act of genocide, using Stanton’s stages adds to
existing discussions and measures on genocide prevention. It sheds light on events related to and
hopes to set an alarm for the state-sponsored humanitarian crisis in the Philippines. It is also a
particularly useful analytical lens for explaining how perpetrators of genocide operate and a
confirmation that genocide is a process,149 a progression of events, and a series of planned
methods operated by organized actors and agencies.

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 Calling the mass murder of drug suspects in the Philippines a “war on drugs” removes its
human toll. It must be called what it is—a mass murder of unarmed, often poor civilians suspected
of using drugs. At his command, Duterte’s administration has successfully incited, if not wholly
organized, the killings of more than 7,000 Filipinos out of fear and a hatred of heinous crimes
previously committed by either suspected or proven drug users. They have justified the killing of
drug suspects by claiming that if they were not killed, they would kill. It is murdering the
“murderer” before the murder happens.

ORCID

Dahlia Simangan http://orcid.org/0000-0001-9418-969X

Notes on contributor
Dahlia Simangan is a Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) postdoctoral fellow
at the United Nations University-Centre for Policy Research, Tokyo. While her main
research examines the cases of post-conflict peacebuilding in Cambodia, Kosovo, and Timor-
Leste in the areas of security, justice and reconciliation, and development, she is also
interested in issues related to democratic governance, rule of law, and human rights. Dahlia is
the recipient of the
2015 Dissertation Award from the Academic Council on the United Nations System
(ACUNS) and the co-founder and former executive director of Peace Perspectives.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320469543_Is_the_Philippine_War_on_Drugs_an_Act_
of_Genocide

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