1
III. LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS The Ombudsman immediately proceeded to the OMB-Visayas office in Cebu City to personally deal with
D. IMPEACHMENT
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 146486. March 4, 2005
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND FORMER DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE VISAYAS ARTURO C.
MOJICA, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a "petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and
alternatively, an original special civil action for certiorari under Sec. 1, Rule 65" of the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals of 18 December 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 58460 entitled, Arturo C. Mojica, Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas v. Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, Over-all Deputy Ombudsman Margarito
Gervacio, Jr. and the Committee of Peers composed of Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrero, Deputy
Ombudsman Rolando Casimiro and Special Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo.
The case had its inception on 29 December 1999, when twenty-two officials and employees of the Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman (OMB) for the Visayas, led by its two directors, filed a formal complaint2 with
the Office of the Ombudsman requesting an investigation on the basis of allegations that then Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas, herein private respondent Arturo Mojica, committed the following:
1. Sexual harassment against Rayvi Padua-Varona;
2. Mulcting money from confidential employees James Alueta and Eden Kiamco; and
3. Oppression against all employees in not releasing the ₱7,200.00 benefits of OMB-Visayas employees
on the date the said amount was due for release.
The complainants further requested that an officer-in-charge from the OMB-Manila be appointed to
manage their office to prevent the Deputy Ombudsman from harassing witnesses and wielding his
influence over them. To underscore the seriousness of their intentions, they threatened to go on a mass
leave of absence, and in fact took their cause to the media.3
The subsequent events, as stated by the Ombudsman and adopted by the Court of Appeals,4 are as
follows:
the office rebellion. Reaching Cebu, the Ombudsman was informed by Petitioner that Petitioner wanted
to proceed to Manila, apparently because of his alienation and the fear for reprisal from his alleged lady
victims’ husbands. Petitioner in fact already had a ticket for the plane leaving two hours later that day.
The Ombudsman assented to the quick movement to Manila for Petitioner’s safety and the interest of
the Office’s operations. Subsequently, the Ombudsman installed Assistant Ombudsman Nicanor J. Cruz
as the Officer-in-Charge of OMB-Visayas.
Acting on the formal complaint against petitioner, the Ombudsman directed his Fact-Finding and
Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) to conduct a verification and fact-finding investigation on the matter. The FFIB,
later in its Report, found the evidence against Petitioner strong on the charges of acts of extortion,
sexual harassment and oppression. The FFIB report was referred by the Ombudsman to a constituted
Committee of Peers composed of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, The Special Prosecutor and the
Deputy Ombudsman for the Military.
The Committee of Peers initially recommended that the investigation be converted into one solely for
purposes of impeachment. However, this recommendation was denied by the Ombudsman after careful
study, and following the established stand of the Office of the Ombudsman that the Deputy Ombudsmen
and The Special Prosecutor are not removable through impeachment. As succintly (sic) stated by the
Ombudsman in his Memorandum dated March 27, 2000 (in reiteration of the March 13, 2000 Order of
Overall Deputy Ombudsman) -
Acting on your query as to whether or not the Ombudsman confirms or affirms the disapproval by
Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr., of your recommendation to conduct instead an
investigation of the complaint against Deputy Ombudsman Arturo C. Mojica solely for the purpose of
impeachment, I hereby confirm the action of disapproval.
Moreover, as demonstrated in many previous cases against Deputy Ombudsman Arturo C. Mojica,
Deputy Ombudsman Manuel B. Casaclang, Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrero, Special Prosecutor
Leonardo P. Tamayo and former Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco A. Villa, the official position of
the Office is that the Constitution, R.A. 6770 and the Supreme Court in Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, G.R. No.
80578, 19 May 1988, exclude the Deputy Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor from the list of
impeachable officials and the Jarque case involves Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto as respondent,
hence, the mention therein of the Deputy Ombudsmen is merely an obiter dictum. Two of your present
members in fact participated in the investigation of the previous Mojica cases and thereafter
recommended the dismissal thereof for lack of merit.
In the same Memorandum, the Ombudsman directed the Committee of Peers to evaluate the merits of
the case and if warranted by evidence, to conduct administrative and criminal investigation(s)
immediately thereafter. Upon evaluation, the Committee recommended the docketing of the complaint
as criminal and administrative cases. The Committee of Peers’ Evaluation dated 30 March 2000, stated as
follows:
On the basis of the foregoing facts, duly supported with sworn-statements executed by all concerned
parties, the undersigned members of the COP find sufficient cause to warrant the conduct of preliminary
investigation and administrative adjudication against Deputy Ombudsman Arturo C. Mojica for the
following criminal and administrative offenses, namely:
I. CRIMINAL

Violation of Section 3, paragraph[s] (b) and (e) of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act);
Violation of R.A. 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995),
II. ADMINISTRATIVE
a. Dishonesty
b. Grave Misconduct
c. Oppression
d. Conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service
e. Directly or indirectly having financial and material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of
his Office; (Section 22, paragraphs (A), (C), (N), (T) and (U), Rule XIV of Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise known as the "Administrative Code of 1987".)
Accordingly, let the instant case be docketed separately, one for the criminal case and another for the
administrative case covering all the offenses specified above and, thereafter, a formal investigation be
simultaneously and jointly conducted by the Committee of Peers, pursuant to Administrative Order No.
7.
Accordingly, on 6 April 2000, the Committee of Peers (COP) directed the herein private respondent
Mojica in OMB-0-00-0615 entitled, Padua-Varona v. Mojica, for violation of Republic Act No. 7877 (Anti-
Sexual Harassment Act of 1995) and Sec. 3, par. (b) and (c) of Rep. Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act) to submit his controverting evidence.
On 10 April 2000, the complainants in OMB-0-00-0615 filed a Motion to Place Respondent Under
Preventive Suspension,5 claiming that the offenses for which private respondent Mojica was charged
warranted removal from office, the evidence against him was strong, and that Mojica’s continued stay in
office would prejudice the case, as he was harassing some witnesses and complainants to recant or
otherwise desist from pursuing the case.
On the same date, the Ombudsman issued a Memorandum6 to the COP, directing them to conduct
administrative proceedings in OMB-ADM-0-00-0316 entitled, OMB Visayas Employees v. Mojica (for
dishonesty, grave misconduct, oppression, conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service,
and directly or indirectly having financial and material interest in any transaction requiring the approval
of his office), and submit a recommendation on the propriety of putting Mojica under preventive
suspension.
Subsequently, the COP issued an Order7 in OMB-ADM-0-00-0316 finding prima facie evidence against
Mojica and requiring him to submit an answer to the above-mentioned offenses within ten days, as well
as his counter-affidavit and supporting evidence.8
2
Aggrieved, the private respondent filed a petition9 for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals praying that
a resolution be issued:
1. . . . issuing a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) upon the filing of the petition to enjoin and restrain
the respondents, (the Ombudsman, the Over-all Deputy Ombudsman, the Committee of Peers, and the
Special Prosecutor) their agents and representatives, from suspending the petitioner (herein private
respondent Mojica);
2. thereafter, converting said TRO into a Writ of Preliminary Injunction;
3. after hearing, a decision be rendered declaring the following acts of the Ombudsman null and void ab
initio:
a. detailing and assigning indefinitely the petitioner to OMB-Manila "in a [special] capacity," thus
effectively demoting/suspending petitioner, and preventing him from preparing his defense;
b. authorizing or directing the docketing of the complaints against the petitioner, which is equivalent to
authorizing the filing of the administrative and/or criminal cases against the petitioner, who is an
impeachable official;
c. denying the request of petitioner for leave of absence, which acts were done without lawful authority,
in a malevolent and oppressive manner and without jurisdiction.
On 04 May 2000, the Court of Appeals resolved to grant the prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and
required the Ombudsman to comment and show cause why no writ of preliminary injunction should be
issued, which reads in part:
Meanwhile, to maintain the status quo and in order to forestall the petition at bench from becoming
moot and academic, and considering that upon examination of the records we believe that there is an
urgent need for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to prevent great and irreparable injury
that would result to herein petitioner before the matter could be heard on notice, the herein
respondents, their agents and representatives acting for and in their behalf or under their authority, are
hereby enjoined and restrained from proceeding with the hearing of the Motion to Place Respondent
Under Preventive Suspension dated April 10, 2000, which hearing is set on May 9, 2000 at 2:00 o’clock in
the afternoon and/or from conducting any further proceedings relative to the suspension from (o)ffice of
the herein petitioner until further order and/or notice from this Court.10
Nevertheless, on 6 June 2000, the COP issued an Order11 in both OMB-0-00-0615 and OMB-ADM-0-00-
0316 to the effect that having failed to submit the required counter-affidavits despite the lapse of
seventeen days from the expiration of the extended reglementary period for filing the same, respondent
Mojica was deemed to have waived his right to present his evidence. The COP thus deemed both
criminal and administrative cases submitted for resolution on the basis of the evidence on record.
Thus, on 13 June 2000, the private respondent thus filed an urgent motion12 before the Court of Appeals
to enjoin the Ombudsman from taking any action whatsoever in the criminal and administrative cases
aforementioned. The following day, the private respondent filed another urgent motion, this time
praying that the Court of Appeals issue an order requiring the Ombudsman to show cause why it should
not be cited for contempt for failing to conform with the 4 May 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals.

On 20 June 2000, the Court of Appeals directed13 the Ombudsman to comment on the above pleadings,
and to comply with the former’s Temporary Restraining Order of 4 May 2000.
The parties subsequently exchanged various pleadings that culminated in a Resolution14 by the Court of
Appeals on 5 July 2000 that, among other things, directed the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining all therein respondents from taking any action whatsoever in cases No. OMB-0-00-0615
(criminal) and No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0316 (administrative) against Mojica, and deemed the instant
petition submitted for resolution on the merits upon the submission of the comment or explanation on
the appellate court’s show cause Resolution of 20 June 2000.
Meanwhile, on 19 June 2000, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military directed the private
respondent Mojica ostensibly to answer a different set of charges for "violation of Art. 266 and Sec. 3(e)
of Rep. Act No. 3019" (OMB-00-0-1050) and for "grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service"15 (OMB-ADM-0-00-0506). Feeling that this was merely an
attempt at circumventing the directives of the Court of Appeals, Mojica filed an urgent motion before
the Court of Appeals for respondents to show cause again why they should not be cited for contempt.
By way of opposition, the Ombudsman pointed out that the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the
appellate court was against any action taken in cases No. OMB-0-00-0615 and No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0316,
and not against any new cases filed against the private respondent thereafter. The Ombudsman further
pointed out that since Mojica’s term of office had already expired as of 6 July 2000, the private
respondent could no longer invoke his alleged immunity from suit.
On 14 August 2000, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military issued an order deeming that
cases No. OMB-0-00-1050 and No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0506 had been deemed submitted for resolution on
the basis of the evidence at hand. On 17 August 2000, the private respondent filed an urgent motion for
the immediate issuance of an order enjoining the Ombudsman from taking any further action
whatsoever in OMB-ADM-0-00-0506 and OMB-0-00-1050.16
On 18 December 2000, despite the expiration of private respondent Mojica’s term of office, the Court of
Appeals nevertheless rendered the assailed Decision17 on the grounds of public interest.
In essence, the appellate court held that although the 1987 Constitution, the deliberations thereon, and
the commentaries of noted jurists, all indicate that a Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable official,
it was nevertheless constrained to hold otherwise on the basis of this Court’s past rulings. Thus, the
dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the order of the Committee of Peers in its Evaluation dated
March 30, 2000 directing the docketing separately of the criminal case as well as the administrative case
against the petitioner is hereby SET ASIDE and DECLARED NULL AND VOID. Accordingly, the complaints
in Criminal Case No. OMB-0-00-0615 and Administrative Case No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0316, respectively,
filed against the petitioner are hereby DISMISSED. All acts or orders of the Ombudsman, the Overall
Deputy Ombudsman and the Committee of Peers, subjecting the petitioner [herein private respondent]
to criminal and administrative investigations, or pursuant to such investigations, are likewise
hereby DECLARED INVALID.18
Thereupon, on 15 January 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before this Court "a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and alternatively, an original
3
special civil action for certiorari under Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the same rules," of the above decision, on the
following grounds:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ERRONEOUSLY RULING THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENT, AS THEN DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE VISAYAS, IS AN IMPEACHABLE
OFFICIAL, CONSIDERING THAT THE PLAIN TEXT OF SEC. 2, ART. XI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, AS WELL
AS THE INTENT OF THE FRAMERS THEREOF, EXCLUDES A DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FROM THE LIST OF
IMPEACHABLE OFFICIALS.
II
THE PRINCIPLE OF STARE DECISIS ET NON QUIETA MOVERE MAY NOT BE INVOKED TO PERPETUATE AN
ERRONEOUS OBITER DICTUM.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS NO JURISDICTION TO ORDER THE DISMISSAL OF A CRIMINAL
CASE AGAINST A RETIRED DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN, WHICH IS STILL PENDING PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION BEFORE PETITIONER OMBUDSMAN.19
At the outset, it bears noting that instead of assailing the Court of Appeals Decision solely by petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner lodged the present
petition "alternatively" as "an original special civil action for certiorari under Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the same
rules."
It is settled that the appeal from a final disposition of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review under
Rule 45 and not a special civil action under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 45 is clear
that the decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the
nature of the action or proceeding involved, may be appealed to this Court by filing a petition for review,
which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. Under Rule 45, the
reglementary period to appeal is fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or denial of motion for
reconsideration.20
The records show that following the petitioner’s receipt on 5 January 2001 of a copy the Court of
Appeals Decision, it filed the present petition on 16 January 2001, well within the reglementary period so
indicated.
We go now into the substantive aspect of this case, where we are presented an attack upon a prior
interpretation of Article XI, Sec. 2 in relation to Article XI, Sec. 8 of our Constitution.
The interpretation in question first appears in Cuenco v. Fernan,21 a disbarment case against then
Associate Justice Marcelo Fernan filed by Atty. Miguel Cuenco, a former member of the House of
Representatives, where we held in part:

There is another reason why the complaint for disbarment here must be dismissed. Members of the
Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7)(1) of the Constitution, be members of the Philippine Bar and
may be removed from office only by impeachment (Article XI [2], Constitution). To grant a complaint for
disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Member’s incumbency, would in effect be to
circumvent and hence to run afoul of the constitutional mandate that Members of the Court may be
removed from office only by impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI (2) of
the Constitution. Precisely the same situation exists in respect of the Ombudsman and his
deputies (Article XI [8] in relation to Article XI [2], id.), a majority of the members of the Commission on
Elections (Article IX [C] [1] [1] in relation to Article XI [2], id.), and the members of the Commission on
Audit who are not certified public accountants (Article XI [D] [1] [1], id.), all of whom are constitutionally
required to be members of the Philippine Bar. (Emphasis supplied.)
Barely two months later, we issued another Resolution in In Re: Raul M. Gonzales,22 concerning the same
charges for disbarment brought against Justice Fernan, wherein we cited the above ruling to underscore
the principle involved in the case, that "[a] public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a
member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from
office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public
officer."23
In 1995, we subsequently anchored our Resolution in Jarque v. Desierto,24 a disbarment case against
then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, on the above ruling, adding that:
. . . [T]he court is not here saying that the Ombudsman and other constitutional officers who are
required by the Constitution to be members of the Philippine Bar and are remova[ble] only by
impeachment, are immunized from liability possibly for criminal acts or for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility or other claimed misbehavior. What the Court is saying is that there is here a
fundamental procedural requirement which must be observed before such liability may be determined
and enforced. The Ombudsman or his deputies must first be removed from office via the constitutional
route of impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure of
the Ombudsman be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to answer either criminally
or administratively – e.g., in disbarment proceedings – for any wrong or misbehavior which may be
proven against him in appropriate proceedings. (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, in Lastimosa-Dalawampu v. Deputy Ombudsman Mojica and Graft Investigator Labella,25 the
Court, citing its Resolution in Jarque v. Desierto,26 dismissed, in a minute resolution, the complaint for
disbarment against the herein private respondent Mojica in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for the
Visayas, stating that:
Anent the complaint for disbarment against respondent Arturo C. Mojica in his capacity as Deputy
Ombudsman for Visayas, suffice it to state that a public officer whose membership in the Philippine Bar
is a qualification for the office held by him and removable only by impeachment cannot be charged with
disbarment during his membership (In Re: Raul M. Gonzales, 160 SCRA 771, 774 [1988]; Cuenco vs.
Fernan, 158 SCRA 29, 40 [1988]). And we have held in the case of Jarque vs. Desierto (A.C. No. 4509, En
Banc Resolution December 5, 1995), that the Ombudsman or his deputies must first be removed from
office via impeachment before they may be held to answer for any wrong or misbehavior which may be
proven against them in disbarment proceedings.
The above Resolution was subsequently made the basis of the appellate court’s assailed Decision of 18
December 2000. Thus, in holding that a Deputy Ombudsman is an impeachable officer, the appellate
4
court stated that it had to "defer to the loftier principle of adherence to judicial precedents, otherwise
known as the doctrine of Stare Decisis.... necessary for the uniformity and continuity of the law and also
to give stability to society."27
Nevertheless, the court a quo took pains to point out that the 1987 Constitution, the deliberations
thereon, and the opinions of constitutional law experts all indicate that the Deputy Ombudsman
is not an impeachable officer.
Is the Deputy Ombudsman, then, an impeachable officer? Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,
states that:
Sec. 2. The President, the Vice-President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for,
and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other
high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from
office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
To determine whether or not the Ombudsman therein mentioned refers to a person or to an office,
reference was made by the appellate court to the Records of the Constitutional Commission, as well as
to the opinions of leading commentators in constitutional law. Thus:
. . . It appears that the members of the Constitutional Commission have made reference only to the
Ombudsman as impeachable, excluding his deputies. The pertinent portions of the record read, to wit:
MR. REGALADO. Yes, thank you.
On Section 10, regarding the Ombudsman, there has been concern aired by Commissioner Rodrigo about
who will see to it that the Ombudsman will perform his duties because he is something like a guardian of
the government. This recalls the statement of Juvenal that while the Ombudsman is the guardian of the
people, "Quis custodiet ipsos custodies," who will guard the guardians? I understand here that the
Ombudsman who has the rank of a chairman of a constitutional commission is also removable only by
impeachment.
MR. ROMULO. That is the intention, Madam President.
MR. REGALADO. Only the Ombudsman?
MR. MONSOD. Only the Ombudsman.
MR. REGALADO. So not his deputies, because I am concerned with the phrase "have the rank of." We
know, for instance, that the City Fiscal of Manila has the rank of a justice of the Intermediate Appellate
Court, and yet he is not a part of the judiciary. So I think we should clarify that also and read our
discussions into the Record for purposes of the Commission and the Committee.
MR. ROMULO. Yes. If I may just comment: the Ombudsman in this provision is a rank in itself really. That
is how we look at it. But for purposes of government classification and salary, we thought we have to
give him a recognizable or an existing rank as a point of reference more than anything else.

MR. REGALADO. Yes, but my concern is whether or not he is removable only by impeachment, because
Section 2 enumerates the impeachable officials, and it does not mention public officers with the rank of
constitutional commissioners.
MR. ROMULO. But we do mention them as the Ombudsman is mentioned in that enumeration. We used
the word "Ombudsman" because we would like it to be his title; we do not want him called "Chairman"
or "Justice." We want him called Ombudsman.
MR. DAVIDE. I will not insist.
On lines 13 and 14, I move for the deletion of the words "and the Ombudsman." The Ombudsman should
not be placed on the level of the President and the Vice-President, the members of the judiciary and the
members of the Constitutional Commissions in the matter of removal from office.
MR. MONSOD. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Monsod is recognized.
MR. MONSOD. We regret we cannot accept the amendment because we feel that the Ombudsman is at
least on the same level as the Constitutional Commissioners and this is one way of insulating it from
politics.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, to make the members of the Ombudsman removable only by
impeachment would be to enshrine and install an officer whose functions are not as delicate as the
others whom we wanted to protect from immediate removal by way of an impeachment.
MR. MONSOD. We feel that an officer in the Ombudsman, if he does his work well, could be stepping on
a lot of toes. We would really prefer to keep him there but we would like the body to vote on it, although
I would like to ask if we still have a quorum, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Do we have a quorum? There are members who are in the lounge.
The Secretary-General and the pages conduct an actual count of the Commissioners present.
THE PRESIDENT. We have a quorum.
MR. MONSOD. May we restate the proposed amendment for the benefit of those who were not here a
few minutes ago.
MR. DE LOS REYES. Madam President, parliamentary inquiry. I thought that amendment was already
covered in the amendment of Commissioner Rodrigo. One of those amendments proposed by
Commissioner Rodrigo was to delete the word "Ombudsman" and, therefore, we have already voted on
it.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, may I comment on that.
5
THE PRESIDENT. Yes, the Gentleman may proceed.
MR. DAVIDE. The proposed amendment of Commissioner Rodrigo was the total deletion of the Office of
the Ombudsman and all sections relating to it. It was rejected by the body and, therefore, we can have
individual amendments now on the particular sections.
THE PRESIDENT. The purpose of the amendment of Commissioner Davide is not just to include the
Ombudsman among those officials who have to be removed from office only on impeachment. Is that
right?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote on the amendment, may I ask a question?
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO. The Ombudsman, is this only one man?
MR. DAVIDE. Only one man.
MR. RODRIGO. Not including his deputies.
MR. MONSOD. No.
Moreover, this Court has likewise taken into account the commentaries of the leading legal luminaries
on the Constitution as to their opinion on whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman is impeachable. All of
them agree in unison that the impeachable officers enumerated in Section 2, Article XI of the 1986
Constitution is exclusive. In their belief, only the Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable.
Foremost among them is the erudite Justice Isagani A. Cruz (ret.), who opined:
The impeachable officers are the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President, the members of the
Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman. (see Art. XI, Sec.
2) The list is exclusive and may not be increased or reduced by legislative enactment. The power to
impeach is essentially a non-legislative prerogative and can be exercised by the Congress only within the
limits of the authority conferred upon it by the Constitution. This authority may not be expanded by the
grantee itself even if motivated by the desire to strengthen the security of tenure of other officials of the
government.
It is now provided by decree (see P.D. No. 1606) that justices of the Sandiganbayan may be removed only
through process of impeachment, the purpose evidently being to withdraw them from the removal
power of the Supreme Court. This prohibition is of dubious constitutionality. In the first place, the list of
impeachable officers is covered by the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius." Secondly, Article
VIII, Section 11, of the Constitution states that all judges of inferior courts – and this would include the
Sandiganbayan – are under the disciplinary power of the Supreme Court and may be removed by it. This
view is bolstered by the last sentence of Article XI, Section 2, which runs in full as follows:

Sec. 2. The President, the Vice-President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high
crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment. (Cruz, Isagani A., Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., pp. 333-
334)
Equally worth noting is the opinion of no less than Rev. Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., himself who was a
member of the Constitutional Commission which drafted the 1987 Constitution, (who) asserted:
Q. Is the list of officers subject to impeachment found in Section 2 exclusive?
A. As presently worded, yes.
(Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., The 1987 Philippine Constitution, A Reviewer-Primer, 1997 ed., p. 401)
Last but certainly not the least is the equally erudite Representative Antonio B. Nachura himself, who, as
a professor of law, commented that the enumeration of impeachable officers in Section 2, Article XI of
the 1987 Constitution, is exclusive. (Nachura, Antonio B., Outline/Reviewer in Political Law, 1998 ed., p.
192)28
From the foregoing, it is immediately apparent that, as enumerated in Sec. 2 of Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, only the following are impeachable officers: the President, the Vice President, the
members of the Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman.29
How then to explain our earlier pronouncement in Cuenco v. Fernan, as later cited in In Re: Raul M.
Gonzales, Jarque v. Desierto and Lastimosa-Dalawampu v. Dep. Ombudsman Mojica and Graft
Investigator Labella? By way of reiteration, said Resolution reads in part:
. . . To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Member’s incumbency,
would in effect be to circumvent and hence to run afoul of the constitutional mandate that Members of
the Court may be removed from office only by impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed
in Article XI [2] of the Constitution. Precisely the same situation exists in respect of the Ombudsman and
his deputies (Article XI [8] in relation to Article XI [2]), . . . all of whom are constitutionally required to be
members of the Philippine Bar.30 (Emphasis supplied)
In cross-referencing Sec. 2, which is an enumeration of impeachable officers, with Sec. 8, which lists the
qualifications of the Ombudsman and his deputies, the intention was to indicate, by way of obiter
dictum, that as with members of this Court, the officers so enumerated were also constitutionally
required to be members of the bar.
A dictum is an opinion that does not embody the resolution or determination of the court, and made
without argument, or full consideration of the point. Mere dicta are not binding under the doctrine
of stare decisis.31
6
The legal maxim "stare decisis et non quieta movere" (follow past precedents and do not disturb what
has been settled) states that where the same questions relating to the same event have been put
forward by parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the
rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.32
The succeeding cases of In Re: Raul M. Gonzales and Jarque v. Desierto do not tackle the impeachability
of a Deputy Ombudsman either. Nor, for that matter, does Lastimosa-Dalawampu v. Deputy
Ombudsman Mojica and Graft Investigator Labella, which, as previously mentioned, is a minute
resolution dismissing a complaint for disbarment against the herein private respondent on the basis of
the questioned obiter in Cuenco v. Fernan and the succeeding cases without going into the merits.
Thus, where the issue involved was not raised nor presented to the court and not passed upon by the
court in the previous case, the decision in the previous case is not stare decisis of the question
presented.33
As to whether or not the private respondent, then Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, may be held
criminally and/or administratively liable, we likewise resolve the issue in favor of the petitioner.
The rule that an impeachable officer cannot be criminally prosecuted for the same offenses which
constitute grounds for impeachment presupposes his continuance in office.34 Hence, the moment he is
no longer in office because of his removal, resignation, or permanent disability, there can be no bar to
his criminal prosecution in the courts.35
Nor does retirement bar an administrative investigation from proceeding against the private respondent,
given that, as pointed out by the petitioner, the former’s retirement benefits have been placed on hold
in view of the provisions of Sections 1236 and 1337 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
WHEREFORE, the Order of the Court of Appeals dated 18 December 2000 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The complaints in Criminal Case No. OMB-0-00-0615 and Administrative Case No. OMB-ADM-0-
00-0316 are hereby REINSTATED and the Office of the Ombudsman is ordered to proceed with the
investigation relative to the above cases.
SO ORDERED.
The case had its inception on 29 December 1999, when twenty-two officials and employees of the Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman (OMB) for the Visayas, led by its two directors, filed a formal complaint with
the Office of the Ombudsman requesting an investigation on the basis of allegations that then Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas, private respondent Arturo Mojica, committed the following: 1. Sexual
harassment against Rayvi Padua-Varona; 2. Mulcting money from confidential employees James Alueta
and Eden Kiamco; and 3. Oppression against all employees in not releasing the P7,200.00 benefits of
OMB-Visayas employees. The complaints in Criminal Case No. OMB-0-00-0615 and Administrative Case
No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0316, were dismissed.
Thereupon, on 15 January 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before this Court “a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and alternatively, an original
special civil action for certiorari under Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the same rules,

ISSUE: Is the Deputy Ombudsman an impeachable officer under Section 2, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution?
RULING:
The 1987 Constitution, the deliberations thereon, and the opinions of constitutional law experts all
indicate that the Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer. The court has likewise taken into
account the commentaries of the leading legal luminaries on the Constitution as to their opinion on
whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman is impeachable. All of them agree in unison that the
impeachable officers enumerated in Section 2, Article XI of the 1986 Constitution is exclusive. In their
belief, only the Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable. The impeachable officers are the
President of the Philippines, the Vice-President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman. (see Art. XI, Sec. 2) The list is exclusive and may not
be increased or reduced by legislative enactment.
The rule that an impeachable officer cannot be criminally prosecuted for the same offenses which
constitute grounds for impeachment presupposes his continuance in office.Hence, the moment he is no
longer in office because of his removal, resignation, or permanent disability, there can be no bar to his
criminal prosecution in the courts. Nor does retirement bar an administrative investigation from
proceeding against the private respondent, given that, as pointed out by the petitioner, the former’s
retirement benefits have been placed on hold in view of the provisions of Sections 12 and 13 of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
OMBUDSMAN VS MOJICA
GR No. 146486, March 4, 2005
FACTS:
Arturo Mojica, Deputy Ombudsman of Visayas was investigated from the averment of two (2) officials
and employee on the basis of committed sexual harassment, mulcting money from confidential
employees and oppression against all employees. The recommendation was denied by the Ombudsman
following the established stand that the deputy Ombudsman and special prosecutor cannot be
impeached.
ISSUE: Under Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, is the Deputy Ombudsman an impeachable
officer?
HELD:
No. the Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer. The court has likewise taken into account the
commentaries of the leading legal luminaries on the Constitution as to their opinion on whether or not
the Deputy Ombudsman is impeachable. All of them agree in unison that the impeachable officers
enumerated in Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution is exclusive. In their belief, only the
Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable. The impeachable officers are the President of the
7
Philippines, the Vice-President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman.
Facts:
The case had its inception on 29 December 1999, when twenty-two officials and employees of the Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman (OMB) for the Visayas, led by its two directors, filed a formal complaint with
the Office of the Ombudsman requesting an investigation on the basis of allegations that then Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas, private respondent Arturo Mojica, committed the following:
1) Sexual harassment against Rayvi Padua-Varona;
2) Mulcting money from confidential employees James Alueta and Eden Kiamco; and
3) Oppression against all employees in not releasing the P7,200.00 benefits of OMB-Visayas employees.
The complaints in Criminal Case No. OMB-0-00-0615 and administrative Case No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0316,
were dismissed. Thereupon, on 15 January 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before this Court “a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and alternatively, an
original special civil action for certiorari under Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the same rules.
Issue: Is the Deputy Ombudsman an impeachable officer under Section 2, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution?
Ruling:
The 1987 Constitution, the deliberations thereon, and the opinions of constitutional law experts all
indicate that the Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer. The court has likewise taken into
account the commentaries of the leading legal luminaries on the Constitution as to their opinion on
whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman is impeachable. All of them agree in unison that the
impeachable officers enumerated in Section 2, Article XI of the 1986 Constitution is exclusive. In their
belief, only the Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable. The impeachable officers are the
President of the Philippines, the Vice-President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman. (see Art. XI, Sec. 2) The list is exclusive and may not
be increased or reduced by legislative enactment. The rule that an impeachable officer cannot be
criminally prosecuted for the same offenses which constitute grounds for impeachment presupposes his
continuance in office. Hence, the moment he is no longer in office because of his removal, resignation, or
permanent disability, there can be no bar to his criminal prosecution in the courts. Nor does retirement
bar an administrative investigation from proceeding against the private respondent, given that, as
pointed out by the petitioner, the former’s retirement benefits have been placed on hold in view of the
provisions of the Republic of the Philippines.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 193459 March 8, 2011
MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ Petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, RISA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, DANILO D.
LIM, FELIPE PESTAÑO, EVELYN PESTAÑO, RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAGONG
ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN); MOTHER MARY JOHN MANANZAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON OF
PAGBABAGO; DANILO RAMOS, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS
(KMP); ATTY. EDRE OLALIA, ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLE'S
LAWYERS (NUPL); FERDINAND R. GAITE, CHAIRPERSON, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION
AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE); and JAMES TERRY RIDON OF THE
LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS), Respondents.
FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., Respondent-Intervenor.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
For resolution is petitioner’s "Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated 15 February 2011)"
dated February 25, 2011 (Motion).
Upon examination of the averments in the Motion, the Court finds neither substantial nor cogent reason
to reconsider its Decision. A plain reading of the Decision could very well dispose of petitioner’s previous
contentions, raised anew in the Motion, but the Court finds it proper, in writing finis to the issue, to draw
petitioner’s attention to certain markers in the Decision.
I unequivocal or well-defined than the elucidation of filing-and-referral in Francisco. Petitioner must come
Contrary to petitioner’s assertion that the Court sharply deviated from the ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The
House of Representatives,1 the Decision of February 15, 2011 reaffirmed and illuminated
the Francisco doctrine in light of the particular facts of the present case.
To argue, as petitioner does, that there never was a simultaneous referral of two impeachment
complaints as they were actually referred to the committee "separately, one after the other"2 is to
dismantle her own interpretation of Francisco that the one-year bar is to be reckoned from the filing of
the impeachment complaint. Petitioner’s Motion concedes3 that the Francisco doctrine on the initiation
of an impeachment proceeding includes the House’s initial action on the complaint. By recognizing the
legal import of a referral, petitioner abandons her earlier claim that per Francisco an impeachment
proceeding is initiated by the mere filing of an impeachment complaint.
Having uprooted her reliance on the Francisco case in propping her position that the initiation of an
impeachment proceeding must be reckoned from the filing of the complaint, petitioner insists on actual
initiation and not "constructive initiation by legal fiction" as averred by Justice Adolfo Azcuna in his
separate opinion in Francisco.
8
In Justice Azcuna’s opinion which concurred with the majority, what he similarly found untenable was
the stretching of the reckoning point of initiation to the time that the Committee on Justice (the
Committee) report reaches the floor of the House.4 Notably, the provisions of the Impeachment Rules of
the 12th Congress that were successfully challenged in Francisco provided that an impeachment
proceeding was to be "deemed initiated" upon the Committee’s finding of sufficiency of substance or
upon the House’s affirmance or overturning of the Committee’s finding,5 which was clearly referred to as
the instances "presumably for internal purposes of the House, as to the timing of some of its internal
action on certain relevant matters."6 Definitely, "constructive initiation by legal fiction" did not refer to
the aspects of filing and referral in the regular course of impeachment, for this was precisely the gist
of Francisco in pronouncing what initiation means.
The Court adhered to the Francisco-ordained balance in the tug-of-war between those who want
to stretch and those who want to shrink the term "initiate," either of which could disrupt the provision’s
congruency to the rationale of the constitutional provision. Petitioner’s imputation that the Court’s
Decision presents a sharp deviation from Francisco as it defers the operability of the one-year bar rule
rings hollow.
Petitioner urges that the word "initiate" must be read in its plain, ordinary and technical meaning, for it
is contrary to reason, logic and common sense to reckon the beginning or start of the initiation process
from its end or conclusion.
Petitioner would have been correct had the subject constitutional provision been worded as "no
initiation process of the impeachment proceeding shall be commenced against the same official more
than once within a period of one year," in which case the reckoning would literally point to the "start of
the beginning." To immediately reckon the initiation to what petitioner herself concedes as the start of
the initiation process is to countenance a raw or half-baked initiation.
In re-affirming what the phrase "no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated" means, the Court
closely applied Francisco on what comprises or completes the initiation phase. Nothing can be more
to terms with her denial of the exact terms of Francisco.
Petitioner posits that referral is not an integral or indispensable part of the initiation of impeachment
proceedings, in case of a direct filing of a verified complaint or resolution of impeachment by at least
one-third of all the Members of the House.7
The facts of the case do not call for the resolution of this issue however. Suffice it to restate a footnote in
the Court’s Decision that in such case of "an abbreviated mode of initiation[, x x x] the filing of the
complaint and the taking of initial action [House directive to automatically transmit] are merged into a
single act."8 Moreover, it is highly impossible in such situation to coincidentally initiate a second
impeachment proceeding in the interregnum, if any, given the period between filing and referral.
Petitioner’s discussion on the singular tense of the word "complaint" is too tenuous to require
consideration. The phraseology of the one-year bar rule does not concern itself with a numerical
limitation of impeachment complaints. If it were the intention of the framers of the Constitution to limit
the number of complaints, they would have easily so stated in clear and unequivocal language.
Petitioner further avers that the demonstrated concerns against reckoning the period from the filing of
the complaint are mere possibilities based on a general mistrust of the Filipino people and their
 9

Representatives. To her, mere possibility of abuse is not a conclusive argument against the existence of IN SUM, the Court did not deviate from, as it did apply the twin rule of filing and referral in the present
power nor a reason to invalidate a law. case, with Francisco as the guiding light. Petitioner refuses to see the other half of that light, however.

The present case does not involve an invalidation of a legal provision on a grant of power. Since the issue II
precisely involves upholding an express limitation of a power, it behooves the Court to look into the
rationale behind the constitutional proscription which guards against an explicit instance of abuse of
Petitioner, meanwhile, reiterates her argument that promulgation means publication. She again cites her
power. The Court’s duty entails an examination of the same possible scenarios considered by the framers
thesis that Commonwealth Act No. 638, Article 2 of the Civil Code, and the two Tañada v. Tuvera11 cases
of the Constitution (i.e., incidents that may prove to disrupt the law-making function of Congress and
mandate that the Impeachment Rules be published for effectivity. Petitioner raises nothing new to
unduly or too frequently harass the impeachable officer), which are basically the same grounds being
change the Court’s stance on the matter.
invoked by petitioner to arrive at her desired conclusion.

To reiterate, when the Constitution uses the word "promulgate," it does not necessarily mean to publish
Ironically, petitioner also offers the Court with various possibilities and vivid scenarios to grimly illustrate
in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. Promulgation, as used in Section 3(8),
her perceived oppression. And her own mistrust leads her to find inadequate the existence of the
Article XI of the Constitution, suitably takes the meaning of "to make known" as it should be generally
pertinent constitutional provisions, and to entertain doubt on "the respect for and adherence of the
understood.
House and the respondent committee to the same."9

Petitioner continues to misapply Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
While petitioner concedes that there is a framework of safeguards for impeachable officers laid down in
Investigations12where the Court noted that the Constitution unmistakably requires the publication of
Article XI of the Constitution, she downplays these layers of protection as illusory or inutile without
rules of procedure pertaining to inquiries in aid of legislation. If the Constitution warranted the
implementation and enforcement, as if these can be disregarded at will.1avvphi1
publication of Impeachment Rules, then it could have expediently indicated such requirement as it did in
the case of legislative inquiries.
Contrary to petitioner’s position that the Court left in the hands of the House the question as to when an
impeachment proceeding is initiated, the Court merely underscored the House’s conscious role in the
The Constitution clearly gives the House a wide discretion on how to effectively promulgate its
initiation of an impeachment proceeding. The Court added nothing new in pinpointing the obvious
Impeachment Rules. It is not for this Court to tell a co-equal branch of government on how to do so
reckoning point of initiation in light of the Francisco doctrine. Moreover, referral of an impeachment
when such prerogative is lodged exclusively with it.
complaint to the appropriate committee is already a power or function granted by the Constitution to
the House.
Still, petitioner argues that the Court erred when it ruled that "to require publication of the House
Impeachment Rules would only delay the impeachment proceedings and cause the House of
Petitioner goes on to argue that the House has no discretion on the matter of referral of an
Representatives to violate constitutionally mandated periods…" She insists that the Committee, after
impeachment complaint and that once filed, an impeachment complaint should, as a matter of course,
publishing the Impeachment Rules, would still have a remainder of 45 days out of the 60-day period
be referred to the Committee.
within which to finish its business.

The House cannot indeed refuse to refer an impeachment complaint that is filed without a subsisting
Petitioner is mistaken in her assertion. Note that the Court discussed the above-mentioned scenario only
bar. To refer an impeachment complaint within an existing one-year bar, however, is to commit the
"in cases where impeachment complaints are filed at the start of each Congress." Section 3, Article XI of
apparently unconstitutional act of initiating a second impeachment proceeding, which may be struck
the Constitution contains relevant self-executing provisions which must be observed at the start of the
down under Rule 65 for grave abuse of discretion. It bears recalling that the one-year bar rule itself is a
impeachment process, the promulgation of the Impeachment Rules notwithstanding.
constitutional limitation on the House’s power or function to refer a complaint.

Petitioner rehashes her allegations of bias and vindictiveness on the part of the Committee Chairperson,
Tackling on the House floor in its order of business a clearly constitutionally-prohibited second
Rep. Niel Tupas, Jr. Yet again, the supposed actuations of Rep. Tupas partake of a keen performance of
impeachment complaint on the matter of whether to make the appropriate referral goes precisely into
his avowed duties and responsibilities as the designated manager of that phase in the impeachment
the propriety of the referral and not on the merits of the complaint. The House needs only to ascertain
proceeding. Besides, the actions taken by the Committee were never its Chairperson’s sole act but rather
the existence or expiry of the constitutional ban of one year, without any regard to the claims set forth in
the collective undertaking of its whole 55-person membership. The Committee members even took to
the complaint.
voting among themselves to validate what actions to take on the motions presented to the Committee.

To petitioner, the intervening days from the filing of the complaint to whatever completes the initiation
Indubitably, an impeachment is not a judicial proceeding, but rather a political exercise. Petitioner thus
of an impeachment proceeding is immaterial in mitigating the influx of successive complaints since
cannot demand that the Court apply the stringent standards it asks of justices and judges when it comes
allowing multiple impeachment charges would result to the same harassment and oppression. She
to inhibition from hearing cases. Incidentally, the Impeachment Rules do not provide for any provision
particularly cites Constitutional Commissioner Ricardo Romulo’s concerns on the amount of time spent if
regarding the inhibition of the Committee chairperson or any member from participating in an
"multiple impeachment charges"10 are allowed. She fails, however, to establish whether Commissioner
impeachment proceeding. The Committee may thus direct any question of partiality towards the
Romulo limited or quantified his reference to not more than one complaint or charge.

concerned member only. And any decision on the matter of inhibition must be respected, and it is not
for this Court to interfere with that decision.
Except for the constitutionally mandated periods, the pacing or alleged precipitate haste with which the
impeachment proceeding against petitioner is conducted is beyond the Court’s control. Again,
impeachment is a highly politicized intramural that gives the House ample leg room to operate, subject
only to the constitutionally imposed limits.13 And beyond these, the Court is duty-bound to respect the
discretion of a co-equal branch of government on matters which would effectively carry out its
constitutional mandate.
FINALLY, the Court has, in its February 15, 2011 Decision, already lifted its September 14, 2010 Status
Quo Ante Order14 which, as said Order clearly stated, was "effective immediately and continuing until
further orders from this Court."15 Such "further order" points to that part of the disposition in the
February 15, 2011 Decision that directs the lifting of the Status Quo Ante Order.
The lifting of the Status Quo Ante Order is effective immediately, the filing of petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration notwithstanding, in the same way that the Status Quo Ante Order was made effective
immediately, respondents’ moves to reconsider or recall it notwithstanding. There is thus no faulting the
Committee if it decides to, as it did proceed with the impeachment proceeding after the Court released
its February 15, 2011 Decision.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 193459 February 15, 2011
GUTIERREZ vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE
Facts:
On 22 July 2010, Baraquel, et al. filed an impeachment complaint (First Complaint) against Ombudsman
Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez (petitioner) based on betrayal of public trust and culpable violation of the
Constitution.
On 3 August 2010, a Second Complaint was filed by Reyes, et al. against the same respondent also based
on betrayal of public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution.
On 11 August 2010, the two complaints were referred by the House Plenary to the Committee on Justice
at the same time.
On 1 September 2010, the Committee on Justice found the First and Second Complaints sufficient in
form. On 7 September 2010, the Committee on Justice, found the First and Second Complaints were
sufficient in form.
On 13 September 2010, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme
Court seeking to enjoin the Committee on Justice from proceeding with the impeachment proceedings.
The petition prayed for a temporary restraining order.
10
Petitioner: She invokes the Court’s expanded certiorari jurisdiction to "determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government."
Public Respondent: The petition is premature and not yet ripe for adjudication since petitioner has at her
disposal a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of the proceedings before public
respondent. Public respondent argues that when petitioner filed the present petition on
September 13, 2010, it had not gone beyond the determination of the sufficiency of form and
substance of the two complaints. Hence, certiorari is unavailing.
1. The following day, during the en banc morning session of 14 September 2010, the majority of the
Court voted to issue a status quo ante order suspending the impeachment proceedings against
petitioner. (Note: In urgent cases, it is a matter of practice for the Court that all the Justices should
have been given time, at least an hour or two, to read the petition before voting on the issuance of
the status quo ante order. Unfortunately, this was not done.)
2. Section 3(5), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no impeachment proceedings shall
be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."
Issue #1: Does the Supreme Court have the power to determine whether public respondent committed
a violation of the Constitution in the exercise of its discretion relating to impeachment proceeding?
Held:
YES, under the doctrine of expanded judicial review. The Constitution did not intend to leave the matter
of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or
in the language of Baker v. Carr,"judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the
exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.
There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to
be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral
components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch
of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
Indubitably, the Court is not asserting its ascendancy over the Legislature in this instance, but simply
upholding the supremacy of the Constitution as the repository of the sovereign will.
Issue #2: Is the petition premature and not yet ripe for adjudication?
Held:
NO. In the present petition, there is no doubt that questions on the validity of the simultaneous
referral of the two complaints and on the need to publish as a mode of promulgating the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the House (Impeachment Rules) present constitutional
vagaries which call for immediate interpretation.
The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two impeachment complaints presents
a novel situation to invoke judicial power. Petitioner cannot thus be considered to have acted
prematurely when she took the cue from the constitutional limitation that only one impeachment
proceeding should be initiated against an impeachable officer within a period of one year.
Issue #3: When is an impeachment complaint deemed initiated?

Held:
There are two components of the act of initiating the complaint: the filing of the impeachment complaint
AND the referral by the House Plenary to the Committee on Justice. Once an impeachment complaint
has been initiated (meaning, filed and initiated), another impeachment complaint may not be filed
against the same official within a one year period.
Issue #4: Do the Impeachment Rules provide for comprehensible standards in determining the
sufficiency of form and substance?
Held:
YES. Contrary to petitioner’ contention, the Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional
requirements and providing that there must be a "verified complaint or resolution," and that the
substance requirement is met if there is "a recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee.
In fact, it is only in the Impeachment Rules where a determination of sufficiency of form and substance
of an impeachment complaint is made necessary. This requirement is not explicitly found in the
Constitution which merely requires a "hearing." ( Section 3[2], Article XI). In the discharge of its
constitutional duty, the House deemed that a finding of sufficiency of form and substance in an
impeachment complaint is vital "to effectively carry out" the impeachment process, hence, such
additional requirement in the Impeachment Rules.
Issue #5: May the Supreme Court look into the narration of facts constitutive of the offenses vis-à-vis
petitioner’s submissions disclaiming the allegations in the complaints?
Held:
NO. This issue would "require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable
offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound
discretion of the legislature (Francisco vs. House of Representatives.)
Issue #6: Was petitioner denied of due process, because of the delay in the publication of the
Impeachment Rules?
Held:
NO. The Supreme Court discussed the difference between publication and promulgation.
To recall, days after the 15th Congress opened on July 26, 2010 or on August 3, 2010, public respondent
provisionally adopted the Impeachment Rules of the 14th Congress and thereafter published on
September 2, 2010 its Impeachment Rules, admittedly substantially identical with that of the 14th
Congress, in two newspapers of general circulation.
Citing Tañada v. Tuvera, petitioner contends that she was deprived of due process since the
Impeachment Rules was published only on September 2, 2010 a day after public respondent ruled on the
sufficiency of form of the complaints. She likewise tacks her contention on Section 3(8), Article XI of the
Constitution which directs that "Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry
out the purpose of this section."
11
Public respondent counters that "promulgation" in this case refers to "the publication of rules in any
medium of information, not necessarily in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation."
While "promulgation" would seem synonymous to "publication," there is a statutory difference in their
usage. The Constitution notably uses the word "promulgate" 12 times. A number of those instances
involves the promulgation of various rules, reports and issuances emanating from Congress, the
Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman as well as other constitutional offices.
To appreciate the statutory difference in the usage of the terms "promulgate" and "publish," the case of
the Judiciary is in point. In promulgating rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the Supreme Court has invariably
required the publication of these rules for their effectivity. As far as promulgation of judgments is
concerned, however, PROMULGATION means "the delivery of the decision to the clerk of court for
filing and publication.
Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally understood—that is, to make
known. Since the Constitutional Commission did not restrict "promulgation" to "publication," the former
should be understood to have been used in its general sense. It is within the discretion of Congress to
determine on how to promulgate its Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that the Judiciary is
permitted to determine that to promulgate a decision means to deliver the decision to the clerk of court
for filing and publication. It is not for the Supreme Court to tell a co-equal branch of government how to
promulgate when the Constitution itself has not prescribed a specific method of promulgation. The Court
is in no position to dictate a mode of promulgation beyond the dictates of the Constitution.
Inquiries in aid of legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution is the sole instance in the
Constitution where there is a categorical directive to duly publish a set of rules of procedure. (Neri vs.
Senate)
Even assuming arguendo that publication is required, lack of it does not nullify the proceedings taken
prior to the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules which faithfully comply with the relevant self-executing
provisions of the Constitution. Otherwise, in cases where impeachment complaints are filed at the start
of each Congress, the mandated periods under Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution would already run
or even lapse while awaiting the expiration of the 15-day period of publication prior to the effectivity of
the Impeachment Rules. In effect, the House would already violate the Constitution for its inaction on
the impeachment complaints pending the completion of the publication requirement. (Just like what
happened in this case, where the complaint was filed even before the 15th Congress open its first
session)
Given that the Constitution itself states that any promulgation of the rules on impeachment is aimed at
"effectively carry[ing] out the purpose" of impeachment proceedings, the Court finds no grave abuse of
discretion when the House deemed it proper to provisionally adopt the Rules on Impeachment of the
14th Congress, to meet the exigency in such situation of early filing and in keeping with the "effective"
implementation of the "purpose" of the impeachment provisions. In other words, the provisional
adoption of the previous Congress’ Impeachment Rules is within the power of the House to promulgate
its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the avowed purpose.
Moreover, the rules on impeachment, as contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, merely aid or
supplement the procedural aspects of impeachment. Being procedural in nature, they may be given
retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws does not
violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally
objectionable. The reason for this is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from,
procedural laws." In the present case, petitioner fails to allege any impairment of vested rights.

It bears stressing that, unlike the process of inquiry in aid of legislation where the rights of witnesses are
involved, impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic, and not for the
punishment of the offender.
Issue #7: When do we reckon the start of the one-year ban?
Petitioner contends that it is reckoned from the filing of the first impeachment complaint against her on
July 22, 2010 or four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits that
within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to
public respondent.
Held:
Francisco doctrine states that the term "initiate" means to file the complaint and referral of the
complaint to the Committee on Justice. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another
impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period. Therefore,
the one-year period ban is reckoned not from the filing of the first complaint, but on the date it is
referred to the House Committee on Justice.
Petitioner submits that referral could not be the reckoning point of initiation because "something prior
to that had already been done.” This is wrong. Following petitioner’s line of reasoning, the verification of
the complaint or the endorsement by a member of the House – steps done prior to the filing – would
already initiate the impeachment proceedings.
Issue #8: Does an impeachment complaint need to allege only one impeachable offense?
Petitioner argues that public respondent gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded its own
Impeachment Rules, which provides that "the Rules of Criminal Procedure under the Rules of Court
shall, as far as practicable, apply to impeachment proceedings before the House." Petitioner invokes the
application of Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on one offense per complaint rule.
To petitioner, the two impeachment complaints are insufficient in form and substance since each
charges her with both culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust.
Petitioner adds that heaping two or more charges in one complaint will confuse her in preparing her
defense; expose her to the grave dangers of the highly political nature of the impeachment process;
constitute a whimsical disregard of certain rules; impair her performance of official functions as well as
that of the House; and prevent public respondent from completing its report within the deadline.
Public respondent counters that there is no requirement in the Constitution that an impeachment
complaint must charge only one offense, and the nature of impeachable offenses precludes the
application of the above-said Rule on Criminal Procedure since the broad terms cannot be defined with
the same precision required in defining crimes. It adds that the determination of the grounds for
impeachment is an exercise of political judgment, which issue respondent-intervenor also considers as
non-justiciable, and to which the Baraquel group adds that impeachment is a political process and not a
criminal prosecution, during which criminal prosecution stage the complaint or information referred
thereto and cited by petitioner, unlike an impeachment complaint, must already be in the name of the
People of the Philippines.
Held:
The Constitution allows the indictment for multiple impeachment offenses, with each charge
representing an article of impeachment, assembled in one set known as the "Articles of
12
Impeachment." It, therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint need not allege only one
impeachable offense.
Petitioner’s claim deserves scant consideration.
Without going into the effectiveness of the suppletory application of the Rules on Criminal Procedure in
carrying out the relevant constitutional provisions, which prerogative the Constitution vests on Congress,
and without delving into the practicability of the application of the one offense per complaint rule, the
initial determination of which must be made by the House93 which has yet to pass upon the question, the
Court finds that petitioner’s invocation of that particular rule of Criminal Procedure does not lie. Suffice
it to state that the Constitution allows the indictment for multiple impeachment offenses, with each
charge representing an article of impeachment, assembled in one set known as the "Articles of
Impeachment."94 It, therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint need not allege only one
impeachable offense.
The second procedural matter deals with the rule on consolidation. In rejecting a consolidation,
petitioner maintains that the Constitution allows only one impeachment complaint against her within
one year.
Records show that public respondent disavowed any immediate need to consolidate. Its chairperson
Rep. Tupas stated that "[c]onsolidation depends on the Committee whether to consolidate[;
c]onsolidation may come today or may come later on after determination of the sufficiency in form and
substance," and that "for purposes of consolidation, the Committee will decide when is the time to
consolidate[, a]nd if, indeed, we need to consolidate."95 Petitioner’s petition, in fact, initially describes
the consolidation as merely "contemplated."96
Since public respondent, whether motu proprio or upon motion, did not yet order a consolidation, the
Court will not venture to make a determination on this matter, as it would be premature, conjectural or
anticipatory.97
Even if the Court assumes petitioner’s change of stance that the two impeachment complaints
were deemedconsolidated,98 her claim that consolidation is a legal anomaly fails. Petitioner’s theory
obviously springs from her "proceeding = complaint" equation which the Court already brushed aside.
FACTS:
Two impeachment complaints were filed against Ombudsman Gutierrez, both were based betrayal of
public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution. The House Plenary referred the two complaints to
the House of Representative Committee on Justice. After hearing, the House of Representative
Committee on Justice issued a Resolution finding both complaints sufficient in form and substance.
Consequently, Ombudsman Gutierrez contended that the issued the Resolution violated the one-year
bar provision under Article XI, Section 3, paragraph 5 of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether the HR Committee on Justice violated the one-year bar provision when it issued the
Resolution.
HELD:
No. Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution provides that, no impeachment proceedings
shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year. The act of
 13

initiating the complaint means the filing of the impeachment complaint and the referral by the House
Plenary to the Committee on Justice. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another
impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period. Therefore,
the one-year period ban is reckoned not from the filing of the first complaint, but on the date it is
referred to the House Committee on Justice. Hence, in this case, the HR Committee did not violate the
one-year bar provision of the Constitution when it accepted the second impeachment complaint after
the first impeachment complaint was filed.

Also, it was held that the HR committee did not abuse its discretion in finding the complaints sufficient in
form in substance. The Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and
providing that there must be a verified complaint or resolution, and that the substance requirement is
met if there is a recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of
the committee.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 200242 July 17, 2012
CHIEF JUSTICE RENATO C. CORONA, Petitioner,
vs.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES sitting as an IMPEACHMENT COURT, BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK, ARLENE "KAKA" BAG-AO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, MARILYN PRIMICIAS-
AGABAS, NIEL TUPAS, RODOLFO FARINAS, SHERWIN TUGNA, RAUL DAZA, ELPIDIO BARZAGA,
REYNALDO UMALI, NERI COLMENARES (ALSO KNOWN AS THE PROSECUTORS FROM THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES), Respondents.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for immediate issuance of
temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction filed by the former Chief Justice of
this Court, Renato C. Corona, assailing the impeachment case initiated by the respondent Members of
the House of Representatives (HOR) and trial being conducted by respondent Senate of the Philippines.
On December 12, 2011, a caucus was held by the majority bloc of the HOR during which a verified
complaint for impeachment against petitioner was submitted by the leadership of the Committee on
Justice. After a brief presentation, on the same day, the complaint was voted in session and 188
Members signed and endorsed it, way above the one-third vote required by the Constitution.
On December 13, 2011, the complaint was transmitted to the Senate which convened as an
impeachment court the following day, December 14, 2011.
On December 15, 2011, petitioner received a copy of the complaint charging him with culpable violation
of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and graft and corruption, allegedly committed as follows:
ARTICLE I
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH HIS TRACK RECORD MARKED BY PARTIALITY AND
SUBSERVIENCE IN CASES INVOLVING THE ARROYO ADMINISTRATION FROM THE TIME OF HIS
APPOINTMENT AS SUPREME COURT JUSTICE AND UNTIL HIS DUBIOUS APPOINTMENT AS A MIDNIGHT
CHIEF JUSTICE TO THE PRESENT.
ARTICLE II
RESPONDENT COMMITTED CULPABLE VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND/OR BETRAYED THE
PUBLIC TRUST WHEN HE FAILED TO DISCLOSE TO THE PUBLIC HIS STATEMENT OFASSETS, LIABILITIES
AND NET WORTH AS REQUIRED UNDER SEC. 17, ART. XI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
14
2.1. It is provided for in Art. XI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution that "a public officer or
employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law,
submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the
President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and other constitutional offices,
and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to
the public in the manner provided by law."
2.2. Respondent failed to disclose to the public his statement of assets, liabilities, and net
worth as required by the Constitution.
2.3. It is also reported that some of the properties of Respondent are not included in his
declaration of his assets, liabilities, and net worth, in violation of the anti-graft and corrupt
practices act.
2.4. Respondent is likewise suspected and accused of having accumulated ill-gotten wealth,
acquiring assets of high values and keeping bank accounts with huge deposits. It has been
reported that Respondent has, among others, a 300-sq. meter apartment in a posh
Mega World Property development at the Fort in Taguig. Has he reported this, as he is constitutionally-
required under Art. XI, Sec. 17 of the Constitution in his Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net
Worth (SALN)? Is this acquisition sustained and duly supported by his income as a public official? Since
his assumption as Associate and subsequently, Chief Justice, has he complied with this duty of public
disclosure?
ARTICLE III
RESPONDENT COMMITTED CULPABLE VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND/OR BETRAYED THE
PUBLIC TRUST BY FAILING TO MEET AND OBSERVE THE STRINGENT STANDARDS UNDER ART. VIII,
SECTION 7 (3) OF THE CONSTITUTION THAT PROVIDES THAT "[A] MEMBER OF THE JUDICIARY MUST BE A
PERSON OF PROVEN COMPETENCE, INTEGRITY, PROBITY, AND INDEPENDENCE" IN ALLOWING THE
SUPREME COURT TO ACT ON MERE LETTERS FILED BY A COUNSEL WHICH CAUSED THE ISSUANCE OF
FLIP-FLOPPING DECISIONS IN FINAL AND EXECUTORY CASES; IN CREATING AN EXCESSIVE
ENTANGLEMENT WITH MRS. ARROYO THROUGH HER APPOINTMENT OF HIS WIFE TO OFFICE; AND IN
DISCUSSING WITH LITIGANTS REGARDING CASES PENDING BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT.
ARTICLE IV
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST AND/OR COMMITTED CULPABLE VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION WHEN HE BLATANTLY DISREGARDED THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS BY
ISSUING A "STATUS QUO ANTE" ORDER AGAINST THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN THE CASE
CONCERNING THE IMPEACHMENT OF THEN OMBUDSMAN MERCEDITAS NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ.
ARTICLE V
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH WANTON ARBITRARINESS AND PARTIALITY IN
CONSISTENTLY DISREGARDING THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA IN THE CASES INVOLVING THE 16
NEWLY-CREATED CITIES, AND THE PROMOTION OF DINAGAT ISLAND INTO A PROVINCE.

ARTICLE VI
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST BY ARROGATING UNTO HIMSELF, AND TO A COMMITTEE HE
CREATED, THE AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION TO IMPROPERLY INVESTIGATE A JUSTICE OF THE
SUPREME COURT FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXCULPATING HIM. SUCH AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION IS
PROPERLY REPOSED BY THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES VIA IMPEACHMENT.
ARTICLE VII
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH HIS PARTIALITY IN GRANTING A TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER (TRO) IN FAVOR OF FORMER PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AND HER
HUSBAND JOSE MIGUEL ARROYO IN ORDER TO GIVE THEM AN OPPORTUNITY TO ESCAPE PROSECUTION
AND TO FRUSTRATE THE ENDS OF JUSTICE, AND IN DISTORTING THE SUPREME COURT DECISION ON THE
EFFECTIVITY OF THE TRO IN VIEW OF A CLEAR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THE
SUPREME COURT’S OWN TRO. ARTICLE VIII RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST AND/OR
COMMITTED GRAFT AND CORRUPTION WHEN HE FAILED AND REFUSEDTO ACCOUNT FOR THE
JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF) AND SPECIAL ALLOWANCE FOR THE JUDICIARY (SAJ)
COLLECTIONS.1
On December 26, 2011, petitioner filed his Answer2 assailing the "blitzkrieg" fashion by which the
impeachment complaint was signed by the Members of the HOR and immediately transmitted to the
Senate. Citing previous instances when President Aquino openly expressed his rejection of petitioner’s
appointment as Chief Justice and publicly attacked this Court under the leadership of petitioner for
"derailing his administration’s mandate," petitioner concluded that the move to impeach him was the
handiwork of President Aquino’s party mates and supporters, including"hidden forces" who will be
benefited by his ouster. As to the charges against him, petitioner denied the same but admitted having
once served the Offices of the President and Vice-President during the term of former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and granted the request for courtesy call only to Mr. Dante Jimenez of the Volunteers
Against Crime and Corruption (VACC) while Mr. Lauro Vizconde appeared with Mr. Jimenez without prior
permission or invitation. Petitioner argued at length that the acts, misdeeds or offenses imputed to him
were either false or baseless, and otherwise not illegal nor improper. He prayed for the outright
dismissal of the complaint for failing to meet the requirements of the Constitution or that the
Impeachment Court enter a judgment of acquittal for all the articles of impeachment.
Meanwhile, the prosecution panel composed of respondent Representatives held a press conference
revealing evidence which supposedly support their accusations against petitioner. The following day,
newspapers carried front page reports of high-priced condominium units and other real properties in
Fort Bonifacio, Taguig and Quezon City allegedly owned by petitioner, as disclosed by prosecutors led by
respondent Rep. Niel C. Tupas, Jr. The prosecution told the media that it is possible that these properties
were not included by petitioner in his Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) which had
not been made available to the public. Reacting to this media campaign, Senators scolded the
prosecutors reminding them that under the Senate Rules of Procedure on Impeachment Trials3 they are
not allowed to make any public disclosure or comment regarding the merits of a pending impeachment
case.4 By this time, five petitions have already been filed with this Court by different individuals seeking
to enjoin the impeachment trial on grounds of improperly verified complaint and lack of due process.
On January 16, 2012, respondent Senate of the Philippines acting as an Impeachment Court, commenced
trial proceedings against the petitioner.Petitioner’s motion for a preliminary hearing was denied. On
January 18, 2012, Atty. Enriqueta E. Vidal, Clerk of Court of this Court, in compliance with a subpoena
15
issued by the Impeachment Court, took the witness stand and submitted the SALNs of petitioner for the
years 2002 to 2010. Other prosecution witnesses also testified regarding petitioner’s SALNs for the
previous years (Marianito Dimaandal, Records Custodian of Malacañang Palace, Atty. Randy A. Rutaquio,
Register of Deeds of Taguig and Atty. Carlo V. Alcantara, Acting Register of Deeds of Quezon City).
In compliance with the directive of the Impeachment Court, the prosecution and defense submitted their
respective memoranda on the question of whether the prosecution may present evidence to prove the
allegations in paragraphs 2.3 (failure to report some properties in SALN) and 2.4 (acquisition of ill-gotten
wealth and failure to disclose in SALN such bank accounts with huge deposits and 300-sq.m. Megaworld
property at the Fort in Taguig) under Article II (par. 2.2. refers to petitioner’s alleged failure to disclose to
the public his SALN as required by the Constitution).
On January 27, 2012, the Impeachment Court issued a Resolution5 which states:
IN SUM, THEREFORE, this Court resolves and accordingly rules:
1. To allow the Prosecution to introduce evidence in support of Paragraphs 2.2 and 2.3 of Article II of the
Articles of Impeachment;
2. To disallow the introduction of evidence in support of Par. 2.4 of the Articles of Impeachment, with
respect to which, this Court shall be guided by and shall rely upon the legal presumptions on the nature
of any property or asset which may be proven to belong to the Respondent Chief Justice as provided
under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019 and Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1379.
SO ORDERED.6
In a subsequent Resolution7 dated February 6, 2012, the Impeachment Court granted the prosecution’s
request for subpoena directed to the officersof two private banks where petitioner allegedly deposited
millions in peso and dollar currencies, as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the majority votes to grant the Prosecution’s Requests for
Subpoenae to the responsible officers of Philippine Savings Bank (PSBank) and Bank of the Philippine
Island (BPI), for them to testify and bring and/or produce before the Court documents on the alleged
bank accounts of Chief Justice Corona, only for the purpose of the instant impeachment proceedings, as
follows:
a) The Branch Manager of the Bank of Philippine Islands, Ayala Avenue Branch, 6th Floor, SGV
Building, 6758 Ayala Avenue, Makati City, is commanded to bring before the Senate at 2:00
p.m. on February 8, 2012, the original and certified true copies of the account opening
forms/documents for Bank Account no. 1445-8030-61 in the name of Renato C. Corona and
the bank statements showing the balances of the said account as of December 31, 2005,
December 31, 2006, December 31, 2007, December 31, 2008, December 31, 2009 and
December 31, 2010.
b) The Branch Manager (and/or authorized representative) of Philippine Savings Bank,
Katipunan Branch, Katipunan Avenue, Loyola Heights, Quezon City, is commanded to bring
before the Senate at 2:00 p.m. on February 8, 2012, the original and certified true copies of
the account opening forms/documents for the following bank accounts allegedly in the name

of Renato C. Corona, and the documents showing the balances of the said accounts as of
December 31, 2007, December 31, 2008, December 31, 2009 and December 31, 2010:
SO ORDERED.8
On February 8, 2012, PSBank filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 200238) seeking to
enjoin the Impeachment Court and the HOR prosecutors from implementing the aforesaid subpoena
requiring PSBank thru its authorized representative to testify and to bring the original and certified true
copies of the opening documents for petitioner’salleged foreign currency accounts, and thereafter to
render judgment nullifying the subpoenas including the bank statements showing the year-end balances
for the said accounts.
On the same day, the present petition was filed arguing that the Impeachment Court committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it: (1) proceeded to trial on the basis
of the complaint filed by respondent Representatives which complaint is constitutionally infirm and
defective for lack of probable cause; (2) did not strike out the charges discussed in Art. II of the
complaint which, aside from being a "hodge-podge" of multiple charges, do not constitute allegations in
law, much less ultimate facts, being all premised on suspicion and/or hearsay; assuming arguendo that
the retention of Par. 2.3 is correct, the ruling of the Impeachment Court to retain Par. 2.3 effectively
allows the introduction of evidence under Par. 2.3, as vehicle to prove Par. 2.4 and therefore its earlier
resolution was nothing more than a hollow relief, bringing no real protection to petitioner; (3) allowed
the presentation of evidence on charges of alleged corruption and unexplained wealth which violates
petitioner’s right to due process because first, Art. II does not mention "graft and corruption" or
unlawfully acquired wealth as grounds for impeachment, and second, it is clear under Sec. 2, Art. XI of
the Constitution that "graft and corruption" is a separate and distinct ground from "culpable violation of
the Constitution" and "betrayal of public trust"; and (4) issued the subpoena for the production of
petitioner’s alleged bank accounts as requested by the prosecution despite the same being the result of
an illegal act ("fruit of the poisonous tree") considering that those documents submitted by the
prosecution violates the absolute confidentiality of such accounts under Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6426 (Foreign
Currency Deposits Act) which is also penalized under Sec. 10 thereof. Petitioner thus prayed for the
following reliefs:
(a) Immediately upon filing of this Petition, issue a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining: (i) the proceedings before the Impeachment Court; (ii)
implementation ofResolution dated 6 February 2012; (iii) the officers or representatives of
BPI and PSBank from testifying and submitting documents on petitioner’s or his family’s bank
accounts; and (iv) the presentation, reception and admission of evidence on paragraphs 2.3
and 2.4 of the Impeachment Complaint;
(b) After giving due course to the Petition, render judgment:
(i) Declaring the Impeachment Complaint null and void ab initio;
(ii) Prohibiting the presentation, reception and admission of evidence on
paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 of the Impeachment Complaint;
(iii) Annulling the Impeachment Court’s Resolution dated 27 January 2012 and 6
February 2011 [sic], as well as any Subpoenae issued pursuant thereto; and
16
(iv) Making the TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction permanent.
Other reliefs, just or equitable, are likewise prayed for.9
Petitioner also sought the inhibition of Justices Antonio T. Carpio and Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno on the
ground of partiality, citing their publicly known "animosity" towards petitioner aside from the fact that
they have been openly touted as the likely replacements in the event that petitioner is removed from
office.10
On February 9, 2012, this Court issued a TRO in G.R. No. 200238 enjoining the Senate from implementing
the Resolution and subpoena ad testificandum et duces tecum issued by the Senate sitting as an
Impeachment Court, both dated February 6, 2012. The Court further resolved to deny petitioner’s
motion for the inhibition of Justices Carpio and Sereno "in the absence of any applicable compulsory
ground and of any voluntary inhibition from the Justices concerned."
On February 13, 2012, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition11 claiming that his right to due process is
being violated in the ongoing impeachment proceedings because certain Senator-Judges have lost the
coldneutrality of impartial judges by acting as prosecutors. Petitioner particularly mentioned Senator-
Judge Franklin S. Drilon, whose inhibition he had sought from the Impeachment Court, to no avail. He
further called attention to the fact that despite the Impeachment Court’s January 27, 2012 Resolution
which disallowed the introduction of evidence in support of paragraph 2.4 of Article II, from which no
motion for reconsideration would be entertained, "the allies of President Aquino in the Senate abused
their authority and continued their presentation of evidence for the prosecution, without fear of
objection". In view of the persistent efforts of President Aquino’s Senator-allies to overturn the ruling of
Presiding Officer Juan Ponce Enrile that the prosecution could not present evidence on paragraph 2.4 of
Article II -- for which President Aquino even thanked "his senator allies in delivering what the
prosecution could not"-- petitioner reiterates the reliefs prayed for in his petition before this Court.
In the Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti12 filed on behalf of the respondents, the Solicitor
General argues that the instant petition raises matters purely political in character which may be decided
or resolved only by the Senate and HOR, with the manifestation that the comment is being filed by the
respondents "without submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the Honorable Supreme Court and
without conceding the constitutional and exclusive power of the House to initiate all cases of
impeachment and of
the Senate to try and decide all cases of impeachment." Citing the case of
Nixon v. United States,13 respondents contend that to allow a public official being impeached to raise
before this Court any and all issues relative to the substance of the impeachment complaint would result
in an unnecessarily long and tedious process that may even go beyond the terms of the Senator-Judges
hearing the impeachment case. Such scenario is clearly not what the Constitution intended.
Traversing the allegations of the petition, respondents assert that the Impeachment Court did not
commit any grave abuse of discretion; it has, in fact, been conducting the proceedings judiciously.
Respondents maintain that subjecting the ongoing impeachment trial to judicial review defeats the very
essence of impeachment. They contend that the constitutional command of public accountability to
petitioner and his obligation to fully disclose his assets, liabilities and net worth prevail over his claim of
confidentiality of deposits; hence, the subpoena subject of this case were correctly and judiciously
issued. Considering that the ongoing impeachment proceedings, which was initiated and is being

conducted in accordance with the Constitution, simply aims to enforce the principle of public
accountability and ensure that the transgressions of impeachable public officials are corrected, the injury
being claimed by petitioner allegedly resulting from the impeachment trial has no factual and legal basis.
It is thus prayed that the present petition, as well as petitioner’s prayer for issuance of a TRO/preliminary
injunction, be dismissed.
The core issue presented is whether the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court may be invoked to assail
matters or incidents arising from impeachment proceedings, and to obtain injunctive relief for alleged
violations of right to due process of the person being tried by the Senate sitting as Impeachment Court.
Impeachment and Judicial Review
Impeachment, described as "the most formidable weapon in the arsenal of democracy,"14 was foreseen
as creating divisions, partialities and enmities, or highlighting pre-existing factions with the greatest
danger that "the decision will be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties, than by the real
demonstrations of innocence or guilt."15Given their concededly political character, the precise role of the
judiciary in impeachment cases is a matter of utmost importance to ensure the effective functioning of
the separate branches while preserving the structure of checks and balance in our government.
Moreover, in this jurisdiction, the acts of any branch or instrumentality of the government, including
those traditionally entrusted to the political departments, are proper subjects of judicial review if tainted
with grave abuse or arbitrariness.
Impeachment refers to the power of Congress to remove a public official for serious crimes or
misconduct as provided in the Constitution. A mechanism designed to check abuse of power,
impeachment has its roots in Athens and was adopted in the United States (US) through the influence of
English common law on the Framers of the US Constitution.
Our own Constitution’s provisions on impeachment were adopted from the US Constitution. Petitioner
was impeached through the mode provided under Art. XI, par. 4, Sec. 3, in a manner that he claims was
accomplished with undue haste and under a complaint which is defective for lack of probable cause.
Petitioner likewise assails the Senate in proceeding with the trial under the said complaint, and in the
alleged partiality exhibited by some Senator-Judges who were apparently aiding the prosecution during
the hearings.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the issues raised in the Supplemental Petition regarding
the behavior of certain Senator-Judges in the course of the impeachment trial are issues that do not
concern, or allege any violation of, the three express and exclusive constitutional limitations on the
Senate’s sole power to try and decide impeachment cases. They argue that unless there is a clear
transgression of these constitutional limitations, this Court may not exercise its power of expanded
judicial review over the actions of Senator-Judges during the proceedings. By the nature of the functions
they discharge when sitting as an Impeachment Court, Senator-Judges are clearly entitled to propound
questions on the witnesses, prosecutors and counsel during the trial. Petitioner thus failed to prove any
semblance of partiality on the part of any Senator-Judges. But whether the Senate Impeachment Rules
were followed or not, is a political question that is not within this Court’s power of expanded judicial
review.
In the first impeachment case decided by this Court, Francisco, Jr. v.
17
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc.16 we ruled that the power of
judicial review in this jurisdiction includes the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment
proceedings. Subsequently, in Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice,17 the Court
resolved the question of the validity of the simultaneous referral of two impeachment complaints
against petitioner Ombudsman which was allegedly a violation of the due process clause and of the one-
year bar provision.
On the basis of these precedents, petitioner asks this Court to determine whether respondents
committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of their
functions and prerogatives that could translate as lack or excess of jurisdiction, which would require
corrective measures from the Court.
Mootness
In the meantime, the impeachment trial had been concluded with the conviction of petitioner by more
than the required majority vote of the Senator-Judges. Petitioner immediately accepted the verdict and
without any protest vacated his office. In fact, the Judicial and Bar Council is already in the process of
screening applicants and nominees, and the President of the Philippines is expected to appoint a new
Chief Justice within the prescribed 90-day period from among those candidates shortlisted by the JBC.
Unarguably, the constitutional issue raised by petitioner had been mooted by supervening events and his
own acts.1âwphi1
An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy so
that a determination thereof would be without practical use and value.18 In such cases, there is no actual
substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled to and which would be negated by the
dismissal of the petition.19
WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief/s is
DISMISSED on the ground of MOOTNESS.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari andprohibition with prayer for immediate issuance oftemporary
restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminaryinjunction filed by the former Chief Justice of this Court,
Renato C. Corona, assailing the impeachment case initiated by the respondentMembers of the House of
Representatives (HOR) and trialbeing conducted by respondent Senate of the Philippines.
On December 12, 2011, a caucus was held by themajority bloc of the HOR during which a verified
complaintfor impeachment against petitioner was submitted by theleadership of the Committee on
Justice. After a briefpresentation, on the same day, the complaint was voted insession and 188 Members
signed and endorsed it, wayabove the one thirdvote required by the Constitution.

On December 13, 2011, the complaint was transmittedto the Senate which convened as an
impeachment court the following day.
On December 15, 2011, petitioner received a copy of thecomplaint charging him with culpable violation
of theConstitution, betrayal of public trust and graft and Corruption, which alleged that:
I. Betrayed the public trust through his track record marked by partiality and subservience in cases
involving the Arroyo Administration from the time of his appointment As Supreme Court justice
and until his dubious appointment as a midnight chief justice to the present;
II. Respondent committed culpable violation of the Constitution and/or betrayed the public trust
when he failed to disclose to the public his SALN as required under sec. 17, art. XI of the 1987
Constitution;
III. Respondent committed culpable violations of the constitution and/or betrayed the public trust by
failing to meet and observe the stringent standards under the constitution that provides that “[a]
Member of the judiciary must be a person of Proven competence, integrity, probity, and
independence” in allowing the supreme court to act on mere letters filed by a counsel which
Caused the issuance of flip-floppingDecisions inFinal and executory cases; in creating an excessive
entanglement with Mrs. Arroyo through her appointment of his wife to office; and in discussing
with litigants regarding cases pending before the Supreme Court.
IV. Respondent betrayed the public trust and/or committed culpable violation of the Constitution
when he blatantly disregarded the principle of separation of powers by issuing a “status quo ante”
order against the House of Representatives in the case concerning the Impeachment of then
Ombudsman MerceditasNavarro-Gutierrez.
And such other allegations of arbitrariness in relation to his office and his relationship with former Pres.
Arroyo and her husband, as well, failure to account for collections of the JDF.
Petitioner filed his answer and assailed the swift manner by which the impeachment complaint as
initiated and transferred from the HOR to the Senate.
Petitioner argued at length that the acts, misdeeds oroffenses imputed to him were either false or
baseless, andotherwise not illegal nor improper. He prayed for theoutright dismissal of the complaint for
failing to meet therequirements of the Constitution or that the ImpeachmentCourt enter a judgment of
acquittal for all the articles ofimpeachment.
Meanwhile, the prosecution panel composed ofrespondent Representatives held a press
conferencerevealing evidencewhich supposedly support their accusations against petitioner, which was
carried on front page newspaper reports, the following day.
On January 16, 2012, respondent Senate of thePhilippines acting as an Impeachment Court,
commencedtrial proceedings against the petitioner. Petitioner’s motionfor a preliminary hearing was
denied. On January 18,2012, Atty. Enriqueta E. Vidal, Clerk of Court of thisCourt, in compliance with a
subpoena issued by theImpeachment Court, took the witness stand and submittedthe SALNs of
petitioner for the years 2002 to 2010.
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Otherprosecution witnesses also testified regarding petitioner’sSALNs and other properties. In a
subsequent Resolution dated February 6, 2012, theImpeachment Court granted the prosecution’s
request forsubpoena directed to the officers of two private bankswhere petitioner allegedly deposited
millions in peso anddollar currencies.
On February 8, 2012, PSBank filed a petition forcertiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 200238) seeking
toenjoin the Impeachment Court and the HOR prosecutorsfrom implementing the aforesaid subpoena
requiringPSBank thru its authorized representative to testify and tobring the original and certified true
copies of the openingdocuments for petitioner’s alleged foreign currencyaccounts, and thereafter to
render judgment nullifying thesubpoenas including the bank statements showing theyearendbalances
for the said accounts.
On the same day, the present petition was filed arguingthat the Impeachment Court committed grave
abuse ofdiscretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. On February 13, 2012, petitioner filed a
Supplemental Petition claiming that his right to due process is beingviolated in the ongoing
impeachment proceedings becausecertain Senator Judgeshave lost the cold neutrality ofimpartial judges
by acting as prosecutors.
The Petitioner was eventually impeached based on evidence presented to the Senate sitting as
impeachment court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate, sitting as an Impeachment Court committed grave abuse of discretion
in ruling for the former Chief Justice’s impeachment.
HELD:
No. Impeachment refers to the power of Congress toremove a public official for serious crimes or
misconduct asprovided in the Constitution. A mechanism designed to checkabuse of power,
impeachment has its roots in Athens and wasadopted in the United States (US) through the influence
ofEnglish common law on the Framers of the US Constitution.
By the nature of the functions theydischarge when sitting as an Impeachment Court, Senator Judgesare
clearly entitled to propound questions on the witnesses,prosecutors and counsel during the trial.
Petitioner thus failed toprove any semblance of partiality on the part of any Senator Judges.But whether
the Senate Impeachment Rules werefollowed or not, is a political question that is not within thisCourt’s
power of expanded judicial review.
An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when itceases to present a justiciable controversy so
that a determinationthereof would be without practical use and value. In such cases,there is no actual
substantial relief to which the petitioner wouldbe entitled to and which would be negated by the
dismissal of thepetition.

REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, represented by SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA v. MARIA LOURDES
P.A. SERENO. DIGEST
G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018 [J. Tijam, En Banc]
DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:
Quo warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public official may be availed of when the subject act or
omission was committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an official’s
qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid. Acts or omissions, even if
it relates to the qualification of integrity being a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed
during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official cannot be the subject of
a quo warranto proceeding, but of impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and the
act or omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or to disciplinary, administrative or criminal action,
if otherwise.
FACTS:
From 1986 to 2006, Sereno served as a member of the faculty of the University of the Philippines-College
of Law. While being employed at the UP Law, or from October 2003 to 2006, Sereno was concurrently
employed as legal counsel of the Republic in two international arbitrations known as the PIATCO cases,
and a Deputy Commissioner of the Commissioner on Human Rights.
The Human Resources Development Office of UP (UP HRDO) certified that there was no record on
Sereno’s file of any permission to engage in limited practice of profession. Moreover, out of her 20 years
of employment, only nine (9) Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) were on the records
of UP HRDO. In a manifestation, she attached a copy of a tenth SALN, which she supposedly sourced
from the “filing cabinets” or “drawers of UP”. The Ombudsman likewise had no record of any SALN filed
by Sereno. The JBC has certified to the existence of one SALN. In sum, for 20 years of service, 11 SALNs
were recovered.
On August 2010, Sereno was appointed as Associate Justice. On 2012, the position of Chief Justice was
declared vacant, and the JBC directed the applicants to submit documents, among which are “all
previous SALNs up to December 31, 2011” for those in the government and “SALN as of December 31,
2011” for those from the private sector. The JBC announcement further provided that “applicants with
incomplete or out-of-date documentary requirements will not be interviewed or considered for
nomination.” Sereno expressed in a letter to JBC that since she resigned from UP Law on 2006 and
became a private practitioner, she was treated as coming from the private sector and only submitted
three (3) SALNs or her SALNs from the time she became an Associate Justice. Sereno likewise added that
“considering that most of her government records in the academe are more than 15 years old, it is
reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all of those files,” and that the clearance issued by UP
HRDO and CSC should be taken in her favor. There was no record that the letter was deliberated upon.
Despite this, on a report to the JBC, Sereno was said to have “complete requirements.” On August 2012,
Sereno was appointed Chief Justice.
On August 2017, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon against Sereno, alleging that
Sereno failed to make truthful declarations in her SALNs. The House of Representatives proceeded to
hear the case for determination of probable cause, and it was said that Justice Peralta, the chairman of
the JBC then, was not made aware of the incomplete SALNs of Sereno. Other findings were made: such
as pieces of jewelry amounting to P15,000, that were not declared on her 1990 SALN, but was declared
in prior years’ and subsequent years’ SALNs, failure of her husband to sign one SALN, execution of the
1998 SALN only in 2003
On February 2018, Atty. Eligio Mallari wrote to the OSG, requesting that the latter, in representation of
the Republic, initiate a quo warranto proceeding against Sereno. The OSG, invoking the Court’s original
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jurisdiction under Section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution in relation to the special civil action under
Rule 66, the Republic, through the OSG filed the petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo
warranto to declare as void Sereno’s appointment as CJ of the SC and to oust and altogether exclude
Sereno therefrom. [yourlawyersays]
Capistrano, Sen. De Lima, Sen. Trillianes, et. al., intervened. Sereno then filed a Motion for Inhibition
against AJ Bersamin, Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, and Leonardo-De Castro, imputing actual bias for having
testified against her on the impeachment hearing before the House of Representatives.
Contentions:
Office of the Solicitor General (petitioner):
OSG argues that the quo warranto is an available remedy because what is being sought is to question the
validity of her appointment, while the impeachment complaint accuses her of committing culpable
violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust while in office, citing Funa v. Chairman Villar,
Estrada v. Desierto and Nacionalista Party v. De Vera. OSG maintains that the phrase “may be removed
from office” in Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution means that Members of the SC may be removed
through modes other than impeachment.
OSG contends that it is seasonably filed within the one-year reglementary period under Section 11, Rule
66 since Sereno’s transgressions only came to light during the impeachment proceedings. Moreover,
OSG claims that it has an imprescriptible right to bring a quo warranto petition under the maxim nullum
tempus occurit regi (“no time runs against the king”) or prescription does not operate against the
government. The State has a continuous interest in ensuring that those who partake of its sovereign
powers are qualified. Even assuming that the one-year period is applicable to the OSG, considering that
SALNs are not published, the OSG will have no other means by which to know the disqualification.
Moreover, OSG maintains that the SC has jurisdiction, citing A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC which created a
permanent Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards, tasked to investigate complaints involving graft
and corruption and ethical violations against members of the SC and contending that this is not a
political question because such issue may be resolved through the interpretation of the provisions of the
Constitution, laws, JBC rules, and Canons of Judicial Ethics.
OSG seeks to oust Sereno from her position as CJ on the ground that Sereno failed to show that she is a
person of proven integrity which is an indispensable qualification for membership in the Judiciary under
Section 7(3), Article VIII of the Constitution. According to the OSG, because OSG failed to fulfill the JBC
requirement of filing the complete SALNs, her integrity remains unproven. The failure to submit her
SALN, which is a legal obligation, should have disqualified Sereno from being a candidate; therefore, she
has no right to hold the office. Good faith cannot be considered as a defense since the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (RA No. 3019) and Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees (RA No. 6713) are special laws and are thus governed by the concept of malum prohibitum,
wherein malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial.
Sereno (respondent):
Sereno contends that an impeachable officer may only be ousted through impeachment, citing Section 2
of Article XI of the Constitution, and Mayor Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, Cuenca v. Hon. Fernan, In Re: First
lndorsement from Hon. Gonzales, and Re: Complaint-Affidavit for Disbarment Against SAJ Antonio T.
Carpio. Sereno contends that the clear intention of the framers of the Constitution was to create an
exclusive category of public officers who can be removed only by impeachment and not otherwise.
Impeachment was chosen as the method of removing certain high-ranking government officers to shield
them from harassment suits that will prevent them from performing their functions which are vital to

the continued operations of government. Sereno further argues that the word “may” on Section 2 of
Article XI only qualifies the penalty imposable after the impeachment trial, i.e., removal from office.
Sereno contends that the since the mode is wrong, the SC has no jurisdiction.
Sereno likewise argues that the cases cited by OSG is not in all fours with the present case because the
President and the Vice President may, in fact, be removed by means other than impeachment on the
basis of Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution vesting in the Court the power to be the “sole
judge” of all contests relating to the qualifications of the President and the Vice-President. There is no
such provision for other impeachable officers. Moreover, on the rest of the cases cited by the OSG, there
is no mention that quo warranto may be allowed.
Sereno also argues that since a petition for quo warranto may be filed before the RTC, such would result
to a conundrum because a judge of lower court would have effectively exercised disciplinary power and
administrative supervision over an official of the Judiciary much higher in rank and is contrary to Sections
6 and 11, Article VIII of the Constitution which vests upon the SC disciplinary and administrative power
over all courts and the personnel thereof.
Sereno likewise posits that if a Member of the SC can be ousted through quo warranto initiated by the
OSG, the Congress’ “check” on the SC through impeachment would be rendered inutile.
Furthermore, Sereno argues that it is already time-barred. Section 11, Rule 66 provides that a petition
for quo warranto must be filed within one (1) year from the “cause of ouster” and not from the
“discovery” of the disqualification.
Moreover, Sereno contends that the Court cannot presume that she failed to file her SALNs because as a
public officer, she enjoys the presumption that her appointment to office was regular. OSG failed to
overcome the presumption created by the certifications from UP HRDO that she had been cleared of all
administrative responsibilities and charges. Her integrity is a political question which can only be decided
by the JBC and the President.
Regarding her missing SALNs, Sereno contends that the fact that SALNs are missing cannot give rise to
the inference that they are not filed. The fact that 11 SALNs were filed should give an inference to a
pattern of filing, not of non-filing.
Intervenors’ arguments:
The intervenors argue that it is not incumbent upon Sereno to prove to the JBC that she possessed the
integrity required by the Constitution; rather, the onus of determining whether or not she qualified for
the post fell upon the JBC. Moreover, submission of SALNs is not a constitutional requirement; what is
only required is the imprimatur of the JBC. The intervenors likewise contend that “qualifications” such as
citizenship, age, and experience are enforceable while “characteristics” such as competence, integrity,
probity, and independence are mere subjective considerations.
ISSUES:
Preliminary issues:
Whether the Court should entertain the motion for intervention
Whether the Court should grant the motion for the inhibition of Sereno against five Justices
Main Issues:
Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for quo warranto.
Whether Sereno may be the respondent in a quo warranto proceeding notwithstanding the fact that an
impeachment complaint has already been filed with the House of Representatives.
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Whether Sereno, who is an impeachable officer, can be the respondent in a quo warranto proceeding,
i.e., whether the only way to remove an impeachable officer is impeachment.
Whether to take cognizance of the quo warranto proceeding is violative of the principle of separation of
powers
Whether the petition is outrightly dismissible on the ground of prescription
Whether the determination of a candidate’s eligibility for nomination is the sole and exclusive function
of the JBC and whether such determination. partakes of the character of a political question outside the
Court’s supervisory and review powers;
Whether the filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement for the position of Chief Justice.
If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative, whether Sereno failed to file her SALNs as mandated by the
Constitution and required by the law and its implementing rules and regulations
If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative, whether Sereno filed SALNs are not filed properly and
promptly.
Whether Sereno failed to comply with the submission of SALNs as required by the JBC
If answer to the twelfth issue is in the affirmative, whether the failure to submit SALNs to the JBC voids
the nomination and appointment of Sereno as Chief Justice;
In case of a finding that Sereno is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice, whether the subsequent
nomination by the JBC and the appointment by the President cured such ineligibility.
Whether Sereno is a de jure or a de facto officer.
HELD:
Anent the first issue: The intervention is improper.
Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a
litigant therein for a certain purpose: to enable the third party to protect or preserve a right or interest
that may be affected by those proceedings. The remedy of intervention is not a matter of right but rests
on the sound discretion of the court upon compliance with the first requirement on legal interest and
the second requirement that no delay and prejudice should result. The justification of one’s “sense of
patriotism and their common desire to protect and uphold the Philippine Constitution”, and that of the
Senator De Lima’s and Trillanes’ intervention that their would-be participation in the impeachment trial
as Senators-judges if the articles of impeachment will be filed before the Senate as the impeachment
court will be taken away is not sufficient. The interest contemplated by law must be actual, substantial,
material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent or expectant. Moreover, the petition of quo
warranto is brought in the name of the Republic. It is vested in the people, and not in any private
individual or group, because disputes over title to public office are viewed as a public question of
governmental legitimacy and not merely a private quarrel among rival claimants.
Anent the second issue: There is no basis for the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to inhibit in the
case.
It is true that a judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner
completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. However, the right of a party to
seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested,
impartial and independent in handling the case must be balanced with the latter’s sacred duty to decide
cases without fear of repression. Bias must be proven with clear and convincing evidence. Those justices
who were present at the impeachment proceedings were armed with the requisite imprimatur of the
Court En Banc, given that the Members are to testify only on matters within their personal knowledge.
The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition, especially when the charge
is without basis. There must be acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before it
can brand them with the stigma of bias or partiality. Sereno’s call for inhibition has been based on

speculations, or on distortions of the language, context and meaning of the answers the Justices may
have given as sworn witnesses in the proceedings before the House.
Moreover, insinuations that the Justices of the SC are towing the line of President Duterte in entertaining
the quo warranto petition must be struck for being unfounded and for sowing seeds of mistrust and
discordance between the Court and the public. The Members of the Court are beholden to no one,
except to the sovereign Filipino people who ordained and promulgated the Constitution. It is thus
inappropriate to misrepresent that the SolGen who has supposedly met consistent litigation success
before the SG shall likewise automatically and positively be received in the present quo warranto action.
As a collegial body, the Supreme Court adjudicates without fear or favor. The best person to determine
the propriety of sitting in a case rests with the magistrate sought to be disqualified. [yourlawyersays]
Anent the third issue: A quo warranto petition is allowed against impeachable officials and SC has
jurisdiction.
The SC have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and RTC to issue the extraordinary writs, including quo
warranto. A direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction to issue such writs is allowed when there
are special and important reasons therefor, and in this case, direct resort to SC is justified considering
that the action is directed against the Chief Justice. Granting that the petition is likewise of
transcendental importance and has far-reaching implications, the Court is empowered to exercise its
power of judicial review. To exercise restraint in reviewing an impeachable officer’s appointment is a
clear renunciation of a judicial duty. an outright dismissal of the petition based on speculation that
Sereno will eventually be tried on impeachment is a clear abdication of the Court’s duty to settle actual
controversy squarely presented before it. Quo warranto proceedings are essentially judicial in character
– it calls for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s constitutional duty and power to decide cases and settle
actual controversies. This constitutional duty cannot be abdicated or transferred in favor of, or in
deference to, any other branch of the government including the Congress, even as it acts as an
impeachment court through the Senate.
To differentiate from impeachment, quo warranto involves a judicial determination of the eligibility or
validity of the election or appointment of a public official based on predetermined rules while
impeachment is a political process to vindicate the violation of the public’s trust. In quo
warrantoproceedings referring to offices filled by appointment, what is determined is the legality of the
appointment. The title to a public office may not be contested collaterally but only directly, by quo
warranto proceedings. usurpation of a public office is treated as a public wrong and carries with it public
interest, and as such, it shall be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of
the Philippines through the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor. The SolGen is given permissible
latitude within his legal authority in actions for quo warranto, circumscribed only by the national interest
and the government policy on the matter at hand.
Anent the fourth issue: Simultaneous quo warranto proceeding and impeachment proceeding is not
forum shopping and is allowed.
Quo warranto and impeachment may proceed independently of each other as these remedies are
distinct as to (1) jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and dismissal,
and (4) limitations. Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial
remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same
issues, either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court, to increase his chances of
obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another. The test for determining forum
shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of
action, and reliefs sought. The crux of the controversy in this quo warranto proceedings is the
determination of whether or not Sereno legally holds the Chief Justice position to be considered as an
impeachable officer in the first place. On the other hand, impeachment is for respondent’s prosecution
21
for certain impeachable offenses. Simply put, while Sereno’s title to hold a public office is the issue in
quo warranto proceedings, impeachment necessarily presupposes that Sereno legally holds the public
office and thus, is an impeachable officer, the only issue being whether or not she committed
impeachable offenses to warrant her removal from office.
Moreover, the reliefs sought are different. respondent in a quo warranto proceeding shall be adjudged
to cease from holding a public office, which he/she is ineligible to hold. Moreover, impeachment, a
conviction for the charges of impeachable offenses shall result to the removal of the respondent from
the public office that he/she is legally holding. It is not legally possible to impeach or remove a person
from an office that he/she, in the first place, does not and cannot legally hold or occupy.
Lastly, there can be no forum shopping because the impeachment proceedings before the House is not
the impeachment case proper, since it is only a determination of probable cause. The impeachment case
is yet to be initiated by the filing of the Articles of Impeachment before the Senate. Thus, at the moment,
there is no pending impeachment case against Sereno. The process before the House is merely
inquisitorial and is merely a means of discovering if a person may be reasonably charged with a crime.
Anent the fifth issue: Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or
invalidly elected impeachable official may be removed from office.
The language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not foreclose a quo warranto action against
impeachable officers: “Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court,
the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on
impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.” The provision uses the permissive term “may”
which denote discretion and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect, indicative of a mere
possibility, an opportunity, or an option. In American jurisprudence, it has been held that “the express
provision for removal by impeachment ought not to be taken as a tacit prohibition of removal by other
methods when there are other adequate reasons to account for this express provision.”
The principle in case law is that during their incumbency, impeachable officers cannot be criminally
prosecuted for an offense that carries with it the penalty of removal, and if they are required to be
members of the Philippine Bar to qualify for their positions, they cannot be charged with disbarment.
The proscription does not extend to actions assailing the public officer’s title or right to the office he or
she occupies. Even the PET Rules expressly provide for the remedy of either an election protest or a
petition for quo warranto to question the eligibility of the President and the Vice-President, both of
whom are impeachable officers.
Further, that the enumeration of “impeachable offenses” is made absolute, that is, only those
enumerated offenses are treated as grounds for impeachment, is not equivalent to saying that the
enumeration likewise purport to be a complete statement of the causes of removal from office. If other
causes of removal are available, then other modes of ouster can likewise be availed. To subscribe to the
view that appointments or election of impeachable officers are outside judicial review is to cleanse their
appointments or election of any possible defect pertaining to the Constitutionally-prescribed
qualifications which cannot otherwise be raised in an impeachment proceeding. To hold otherwise is to
allow an absurd situation where the appointment of an impeachable officer cannot be questioned even
when, for instance, he or she has been determined to be of foreign nationality or, in offices where Bar
membership is a qualification, when he or she fraudulently represented to be a member of the Bar.
Anent the sixth issue: The Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition is not
violative of the doctrine of separation of powers.
The Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto involving a person who would
otherwise be an impeachable official had it not been for a disqualification, is not violative of the core
constitutional provision that impeachment cases shall be exclusively tried and decided by the Senate.

Again, the difference between quo warranto and impeachment must be emphasized. An action for quo
warranto does not try a person’s culpability of an impeachment offense, neither does a writ of quo
warranto conclusively pronounce such culpability. The Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over quo
warranto proceedings does not preclude Congress from enforcing its own prerogative of determining
probable cause for impeachment, to craft and transmit the Articles of Impeachment, nor will it preclude
Senate from exercising its constitutionally committed power of impeachment.
However, logic, common sense, reason, practicality and even principles of plain arithmetic bear out the
conclusion that an unqualified public official should be removed from the position immediately if indeed
Constitutional and legal requirements were not met or breached. To abdicate from resolving a legal
controversy simply because of perceived availability of another remedy, in this case impeachment,
would be to sanction the initiation of a process specifically intended to be long and arduous and compel
the entire membership of the Legislative branch to momentarily abandon their legislative duties to focus
on impeachment proceedings for the possible removal of a public official, who at the outset, may clearly
be unqualified under existing laws and case law.
For guidance, the Court demarcates that an act or omission committed prior to or at the time of
appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office as to render such
appointment or election invalid is properly the subject of a quo warranto petition, provided that the
requisites for the commencement thereof are present. Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even if it relates
to the qualification of integrity, being a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed during the
incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official, cannot be the subject of a quo
warranto proceeding, but of something else, which may either be impeachment if the public official
concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or disciplinary,
administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.
Anent the seventh issue: Prescription does not lie against the State.
The rules on quo warranto provides that “nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to authorize
an action against a public officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the same be commenced
within one (1) year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such office or
position, arose”. Previously, the one-year prescriptive period has been applied in cases where private
individuals asserting their right of office, unlike the instant case where no private individual claims title
to the Office of the Chief Justice. Instead, it is the government itself which commenced the present
petition for quo warranto and puts in issue the qualification of the person holding the highest position in
the Judiciary.
Section 2 of Rule 66 provides that “the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the
President of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that
any case specified in the preceding section can be established by proof must commence such action.” It
may be stated that ordinary statutes of limitation, civil or penal, have no application to quo warranto
proceeding brought to enforce a public right. There is no limitation or prescription of action in an action
for quo warranto, neither could there be, for the reason that it was an action by the Government and
prescription could not be plead as a defense to an action by the Government.
That prescription does not lie in this case can also be deduced from the very purpose of an action for quo
warranto. Because quo warranto serves to end a continuous usurpation, no statute of limitations applies
to the action. Needless to say, no prudent and just court would allow an unqualified person to hold
public office, much more the highest position in the Judiciary. Moreover, the Republic cannot be faulted
for questioning Sereno’s qualification· for office only upon discovery of the cause of ouster because even
up to the present, Sereno has not been candid on whether she filed the required SALNs or not. The
defect on Sereno’s appointment was therefore not discernible, but was, on the contrary, deliberately
rendered obscure.
22
Anent the eighth issue: The Court has supervisory authority over the JBC includes ensuring that the JBC
complies with its own rules.
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution provides that “A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created
under the supervision of the Supreme Court.” The power of supervision means “overseeing or the
authority of an officer to see to it that the subordinate officers perform their duties.” JBC’s absolute
autonomy from the Court as to place its non-action or improper· actions beyond the latter’s reach is
therefore not what the Constitution contemplates. What is more, the JBC’s duty to recommend or
nominate, although calling for the exercise of discretion, is neither absolute nor unlimited, and is not
automatically equivalent to an exercise of policy decision as to place, in wholesale, the JBC process
beyond the scope of the Court’s supervisory and corrective powers. While a certain leeway must be
given to the JBC in screening aspiring magistrates, the same does not give it an unbridled discretion to
ignore Constitutional and legal requirements. Thus, the nomination by the JBC is not accurately an
exercise of policy or wisdom as to place the JBC’s actions in the same category as political questions that
the Court is barred from resolving. [yourlawyersays]
With this, it must be emphasized that qualifications under the Constitution cannot be waived or
bargained by the JBC, and one of which is that “a Member of the Judiciary must be a person
of provencompetence, integrity, probity, and independence. “Integrity” is closely related to, or if not,
approximately equated to an applicant’s good reputation for honesty, incorruptibility, irreproachable
conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards.” Integrity is likewise imposed by the New
Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court has always viewed
integrity with a goal of preserving the confidence of the litigants in the Judiciary. Hence, the JBC was
created in order to ensure that a member of the Supreme Court must be a person
of provencompetence, integrity, probity, and independence.
Anent the ninth issue: The filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement.
Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution states that “A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption
of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his
assets, liabilities, and net worth.” This has likewise been required by RA 3019 and RA 6713. “Failure to
comply” with the law is a violation of law, a “prima facie evidence of unexplained wealth, which may
result in the dismissal from service of the public officer.” It is a clear breach of the ethical standards set
for public officials and employees. The filing of the SALN is so important for purposes of transparency
and accountability that failure to comply with such requirement may result not only in dismissal from the
public service but also in criminal liability. Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713 even provides that non-
compliance with this requirement is not only punishable by imprisonment and/or a fine, it may also
result in disqualification to hold public office.
Because the Chief Justice is a public officer, she is constitutionally and statutorily mandated to perform a
positive duty to disclose all of his assets and liabilities. According to Sereno herself in her dissenting
opinion in one case, those who accept a public office do so cum onere, or with a burden, and are
considered as accepting its burdens and obligations, together with its benefits. They thereby subject
themselves to all constitutional and legislative provisions relating thereto, and undertake to perform all
the duties of their office. The public has the right to demand the performance of those duties. More
importantly, while every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater
demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary.
Noncompliance with the SALN requirement indubitably· reflects on a person’s integrity. It is not merely a
trivial or a formal requirement. The contention that the mere non-filing does not affect Sereno’s integrity
does not persuade considering that RA 6713 and RA 3019 are malum prohibitum and not malum in se.
Thus, it is the omission or commission of that act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect

thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. Malice or criminal intent is
completely immaterial.
Anent the tenth issue: Sereno chronically failed to file her SALNs and thus violated the Constitution, the
law, and the Code of Judicial Conduct.
In Sereno’s 20 years of government service in UP Law, only 11 SALNs have been filed. Sereno could have
easily dispelled doubts as to the filing or nonfiling of the unaccounted SALNs by presenting them before
the Court. Yet, Sereno opted to withhold such information or such evidence, if at all, for no clear reason.
The Doblada case, invoked by Sereno, cannot be applied, because in the Doblada case, there was a letter
of the head of the personnel of the branch of the court that the missing SALN exists and was duly
transmitted and received by the OCA as the repository agency. In Sereno’s case, the missing SALNs are
neither proven to be in the records of nor was proven to have been sent to and duly received by the
Ombudsman as the repository agency. The existence of these SALNs and the fact of filing thereof were
neither established by direct proof constituting substantial evidence nor by mere inference. Moreover,
the statement of the Ombudsman is categorical: “based on records on file, there is no SALN filed by
[Sereno] for calendar years 1999 to 2009 except SALN ending December 1998.” This leads the Court to
conclude that Sereno did not indeed file her SALN.
For this reason, the Republic was able to discharge its burden of proof with the certification from UP
HRDO and Ombudsman, and thus it becomes incumbent upon Sereno to discharge her burden of
evidence. Further, the burden of proof in a quo warranto proceeding is different when it is filed by the
State in that the burden rests upon the respondent.
In addition, contrary to what Sereno contends, being on leave does not exempt her from filing her SALN
because it is not tantamount to separation from government service. The fact that Sereno did not
receive any pay for the periods she was on leave does not make her a government worker “serving in an
honorary capacity” to be exempted from the SALN laws on RA 6713. [yourlawyersays]
Neither can the clearance and certification of UP HRDO be taken in favor of Sereno. During the period
when Sereno was a professor in UP, concerned authorized official/s of the Office of the President or the
Ombudsman had not yet established compliance procedures for the review of SALNs filed by officials and
employees of State Colleges and Universities, like U.P. The ministerial duty of the head of office to issue
compliance order came about only on 2006 from the CSC. As such, the U.P. HRDO could not have been
expected to perform its ministerial duty of issuing compliance orders to Sereno when such rule was not
yet in existence at that time. Moreover, the clearance are not substitutes for SALNs. The import of said
clearance is limited only to clearing Sereno of her academic and administrative responsibilities, money
and property accountabilities and from administrative charges as of the date of her resignation.
Neither can Sereno’s inclusion in the matrix of candidates with complete requirements and in the
shortlist nominated by the JBC confirm or ratify her compliance with the SALN requirement. Her
inclusion in the shortlist of candidates for the position of Chief Justice does not negate, nor supply her
with the requisite proof of integrity. She should have been disqualified at the outset. Moreover, the JBC
En Banc cannot be deemed to have considered Sereno eligible because it does not appear that Sereno’s
failure to submit her SALNs was squarely addressed by the body. Her inclusion in the shortlist of
nominees and subsequent appointment to the position do not estop the Republic or this Court from
looking into her qualifications. Verily, no estoppel arises where the representation or conduct of the
party sought to be estopped is due to ignorance founded upon an innocent mistake
Anent the eleventh issue: Sereno failed to properly and promptly file her SALNs, again in violation of the
Constitutional and statutory requirements .
23
Failure to file a truthful, complete and accurate SALN would likewise amount to dishonesty if the same is
attended by malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false statements. The suspicious
circumstances include: 1996 SALN being accomplished only in 1998; 1998 SALN only filed in 2003; 1997
SALN only notarized in 1993; 2004-2006 SALNs were not filed which were the years when she received
the bulk of her fees from PIATCO cases, 2006 SALN was later on intended to be for 2010, gross amount
from PIATCO cases were not reflected, suspicious increase of P2,700,000 in personal properties were
seen in her first five months as Associate Justice. It is therefore clear as day that Sereno failed not only in
complying with the physical act of filing, but also committed dishonesty betraying her lack of integrity,
honesty and probity. The Court does not hesitate to impose the supreme penalty of dismissal against
public officials whose SALNs were found to have contained discrepancies, inconsistencies and non-
disclosures.
Anent the twelfth issue: Sereno failed to submit the required SALNs as to qualify for nomination pursuant
to the JBC rules.
The JBC required the submission of at least ten SALNs from those applicants who are incumbent
Associate Justices, absent which, the applicant ought not to have been interviewed, much less been
considered for nomination. From the minutes of the meeting of the JBC, it appeared that Sereno was
singled out from the rest of the applicants for having failed to submit a single piece of SALN for her years
of service in UP Law. It is clear that JBC did not do away with the SALN requirement, but still required
substantial compliance. Subsequently, it appeared that it was only Sereno who was not able to
substantially comply with the SALN requirement, and instead of complying, Sereno wrote a letter
containing justifications why she should no longer be required to file the SALNs: that she resigned from
U.P. in 2006 and then resumed government service only in 2009, thus her government service is not
continuous; that her government records are more than 15 years old and thus infeasible to retrieve; and
that U.P. cleared her of all academic and administrative responsibilities and charges.
These justifications, however, did not obliterate the simple fact that Sereno submitted only 3 SALNs to
the JBC in her 20-year service in U.P., and that there was nary an attempt on Sereno’s part to comply.
Moreover, Sereno curiously failed to mention that she did not file several SALNs during the course of her
employment in U.P. Such failure to disclose a material fact and the concealment thereof from the JBC
betrays any claim of integrity especially from a Member of the Supreme Court. [yourlawyersays]
Indubitably, Sereno not only failed to substantially comply with the submission of the SALNs but there
was no compliance at all. Dishonesty is classified as a grave offense the penalty of which is dismissal from
the service at the first infraction. A person aspiring to public office must observe honesty, candor and
faithful compliance with the law. Nothing less is expected. Dishonesty is a malevolent act that puts
serious doubt upon one’s ability to perform his duties with the integrity and uprightness demanded of a
public officer or employee. For these reasons, the JBC should no longer have considered Sereno for
interview.
Moreover, the fact that Sereno had no permit to engage in private practice while in UP, her false
representations that she was in private practice after resigning from UP when in fact she was counsel for
the government, her false claims that the clearance from UP HRDO is proof of her compliance with
SALNs requirement, her commission of tax fraud for failure to truthfully declare her income in her ITRs
for the years 2007-2009, procured a brand new Toyota Land Cruiser worth at least P5,000,000, caused
the hiring of Ms. Macasaet without requisite public bidding, misused P3,000,000 of government funds
for hotel accommodation at Shangri-La Boracay as the venue of the 3rd ASEAN Chief Justices meeting,
issued a TRO in Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines v. COMELECcontrary to the
Supreme Court’s internal rules, manipulated the disposition of the DOJ request to transfer the venue of
the Maute cases outside of Mindanao, ignored rulings of the Supreme Court with respect to the grant of
survivorship benefits which caused undue delay to the release of survivorship benefits to spouses of
deceased judges and Justices, manipulated the processes of the JBC to exclude then SolGen, now AJ
 24

Francis Jardeleza, by using highly confidential document involving national security against the latter
among others, all belie the fact that Sereno has integrity.
Anent the thirteenth issue: Sereno’s failure to submit to the JBC her SALNs for several years means that
her integrity was not established at the time of her application
The requirement to submit SALNs is made more emphatic when the applicant is eyeing the position of
Chief Justice. On the June 4, 2012, JBC En Banc meeting, Senator Escudero proposed the addition of the
requirement of SALN in order for the next Chief Justice to avoid what CJ Corona had gone through.
Further, the failure to submit the required SALNs means that the JBC and the public are divested of the
opportunity to consider the applicant’s fitness or propensity to commit corruption or dishonesty. In
Sereno’s case, for example, the waiver of the confidentiality of bank deposits would be practically
useless for the years that she failed to submit her SALN since the JBC cannot verify whether the same
matches the entries indicated in the SALN.
Sereno is found DISQUALIFIED from and is hereby adjudged GUILTY of UNLAWFULLY HOLDING and
EXERCISING the OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE. Accordingly, Sereno is OUSTED and EXCLUDED therefrom.
The position of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is declared vacant and the Judicial and Bar Council
is directed to commence the application and nomination process.
This Decision is immediately executory without need of further action from the Court.
Sereno is ordered to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from receipt hereof why she should not be
sanctioned for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Code of Judicial Conduct for
transgressing the sub judice rule and for casting aspersions and ill motives to the Members of the
Supreme Court.

Anent the fourteenth issue: Sereno’s ineligibility for lack of proven integrity cannot be cured by her
nomination and subsequent appointment as Chief Justice.

Well-settled is the rule that qualifications for public office must be possessed at the time of appointment
and assumption of office and also during the officer’s entire tenure as a continuing requirement. The
voidance of the JBC nomination as a necessary consequence of the Court’s finding that Sereno is
ineligible, in the first place, to be a candidate for the position of Chief Justice and to be nominated for
said position follows as a matter of course. The Court has ample jurisdiction to do so without the
necessity of impleading the JBC as the Court can take judicial notice of the explanations from the JBC
members and the OEO. he Court, in a quo warranto proceeding, maintains the power to issue such
further judgment determining the respective rights in and to the public office, position or franchise of all
the parties to the action as justice requires.

Neither will the President’s act of appointment cause to qualify Sereno. Although the JBC is an office
constitutionally created, the participation of the President in the selection and nomination process is
evident from the composition of the JBC itself.

An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the
only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. While the Court
surrenders discretionary appointing power to the President, the exercise of such discretion is subject to
the non-negotiable requirements that the appointee is qualified and all other legal requirements are
satisfied, in the absence of which, the appointment is susceptible to attack.

Anent the fifteenth issue: Sereno is a de facto officer removable through quo warranto

The effect of a finding that a person appointed to an office is ineligible therefor is that his presumably
valid appointment will give him color of title that confers on him the status of a de facto officer. For lack
of a Constitutional qualification, Sereno is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice and is merely
holding a colorable right or title thereto. As such, Sereno has never attained the status of an
impeachable official and her removal from the office, other than by impeachment, is justified. The
remedy, therefore, of a quo warranto at the instance of the State is proper to oust Sereno from the
appointive position of Chief Justice. [yourlawyersays]

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Quo Warranto is GRANTED.


E. SANDIGANBAYAN AND OMBUDSMAN
EN BANC
G.R. No. 196231 September 4, 2012
EMILIO A. GONZALES III, Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, acting through and represented by EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., SENIOR DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY JOSE AMOR M.
AMORANDO, Officer in Charge, Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, ATTY.
RONALDO A. GERON, DIR. ROWENA TURINGAN-SANCHEZ, and ATTY. CARLITOD.
CATAYONG, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The Case
These two petitions have been consolidated not because they stem from the same factual milieu but
because they raise a common thread of issues relating to the President's exercise of the power to
remove from office herein petitioners who claim the protective cloak of independence of the
constitutionally-created office to which they belong - the Office of the Ombudsman.
The first case, docketed as G.R. No. 196231, is a Petition for Certiorari (with application for issuance of
temporary restraining order or status quo order) which assails on jurisdictional grounds the
Decision1 dated March 31, 2011 rendered by the Office of the President in OP Case No. 10-J-460
dismissing petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III, Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law
Enforcement Offices (MOLEO), upon a finding of guilt on the administrative charges of Gross Neglect of
Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting a Betrayal of Public Trust. The petition primarily seeks to
declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as the
Ombudsman Act of 1989, which gives the President the power to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of the
Office of the Ombudsman.
The second case, docketed as G.R. No. 196232, is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with
application for issuance of a temporary restraining order or status quo order) seeking to annul, reverse
and set aside (1) the undated Order2 requiring petitioner Wendell Barreras-Sulit to submit a written
explanation with respect to alleged acts or omissions constituting serious/grave offenses in relation to
the Plea Bargaining Agreement (PLEBARA) entered into with Major General Carlos F. Garcia; and (2) the
April 7, 2011 Notice of Preliminary Investigation,3 both issued by the Office of the President in OP-DC-
Case No. 11-B-003, the administrative case initiated against petitioner as a Special Prosecutor of the
Office of the Ombudsman. The petition likewise seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of R.A.
No. 6770 giving the President the power to dismiss a Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The facts from which these two cases separately took root are neither complicated nor unfamiliar.
25
In the morning of August 23, 2010, news media scampered for a minute-by-minute coverage of a
hostage drama that had slowly unfolded right at the very heart of the City of Manila. While initial news
accounts were fragmented it was not difficult to piece together the story on the hostage-taker, Police
Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza. He was a disgruntled former police officer attempting to secure his
reinstatement in the police force and to restore the benefits of a life-long, and erstwhile bemedaled,
service. The following day, broadsheets and tabloids were replete with stories not just of the deceased
hostage-taker but also of the hostage victims, eight of whom died during the bungled police operation to
rescue the hapless innocents. Their tragic deaths triggered word wars of foreign relation proportions.
One newspaper headline ran the story in detail, as follows:
MANILA, Philippines - A dismissed policeman armed with an assault rifle hijacked a bus packed with
tourists, and killed most of its passengers in a 10 hour-hostage drama shown live on national television
until last night.
Former police senior inspector Rolando Mendoza was shot dead by a sniper at past 9 p.m. Mendoza
hijacked the bus and took 21 Chinese tourists hostage, demanding his reinstatement to the police force.
The hostage drama dragged on even after the driver of the bus managed to escape and told police that
all the remaining passengers had been killed.
Late into the night assault forces surrounded the bus and tried to gain entry, but a pair of dead hostages
hand-cuffed to the door made it difficult for them. Police said they fired at the wheels of the bus to
immobilize it.
Police used hammers to smash windows, door and wind-shield but were met with intermittent fire from
the hos-tage taker.
Police also used tear gas in an effort to confirm if the remaining hostages were all dead or alive. When
the standoff ended at nearly 9 p.m., some four hostages were rescued alive while Mendoza was killed by
a sniper.
Initial reports said some 30 policemen stormed the bus. Shots also rang out, sending bystanders
scampering for safety.
It took the policemen almost two hours to assault the bus because gunfire reportedly rang out from
inside the bus.
Mendoza hijacked the tourist bus in the morning and took the tourists hostage.
Mendoza, who claimed he was illegally dismissed from the police service, initially released nine of the
hostages during the drama that began at 10 a.m. and played out live on national television.
Live television footage showed Mendoza asking for food for those remaining in the bus, which was
delivered, and fuel to keep the air-conditioning going. The disgruntled former police officer was
reportedly armed with an M-16 rifle, a 9 mm pistol and two hand grenades.

Mendoza posted a handwritten note on the windows of the bus, saying "big deal will start after 3 p.m.
today." Another sign stuck to another window said "3 p.m. today deadlock."
Stressing his demand, Mendoza stuck a piece of paper with a handwritten message: "Big mistake to
correct a big wrong decision." A larger piece of paper on the front windshield was headed, "Release final
decision," apparently referring to the case that led to his dismissal from the police force.
Negotiations dragged on even after Mendoza's self-imposed deadline.
Senior Police Officer 2 Gregorio Mendoza said his brother was upset over his dismissal from the police
force. "His problem was he was unjustly removed from service. There was no due process, no hearing,
no com-plaint," Gregorio said.
Last night, Gregorio was arrested by his colleagues on suspicions of being an accessory to his brother's
action. Tensions rose as relatives tried to prevent lawmen from arresting Gregorio in front of national
television. This triggered the crisis that eventually forced Mendoza to carry out his threat and kill the
remaining hostages.
Negotiators led by Superintendent Orlando Yebra and Chief Inspector Romeo Salvador tried to talk
Mendoza into surrendering and releasing the 21 hostages, mostly children and three Filipinos, including
the driver, the tourist guide and a photographer. Yebra reportedly lent a cellphone to allow
communications with Mendoza in-side the bus, which was parked in front ofthe Quirino Grandstand.
Children could be seen peeking from the drawn curtains of the bus while police negotiators hovered near
the scene.
Manila Police District (MPD) director Chief Superinten-dent Rodolfo Magtibay ordered the deployment
of crack police teams and snipers near the scene. A crisis man-agement committee had been activated
with Manila Vice Mayor Isko Moreno coordinating the actions with the MPD.
Earlier last night, Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez had a meeting with Moreno to discuss Mendoza's
case that led to his dismissal from the service. Ombudsman spokesman Jose de Jesus said Gutierrez gave
a "sealed letter" to Moreno to be delivered to Mendoza. De Jesus did not elaborate on the contents of
the letter but said Moreno was tasked to personally deliver the letter to Mendoza.
MPD spokesman Chief Inspector Edwin Margarejo said Mendoza was apparently distraught by the slow
process of the Ombudsman in deciding his motion for reconside-ration. He said the PNP-Internal Affairs
Service and the Manila Regional Trial Court had already dismissed crim-inal cases against him.
The hostage drama began when Mendoza flagged down the Hong Thai Travel Tourist bus (TVU-799),
pretend-ing to hitch a ride. Margarejo said the bus had just left Fort Santiago in Intramuros when
Mendoza asked the driver to let him get on and ride to Quirino Grandstand. Upon reaching the Quirino
Grandstand, Mendoza an-nounced to the passengers that they would be taken hostage. "Having worn
his (police) uniform, of course there is no doubt that he already planned the hostage taking," Margarejo
said. - Sandy Araneta, Nestor Etolle, Delon Porcalla, Amanda Fisher, Cecille Suerte Felipe, Christi-na
Mendez, AP Grandstand Carnage, The Philippine Star, Updated August 24, 2010 12:00 AM, Val Rodri-
guez.4
26
In a completely separate incident much earlier in time, more particularly in December of 2003, 28-year-
old Juan Paolo Garcia and 23-year-old Ian Carl Garcia were caught in the United States smuggling
$100,000 from Manila by concealing the cash in their luggage and making false statements to US
Customs Officers. The Garcia brothers pleaded guilty to bulk cash smuggling and agreed to forfeit the
amount in favor of the US Government in exchange for the dismissal of the rest of the charges against
them and for being sentenced to time served. Inevitably, however, an investigation into the source of
the smuggled currency conducted by US Federal Agents and the Philippine Government unraveled a
scandal of military corruption and amassed wealth -- the boys' father, Retired Major General Carlos F.
Garcia, former Chief Procurement Officer of the Armed Forces, had accumulated more than ₱ 300
Million during his active military service. Plunder and Anti-Money Laundering cases were eventually filed
against Major General Garcia, his wife and their two sons before the Sandiganbayan.
G.R. No. 196231
Sometime in 2008, a formal charge5 for Grave Misconduct (robbery, grave threats, robbery extortion and
physical injuries) was filed before the Philippine National Police-National Capital Region (PNP-NCR)
against Manila Police District Senior Inspector (P/S Insp.) Rolando Mendoza, and four others, namely,
Police Inspector Nelson Lagasca, Senior Police Inspector I Nestor David, Police Officer III Wilson Gavino,
and Police Officer II Roderick Lopena. A similar charge was filed by the private complainant, Christian M.
Kalaw, before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Manila, docketed as I.S. No. 08E-09512.
On July 24, 2008, while said cases were still pending, the Office of the Regional Director of the National
Police Commission (NPC) turned over, upon the request of petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III, all relevant
documents and evidence in relation to said case to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for appropriate
administrative adjudication.6 Subsequently, Case No. OMB-P-A-08-0670-H for Grave Misconduct was
lodged against P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers, who filed their respective
verified position papers as directed.
Meanwhile, on August 26, 2008, I.S. No. 08E-09512 was dismissed7 upon a finding that the material
allegations made by the complainant had not been substantiated "by any evidence at all to warrant the
indictment of respondents of the offenses charged." Similarly, the Internal Affairs Service of the PNP
issued a Resolution8 dated October 17, 2008 recommending the dismissal without prejudice of the
administrative case against the same police officers, for failure of the complainant to appear in three (3)
consecutive hearings despite due notice.
However, on February 16, 2009, upon the recommendation of petitioner Emilio Gonzales III, a
Decision9 in Case No. OMB-P-A-08-0670-H finding P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police
officers guilty of Grave Misconduct was approved by the Ombudsman. The dispositive portion of said
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that respondents P/S Insp. ROLANDO DEL ROSARIO
MENDOZA and PO3 WILSON MATIC GAVINO of PRO-ARMM, Camp Brig. Gen. Salipada K. Pendatun,
Parang, Shariff Kabunsuan; P/INSP. NELSON URBANO LAGASCA, SPO1 NESTOR REYES DAVID and PO2
RODERICK SALVA LOPEÑA of Manila Police District, Headquarters, United Nations Avenue, Manila, be
meted the penalty of DISMISSAL from the Service, pursuant to Section 52 (A), Rule IV, Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, with the accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement benefits
and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government service pursuant to Section 58,
Rule IV of the same Uniform Rules of Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, for having
committed GRAVE MISCONDUCT.
 27

On November 5, 2009, they filed a Motion for Reconsideration10 of the foregoing Decision, followed by a proceedings, Christian Kalaw did not also affirm his complaint-affidavit with the Ombudsman
Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration11 on November 19, 2009. On December 14, 2009, the or submit any position paper as required.
pleadings mentioned and the records of the case were assigned for review and recommendation to Graft
Investigation and Prosecutor Officer Dennis L. Garcia, who released a draft Order12 on April 5, 2010 for
(c) Subsequently, Mendoza, after serving preventive suspension, was adjudged liable for
appropriate action by his immediate superior, Director Eulogio S. Cecilio, who, in turn, signed and
grave misconduct by Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales (duly approved on May 21, 2009) based
forwarded said Order to petitioner Gonzalez's office on April 27, 2010. Not more than ten (10) days after,
on the sole and uncorroborated complaint-affidavit of Christian Kalaw, which was not
more particularly on May 6, 2010, petitioner endorsed the Order, together with the case records, for
previously sustained by the City Prosecutor's Office and the PNP Internal Affairs Service. From
final approval by Ombudsman Merceditas N. Gutierrez, in whose office it remained pending for final
the said Resolution, Mendoza interposed a timely motion for reconsideration (dated and filed
review and action when P/S Insp. Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of foreign tourists on that fateful day of
November 5, 2009) as well as a supplement thereto. No opposition or comment was filed
August 23, 2010 in a desperate attempt to have himself reinstated in the police service.
thereto.

In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, which ended in the tragic murder of eight HongKong
(d) Despite the pending and unresolved motion for reconsideration, the judgment of dismissal
Chinese nationals, the injury of seven others and the death of P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza, a public
was enforced, thereby abruptly ending Mendoza's 30 years of service in the PNP with
outcry against the blundering of government officials prompted the creation of the Incident Investigation
forfeiture of all his benefits. As a result, Mendoza sought urgent relief by sending several
and Review Committee (IIRC),13 chaired by Justice Secretary Leila de Lima and vice-chaired by Interior
hand-written letter-requests to the Ombudsman for immediate resolution of his motion for
and Local Government Secretary Jesus Robredo. It was tasked to determine accountability for the
reconsideration. But his requests fell on deaf ears.
incident through the conduct of public hearings and executive sessions. However, petitioner, as well as
the Ombudsman herself, refused to participate in the IIRC proceedings on the assertion that the Office of
the Ombudsman is an independent constitutional body. By allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish for nine long (9) months without any
justification, Ombudsman Gutierrez and Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed complete and wanton
violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rule to resolve motions for reconsideration in administrative
Sifting through testimonial and documentary evidence, the IIRC eventually identified petitioner Gonzales
disciplinary cases within five (5) days from submission (Sec. 8, Ombudsman Rules of Procedure). The
to be among those in whom culpability must lie. In its Report,14 the IIRC made the following findings:
inaction is gross, there being no opposition to the motion for reconsideration.

Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable negligence and gross violation of their
Besides, the Ombudsman, without first resolving the motion for reconsideration, arbitrarily enforced the
own rules of procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish for more than
judgment of dismissal and ignored the intervening requests for immediate resolution, thereby rendering
nine (9) months without any justification, in violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve
the inaction even more inexcusable and unjust as to amount to gross negligence and grave misconduct.
motions for reconsideration in administrative disciplinary cases within five (5) days from submission. The
inaction is gross, considering there is no opposition thereto. The prolonged inaction precipitated the
desperate resort to hostage-taking. SECOND, Ombudsman Gutierrez and Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious disregard of due
process, manifest injustice and oppression in failing to provisionally suspend the further implementation
of the judgment of dismissal against Mendoza pending disposition of his unresolved motion for
More so, Mendoza's demand for immediate resolution of his motion for reconsideration is not without
reconsideration.
legal and compelling bases considering the following:

By enforcing the judgment of dismissal without resolving the motion for reconsideration for over nine
(a) PSI Mendoza and four policemen were investigated by the Ombudsman involving a case
months, the two Ombudsman officials acted with arbitrariness and without regard to due process and
for alleged robbery (extortion), grave threats and physical injuries amounting to grave
the constitutional right of an accused to the speedy disposition of his case. As long as his motion for
misconduct allegedly committed against a certain Christian Kalaw. The same case, however,
reconsideration remained pending and unresolved, Mendoza was also effectively deprived of the right to
was previously dismissed by the Manila City Prosecutors Office for lack of probable cause and
avail of the ordinary course of appeal or review to challenge the judgment of dismissal before the higher
by the PNP-NCR Internal Affairs Service for failure of the complainant (Christian Kalaw) to
courts and seek a temporary restraining order to prevent the further execution thereof.
submit evidence and prosecute the case. On the other hand, the case which was filed much
ahead by Mendoza et al. against Christian Kalaw involving the same incident, was given due
course by the City Prosecutors Office. As such, if the Ombudsman cannot resolve with dispatch the motion for reconsideration, it should have
provisionally suspended the further enforcement of the judgment of dismissal without prejudice to its
re-implementation if the reconsideration is eventually denied. Otherwise, the Ombudsman will benefit
(b) The Ombudsman exercised jurisdiction over the case based on a letter issued motu
from its own inaction. Besides, the litigant is entitled to a stay of the execution pending resolution of his
proprio for Deputy Ombudsman Emilio A. Gonzalez III, directing the PNP-NCR - without citing
motion for reconsideration. Until the motion for reconsideration is denied, the adjudication process
any reason - to endorse the case against Mendoza and the arresting policemen to his office
before the Ombudsman cannot be considered as completely finished and, hence, the judgment is not yet
for administrative adjudication, thereby showing undue interest on the case. He also caused
ripe for execution.
the docketing of the case and named Atty. Clarence V. Guinto of the PNP-CIDG-NCR, who
indorsed the case records, as the nominal complainant, in lieu of Christian Kalaw. During the
When the two Ombudsman officials received Mendoza's demand for the release of the final order
resolving his motion for reconsideration, they should have performed their duty by resolving the

reconsideration that same day since it was already pending for nine months and the prescribed period
for its resolution is only five days. Or if they cannot resolve it that same day, then they should have acted
decisively by issuing an order provisionally suspending the further enforcement of the judgment of
dismissal subject to revocation once the reconsideration is denied and without prejudice to the arrest
and prosecution of Mendoza for the hostage-taking. Had they done so, the crisis may have ended
peacefully, without necessarily compromising the integrity of the institution. After all, as relayed to the
negotiators, Mendoza did express willingness to take full responsibility for the hostage-taking if his
demand for release of the final decision or reinstatement was met.
But instead of acting decisively, the two Ombudsman officials merely offered to review a pending motion
for review of the case, thereby prolonging their inaction and aggravating the situation. As expected,
Mendoza - who previously berated Deputy Gonzales for allegedly demanding Php150,000 in exchange
for favorably resolving the motion for reconsideration - rejected and branded as trash ("basura") the
Ombudsman [sic] letter promising review, triggering the collapse of the negotiations. To prevent the
situation from getting out of hand, the negotiators sought the alternative option of securing before the
PNP-NCRPO an order for Mendoza's provisional reinstatement pending resolution of the motion for
reconsideration. Unfortunately, it was already too late. But had the Ombudsman officials performed
their duty under the law and acted decisively, the entire crisis may have ended differently.
The IIRC recommended that its findings with respect to petitioner Gonzales be referred to the Office of
the President (OP) for further determination of possible administrative offenses and for the initiation of
the proper administrative proceedings.
On October 15, 2010, the OP instituted a Formal Charge15 against petitioner Gonzales for Gross Neglect
of Duty and/or Inefficiency in the Performance of Official Duty under Rule XIV, Section 22 of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292 and other pertinent Civil
Service Laws, rules and regulations, and for Misconduct in Office under Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.16 Petitioner filed his Answer17 thereto in due time.
Shortly after the filing by the OP of the administrative case against petitioner, a complaint dated October
29, 2010 was filed by Acting Assistant Ombudsman Joselito P. Fangon before the Internal Affairs Board of
the Office of the Ombudsman charging petitioner with "directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any
gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with any
contract or transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his
official capacity has to intervene under the law" under Section 3(b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, and also, with solicitation or acceptance of gifts under Section 7(d) of the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards.18 In a Joint Resolution19 dated February 17, 2011, which was approved by
Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, the complaint was dismissed, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding no probable cause to indict respondent Emilio A. Gonzales III
for violations of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 and Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713, the complaint is hereby
be [sic] DISMISSED.
Further, finding no sufficient evidence to hold respondent administratively liable for Misconduct, the
same is likewise DISMISSED.
Meanwhile, the OP notified20 petitioner that a Preliminary Clarificatory Conference relative to the
administrative charge against him was to be conducted at the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary
28
for Legal Affairs (ODESLA) on February 8, 2011. Petitioner Gonzales alleged,21 however, that on February
4, 2011, he heard the news that the OP had announced his suspension for one year due to his delay in
the disposition of P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion for reconsideration. Hence, believing that the OP had
already prejudged his case and that any proceeding before it would simply be a charade, petitioner no
longer attended the scheduled clarificatory conference. Instead, he filed an Objection to
Proceedings22 on February 7, 2011. Despite petitioner's absence, however, the OP pushed through with
the proceedings and, on March 31, 2011, rendered the assailed Decision,23 the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Office finds Deputy Ombudsman Emilio A. Gonzales III guilty
of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal of public trust, and hereby meted
out the penalty of DISMISSAL from service.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the petition.
G.R. No. 196232
In April of 2005, the Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman charged Major
General Carlos F. Garcia, his wife Clarita D. Garcia, their sons Ian Carl Garcia, Juan Paulo Garcia and
Timothy Mark Garcia and several unknown persons with Plunder (Criminal Case No. 28107) and Money
Laundering (Criminal Case No. SB09CRM0194) before the Sandiganbayan.
On January 7, 2010, the Sandiganbayan denied Major General Garcia's urgent petition for bail holding
that strong prosecution evidence militated against the grant of bail. On March 16, 2010, however, the
government, represented by petitioner, Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit ("Barreras-Sulit") and
her prosecutorial staff sought the Sandiganbayan's approval of a Plea Bargaining Agreement (hereinafter
referred to as "PLEBARA") entered into with the accused. On May 4, 2010, the Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution finding the change of plea warranted and the PLEBARA compliant with jurisprudential
guidelines.
Outraged by the backroom deal that could allow Major General Garcia to get off the hook with nothing
but a slap on the hand notwithstanding the prosecution's apparently strong evidence of his culpability
for serious public offenses, the House of Representatives' Committee on Justice conducted public
hearings on the PLEBARA. At the conclusion of these public hearings, the Committee on Justice passed
and adopted Committee Resolution No. 3,24recommending to the President the dismissal of petitioner
Barreras-Sulit from the service and the filing of appropriate charges against her Deputies and Assistants
before the appropriate government office for having committed acts and/or omissions tantamount to
culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, which are violations under the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and grounds for removal from office under the Ombudsman Act.
The Office of the President initiated OP-DC-Case No. 11-B-003 against petitioner Barreras-Sulit. In her
written explanation, petitioner raised the defenses of prematurity and the lack of jurisdiction of the OP
with respect to the administrative disciplinary proceeding against her. The OP, however, still proceeded
with the case, setting it for preliminary investigation on April 15, 2011.
Hence, the petition.

The Issues
In G.R. No. 196231, petitioner Gonzales raises the following grounds, to wit:
(A)
RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE OTHER INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS,
HAS NO CONSTITUTIONAL OR VALID STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO SUBJECT PETITIONER TO AN
ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION AND TO THEREAFTER ORDER HIS REMOVAL AS DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN.
(B)
RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE OTHER INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS,
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
CONDUCTED ITS INVESTIGATION AND RENDERED ITS DECISION IN VIOLATION OF PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO
DUE PROCESS.
(C)
RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS, GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT
PETITIONER COMMITTED DELAY IN THE DISPOSITION OF MENDOZA'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.
(D)
RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS, GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT
PETITIONER TOOK UNDUE INTEREST IN MENDOZA'S CASE.
(E)
RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS, GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FAULTING PETITIONER
FOR NOT RELEASING THE RESOLUTION ON MENDOZA'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR FOR NOT
SUSPENDING MENDOZA'S DISMISSAL FROM SERVICE DURING THE HOSTAGE CRISIS.
(F)
RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS, GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT THERE
WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT PETITIONER DEMANDED A BRIBE FROM MENDOZA.25
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 196232, petitioner Barreras-Sulit poses for the Court the question -
AS OF THIS POINT IN TIME, WOULD TAKING AND CONTINUING TO TAKE ADMINISTRATIVE
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING AGAINST PETITIONER BE LAWFUL AND JUSTIFIABLE?26
29
Re-stated, the primordial question in these two petitions is whether the Office of the President has
jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special
Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-created Office of the Ombudsman.
The Court's Ruling
Short of claiming themselves immune from the ordinary means of removal, petitioners asseverate that
the President has no disciplinary jurisdiction over them considering that the Office of the Ombudsman to
which they belong is clothed with constitutional independence and that they, as Deputy Ombudsman
and Special Prosecutor therein, necessarily bear the constitutional attributes of said office.
The Court is not convinced.
The Ombudsman's administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prose-
cutor is not exclusive.
It is true that the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations
proceeds from its constitutional mandate to be an effective protector of the people against inept and
corrupt government officers and employees,27 and is subsumed under the broad powers "explicitly
conferred" upon it by the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770.28
The ombudsman traces its origins to the primitive legal order of Germanic tribes. The Swedish term,
which literally means "agent" or "representative," communicates the concept that has been carried on
into the creation of the modern-day ombudsman, that is, someone who acts as a neutral representative
of ordinary citizens against government abuses.29 This idea of a people's protector was first
institutionalized in the Philippines under the 1973 Constitution with the creation of the Tanodbayan,
which wielded the twin powers of investigation and prosecution. Section 6, Article XIII of the 1973
Constitution provided thus:
Sec. 6. The Batasang Pambansa shall create an office of the Ombudsman, to be known as Tanodbayan,
which shall receive and investigate complaints relative to public office, including those in government-
owned or controlled corporations, make appropriate recommendations, and in case of failure of justice
as defined by law, file and prosecute the corresponding criminal, civil, or administrative case before the
proper court or body.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution later envisioned a more effective ombudsman vested with
authority to "act in a quick, inexpensive and effective manner on complaints against administrative
officials", and to function purely with the "prestige and persuasive powers of his office" in correcting
improprieties, inefficiencies and corruption in government freed from the hampering effects of
prosecutorial duties.30 Accordingly, Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution enumerates the
following powers, functions, and duties of the Office of the Ombudsman, viz:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient.
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the Government, or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-owned or controlled

corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop,
prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties.
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault,
and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure
compliance therewith.
(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into
by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity
to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action.
(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its
responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents.
(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due
prudence.
(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the
Government and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high standards of
ethics and efficiency.
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or
duties as may be provided by law.31
Congress thereafter passed, on November 17, 1989, Republic Act No. 6770, the Ombudsman Act of
1989, to shore up the Ombudsman's institutional strength by granting it "full administrative disciplinary
power over public officials and employees,"32 as follows:
Sec. 21. Officials Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-
owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only
by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.(Emphasis supplied)
In the exercise of such full administrative disciplinary authority, the Office of the Ombudsman was
explicitly conferred the statutory power to conduct administrative investigations under Section 19 of the
same law, thus:
Sec. 19. Administrative complaints. - The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not
limited, to acts or omissions which:
1. Are contrary to law or regulation;
2. Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;
30
3. Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency's functions, though in accordance with law;
4. Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;
5. Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or
6. Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.
While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is extensive and covers all government
officials, whether appointive or elective, with the exception only of those officials removable by
impeachment, the members of congress and the judiciary, such authority is by no means exclusive.
Petitioners cannot insist that they should be solely and directly subject to the disciplinary authority of
the Ombudsman. For, while Section 21 declares the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority over all
government officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President express power of removal
over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. Thus:
Section 8. Removal; Filling of Vacancy.-
(2) A Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the President for any of the
grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, and after due process.
It is a basic canon of statutory construction that in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every
part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a
hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. A construction that would render a provision inoperative should
be avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts
of a coordinated and harmonious whole.33Otherwise stated, the law must not be read in truncated parts.
Every part thereof must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general
intent of the whole enactment.34
A harmonious construction of these two apparently conflicting provisions in R.A. No. 6770 leads to the
inevitable conclusion that Congress had intended the Ombudsman and the President to exercise
concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor, respectively. This sharing of authority goes into the wisdom of the legislature, which
prerogative falls beyond the pale of judicial inquiry. The Congressional deliberations on this matter are
quite insightful, viz:
Senator Angara explained that the phrase was added to highlight the fact that the Deputy Tanodbayan
may only be removed for cause and after due process. He added that the President alone has the power
to remove the Deputy Tanodbayan.
Reacting thereto, Senator Guingona observed that this might impair the independence of the
Tanodbayan and suggested that the procedural removal of the Deputy Tanodbayan...; and that he can be
removed not by the President but by the Ombudsman.

However, the Chair expressed apprehension that the Ombudsman and the Deputy Ombudsman may try
to protect one another. The Chair suggested the substitution of the phrase "after due process" with the
words after due notice and hearing with the President as the ultimate authority.
Senator Guingona contended, however, that the Constitution provides for an independent Office of the
Tanodbayan, and to allow the Executive to have disciplinary powers over the Tanodbayan Deputies
would be an encroachment on the independence of the Tanodbayan.
Replying thereto, Senator Angara stated that originally, he was not averse to the proposal, however,
considering the Chair's observation that vesting such authority upon the Tanodbayan itself could result in
mutual protection, it is necessary that an outside official should be vested with such authority to effect a
check and balance.35
Indubitably, the manifest intent of Congress in enacting both provisions - Section 8(2) and Section 21 - in
the same Organic Act was to provide for an external authority, through the person of the President, that
would exercise the power of administrative discipline over the Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor without in the least diminishing the constitutional and plenary authority of the Ombudsman
over all government officials and employees. Such legislative design is simply a measure of "check and
balance" intended to address the lawmakers' real and valid concern that the Ombudsman and his
Deputy may try to protect one another from administrative liabilities.
This would not be the first instance that the Office of the President has locked horns with the
Ombudsman on the matter of disciplinary jurisdiction. An earlier conflict had been settled in favor of
shared authority in Hagad v. Gozo Dadole.36 In said case, the Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Mandaue City,
and a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, were charged before the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 6713, and the Revised Penal Code.
The pivotal issue raised therein was whether the Ombudsman had been divested of his authority to
conduct administrative investigations over said local elective officials by virtue of the subsequent
enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), the pertinent provision of which
states:
Sec. 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints.- A verified complaint against any erring local
elective official shall be prepared as follows:
(a) A complaint against any elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city, an independent
component city or component city shall be filed before the Office of the President.
The Court resolved said issue in the negative, upholding the ratiocination of the Solicitor General that
R.A. No. 7160 should be viewed as having conferred on the Office of the President, but not on an
exclusive basis, disciplinary authority over local elective officials. Despite the fact that R.A. No. 7160 was
the more recent expression of legislative will, no repeal of pertinent provisions in the Ombudsman Act
was inferred therefrom. Thus said the Court:
Indeed, there is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether
expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific
matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one
and strike down the other. Well settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication are not favored,
and that courts must generally assume their congruent application. The two laws must be absolutely
incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be
31
drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi,
i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform
system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the
existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be
resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give
effect to all laws on the subject.37
While Hagad v. Gozo Dadole38 upheld the plenary power of the Office of the Ombudsman to discipline
elective officials over the same disciplinary authority of the President under R.A. No. 7160, the more
recent case of the Office of the Ombudsman v. Delijero39 tempered the exercise by the Ombudsman of
such plenary power invoking Section 23(2)40 of R.A. No. 6770, which gives the Ombudsman the option to
"refer certain complaints to the proper disciplinary authority for the institution of appropriate
administrative proceedings against erring public officers or employees." The Court underscored therein
the clear legislative intent of imposing "a standard and a separate set of procedural requirements in
connection with administrative proceedings involving public school teachers"41 with the enactment of
R.A. No. 4670, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta for Public School Teachers." It thus declared that,
while the Ombudsman's administrative disciplinary authority over a public school teacher is concurrent
with the proper investigating committee of the Department of Education, it would have been more
prudent under the circumstances for the Ombudsman to have referred to the DECS the complaint
against the public school teacher.
Unquestionably, the Ombudsman is possessed of jurisdiction to discipline his own people and mete out
administrative sanctions upon them, including the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service.
However, it is equally without question that the President has concurrent authority with respect to
removal from office of the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, albeit under specified
conditions. Considering the principles attending concurrence of jurisdiction where the Office of the
President was the first to initiate a case against petitioner Gonzales, prudence should have prompted the
Ombudsman to desist from proceeding separately against petitioner through its Internal Affairs Board,
and to defer instead to the President's assumption of authority, especially when the administrative
charge involved "demanding and soliciting a sum of money" which constitutes either graft and
corruption or bribery, both of which are grounds reserved for the President's exercise of his authority to
remove a Deputy Ombudsman.
In any case, assuming that the Ombudsman's Internal Affairs Board properly conducted a subsequent
and parallel administrative action against petitioner, its earlier dismissal of the charge of graft and
corruption against petitioner could not have the effect of preventing the Office of the President from
proceeding against petitioner upon the same ground of graft and corruption. After all, the doctrine of res
judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative
powers.42 In Montemayor v. Bundalian,43 the Court sustained the President's dismissal from service of a
Regional Director of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) who was found liable for
unexplained wealth upon investigation by the now defunct Philippine Commission Against Graft and
Corruption (PCAGC). The Court categorically ruled therein that the prior dismissal by the Ombudsman of
similar charges against said official did not operate as res judicata in the PCAGC case.
By granting express statutory power to the President to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special
Prosecutor, Congress merely filled an obvious gap in the law.
Section 9, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution confers upon the President the power to appoint the
Ombudsman and his Deputies, viz:

Section 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least six
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of three nominees for every vacancy
thereafter. Such appointments shall require no confirmation. All vacancies shall be filled within three
months after they occur.
While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for in the Constitution, which is
by impeachment under Section 244 of the same Article, there is, however, no constitutional provision
similarly dealing with the removal from office of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, for that
matter. By enacting Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a gap in the law without running
afoul of any provision in the Constitution or existing statutes. In fact, the Constitution itself, under
Section 2, authorizes Congress to provide for the removal of all other public officers, including the
Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are not subject to impeachment.
That the Deputies of the Ombudsman were intentionally excluded from the enumeration of impeachable
officials is clear from the following deliberations45 of the Constitutional Commission, thus:
MR. REGALADO. Yes, thank you. On Section 10, regarding the Ombudsman, there has been concern aired
by Commissioner Rodrigo about who will see to it that the Ombudsman will perform his duties because
he is something like a guardian of the government. This recalls the statement of Juvenal that while the
Ombudsman is the guardian of the people, "Quis custodiet ipsos custodies", who will guard the
guardians? I understand here that the Ombudsman who has the rank of a chairman of a constitutional
commission is also removable only by impeachment.
MR. ROMULO. That is the intention, Madam President.
MR. REGALADO. Only the Ombudsman?
MR. MONSOD. Only the Ombudsman.
MR. REGALADO. So not his deputies, because I am concerned with the phrase "have the rank of". We
know, for instance, that the City Fiscal of Manila has the rank of a justice of the Intermediate Appellate
Court, and yet he is not a part of the judiciary. So I think we should clarify that also and read our
discussions into the Record for purposes of the Commission and the Committee.46
THE PRESIDENT. The purpose of the amendment of Commissioner Davide is not just to include the
Ombudsman among those officials who have to be removed from office only onimpeachment. Is that
right?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote on the amendment, may I ask a question?
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO. The Ombudsman, is this only one man?
32
MR. DAVIDE. Only one man.
MR. RODRIGO. Not including his deputies.
MR. MONSOD. No.47 (Emphasis supplied)
The Power of the President to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor is Implied from
his Power to Appoint.
Under the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries with it the power to remove.48 As a
general rule, therefore, all officers appointed by the President are also removable by him.49 The
exception to this is when the law expressly provides otherwise - that is, when the power to remove is
expressly vested in an office or authority other than the appointing power. In some cases, the
Constitution expressly separates the power to remove from the President's power to appoint. Under
Section 9, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower
courts shall be appointed by the President. However, Members of the Supreme Court may be removed
after impeachment proceedings initiated by Congress (Section 2, Article XI), while judges of lower courts
may be removed only by the Supreme Court by virtue of its administrative supervision over all its
personnel (Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII). The Chairpersons and Commissioners of the Civil Service
Commission Section 1(2), Article IX(B), the Commission on Elections Section 1(2), Article IX(C), and the
Commission on Audit Section 1(2), Article IX(D) shall likewise be appointed by the President, but they
may be removed only by impeachment (Section 2, Article XI). As priorly stated, the Ombudsman himself
shall be appointed by the President (Section 9, Article XI) but may also be removed only by impeachment
(Section 2, Article XI).
In giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, Congress
simply laid down in express terms an authority that is already implied from the President's constitutional
authority to appoint the aforesaid officials in the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Office of the Ombudsman is charged with monumental tasks that have been generally categorized
into investigatory power, prosecutorial power, public assistance, authority to inquire and obtain
information and the function to adopt, institute and implement preventive measures.50 In order to
ensure the effectiveness of his constitutional role, the Ombudsman was provided with an over-all deputy
as well as a deputy each for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. However, well into the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission, a provision for the appointment of a separate deputy for the military
establishment was necessitated by Commissioner Ople's lament against the rise within the armed forces
of "fraternal associations outside the chain of command" which have become the common soldiers'
"informal grievance machinery" against injustice, corruption and neglect in the uniformed service,51 thus:
In our own Philippine Armed Forces, there has arisen in recent years a type of fraternal association
outside the chain of command proposing reformist objectives. They constitute, in fact, an informal
grievance machinery against injustices to the rank and file soldiery and perceive graft in higher rank and
neglect of the needs of troops in combat zones. The Reform the Armed Forces Movement of RAM has
kept precincts for pushing logistics to the field, the implied accusation being that most of the resources
are used up in Manila instead of sent to soldiers in the field. The Guardians, the El Diablo and other
organizations dominated by enlisted men function, more or less, as grievance collectors and as mutual
aid societies.

This proposed amendment merely seeks to extend the office of the Ombudsman to the military
establishment, just as it champions the common people against bureaucratic indifference. The
Ombudsman can designate a deputy to help the ordinary foot soldier get through with his grievance to
higher authorities. This deputy will, of course work in close cooperation with the Minister of National
Defense because of the necessity to maintain the integrity of the chain of command. Ordinary soldiers,
when they know they can turn to a military Ombudsman for their complaints, may not have to fall back
on their own informal devices to obtain redress for their grievances. The Ombudsman will help raise
troop morale in accordance with a major professed goal of the President and the military authorities
themselves. x x x
The add-on now forms part of Section 5, Article XI which reads as follows:
Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the
Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one over-all Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon,
Visayas and Mindanao. A separate deputy for the military establishment shall likewise be
appointed.(Emphasis supplied)
The integrity and effectiveness of the Deputy Ombudsman for the MOLEO as a military watchdog looking
into abuses and irregularities that affect the general morale and professionalism in the military is
certainly of primordial importance in relation to the President's own role asCommander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces. It would not be incongruous for Congress, therefore, to grant the President concurrent
disciplinary authority over the Deputy Ombudsman for the military and other law enforcement offices.
Granting the President the Power to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman does not Diminish the
Independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
The claim that Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 granting the President the power to remove a Deputy
Ombudsman from office totally frustrates, if not resultantly negates the independence of the Office of
the Ombudsman is tenuous. The independence which the Office of the Ombudsman is vested with was
intended to free it from political considerations in pursuing its constitutional mandate to be a protector
of the people. What the Constitution secures for the Office of the Ombudsman is, essentially, political
independence. This means nothing more than that "the terms of office, the salary, the appointments and
discipline of all persons under the office" are "reasonably insulated from the whims of politicians."52 And
so it was that Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution had declared the creation of the independent
Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman and his Deputies, who are described as
"protectors of the people" and constitutionally mandated to act promptly on complaints filed in any
form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government Section 12, Article XI. Pertinent
provisions under Article XI prescribes a term of office of seven years without reappointment Section 11,
prohibits a decrease in salaries during the term of office Section 10, provides strict qualifications for the
office Section 8, grants fiscal autonomy Section 14 and ensures the exercise of constitutional functions
Section 12 and 13. The cloak of independence is meant to build up the Office of the Ombudsman's
institutional strength to effectively function as official critic, mobilizer of government, constitutional
watchdog53 and protector of the people. It certainly cannot be made to extend to wrongdoings and
permit the unbridled acts of its officials to escape administrative discipline.
Being aware of the constitutional imperative of shielding the Office of the Ombudsman from political
influences and the discretionary acts of the executive, Congress laid down two restrictions on the
President's exercise of such power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman, namely: (1) that the removal
33
of the Deputy Ombudsman must be for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman
and (2) that there must be observance of due process. Reiterating the grounds for impeachment laid
down in Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, paragraph 1 of Section 8 of R.A. No. 6770 states
that the Deputy Ombudsman may be removed from office for the same grounds that the Ombudsman
may be removed through impeachment, namely, "culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust." Thus, it cannot be rightly
said that giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor for
that matter, would diminish or compromise the constitutional independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman. It is, precisely, a measure of protection of the independence of the Ombudsman's Deputies
and Special Prosecutor in the discharge of their duties that their removal can only be had on grounds
provided by law.
In Espinosa v. Office of the Ombudsman,54 the Court elucidated on the nature of the Ombudsman's
independence in this wise -
The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers is vested in the Office of the Ombudsman. To
insulate the Office from outside pressure and improper influence, the Constitution as well as RA 6770
has endowed it with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory powers virtually free from
legislative, executive or judicial intervention. This Court consistently refrains from interfering with the
exercise of its powers, and respects the initiative and independence inherent in the Ombudsman who,
'beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of public
service.
Petitioner Gonzales may not be removed from office where the questioned acts, falling short of
constitutional standards, do not constitute betrayal of public trust.
Having now settled the question concerning the validity of the President's power to remove the Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, we now go to the substance of the administrative findings in OP
Case No. 10-J-460 which led to the dismissal of herein petitioner, Deputy Ombudsman Emilio A.
Gonzales, III.
At the outset, the Court finds no cause for petitioner Gonzales to complain simply because the OP
proceeded with the administrative case against him despite his non-attendance thereat. Petitioner was
admittedly able to file an Answer in which he had interposed his defenses to the formal charge against
him. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an
opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving
reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the
minimum requirements of due process.55 Due process is simply having the opportunity to explain one's
side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.56
The essence of due process is that a party is afforded reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit
any evidence he may have in support of his defense.57 Mere opportunity to be heard is sufficient. As long
as petitioner was given the opportunity to explain his side and present evidence, the requirements of
due process are satisfactorily complied with because what the law abhors is an absolute lack of
opportunity to be heard.58 Besides, petitioner only has himself to blame for limiting his defense through
the filing of an Answer. He had squandered a subsequent opportunity to elucidate upon his pleaded
defenses by adamantly refusing to attend the scheduled Clarificatory Conference despite notice. The OP
recounted as follows -

It bears noting that respondent Deputy Ombudsman Gonzalez was given two separate opportunities to
explain his side and answer the Formal Charge against him.
In the first instance, respondent was given the opportunity to submit his answer together with his
documentary evidence, which opportunity respondent actually availed of. In the second instance, this
Office called a Clarificatory Conference on 8 February 2011 pursuant to respondent's express election of
a formal investigation. Despite due notice, however, respondent Deputy Ombudsman refused to appear
for said conference, interposing an objection based on the unfounded notion that this Office has
prejudged the instant case. Respondent having been given actual and reasonable opportunity to explain
or defend himself in due course, the requirement of due process has been satisfied.59
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial
evidence,60 which is more than a mere scintilla and means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.61 The fact, therefore, that petitioner later refused to
participate in the hearings before the OP is not a hindrance to a finding of his culpability based on
substantial evidence, which only requires that a decision must "have something upon which it is
based."62
Factual findings of administrative bodies are controlling when supported by substantial evidence.63 The
OP's pronouncement of administrative accountability against petitioner and the imposition upon him of
the corresponding penalty of removal from office was based on the finding of gross neglect of duty and
grave misconduct in office amounting to a betrayal of public trust, which is a constitutional ground for
the removal by impeachment of the Ombudsman (Section 2, Article XI, 1987 Constitution), and a
statutory ground for the President to remove from office a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor
Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act.
The OP held that petitioner's want of care and wrongful conduct consisted of his unexplained action in
directing the PNP-NCR to elevate P/S Insp. Mendoza's case records to his office; his failure to verify the
basis for requesting the Ombudsman to take over the case; his pronouncement of administrative liability
and imposition of the extreme penalty of dismissal on P/S Insp. Mendoza based upon an unverified
complaint-affidavit; his inordinate haste in implementing P/S Insp. Mendoza's dismissal notwithstanding
the latter's non-receipt of his copy of the Decision and the subsequent filing of a motion for
reconsideration; and his apparent unconcern that the pendency of the motion for reconsideration for
more than five months had deprived P/S Insp. Mendoza of available remedies against the immediate
implementation of the Decision dismissing him from the service.
Thus, taking into consideration the factual determinations of the IIRC, the allegations and evidence of
petitioner in his Answer as well as other documentary evidence, the OP concluded that: (1) petitioner
failed to supervise his subordinates to act with dispatch on the draft resolution of P/S Insp. Mendoza's
motion for reconsideration and thereby caused undue prejudice to P/S Insp. Mendoza by effectively
depriving the latter of the right to challenge the dismissal before the courts and prevent its immediate
execution, and (2) petitioner showed undue interest by having P/S Insp. Mendoza's case endorsed to the
Office of the Ombudsman and resolving the same against P/S Insp. Mendoza on the basis of the
unverified complaint-affidavit of the alleged victim Christian Kalaw.
The invariable rule is that administrative decisions in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only
be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law.64 In the instant case, while the
evidence may show some amount of wrongdoing on the part of petitioner, the Court seriously doubts
the correctness of the OP's conclusion that the imputed acts amount to gross neglect of duty and grave
34
misconduct constitutive of betrayal of public trust. To say that petitioner's offenses, as they factually
appear, weigh heavily enough to constitute betrayal of public trust would be to ignore the significance of
the legislature's intent in prescribing the removal of the Deputy Ombudsman or the Special Prosecutor
for causes that, theretofore, had been reserved only for the most serious violations that justify the
removal by impeachment of the highest officials of the land.
Would every negligent act or misconduct in the performance of a Deputy Ombudsman's duties
constitute betrayal of public trust warranting immediate removal from office? The question calls for a
deeper, circumspective look at the nature of the grounds for the removal of a Deputy Ombudsman and a
Special Prosecutor vis-a-vis common administrative offenses.
Betrayal of public trust is a new ground for impeachment under the 1987 Constitution added to the
existing grounds of culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption and
other high crimes. While it was deemed broad enough to cover any violation of the oath of office,65 the
impreciseness of its definition also created apprehension that "such an overarching standard may be too
broad and may be subject to abuse and arbitrary exercise by the legislature."66 Indeed, the catch-all
phrase betrayal of public trust that referred to "all acts not punishable by statutes as penal offenses but,
nonetheless, render the officer unfit to continue in office"67 could be easily utilized for every conceivable
misconduct or negligence in office. However, deliberating on some workable standard by which the
ground could be reasonably interpreted, the Constitutional Commission recognized that human error
and good faith precluded an adverse conclusion.
MR. VILLACORTA: x x x One last matter with respect to the use of the words "betrayal of public trust" as
embodying a ground for impeachment that has been raised by the Honorable Regalado. I am not a
lawyer so I can anticipate the difficulties that a layman may encounter in understanding this provision
and also the possible abuses that the legislature can commit in interpreting this phrase. It is to be noted
that this ground was also suggested in the 1971 Constitutional Convention. A review of the Journals of
that Convention will show that it was not included; it was construed as encompassing acts which are just
short of being criminal but constitute gross faithlessness against public trust, tyrannical abuse of power,
inexcusable negligence of duty, favoritism, and gross exercise of discretionary powers. I understand from
the earlier discussions that these constitute violations of the oath of office, and also I heard the
Honorable Davide say that even the criminal acts that were enumerated in the earlier 1973 provision on
this matter constitute betrayal of public trust as well. In order to avoid confusion, would it not be clearer
to stick to the wording of Section 2 which reads: "may be removed from office on impeachment for and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, and other high crimes, graft and
corruption or VIOLATION OF HIS OATH OF OFFICE", because if betrayal of public trust encompasses the
earlier acts that were enumerated, then it would behoove us to be equally clear about this last provision
or phrase.
MR. NOLLEDO: x x x I think we will miss a golden opportunity if we fail to adopt the words "betrayal of
public trust" in the 1986 Constitution. But I would like him to know that we are amenable to any possible
amendment. Besides, I think plain error of judgment, where circumstances may indicate that there is
good faith, to my mind, will not constitute betrayal of public trust if that statement will allay the fears of
difficulty in interpreting the term."68 (Emphasis supplied)
The Constitutional Commission eventually found it reasonably acceptable for the phrase betrayal of
public trust to refer to "acts which are just short of being criminal but constitute gross faithlessness
against public trust, tyrannical abuse of power, inexcusable negligence of duty, favoritism, and gross
exercise of discretionary powers."69 In other words, acts that should constitute betrayal of public trust as

to warrant removal from office may be less than criminal but must be attended by bad faith and of such
gravity and seriousness as the other grounds for impeachment.
A Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor are not impeachable officers. However, by providing for
their removal from office on the same grounds as removal by impeachment, the legislature could not
have intended to redefine constitutional standards of culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, as well as betrayal of public trust, and apply them less
stringently. Hence, where betrayal of public trust, for purposes of impeachment, was not intended to
cover all kinds of official wrongdoing and plain errors of judgment, this should remain true even for
purposes of removing a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor from office. Hence, the fact that the
grounds for impeachment have been made statutory grounds for the removal by the President of a
Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor cannot diminish the seriousness of their nature nor the
acuity of their scope. Betrayal of public trust could not suddenly "overreach" to cover acts that are not
vicious or malevolent on the same level as the other grounds for impeachment.
The tragic hostage-taking incident was the result of a confluence of several unfortunate events including
system failure of government response. It cannot be solely attributed then to what petitioner Gonzales
may have negligently failed to do for the quick, fair and complete resolution of the case, or to his error of
judgment in the disposition thereof. Neither should petitioner's official acts in the resolution of P/S Insp.
Mendoza's case be judged based upon the resulting deaths at the Quirino Grandstand. The failure to
immediately act upon a party's requests for an early resolution of his case is not, by itself, gross neglect
of duty amounting to betrayal of public trust. Records show that petitioner took considerably less time
to act upon the draft resolution after the same was submitted for his appropriate action compared to
the length of time that said draft remained pending and unacted upon in the Office of Ombudsman
Merceditas N. Gutierrez. He reviewed and denied P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion for reconsideration within
nine (9) calendar days reckoned from the time the draft resolution was submitted to him on April 27,
2010 until he forwarded his recommendation to the Office of Ombudsman Gutierrez on May 6, 2010 for
the latter's final action. Clearly, the release of any final order on the case was no longer in his hands.
Even if there was inordinate delay in the resolution of P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion and an unexplained
failure on petitioner's part to supervise his subordinates in its prompt disposition, the same cannot be
considered a vicious and malevolent act warranting his removal for betrayal of public trust. More so
because the neglect imputed upon petitioner appears to be an isolated case.
Similarly, petitioner's act of directing the PNP-IAS to endorse P/S Insp. Mendoza's case to the
Ombudsman without citing any reason therefor cannot, by itself, be considered a manifestation of his
undue interest in the case that would amount to wrongful or unlawful conduct. After all, taking
cognizance of cases upon the request of concerned agencies or private parties is part and parcel of the
constitutional mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman to be the "champion of the people." The factual
circumstances that the case was turned over to the Office of the Ombudsman upon petitioner's request;
that administrative liability was pronounced against P/S Insp. Mendoza even without the private
complainant verifying the truth of his statements; that the decision was immediately implemented; or
that the motion for reconsideration thereof remained pending for more than nine months cannot be
simply taken as evidence of petitioner's undue interest in the case considering the lack of evidence of
any personal grudge, social ties or business affiliation with any of the parties to the case that could have
impelled him to act as he did. There was likewise no evidence at all of any bribery that took place, or of
any corrupt intention or questionable motivation.
Accordingly, the OP's pronouncement of administrative accountability against petitioner and the
imposition upon him of the corresponding penalty of dismissal must be reversed and set aside, as the
35
findings of neglect of duty or misconduct in office do not amount to a betrayal of public trust. Hence, the
President, while he may be vested with authority, cannot order the removal of petitioner as Deputy
Ombudsman, there being no intentional wrongdoing of the grave and serious kind amounting to a
betrayal of public trust.
This is not to say, however, that petitioner is relieved of all liability for his acts showing less than diligent
performance of official duties. Although the administrative acts imputed to petitioner fall short of the
constitutional standard of betrayal of public trust, considering the OP's factual findings of negligence and
misconduct against petitioner, the Court deems it appropriate to refer the case to the Office of the
Ombudsman for further investigation of the charges in OP Case No. 10-J-460 and the imposition of the
corresponding administrative sanctions, if any.
Inasmuch as there is as yet no existing ground justifying his removal from office, petitioner is entitled to
reinstatement to his former position as Deputy Ombudsman and to the payment of backwages and
benefits corresponding to the period of his suspension.
The Office of the President is vested with statutory authority to proceed administratively against
petitioner Barreras-Sulit to determine the existence of any of the grounds for her removal from office
as provided for under the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act.
Petitioner Barreras-Sulit, on the other hand, has been resisting the President's authority to remove her
from office upon the averment that without the Sandiganbayan's final approval and judgment on the
basis of the PLEBARA, it would be premature to charge her with acts and/or omissions "tantamount to
culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust," which are grounds for removal from
office under Section 8, paragraph (2) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989; and which also constitute a
violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) -
causing undue injury to the Government or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
With reference to the doctrine of prejudicial procedural antecedent, petitioner Barreras-Sulit asserts that
the propriety of taking and continuing to take administrative disciplinary proceeding against her must
depend on the final disposition by the Sandiganbayan of the PLEBARA, explaining that if the
Sandiganbayan would uphold the PLEBARA, there would no longer be any cause of complaint against
her; if not, then the situation becomes ripe for the determination of her failings.
The argument will not hold water. The incidents that have taken place subsequent to the submission in
court of the PLEBARA shows that the PLEBARA has been practically approved, and that the only thing
which remains to be done by the Sandiganbayan is to promulgate a judgment imposing the proper
sentence on the accused Major General Garcia based on his new pleas to lesser offenses. On May 4,
2010, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution declaring that the change of plea under the PLEBARA was
warranted and that it complied with jurisprudential guidelines. The Sandiganbayan, thereafter, directed
the accused Major General Garcia to immediately convey in favor of the State all the properties, both
real and personal, enumerated therein. On August 11, 2010, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution,
which, in order to put into effect the reversion of Major General Garcia's ill-gotten properties, ordered
the corresponding government agencies to cause the transfer of ownership of said properties to the
Republic of the Philippines. In the meantime, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) informed the
Sandiganbayan that an Order70 had been issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 on
November 5, 2010 allowing the transfer of the accused's frozen accounts to the Republic of the
Philippines pursuant to the terms of the PLEBARA as approved by the Sandiganbayan. Immediately after
the OSP informed the Sandiganbayan that its May 4, 2010 Resolution had been substantially complied
with, Major General Garcia manifested71 to the Sandiganbayan on November 19, 2010 his readiness for

sentencing and for the withdrawal of the criminal information against his wife and two sons. Major
General Garcia's Motion to Dismiss,72 dated December 16, 2010 and filed with the Sandiganbayan, reads:
1.0 The Co-Accused were impleaded under the theory of conspiracy with the Principal Accused MGen.
Carlos F. Garcia (AFP Ret.), (Principal Accused) with the allegation that the act of one is the act of the
others. Therefore, with the approval by the Honorable Court of the Plea Bargaining Agreement executed
by the Principal Accused, the charges against the Co-Accused should likewise be dismissed since the
charges against them are anchored on the same charges against the Principal Accused.
On December 16, 2010, the Sandiganbayan allowed accused Major General Garcia to plead guilty to the
lesser offenses of direct bribery and violation of Section 4(b), R.A. No. 9160, as amended. Upon Major
General Garcia's motion, and with the express conformity of the OSP, the Sandiganbayan allowed him to
post bail in both cases, each at a measly amount of ₱ 30,000.00.
The approval or disapproval of the PLEBARA by the Sandiganbayan is of no consequence to an
administrative finding of liability against petitioner Barreras-Sulit. While the court's determination of the
propriety of a plea bargain is on the basis of the existing prosecution evidence on record, the disciplinary
authority's determination of the prosecutor's administrative liability is based on whether the plea
bargain is consistent with the conscientious consideration of the government's best interest and the
diligent and efficient performance by the prosecution of its public duty to prosecute crimes against the
State. Consequently, the disciplining authority's finding of ineptitude, neglect or willfulness on the part
of the prosecution, more particularly petitioner Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit, in failing to pursue or
build a strong case for the government or, in this case, entering into an agreement which the
government finds "grossly disadvantageous," could result in administrative liability, notwithstanding
court approval of the plea bargaining agreement entered into.
Plea bargaining is a process in criminal cases whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a
mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval.73 The essence of a plea bargaining
agreement is the allowance of an accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense than that charged against
him. Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the procedure therefor, to
wit:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. -- At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended
party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is
necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be
allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of
the complaint or information is necessary. (Sec. 4, Cir. 38-98)
Plea bargaining is allowable when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt
of the accused of the crime charged.74 However, if the basis for the allowance of a plea bargain in this
case is the evidence on record, then it is significant to state that in its earlier Resolution75 promulgated
on January 7, 2010, the Sandiganbayan had evaluated the testimonies of twenty (20) prosecution
witnesses and declared that "the conglomeration of evidence presented by the prosecution is viewed by
the Court to be of strong character that militates against the grant of bail."
Notwithstanding this earlier ruling by the Sandiganbayan, the OSP, unexplainably, chose to plea bargain
with the accused Major General Garcia as if its evidence were suddenly insufficient to secure a
conviction. At this juncture, it is not amiss to emphasize that the "standard of strong evidence of guilt
which is sufficient to deny bail to an accused is markedly higher than the standard of judicial probable
36
cause which is sufficient to initiate a criminal case."76Hence, in light of the apparently strong case against
accused Major General Garcia, the disciplining authority would be hard-pressed not to look into the
whys and wherefores of the prosecution's turnabout in the case.
The Court need not touch further upon the substantial matters that are the subject of the pending
administrative proceeding against petitioner Barreras-Sulit and are, thus, better left to the complete and
effective resolution of the administrative case before the Office of the President.
The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act has, nonetheless, failed to
obtain the necessary votes to invalidate the law, thus, keeping said provision part of the law of the land.
To recall, these cases involve two distinct issues: (a) the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the
Ombudsman Act; and (b) the validity of the administrative action of removal taken against petitioner
Gonzales. While the Court voted unanimously to reverse the decision of the OP removing petitioner
Gonzales from office, it was equally divided in its opinion on the constitutionality of the assailed
statutory provision in its two deliberations held on April 17, 2012 and September 4, 2012. There being no
majority vote to invalidate the law, the Court, therefore, dismisses the challenge to the constitutionality
of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act in accordance with Section 2(d), Rule 12 of the Internal Rules of
the Court.
Indeed, Section 4(2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution requires the vote of the majority of the
Members of the Court actually taking part in the deliberation to sustain any challenge to the
constitutionality or validity of a statute or any of its provisions.
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of the Office of the President in OP Case No. 10-J-460
isREVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is ordered REINSTATED with payment of
backwages corresponding to the period of suspension effective immediately, even as the Office of the
Ombudsman is directed to proceed with the investigation in connection with the above case against
petitioner. In G.R. No. 196232, We AFFIRM the continuation of OP-DC Case No. 11-B-003 against Special
Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit for alleged acts and omissions tantamount to culpable violation of the
Constitution and a betrayal of public trust, in accordance with Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act of
1989.
The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Facts:
In the challenged Decision, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 and
ruled that the President has disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special
Prosecutor. The Court, however, reversed the OP ruling that: (i)... found Gonzales guilty of Gross Neglect
of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal of public trust; and (ii) imposed on him the penalty
of dismissal.
Sulit, who had not then been dismissed and who simply sought to restrain the disciplinary proceedings
against her, solely questioned the jurisdiction of the OP to subject her to disciplinary proceedings. The
Court affirmed the continuation of the proceedings against her... after upholding the constitutionality of
Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770.

In view of the Court's ruling, the OP filed the present motion for reconsideration through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG).
In April 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia and several others,
before the Sandiganbayan, with plunder and money laundering. On May 7, 2007, Garcia filed an Urgent
Petition for Bail which the prosecution opposed. The Sandiganbayan denied Garcia's urgent petition for
bail on January 7, 2010, in view of the strength of the prosecution's evidence against Garcia.
Issues:
Gonzales posited in his petition that the OP has no administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy
Ombudsman. Under Section 21 of RA No. 6770, it is the Ombudsman who exercises administrative
disciplinary jurisdiction over the Deputy Ombudsman.
On the merits, Gonzales argued that his office received the draft order from GIPO Garcia on April 27,
2010. On May 6, 2010, he completed his review of the draft, approved it, and transmitted it to the Office
of the Ombudsman for final approval. Since the draft... order on Mendoza's motion for reconsideration
had to undergo different levels of preparation, review and approval, the period it took to resolve the
motion could not be unjustified, since he himself acted on the draft order only within nine (9) calendars
days from his receipt of... the order.
Ruling:
On motion for reconsideration and further reflection, the Court votes to grant Gonzales' petition and to
declare Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 unconstitutional with respect to the Office of the Ombudsman.
a. The Philippine Ombudsman
Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is envisioned to be
the "protector of the people" against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the Government, to function
essentially as a complaints and action bureau.[36] This constitutional vision of a Philippine Ombudsman
practically intends to make the Ombudsman an authority to directly check and guard against the ills,
abuses and excesses of the bureaucracy. Pursuant to Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,
Congress enacted RA No. 6770 to enable it to further realize the vision of the Constitution. Section 21 of
RA No. 6770 provides:
Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. The Office of the Ombudsman shall
have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government,
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be
removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
The Ombudsman's broad investigative and disciplinary powers include all acts of malfeasance,
misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all public officials, including Members of the Cabinet and key Executive
officers, during their tenure.
Given the scope of its disciplinary authority, the Office of the Ombudsman is a very powerful
government constitutional agency that is considered "a notch above other grievance-handling
investigative bodies."[39] It has powers, both constitutional... and statutory, that are commensurate
with its daunting task of enforcing accountability of public officers.[40]...
b. "Independence" of constitutional bodies... vis-a-vis the Ombudsman's independence.
37
Notably, the independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the Constitutional
Commissions shares certain characteristics they do not owe their existence to any act of Congress, but
are created by the Constitution itself; additionally, they all enjoy fiscal... autonomy. In general terms, the
framers of the Constitution intended that these "independent" bodies be insulated from political
pressure to the extent that the absence of "independence" would result in the impairment of their core
functions.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the Commission on Audit highlighted the... developments
in the past Constitutions geared towards insulating the Commission on Audit from political pressure.
The kind of independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman certainly cannot be inferior but is
similar in degree and kind to the independence similarly guaranteed by the Constitution to the
Constitutional Commissions since all these offices fill the political... interstices of a republican democracy
that are crucial to its existence and proper functioning.
c. Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 vesting... disciplinary authority in the President... over the Deputy
Ombudsman violates... the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman and is thus... unconstitutional... we rule that subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to
discipline and removal by the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department
are subject to the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the...
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself. The Office of the Ombudsman, by express
constitutional mandate, includes its key officials, all of them tasked to support the Ombudsman in
carrying out her mandate. Unfortunately, intrusion upon the... constitutionally-granted independence is
what Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 exactly did. By so doing, the law directly collided not only with the
independence that the Constitution guarantees to the Office of the Ombudsman, but inevitably with the
principle of checks and... balances that the creation of an Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize
What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally and necessarily true for her Deputies who act as
agents of the Ombudsman in the performance of their duties. The Ombudsman can hardly be expected
to place her complete trust in her subordinate officials who are not as... independent as she is, if only
because they are subject to pressures and controls external to her Office. This need for complete trust is
true in an ideal setting and truer still in a young democracy like the Philippines where graft and
corruption is still a major problem... for the government. For these reasons, Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770
(providing that the President may remove a Deputy Ombudsman) should be declared void.
he statements made by Commissioner Monsod emphasized a very logical principle: the Executive power
to remove and discipline key officials of the Office of the Ombudsman, or to exercise any power over
them, would result in an absurd situation wherein the Office of the Ombudsman is given the duty to
adjudicate on the integrity and competence of the very persons who can remove or suspend its
members.
e. Congress' power determines the... manner and causes for the removal... of non-impeachable officers
is not... a carte blanch authority
Under Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,[53] Congress is empowered to determine the modes
of removal from office of all public officers and employees except the President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman, who are all impeachable officials.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution in providing that "[a]ll other public officers and employees
may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment" in the second sentence of

Section 2, Article XI is to prevent Congress from extending the more... stringent rule of "removal only by
impeachment" to favored public officers
While the manner and cause of removal are left to congressional determination, this must still be
consistent with constitutional guarantees and principles, namely: the right to procedural and substantive
due process; the constitutional guarantee of security... of tenure; the principle of separation of powers;
and the principle of checks and balances.
a. The Office of the President's... finding of gross negligence has... no legal and factual leg to... stand on...
b. No gross neglect of duty or inefficiency
Clearly, when Mendoza hijacked the tourist bus on August 23, 2010, the records of the case were already
pending before Ombudsman Gutierrez.
Gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or
omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and
intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other... persons may be affected.
In the case of public officials, there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and
palpable.[71]
Gonzales cannot be guilty of gross neglect of duty and/or inefficiency since he acted on the case
forwarded to him within nine days. In finding Gonzales guilty, the OP[72] relied on Section 8, Rule III of
Administrative Order No. 7 (or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, series of 1990, as
amended) in ruling that Gonzales should have acted on Mendoza's Motion for Reconsideration within
five days:
Section 8. Motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation: Grounds Whenever allowable, a motion for
reconsideration or reinvestigation may only be entertained if filed within ten (10) days from receipt of
the decision or order by the party on the basis of any of... the following grounds:
Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation shall be allowed, and the Hearing Officer shall
resolve the same within five (5) days from the date of submission for resolution. [emphasis and
underscore ours]
Even if we consider this provision to be mandatory, the period it requires cannot apply to Gonzales since
he is a Deputy Ombudsman whose obligation is to review the case; he is not simply a Hearing Officer
tasked with the initial resolution of the motion.
c. No actionable failure to supervise subordinates
The facts do not show that Gonzales' subordinates had in any way been grossly negligent in their work.
While GIPO Garcia reviewed the case and drafted the order for more than three months, it is noteworthy
that he had not drafted the initial decision and, therefore, had to... review the case for the first time.[77]
Even the Ombudsman herself could not be faulted for acting on a case within four months, given the
amount of cases that her office handles.
The point is that these are not inordinately long periods for the work involved: examination of the
records, research on the pertinent laws and jurisprudence, and exercise of legal judgment and discretion.
d. No undue interest... he fact that Gonzales had Mendoza's case endorsed to his office lies within his
mandate, even if it were based merely on the request of the alleged victim's father. The Constitution
empowers the Ombudsman and her Deputies to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or...
manner against any public official or employee of the government.[78] This provision is echoed by
38
Section 13 of RA No. 6770,[79] and by Section 3, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 7, series of 1990, as
amended.[80]
Moreover, Gonzales and his subordinates did not resolve the complaint only on the basis of the
unverified affidavit of Kalaw.
we cannot deduce undue interest simply because Gonzales' decision differs from the decision of the
PNP-IAS (which dismissed the complaint against Mendoza).
Basic strictures of fair play dictate that we can only be held liable for our own misdeeds; we can be made
to account only... for lapses in our responsibilities. It is notable that of all the officers, it was Gonzales
who took the least time nine days followed by Cecilio, who took 21 days; Garcia the writer of the draft
took less than four months, and the Ombudsman, less than four months... until the kidnapping incident
rendered Mendoza's motion moot.
D. The Special Prosecutor: The Constitutional Issue
Thus, by constitutional design, the Special
Prosecutor is by no means an ordinary subordinate but one who effectively and directly aids the
Ombudsman in the exercise of his/her duties, which include investigation and prosecution of officials in
the Executive Department.
Thus, even if the Office of the Special Prosecutor is not expressly made part of the composition of the
Office of the Ombudsman, the role it performs as an organic component of that Office militates against a
differential treatment between the Ombudsman's Deputies, on one... hand, and the Special Prosecutor
himself, on the other. What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally true, not only for her Deputies
but, also for other lesser officials of that Office who act directly as agents of the Ombudsman herself in
the performance of... her duties.
Thus, under the present Constitution, there is every reason to treat the Special Prosecutor to be at par
with the Ombudsman's deputies, at least insofar as an extraneous disciplinary authority is concerned,
and must also enjoy the same grant of independence under the Constitution.
n the voting held on January 28, 2014, by a vote of 8-7,[108] the Court resolved to reverse its September
4, 2012 Decision insofar as petitioner Gonzales is concerned (G.R. No. 196231). We declared Section 8(2)
of RA
No. 6770 unconstitutional by granting disciplinary jurisdiction to the President over a Deputy
Ombudsman, in violation of the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
However, by another vote of 8-7,[109] the Court resolved to maintain the validity of Section 8(2) of RA
No. 6770 insofar as Sulit is concerned. The Court did not consider the Office of the Special Prosecutor to
be constitutionally within the
Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to the independence the latter enjoys under the
Constitution.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to declare Section 8(2) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. This
ruling renders any further ruling on the dismissal of Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III unnecessary,
but is without prejudice to the power of the Ombudsman to... conduct an administrative investigation, if
warranted, into the possible administrative liability of Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III under
pertinent Civil Service laws, rules and regulations.
 39

CASE 2012-0070: EMILIO A. GONZALES III VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES ET AL.
(G.R. No. 196231) WENDELL BARRERAS-SULIT VS. ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA ET AL. (G.R. NO. 196232)
(04 SEPTEMBER 2012, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.) SUBJECT/S: DISMISSAL OF DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN AND
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR BY THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT (BRIEF TITLES: GONZALES VS. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT; SULIT VS. OCHOA)
WAS THE DISMISSAL OF GONZALES AS DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN BY THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
CORRECT?
NO. HIS REMOVAL MUST BE FOR ANY OF THE GROUNDS PROVIDED IN THE REMOVAL OF THE
OMBUDSMAN. THE ALLEGED GROUND OF BETRAYAL OF PUBLIC TRUST WAS NOT PRESENT IN HIS CASE.

DISPOSITIVE:
“WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of the Office of the President in OP Case No. 10-J-460 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is ordered REINSTATED with payment of
backwages corresponding to the period of suspension effective immediately) even as the Office of the
Ombudsman is directed to proceed with the investigation in connection with the above case against
petitioner.
PETITIONER GONZALES MAY NOT BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE WHERE THE QUESTIONED ACTS, FALLING
SHORT OF CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS, DO NOT CONSTITUTE BETRAYAL OF PUBLIC TRUST.
Congress laid down two restrictions on the President’s exercise of such power of removal over a Deputy
Ombudsman, namely: (1) that the removal of the Deputy Ombudsman must be for any of the grounds
provided for the removal of the Ombudsman and (2) that there must be observance of due process.

In G.R. No. 196232, We AFFIRM the continuation of OP-DC Case No. 11-1 B-003 against Special
Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit for alleged acts and omissions tantamount to culpable violation of the
Constitution and a betrayal of public trust, in accordance with Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act of
1989.

The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.”

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

DOES THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT HAVE ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION OVER THE DEPUTY
OMBUDSMAN AND THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR?

YES. THE OMBUDSMAN’S ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY POWER OVER A DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN AND
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IS NOT EXCLUSIVE. SECTION 8 OF RA 6770 (THE OMBUDSMAN ACT OF 1989)
GRANTS THE PRESIDENT THE POWER TO REMOVE THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN AND THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR FROM OFFICE AFTER DUE PROCESS.

Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides that

Section 8. Removal; Filling of Vacancy. —

(2) A Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the President for any of the
grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, and after due process.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 164679 July 27, 2011
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner,
vs.
ULDARICO P. ANDUTAN, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Through a petition for review on certiorari,1 the petitioner Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman)
seeks the reversal of the decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July 28, 2004, in "Uldarico P.
Andutan, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman and Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB), etc.," docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 68893. The assailed decision annulled and set aside the decision of the Ombudsman
dated July 30, 2001,3 finding Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr. guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty.
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
Andutan was formerly the Deputy Director of the One-Stop Shop Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center
of the Department of Finance (DOF). On June 30, 1998, then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora issued
a Memorandum directing all non-career officials or those occupying political positions to vacate their
positions effective July 1, 1998.4 On July 1, 1998, pursuant to the Memorandum, Andutan resigned from
the DOF.5
On September 1, 1999, Andutan, together with Antonio P. Belicena, former Undersecretary, DOF;
Rowena P. Malonzo, Tax Specialist I, DOF; Benjamin O. Yao, Chairman and Executive Officer, Steel Asia
Manufacturing Corporation (Steel Asia); Augustus S. Lapid, Vice-President, Steel Asia; Antonio M.
Lorenzana, President and Chief Operating Officer, Steel Asia; and Eulogio L. Reyes, General Manager,
Devmark Textiles Ind. Inc., was criminally charged by the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of
the Ombudsman with Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents, and violations of Section 3(a), (e)
and (j) of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.6 As
government employees, Andutan, Belicena and Malonzo were likewise administratively charged of Grave
Misconduct, Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Documents and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest
of the Service.7
The criminal and administrative charges arose from anomalies in the illegal transfer of Tax Credit
Certificates (TCCs) to Steel Asia, among others.8
During the investigation, the FFIB found that Steel Asia fraudulently obtained TCCs worth Two Hundred
Forty-Two Million, Four Hundred Thirty-Three Thousand, Five Hundred Thirty-Four Pesos
(₱242,433,534.00).9 The FFIB concluded that Belicena, Malonzo and Andutan – in their respective
capacities – irregularly approved the "issuance of the TCCs to several garment/textile companies and
allowing their subsequent illegal transfer" to Steel Asia.10
40
On November 11, 1999, the Ombudsman ordered the respondents therein (respondents) to submit their
counter-affidavits. Only Malonzo complied with the order, prompting the Ombudsman to set a
Preliminary Conference on March 13, 2000.
Upon the respondents’ failure to appear at the March 20, 2000 hearing, the Ombudsman deemed the
case submitted for resolution.
On July 30, 2001, the Ombudsman found the respondents guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty.11 Having been
separated from the service, Andutan was imposed the penalty of forfeiture of all leaves, retirement and
other benefits and privileges, and perpetual disqualification from reinstatement and/or reemployment in
any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government owned and controlled agencies
or corporations.12
After failing to obtain a reconsideration of the decision,13 Andutan filed a petition for review on certiorari
before the CA.
On July 28, 2004,14 the CA annulled and set aside the decision of the Ombudsman, ruling that the latter
"should not have considered the administrative complaints" because: first, Section 20 of R.A. 6770
provides that the Ombudsman "may not conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative act or
omission complained of if it believes that x x x [t]he complaint was filed after one year from the
occurrence of the act or omission complained of";15 and second, the administrative case was filed after
Andutan’s forced resignation.16
THE PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS
In this petition for review on certiorari, the Ombudsman asks the Court to overturn the decision of the
CA. It submits, first, that contrary to the CA’s findings, administrative offenses do not prescribe after one
year from their commission,17 and second, that in cases of "capital" administrative offenses, resignation
or optional retirement cannot render administrative proceedings moot and academic, since accessory
penalties such as perpetual disqualification and the forfeiture of retirement benefits may still be
imposed.18
The Ombudsman argues that Section 20 of R.A. 6770 is not mandatory. Consistent with existing
jurisprudence, the use of the word "may" indicates that Section 20 is merely directory or
permissive.19 Thus, it is not ministerial upon it to dismiss the administrative complaint, as long as any of
the circumstances under Section 20 is present.20 In any case, the Ombudsman urges the Court to
examine its mandate under Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, and hold that an imposition of
a one (1) year prescriptive period on the filing of cases unconstitutionally restricts its mandate.21
Further, the Ombudsman submits that Andutan’s resignation from office does not render moot the
administrative proceedings lodged against him, even after his resignation. Relying on Section VI(1) of
Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular No. 38,22 the Ombudsman argues that "[a]s long as
the breach of conduct was committed while the public official or employee was still in the service x x x a
public servant’s resignation is not a bar to his administrative investigation, prosecution and
adjudication."23 It is irrelevant that Andutan had already resigned from office when the administrative
case was filed since he was charged for "acts performed in office which are inimical to the service and
prejudicial to the interests of litigants and the general public."24 Furthermore, even if Andutan had
already resigned, there is a need to "determine whether or not there remains penalties capable of

imposition, like bar from reentering the (sic) public service and forfeiture of benefits."25 Finally, the
Ombudsman reiterates that its findings against Andutan are supported by substantial evidence.
THE RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS
Andutan raises three (3) counterarguments to the Ombudsman’s petition.
First, Andutan submits that the CA did not consider Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 as a prescriptive period;
rather, the CA merely held that the Ombudsman should not have considered the administrative
complaint. According to Andutan, Section 20(5) "does not purport to impose a prescriptive period x x x
but simply prohibits the Office of the Ombudsman from conducting an investigation where the
complaint [was] filed more than one (1) year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained
of."26 Andutan believes that the Ombudsman should have referred the complaint to another government
agency.27 Further, Andutan disagrees with the Ombudsman’s interpretation of Section 20(5). Andutan
suggests that the phrase "may not conduct the necessary investigation" means that the Ombudsman is
prohibited to act on cases that fall under those enumerated in Section 20(5).28
Second, Andutan reiterates that the administrative case against him was moot because he was no longer
in the public service at the time the case was commenced.29 According to Andutan, Atty. Perez v. Judge
Abiera30 and similar cases cited by the Ombudsman do not apply since the administrative investigations
against the respondents in those cases were commenced prior to their resignation. Here, Andutan urges
the Court to rule otherwise since unlike the cases cited, he had already resigned before the
administrative case was initiated. He further notes that his resignation from office cannot be
characterized as "preemptive, i.e. made under an atmosphere of fear for the imminence of formal
charges"31 because it was done pursuant to the Memorandum issued by then Executive Secretary
Ronaldo Zamora.
Having established the propriety of his resignation, Andutan asks the Court to uphold the mootness of
the administrative case against him since the cardinal issue in administrative cases is the "officer’s fitness
to remain in office, the principal penalty imposable being either suspension or removal."32 The
Ombudsman’s opinion - that accessory penalties may still be imposed - is untenable since it is a
fundamental legal principle that "accessory follows the principal, and the former cannot exist
independently of the latter."33
Third, the Ombudsman’s findings were void because procedural and substantive due process were not
observed. Likewise, Andutan submits that the Ombudsman’s findings lacked legal and factual bases.
ISSUES
Based on the submissions made, we see the following as the issues for our resolution:
I. Does Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an
administrative investigation a year after the act was committed?
II. Does Andutan’s resignation render moot the administrative case filed against him?
41
III. Assuming that the administrative case is not moot, are the Ombudsman’s findings
supported by substantial evidence?
THE COURT’S RULING
We rule to deny the petition.
The provisions of Section 20(5) are merely directory; the Ombudsman is not prohibited from conducting
an investigation a year after the supposed act was committed.
The issue of whether Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 is mandatory or discretionary has been settled by
jurisprudence.34In Office of the Ombudsman v. De Sahagun,35 the Court, speaking through Justice
Austria-Martinez, held:
[W]ell-entrenched is the rule that administrative offenses do not prescribe [Concerned Taxpayer v.
Doblada, Jr., A.M. No. P-99-1342, September 20, 2005, 470 SCRA 218; Melchor v. Gironella, G.R. No.
151138, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 476; Heck v. Judge Santos, 467 Phil. 798, 824 (2004); Floria v.
Sunga, 420 Phil. 637, 648-649 (2001)]. Administrative offenses by their very nature pertain to the
character of public officers and employees. In disciplining public officers and employees, the object
sought is not the punishment of the officer or employee but the improvement of the public service and
the preservation of the public’s faith and confidence in our government [Melchor v. Gironella, G.R. No.
151138, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 476, 481; Remolona v. Civil Service Commission, 414 Phil. 590, 601
(2001)].
Respondents insist that Section 20 (5) of R.A. No. 6770, to wit:
SEC. 20. Exceptions. – The Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary investigation of any
administrative act or omission complained of if it believes that:
(5) The complaint was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of.
(Emphasis supplied)
proscribes the investigation of any administrative act or omission if the complaint was filed after one
year from the occurrence of the complained act or omission.
In Melchor v. Gironella [G.R. No. 151138, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 476], the Court held that the
period stated in Section 20(5) of R.A. No. 6770 does not refer to the prescription of the offense but to
the discretion given to the Ombudsman on whether it would investigate a particular administrative
offense. The use of the word "may" in the provision is construed as permissive and operating to confer
discretion [Melchor v. Gironella, G.R. No. 151138, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 476, 481; Jaramilla v.
Comelec, 460 Phil. 507, 514 (2003)]. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, they must be given their literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation
[Melchor v. Gironella, G.R. No. 151138, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 476, 481; National Federation of
Labor v. National Labor Relations Commission, 383 Phil. 910, 918 (2000)].
In Filipino v. Macabuhay [G.R. No. 158960, November 24, 2006, 508 SCRA 50], the Court interpreted
Section 20 (5) of R.A. No. 6770 in this manner:

Petitioner argues that based on the abovementioned provision [Section 20(5) of RA 6770)], respondent's
complaint is barred by prescription considering that it was filed more than one year after the alleged
commission of the acts complained of.
Petitioner's argument is without merit.
The use of the word "may" clearly shows that it is directory in nature and not mandatory as petitioner
contends. When used in a statute, it is permissive only and operates to confer discretion; while the word
"shall" is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced. Applying Section 20(5),
therefore, it is discretionary upon the Ombudsman whether or not to conduct an investigation on a
complaint even if it was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of.
In fine, the complaint is not barred by prescription. (Emphasis supplied)
The declaration of the CA in its assailed decision that while as a general rule the word "may" is directory,
the negative phrase "may not" is mandatory in tenor; that a directory word, when qualified by the word
"not," becomes prohibitory and therefore becomes mandatory in character, is not plausible. It is not
supported by jurisprudence on statutory construction. [emphases and underscoring supplied]
Clearly, Section 20 of R.A. 6770 does not prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an administrative
investigation after the lapse of one year, reckoned from the time the alleged act was committed.
Without doubt, even if the administrative case was filed beyond the one (1) year period stated in Section
20(5), the Ombudsman was well within its discretion to conduct the administrative investigation.
However, the crux of the present controversy is not on the issue of prescription, but on the issue of the
Ombudsman’s authority to institute an administrative complaint against a government employee who
had already resigned. On this issue, we rule in Andutan’s favor.
Andutan’s resignation divests the Ombudsman of its right to institute an administrative complaint
against him.
Although the Ombudsman is not precluded by Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 from conducting the
investigation, the Ombudsman can no longer institute an administrative case against Andutan because
the latter was not a public servant at the time the case was filed.
The Ombudsman argued – in both the present petition and in the petition it filed with the CA – that
Andutan’s retirement from office does not render moot any administrative case, as long as he is charged
with an offense he committed while in office. It is irrelevant, according to the Ombudsman, that Andutan
had already resigned prior to the filing of the administrative case since the operative fact that
determines its jurisdiction is the commission of an offense while in the public service.
The Ombudsman relies on Section VI(1) of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 38 for
this proposition, viz.:
Section VI.
1. x x x
42
An officer or employee under administrative investigation may be allowed to resign pending decision of
his case but it shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the proceeding against him. It shall also
be without prejudice to the filing of any administrative, criminal case against him for any act committed
while still in the service. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The CA refused to give credence to this argument, holding that the provision "refers to cases where the
officers or employees were already charged before they were allowed to resign or were separated from
service."36 In this case, the CA noted that "the administrative cases were filed only after Andutan was
retired, hence the Ombudsman was already divested of jurisdiction and could no longer prosecute the
cases."37
Challenging the CA’s interpretation, the Ombudsman argues that the CA "limited the scope of the cited
Civil Service Memorandum Circular to the first sentence."38 Further, according to the Ombudsman, "the
court a quo ignored the second statement in the said circular that contemplates a situation where
previous to the institution of the administrative investigation or charge, the public official or employee
subject of the investigation has resigned."39
To recall, we have held in the past that a public official’s resignation does not render moot an
administrative case that was filed prior to the official’s resignation. In Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr.,40 we held
that:
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Juan [A.M. No. P-03-1726, 22 July 2004, 434 SCRA 654, 658], this
Court categorically ruled that the precipitate resignation of a government employee charged with an
offense punishable by dismissal from the service does not render moot the administrative case against
him. Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability when facing administrative sanction.
The resignation of a public servant does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which
he or she shall still be answerable [Baquerfo v. Sanchez, A.M. No. P-05-1974, 6 April 2005, 455 SCRA 13,
19-20]. [emphasis and underscoring supplied]
Likewise, in Baquerfo v. Sanchez,41 we held:
Cessation from office of respondent by resignation [Reyes v. Cristi, A.M. No. P-04-1801, 2 April 2004, 427
SCRA 8] or retirement [Re: Complaint Filed by Atty. Francis Allan A. Rubio on the Alleged Falsification of
Public Documents and Malversation of Public Funds, A.M. No. 2004-17-SC, 27 September 2004; Caja v.
Nanquil, A.M. No. P-04-1885, 13 September 2004] neither warrants the dismissal of the administrative
complaint filed against him while he was still in the service [Tuliao v. Ramos, A.M. No. MTJ-95-1065, 348
Phil. 404, 416 (1998), citing Perez v. Abiera, A.C. No. 223-J, 11 June 1975, 64 SCRA 302; Secretary of
Justice v. Marcos, A.C. No. 207-J, 22 April 1977, 76 SCRA 301] nor does it render said administrative case
moot and academic [Sy Bang v. Mendez, 350 Phil. 524, 533 (1998)]. The jurisdiction that was this Court’s
at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the
respondent public official had ceased in office during the pendency of his case [Flores v. Sumaljag, 353
Phil. 10, 21 (1998)]. Respondent’s resignation does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability
to which he shall still be answerable [OCA v. Fernandez, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1511, 20 August 2004].
[emphases and underscoring supplied)
However, the facts of those cases are not entirely applicable to the present case. In the above-cited
cases, the Court found that the public officials – subject of the administrative cases – resigned, either to
prevent the continuation of a case already filed42 or to pre-empt the imminent filing of one.43 Here,
neither situation obtains.

The Ombudsman’s general assertion that Andutan pre-empted the filing of a case against him by
resigning, since he "knew for certain that the investigative and disciplinary arms of the State would
eventually reach him"44 is unfounded. First, Andutan’s resignation was neither his choice nor of his own
doing; he was forced to resign. Second, Andutan resigned from his DOF post on July 1, 1998, while the
administrative case was filed on September 1, 1999, exactly one (1) year and two (2) months after his
resignation. The Court struggles to find reason in the Ombudsman’s sweeping assertions in light of these
facts.
What is clear from the records is that Andutan was forced to resign more than a year before the
Ombudsman filed the administrative case against him. Additionally, even if we were to accept the
Ombudsman’s position that Andutan foresaw the filing of the case against him, his forced resignation
negates the claim that he tried to prevent the filing of the administrative case.
Having established the inapplicability of prevailing jurisprudence, we turn our attention to the provisions
of Section VI of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38. We disagree with the Ombudsman’s interpretation
that "[a]s long as the breach of conduct was committed while the public official or employee was still in
the service x x x a public servant’s resignation is not a bar to his administrative investigation, prosecution
and adjudication."45 If we agree with this interpretation, any official – even if he has been separated
from the service for a long time – may still be subject to the disciplinary authority of his superiors, ad
infinitum. We believe that this interpretation is inconsistent with the principal motivation of the law –
which is to improve public service and to preserve the public’s faith and confidence in the government,
and not the punishment of the public official concerned.46 Likewise, if the act committed by the public
official is indeed inimical to the interests of the State, other legal mechanisms are available to redress
the same.
The possibility of imposing accessory penalties does not negate the Ombudsman’s lack of jurisdiction.
The Ombudsman suggests that although the issue of Andutan’s removal from the service is moot, there
is an "irresistible justification" to "determine whether or not there remains penalties capable of
imposition, like bar from re-entering the public service and forfeiture of benefits."47 Otherwise stated,
since accessory penalties may still be imposed against Andutan, the administrative case itself is not moot
and may proceed despite the inapplicability of the principal penalty of removal from office.
We find several reasons that militate against this position.
First, although we have held that the resignation of an official does not render an administrative case
moot and academic because accessory penalties may still be imposed, this holding must be read in its
proper context. In Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr.,48 indeed, we held:
A case becomes moot and academic only when there is no more actual controversy between the parties
or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits of the case [Tantoy, Sr. v. Abrogar, G.R.
No. 156128, 9 May 2005, 458 SCRA 301, 305]. The instant case is not moot and academic, despite the
petitioner’s separation from government service. Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions -
that of separation from service - may no longer be imposed on the petitioner, there are other penalties
which may be imposed on her if she is later found guilty of administrative offenses charged against her,
namely, the disqualification to hold any government office and the forfeiture of benefits. [emphasis and
underscoring supplied]
43
Reading the quoted passage in a vacuum, one could be led to the conclusion that the mere availability of
accessory penalties justifies the continuation of an administrative case. This is a misplaced reading of the
case and its ruling.
Esther S. Pagano – who was serving as Cashier IV at the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Benguet –
filed her certificate of candidacy for councilor four days after the Provincial Treasurer directed her to
explain why no administrative case should be filed against her. The directive arose from allegations that
her accountabilities included a cash shortage of ₱1,424,289.99. She filed her certificate of candidacy
under the pretext that since she was deemed ipso facto resigned from office, she was no longer under
the administrative jurisdiction of her superiors. Thus, according to Pagano, the administrative complaint
had become moot.
We rejected Pagano’s position on the principal ground "that the precipitate resignation of a government
employee charged with an offense punishable by dismissal from the service does not render moot the
administrative case against him. Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability when
facing administrative sanction."49Our position that accessory penalties are still imposable – thereby
negating the mootness of the administrative complaint – merely flows from the fact that Pagano pre-
empted the filing of the administrative case against her. It was neither intended to be a stand-alone
argument nor would it have justified the continuation of the administrative complaint if Pagano’s filing of
candidacy/resignation did not reek of irregularities. Our factual findings in Pagano confirm this, viz.:
At the time petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy, petitioner was already notified by the Provincial
Treasurer that she needed to explain why no administrative charge should be filed against her, after it
discovered the cash shortage of ₱1,424,289.99 in her accountabilities. Moreover, she had already filed
her answer. To all intents and purposes, the administrative proceedings had already been commenced at
the time she was considered separated from service through her precipitate filing of her certificate of
candidacy. Petitioner’s bad faith was manifest when she filed it, fully knowing that administrative
proceedings were being instituted against her as part of the procedural due process in laying the
foundation for an administrative case.50 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)1avvphil
Plainly, our justification for the continuation of the administrative case – notwithstanding Pagano’s
resignation – was her "bad faith" in filing the certificate of candidacy, and not the availability of
accessory penalties.
Second, we agree with the Ombudsman that "fitness to serve in public office x x x is a question of
transcendental [importance]51" and that "preserving the inviolability of public office" compels the state
to prevent the "re-entry [to] public service of persons who have x x x demonstrated their absolute lack of
fitness to hold public office."52However, the State must perform this task within the limits set by law,
particularly, the limits of jurisdiction. As earlier stated, under the Ombudsman’s theory, the
administrative authorities may exercise administrative jurisdiction over subordinates ad infinitum; thus,
a public official who has validly severed his ties with the civil service may still be the subject of an
administrative complaint up to his deathbed. This is contrary to the law and the public policy behind it.
Lastly, the State is not without remedy against Andutan or any public official who committed violations
while in office, but had already resigned or retired therefrom. Under the "threefold liability rule," the
wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative
liability.53 Even if the Ombudsman may no longer file an administrative case against a public official who
has already resigned or retired, the Ombudsman may still file criminal and civil cases to vindicate
Andutan’s alleged transgressions. In fact, here, the Ombudsman – through the FFIB – filed a criminal case

for Estafa and violations of Section 3(a), (e) and (j) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against
Andutan. If found guilty, Andutan will not only be meted out the penalty of imprisonment, but also the
penalties of perpetual disqualification from office, and confiscation or forfeiture of any prohibited
interest.54
Conclusion
Public office is a public trust. No precept of administrative law is more basic than this statement of what
assumption of public office involves. The stability of our public institutions relies on the ability of our civil
servants to serve their constituencies well.
While we commend the Ombudsman’s resolve in pursuing the present case for violations allegedly
committed by Andutan, the Court is compelled to uphold the law and dismiss the petition. Consistent
with our holding that Andutan is no longer the proper subject of an administrative complaint, we find no
reason to delve on the Ombudsman’s factual findings.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the Office of the Ombudsman’s petition for review on certiorari, and AFFIRM the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68893, promulgated on July 28, 2004, which annulled
and set aside the July 30, 2001 decision of the Office of the Ombudsman, finding Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr.
guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS:
Pursuant to the Memorandum directing all non-career officials or those occupying political positions to
vacate their positions, Andutan resigned from the DOF as the former Deputy Director of the One-Stop
Shop Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center of the DOF. Subsequently, Andutan, et al. was criminally
charged by the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of the Ombudsman with Estafa through
Falsification of Public Documents, and violations RA 3019. As government employees, Andutan et al.
were likewise administratively charged of Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, Falsification of Official
Documents and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. The criminal and administrative
charges arose from anomalies in the illegal transfer of Tax Credit Certificates (TCCs) to Steel Asia, among
others. The Ombudsman found the respondents guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty. Having been separated
from the service, Andutan was imposed the penalty of forfeiture of all leaves, retirement and other
benefits and privileges, and perpetual disqualification from reinstatement and/or reemployment in any
branch or instrumentality of the government, including government owned and controlled agencies or
corporations. The CA annulled and set aside the decision of the Ombudsman, ruling that the latter
“should not have considered the administrative complaints” because: first, Section 20 of R.A. 6770
provides that the Ombudsman “may not conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative act or
omission complained of if it believes that x x x [t]he complaint was filed after one year from the
occurrence of the act or omission complained of”; and second, the administrative case was filed after
Andutan’s forced resignation
ISSUES:
44
1. Whether Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an administrative
investigation a year after the act was committed.
2. Whether the Ombudsman has authority to institute an administrative complaint against a government
employee who had already resigned.
HELD:
1. No. Well-entrenched is the rule that administrative offenses do not prescribe. Administrative offenses
by their very nature pertain to the character of public officers and employees. In disciplining public
officers and employees, the object sought is not the punishment of the officer or employee but the
improvement of the public service and the preservation of the public’s faith and confidence in our
government. Clearly, Section 20 of R.A. 6770 does not prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an
administrative investigation after the lapse of one year, reckoned from the time the alleged act was
committed. Without doubt, even if the administrative case was filed beyond the one (1) year period
stated in Section 20(5), the Ombudsman was well within its discretion to conduct the administrative
investigation.
2. No. The Ombudsman can no longer institute an administrative case against Andutan because the
latter was not a public servant at the time the case was filed. It is irrelevant, according to the
Ombudsman, that Andutan had already resigned prior to the filing of the administrative case since the
operative fact that determines its jurisdiction is the commission of an offense while in the public service.
The SC observed that indeed it has held in the past that a public official’s resignation does not render
moot an administrative case that was filed prior to the official’s resignation. However, the facts of those
cases are not entirely applicable to the present case. In the past cases, the Court found that the public
officials – subject of the administrative cases – resigned, either to prevent the continuation of a case
already filed or to pre-empt the imminent filing of one. Here, neither situation obtains. First, Andutan’s
resignation was neither his choice nor of his own doing; he was forced to resign. Second, Andutan
resigned from his DOF post on July 1, 1998, while the administrative case was filed on September 1,
1999, exactly one year and two months after his resignation. What is clear from the records is that
Andutan was forced to resign more than a year before the Ombudsman filed the administrative case
against him. If the SC agreed with the interpretation of the Ombudsman, any official – even if he has
been separated from the service for a long time – may still be subject to the disciplinary authority of his
superiors, ad infinitum. Likewise, if the act committed by the public official is indeed inimical to the
interests of the State, other legal mechanisms are available to redress the same.

F. PUBLIC OFFICE AND RESPONSIBILITY
EN BANC
G.R. No. 81563 December 19, 1989
AMADO C. ARIAS, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The facts of this case are stated in the dissenting opinion of Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino which
follows this majority opinion. The dissent substantially reiterates the draft report prepared by Justice
Griño-Aquino as a working basis for the Court's deliberations when the case was being discussed and for
the subsequent votes of concurrence or dissent on the action proposed by the report.
There is no dispute over the events which transpired. The division of the Court is on the conclusions to
be drawn from those events and the facts insofar as the two petitioners are concerned. The majority is
of the view that Messrs. Arias and Data should be acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt. The Court
feels that the quantum of evidence needed to convict petitioners Arias and Data beyond reasonable
doubt, as co-conspirators in the conspiracy to cause undue injury to the Government through the
irregular disbursement and expenditure of public funds, has not been satisfied.
In acquitting the petitioners, the Court agrees with the Solicitor-General 1 who, in 80 pages of his
consolidated manifestation and motion, recommended that Messrs. Arias and Data be acquitted of the
crime charged, with costs de oficio. Earlier, Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor Eleuterio F. Guerrero had
also recommended the dropping of Arias from the information before it was filed.
There is no question about the need to ferret out and convict public officers whose acts have made the
bidding out and construction of public works and highways synonymous with graft or criminal
inefficiency in the public eye. However, the remedy is not to indict and jail every person who may have
ordered the project, who signed a document incident to its construction, or who had a hand somewhere
in its implementation. The careless use of the conspiracy theory may sweep into jail even innocent
persons who may have been made unwitting tools by the criminal minds who engineered the
defraudation.
Under the Sandiganbayan's decision in this case, a department secretary, bureau chief, commission
chairman, agency head, and all chief auditors would be equally culpable for every crime arising from
disbursements which they have approved. The department head or chief auditor would be guilty of
conspiracy simply because he was the last of a long line of officials and employees who acted upon or
affixed their signatures to a transaction. Guilt must be premised on a more knowing, personal, and
deliberate participation of each individual who is charged with others as part of a conspiracy.
The records show that the six accused persons were convicted in connection with the overpricing of land
purchased by the Bureau of Public Works for the Mangahan Floodway Project. The project was intended
to ease the perennial floods in Marikina and Pasig, Metro Manila.
45
The accused were prosecuted because 19,004 square meters of "riceland" in Rosario, Pasig which had
been assessed at P5.00 a square meter in 1973 were sold as residential land" in 1978 for P80.00 a square
meter. The land for the floodway was acquired through negotiated purchase,
We agree with the Solicitor-General that the assessor's tax valuation of P5.00 per square meter of land in
Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila is completely unrealistic and arbitrary as the basis for conviction.
Herein lies the first error of the trial court.
It must be stressed that the petitioners are not charged with conspiracy in the falsification of public
documents or preparation of spurious supporting papers. The charge is causing undue injury to the
Government and giving a private party unwarranted benefits through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith, or inexcusable negligence.
The alleged undue injury in a nutshell is the Government purchase of land in Pasig, Rizal for P80.00 a
square meter instead of the P5.00 value per square meter appearing in the tax declarations and fixed by
the municipal assessor, not by the landowner.
The Sandiganbayan, without any clear factual basis for doing so has assumed that the P5.00 per square
meter value fixed by the assessor in the tax declarations was the correct market value of the Mangahan
property and if the Government purchased the land for P80.00 a square meter, it follows that it must
have suffered undue injury.
The Solicitor General explains why this conclusion is erroneous:
1. No undue injury was caused to the Government
a. The P80.00 per square rneter acquisition cost is just fair and reasonable.
It bears stress that the Agleham property was acquired through negotiated purchase. It was, therefor,
nothing more than an ordinary contract of sale where the purchase price had to be arrived at by
agreement between the parties and could never be left to the discretion of one of the contracting
parties (Article 1473, New Civil Code). For it is the essence of a contract of sale that there must be a
meeting of the minds between the seller and the buyer upon the thing which is the object of the
contract and upon the price (Article 1475, New Civil Code). Necessarily, the parties have to negotiate the
reasonableness of the price, taking into consideration such other factors as location, potentials,
surroundings and capabilities. After taking the foregoing premises into consideration, the parties have,
thus, arrived at the amount of P80.00 per square meter as the fair and reasonable price for the Agleham
property.
It bears stress that the prosecution failed to adduce evidence to prove that the true and fair market
value in 1978 of the Agleham property was indeed P5.00 per square meter only as stated by the assessor
in the tax declaration (Exhibit W). On the contrary, the prosecution's principal witness Pedro Ocol, the
Assistant Municipal Assessor of Pasig, admitted that the purchase price of P80.00 per square meter paid
for the Agleham property as stated in the Deed of Sale (Exhibit G) is reasonable (tsn, August 19,1983, p.
20) and fair (Ibid, p. 76); that 'the value of lands within the town of Pasig ranges from P80.00 to P500.00'
(Ibid, p. 21); that the Agleham property is "around 300 meters" from Ortigas Avenue, "adjacent to the
existing Leongson [Liamson] Subdivision ... and near Eastland Garment Building" (Ibid, pp. 12-13); that

said property is surrounded by factories, commercial establishments and residential subdivisions (Ibid,
pp. 73-74); that the P5.00 per square meter assessed valuation of the Agleham property appearing on
the tax declaration (Exhibit W) was based on actual use only (lbid, pp. 26-27), it being the uniform rate
for all ricefields in Pasig irrespective of their locations (Ibid, pp. 72-74) and did not take into account the
existence of many factories and subdivisions in the area (Ibid., pp. 25-27, 72-74), and that the assessed
value is different from and always lower than the actual market value (Ibid, pp. 22-23). (At pp. 256-259,
Rollo)
A negotiated purchase may usually entail a higher buying price than one arrived at in the course of
expropriation proceedings.
In Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay (149 SCRA 305, 310 [1987]) we struck down the martial law
decree that pegged just compensation in eminent domain cases to the assessed value stated by a
landowner in his tax declaration or fixed by the municipal assessor, whichever is lower. Other factors
must be considered. These factors must be determined by a court of justice and not by municipal
employees.
In the instant case, the assessor's low evaluation, in the fixing of which the landowner had no
participation, was used for a purpose infinitely more weighty than mere expropriation of land. It forms
the basis for a criminal conviction.
The Court is not prepared to say that P80.00 to P500.00 a square meter for land in Pasig in 1978 would
be a fair evaluation. The value must be determined in eminent domain proceedings by a competent
court. We are certain, however, that it cannot be P5.00 a square meter. Hence, the decision, insofar as it
says that the "correct" valuation is P5.00 per square meter and on that basis convicted that petitioners
of causing undue injury, damage, and prejudice to the Government because of gross overpricing, is
grounded on shaky foundations.
There can be no overpricing for purposes of a criminal conviction where no proof adduced during orderly
proceedings has been presented and accepted.
The Court's decision, however, is based on a more basic reason. Herein lies the principal error of the
respondent court.
We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office plagued by all too common problems-dishonest
or negligent subordinates, overwork, multiple assignments or positions, or plain incompetence is
suddenly swept into a conspiracy conviction simply because he did not personally examine every single
detail, painstakingly trace every step from inception, and investigate the motives of every person
involved in a transaction before affixing, his signature as the final approving authority.
There appears to be no question from the records that documents used in the negotiated sale were
falsified. A key tax declaration had a typewritten number instead of being machine-numbered. The
registration stampmark was antedated and the land reclassified as residential instead of ricefield. But
were the petitioners guilty of conspiracy in the falsification and the subsequent charge of causing undue
in injury and damage to the Government?
We can, in retrospect, argue that Arias should have probed records, inspected documents, received
procedures, and questioned persons. It is doubtful if any auditor for a fairly sized office
46
could personally do all these things in all vouchers presented for his signature. The Court would be asking
for the impossible. All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent 'on their subordinates and on
the good faith of those prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. If a department
secretary entertains important visitors, the auditor is not ordinarily expected to call the restaurant about
the amount of the bill, question each guest whether he was present at the luncheon, inquire whether
the correct amount of food was served and otherwise personally look into the reimbursement voucher's
accuracy, propriety, and sufficiency. There has to be some added reason why he should examine each
voucher in such detail. Any executive head of even small government agencies or commissions can attest
to the volume of papers that must be signed. There are hundreds of document , letters and supporting
paper that routinely pass through his hands. The number in bigger offices or departments is even more
appalling.
There should be other grounds than the mere signature or approval appearing on a voucher to sustain a
conspiracy charge and conviction.
Was petitioner Arias part of the planning, preparation, and perpetration of the alleged conspiracy to
defraud the government?
Arias joined the Pasig office on July 19, 1978. The negotiations for the purchase of the property started in
1977. The deed of sale was executed on April 20, 1978. Title was transferred to the Republic on June 8,
1978. In other words, the transaction had already been consummated before his arrival. The pre-audit,
incident to payment of the purchase, was conducted in the first week of October, 1978. Arias points out
that apart from his signature linking him to the signature on the voucher, there is no evidence
transaction. On the contrary, the other co-accused testified they did not know him personally and none
approached him to follow up the payment.
Should the big amount of P1,520,320.00 have caused him to investigate . gate the smallest detains of the
transaction?
Yes, if the land was really worth only P5.00 a square meter. However, if land in Pasig was already worth
P80.00 a square meter at the time, no warning bell of intuition would have sounded an inner alarm. Land
along Ortigas Avenue on the way to Pasig is now worth P20,000.00 to P30,000.00 a square meter. The
falsification of the tax declaration by changing "riceland" to "residential' was done before Arias was
assigned to Pasig besides, there is no such thing as "riceland" in inner Metro Manila. Some lots in
outlying or easily flooded areas may still be planted to rice or kangkong but this is only until the place is
dedicated to its real purpose which is commercial, industrial, or residential. If the Sandiganbayan is going
to send somebody to jail for six years, the decision should be based on firmer foundation.
The Sandiganbayan asked why Arias kept the documents from October, 1978 to June 23, 1982. Arias
explained that the rules of the Commission on Audit require auditors to keep these d documents
and under no circumstance to relinquish custody to other persons. Arias was auditor of the Bureau of
Public Works in Pasig up to September 1, 1981. The seven months delay in the formal turnover of
custody to the new auditor was explained by prosecution witness Julito Pesayco, who succeeded him as
auditor and who took over the custody of records in that office.
The main reason for the judgment of conviction, for the finding of undue injury and damage to the
Government is the alleged gross overprice for the land purchased for the floodway project. Assuming
that P80.00 is indeed exorbitant, petitioner Arias cites his testimony as follows:

Q In conducting the pre-audit, did you determine the reasonableness of the price of the property?
A In this case, the price has been stated, the transaction had been consummated and the corresponding
Transfer Certificate of little had been issued and transferred to the government of the Philippines. The
auditors have no more leeway to return the papers and then question the purchase price.
Q Is it not a procedure in your office that before payment is given by the government to private
individuals there should be a pre-audit of the papers and the corresponding checks issued to the vendor?
A Correct, Your Honor, but it depends on the kind of transaction there is.
Q Yes, but in this particular case, the papers were transferred to the government without paying the
price Did you not consider that rather odd or unusual? (TSN, page 17, April 27,1987).
A No, Your Honor.
Q Why not?
A Because in the Deed of Sale as being noted there, there is a condition that no payments will be made
unless the corresponding title in the payment of the Republic is committed is made.
Q In this case you said that the title is already in the name of the government?
A Yes, Your Honor. The only thing we do is to determine whether there is an appropriation set aside to
cover the said specification. As of the price it is under the sole authority of the proper officer making the
sale.
Q My point is this. Did you not consider it unusual for a piece of property to be bought by the
government; the sale was consummated; the title was issued in favor of the government without the
price being paid first to the seller?
A No, Your Honor. In all cases usually, payments made by the government comes later than the transfer.
Q That is usual procedure utilized in road right of way transaction?
A Yes, Your Honor. (TSN, p. 18, April 27,1987).
Q And of course as auditor, 'watch-dog' of the government there is also that function you are also called
upon by going over the papers . . . (TSN, page 22, April 27,1987). I ... vouchers called upon to determine
whether there is any irregularity as at all in this particular transaction, is it not?
A Yes, Ma'am.
Q And that was in fact the reason why you scrutinized also, not only the tax declaration but also the
certification by Mr. Jose and Mr. Cruz?
47
A As what do you mean of the certification, ma'am?
Q Certification of Mr. Jose and Mr. Cruz in relation to PD No. 296, A They are not required documents
that an auditor must see. (TSN, page 23, April 27,1987).
and continuing:
A ... The questioning of the purchase price is now beyond the authority of the auditor because it is
inasmuch as the amount involved is beyond his counter-signing authority. (TSN, page 35, April 27, 1987).
(At pp. 15-16, Petition. Underlinings supplied by petitioner)
The Solicitor General summarizes the participation of petitioner Data as follows:
As regards petitioner Data's alleged participation, the evidence on record shows that as the
then District Engineer of the Pasig Engineering District he created a committee, headed by
Engr. Priscillo Fernando with Ricardo Asuncion, Alfonso Mendoza, Ladislao Cruz, Pedro Hucom
and Carlos Jose, all employees of the district office, as members, specifically to handle the
Mangahan Floodway Project, gather and verify documents, conduct surveys, negotiate with
the owners for the sale of their lots, process claims and prepare the necessary documents; he
did not take any direct and active part in the acquisition of land for the Mangahan floodway;
it was the committee which determined the authenticity of the documents presented to them
for processing and on the basis thereof prepared the corresponding deed of sale; thereafter,
the committee submitted the deed of sale together with the supporting documents to
petitioner Data for signing; on the basis of the supporting certified documents which
appeared regular and complete on their face, petitioner Data, as head of the office and the
signing authority at that level, merely signed but did not approve the deed of sale (Exhibit G)
as the approval thereof was the prerogative of the Secretary of Public Works; he thereafter
transmitted the signed deed of sale with its supporting documents to Director Anolin of the
Bureau of Public Works who in turn recommended approval thereof by the Secretary of
Public Works; the deed of sale was approved by the Asst. Secretary of Public Works after a
review and re-examination thereof at that level; after the approval of the deed of sale by the
higher authorities the covering voucher for payment thereof was prepared which petitioner
Data signed; petitioner Data did not know Gutierrez and had never met her during the
processing and payment of her claims (tsn, February 26, 1987, pp. 10-14, 16-24, 31-32). (At
pp. 267-268, Rollo.)
On the alleged conspiracy, the Solicitor General argues:
It is respectfully submitted that the prosecution likewise has not shown any positive and
convincing evidence of conspiracy between the petitioners and their co-accused. There was
no direct finding of conspiracy. Respondent Court's inference on the alleged existence of
conspiracy merely upon the purported 'pre-assigned roles (of the accused) in the commission
of the (alleged) illegal acts in question is not supported by any evidence on record. Nowhere
in the seventy- eight (78) page Decision was there any specific allusion to some or even one
instance which would link either petitioner Arias or Data to their co-accused in the planning,
preparation and/or perpetration, if any, of the purported fraud and falsifications alleged in
the information That petitioners Data and Arias happened to be officials of the Pasig District
Engineering Office who signed the deed of sale and passed on pre-audit the general voucher
covering the subject sale, respectively, does hot raise any presumption or inference, that they
 48

were part of the alleged plan to defraud the Government, as indeed there was none. It should
be remembered that, as aboveshown, there was no undue injury caused to the Government
as the negotiated purchase of the Agleham property was made at the fair and reasonable
price of P80.00 per square meter.

That there were erasures and superimpositions of the words and figures of the purchase price
in the deed of sale from P1,546,240.00 to P1,520,320.00 does not prove conspiracy. It may be
noted that there was a reduction in the affected area from the estimated 19,328 square
meters to 19,004 square meters as approved by the Land Registration Commission, which
resulted in the corresponding reduction in the purchase price from P1,546,240.00 to
Pl,520,320.00. The erasures in the deed of sale were simple corrections that even benefited
the Government.

Moreover, contrary to the respondent Court's suspicion, there was nothing irregular in the
use of the unapproved survey plan/technical description in the deed of sale because the
approval of the survey plan/ technical description was not a prerequisite to the approval of
the deed of sale. What is important is that before any payment is made by the Government
under the deed of sale the title of the seller must have already been cancelled and another
one issued to the Government incorporating therein the technical description as approved by
the Land Registration Commission, as what obtained in the instant case. (At pp. 273-275,
Rollo)

We agree with the counsel for the People. There is no adequate evidence to establish the guilt of the
petitioners, Amado C. Arias and Cresencio D. Data, beyond reasonable doubt. The inadequate evidence
on record is not sufficient to sustain a conviction.

WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Sandiganbayan insofar as it convicts and sentences
petitioners Amado C. Arias and Cresencio D. Data is hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioners Arias and Data are
acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 154499 February 27, 2004
ALBERTO V. REYES, WILFREDO B. DOMO-ONG and HERMINIO C. PRINCIPIO, petitioners
vs.
RURAL BANK OF SAN MIGUEL (BULACAN), INC., represented by HILARIO P. SORIANO, President and
Principal Stockholder, respondent.
RESOLUTION
Tinga, J.:
This deals with the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioners Alberto V. Reyes and Wilfredo B. Domo-
ong, both Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) officials,1 and the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of
respondent Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc.
In the Decision2 of March 14, 2003, this Court found Deputy Governor Reyes and Director Domo-ong
liable for violation of the "standards of professionalism" prescribed by the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees (Republic Act No. 6713) in that they used the distressed
financial condition of respondent Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. (RBSMI) as the subject of a
case study in one of the BSP seminars and did the "brokering" of the sale of RBSMI. The Court modified
the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 601843 by reducing the penalty imposed by the
appellate court from a fine equivalent to six months’ salary to a fine of two months’ salary for Reyes and
one month salary for Domo-ong.
In the Decision, the Court exonerated petitioner Herminio C. Principio4 of the administrative charges. The
exoneration is the subject of RBSMI’s Motion For Partial Reconsideration.
The Motion for Reconsideration of Reyes and Domo-ong is anchored on the following grounds: (1) it was
not under their auspices that the seminar which used training materials containing two case studies on
RBSMI’s financial distress was conducted but under that of another department and other officials of
BSP; and, (2) they did not do any act which constituted "brokering" of the sale of RBSMI or deviated from
the standards of professionalism.
A brief revisit of the operative milieu is warranted to gain the needed perspective.
In a letter dated May 19, 1999, addressed to then BSP Governor Singson, RBSMI charged the petitioners
with violation of Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees). The Monetary Board (MB) of the BSP created an Ad Hoc Committee to investigate the
matter.
The ensuing investigation disclosed that sometime in September 1996, RBSMI, which had a history of
major violations/exceptions dating back to 1995, underwent periodic examination by the BSP. The
examination team headed by Principio noted 20 serious exceptions/violations and deficiencies of
RBSMI.5
49
Through Resolution No. 96, the MB required RBSMI to submit within 15 days a written explanation with
respect to the findings of the examiner. It also directed the Department of Rural Banks (DRB), to verify,
monitor and report to the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector (SES) on the
findings/exceptions noted, until the same shall have been corrected.
As directed by the MB, another examination team conducted a special examination on RBSMI. RBSMI
President Hilario Soriano claimed that he was pressured into issuing a memorandum to the bank
employees authorizing the team to review the bank’s accounting and internal control system.
Soriano also alleged that sometime in March 1997, Reyes started urging him to consider selling the bank.
He specified that on May 28, 1997, Reyes introduced him through telephone to Mr. Exequiel Villacorta,
President and Chief Executive Officer of the TA Bank. They agreed to meet on the following day. In
his Affidavit,6 Villacorta confirmed that he and Soriano indeed met but the meeting never got past the
exploratory stage since he (Villacorta) immediately expressed disinterest because Soriano wanted to sell
all his equity shares while he was merely contemplating a possible buy-in.
Soriano further alleged that when the talks with Villacorta failed, Reyes asked him whether he wanted to
meet another buyer, to which he answered in the affirmative. Thereafter, Reyes introduced him by
telephone to Benjamin P. Castillo of the Export and Industry Bank (EIB), whom he met on June 26, 1997.
No negotiation took place because Soriano desired a total sale while EIB merely desired a joint venture
arrangement or a buy-in to allow EIB to gain control of RBSMI.
Meanwhile, on June 13, 1997, the MB approved Resolution No. 7247 ordering RBSMI to correct the major
exceptions noted within 30 days from receipt of the advice, and to remit to the BSP the amount of
₱2,538,483.00 as fines and penalties for incurring deficiencies in reserves against deposit liabilities.
On July 21, 1997, Soriano submitted RBSMI’s answers to the BSP exceptions/findings mentioned. He
stated that "the actions taken or to be taken by the bank (RBSMI) were deliberated and ratified by the
Board of Directors in its regular meeting held on July 9, 1997." Among the board approved actions was
the bank’s request addressed to Domo-ong for BSP "to debit the demand deposit of the bank in the
amount of ₱2,538,483.00" representing the payment of fines and penalties.
More than a year after, however, the RBSMI asked for a reconsideration of MB Resolution No.
724 insofar as the imposition of fine amounting to ₱2,538,483.00. On January 21, 1999, the MB
adopted Resolution No. 71,8authorizing the conditional reversal of sixty percent (60%) of the penalty
pending resolution of the dispute on the findings on reserve deficiency. Subsequently, on April 7, 1999,
the MB approved the interim reversal of the entire amount of the penalty "pending the outcome of the
study on the legal and factual basis for the imposition of the penalty."
The above incidents, particularly the alleged "brokering" by Reyes and the petitioners’ "unsupported"
recommendation to impose a penalty of ₱2,538,483.00 for legal reserve deficiency, prompted the
respondent to file the letter-complaint charging the petitioners with "unprofessionalism."
The Motion for Reconsideration bid of Reyes and Domo-ong is meritorious.
In pinning liability on Reyes and Domo-ong for the seminar which used the rural bank as a case study, the
court made this ratiocination, viz:

"(W)hile there was indeed no evidence showing that either petitioner Reyes or petitioner Domo-ong
distributed or used the materials, the very fact that the seminar was conducted under their auspices is
enough to make them liable to a certain extent. Petitioner Reyes, as Head of the BSP Supervision and
Examination Sector, and petitioner Domo-ong, as Director of the BSP Department of Rural Banks, should
have exercised their power of control and supervision so that the incident could have been prevented
or at the very least remedied." (Emphasis supplied)
Plainly, conclusion on petitioners’ culpability is grounded, not on an established fact but on a mere
inference that the seminar was conducted under their auspices. Indeed, the pronouncement on the
petitioners’ role is evidently conjectural and evaluation of the extent of their responsibility admittedly
uncertain.
It is conceded that there was no evidence that the seminar was conducted under petitioners’ patronage.
And it was assumed, as indeed there was absolutely paucity of proof, that they exercised supervision and
control over the persons responsible in organizing the seminar. On the contrary, as shown in the Motion
For Reconsideration, it was the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Institute (BSPI), an office separate and
independent from the SES which is directly under the control and supervision of another Deputy
Governor, that for the Resource Management Sector (RMS)9which is charged with conducting seminars
and lectures for the BSP, including the seminar involved in this case.
In its Comment,10 RBSMI argues that since information on the state of its finances found its way as a
training material of RMS, the event could have transpired only because the SES permitted it. Even if the
subordinates of petitioners were the source of information, RBSMI further claims in ostensible reference
to the principle of command responsibility, petitioners could be held liable for negligence.
It is noteworthy again that petitioners’ alleged role in the disclosure of information is not anchored on
any concrete piece of evidence. That explains the RBSMI’s effort to cast liability vicariously on the
petitioners by a superficial resort to the principle of command responsibility which this Court did not
reject. But neither the principle itself which is an accepted notion in military or police structural
dynamics or its counterpart of respondent superior in the law on quasi-delicts11 would be relevant in this
case, involving as it does the actual performance in office of the petitioners and given the fact that
petitioners are high ranking officers of the country’s central monetary authority. Indeed, as such officers,
petitioners cannot be expected to monitor the activities of their subalterns. In Arias v.
Sandiganbayan,12 this Court held that all heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on the good
faith of their subordinates. The case specifically involved the liability of the head of office in the
preparation of bids, purchase of supplies and contract negotiations done by his subordinates. In the
same fashion, petitioners in this case owing to their high ranks cannot be expected to acquaint
themselves with such minutiae as the flow of files and documents which leave their desks. Myriad details
such as those are, by office practice, left to subalterns and minor employees. Delegation of function is
part of sound management.
From another perspective, the negligence of the subordinate cannot be ascribed to his superior in the
absence of evidence of the latter’s own negligence. Indeed, the negligence of the subordinate is not
tantamount to negligence of the superior official so the Court ruled in a case13 where the mandated
responsibilities of the superior do not include actual monitoring of projects. In another case,14 this Court
rejected the principle of command responsibility although the case involved a provincial constabulary
commander, aptly noting that there was neither allegation nor proof that he had been in any way guilty
of fault or negligence in connection with the unlawful raid and arrest effected by his subordinates.
50
The immunity of public officers from liability for the non-feasances, negligence or omissions of duty of
their official subordinates and even for the latter’s misfeasances or positive wrongs rests, according
to Mechem, "upon obvious considerations of public policy, the necessities of the public service and the
perplexities and embarrassments of a contrary doctrine."15 These official subordinates, he notes further,
are themselves public officers though of an inferior grade, and therefore directly liable in the cases in
which any public officer is liable, for their own misdeeds or defaults.16
Significantly, Mechem’s disquisition provides the mooring of the Administrative Code of 1987 which
provides that a head of a department or a superior officer shall not be civilly liable for the wrongful acts,
omissions of duty, negligence, or misfeasance of his subordinates, unless he has actually authorized by
written order the specific act or misconduct complained of.17
Now, the label of unprofessionalism bestowed by the Court on the petitioners at the instance of RBSMI.
In the assailed Decision, the Court categorized Reyes’ telephone introduction of officials of other banks
to RBSMI’s President in connection with the latter’s expressed desire to sell the bank as "brokering"
which in turn constitutes, according to the Court, violation of the standards of professionalism. The
standards are set forth in Section 4 (A) (b) of Republic Act 6713, as follows:
Sec. 4. Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees. — (A) Every public official and employee shall
observe the following as standards of personal conduct in the discharge and execution of official duties:
(b) Professionalism. — Public officials and employees shall perform and discharge their duties with the
highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill. They shall enter public service with
utmost devotion and dedication to duty. They shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of their
roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage.
The Court equates "brokering" with unprofessionalism. According to Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary,"professionalism" means "the conduct, aims, or qualities that characterize or mark a
profession." Any standard thesaurus defines a "professional" as a person who engages in an activity with
great competence. Indeed, to call a person a professional is to describe him as competent, efficient,
experienced, proficient or polished.
The crucial question, therefore, is whether Reyes conducted himself in an unprofessional manner in
doing the acts imputed to him.
The Court rules in the negative.
In the first place, the acts of Reyes do not constitute "brokering." Case law18 defines a "broker" as "one
who is engaged, for others, on a commission, negotiating contracts relative to property with the custody
of which he has no concern; the negotiator between other parties, never acting in his own name but in
the name of those who employed him. . . . a broker is one whose occupation is to bring the parties
together, in matters of trade, commerce or navigation." According to Bouvier’s Law Dictionary,
"brokerage" refers to "the trade or occupation of a broker; the commissions paid to a broker for his
services," while "brokers" are "those who are engaged for others on the negotiation of contracts relative
to property, with the custody of which they have no concern."19

Thus, the word "brokering" clearly indicates the performance of certain acts for monetary consideration
or compensation. To give it another definition such as that imputed by RBSMI to the acts of Reyes is to
distort the accepted jurisprudential meaning of the term. From the evidence, all that Reyes did was to
introduce RBSMI’s President to the President of TA Bank and EIB. Nothing more. There was not even a
hint that he was motivated by monetary consideration or swayed by any personal interest in doing what
he did.
On his part, Soriano who is RBSMI’s President himself admitted that the talks with Villacorta and Castillo
never got past the exploratory stage because the two wanted a buy-in while he was for a total sell-out.
This is an indelible indication that Reyes was not personally involved in the transaction. If he were, he
would at least have an inkling of the plans of Villacorta and Castillo; otherwise, he would not have
wasted his time introducing them to Soriano.
Indeed, RBSMI miserably failed to establish that Reyes had breached the standard of professional
conduct required of a public servant. It appears to the Court that in keeping with the standards of
professionalism and heeding the mandate of his position, he made the telephone introductions for no
other purpose but to pave the way for a possible consolidation or merger of RBSMI with interested
banks. As this Court found in its Decision, it is indeed the policy of the BSP to promote mergers and
consolidations by providing incentives to banks that would undergo such corporate combinations.20 To
effectively implement the policy, it was necessary that the banks be advised and assisted by a person
knowledgeable about the transactions like Reyes. The benefits which may ultimately arise out of any
preliminary facilitation step such as what Reyes undertook will not accrue to the facilitator but to the
parties to the transaction themselves and, of course, the institution whose policy initiative is being
carried out.
All told, there is neither legal nor factual support for holding Reyes and Domo-ong liable.
As to the motion for partial reconsideration filed by RBSMI, it is argued that Principio should be
administratively penalized for his undue haste in submitting his report to the MB, in making an
unsupported recommendation for imposition of penalties for legal reserve deficiencies, and for taking
charge of the examinations of RBSMI three consecutive times. RBSMI’s arguments are not new, they
having been previously presented to and squarely ruled upon by the Court.
In closing, it cannot be overemphasized that the BSP is an independent body corporate bestowed under
its charter21 with fiscal and administrative autonomy. As such, its officials should be granted a certain
degree of flexibility in the performance of their duties and provided insulation from interference and
vexatious suits, especially when moves of the kind are resorted to as counterfoil to the exercise of their
regulatory mandate. Elsewise, the institutional independence and autonomy of the BSP as the central
mandatory authority would be rendered illusory.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration of the
petitioners Deputy Governor Alberto V. Reyes and Director Wilfredo B. Domo-ong. The Decision dated
March 14, 2003 is SET ASIDE and another entered, DISMISSING the administrative complaint and
EXONERATING all the petitioners. The Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the respondent Rural Bank
of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. is DENIED. SO ORDERED.
COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY;HEAD OF A DEPARTMENT OR A SUPERIOR OFFICER SHALL NOT BE CIVILLY
LIABLE FOR THE WRONGFUL ACTS.OMISSION OF DUTY, NEGLIGENCE FOR MISFEASANCE OF HIS
SUBORDINATE.UNLESS HE HAS ACTUALLY AUTHORIZE BY WRITTEN ORDER OF THE SPECIFIC ACT OR
51
MISCONDUCT COMPLAINED OF
Facts:
In a letter dated May 19,1999, addressed to then BSP Governor Singson, RBSMI charge the petitioner
with violation of RA No. 6713 ( code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees). The Monetary Board (MB) of the BSP created an Ad Hoc Committee to investigate the
matter.
The ensuing investigation disclosed that sometime in September 1996, RBSMI, which had a history of
major violations/exceptions dating back to 1995, underwent periodic examination by the BSP. The
examination team headed by Principio noted serious 20 exceptions/violations and deficiencies of RBSMI.
Through Resolution No. 96, the MB required RBSMI to submit within 15 days a written explanation with
respect to the findings of the examiner. It also directed the Department of Rural Banks DRB), to verify,
monitor and report to the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector (SES) on the findings
noted, until the same shall have been corrected.
Meanwhile on June 13,1997, the MB approved Resolution No. 724 ordering RBSMI to correct the major
exceptions noted within 30 days from receipt of the advice, and to remit to the BSP the amount of
P2,538,483.00 as fines and penalties for incurring deficiencies in reserves against deposit liabilities.
More than a year after, however, the RBSMI asked for a reconsideration of MB Resolution No. 724
insofar as the imposition of fine amounting to P P2,538,483.00.On January 21, 1999, the MB adopted
Resolution No. 71, authorizing the conditional reversal of sixty of the dispute on the findings on reserve
deficiency. Subsequently, on April 7, 1999, the MB approved the interim reversal of the entire amount of
the penalty “pending the outcome of the study on the legal and factual basis for the imposition of the
penalty.”
The above incidents, particularly the alleged “brokering” by Reyes and the petitioners’ “unsupported”
recommendation to impose a penalty of P2,538,483.00 for legal reserve deficiency, prompted the
respondent to file the letter-complaint charging the petitioners with “unprofessionalism.”
In the Decision if March 14,2003, this Court found Deputy Governor Reyes and Director Domo-ong liable
for violation of the “standards of professionalism” prescribed by RA 6713in that they used the distressed
financial condition of respondent RBSMI as the subject of a case study in one of the BSP seminars and did
the “brokering” of the sale of RBSMI. The Court modified the decision of the CA by reducing the penalty
imposed from the a fine equivalent to six months’salary to a fine of 2 months salary for Reyes and one
month salary for Domo-ong.
The court exonerated petitioner Proncipio of the Administrative charges. The exoneration is subject to
RBSMI’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not the Superior officer shall not be civilly liable for the wrongful acts, omissions of
duty, negligence or misfeasance of his subordinate officer.
Held:
The immunity of public officers from liability for nonfeasance, negligence or omissions of duty of their
official subordinate and even for the latter’s misfeasance or positive wrong rests, according to MECHEM,
“upon obvious considerations of public policy, the necessities of the public service and the perplexities
and embarrassments of a contrary doctrine.” These official subordinates are themselves public officers
though of an inferior grade, and therefore directly liable in the cases in which any public officer is liable,
for their own misdeeds or defaults.
Under the Admin Code of 1987, which provides that head of a department or a superior officer shall not
be civilly liable for the wrongful acts, omissions of duty, negligence, misfeasance of his subordinates,
unless he has actually authorized by written order the specific act or misconduct complained of.
 52

EN BANC the same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular issued therefor, there thus,
stands to be a violation of the separation of powers principle.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, in her capacity as the Ombudsman, Petitioner,
- versus -
COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) and JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR., Respondents. In addition, it should be pointed out that the breach of Congress in prohibiting provisional injunctions,
G.R. Nos. 217126-27 such as in the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, does not only undermine the constitutional
allocation of powers; it also practically dilutes a court’s ability to carry out its functions. This is so since a
Promulgated: particular case can easily be mooted by supervening events if no provisional injunctive relief is extended
November 10 2015 while the court is hearing the same.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS:
The Ombudsman’s argument against the CA’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition,
and her corollary prayer for its dismissal, is based on her interpretation of Section 14, RA 6770, or the
Ombudsman Act, which reads in full:
Section 14. Restrictions. – No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation
being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the
subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.
Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against “decision or findings” of the
Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus – similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770-
attempts to effectively increase the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction without its advice and
concurrence, it is therefore concluded that the former provision is also unconstitutional and perforce,
invalid. Contrary to the Ombudsman’s posturing, Fabian should squarely apply since the above-stated
Ombudsman Act provisions are in part materia in that they “cover the same specific or particular subject
matter,” that is, the manner of judicial review over issuances of the Ombudsman.
Note that since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is clearly determinative of the existence of
the CA’s subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, including all
subsequent proceedings relative thereto, as the Ombudsman herself has developed, the Court deems it
proper to resolve this issue ex mero motu (on its own motion):
Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily
rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is involved in which case
it may be raised at any time or on the court’s own motion. The Court ex mero motu may take cognizance
of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact is developed. The court has a clearly
recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction in any proceeding.

The Ombudsman’s maintains that the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 textually prohibits courts
from extending provisional injunctive relief to delay any investigation conducted by her office. Despite
the usage of the general phrase “[n]o writ of injunction shall be issued by any court,” the Ombudsman
herself concedes that the prohibition does not cover the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Are the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 14 of R.A. No. 6770, valid and constitutional?

RULING:

The first paragraph is declared INEFFECTIVE until the Court adopts the same as part of the rules of
procedure through an administrative circular duly issued; The second paragraph is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INVALID.

The Court rules that when Congress passed the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 and, in so doing,
took away from the courts their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted
by the Ombudsman, it encroached upon this Court’s constitutional rule-making authority. Through this
provision, Congress interfered with a provisional remedy that was created by this Court under its duly
promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is both integral and inherent to every court’s exercise of
judicial power. Without the Court’s consent to the proscription, as may be manifested by an adoption of

G. ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH AND STATE RECOVERY
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 147227 November 19, 2004
MARIA REMEDIOS ARGANA, DONATA ALMENDRALA VDA. DE ARGANA, LUIS ARGANA, JR., PEREGRINO
ARGANA, ESTATE OF GELACIO ARGANA, EUFROCINIO NOFUENTE, AMPARO ARGANA NOFUENTE,
JUANITO ROGELIO, MILAGROS ARGANA ROGELIO, MARIA FELICIDAD ARGANA, MARIA DOROTEA
ARGANA, REFEDOR SOUTH GOLD PROPERTY MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari assailing the Resolution dated April 11, 2000 and the Order
dated February 22, 2001 of the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, in Civil Case No. 0026.1
On July 29, 1987, respondent Republic of the Philippines filed with the Sandiganbayan a Petition for
Forfeiture of alleged ill-gotten assets and properties of the late Maximino A. Argana, who served as
Mayor of the Municipality of Muntinlupa2 from 1964 to 1967 and from 1972 until his death in 1985.
On October 28, 1998, the Sandiganbayan remanded the case to the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) for the conduct of an inquiry. In 1990, the case was reactivated in the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioners Maria Remedios Argana, Donata Almendrala Vda. De Argana, Luis Argana, Jr.,
Peregrino Argana, Estate of Gelacio Argana, Eufrocinio Nofuente, Amparo Argana Nofuente, Juanito
Rogelio, Milagros Argana Rogelio, Maria Felicidad Argana, Maria Dorotea Argana, and Refedor South
Gold Property Management & Development Corporation filed a series of motions, including a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of the lack of authority of the PCGG to institute the case on behalf of respondent.
This issue eventually reached this Court and was decided in favor of respondent on September 29, 1994.3
Petitioners, in their Answer, denied that the properties sought to be forfeited by respondent were
unlawfully acquired by the deceased Mayor and/or by petitioners. Still, to avoid a protracted litigation,
petitioners exerted efforts to settle the case amicably with respondent through the PCGG.
After a series of motions were again filed by petitioners, the Sandiganbayan finally set the case for pre-
trial on November 26, 1997, but the pre-trial was reset several times in view of the manifestation of the
parties that they were in the process of negotiating a compromise.
On August 7, 1997, petitioners' offer of compromise was accepted by the PCGG in its Resolution No. 97-
180-A.4
53
Thereafter, the PCGG conducted an evaluation of the properties offered for settlement by petitioners. In
a Memorandum dated August 18, 1997, Mauro J. Estrada, Director of the PCGG Research and
Development Program, recommended the inclusion of another tract of land5 belonging to petitioners
among the properties which would be subject of the compromise.
On September 18, 1997, respondent, represented by PCGG Commissioners Reynaldo S. Guiao and
Herminio A. Mendoza entered into a Compromise Agreement with petitioners, represented by petitioner
Maria Felicidad Argana. Petitioners conveyed, ceded and released in favor of respondent a total of
361.9203 hectares of agricultural land in Pangil and Famy, Laguna, or 75.12% of the properties subject of
litigation, in consideration of the dismissal or withdrawal of all pending civil, criminal and administrative
cases filed, litigated or investigated by respondent against them. The remainder was distributed as
follows:
To be retained by the late Mayor Argana's heirs 9.88% 47.78787 hectares
Owned by the Mayor's Brothers and Sisters 5.53% 26.6318 hectares
Foreclosed by Los Baños Rural Bank 1.24% 5.9856 hectares
Owned by Other Persons 8.23% 39.64865 hectares
24.88% 120.05392 hectares6
In a letter dated October 7, 1997,7 the PCGG informed the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) of the
signing of the Compromise Agreement and requested the OSG to file the appropriate motion for
approval thereof with the Sandiganbayan.
Subsequently, the OSG requested for clarification from the PCGG if the compromise agreement included
all the sequestered assets of petitioners subject of litigation. In response to the request, PCGG informed
the OSG in a letter dated February 4, 19988 that the properties mentioned in the Compromise
Agreement comprise all the sequestered assets subject of litigation, and reiterated that it entered into a
compromise agreement with petitioners because it believed that the evidence might not be sufficient to
warrant continuing the prosecution of Civil Case No. 0026 and that it is to the best interest of the
government to accept the offer of petitioners.9
On May 27, 1998, then President of the Republic of the Philippines Fidel V. Ramos approved the
Compromise Agreement between petitioners and respondent.10
On June 4, 1998,11 the OSG filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to Approve Compromise Agreement.
Petitioners expressed their conformity to the motion on June 15, 1998.
After conducting hearings on the motion, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its Decision on July 31, 1998
approving the Compromise Agreement and rendering judgment in accordance with the terms thereof.12
However, on October 5, 1998, respondent, through the OSG and the PCGG, filed with the Sandiganbayan
a Motion to Rescind Compromise Agreement and to Set Aside Judgment by Compromise (Motion to
Rescind). Respondent prayed for the rescission of the Compromise Agreement or reformation thereof

after a renegotiation with petitioners. Respondent contended that the partition of the properties in the
Compromise Agreement was grossly disadvantageous to the government and that there was fraud and
insidious misrepresentation by petitioners in the distribution and partition of properties, to the damage
and prejudice of the government. According to respondent, there was fraud and insidious
misrepresentation because petitioners proposed to divide the properties—with 75% accruing to the
government and the remaining 25% going to petitioners and their other creditors—based on the total
land area of the properties instead of on their value. As a result, the government obtained only Three
Million Six Hundred Twenty Thousand Pesos (P3,620,000.00) worth of land, while petitioners received
almost Four Billion Pesos (P4,000,000,000.00) worth.
Petitioners filed an Answer to the Motion to Rescind and contended that the July 31, 1998 Decision of
the Sandiganbayan could no longer be annulled because it had already become final and executory; that
respondent's counsel had no authority to file the motion; and that the motion was defective because it
did not include a Certification against Forum-Shopping. They also argued that there was no agreement to
divide the properties by a 75% to 25% ratio in favor of the government. What they proposed to cede to
the government by way of compromise were their properties in Pangil covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) Nos. T-4044 and T-4009 and those in Famy, Laguna covered by TCT Nos. T-3813 to T-3817 and
T-4104, 4106 and 4108, not a specific percentage of the properties subject of litigation.13
In its Resolution dated September 22, 1999, the Sandiganbayan treated the Motion to Rescind as a
petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure and set the motion
for hearing.
On April 11, 2000, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution granting respondent's motion to rescind and
setting aside the Decision dated July 31, 1998. The Sandiganbayan held that the Motion to Rescind was
filed on time on October 5, 1998, the working day immediately following October 4, 1998, which was a
Sunday and the 60th day after respondent received the July 31, 1998 Decision on August 5, 1998. It also
ruled that the presumption that the OSG had authority to file the Motion to Rescind was not overcome
by petitioners. Under Republic Act No. 1379,14the filing and prosecution of cases for forfeiture of
unlawfully acquired property is a function of the OSG. Petitioners failed to show proof that pleadings or
motions filed by lawyers of the government or the PCGG must first be approved by the PCGG En Banc
and by the President of the Republic. The Sandiganbayan likewise held that respondent was not required
to file a certification against forum-shopping because the motion to rescind was not an initiatory
pleading.15
With respect to the issue of fraud, it held that there was extrinsic fraud in the execution of the
Compromise Agreement. The Sandiganbayan stated:
…The values were deliberately omitted to make it appear that the Compromise Agreement
adheres to the 75%-25% ratio broadly adopted by the PCGG in compromising cases of ill-
gotten wealth. It was this 75%-25% mode of compromise, with the greater share of 75% going
to the government that misled the Court to believe, as We did believe, that the Compromise
Agreement was fair, reasonable and advantageous to the Government….
…What was projected to be a 75%-25% ratio was in reality a 00.15%-99.85% ratio, with
99.85% going to the Arganas. This is unconscionable and immoral. And since it results in a
transaction grossly disadvantageous and immoral to the government, it is against the law as
being violative of Section 3(g) of Republic Act 3019.
54
…
In the instant case, fraud of an extrinsic character exists because the representatives of
plaintiff Republic in the PCGG connived with defendants in hiding the assessed or market
values of the properties involved, so as to make it appear that the Compromise Agreement
adhered to the 75%-25% ratio adopted by the PCGG in entering into compromise of cases
involving the recovery of ill-gotten wealth. Through their infidelity, those in the PCGG who
handled or were closely involved with the case during the last days of the previous
administration fraudulently gave the Compromise Agreement a semblance of fairness and
official acceptability. They sold plaintiff Republic down the river by entering into an
agreement grossly disadvantageous to the government. For while plaintiff Republic got
00.15% (00.15074) of the estimated value of all the properties involved in this case,
defendants almost ran away with 99.85% (99.84526) of their value. This is patently unfair. It is
no compromise but a virtual sell-out. It could not have been pulled off without the
connivance or collusion of those responsible for the case in the PCGG. Instead of protecting
the interest of the government, they connived at its defeat…almost.16
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated May 9, 2000 and a Supplement to said motion
dated May 30, 2000. Petitioners also filed an Urgent Motion for Voluntary Inhibition dated May 18, 2000
praying that the members of the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan voluntarily inhibit themselves from
hearing and resolving the petitioners' pending motions.
On February 22, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued two Orders, one denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration,17and the other, denying the motion for voluntary inhibition.18
Hence, petitioners filed the present petition on April 27, 2001.
Respondent filed its Comment on October 22, 2001.
On November 12, 2001, the Court issued a Resolution giving due course to the petition and requiring the
parties to submit their respective memoranda.19
Respondent filed its Memorandum on January 29, 2002. Petitioners filed theirs on February 26, 2002. In
their respective memoranda, the parties reiterated the arguments in their earlier pleadings.
Specifically, petitioners raise the following arguments:
(A) The Sandiganbayan (Third Division) denied Petitioners their right to substantive and
procedural due process when it refused to voluntarily inhibit itself from further hearing the
instant case.
(B) The PCGG lawyers had no authority to ask for the rescission of the subject Compromise
Agreement without the consent of the PCGG En Banc and the President of the Republic of the
Philippines.
(C) The Motion to Rescind, which was treated by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) as a
Petition for Relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, is fatally defective because—

1. It was not filed by a party to the case, i.e., it was filed by counsel without the
client's authority.
2. It was filed out of time.
3. It was filed sans any supporting Affidavit of Merit.
4. It lacked the required Certification on Non-Forum Shopping.
(D) There is no factual or legal basis for the finding of fraud by the Sandiganbayan (Third
Division).
(E) Upon approval of the Compromise Agreement, the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) lost
jurisdiction over the case, including the authority to rescind said Compromise Agreement and
to set aside the judgment based thereon.
(F) The Sandiganbayan (Third Division) lacked authority to alter a contract by construction or
to make a new contract for the parties.
(G) Since the Compromise Agreement had already been implemented, rescission cannot be
availed of.20
Petitioners contend that the members of the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan should have inhibited
themselves from resolving petitioners' motion for reconsideration because from the tenor of the April
11, 2000 Order of the court granting respondent's motion to rescind, it was evident that the
Sandiganbayan had already prejudged the properties subject of litigation as having been unlawfully
acquired.21
Petitioners likewise assert that the property value of a property offered for the amicable settlement of a
case is not always material in determining the validity of a compromise agreement. They point out that
what impelled the PCGG to enter into a compromise agreement with them was PCGG's perception that
its evidence against petitioners was weak and might not be sufficient to justify maintaining the case
against them.22
In addition, petitioners insist that the Motion to Rescind which was treated by the Sandiganbayan as a
petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 is fatally defective for (i) lack of authority of respondent's
lawyers to file the same; (ii) having been filed out of time; (iii) non-submission of an Affidavit of Merit;
and (iv) non-submission of a Certification against Forum-Shopping.23
It is argued by petitioners that the Sandiganbayan should have denied respondent's Motion to Rescind
outright for having been filed without authority from the PCGG En Banc and the President of the
Republic, both of whom earlier approved and authorized the execution of the Compromise Agreement.
According to petitioners, after final judgment has been rendered in a case, an attorney has no implied
authority from his client to seek material or substantial alterations or modifications in such judgment.24
Petitioners claim that the Motion to Rescind was filed only on October 5, 1998, or beyond sixty (60) days
from the time the Sandiganbayan promulgated its July 31, 1998 Decision approving the Compromise
55
Agreement.25 In support of their petition, petitioners cite Section 3 of Rule 38 which requires that the
petition for relief be filed within sixty (60) days after the party seeking the relief learns of the judgment
or final order to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was
entered. They also invoke the case of Samonte v. Samonte26 where the Court held that a judgment upon
compromise is deemed to have come to the knowledge of the parties on the very day it is entered.27
It is further argued by petitioners that the Sandiganbayan's finding that the settlement between
petitioners and respondent was attended by fraud has no factual or legal basis. Petitioners point out that
the property values cited by respondent in its Motion to Rescind were based solely on the estimates of
the PCGG lawyers and no evidence of the valuation of the properties were presented before the
Sandiganbayan to establish fraud. They also contend that the Sandiganbayan had no legal basis for
taking judicial notice of the fact that agricultural land in rural areas such as Famy and Pangil, Laguna is
much cheaper and is usually sold by the hectare, while land in Metro Manila and in nearby municipalities
such as Muntinlupa is more valuable and sold per square meter. Petitioners insist that knowledge of the
valuation of property is not a condition sine qua non for the validity of a compromise agreement.28
Petitioners also assert that the Sandiganbayan did not have jurisdiction to annul the Compromise
Agreement because its July 31, 1998 Decision had already become final and executory. Moreover, as a
contract validly entered into by the parties, the Compromise Agreement had binding effect and authority
on the parties thereto even if it were not judicially approved.29
Petitioners likewise contend that the Sandiganbayan cannot alter the Compromise Agreement which is a
valid and binding contract between themselves and respondent and impose the additional requirement
that "the moneys, properties or assets involved in the compromise must be fully disclosed and described
not only as to the number or area (in case of real properties) but also as to their exact location,
classification, appraised and fair market value, liens and encumbrances, whether titled or not, etc., so as
to leave no room for doubt that all the parties, the Court and the public know exactly what each party is
giving or taking away, and under what specific terms and conditions."30 According to them, the
imposition of this requirement would be beyond the scope of the Sandiganbayan's authority.31
Lastly, petitioners argue that the Compromise Agreement can no longer be rescinded because it had
already been implemented. In support of this argument, petitioners claim that on September 22, 1997,
or four days after the signing of the agreement, they delivered to the PCGG the original TCTs of the
properties ceded to respondent under the agreement.32
Respondent, through the OSG, contends that the Sandiganbayan's April 11, 2000 Resolution which
granted the motion to rescind the Compromise Agreement and set aside its July 31, 1998 Decision
cannot be the proper subject of a Petition for Certiorari. According to respondent, petitioners were not
without any other remedy from the adverse ruling of the Sandiganbayan, and they should have gone to
trial and reiterated their special defenses.33
Respondent also maintains that the Sandiganbayan did not err in denying petitioners' motion for
voluntary inhibition of its members because petitioners' allegations of partiality and bias were not
supported by clear and convincing evidence.34
It is also argued by respondent that there is no rule or law requiring that pleadings or motions filed by
lawyers of the government or the PCGG must first be approved by the PCGG En Banc and by the
President of the Republic.35

Anent the alleged procedural infirmities in the filing of the Motion to Rescind, respondent asserts that it
complied with the reglementary period for the filing of a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38
and that it is not an initiatory pleading which is required to be accompanied by a Certification against
Forum-Shopping.36
Respondent disagrees with the contention of petitioners that the Sandiganbayan already lost jurisdiction
over the case when it rendered its Decision on the Compromise Agreement on July 31, 1998 considering
that the decision is immediately executory since there is no appeal from such judgment. According to
respondent, the Rules of Court does recognize the jurisdiction of the court which rendered a decision
over a petition for relief from the same decision, and does not distinguish whether the judgment is based
on the evidence presented or on a compromise agreement. Moreover, as an exception to the general
rule that the court which rendered judgment on the compromise cannot modify such compromise, the
court may order modifications thereon when the parties consent to such modification or when there is a
hearing to determine the presence or absence of vitiated consent.37
Respondent adds that the Sandiganbayan did not make a new contract for the parties but simply
declared their Compromise Agreement null and void with the net effect of continuing the case from
where it left off.38
Respondent insists that a compromise agreement which is unconscionable, shocking to the mind and
contrary to law and public policy, such as that entered into by it with petitioners, is null and void. A void
compromise agreement vests no rights and creates no obligations. Considering that the compromise
agreement sought to be declared void in this case is one which is prejudicial to the government, it is the
Court's duty to strike it down as null and void.39
It is argued by respondent that while it did not present additional evidence after it filed the Motion to
Rescind, it submitted the motion on the basis of all the verified pleadings and papers on record.
Respondent likewise claims that the Sandiganbayan did not err in taking judicial notice of the fact that
agricultural lands in the provinces, such as the lands titled in petitioners' names in Famy and Pangil,
Laguna, are much cheaper than lands in urban areas such as those in Muntinlupa City. Respondent insists
that such fact is a matter of public knowledge and may be taken judicial notice of under Section 1, Rule
129 of the Revised Rules of Court.40
Respondent also points out that petitioners expressly admitted in their Answer to the Motion to Rescind
that the value of the properties which they ceded to respondent under the Compromise Agreement is
less than the value of the properties retained by them.41
Respondent claims that there was fraud of an extrinsic character because its representatives in the PCGG
connived with petitioners in concealing the assessed or market values of the properties subject of the
Compromise Agreement to make it appear that the latter adhered to the 75%-25% ratio adopted by the
PCGG in entering into compromise of cases involving the recovery of ill-gotten wealth. It is pointed out
by respondent that the OSG was in fact initially reluctant to file the motion for approval of the
compromise agreement with the Sandiganbayan because the Compromise Agreement only mentioned
the areas of the properties but conspicuously failed to mention the property values thereof. Respondent
explained:
On October 7, 1997, the PCGG forwarded to the OSG a copy of the Compromise Agreement
between the Republic and the Arganas in SB Civil Case No. 0026, with a request that the OSG
file a motion with the Sandiganbayan for the approval of the said Compromise Agreement.
56
On November 7, 1997, in reply to the letter of PCGG, the OSG with then Solicitor General
Silvestre H. Bello III as signatory, wrote the PCGG requesting it to submit to the OSG
clarification on the provision in the compromise agreement that the properties mentioned
therein comprise all the sequestered assets subject of the litigation considering that in the
petition filed by the Republic, it is alleged that the late mayor Argana acquired no less than
251 OCTs/TCTs in Muntinlupa and the neighboring towns plus some other ill-gotten
properties. The OSG likewise opined that the Compromise Agreement must first be submitted
to the President for his approval before submitting it to the Sandiganbayan.
On February 10, 1998, the OSG received a reply from the PCGG, through Commissioner
Herminio Mendoza, reiterating that the PCGG has decided to enter into the compromise
agreement because it believes that the evidence may not be sufficient to warrant continuing
prosecution of Civil Case No. 0026 against the Arganas.
With respect to OSG's request for clarification, the PCGG furnished the OSG a copy of the
report conducted by the PCGG Research and Development Department whereby it is stated
that there are 324 OCTs/TCTs evaluated representing real properties of the late Mayor
Argana with a total land area of 481.77422 hectares out of which the Republic will get
361.9203 hectares or 75.12% of the total land area under the Compromise Agreement. No
mention, however, was made as to the value of the properties to be ceded to the Republic
and the properties to be retained by the Arganas.
On March 2, 1998, the OSG, through then Solicitor General Romeo C. dela Cruz, again wrote
the PCGG reiterating its previous position that before submitting the compromise agreement
to the Sandiganbayan for approval, it must first be submitted to the President of the
Philippines for his approval as required in par. 6 of the Compromise Agreement. The OSG also
reiterated its request for clarification regarding the properties covered by the compromise
agreement as the Report submitted to it made mention of 361.9203 hectares or 75.12% out
of the total land area of 481.71422 hectares to be ceded to the Republic, and 24.88% to be
retained by the Arganas, no mention whatsoever was made of the kind of land, location and
value of the respective areas.
On June 2, 1998, the OSG received a letter dated May 29,1998 from then Commissioner
Herminio A. Mendoza forwarding it copy of the approval by then President Fidel Ramos of the
Compromise Agreement. With respect to its query, it was stated therein that the PCGG is
unable to determine the value of the land to be ceded to the Republic and those to be
retained by the Arganas because of the big number of the parcels of the land located mainly
in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila and Laguna and/or the lack of available records showing their
respective values for tax purposes. The PCGG reiterated their request that the OSG file with
the Sandiganbayan in SB Civil Case No. 0026 a motion for the approval of the compromise
agreement.
Obviously, through such a scheme, those in the PCGG then who handled or were involved
with the case fraudulently gave the Compromise Agreement a semblance of fairness and
official acceptability, but in truth, it was grossly disadvantageous to the government. The
motion to approve compromise agreement was filed by the OSG out of courtesy as the PCGG
was able to get the approval of then Pres. Fidel V. Ramos but not because it (OSG) totally
approved the same after an independent evaluation of the report. 42 (Emphasis in the
original.)

Finally, respondent argues that the Compromise Agreement had not yet been implemented. Although
petitioners delivered the TCTs covering the lots ceded to respondent under the terms of the compromise
on September 22, 1997, such delivery could not have the effect of implementation of the Compromise
Agreement because the contract was submitted to the Sandiganbayan for approval only on June 15,
1998. The Compromise Agreement expressly required that in order for it to be effective, it must be
approved by the President of the Republic and of the Sandiganbayan.43
The issues for the Court's resolution are as follows:
1) Whether a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy;
2) Whether the OSG and the PCGG lawyers have authority to file the Motion to Rescind on
behalf of respondent;
3) Whether the Motion to Rescind, which was treated by the Sandiganbayan as a petition for
relief, complied with the requirements of Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure;
4) Whether the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the Motion to
Rescind and in setting aside its Decision dated July 31, 1998; and
5) Whether the members of the Sandiganbayan's Third Division should have inhibited
themselves from resolving petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
The Court shall first tackle the first, second, third and fifth issues since these involve
procedural matters.
The Court does not agree with respondent's contention that a petition for certiorari is not the proper
remedy to assail the February 22, 2001 Order of the Sandiganbayan which affirmed its earlier directive to
set the case against petitioners for pre-trial following the annulment of its judgment by compromise
agreement. A special civil action for certiorari may be instituted when any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.44 The Court has previously held that an order
setting the case for further proceedings, issued after the original judgment rendered pursuant to a
compromise agreement is set aside, is an interlocutory order and is therefore not appealable.45 Since no
appeal is available against such an order, the proper remedy to assail it is a special civil action for
certiorari. The remedy taken by petitioners is therefore proper.
Petitioners' contention that the Motion to Rescind filed by the lawyers of the PCGG and of the OSG
should have been treated by the Sandiganbayan as a mere scrap of paper because the motion was filed
without the authority of the PCGG En Banc and of the President of the Republic has no legal basis. There
is no requirement under the law that pleadings and motions filed by lawyers of the government or the
PCGG must first be approved by the PCGG En Banc and by the President of the Philippines. More
importantly, R.A. No. 1379 expressly authorizes the OSG to prosecute cases of forfeiture of property
unlawfully acquired by any public officer or employee.46 It must be remembered that it was the OSG
which filed Civil Case No. 0026 for the forfeiture of petitioners' allegedly ill-gotten wealth, and that the
Compromise Agreement between petitioners and respondent was an amicable settlement of that case.
By filing an action for rescission of the Compromise Agreement based on extrinsic fraud, the OSG was
57
merely performing its legal duty to recover the wealth purportedly amassed unlawfully by the late Mayor
Argana during his terms as Mayor of Muntinlupa. The Motion to Rescind was filed precisely because the
PCGG, as respondent's authorized representative in the compromise, discovered that the execution of
the Compromise Agreement was attended by fraud and sought the help of the OSG which in turn is the
duly authorized government agency to represent respondent in forfeiture cases under R.A. No. 1379.
Hence, the Sandiganbayan correctly upheld the authority of the OSG, assisted by the PCGG, in filing the
Motion to Rescind.
The Court also finds that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan in
granting the Motion to Rescind, which it treated as a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of
the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. Section 3 thereof prescribes the periods within which the petition for
relief must be filed:
Time for filing petition; contents and verification.– A petition provided for in either of the
preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the
petitioner learns of the judgment, final order or other proceeding to be set aside, and not
more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding
was taken, and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and
substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.
The Court has previously held that as applied to a judgment based on compromise, both the sixty (60)-
day and six (6)-month reglementary periods within which to file a petition for relief should be reckoned
from the date when the decision approving the compromise agreement was rendered because such
judgment is considered immediately executory and entered on the date that it was approved by the
court.47
Applying the foregoing rule to the present case, the sixty (60)-day period should be counted from July 31,
1998, the date of the Sandiganbayan Decision granting the Motion to Approve Compromise Agreement.
The sixtieth day from July 31, 1998 is September 29, 1998. The Motion to Rescind was filed by the OSG
only on October 5, 1998, clearly several days after the sixtieth day from the rendition of the July 31, 1998
Decision.
This notwithstanding, the Court finds that no grave abuse can be ascribed to the Sandiganbayan in
admitting the Motion to Rescind as a petition for relief was timely filed.
Although as a general rule, the party filing a petition for relief must strictly comply with the sixty (60)-day
and six (6)-month reglementary periods under Section 3, Rule 38,48 it is not without exceptions. The
Court relaxed the rule in several cases49 and held that the filing of a petition for relief beyond the sixty
60-day period is not fatal so long as it is filed within the six (6)-month period from entry of judgment.50
The Court notes that the filing of the Motion to Rescind on October 5, 1998 was indeed seven days
beyond the sixty 60-day period but still well within the six (6)-month period from entry of judgment.
Moreover, the case involves an alleged fraud committed against the Republic, and thus justifies the
liberal interpretation of procedural laws by the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners' claim that respondent failed to attach an affidavit of merit to its Motion to Rescind is belied
by the record of the case. Petitioners in fact attached, as Annex "N" of their Petition for Certiorari, a copy
of the respondent's Motion to Rescind. The Affidavit of Merit signed by Dennis M. Taningco, the counsel
 58

of the PCGG in Civil Case No. 0026, was attached to the Motion to Rescind. In any case, the Court in
Mago v. Court of Appeals51 held that the absence of an affidavit of merit does not always result in the
denial of the petition for relief, so long as the facts required to be set out in the affidavit appear in the
verified petition. The oath which forms part of the petition elevates it to the same category as an
affidavit.52
Neither was it necessary for respondent to attach a Certification against Forum-Shopping to the Motion
to Rescind. As correctly held by the Sandiganbayan, the Motion to Rescind, which in effect was a petition
for relief, is not an initiatory pleading which requires the inclusion of a Certification against Forum-
Shopping. Section 2, Rule 38 requires that a petition for relief must be filed with the court which
rendered the judgment or order sought to be set aside, and in the same case wherein the judgment or
order was rendered. If the court finds that the allegations in the petition for relief are true, it shall set
aside the judgment and try the principal case upon the merits as if a timely motion for new trial had
been granted.53 Clearly, then, a petition for relief is not an initiatory pleading in a new case which would
require the filing by the petitioner therein of a Certification of Non- Forum Shopping.
Noticeable from the documents submitted to the court after the decision approving the
Compromise Agreement was promulgated is the fact that only the percentage of sharing
based on area was mentioned and brought to the attention of the PCGG en banc and the
Solicitor General. The value of the properties was never, and not even once, mentioned. Thus,
in the Memorandum of Director Mauro J. Estrada of the PCGG Research and Development
Department to the PCGG Chairman, dated August 18, 1997, the following exposition appears:
"12. On July 10, 1996, the Arganas submitted a proposal for Compromise Agreement (copy
attached, per Annex "J") that would cede by donation about 231 hectares of agricultural lands
to the government, Xerox copies of nine (9) TCTs attached therewith, enumerated as follows:
"TCT No. Area in Square Meters Location
T-3813 47,908 Famy, Laguna

The Court also finds no abuse of discretion by the Sandiganbayan in denying petitioners' Urgent Motion T-8314 47,461 -do-
for Voluntary Inhibition. As explained in Gutang v. Court of Appeals,54 the import of the rule on voluntary
inhibition is that the decision of a judge on whether or not to inhibit is left to his or her sound discretion T-8315 30,000 -do-
and conscience, based on his or her rational and logical assessment of the case where the motion for
inhibition is filed. It implies that in addition to pecuniary interest, relationship, or previous participation T-8316 40,000 -do-
in the matter under litigation—which are grounds for mandatory inhibition under the first paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court—there might be other causes that could diminish the T-8317 30,000 -do-
objectivity of the judge, thus warranting his or her inhibition. Petitioners' claim of bias and partiality on
the part of the Sandiganbayan justices who issued the April 11, 2000 Resolution, evaluated in light of the
T-4104 20,000 -do-
resolution itself, is evidently more imagined than real. To say, as is petitioners' wont, that a judge who
throws out a party's motion in the language employed by the Sandiganbayan in the questioned
Resolution is necessarily prejudiced, is to be indiscriminate and precipitate. T-4106 38,550 -do-

T-4108 31,618 -do-

Petitioners' assertion that the April 11, 2000 Resolution was harshly worded and evinced prejudgment of
the case in respondent's favor is easily disproved by a reading of the Resolution in its entirety. As will be
T-4044 1,137,361 San Isidro & Banilan,
discussed hereafter, the Sandiganbayan's pronouncement that the Compromise Agreement was grossly
883,355 Pangil, Laguna
disadvantageous and prejudicial to the government is supported by the facts on record. In charging the
Sandiganbayan with forejudgment when it said that "all it takes to prove the case is evidence that the
properties are manifestly out of proportion to the late Mayor Maximino A. Argana's salary and to his 2,306,253 Sq. Meters
other lawful income and other legitimately acquired income,"55petitioners have taken the statement out 230,6253 Hectares
of context. The Sandiganbayan made the statement in relation to its bewilderment as to why the PCGG
expressed difficulty in prosecuting the case against the late Mayor Argana in spite of the presumption
regarding unexplained wealth in Section 8 of R.A. No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). "Another big tract of land located at Matikiw, Pangil, Laguna, consisting of 131,2950 hectares
The Sandiganbayan therefore had legal and factual grounds to deny petitioners' motion for inhibition. covered by TCT No. T-4009, per Annex "K" may be considered for inclusion in the proposed
compromise settlement. The reason for this is that this land is being eyed by the DAR for
distribution under the CARP. As a whole, the government may be able to acquire about
Anent the propriety of the Sandiganbayan's nullification of the Compromise Agreement on the ground of 361.9203 hectares of land equivalent to 75.12% of the 481.7742 hectares of land of
extrinsic fraud, the Court holds that no error nor grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed to the sequestered real estate property belonging to the Arganas and other owners.
Sandiganbayan for ruling that the execution of the Compromise Agreement was tainted with fraud on
the part of petitioners and in connivance with some PCGG officials. A circumspect review of the record of
the case reveals that fraud, indeed, was perpetuated upon respondent in the execution of the "However, of the 481.7742 hectares covered by a sequestration order, the late Mayor Argana
Compromise Agreement, the assessed or market values of the properties offered for settlement having owns about 409.50817 hectares and possibly the heirs are willing to cede 361.9203 hectares
been concealed from the reviewing authorities such as the PCGG En Banc and even the President of the which is equivalent to 88.38%, retaining 47.5887 hectares or 11.62% of what they owned.
Republic. The discussion of the Sandiganbayan on the nature and extent of the fraud perpetuated upon
respondent in the execution of the Compromise Agreement is clear and convincing: "E. EVALUATION
 59

"1) As presented in Annex "L", page 13, the total area of real estate property sequestered "However, since the late Mayor Argana owns 409.50817 hectares sequestered and may
aggregated to 481.7742 hectares accounted as follows: possibly cede 361.9203 hectares, the percentage share of the government would be 88.38%
of the 409.50817 hectares actually registered in his name and his children.
Total Area Sequestered 100.00% 481.77422
Accounted as Follows: "G. RECOMMENDATION
a) owned by Mayor Maximino Argana 75.12% 409.50817 has.
b) Owned by his Brothers & Sisters 9.88% 26.6318 has. "The PCGG wanted to recover as much as it could and as fast as possible, while the Arganas
wanted to buy peace without admitting guilt. In order to avoid further lengthy litigation and
c) Foreclosed by Los Baños Rural Bank 1.24% 5.9856 has. to put an end to an almost ten-year unresolved sequestration issue, and to expedite recovery
d) Owned by Other Persons 8.23% 39.64865 has. so that the remaining assets may be used to contribute to the national recovery, the
TOTAL 100.00% 481.77422 has. 230.6253 hectares of land covered by nine (9) TCTs (Nos. T-3813, T-3814, T-3815, T-3816, T-
3817, T-4104, T-4106, T-4108 and T-4044) offered by the Arganas be favorably considered, on
condition that another real estate property covered by TCT No. T-4009, located at Matikiw,
"2) Out of the total area of 481.77422 hectares covered by a sequestration order, about Pangil, Laguna, consisting of 131.2950 hectares, be included and to be ceded to the
409.50817 hectares are owned by the late Mayor Argana. The other lots are owned by his government. All other lots sequestered should be freed from the sequestration order.
brothers and sisters (26.6318 hectares), foreclosed by Los Baños Rural Bank (5.9856
hectares), and registered and/or acquired by other persons (39.64865 hectares). In the event
that the other big area consisting of 131.2950 hectares of land is included in the compromise "As a whole, the government stands to acquire about 361.9203 hectares out of the 409.50817
settlement in favor of the government, a total of 361-50817 (sic) hectares of land would hectares registered in the name of Sps. Maximino A. Argana, REFEDOR, and their children,
comprise about 88.38 % of the 409.50817 hectares registered in the name of the late Mayor equivalent to 88.38%. The remaining 11.62% or 47.58787 hectares will be retained by the
Argana. latter.

3) However, as a whole the 361.9203 hectares to be ceded to the government is equivalent to "For the consideration of the Commission.
75.12% of the 481.77422 hectares sequestered by PCGG as presented above. Since the late
mayor owns 409.50817 hectares to the government, the percentage share of the government
would be 88.38 % and the remaining 11.62 % may be retained by the heirs of the late Mayor Signed
Argana, equivalent to 47.58787 hectares.
MAURO J. ESTRADA"
"F. SUMMARY (Record, v. 6, pp. 776-78)
(Underlining supplied)

"The family of the late Mayor Maximino A. Argana offered to cede to the government a total
of 230.62553 hectares of land covered by nine (9) TCTs. Another property, however, The value of the properties must have been raised or even discussed during the several years
consisting of 131.2950 hectares may be considered for inclusion which would increase to that the properties were held under sequestration. Yet, not even the PCGG bothered to
361.9203 hectares of land that may be ceded to the government. produce any tax declaration, assessment or appraisal to show the assessed or fair market
value of the properties. . . . .
"In the event that the 361.9203 hectares are finally considered and acceptable by both
parties, the PCGG and the Arganas, the 481.77422 hectares of sequestered property would be Again in another Memorandum of Director Mauro J. Estrada to PCGG Counsel Edgardo L.
accounted as follows: Kilayko, dated February 2, 1988, the properties were listed according to the name of the
owner, certificate of title, area in square meters, location and percentages in relation to the
Total Area Sequestered 100.00% 481.77422 has. whole. Obvious from the listing is the absence of a column to indicate the value of the
properties or their classification. . . .
Accounted as follows:
a) To be ceded the Government 75.12% 361.9203 has.
The percentage based solely on area, was clearly emphasized, as shown by the following
b) To be retained by the late Mayor Argana's Heirs 9.88% 47.78787 has.
portions of said Memorandum:
c) Owned by his Brothers & Sisters 5.53% 26.6318 has.
d) Foreclosed by Los Baños Rural Bank 1.24% 5.9856 has.
"Out of the 409.50817 hectares registered in the name of Spouses Maximo A. Argana and
e) Owned by Other Persons 8.23% 39.64865 has. Donata A. Argana as presented above, 361.9203 hectares covering eleven (11) TCTs are to be
Total 100.00% 481.77422 has. ceded to the government under the compromise agreement signed by Argana and the
Commission in the latter part of 1997. The 361.9203 hectares to be ceded to the government
 60

is equivalent to 75.12 % of the total area of 481.77422 hectares, as presented below: x x x"
(Record, v. 6, p. 1739) (underlining supplied)
"As a whole, there are 324 TCTs/OCTs covering a total area of 481.77422 hectares, out of
which the heirs of the late Mayor agreed to cede 361.9203 hectares equivalent to 75.12 % of
the total area. Sometime. In August 1997, the Commission agreed to accept the offer by
concluding a compromise agreement with the heirs of the late Mayor." (Record, v. 6, p. 1739)
(underlining supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Resolution dated April 11, 2000 of the
Sandiganbayan granting the Motion to Rescind Compromise Agreement and to Set Aside Judgment by
Compromise and setting the case for pre-trial, as well as the Order dated February 22, 2001 denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration, are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

. . . The values were deliberately omitted to make it appear that the Compromise Agreement
adheres to the 75%-25% ratio broadly adopted by the PCGG in compromising cases of ill-
gotten wealth. It was this 75%-25% mode of compromise, with the greater share of 75% going
to the government that misled the Court to believe, as We did believe, that the Compromise
Agreement was fair, reasonable and advantageous to the Government. . . .

. . . What was projected to be a 75%-25% ratio was in reality a 00.15%-99.85% ratio, with
99.85% going to the Arganas. This is unconscionable and immoral. And since it results in a
transaction grossly disadvantageous and immoral to the government, it is against the law as
being violative of Section 3(g) of Republic Act 3019.

In the instant case, fraud of an extrinsic character exists because the representatives of
plaintiff Republic in the PCGG connived with defendants in hiding the assessed or market
values of the properties involved, so as to make it appear that the Compromise Agreement
adhered to the 75%-25% ratio adopted by the PCGG in entering into compromise of cases
involving the recovery of ill-gotten wealth. Through their infidelity, those in the PCGG who
handled or were closely involved with the case during the last days of the previous
administration fraudulently gave the Compromise Agreement a semblance of fairness and
official acceptability. They sold plaintiff Republic down the river by entering into an
agreement grossly disadvantageous to the government. For while plaintiff Republic got
00.15% (00.15074) of the estimated value of all the properties involved in this case,
defendants almost ran away with 99.85% (99.84526) of their value. This is patently unfair. It is
no compromise but a virtual sell-out. It could not have been pulled off without the
connivance or collusion of those responsible for the case in the PCGG. Instead of protecting
the interest of the government, they connived at its defeat…almost.56 (Emphasis in the
original.)

It is evident from the foregoing that the ruling of the Sandiganbayan is grounded on facts and on the law.
The Court sees no reason to depart from the conclusions drawn by the Sandiganbayan on the basis of its
findings, especially considering that the three justices comprising the Sandiganbayan's Third Division
conducted a thorough examination of the documents submitted by the parties to this case, heard the
testimonies of the parties' witnesses and observed their deportment during the hearing on the Motion
to Rescind.

Moreover, it is an established rule that the State cannot be estopped by the mistakes of its
agents.57 Respondent cannot be bound by a manifestly unjust compromise agreement reviewed on its
behalf and entered into by its representatives from the PCGG who apparently were not looking after
respondent's best interests.
 61

H. TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS Transmittal14 dated August 23, 2000 which contained an explicit directive from the Court for the SB to
submit proof of execution within fifteen (15) days from receipt. As such, the SB immediately set the case
for this purpose.
EN BANC
On February 26, 2001, Labrador’s counsel de oficio, Atty. Vicente Espina, manifested in open court that
G.R. No. 199114 July 16, 2013 Labrador desires to apply for probation in accordance with Presidential Decree No. (PD) 968,15 as
amended by PD 199016(Probation Law). Thus, in an Order17 of even date, the SB resolved to accord
Labrador a period of fifteen (15) days within which to file such application, and, in the meantime,
ROSALINDA DIMAPILIS-BALDOZ, IN HER CAPACITY AS THEN ADMINISTRATOR OF THE PHILIPPINE suspended the execution proceedings.
OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA), PETITIONER,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REPRESENTED BY CHAIRMAN REYNALDO A. VILLAR AND COMMISSIONER Eventually, upon favorable recommendation of the Parole and Probation Office, the SB, in a
JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR., RESPONDENT. Resolution18 dated September 28, 2001, granted Labrador’s application for probation and likewise
cancelled the bail bond he posted for his provisional liberty.19
DECISION
Thereafter, at the end of Labrador’s probation period, a Probation Officer’s Final Report20 dated
November 4, 2003 was issued, recommending that his probation be terminated and that he be
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: discharged from its legal effects. The SB, however, withheld its approval and, instead, issued a
Resolution21 dated March 2, 2004 (March 2, 2004 Resolution), stating that Labrador’s application for
Assailed in this petition for certiorari1 is respondent Commission on Audit’s (COA) Decision No. 2009- probation was, in fact, erroneously granted due to his previous appeal from his judgment of conviction,
1212 dated October 29, 2009 which affirmed Notice of Disallowance No. 2006-0023 dated January 18, in violation of Section 4 of the Probation Law.22 Further, owing to the probation officer’s finding that
2006, directing petitioner Rosalinda Dimapilis-Baldoz (Dimapilis-Baldoz), in her capacity as then Labrador continued to hold the position of POEA ESRD Chief despite him having been sentenced to suffer
Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), to refund the government the penalty of temporary special disqualification from office, the SB directed that copies of the March 2,
the amount of ₱1,740,124.08 which represents the salaries and benefits unduly received by Leonel P. 2004 Resolution be furnished to Dimapilis-Baldoz, as POEA Administrator, as well as to the CSC Chairman
Labrador (Labrador) despite his adjudged dismissal from service. for their information.23

The Facts On March 9, 2004, Dimapilis-Baldoz received a copy of the said resolution and thereupon issued a
Notice/Order of Separation24 dated March 11, 2004 (Separation Order), relieving Labrador of his duties,
viz:
Labrador was the former Chief of the POEA’s Employment Services Regulation Division (ESRD). On May 2,
1997, then Labor Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing (Quisumbing) ordered his dismissal from service as
he was found to have bribed a certain Madoline Villapando, an overseas Filipino worker, in the amount NOTICE/ORDER OF SEPARATION
of ₱6,200.00 in order to expedite the issuance of her overseas employment certificate.4 Labrador’s
dismissal was affirmed on appeal by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) through CSC Resolution No. 03- TO : MR. LEONEL P. LABRADOR
0339 dated March 12, 2003,5 and his subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied through CSC
No. 8 Luciano Street
Resolution No. 040547 dated May 17, 2004.6 Phase 5, Bahayang Pag-asa Subdivision
Molino, Bacoor
Aside from the foregoing administrative proceedings, a criminal case for direct bribery was instituted 4102 Cavite
against Labrador in view of the same infraction. Consequently, on August 31, 1999, the Sandiganbayan
(SB) promulgated a Decision,7 convicting him of the aforementioned crime and thereby sentenced him Anent Notice of Resolution dated 02 March 2004 Re: Criminal Case No. 19863 issued by the
to: (a) suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years Sandiganbayan Fourth Division, Quezon City, resolving the finality and execution of the Court’s August
of prision correccional, as maximum; (b) pay a fine of ₱3,000.00; (c) suffer the penalty of temporary
31, 1999 decision carrying among other penalties temporary special disqualification from office, please
special disqualification from public office; and (d) pay costs.8 Labrador’s motion for reconsideration was be informed that effective today, you are hereby considered dropped from the rolls and separated from
denied in a Resolution dated November 17, 1999,9 prompting him to elevate the matter to the Court.10 the service.

In a Resolution dated January 26, 200011 (January 26, 2000 Resolution), the Court affirmed Labrador’s As such, you are further instructed to turn over your duties and responsibilities and clear yourself of all
conviction and subsequently denied his motion for reconsideration with finality on March 15, property and money accountabilities with this Office.
2000.12 Likewise, in a Resolution dated June 28, 2000,13 the Court denied Labrador’s motion for leave to
file a second motion for reconsideration with motion for new trial and prayer for referral to the Court En
Banc, resulting in the January 26, 2000 Resolution’s entry of judgment. On October 26, 2000, the SB For strict compliance.
received copies of the same resolution and its corresponding entry of judgment through a Letter of

Mandaluyong City, 11 March 2004.
Sgd. ROSALINDA DIMAPILIS-BALDOZ
Administrator
Incidents Before the COA
Almost a year later, or on February 7, 2005, COA State Auditor IV, Crescencia L. Escurel, issued Audit
Observation Memorandum No. 2005-01125 dated February 7, 2005 (COA Audit Memo) which contained
her audit observations on the various expenditures of the POEA pertaining to the payment of salaries
and benefits to Labrador for the period covering August 31, 1999 to March 15, 2004. The pertinent
portions of the COA Audit Memo read as follows:26
The accounts Government Equity and Salaries and Wages-Regular, Additional Compensation,
Representation and Transportation Allowances and Other Personnel Benefits are overstated by
₱1,626,956.05, ₱57,143.03, ₱3,000.00, ₱16,050.00 and ₱11,800.00, respectively due to payment of
salaries and wages, additional compensation, allowances and other benefits to an official from August
31, 1999 to March 15, 2004, contrary to the Sandiganbayan Decision dated August 31, 1999.
In view thereof, justification is desired why Mr. Leonel Labrador, formerly Chief General Services Division
and Employment Services Regulation Division was allowed to continue in the service and receive his
salaries, additional compensation, RATA and other personnel benefits from August 31, 1999 to the time
he was terminated from office effective March 9, 2004 (Note: The last salary received was even up to
March 15, 2004) in the total amount of ₱1,714,949.08, including other emoluments such as allowances,
13th month pay and other personnel benefits granted him such as medical and rice allowances, incentive
allowances, etc. in the amount of ₱565,795.05. Pursuant to the August 31, 1999 judgment of conviction,
which had long become final and executory, Mr. Labrador is considered terminated from the service and
is no longer entitled to continue to draw his salaries thereafter up to March 15, 2004. x x x
Corollary to this, Book V Title I Subtitle B Chapter 9, Sec. 52, EO 292 and Sec. 103 PD 1445 provides that
expenditures of government funds or uses of government property in violation of law or regulations shall
be a personal liability of the official or employee found to be directly responsible therefore.
(Underscoring and italics in the original)
Based on these observations, the COA issued a Notice of Disallowance27 (Notice of Disallowance) on
January 18, 2006, finding Dimapilis-Baldoz, among other POEA employees,28 personally liable for the
salaries and other benefits unduly received by Labrador in the amount of ₱1,740,124.08, paid through
various checks issued from August 1999 to March 15, 2004.
Through a letter29dated March 3, 2006, Dimapilis-Baldoz sought the reconsideration of the Notice of
Disallowance, asserting that the POEA should not be held liable for the refund of the foregoing amount
since Labrador's employment was fully and promptly terminated upon receipt of the SB’s March 2, 2004
Resolution.
However, on October 29, 2009, the COA issued Decision No. 2009-12130 (COA Decision) which affirmed
the Notice of Disallowance and reiterated that the amount covering the salaries and benefits of Labrador
should not have been paid to him from August 1999 to March 31, 2004 pending final resolution of the
criminal case against him. The COA pointed out that Labrador should not have reported for work while
62
he was under probation since his probation did not obliterate the crime for which he was convicted,
more so his penalty of dismissal from the service.31
On January 26, 2010, the POEA moved for the reconsideration32 (POEA’s Motion for Reconsideration) of
the COA Decision. On even date, POEA Administrator Jennifer Jardin-Manalili (Jardin-Manalili), who took
over the post of Dimapilis-Baldoz, wrote a letter to Audit Team Leader Evelyn V. Menciano, requesting
that the execution of the COA Decision be held in abeyance pending resolution of the POEA’s Motion for
Reconsideration.33 In a letter34 dated May 31, 2000, the COA, however, no longer entertained the said
motion in view of the issuance by the COA Secretary of a Notice of Finality of Decision35 dated January 7,
2010, stating that the COA Decision had already become final and executory since no motion for
reconsideration or appeal was filed within the reglementary period.36
Undaunted, Jardin-Manalili, through a letter37 dated June 21, 2010, again implored the COA to resolve
POEA’s Motion for Reconsideration on its merits and not to deny it outright on a technicality. Yet, the
COA no longer responded to the said plea, prompting Dimapilis-Baldoz to file this petition for certiorari.
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not grave abuse of discretion attended the
COA’s disallowance in this case.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious
A. Grave abuse of discretion; reckoning
point of period of disallowance.
It is fundamental that the COA has the authority to rule on the legality of the disbursement of
government funds. This finds force in Section 2, Article IX-D of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
(Constitution) which explicitly provides that:
D. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Section 2.
The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all
accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property,
owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and on
a post- audit basis:
a. constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy
under this Constitution;
b. autonomous state colleges and universities;

c. other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and
d. such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or
through the Government, which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to
such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. x x x
The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the
scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and
promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures or uses
of government funds and properties.
Section 11, Chapter 4, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
"Administrative Code of 1987" (Administrative Code), echoes this constitutional mandate, to wit:
SEC. 11. General Jurisdiction. – (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to
examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or
uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that
have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and
universities; (c) other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such
non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the
Government, which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition
of subsidy or equity. x x x
(2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the
scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and
promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses
of government funds and properties.
In view of the foregoing, it has been pronounced that the COA’s exercise of its general audit power is
among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check and balance system inherent in our
form of government. Furthermore, it has also been declared that the COA is endowed with enough
latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or
unconscionable expenditures of government funds.38
Pursuant to its mandate, the COA disallowed the disbursements pertaining to the personnel benefits
paid to Labrador, reasoning that the latter should have stopped reporting for work as early as June 28,
2000 when the denial of his appeal from the SB’s August 31, 1999 Decision rendered his conviction for
the crime of direct bribery final and executory, notwithstanding the grant of his application for
probation. In this regard, it opines that the period of disallowance should be reckoned from May 3, 2000
which is the date the SB’s August 31, 1999 Decision had become final and executory.39
While Dimapilis-Baldoz takes no exception to the COA’s authority to disallow any illegal disbursements,
she argues that its disallowance of the subject amounts pertaining to Labrador’s salaries and benefits
should have been reckoned only from March 2, 2004, which is the time the SB set aside its initial
resolution granting Labrador’s application for probation and directing the latter to finally serve the
63
penalties imposed against him, more significantly, his temporary special disqualification from public
office.
The Court holds that neither of these positions adopts a proper perspective toward the attendant facts
of the case.
Significant to the determination of the appropriate period of the disallowance is the undisputed fact
that, pursuant to an order issued by then Labor Secretary Quisumbing, Labrador had already been made
to suffer the administrative penalty of dismissal from service on May 2, 1997, which was long before the
SB convicted him of direct bribery on August 31, 1999. As a matter of law, a department secretary’s
decision confirming the removal of an officer under his authority is immediately executory, even pending
further remedy by the dismissed public officer.40 On this score, Section 47(2), Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title
I, Book V of the Administrative Code, as amended,41 expressly provides:
(2) The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall
have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and
employees under their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is
suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days' salary. In case
the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the same may be
initially appealed to the department and finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same shall
be executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after
confirmation by the Secretary concerned. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In Bangalisan v. CA,42 the Court upheld the immediate execution of the Education Secretary’s decision
dismissing or suspending a band of striking public school teachers pursuant to the above-cited provision
(Section 472):
As to the immediate execution of the decision of the Secretary against petitioners, the same is
authorized by Section 47, paragraph (2), of Executive Oder No. 292, thus: "The Secretaries and heads of
agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate
and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction.
Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or
fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days' salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office
head is appealable to the Commission, the same shall be executory except when the penalty is removal,
in which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned."43
Likewise, in the subsequent cases of De la Cruz v. CA44 and Hon. Gloria v. CA,45 the Court similarly
affirmed the import of Section 47(2) on the immediate effect of administrative sanctions upon final
order by the department secretary or head of agency.
Hence, based on these authorities, then Labor Secretary Quisumbing’s order of dismissal in this case
should have also been executed immediately upon its issuance on May 2, 1997. In this accord, Labrador
should not have been allowed to report for work from such date, much less receive any salary or benefit
accruing from his previous post.
At this juncture, it is well to note that neither the grant nor subsequent revocation of Labrador’s
probation should hold any relevance to his disqualification from office.
 64

As correctly argued by the COA, the grant of probation does not justify a public employee’s retention in
the government service. This was settled in the case of the Office of the Court Administrator v.
Librado46 wherein the Court declared:
x x x While indeed the purpose of the Probation Law (P.D. No. 968, as amended) is to save valuable
human material, it must not be forgotten that unlike pardon probation does not obliterate the crime
[for] which the person under probation has been convicted. The reform and rehabilitation of the
probationer cannot justify his retention in the government service. He may seek to re-enter government
service, but only after he has shown that he is fit to serve once again. It cannot be repeated too often
that a public office is a public trust, which demands of those in its service the highest degree of morality.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, irrespective of the incidents concerning Labrador’s probation, the concomitant effects of his
conviction, more significantly, his disqualification to hold public office, were already left for him to suffer
at the time the SB’s August 31, 1999 Decision became final and executory on May 3, 2000 which is the
same date the COA posits as the reckoning point of its period of disallowance. However, as earlier
discussed, the proper reckoning point for the said disallowance should be pegged at May 2, 1997, since
Labrador had already been dismissed from the service at such time and hence, had already been
disqualified from receiving any salary or benefit attendant to his post. In this light, the Court finds no
reason to engage in a discussion on the date the SB’s August 31, 1999 Decision had actually become final
and executory. It is key, however, to ascertain how the fact of Labrador’s May 2, 1997 dismissal figures
into the finding of grave abuse of discretion in this case.
An equally compelling incident relevant to the finding of grave abuse of discretion in this case is the
adjudged personal liability of Dimapilis-Baldoz, among other POEA personnel.
Essentially, Dimapilis-Baldoz tries to exculpate herself from the foregoing by arguing that she and her
office were not officially notified of the orders, resolutions, and decisions of the SB or that of the Court,
affirming Labrador’s conviction of the crime of direct bribery, and even the notices on the subsequent
actions and proceedings undertaken by the SB.51 In fact, In her letter for reconsideration addressed to
the COA’s Legal and Adjudication Office,52 Dimapilis-Baldoz alleged that Labrador’s 201 file is bereft of
any records regarding the SB case. While admitting that Labrador did indeed continue to report for work
despite the SB’s August 31, 1999 Decision convicting him of direct bribery, these antecedents show that
she merely acted in good faith and lawfully exercised her duties when she approved the payment of
Labrador’s salaries, wages, and other personnel benefits for the period beginning August 31, 1999 to
March 2, 2004.53
The Court finds the defense to be well-taken.
It is a standing rule that every public official is entitled to the presumption of good faith in the discharge
of official duties,54 such that, in the absence of any proof that a public officer has acted with malice or
bad faith, he should not be charged with personal liability for damages that may result from the
performance of an official duty.55 Good faith is always presumed and he who alleges the contrary bears
the burden56 to convincingly show that malice or bad faith attended the public officer’s performance of
his duties.57

Jurisprudence instructs that not every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or
Keeping with these principles, the Court observes that Dimapilis-Baldoz’s actuations were only
fact, constitutes grave abuse of discretion.47 The abuse of discretion to be qualified as "grave" must be so
impressed with good faith which perforce, negates her personal liability in this case.
patent or gross as to constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to
act at all in contemplation of law.48
To elucidate, while the COA correctly affirmed the disallowance of the salaries and benefits which
Labrador unduly received when he continued to hold office despite his conviction, the liability for refund
Applying these principles to the case at bar, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the COA in
cannot be imposed upon Dimapilis-Baldoz because she had no knowledge or any reasonable indication
fixing the reckoning point of the period of disallowance at May 3, 2000, since records are bereft of any
that the payment of salaries to Labrador was actually improper. Two important incidents impel this
showing that it had any knowledge of Labrador’s prior dismissal on May 2, 1997. To hold otherwise
conclusion: first, Labrador’s 201 File with the POEA was without any record of the SB case; and second,
would be simply antithetical to the concept of grave abuse of discretion, much less countenance a
Dimapilis-Baldoz was only apprised of his conviction when her office was furnished a copy of the SB’s
speculative endeavor.
March 2, 2004 Resolution which ordered the revocation of Labrador’s probation. In addition, Dimapilis-
Baldoz’s good faith is further strengthened by the fact that she lost no time in issuing the Separation
Be that as it may, the Court cannot, nevertheless, sanction the erroneous finding that the disallowance Order as soon as she was apprised of Labrador’s situation. Thus, absent any proof to the contrary, it
of the POEA’s illegal disbursements to Labrador should only be reckoned from May 3, 2000 when he was, cannot be gainsaid that Dimapilis-Baldoz’s approval was spurred only by the honest belief that the
in fact, already dismissed as early as May 2, 1997. The salaries of government employees clearly payment of salaries disbursed to Labrador was due and owing to him.1âwphi1
constitute public funds49 which should, at all times, be properly accounted for. In this relation, the
Constitution vests the COA with the primary responsibility to ensure that any irregularity in the
It is well to stress that neither will it do justice to hold Dimapilis-Baldoz personally liable simply because
disbursement of the same is cleared, or any attendant illegality be proscribed. Yet, when a significant
she possessed the final authority for the disbursements and had direct supervision over her
fact which would impact this process is missed – as in this case, the May 2, 1997 dismissal of Labrador –
subordinates. Case law exhorts that although a public officer is the final approving authority and the
the public nature of the above-mentioned interests impels the Court to judiciously mind the COA of such
employees who processed the transaction were directly under his supervision, personal liability does not
fact if only to aid the latter to fulfill its constitutional mandate as well as to avert any loss on the part of
automatically attach to him but only upon those directly responsible for the unlawful expenditures.58 As
the government. Verily, public funds are the property of the people and must be used prudently at all
Dimapilis-Baldoz’s direct responsibility therefor had not been demonstrated, in addition to her good
times with a view to prevent dissipation and waste.50 As such, the COA must correct its previous
faith as above-discussed, there is no cogent factual or legal basis to hold her personally liable. In this
issuances in this case in order to reflect the actual date of Labrador’s dismissal which would also be the
respect, the Court finds that the COA gravely abused its discretion.
proper reckoning point of the period of disallowance.

As to how the matter of Labrador’s administrative penalty of dismissal from the service escaped notice –
B. Grave abuse of discretion; personal liability of Dimapilis-Baldoz.
not to mention, implementation – is not revealed in the records before the Court; but it can be easily
 65

surmised that the POEA’s incapability to deal with a twice-dismissed employee was largely attributable
to bureaucratic incompetence. It bears emphasizing that it is the policy of the State to maintain honesty
and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and
corruption.59 It should, therefore, be the responsibility of each government agency, such as the POEA, to
know matters pertaining to the conduct of its own employees in the performance of their duties and to
readily take action against those undeserving of the public’s trust. To be an effective agent at exacting
accountability from those under its direct authority, government agencies would do well to devise a
coordinative system to ensure that records of personnel actions concerning its individual employees are
properly updated and secured on file, especially all administrative and criminal cases decided against
them.

In view of the foregoing pronouncements, the Court finds it unnecessary to delve on the other ancillary
issues raised in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Accordingly, Notice of Disallowance No. 2006-002 dated
January 18, 2006 and Decision No. 2009-121 dated October 29, 2009 issued by respondent Commission
on Audit is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, (a) deleting the portions pertaining to petitioner Rosalinda
Dimapilis-Baldoz’s personal liability; and (b) adjusting the proper period of disallowance from the date of
Leonel P. Labrador’s dismissal on May 2, 1997. The foregoing is without prejudice to any subsequent
action or proceeding to recover any undue amount/s received by Labrador.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
A.M. No. 14061-Ret June 19, 2012
Re: Application for Retirement of Judge Moslemen T. Macarambon under Republic Act No. 910,
Present: as amended by Republic Act No. 9946.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
For consideration are: (1) the letter dated September 15, 2011 of Judge Moslemen T. Macarambon
(Judge Macarambon); and (2) the Memorandum of Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez (Court
Administrator), both addressed to former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona regarding the request of Judge
Macarambon to retire under Republic Act (RA) No. 910, as amended by RA No. 9946.
Judge Macarambon was a judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for a period of 18 years, 1 month and
16 days. Before reaching the optional retirement age of 60, Judge Macarambon transferred to the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) having been appointed as Commissioner by then President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo (President Arroyo). He served as COMELEC Commissioner for less than a year and was
no longer re-appointed after having been bypassed thrice by the Commission on Appointments. Judge
Macarambon was subsequently appointed by President Arroyo as President/CEO of the National
Transmission Corporation but he resigned from the position less than a year after when he failed to
receive a reappointment from President Benigno C. Aquino III.
In his letter, Judge Macarambon requests that he be allowed to retire under Section 1 of RA No. 910, as
amended, the pertinent portions of which read:
SECTION 1. When a Justice of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, or of the
Court of Tax Appeals, or a Judge of the regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court,
municipal circuit trial court, shari'a district court, shari'a circuit court, or any other court hereafter
established who has rendered at least fifteen (15) years service in the Judiciary or in any other branch of
the Government, or in both, (a) retires for having attained the age of seventy years, or (b) resigns by
reason of his/her incapacity to discharge the duties of his/her office as certified by the Supreme Court,
he/she shall receive during the residue of his/her natural life, in the manner hereinafter provided, the
salary which plus the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, representation and other allowances
such as personal economic relief allowance (PERA) and additional compensation allowance which he/she
was receiving at the time of his/her retirement, or resignation, and non-wage benefit in the form of
education scholarship to one (1) child of all Justices and Judges to free tuition fee in a state university or
college: Provided,That such grant will cover only one (1) bachelor's degree. When a Justice of the
Sandiganbayan or of the Court of Tax Appeals, or a Judge of the regional trial court, metropolitan trial
court, municipal trial court, municipal circuit trial court, shari'a district court, shari'a circuit court, or any
other court hereafter established has attained the age of sixty (60) years and has rendered at least
fifteen (15) years service in the Government, the last three (3) of which shall have been continuously
rendered in the Judiciary, he/she shall likewise be entitled to retire and receive during the residue of
his/her natural life also in the manner hereinafter provided, the salary plus the highest monthly
aggregate of transportation, representation and other allowances such as personal economic relief
allowance (PERA) and additional compensation allowance which he/she was then receiving and the non-
66
wage benefit in the form of education scholarship to one (1) child of all Justices and Judges to free
tuition fee in a state university or college: x x x .
Judge Macarambon asserts that Section 1 allows the payment of retirement benefits to a judge of the
RTC who resigns by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of his office. Citing the case of Re:
Application for Retirement under R.A. No. 910 of Associate Justice Ramon B. Britanico of the
Intermediate Appellate Court, he posits that his appointment as COMELEC Commissioner incapacitated
him to discharge his duties as an RTC judge on account of his "submission to the will of the political
authority and appointing power."
As an alternative, he appeals that he be allowed to retire under the second sentence of Section 1
considering that he has rendered a total of 18 years, 1 month and 16 days of judicial service and a total
of 35 years of government service. Judge Macarabon claims that while he was short of the minimum age
requirement of 60, he believes that the Court’s ruling in Re: Gregorio G. Pineda1 is applicable to his case
where the Court brushed aside such requirement and considered the retiree’s career which was marked
with competence, integrity, and dedication to public service.
In his Memorandum, the Court Administrator disagreed with Judge Macarambon’s position. The Court
Administrator averred:
We humbly submit that Judge Macarambon’s case is different from that of Justice Britanico’s. Justice
Britanico, together with the other Members of the Judiciary at that time, was ordered by then President
Corazon C. Aquino, through Proclamation No. 1, to tender their courtesy resignations. The decision as to
whether or not they would stay in their office was the prerogative of then President Aquino. On the
contrary, the prerogative to accept the appointment as a COMELEC Commissioner depended entirely on
Judge Macarambon. He had the choice of whether or not to accept the appointment of being a
Commissioner or to stay as a RTC Judge. Therefore, his appointment as a COMELEC Commissioner did
not render him incapacitated to discharge the duties of his office as a RTC Judge.
Nonetheless, based on the documents submitted, Judge Macarambon may retire under R.A. No. 1616, as
he meets all the requirements for retirement under the said law, i.e., has been in the government service
as of 01 June 1977 and has rendered at least twenty (20) years government service, the last three (3)
years of which have been continuous.
The sole issue is whether we can allow a judge who voluntarily resigned from his judicial office before
reaching the optional retirement age to receive retirement benefits under RA No. 910, as amended.
Resignation and retirement are two distinct concepts carrying different meanings and legal
consequences in our jurisdiction. While an employee can resign at any time, retirement entails the
compliance with certain age and service requirements specified by law and jurisprudence. Resignation
stems from the employee’s own intent and volition to resign and relinquish his/her post.2 Retirement
takes effect by operation of law. In terms of severance to one’s employment, resignation absolutely cuts-
off the employment relationship in general; in retirement, the employment relationship endures for the
purpose of the grant of retirement benefits.
RA No. 910, as amended allows the grant of retirement benefits to a justice or judge who has either
retired from judicial service or resigned from judicial office.
 67

In case of retirement, a justice or judge must show compliance with the age and service requirements as
provided in RA No. 910, as amended. The second sentence of Section 1 imposes the following minimum
requirements for optional retirement:
(a) must have attained the age of sixty (60) years old; and
More important, there must be present an essential factor before an application under the Plana or
Britanico rulings may be granted.1âwphi1 The Court allows a making up or compensating for lack of
required age or service only if satisfied that the career of the retiree was marked by competence,
integrity, and dedication to the public service; it was only a bowing to policy considerations and an
acceptance of the realities of political will which brought him or her to premature retirement.5

(b) must have rendered at least fifteen (15) years service in the Government, the last three (3)
of which shall have been continuously rendered in the Judiciary.
Strict compliance with the age and service requirements under the law is the rule and the grant of
exception remains to be on a case to case basis.3 We have ruled that the Court allows seeming
exceptions to these fixed rules for certain judges and justices only and whenever there are ample
reasons to grant such exception.4
On the other hand, resignation under RA No. 910, as amended must be "by reason of incapacity to
discharge the duties of the office." In Britanico, we held that the resignation contemplated under RA No.
910, as amended must have the element of involuntariness on the part of the justice or judge. More
than physical or mental disability to discharge the judicial office, the involuntariness must spring from
the intent of the justice or judge who would not have parted with his/her judicial employment were it
not for the presence of circumstances and/or factors beyond his/her control.
In this case, Judge Macarambon failed to present similar circumstances, i.e., the presence of available
and sufficient accumulated leave credits which we may tack in to comply with the age requirement. A
verification from the Leave Division, OCA shows that at the time he left the Court on November 5, 2007,
Judge Macarambon only had 514 vacation leaves and 79 sick leaves which are insufficient to cover the
gap in the age of retirement. Moreover, these accumulated leave credits were all forwarded to the
COMELEC upon his transfer. Further, we already stated that unlike in Britanico, the nature of his
separation from his judicial office was voluntary.
All told, we are not unmindful of Judge Macarambon’s long and dedicated service in the government for
which he is undeniably entitled to be rewarded. We agree with the Court Administrator that although
Judge Macarambon is not qualified to retire under RA No. 910, as amended, he may retire under RA No.
1616 based on the documents he had presented before the Court which meets the age and service
requirements under the said law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we resolve to:

In either of the two instances above-mentioned, Judge Macarambon’s case does not render him eligible
(1) NOTE the Memorandum dated April 3, 2012 of Court Administrator Jose Midas P.
to retire under RA No. 910, as amended.
Marquez; and

First, Judge Macarambon failed to satisfy the age requirement as shown by the records and by his own
(2) DENY the letter-request dated September 15, 2011 of Judge Moslemen T. Macarambon to
admission that he was less than 60 years of age when he resigned from his judicial office before
retire under Republic Act No. 910, as amended by Republic Act No. 9946 for lack of legal
transferring to the COMELEC. Likewise, he failed to satisfy the service requirement not having been in
basis.
continuous service with the Judiciary for three (3) years prior to his retirement.

Judge Macarambon is hereby ADVISED to file an application for optional retirement under Republic Act
Second, Judge Macarambon’s resignation was not by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the
No. 1616 with the Government Service Insurance System, subject to the submission of the requirements
office. His separation from judicial employment was of his own accord and volition. Thus, our ruling in
for retirement, and to the deduction of the retirement gratuity he received from his previous retirement,
Britanico cannot be properly applied to his case since his resignation was voluntary.
if there be any, and subject finally to the availability of funds and the usual clearance requirements.

Third, we find no exceptional reasons to justify Judge Macarambon’s request. In Re: Gregorio Pineda, the
SO ORDERED.
case cited by Judge Macarambon, the Court fully explained how a liberal approach in the application of
retirement laws should be construed, thus:

The rule is that retirement laws are construed liberally in favor of the retiring employee. However, when
in the interest of liberal construction the Court allows seeming exceptions to fixed rules for certain
retired Judges or Justices, there are ample reasons behind each grant of an exception. The crediting of
accumulated leaves to make up for lack of required age or length of service is not done indiscriminately.
It is always on a case to case basis.

In some instances, the lacking element-such as the time to reach an age limit or comply with length of
service is de minimis. It could be that the amount of accumulated leave credits is tremendous in
comparison to the lacking period of time.

EN BANC
A.M. No. 14061-Ret June 19, 2012
Re: Application for Retirement of Judge Moslemen T. Macarambon under Republic Act No. 910,
Present: as amended by Republic Act No. 9946.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
For consideration are: (1) the letter dated September 15, 2011 of Judge Moslemen T. Macarambon
(Judge Macarambon); and (2) the Memorandum of Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez (Court
Administrator), both addressed to former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona regarding the request of Judge
Macarambon to retire under Republic Act (RA) No. 910, as amended by RA No. 9946.
Judge Macarambon was a judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for a period of 18 years, 1 month and
16 days. Before reaching the optional retirement age of 60, Judge Macarambon transferred to the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) having been appointed as Commissioner by then President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo (President Arroyo). He served as COMELEC Commissioner for less than a year and was
no longer re-appointed after having been bypassed thrice by the Commission on Appointments. Judge
Macarambon was subsequently appointed by President Arroyo as President/CEO of the National
Transmission Corporation but he resigned from the position less than a year after when he failed to
receive a reappointment from President Benigno C. Aquino III.
In his letter, Judge Macarambon requests that he be allowed to retire under Section 1 of RA No. 910, as
amended, the pertinent portions of which read:
SECTION 1. When a Justice of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, or of the
Court of Tax Appeals, or a Judge of the regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court,
municipal circuit trial court, shari'a district court, shari'a circuit court, or any other court hereafter
established who has rendered at least fifteen (15) years service in the Judiciary or in any other branch of
the Government, or in both, (a) retires for having attained the age of seventy years, or (b) resigns by
reason of his/her incapacity to discharge the duties of his/her office as certified by the Supreme Court,
he/she shall receive during the residue of his/her natural life, in the manner hereinafter provided, the
salary which plus the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, representation and other allowances
such as personal economic relief allowance (PERA) and additional compensation allowance which he/she
was receiving at the time of his/her retirement, or resignation, and non-wage benefit in the form of
education scholarship to one (1) child of all Justices and Judges to free tuition fee in a state university or
college: Provided, That such grant will cover only one (1) bachelor's degree. When a Justice of the
Sandiganbayan or of the Court of Tax Appeals, or a Judge of the regional trial court, metropolitan trial
court, municipal trial court, municipal circuit trial court, shari'a district court, shari'a circuit court, or any
other court hereafter established has attained the age of sixty (60) years and has rendered at least
fifteen (15) years service in the Government, the last three (3) of which shall have been continuously
rendered in the Judiciary, he/she shall likewise be entitled to retire and receive during the residue of
his/her natural life also in the manner hereinafter provided, the salary plus the highest monthly
68
aggregate of transportation, representation and other allowances such as personal economic relief
allowance (PERA) and additional compensation allowance which he/she was then receiving and the non-
wage benefit in the form of education scholarship to one (1) child of all Justices and Judges to free
tuition fee in a state university or college: x x x .
Judge Macarambon asserts that Section 1 allows the payment of retirement benefits to a judge of the
RTC who resigns by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of his office. Citing the case of Re:
Application for Retirement under R.A. No. 910 of Associate Justice Ramon B. Britanico of the
Intermediate Appellate Court, he posits that his appointment as COMELEC Commissioner incapacitated
him to discharge his duties as an RTC judge on account of his "submission to the will of the political
authority and appointing power."
As an alternative, he appeals that he be allowed to retire under the second sentence of Section 1
considering that he has rendered a total of 18 years, 1 month and 16 days of judicial service and a total
of 35 years of government service. Judge Macarabon claims that while he was short of the minimum age
requirement of 60, he believes that the Court’s ruling in Re: Gregorio G. Pineda1 is applicable to his case
where the Court brushed aside such requirement and considered the retiree’s career which was marked
with competence, integrity, and dedication to public service.
In his Memorandum, the Court Administrator disagreed with Judge Macarambon’s position. The Court
Administrator averred:
We humbly submit that Judge Macarambon’s case is different from that of Justice Britanico’s. Justice
Britanico, together with the other Members of the Judiciary at that time, was ordered by then President
Corazon C. Aquino, through Proclamation No. 1, to tender their courtesy resignations. The decision as to
whether or not they would stay in their office was the prerogative of then President Aquino. On the
contrary, the prerogative to accept the appointment as a COMELEC Commissioner depended entirely on
Judge Macarambon. He had the choice of whether or not to accept the appointment of being a
Commissioner or to stay as a RTC Judge. Therefore, his appointment as a COMELEC Commissioner did
not render him incapacitated to discharge the duties of his office as a RTC Judge.
Nonetheless, based on the documents submitted, Judge Macarambon may retire under R.A. No. 1616, as
he meets all the requirements for retirement under the said law, i.e., has been in the government service
as of 01 June 1977 and has rendered at least twenty (20) years government service, the last three (3)
years of which have been continuous.
The sole issue is whether we can allow a judge who voluntarily resigned from his judicial office before
reaching the optional retirement age to receive retirement benefits under RA No. 910, as amended.
Resignation and retirement are two distinct concepts carrying different meanings and legal
consequences in our jurisdiction. While an employee can resign at any time, retirement entails the
compliance with certain age and service requirements specified by law and jurisprudence. Resignation
stems from the employee’s own intent and volition to resign and relinquish his/her post.2 Retirement
takes effect by operation of law. In terms of severance to one’s employment, resignation absolutely cuts-
off the employment relationship in general; in retirement, the employment relationship endures for the
purpose of the grant of retirement benefits.

RA No. 910, as amended allows the grant of retirement benefits to a justice or judge who has either
retired from judicial service or resigned from judicial office.
In case of retirement, a justice or judge must show compliance with the age and service requirements as
provided in RA No. 910, as amended. The second sentence of Section 1 imposes the following minimum
requirements for optional retirement:
(a) must have attained the age of sixty (60) years old; and
(b) must have rendered at least fifteen (15) years service in the Government, the last three (3) of which
shall have been continuously rendered in the Judiciary.
Strict compliance with the age and service requirements under the law is the rule and the grant of
exception remains to be on a case to case basis.3 We have ruled that the Court allows seeming
exceptions to these fixed rules for certain judges and justices only and whenever there are ample
reasons to grant such exception.4
On the other hand, resignation under RA No. 910, as amended must be "by reason of incapacity to
discharge the duties of the office." In Britanico, we held that the resignation contemplated under RA No.
910, as amended must have the element of involuntariness on the part of the justice or judge. More
than physical or mental disability to discharge the judicial office, the involuntariness must spring from
the intent of the justice or judge who would not have parted with his/her judicial employment were it
not for the presence of circumstances and/or factors beyond his/her control.
In either of the two instances above-mentioned, Judge Macarambon’s case does not render him eligible
to retire under RA No. 910, as amended.
First, Judge Macarambon failed to satisfy the age requirement as shown by the records and by his own
admission that he was less than 60 years of age when he resigned from his judicial office before
transferring to the COMELEC. Likewise, he failed to satisfy the service requirement not having been in
continuous service with the Judiciary for three (3) years prior to his retirement.
Second, Judge Macarambon’s resignation was not by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the
office. His separation from judicial employment was of his own accord and volition. Thus, our ruling in
Britanico cannot be properly applied to his case since his resignation was voluntary.
Third, we find no exceptional reasons to justify Judge Macarambon’s request. In Re: Gregorio Pineda, the
case cited by Judge Macarambon, the Court fully explained how a liberal approach in the application of
retirement laws should be construed, thus:
The rule is that retirement laws are construed liberally in favor of the retiring employee. However, when
in the interest of liberal construction the Court allows seeming exceptions to fixed rules for certain
retired Judges or Justices, there are ample reasons behind each grant of an exception. The crediting of
accumulated leaves to make up for lack of required age or length of service is not done indiscriminately.
It is always on a case to case basis.
69
In some instances, the lacking element-such as the time to reach an age limit or comply with length of
service is de minimis. It could be that the amount of accumulated leave credits is tremendous in
comparison to the lacking period of time.
More important, there must be present an essential factor before an application under the Plana or
Britanico rulings may be granted.1âwphi1 The Court allows a making up or compensating for lack of
required age or service only if satisfied that the career of the retiree was marked by competence,
integrity, and dedication to the public service; it was only a bowing to policy considerations and an
acceptance of the realities of political will which brought him or her to premature retirement.5
In this case, Judge Macarambon failed to present similar circumstances, i.e., the presence of available
and sufficient accumulated leave credits which we may tack in to comply with the age requirement. A
verification from the Leave Division, OCA shows that at the time he left the Court on November 5, 2007,
Judge Macarambon only had 514 vacation leaves and 79 sick leaves which are insufficient to cover the
gap in the age of retirement. Moreover, these accumulated leave credits were all forwarded to the
COMELEC upon his transfer. Further, we already stated that unlike in Britanico, the nature of his
separation from his judicial office was voluntary.
All told, we are not unmindful of Judge Macarambon’s long and dedicated service in the government for
which he is undeniably entitled to be rewarded. We agree with the Court Administrator that although
Judge Macarambon is not qualified to retire under RA No. 910, as amended, he may retire under RA No.
1616 based on the documents he had presented before the Court which meets the age and service
requirements under the said law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we resolve to:
(1) NOTE the Memorandum dated April 3, 2012 of Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez; and
(2) DENY the letter-request dated September 15, 2011 of Judge Moslemen T. Macarambon to retire
under Republic Act No. 910, as amended by Republic Act No. 9946 for lack of legal basis.
Judge Macarambon is hereby ADVISED to file an application for optional retirement under Republic Act
No. 1616 with the Government Service Insurance System, subject to the submission of the requirements
for retirement, and to the deduction of the retirement gratuity he received from his previous retirement,
if there be any, and subject finally to the availability of funds and the usual clearance requirements.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 191890 December 04, 2012
EVALYN I. FETALINO and AMADO M. CALDERON, Petitioners,
MANUEL A. BARCELONA, JR., Petitioner-Intervenor,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition with Application for Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, 1 seeking to nullify and enjoin the implementation of
Commission on Elections (Co melee) Resolution No. 8808 issued on March 30, 2010.2 Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 1568, as amended,3 extends a five-year lump sum gratuity to the chairman or any member
of the Comelec upon retirement, after completion of the term of office; incapacity; death;
and resignation after reaching 60 years of age but before expiration of the term of office. The
Comelec en banc determined that former Comelec Commissioners Evalyn I. Fetalino4 and Amado M.
Calderon5 (petitioners) - whose ad interim appointments were not acted upon by the Commission on
Appointments (CA) and, who were subsequently, not reappointed — are not entitled to the five-year
lump sum gratuity because they did not complete in full the seven year term of office.
The Antecedent Facts
On February 10, 1998, President Fidel V. Ramos extended an interim appointment to the petitioners as
Comelec Commissioners, each for a term of seven (7) years, pursuant to Section 2, Article IX-D of the
1987 Constitution.6Eleven days later (or on February 21, 1998), Pres. Ramos renewed the petitioners’ ad
interim appointments for the same position. Congress, however, adjourned in May 1998 before the CA
could act on their appointments. The constitutional ban on presidential appointments later took effect
and the petitioners were no longer re-appointed as Comelec Commissioners.7 Thus, the
petitioners merely served as Comelec Commissioners for more than four months, or from February 16,
1998 to June 30, 1998.8
Subsequently, on March 15, 2005, the petitioners applied for their retirement benefits and monthly
pension with the Comelec, pursuant to R.A. No. 1568.9 The Comelec initially approved the petitioners’
claims pursuant to its Resolution No. 06-136910 dated December 11, 2006 whose dispositive portion
reads:
The Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve the recommendation of Director Alioden
D. Dalaig, Law Department, to grant the request of former Comelec Commissioners Evalyn Fetalino and
Amado Calderon for the payment of their retirement benefits, subject to release of funds for the
purpose by the Department of Budget and Management.11
On February 6, 2007, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 07-0202 granting the petitioners a pro-rated
gratuity and pension.12 Subsequently, on October 5, 2007, the petitioners asked for a re-computation of
their retirement pay on the principal ground that R.A. No. 1568,13 does not cover a pro-rated
70
computation of retirement pay. In response, the Comelec issued a resolution referring the matter to its
Finance Services Department for comment and recommendation.14 On July 14, 2009, the Comelec issued
another resolution referring the same matter to its Law Department for study and recommendation.15
In the presently assailed Resolution No. 880816 dated March 30, 2010, the Comelec, on the basis of the
Law Department’s study, completely disapproved the petitioners’ claim for a lump sum benefit under
R.A. No. 1568. The Comelec reasoned out that:
Of these four (4) modes by which the Chairman or a Commissioner shall be entitled to lump sum benefit,
only the first instance (completion of term) is pertinent to the issue we have formulated above. It is clear
that the non-confirmation and non-renewal of appointment is not a case of resignation or incapacity or
death. The question rather is: Can it be considered as retirement from service for
having completed one’s term of office?
The full term of the Chairman and the Commissioners is seven (7) years. When there has been a partial
service, what remains is called the "unexpired term." The partial service is usually called tenure. There is
no doubt in the distinction between a term and tenure. Tenure is necessarily variable while term is
always fixed. When the law, in this case, RA 1568 refers to completion of term of office, it can only mean
finishing up to the end of the seven year term. By completion of term, the law could not have meant
partial service or a variable tenure that does not reach the end. It could not have meant, the "expiration
of term" of the Commissioner whose appointment lapses by reason of non-confirmation of appointment
by the Commission on Appointments and non-renewal thereof by the President. It is rightly called
expiration of term but note: it is not completion of term. RA 1568 requires ‘having completed his term of
office’ for the Commissioner to be entitled to the benefits.
Therefore, one whose ad interim appointment expires cannot be said to have completed his term of
office so as to fall under the provisions of Section 1 of RA 1568 that would entitle him to a lump sum
benefit of five (5) years salary.17 (emphasis, italics and underscores ours)
On this basis, the Comelec ruled on the matter, as follows:
Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to APPROVE and ADOPT
the study of the Law Department on the payment of retirement benefits to members of the Commission.
Consequently, the following former Chairman and Commissioners of this Commission whose
appointments expired by reason of nonapproval by Commission on Appointments and non-renewal by
the President are not entitled to a lump sum benefit under Republic Act 1528 (sic):
Name Position Date of Service
1. Alfredo Benipayo, Jr. Chairman Feb. 16, 2001 to June 5, 2002
2. Evalyn Fetalino Commissioner Feb. 16, 1998 to June 30, 1998
3. Amado Calderon Commissioner Feb. 16, 1998 to June 30, 1998
4. Virgilio Garciliano Commissioner Feb. 12, 2004 to June 10, 2005

5. Manuel Barcelona, Jr. Commissioner Feb. 12, 2004 to June 10, 2005
6. Moslemen Macarambon Commissioner Nov[.] 05, 2007 to Oct. 10, 2008
7. Leonardo Leonida Commissioner July 03, 2008 to June 26, 2009
This resolution shall also apply to all requests of former COMELEC Chairmen and Commissioners similarly
situated. All previous resolutions which are inconsistent herewith are hereby AMENDED or REVOKED
accordingly.
Let the Finance Services and Personnel Departments implement this resolution.18 (emphasis ours)
The Petitions
The petitioners sought the nullification of Comelec Resolution No. 8808 via a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner intervenor Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr. later joined the petitioners
in questioning the assailed resolution. Like the petitioners, Barcelona did not complete the full seven-
year term as Comelec Commissioner since he served only from February 12, 2004 to July 10, 2005. The
petitioners and Barcelona commonly argue that:
(1) the non-renewal of their ad interim appointments by the CA until Congress already
adjourned qualifies as retirement under the law and entitles them to the full five-year lump
sum gratuity;
(2) Resolution No. 06-1369 that initially granted the five-year lump sum gratuity is already
final and executory and cannot be modified by the Comelec; and
(3) they now have a vested right over the full retirement benefits provided by RA No. 1568 in
view of the finality of Resolution No. 06- 1369.19
In the main, both the petitioners and Barcelona pray for a liberal interpretation of Section 1 of R.A. No.
1568. They submit that the involuntary termination of their ad interim appointments as Comelec
Commissioners should be deemed by this Court as a retirement from the service. Barcelona, in support
of his plea for liberal construction, specifically cites the case of Ortiz v. COMELEC.20 The Court ruled in this
cited case that equity and justice demand that the involuntary curtailment of Mario D. Ortiz’s term be
deemed a completion of his term of office so that he should be considered retired from the service.
In addition, the petitioners also bewail the lack of notice and hearing in the issuance of Comelec
Resolution No. 8808. Barcelona also assails the discontinuance of his monthly pension on the basis of the
assailed Comelec issuance.21
The Case for the Respondents
On July 22, 2010, the Comelec filed its Comment22 through the Office of the Solicitor General. The
Comelec prays for the dismissal of the petition on the grounds outlined below:
71
First, it submits that the petitioners’ reliance on Section 13, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure to show that Resolution No. 06-1369 has attained finality is misplaced as this
resolution is not the final decision contemplated by the Rules. It also argues that estoppel
does not lie against the Comelec since the erroneous application and enforcement of the law
by public officers do not estop the Government from making a subsequent correction of its
errors.23
Second, the Comelec reiterates that the petitioners are not entitled to the lump sum gratuity,
considering that they cannot be considered as officials who retired after completing their
term of office. It emphasizes that R.A. No. 1568 refers to the completion of the term of office,
not to partial service or to a variable tenure that does not reach its end, as in the case of the
petitioners. The Comelec also draws the Court’s attention to the case of Matibag v.
Benipayo24 where the Court categorically ruled that an ad interim appointment that lapsed by
inaction of the Commission on Appointments does not constitute a term of office.25
Third, it argues that the petitioners do not have any vested right on their retirement benefits
considering that the retirements benefits afforded by R.A. No. 1568 are purely gratuitous in
nature; they are not similar to pension plans where employee participation is mandatory so
that they acquire vested rights in the pension as part of their compensation. Without such
vested rights, the Comelec concludes that the petitioners were not deprived of their property
without due process of law.26
The Court’s Ruling
We DISMISS the petition and DENY Barcelona’s petition for intervention.
Preliminary Considerations
R.A. No. 1568 provides two types of retirement benefits for a Comelec Chairperson or Member:
a gratuity or five-year lump sum, and an annuity or a lifetime monthly pension.27 Our review of the
petitions, in particular, Barcelona’s petition for intervention, indicates that he merely questions the
discontinuance of his monthly pension on the basis of Comelec Resolution No. 8808.28 As the assailed
resolution, by its plain terms (cited above), only pertains to the lump sum benefit afforded by R.A. No.
1568, it appears that Barcelona’s petition for intervention is misdirected. We note, too, that Barcelona
has not substantiated his bare claim that the Comelec discontinued the payment of his monthly pension
on the basis of the assailed Resolution.
To put the case in its proper perspective, the task now before us is to determine whether the petitioners
are entitled to the full five-year lump sum gratuity provided for by R.A. No. 1568. We conclude under our
discussion below that they are not so entitled as they did not comply with the conditions required by
law.
The petitioners are not entitled to the lump sum gratuity under Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, as amended
That the petitioners failed to meet conditions of the applicable retirement law — Section 1 of R.A. No.
156829 — is beyond dispute. The law provides:

Sec. 1. When the Auditor General or the Chairman or any Member of the Commission on Elections
retires from the service for having completed his term of office or by reason of his incapacity to
discharge the duties of his office, or dies while in the service, or resigns at any time after reaching the
age of sixty years but before the expiration of his term of office, he or his heirs shall be paid in lump sum
his salary for one year, not exceeding five years, for every year of service based upon the last annual
salary that he was receiving at the time of retirement, incapacity, death or resignation, as the case may
be: Provided, That in case of resignation, he has rendered not less than twenty years of service in the
government; And, provided, further, That he shall receive an annuity payable monthly during the residue
of his natural life equivalent to the amount of monthly salary he was receiving on the date of retirement,
incapacity or resignation. [italics supplied]
To be entitled to the five-year lump sum gratuity under Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, any of the following
events must transpire:
(1) Retirement from the service for having completed the term of office;
(2) Incapacity to discharge the duties of their office;
(3) Death while in the service; and
(4) Resignation after reaching the age of sixty (60) years but before the expiration of the term
of office. In addition, the officer should have rendered not less than twenty years of service in
the government at the time of retirement.
Death during the service obviously does not need to be considered in the present case, thus
leaving retirement, incapacity and resignation as the event that must transpire in order to be entitled to
the lump sum gratuity.
We note that the termination of the petitioners’ ad interim appointments could hardly be considered as
incapacity since it was not the result of any disability that rendered them incapable of performing the
duties of a Commissioner. Thus, incapacity is likewise effectively removed from active consideration.
"Resignation is defined as the act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he declines his office and
renounces the further right to it. To constitute a complete and operative act of resignation, the officer or
employee must show a clear intention to relinquish or surrender his position accompanied by the act of
relinquishment."30 In this sense, resignation likewise does not appear applicable as a ground because the
petitioners did not voluntarily relinquish their position as Commissioners; their termination was merely a
consequence of the adjournment of Congress without action by the CA on their ad
interim appointments.
This eliminative process only leaves the question of whether the termination of the petitioners’ ad
interim appointments amounted to retirement from the service after completion of the term of office.
We emphasize at this point that the right to retirement benefits accrues only when two conditions are
met: first, when the conditions imposed by the applicable law – in this case, R.A. No. 1568 — are fulfilled;
and second, when an actual retirement takes place.31 This Court has repeatedly emphasized that
retirement entails compliance with certain age and service requirements specified by law and
jurisprudence, and takes effect by operation of law.32
72
Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 allows the grant of retirement benefits to the Chairman or any Member of the
Comelec who has retired from the service after having completed his term of office. The petitioners
obviously did not retire under R.A. No. 1568, as amended, since they never completed the full seven-
year term of office prescribed by Section 2, Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution; they served as Comelec
Commissioners for barely four months, i.e., from February 16, 1998 to June 30, 1998. In the recent case
of Re: Application for Retirement of Judge Moslemen T. Macarambon under Republic Act No. 910, as
amended by Republic Act No. 9946,33 where the Court did not allow Judge Macarambon to retire under
R.A. No. 910 because he did not comply with the age and service requirements of the law, the Court
emphasized:
Strict compliance with the age and service requirements under the law is the rule and the grant of
exception remains to be on a case to case basis. We have ruled that the Court allows seeming
exceptions to these fixed rules for certain judges and justices only and whenever there are ample
reasons to grant such exception. (emphasis ours; citations omitted)
More importantly, we agree with the Solicitor General that the petitioners’ service, if any, could only
amount to tenure in office and not to the term of office contemplated by Section 1 of R.A. No.
1568. Tenure and term of office have well-defined meanings in law and jurisprudence. As early as 1946,
the Court, in Topacio Nueno v. Angeles,34provided clear distinctions between these concepts in this wise:
The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the
interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term
during which the incumbent actually holds the office. The term of office is not affected by the hold-
over. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the
incumbent. There is no principle, law or doctrine by which the term of an office may be extended by
reason of war. [emphasis ours]
This is the ruling that has been followed since then and is the settled jurisprudence on these concepts.35
While we characterized an ad interim appointment in Matibag v. Benipayo36 "as a permanent
appointment that takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the
appointee has qualified into office," we have also positively ruled in that case that "an ad
interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments does not
constitute a term of office."37 We consequently ruled:
However, an ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments
does not constitute a term of office. The period from the time the ad interim appointment is made to
the time it lapses is neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term. To hold otherwise would mean that the
President by his unilateral action could start and complete the running of a term of office in the
COMELEC without the consent of the Commission on Appointments. This interpretation renders inutile
the confirming power of the Commission on Appointments.38 (emphasis ours; italics supplied)
Based on these considerations, we conclude that the petitioners can never be considered to have retired
from the service not only because they did not complete the full term, but, more importantly, because
they did not serve a "term of office" as required by Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, as amended.
Ortiz v. COMELEC cannot be applied to the present case
 73

We are not unmindful of the Court’s ruling in Ortiz v. COMELEC39 which Barcelona cites as basis for his The application of the clear letter of the retirement law in this case is supported by jurisprudence. As
claim of retirement benefits despite the fact that — like the petitioners — he did not complete the full early as 1981, in the case of In Re: Claim of CAR Judge Noel,42 the Court strictly adhered to the provisions
term of his office. of R.A. No. 910 and did not allow the judge’s claim of monthly pension and annuity under the
aforementioned law, considering that his length of government service fell short of the minimum
requirements.
In that case, the petitioner was appointed as Comelec Commissioner, for a term expiring on May 17,
1992, by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, and took his oath of office on July 30, 1985. When
President Corazon Aquino assumed the Presidency and following the lead of the Justices of the Supreme Similarly, in Re: Judge Alex Z. Reyes,43 the Court dismissed CTA Judge Reyes’ invocation of the doctrine of
Court, Ortiz — together with the other Comelec Commissioners — tendered his courtesy resignation on liberal construction of retirement laws to justify his request that the last step increment of his salary
March 5, 1986. On July 21, 1986, President Aquino accepted their resignations effective immediately. grade be used in the computation of his retirement pay and terminal leave benefits, and held:
Thereafter, Ortiz applied for retirement benefits under R.A. No. 1568, which application the Comelec
denied. The Court, however, reversed the Comelec and held that "[t]he curtailment of [Ortiz’s] term not
In Borromeo, the court had occasion to say: "It is axiomatic that retirement laws are liberally construed
being attributable to any voluntary act on the part of the petitioner, equity and justice demand that he
and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited. All doubts as to the intent of the law
should be deemed to have completed his term xxx. [That he] should be placed in the same category as
should be resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve its humanitarian purposes." Such interpretation in
that of an official holding a primarily confidential position whose tenure ends upon his superior’s loss of
favor of the retiree is unfortunately not called for nor warranted, where the clear intent of the
confidence in him." Thus, as "he is deemed to have completed his term of office, [Ortiz] should be
applicable law and rules are demonstrably against the petitioner's claim. (Paredes v. City of Manila,
considered retired from the service."40
G.R. No. 88879, March 21, 1991). Section 4 is explicit and categorical in its prohibition and, unfortunately
for Judge Reyes, applies squarely to the instant case.44 (emphasis ours; italics supplied)
A close reading of Ortiz reveals that it does not have the same fact situation as the present case and is
thus not decisive of the present controversy. We note that the impact of the principle of stare
Finally, in Gov’t Service Insurance System v. Civil Service Commission,45 the Court was asked to resolve
decisis that Barcelona cited as basis is limited; specific judicial decisions are binding only on the parties
whether government service rendered on a per diem basis is creditable for computing the length of
to the case and on future parties with similar or identical factual situations.41 Significantly, the factual
service for retirement purposes. In disregarding the petitioners’ plea for liberal construction, the Court
situation in Ortiz is totally different so that its ruling cannot simply be bodily lifted and applied arbitrarily
held:
to the present case.

The law is very clear in its intent to exclude per diem in the definition of "compensation." Originally, per
First, in Ortiz, Ortiz’s appointment was a regular appointment made by then President Marcos, while the
diem was not among those excluded in the definition of compensation (See Section 1(c) of C.A. No. 186),
petitioners were appointed by President Ramos ad interim or during the recess of Congress.
not until the passage of the amending laws which redefined it to exclude per diem.

Second, Ortiz’s appointment was made under the 1973 Constitution which did not require the
The law not only defines the word "compensation," but it also distinguishes it from other forms of
concurrence of the CA. Notably, the 1973 Constitution abolished the CA and did not provide for an
remunerations. Such distinction is significant not only for purposes of computing the contribution of the
executive limit on the appointing authority of the President. In the present case, the petitioners’ ad
employers and employees to the GSIS but also for computing the employees' service record and
interim appointment was made under the 1987 Constitution which mandated that an appointment shall
benefits.
be effective only until disapproval by the CA or until the next adjournment of Congress.

Private respondents both claim that retirement laws must be liberally interpreted in favor of the
Third, in Ortiz, the Court addressed the issue of whether a constitutional official, whose "courtesy
retirees. However, the doctrine of liberal construction cannot be applied in the instant petitions,
resignation" had been accepted by the President of the Philippines during the effectivity of the Freedom
where the law invoked is clear, unequivocal and leaves no room for interpretation or
Constitution, may be entitled to retirement benefits under R.A. No. 1568. In the present case, the issue is
construction. Moreover, to accommodate private respondents' plea will contravene the purpose for
whether the termination of the petitioners’ ad interim appointments entitles them to the full five-year
which the law was enacted, and will defeat the ends which it sought to attain (cf. Re: Judge Alex Z. Reyes,
lump sum gratuity provided for by R.A. No. 1568.
216 SCRA 720 [1992]).46 [italics supplied; emphasis ours]

No occasion for liberal construction since Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, as amended, is clear and
No compelling reasons exist to warrant the liberal application of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, as
unambiguous
amended, to the present case

The petitioners’ appeal to liberal construction of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 is misplaced since the law is
We find no compelling legal or factual reasons for the application of the Court’s liberality in the
clear and unambiguous. We emphasize that the primary modality of addressing the present case is to
interpretation of retirement laws to the present case. The discretionary power of the Court to exercise
look into the provisions of the retirement law itself. Guided by the rules of statutory construction in this
the liberal application of retirement laws is not limitless; its exercise of liberality is on a case-to-case
consideration, we find that the language of the retirement law is clear and unequivocal; no room for
basis and only after a consideration of the factual circumstances that justify the grant of an exception.
construction or interpretation exists, only the application of the letter of the law.
The recent case of Re: Application for Retirement of Judge Moslemen T. Macarambon under Republic Act
No. 910, as amended by Republic Act No. 994647 fully explained how a liberal approach in the application
of retirement laws should be construed, viz:

The rule is that retirement laws are construed liberally in favor of the retiring employee. However, when
in the interest of liberal construction the Court allows seeming exceptions to fixed rules for certain
retired Judges or Justices, there are ample reasons behind each grant of an exception. The crediting of
accumulated leaves to make up for lack of required age or length of service is not done indiscriminately.
It is always on a case to case basis.
In some instances, the lacking element—such as the time to reach an age limit or comply with length of
service is de minimis. It could be that the amount of accumulated leave credits is tremendous in
comparison to the lacking period of time.
More important, there must be present an essential factor before an application under
the Plana or Britanico rulings may be granted. The Court allows a making up or compensating for lack of
required age or service only if satisfied that the career of the retiree was marked by competence,
integrity, and dedication to the public service; it was only a bowing to policy considerations and an
acceptance of the realities of political will which brought him or her to premature retirement. (emphases
and italics ours; citation omitted)
In the present case, as previously mentioned, Ortiz cannot be used as authority to justify a liberal
application of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, as amended not only because it is not on all fours with the
present case; more importantly, the Court in Ortiz had ample reasons, based on the unique factual
circumstances of the case, to grant an exception to the service requirements of the law. In Ortiz, the
Court took note of the involuntariness of Ortiz’s "courtesy resignation," as well as the peculiar
circumstances obtaining at that time President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 calling for the courtesy
resignation of all appointive officials, viz:
From the foregoing it is evident that petitioner's "resignation" lacks the element of clear intention to
surrender his position. We cannot presume such intention from his statement in his letter of March 5,
1986 that he was placing his position at the disposal of the President. He did not categorically state
therein that he was unconditionally giving up his position. It should be remembered that said letter was
actually a response to Proclamation No. 1 which President Aquino issued on February 25, 1986 when she
called on all appointive public officials to tender their "courtesy resignation" as a "first step to restore
confidence in public administration."48
In stark contrast, no such peculiar circumstances obtain in the present case.
Finally, in the absence of any basis for liberal interpretation, the Court would be engaged in judicial
legislation if we grant the petitioners’ plea. We cannot overemphasize that the policy of liberal
construction cannot and should not be to the point of engaging in judicial legislation — an act that the
Constitution absolutely forbids this Court to do. In the oft-cited case of Tanada v. Yulo,49 Justice George
A. Malcolm cautioned against judicial legislation and warned against liberal construction being used as a
license to legislate and not to simply interpret,50 thus:
Counsel in effect urges us to adopt a liberal construction of the statute. That in this instance, as in the
past, we aim to do. But counsel in his memorandum concedes "that the language of the proviso in
question is somewhat defective and does not clearly convey the legislative intent", and at the hearing in
response to questions was finally forced to admit that what the Government desired was for the court to
insert words and phrases in the law in order to supply an intention for the legislature. That we cannot
do. By liberal construction of statutes, courts from the language used, the subject matter, and the
purposes of those framing them are able to find out their true meaning. There is a sharp distinction,
74
however, between construction of this nature and the act of a court in engrafting upon a law something
that has been omitted which someone believes ought to have been embraced. The former is liberal
construction and is a legitimate exercise of judicial power. The latter is judicial legislation forbidden by
the tripartite division of powers among the three departments of government, the executive, the
legislative, and the judicial.51
In the present case, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, by its plain terms, is clear that retirement entails the
completion of the term of office. To construe the term "retirement" in Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 to
include termination of an ad interim appointment is to read into the clear words of the law exemptions
that its literal wording does not support; to depart from the meaning expressed by the words of R.A. No.
1568 is to alter the law and to legislate, and not to interpret. We would thereby violate the timehonored
rule on the constitutional separation of powers. The words of Justice E. Finley Johnson in the early case
of Nicolas v. Alberto52 still ring true today, viz.:
The courts have no legislative powers. In the interpretation and construction of statutes their sole
function is to determine, and, within the constitutional limits of the legislative power, to give effect to
the intention of the legislature. The courts cannot read into a statute something which is not within the
manifest intention of the legislature as gathered from the statute itself. To depart from the meaning
expressed by the words of a statute, is to alter the statute, to legislate and not to interpret. The
responsibility for the justice or wisdom of legislation rests with the legislature, and it is the province of
the courts to construe, not to make the laws.
To reiterate, in light of the express and clear terms of the law, the basic rule of statutory construction
should therefore apply: "legislative intent is to be determined from the language employed, and where
there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction."53
The Comelec did not violate the rule on finality of judgments
Petitioners argue that Resolution No. 06-1369, which initially granted them a five-year lump sum
gratuity, attained finality thirty (30) days after its promulgation, pursuant to Section 13, Rule 18 of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure, and, thus, can no longer be modified by the Comelec.
We cannot agree with this position. Section 13, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure reads:
Sec. 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions. –
a. In ordinary actions, special proceedings, provisional remedies and special reliefs a decision or
resolution of the Commission en banc shall become final and executory after thirty (30) days from its
promulgation.
A simple reading of this provision shows that it only applies to ordinary actions, special proceedings,
provisional remedies and special reliefs. Under Section 5, Rule 1 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedures, ordinary actions refer to election protests, quo warranto, and appeals from decisions of
courts in election protest cases; special proceedings refer to annulment of permanent list of voters,
registration of political parties and accreditation of citizens’ arms of the Commission; provisional
remedies refer to injunction and/or restraining order; and special reliefs refer to certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus and contempt. Thus, it is clear that the proceedings that precipitated the issuance of
Resolution No. 06-1369 do not fall within the coverage of the actions and proceedings under Section 13,
 75

Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. Thus, the Comelec did not violate its own rule on finality of G.R. No. 191890: December 4, 2012
judgments.1âwphi1

EVALYN I. FETALINO and AMADO M. CALDERON, Petitioners, MANUEL A. BARCELONA, JR., Petitioner-
No denial of due process
Intervenor, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

We also find no merit in the petitioners’ contention that that they were denied due process of law when
the Comelec issued Resolution No. 8808 without affording them the benefit of a notice and hearing. We FACTS:
have held in the past that "[t]he essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard, or as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. [Thus, a] formal or trial-type hearing is not at all President Fidel V. Ramos extended an interim appointment to petitioners Evalyn Fetalino (Fetalino) and
times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied where the parties are given fair and Amado Calderon (Calderon) as Comelec Commissioners, each for a term of seven (7) years. Congress,
reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is
absolute lack of notice and hearing." 54 In Bautista v. Commission on Elections,55 we emphasized: however, adjourned before the Commission on Appointments (CA) could act on their appointments. The
constitutional ban on presidential appointments later took effect and Fetalino and Calderon were no
In Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan (166 SCRA 316 [1988]), we held that the right to be heard does not only longer re-appointed. Thus, Fetalino and Calderon merely served as Comelec Commissioners for more
refer to the right to present verbal arguments in court. A party may also be heard through his pleadings.
than four months.
Where opportunity to be heard is accorded either through oral arguments or pleadings, there is no
denial of procedural due process. As reiterated in National Semiconductor (HK) Distribution, Ltd. vs.
NLRC (G.R. No. 123520, June 26, 1998), the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, Subsequently, Fetalino and Calderon applied for their retirement benefits and monthly pension with the
or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side. Hence, in Navarro III vs.
Damaso (246 SCRA 260 1995), we held that a formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and not in all Comelec, pursuant to R.A. No. 1568. The Comelec initially approved the claims pursuant to its resolution.
instances essential.56 (italics supplied) However, in its subsequent resolution, the Comelec, on the basis of its Law Departments study,
completely disapproved the Fetalino and Calderons claim, stating that one whose ad interim
Thus, "a party cannot successfully invoke deprivation of due process if he was accorded the opportunity
appointment expires cannot be said to have completed his term of office so as to fall under the
of a hearing, through either oral arguments or pleadings. There is no denial of due process when a party
is given an opportunity through his pleadings."57 In the present case, the petitioners cannot claim provisions of Section 1 of RA 1568 that would entitle him to a lump sum benefit of five years salary.
deprivation of due process because they actively participated in the Comelec proceedings that sought for Petitioner-intervenor Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr. (Barcelona) later joined the petitioners in questioning the
payment of their retirement benefits under R.A. No. 1568. The records clearly show that the issuance of
the assailed Comelec resolution was precipitated by the petitioners’ application for retirement benefits assailed subsequent resolution.
with the Comelec. Significantly, the petitioners were given ample opportunity to present and explain
their respective positions when they sought a re-computation of the initial pro-rated retirement benefits
ISSUES:
that were granted to them by the Comelec. Under these facts, no violation of the right to due process of
law took place.
A. Whether or not an ad interim appointment qualifies as retirement under the law and entitles them to
No vested rights over retirement benefits the full five-year lump sum gratuity;

As a last point, we agree with the Solicitor General that the retirement benefits granted to the
B. Whether or not the resolution that initially granted the five-year lump sum gratuity is already final and
petitioners under Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 are purely gratuitous in nature; thus, they have no vested
right over these benefits. 58Retirement benefits as provided under R.A. No. 1568 must be distinguished executory;
from a pension which is a form of deferred compensation for services performed; in a pension, employee
participation is mandatory, thus, employees acquire contractual or vested rights over the pension as part
of their compensation. 59 In the absence of any vested right to the R.A. No. 1568 retirement benefits, the C. Whether or not Fetalino and Calderon acquired a vested right over the full retirement benefits provided
petitioners' due process argument must perforce fail. by RA No. 1568.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners
HELD: The petition lacks merit.
Evalyn I. Fetalino and Amado M. Calderon for lack of merit. We likewise DENY Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr.'s
petition for intervention for lack of merit. No costs.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Term of Office
SO ORDERED.
 76

First Issue: Fetalino, Calderon and Barcelona are not entitled to the lump sum gratuity under Section 1 employees acquire contractual or vested rights over the pension as part of their compensation.
of R.A. No. 1568, as amended. DENIED

The Court emphasized that the right to retirement benefits accrues only when two conditions are met:
first, when the conditions imposed by the applicable law in this case, R.A. No. 1568 are fulfilled; and
second, when an actual retirement takes place. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that retirement
entails compliance with certain age and service requirements specified by law and jurisprudence, and
takes effect by operation of law.

Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 allows the grant of retirement benefits to the Chairman or any Member of the
Comelec who has retired from the service after having completed his term of office. Fetalino, Calderon
and Barcelona obviously did not retire under R.A. No. 1568, as amended, since they never completed the
full seven-year term of office. While the Court characterized an ad interim appointment in Matibag v.
Benipayo as a permanent appointment that takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by
the President once the appointee has qualified into office, the Court have also positively ruled in that
case that an ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments
does not constitute a term of office.

Second Issue: The Comelec did not violate the rule on finality of judgments.

Section 13, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure reads: In ordinary actions, special proceedings,
provisional remedies and special reliefs a decision or resolution of the Commission en banc shall become
final and executory after thirty (30) days from its promulgation.

A simple reading of this provision shows that it only applies to ordinary actions, special proceedings,
provisional remedies and special reliefs. Thus, it is clear that the proceedings that precipitated the
issuance of the assailed resolution do not fall within the coverage of the actions and proceedings under
Section 13, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. Thus, the Comelec did not violate its own rule on
finality of judgments.

Third Issue: No vested rights over retirement benefits.

Retirement benefits granted to Fetalino, Calderon and Barcelona under Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 are
purely gratuitous in nature; thus, they have no vested right over these benefits. Retirement benefits as
provided under R.A. No. 1568 must be distinguished from a pension which is a form of deferred
compensation for services performed; in a pension, employee participation is mandatory, thus,

EN BANC
G.R. NO. 188716, June 10, 2013
MELINDA L. OCAMPO, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64, of the Rules of Court assailing
Decision No. 2008-0171 dated 15 February 2008 and Decision No. 2009-0382 dated 1 June 2009 of the
Commission on Audit (COA) sustaining Notice of Disallowance (ND) No. 2003-021 dated 3 September
2003 disallowing the payment of retirement gratuity to petitioner Melinda L. Ocampo (Ocampo) as
Board Member and Chairperson, respectively, of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB), amounting to
P1,449,450.48.
On 1 March 1996, Ocampo retired from the National Electrification Administration under
Commonwealth Act No. 1863 as amended, by Republic Act No. 1616,4 after more than seventeen (17)
years of service. Ocampo availed of the lump sum payment with a net gratuity of P358,917.01.
Three days thereafter, on 4 March 1996, under Letter of Appointment dated 16 February 1996, Ocampo
assumed office as Board Member of the ERB. On 30 June 1998, upon expiration of her term, Ocampo
retired under Executive Order No. 172, "Creating the Energy Regulatory Board" in relation to Republic
Act No. 1568, "An Act to Provide Life Pension to the Auditor General and the Chairman or any Member
of the Commission on Elections." Ocampo availed of the five year lump sum benefit and the
corresponding monthly pension to be paid out for the remainder of her life. This first gratuity lump sum
payment based on sixty (60) months or five (5) years advance salary was immediately received by
Ocampo after her retirement. Likewise, Ocampo began to receive her monthly
pension.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On 25 August 1998, Ocampo was again appointed, this time as Chairman of ERB with a term of four (4)
years. On 15 August 2001, the ERB was abolished and replaced by the Energy Regulatory Commission
(ERC) as a consequence of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9136, the Electric Reform Act of 2001. For
the second time, Ocampo sought retirement under Executive Order No. 172. Ocampo's claim was
endorsed by the then Chairperson of the ERC, Fe C. Barin (Chairperson Barin), to the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM). Upon release by the DBM of the Special Allotment Release Order
(SARO) and the corresponding Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA), Chairperson Barin approved the payment
thereof to Ocampo.
However, on post-audit of the transaction with Ocampo as payee, State Auditor IV, Nelda R. Monterde
(Auditor Monterde), issued Notice of Suspension (NS) No. 2002-002-101 dated 10 July 2002: (1)
suspending payment of the amount of P1,452,613.71 covering Ocampo's second retirement gratuity
computed on a pro-rata basis equivalent to only two years, eleven months, and twenty days;6 and (2)
requiring submission by the ERC of "legal basis for [the payment of] retirement gratuity twice under the
same law (EO 172)."7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In a letter dated 23 July 2002, Chairperson Barin responded:
77
1. The application for retirement and or claims for retirement benefits of former Chairman
Melinda L. Ocampo [were] endorsed to DBM for its proper disposition together with the
pertinent information or circumstances attendant thereto. Please see the attached letter of
endorsement dated April 2, 2002 and the matrix of information on Chairman Ocampo's
appointment and tenure in office. This was received by DBM on April 5, 2002.
2. In its letter dated April 24, 2002, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued
the Special Allotment Release Order (SARO) and the corresponding Notice of Cash Allocation
(NCA) to cover the payment of Chairman Ocampo's second gratuity benefits.
3. Under the above-mentioned circumstances there was no more cogent reason nor basis for
this Office to defer the release to Chairman Ocampo of the amount corresponding to the
DBM approved gratuity benefits, especially considering the follow-up efforts by the
beneficiaries. To do otherwise could expose the undersigned to charges of unreasonable
delayed action.8
On 28 October 2002, Ocampo likewise wrote Auditor Monterde asking for the lifting of NS No. 2002-002-
101 dated 10 July 2002 and asseverating her entitlement to the second retirement gratuity:
1. That the basic law (E.O. 172, as amended) provides no prohibition to receive second
retirement gratuity;
2. That I retired under different positions, first as Board Member and second as Chairman of the
Energy Regulatory Board;
3. Retirement laws are liberally construed in favor of the employee because the level of
retirement compensation is below the cost of living requirements of a retiree. A grateful
nation owes the retiree at the very least a liberal interpretation.9
Acting on Chairperson Barin's request for the lifting of NS No. 2002-001-101 dated 10 July 2002, the
Legal and Adjudication Office-National (LAO-N) of the COA issued LAO-N-2003-132 dated 12 June 2003
denying the request:
Of pertinence is the last paragraph of Section 1 of EO 172, quoted hereunder, thus:
The Chairman and the Members of the Board, upon completion of their terms or upon becoming
eligible for retirement under existing lawsshall be entitled to the same retirement benefits and
privileges provided for the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Elections.
The retirement benefits of the Members of the Commission on Elections is found in RA 3595, amending
RA 1568. Section 1 thereof states:
Section 1. When the Auditor General or the [Chairman] or any Member of the Commission on Elections
retires from the service for having completed his term [of office] x x x, he or his heirs shall be paid in
lump sum his salary for one year, not exceeding five years, for every year of service based upon the
last annual salary that he was receiving at the time of retirement, x x x; And, provided, further, That he
shall receive an annuity payable monthly during the residue of his natural life equivalent to the
amount of monthly salary that he was receiving on the date of retirement, incapacity or resignation.
(Emphasis theirs).

The above provision of law is integral to the matter on hand since RA 1568 merely extends to the Auditor
General and the Chairman or any Member of the Commission on Elections the retirement benefits
granted under RA 910. EO 172, on the other hand, explicitly provides that the Chairman and Members of
the Board shall be entitled to the same retirement benefits given to the Chairman and Members of the
COMELEC. Having claimed retirement benefits under EO 172 twice, x x x Ms. Ocampo, therefore, would
in all certainty be receiving double pension for the remainder of [her life].
The above-situation is predictable considering that under Paragraph 2 of Section 1 of EO 172, a person
may be appointed to the Board for a minimum of two terms, to wit: "No person may be appointed to
serve more than two (2) successive terms in the Board." It follows then that upon meeting the condition
of completion of terms or eligibility for retirement each time, the concerned official would apply for
retirement benefits, as a matter of course. While this could have been the scenario, it bears emphasizing
that EO 172, however, does not have a parallel provision that would allow a Board Member to claim the
full benefits of the law for as long as the number of term [of] office of such official would allow. The most
practical solution that would not run counter to the prohibition against double pension is to deduct the
amount of lump sum and monthly pensions already received on the first retirement under EO 172 from
the gratuity claimed on the second retirement under the same law. While there is no hard and fast rule
requiring such deduction, for reasons of equity however, it would be proper and logical that said benefits
should nevertheless be deducted from the retirement pay to be received by the employee concerned.
EO 172 sets forth the condition when the Chairman and the Members of the Board of the ERB shall be
entitled to retirement benefits provided under RA 3595. For clarity, the condition is "upon completion of
their terms or upon becoming eligible for retirement under existing laws." A quick review of the
circumstances herein obtaining would show that x x x Ms. Ocampo had met such condition when [her]
term [was] completed upon the abolition of ERB. As then ERB Chairman, [she was] originally appointed
to a term of four years which was however shortened to less than three years. x x x Of equal importance
is the fact that [she was] also eligible for retirement under existing laws. Records bear that x x x Ms.
Ocampo had previously retired on March 3, 1996.
Section 1 of RA 3595 is clear as to the extent of the gratuity: lump sum of salary for one year, not
exceeding five years, for every year of service plus the life pension. In the attached pertinent documents,
it is shown that [Ocampo was] granted retirement gratuity in the amount of x x x P1,472,155.43, x x x
computed as follows:
Highest Monthly Salary (Per NOSA) x No. of Gratuity Months = Gratuity Pay
P41,275.00 x 35.667 = [P]1,472,155.43
As already mentioned, [she is] also entitled to an annuity payable monthly during the residue of [her]
natural [life]. The payment of pension starts after the expiration of the five year period as provided for
under Section 3 of RA 910, the retirement law of the Members of the Judiciary, thus:
Section 3. Upon retirement a Justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals shall be
automatically entitled to a lump sum payment of the monthly salary that said Justice was receiving at the
time of his retirement for five years, and thereafter upon survival after the expiration of this period of
five years, to a further annuity payable monthly during the residue of his natural life equivalent to the
amount of the monthly salary he was receiving on the date of his retirement. (Emphasis theirs).
In our jurisdiction, the legal precept is against double pension. The rule in construing or applying pension
and gratuity laws is that, in the absence of express provision to the contrary, they will be so interpreted
as to prevent any person from receiving double compensation x x x. There must be a provision, clear and
unequivocal, to justify a double pension. x x x It is therefore, incumbent upon x x x Ms. Ocampo to show
78
that they are exempt from this general rule.
The provision of second paragraph of Section 8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution which states "Pensions
or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation[,]" may not be
invoked. This provision simply means that a retiree receiving pension or gratuity can continue to receive
such pension or gratuity even if he accepts another government position to which compensation is
attached x x x.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the herein request for lifting of NS. No. 2002-001-101 (2002) is
hereby DENIED.10
On motion for reconsideration of Ocampo, the COA LAO-N issued ND No. 2003-021 dated 3 September
2003 affirming NS No. 2002-001-101 disallowing Ocampo's receipt of a second retirement gratuity under
Executive Order No. 172.
On appeal, COA, in Decision No. 2008-017 dated 15 February 2008, partially affirmed ND No. 2003-021
and allowed Ocampo's receipt of a pro- rated retirement gratuity based on her salary as Chairperson of
the ERB:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Commission affirms in part the disallowance, under ND No.
2003-021 dated September 03, 2003, and rules that [Ocampo] is entitled to a pro-rata retirement
gratuity, conformably to her years in service as Chairman of ERB which is, two years, eleven months and
twenty days. In accordance with the computation prepared by the Office of the Supervising Auditor,
Energy Regulatory Board hereto attached as Annex A and made an integral part hereof, of the total
amount of P4,138,086.71, inclusive of gratuities and pensions, received by Ms. Ocampo only
P2,688,636.23 is allowable. In fine, this Commission affirms the disallowance up to the amount of
P1,449,450.48.
Accordingly, the monthly pension that [Ocampo] should receive shall only correspond to one monthly
pension based on the computation of her last retirement benefit.
The Auditor concerned is hereby ordered to require the adjustment in the books of accounts of the
agency as regards the payment of the first lump sum gratuity.11
In its Decision No. 2009-038 dated 1 June 2009, COA denied Ocampo's motion for reconsideration and
affirmed the disallowance of the amount of P1,449,450.48 and of the double monthly for Ocampo.
Hence, this petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion by the COA.
The singular issue for our resolution is framed by Ocampo:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COA ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO RECEIVE ONLY
THE BENEFITS CORRESPONDING TO HER RETIREMENT AS ERB CHAIR, AND THE PERIOD DURING WHICH
SHE SERVED AS MEMBER OF THE SAID BOARD SHOULD BE MERELY TACKED IN TO THE PERIOD DURING
WHICH SHE SERVED AS SUCH CHAIR.12
In sum, Ocampo posits that she should be separately paid retirement benefits for her respective terms as
Board Member and Chairperson of the ERB. In other words, Ocampo claims two (2) lump sum payments,
and payment thereafter of two (2) monthly pensions.
While Ocampo accedes that the "rule is against a retiree's receiving double pension," she claims
exemption to the application thereof because of the absence of a prohibition, whether express or

implied, in Executive Order No. 172 or Republic Act No. 3595 "for a covered official to retire twice
thereunder and receive the corresponding benefits each time." Ocampo stresses that the applicable
laws, Executive Order No. 172 and Republic Act No. 3595, were intended specifically to accord special
privileges to covered government officials who are considered, for retirement purposes, on the same
level as Members of Constitutional Commissions; and the "very enactment [of these laws] are
unequivocal expressions of the intention to remove the covered officials from the operation of the
general rule." Thus, a liberal interpretation thereof must follow.
The Office of the Solicitor General, in its Comment, ostensibly defending COA's stance, concluded that:
Hence, [Ocampo] is entitled only to a pro-rata amount on her retirement gratuity to be computed based
on her two (2) years, eleven (11) months and twenty (20) days actual creditable service as Chairman of
ERB considering that she cannot anymore tack her previous stint as member of the Board of the ERB
since her retirement benefits were already awarded to her.13
In her Reply, Ocampo counters that:
1. With due respect, the Comment of the OSG in behalf of COA did not fully support the COA Decision
dated February 15, 2008 and Resolution dated June 1, 2009.
1.1 x x x [T]he OSG Comment argued that "[Ocampo] is entitled only to a pro-rata amount of her
retirement gratuity to be computed based on her two (2) years, eleven (11) months, and twenty (20)
days actual creditable service as Chairman of ERB x x x." This is contrary to the COA Decision dated
February 15, 2008 being questioned which ruled that "[Ocampo] should have received only pro-rata
amount on her retirement gratuity to be computed based on two years and four months actual
creditable service as Board Member of the ERB. Likewise [Ocampo] is entitled to a pro-rata retirement
gratuity as ERB chairman, based on two years, eleven months, and twenty days of service as ERB
Chairman."
1.2 x x x [T]he OSG x x x, posits that [Ocampo], after legally receiving the first gratuity pay equivalent to a
lump sum of five years as Board member III of ERB in the total amount of Php1,784,040.00, is also
entitled to a pro-rata computation of her retirement gratuity as ERB Chairman equivalent to two years,
eleven months, and twenty days in the amount of Php1,452,613.71. However, the COA's Decision
subject of this case ruled that [Ocampo] is entitled to the pro-rata computation of her
retirement BOTH as ERB Board Member III and as ERB Chairman for a total of five (5) years, three (3)
months, and 20 days in the total amount of Php 2,688,636.23 only.
1.3 x x x This is significant because in the COA Decision, [Ocampo] is being required to refund the amount
of Php1,449,450.48 while in the OSG position before this Honorable Court, [Ocampo] will not refund any
amount. x x x.14 (Emphasis theirs).
Considering the foregoing asseverations, we list the following issues for our resolution:
1. Whether Ocampo is entitled to a second lump sum retirement gratuity as ERB Chairperson under
Executive Order No. 172, given that she had already received in full, as admitted by Ocampo herself, a
five year lump sum retirement gratuity as ERB Board Member;
2. Corollary thereto, whether Ocampo is entitled to double monthly pensions as part of her two
retirement gratuities for having held the positions of ERB Board Member and Chairperson, respectively.
To obviate confusion, we state at the outset that the parties make no issue of Ocampo's second
retirement as a consequence of the abolition of the ERB and its replacement by the ERC. The issues for
79
our resolution relate only to Ocampo's retirement benefits in the two instances of her retirement from
the ERB.
For easy reference, a recital of the applicable laws:
1. Section 1, paragraphs 2 and 6 of Executive Order No. 172.
[2] The term of office of the Chairman and the Board Members shall be four (4) years, but the first
Chairman to be appointed shall hold office for four (4) years, and of the first four (4) Members, two (2)
shall hold office for a term of two (2) years, and two (2) shall hold office for a term of three (3) years. No
person may be appointed to serve more than two (2) successive terms in the Board.
[6] The Chairman and the Members of the Board, upon completion of their terms or upon becoming
eligible for retirement under existing laws shall be entitled to the same retirement benefits and
privileges provided for the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Elections.
2. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 3595.
Section 1. When the Auditor General or the Chairman or any Member of the Commission on Elections
retires from the service for having completed his term [of] office or by reason of his incapacity to
discharge the duties of his office, or dies while in the service, or resigns at any time after reaching the
age of sixty years but before the expiration of [his] term of office, he or his heirs shall be paid in lump
sum his salary for one year, not exceeding five years, for every year of service based upon the last annual
salary that he was receiving at the time of retirement, incapacity, death or resignation, as the case may
be; Provided, That in case of resignation, he has rendered not less than twenty years of service in the
government: And, provided, further,
That he shall receive an annuity payable monthly during the residue of his natural life equivalent to the
amount of monthly salary he was receiving on the date of retirement, incapacity or resignation.
3. Item No. 4, Administrative Order No. 444.
4. Upon retirement, the lump sum of five years' gratuity as provided under R.A. 3595 for the
Chairman/Commissioner of a Constitutional Commission shall be computed on the basis of the highest
monthly salary plus the duly authorized transportation, living and representation allowances in the last
month prior to retirement or expiration of term.15
Textually, the rules on the retirement benefits under Executive Order No. 172, in relation to Republic Act
No. 3595, are:
1. The employee must have completed his term of office, or become incapacitated to discharge the
duties of his office, or dies while in the service, or resigns at any time after reaching the age of sixty years
but before the expiration of his term of office;
2. The lump sum is to be paid out according to the employee's number of years of service with the ERB;
3. The lump sum gratuity to be paid is the employee's salary for one year, not to exceed five
years;16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
4. The lump sum is based on the employee's last annual salary that he was receiving at the time of
retirement, incapacity, death or resignation, as the case may be;
5. In case of resignation, the employee should have rendered not less than twenty years of service in the
government; and,
6. The employee shall receive an annuity payable monthly during the residue of his natural life
equivalent to the amount of monthly salary he was receiving on the date of retirement, incapacity or
resignation.

In affirming ND No. 2003-021 dated 3 September 2003, the COA ruled that: (1) the phrase "for every
year of service" limits the payment of the lump sum to the employee's length of service and does not
automatically entitle an employee to a lump sum gratuity of five years; (2) Ocampo is not entitled to two
(2) lump sum benefit of five years for each term as it would run counter to the "common-sense
principle" laid down in jurisprudence; (3) payment to Ocampo of two retirement benefits under
Executive Order No. 172 for both her retirements, albeit under different positions and offices, is
unconstitutional as it violates the provision against additional or double compensation; and (4)
ultimately, Ocampo should have received only a pro- rated amount on her retirement gratuity based on
her two years and four months as ERB Board Member, and two years, eleven months and twenty days as
ERB Chairperson.
We note that, while COA's decisions did not state whether Ocampo, for her first retirement gratuity,
received the maximum lump sum benefit of five years which an employee may receive, Ocampo
asseverated in her Reply, and the records of this case categorically show that for her retirement as ERB
Board Member, she received the maximum lump sum benefit of five years although her actual creditable
service for that position and period is less than five (5) years, i.e., two years and four months. This has
already been paid to, and received by Ocampo, and has never been the subject of any audit or
disallowance by the COA prior to Ocampo's claim for a second retirement benefit as ERB Chairperson.
Ocampo is surprised, therefore, that her first retirement gratuity, which she had long received, was
audited by the COA. In short, Ocampo argues that the foregoing expenditure is not the proper subject of
COA's jurisdiction, as COA should confine itself to its disallowance of Ocampo's second retirement
gratuity in the amount of P1,452,613.71 computed on a pro-rated basis equivalent to Ocampo's length of
service as ERB Chairperson for two years, eleven months and twenty days.
In fact, in the dispositive portion of COA's Decision 2008-017, COA's pro-rated computation of Ocampo's
first and second retirement benefits as ERB Board Member and Chairperson, respectively, exceeded the
five-year limit set forth in the law. The pro-rated computation of COA of Ocampo's retirement benefits
corresponded to Ocampo's total period of employment as both ERB Board Member and Chairperson for
five (5) years, three (3) months, and twenty (20) days, in the total amount of P2,688,636.23. Thus, in the
Decisions 2008-017 and 2009-038, COA affirmed the disallowance of ?1,449,450.48. COA noted that
Ocampo had already received the total amount of ?4,138,086.71 as retirement benefits, and ordered the
Auditor concerned to adjust the books of accounts of the agency respecting the payment of the first
lump sum gratuity.
First. We disagree with Ocampo that COA should not have audited the first retirement benefit paid to
Ocampo as ERB Board Member. COA's plenary authority, consisting of pre and post audit, is enshrined in
the Constitution,17 and as oft observed in jurisprudence.18 COA validly looked into the government
expenditure relating to the first retirement benefit paid to Ocampo because she now claims payment of
a second retirement benefit under the same law. Part of the scope of the COA's power, authority and
duty is to "promulgate accounting and auditing rules, and regulations including those for the prevention
and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or
uses of government funds and properties."
Second. Before examining the correctness of the COA audit, however, it is imperative to ascertain first, in
view of the circumstances herein obtaining, as to how much Ocampo is entitled to receive as retirement
benefits under Executive Order No. 172 in relation to Republic Act No. 1568 as amended by Republic Act
No. 3595. We can recall that Ocampo retired twice from the ERB under the following circumstances:
a. Ocampo first retired from the ERB on 30 June 1998, after serving a total of two (2) years and
four (4) months as a member thereof (first retirement).
80
b. After her first retirement, Ocampo was re-appointed to the ERB, this time, as its chairman on
25 August 1998.
c. Ocampo retired once again from the ERB on 15 August 2001, after serving a total of two (2)
years, eleven (11) months and twenty (20) days as chairman thereof (second retirement).
Owing to her two retirements from the ERB, Ocampo now claims that she is likewise entitled to two (2)
sets of retirement benefits under Executive Order No. 172 in relation to Republic Act No. 1568 as
amended by Republic Act No. 3595.
We disagree.
Claim of Ocampo for Two Sets of Retirement Benefits Not a Claim of Double Compensation
At the outset, it must be clarified that the claim of Ocampo for two (2) sets of retirement benefits under
Republic Act No. 1568 is not, strictly speaking, a claim for double compensation prohibited under the
first paragraph of Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitution. Claims for double retirement benefits fall
under the prohibition against the receipt of double compensation when they are based on exactly the
same services and on the same creditable period.19 This is not, however, the case herein.
In this case, Ocampo is not claiming two (2) sets of retirement benefits for one and the same creditable
period. Rather, Ocampo is claiming a set of retirement benefits for each of her two (2) retirements from
the ERB. In other words, each set of retirement benefits claimed by Ocampo is based on distinct
creditable periods i.e., one for her term as member of the ERB and another for her term as chairman of
the same agency.
What Ocampo is merely claiming, therefore, is that she is entitled to two (2) sets of retirement benefits
for her two (2) retirements from the ERB under Republic Act No. 1568, as amended. Hence, in order to
resolve her claim, what is only required is an interpretation of Republic Act No. 1568, as amended.
Republic Act No. 1568 as Amended Does Not Justify Payment of More than One Gratuity and Annuity
as a Consequence of Several Retirements from the Same Agency
As can be seen from our discussion above, the success of Ocampo's claim actually depends on the
existence of a provision in Republic Act No. 1568 that allows her to recover two (2) set of retirement
benefits as a consequence of her two (2) retirements from the ERB. Ocampo hinges her claim for two (2)
sets of retirement benefits solely on the provisions of Republic Act No. 1568 as amended by Republic
Act No. 3595.
We rule against her.
There is nothing in Republic Act No. 1568 as amended by Republic Act No. 3595 that allows a qualified
retiree to therein recover two (2) sets of retirement benefits as a consequence of two (2) retirements
from the same covered agency. As worded, Republic Act No. 1568, as amended, only allows payment of
only a single gratuity and a single annuity out of a single compensable retirement from any one of the
covered agencies.
In fact, the contingency of multiple retirements from the same covered agency could not have been
contemplated by the law. We can confirm this if we take into consideration that Republic Act No. 1568 is
a law that, first and foremost, was intended to cover the retirement benefits of the chairmen and
members of the COA (formerly the Office of the Auditor General) and of the Commission on Elections
 81

(COMELEC)20 and that it has been the consistent policy of the State, indeed since the 1935 Constitution,
to prohibit any appointment of more than one term in the said constitutional bodies. Hence, Republic
Act No. 1568, as it was passed and in its present form, cannot be said to have sanctioned the payment of
more than one set of retirement benefits to a retiree as a consequence of multiple retirements in one
agency.
The mere circumstance that members and chairmen of the ERB may be appointed to serve therein for
more than one term (but not for two consecutive terms)21 does not mean that they would be entitled a
set of retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 1568 for each of their completed term. Section 1 of
Executive Order No. 172 merely extends to members and chairmen of the ERB similar retirement
benefits that retiring members and chairmen of the COA and COMELEC are entitled to under the
law. Similar does not mean greater.
Since Republic Act No. 1568, as amended by Republic Act No. 3595 clearly does not justify the payment
of more than one gratuity and one annuity to a qualified retiree, Ocampo cannot claim two (2) sets of
retirement benefits under the same law.
How Much Ocampo is Entitled to Recover As Retirement Benefits
Having settled that Ocampo is only entitled to receive only one set of retirement benefits under
Republic Act No. 1568 as amended, We now proceed to the determination of how much Ocampo is
entitled to receive as retirement benefits under the same law.
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1568 grants two (2) types of retirement benefits to a qualified retiree, i.e.,
a gratuity or a lump sum payment and an annuity or monthly pension, viz:
for purposes of computing her annuity, Ocampo's last monthly salary shall be that which she was
receiving monthly as of the date of her second retirement.
Third. We now come to COA's findings. As can be seen from the factual narration, the disallowance made
by the COA with respect to some of the retirement benefits already received by Ocampo rests on a
different premise than that We have settled in the previous discussions. Hence, for the sake of accuracy,
We require a remand of this case to the COA with the following directives:
1. To recompute the gratuity and annuity of Ocampo in accordance with the principles
enunciated in this Decision;
2. To require the adjustment of Ocampo's account to reflect such recomputed gratuity and
annuity;
3. To compare such recomputed gratuity and annuity with the gratuity and annuity already
received by Ocampo so far; and,
a. In the event that the recomputed gratuity or annuity is greater than the gratuity or
annuity already received by Ocampo, to allow the payment to Ocampo of only the
excess,
b. In the event that the recomputed gratuity or annuity is lesser than the gratuity or
annuity already received by Ocampo, to disallow the excess payments to Ocampo
and require the refund thereof.

Section 1. When the Auditor General or the Chairman or any Member of the Commission on It is in this light that We are constrained to grant this petition.
Elections retires from the service for having completed his term or office or by reason of his incapacity
to discharge the duties of his office, or dies while in the service, or resigns at any time after reaching the WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. This case is remanded to the Commission
age of sixty years but before the expiration of this term of office, he or his heirs shall be paid in lump on Audit with the following directives:
sum his salary for one year, not exceeding five years, for every year of service based upon the last
annual salary that he was receiving at the time of retirement, incapacity, death or resignation, as the
case may be: Provided, That in case of resignation, he has rendered not less than twenty years of service 1. To recompute the gratuity and annuity of Ocampo in accordance with the principles
in the government; And, provided, further, That he shall receive an annuity payable monthly during the enunciated in this Decision;nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary
residue of his natural life equivalent to the amount of monthly salary he was receiving on the date of 2. To require the adjustment of Ocampo's account to reflect such recomputed gratuity and
retirement, incapacity or resignation. (Emphasis supplied). annuity;nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary
3. To compare such recomputed gratuity and annuity with the gratuity and annuity already
Applying the above provision, We discern that Ocampo may recover one gratuity in an amount received by Ocampo so far; and,
equivalent to her last annual salary multiplied by her actual years of service in the ERB but not to exceed
five (5) years. In addition, Ocampo is entitled to receive only one annuity equivalent to the amount of a. In the event that the recomputed gratuity or annuity is greater than the gratuity or
her last monthly salary. annuity already received by Ocampo, to allow the payment to Ocampo of only the
excess,
While Ocampo is entitled to receive only one set of retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 1568, as
amended, despite her two (2) retirements, We believe that her subsequent stint as Chairman of the b. In the event that the recomputed gratuity or annuity is lesser than the gratuity or
ERB and her consequent second retirement necessitated an adjustment of the retirement benefits she annuity already received by Ocampo, to disallow the excess payments to Ocampo
is entitled to under the law. This is because Republic Act No. 1568, as amended, reckons the amount of and require the refund thereof.
gratuity on the retiree's last annual salary and actual years of service not exceeding five (5) years, and it
bases the amount of annuity on the retiree's last monthly salary.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, for purposes of computing her gratuity, Ocampo's last annual salary shall be that which she was
receiving at the time of her second retirement and her actual years of service shall be the sum of her
years of service both as ERB member and chairman, but not to exceed five (5) years. On the other hand,

EN BANC
A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA June 16, 2015
Re: Letter· of Court of Appeals Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso for Entitlement to Longevity Pay for His
Services as Commission Member III of the National Labor Relations Commission
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
Prefatory Statement
The Consolidated Cases
and the Affected Parties
For the Court’s consideration are the following: (1) letter-request dated August 22, 2012, of Court of
Appeals ( CA) Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando;1 (2) letter-request dated September 11,
2012, of CA Associate Justice Angelita A. Gacutan;2 and (3) motion for reconsideration3 dated November
7, 2012, of CA Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso.4
The petitioners are all Justices of the Court of Appeals. Justices Veloso and Fernando claim longevity pay
for services rendered within and outside the Judiciary as part of their compensation package . Justice
Gacutan, who has recently retired, claims deficiency payment of her longevity pay for the services she
had rendered before she joined the Judiciary, as well as a re-computation of her retirement pay to
include the claimed longevity pay.
Interest in the outcome of these consolidated cases goes beyond that of the petitioners; some
incumbent justices and judges, before joining the Judiciary, also served in the Executive Department and
would like to see these previous services credited in the computation of their longevity pay. Others who
had also previously served with the Executive Department currently enjoy longevity pay credit for their
executive service; they would like to see their mistakenly granted longevity pay credits maintained.
Thus, the Court’s decision on these consolidated cases, whether to find for or against the petitioners, will
likewise affect the interests of other judges and justices in similar circumstance, including several
members of this honorable court participating in these matters.
Antecedents
A. Letter-Request of Justice Salazar-Fernando
In her letter dated August 22, 2012,5 Justice Salazar-Fernando requested that her services as Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court ( MTC) of Sta. Rita, Pampanga, from February 15, 1983 to July 31, 1987, and as
Commissioner of the Commission on Elections ( COMELEC ), from February 14, 1992 to February 14,
1998, be considered as part of her judicial services "as in the case of Hon. Bernar do P. Pardo, Retired
82
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court." Accordingly, Justice Salazar-Fernando requested that her
longevity pay be adjusted "from the current 10% to 20% of [her] basic salary effective May 25, 1999."
We referred this letter-request to Atty. Eden T. Candelaria, Chief of the Office of Administrative Services
( OAS ), for study and recommendation.
In her February 18, 2013 Memorandum,6 Atty. Candelaria recommended that Justice Salazar-Fernando’s
services as MTC Judge be credited as judicial service that can be added to her present longevity pay.
Atty. Candelaria, however, recommended the denial of Justice Salazar-Fernando’srequest that her
services at the COMELEC be also credited for her present longevity pay. Nonetheless, she recommended
that Justice Salazar-Fernando’s services in the COMELEC be included in the computation of her longevity
pay upon retirement "as in the case of Justice Pardo."
B. Letter-Request of Justice Gacutan
In her letter7 dated September 11, 2012, Justice Gacutan requested that: (a) her services as
Commissioner IV of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) , from March 3, 1998 to
November5, 2009, be credited as judicial service for purposes of retirement; (b) she be given a longevity
pay equivalent to 10% of her basic salary; and (c) an adjustment of her salary, allowances and benefits be
made from the time she assumed as CA Justice on November 6, 2009. In the Court’s Resolution8 of
November 13, 2012, we required the Fiscal Management and Budget Office (FMBO ) to comment
onJustice Gacutan’s letter. In her Comment of January 4, 2013, Atty. Corazon G. Ferrer-Flores, Deputy
Clerk of Court and Chief of Office of the FMBO, recommended that: (1) Justice Gacutan’s request for the
crediting of her services as Commissioner IV of the NLRC as judicial service be granted, but only for
purposes of her retirement benefits, to take effect on her compulsory retirement on December 3,
2013;and (2) Justice Gacutan’s request that her salary and allowances be adjusted retroactive from her
assumption of office in the CA on November 6, 2009, be denied.9
C. Motion for Reconsideration of Justice Veloso
In his November 7, 2012 motion for reconsideration,10 Justice Veloso assailed the Court’s October 23,
2012 Resolution11 that denied his request for the crediting of his services as NLRC Commissioner as
judicial service for purposes of adjusting his salary and benefits, specifically his longevity pay.
Justice Veloso claimed that Republic Act No. (RA) 9347 which amended Article 216 of the Labor Code
should be applied retroactively since it is a curative statute. He maintained under this view that he
already had the rank of a CA Justice as NLRC Commissioner before he was appointed to the appellate
court on February 4, 2004.
We referred Justice Veloso’s motion for reconsideration to the FMBO for report and recommendation in
our Resolution of November 27, 2012.12
In her Report and Recommendation dated February 15, 2013,13 Atty. Ferrer-Flores recommended that
Justice Veloso’s motion for reconsideration be denied since the points he raised were a rehash of his
arguments in his July 30, 2012 letter-request.14

Our Rulings
I. Letter of Justice Salazar-Fernando in A.M. No. 13-02-07-SC
a. Services as MTC Judge
We grant the request of Justice Salazar-Fernando to credit as judicial service her previous services as
MTC Judge of Sta. Rita, Pampanga, as judicial service in the computation of her longevity pay.
Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Bilang ( B.P. Blg.) 129 provides:
Section 42. Longevity pay. – A monthly longevity pay equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic pay shall be
paid to the Justices and Judges of the courts herein created for each five years of continuous, efficient,
and meritorious service rendered in the judiciary; Provided, That in no case shall the total salary of each
Justice or Judge concerned, after this longevity pay is added, exceed the salary of the Justice or Judge
next in rank. [Italics supplied; emphasis and underscoring ours]
We find it undisputed that Justice Salazar-Fernando served as MTC Judge from February 15, 1983 to July
31, 1987. This service constitutes continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the Judiciary
and, hence, should be included in the computation of her longevity pay.
b. Service as COMELEC Commissioner
We deny, however, the inclusion of Justice Salazar-Fernando’s request to credit her services as COMELEC
Commissioner, from February 14, 1992 to February 14, 1998, as judicial service for longevity pay
purposes.
The only service recognized for purposes of longevity pay under Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 is service in
the Judiciary, not service in any other branch of government. The CO MELEC is an agency independent of
the Judiciary; hence, service in this agency cannot be considered as service rendered in the Judiciary.
We find Justice Salazar-Fernando’s invocation of the case of Justice Pardo, to support her claim to
longevity pay, misplaced.
b.1. Our Pardo Ruling
In In Re: Request of Justice Bernardo P. Pardo for Adjustment of His Longevity Pay,15 we held that the
inclusion of Justice Pardo’s service in the COMELEC in the computation of his longevity pay upon his
retirement was predicated on the factual circumstances peculiar to him: he was an incumbent CA Justice
when he was appointed COMELEC Chairman, and was appointed to the Supreme Court after his service
with the COMELEC, without any interruption in his service .
The Court ― based on its reading of Section 3 of B.P. Blg. 12916 ― did not consider his intervening
service in the COMELEC, an office outside the Judiciary, as a disruption of his service in the Judiciary.
83
Notably, the Court in In Re: Justice Pardo liberally interpreted the phrase "the Court" in Section 3 of BP
129 to mean the entire judiciary, not just the Court of Appeals. The provision reads:
Any member who is reappointed to the Court after rendering service in any other position in the
government shall retain precedence to which he was entitled under his original appointment, and his
service in the Court shall, for all intents and purposes , be considered as continuous and uninterrupted.
(emphases supplied)
This provision was an amendment to Section 3 of BP 129 which, as originally worded, referred only to
the organization of the CA, the appointment process of its justices, and the means by which seniority of
rank is determined among the CA justices. Executive Order No. 33 added this phrase, and hence Section
3 now reads as:
Sec. 3. Organization. There is hereby created a Court of Appeals which shall consist of a Presiding Justice
and fifty Associate Justices who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines. The Presiding
Justice shall be so designated in hi s appointment, and the Associate Justice shall have precedence
according to the dates of their respective appointments, or when the appointments of two or more of
them shall bear the same date, according to the order in which their appointments were issued by the
President. Any member w ho is reappointed to the Court after rendering in any other position in the
government shall retain the precedence to which he was entitled under his original appointment, and his
service in the Court shall, for all intents and purposes, be considered as continuous and uninterrupted.
Thus, had the Court given a more literal interpretation of the phrase added by EO No. 33,then it would
have interpreted its application to refer to an incumbent CA justice only. The phrase, after all, had been
added to Section 3 of BP 129, which referred to the organization of the CA. Following this interpretation,
Justice Pardo’s service in the COMELEC would not have been appreciated in determining his longevity
pay, as he was reappointed not to the CA, but to the Supreme Court.
Instead, the Court, taking a more liberal approach, interpreted the phrase "the Court" to mean the entire
judiciary. It noted that the additional phrase in Section 3 used the generic word "Court" instead of Court
of Appeals, and that to apply the stricter application of interpreting "Court" to mean "Court of Appeals"
would "lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers."
Thus, following this more liberal approach, Justice Pardo’s one-time service outside of the judiciary was
considered part of his service in the judiciary for purposes of determining hi s longevity pay. The same
may be applied, for instance, to a trial court judge who rendered service outside the judiciary and then
returned to being a member of the bench.
Thus, the Court’s ruling in In Re: Justice Pardo is authority for expanding EO No. 33’s amendment to
Section 3 of BP 129 to all members of the judiciary.
b.2. The liberal Pardo ruling cannot and should not be extended to allow members of the judiciary to
leave and return more than once, without interrupting the continuity of their service.
The next question to be asked, then, refers to the frequency by which members of the judiciary may be
able to serve in other branches of government without breaking their ‘continuo us and uninterrupted’
service. Did the ruling in Justice Pardo’s case allow members of the judiciary to leave for other branches

of government numerous times, and still maintain continuous and uninterrupted service in the judiciary?
The answer to this question is a resounding no.
A critical aspect of Justice Pardo’s case was the absence of any gap in his service from the time he was
appointed as Caloocan City Judge in 1974, until he retired as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court in
2002. He occupied the positions of District Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 34, Caloocan
City, from May 3, 1974 to January 17, 1983; Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 43, Manila, from January
18, 1983 to March 29, 1993; Associate Justice of the CA, from March 30, 1993 to February 16,
1995; Chairman, COMELEC, from February 17, 1995 to October 6, 1998; and Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court, from October 7, 1998 to February 10, 2002.
In these lights, Justice Pardo’s case has nothing to offer by way of jurisprudential precedent in terms of
determining whether Section 3 of BP 129 allows judges and justices to leave the judiciary several times
without breaking their continuous service. There was no occasion to rule on this issue, as Justice Pardo
left the judiciary only once, to serve in the COMELEC.
Proceeding from this conclusion, the next level of inquiry leads us to examine whether Section 3 of BP
129 allows multiple breaks in judicial office and considers these breaks as part of a continuous and
uninterrupted judicial service.
The amendment to Section 3, as worded and interpreted in In Re: Justice Pardo , refers to the
reappointment of a member of the judiciary after serving in another branch of government. The judge
shall retain the precedence to which he was entitled under his original appointment, and his judicial
service shall be considered uninterrupted.
This service outside the judiciary, however, should only occur once, as in Justice Pardo’s case. Section 3
refers to an original appointment , which is the first appointment by which a lawyer becomes a member
of the judiciary. As he progresses in the judiciary ― whether by staying in his original post or by being
appointed in other posts ― he acquires seniority, which is especially applicable in determining his
retirement and longevity pay. Once he leaves the judiciary, however, his original appointment is cut off;
hence, Section 3 can only refer to the judge’s return to the judiciary as a "reappointment." He needs to
get re-appointed back to the judiciary, as he is no longer part of it.
Section 3 works to bridge the gap between the time the judge left his original appointment and his
reappointment to the judiciary, provided the gap in service was rendered in another branch of
government. Once reappointed to the judiciary, however, he can no longer avail of Section 3, as Section
3 speaks of an original appointment. A second reappointment, after another service in a different
government agency, would be succeeding the first reappointment, and not the original appointment.
Section 3 operates to bridge an original appointment with a reappointment, and not to connect a
reappointment with a second appointment. Had the latter interpretation been the intent behind the law,
then it should and would have made this situation clearer.
Further, the application of Section 3 appears to be limited to service in a single position in government
outside of the judiciary. Section 3 speaks of "any other position in the government," and thus uses a
singular noun. After this single service, the judge or justice invoking the application of Section 3 must
have returned to the judiciary in order for his service to be deemed uninterrupted.
84
Additionally, it must not be lost on us that we have already given Section 3 a liberal interpretation in In
Re: Justice Pardo. To top this exercise of liberality with another liberal interpretation of the same
provision, when the law is clear regarding its application, would amount to judicial legislation that
furthers the interests within our ranks.
To recapitulate, Section 3 applies to any judge or justice, who left the judiciary, served in a single non-
judicial governmental post, and returned to the judiciary. This was what happened in the case of Justice
Pardo, when after a long and continuous service in the judiciary, he left to serve in the COMELEC and
from there was subsequently appointed to the Supreme Court.
b.3. Justice Fernando is not entitled to her request even under the liberal Pardo ruling.
Justice Salazar-Fernando effectively asks us in her present case to give her the benefit of our Pardo ruling
although the attendant facts of her case differ from those of Justice Pardo’s and do not approximate the
factual situation that Section 3 requires.
In the first place, her record shows that her services in between her judicial services were not continuous
and uninterrupted.
We find that after Justice Salazar-Fernando’s stint as MTC Judge in July 1987, she was named Chairman
of the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) where she served from August
1987 to February 13, 1992. During this period, she concurrently held directorship posts at the Light Rail
Transit Authority (LRTA) and at the Office of Transport Cooperatives (OTC). In the later part of
1991,Justice Salazar-Fernando held the position of Officer-in-Charge/Assistant Secretary of the Land
Transportation Office.
It was only after Justice Salazar-Fernando’s stints at the LTFRB, LRTA, and OTC all non-judicial offices that
she was appointed as Commissioner of the COMELEC on February 14, 1992, and served in this capacity
until February 15, 1998. Three (3) days later, or on February 18, 1998, she started to serve as a
consultant in the COMELEC until October 6, 1998.
Parenthetically, her service as consultant is not a "position in government" that should be considered a
part of her government service as she did not occupy any specific position in government. Moreover, it
was only five (5) months after her COMELEC consultancy, or on March 25, 1999, that Justice Salazar-
Fernando was appointed as Associate Justice of the CA. Thus, significant gaps in her judicial service
intervened so that her situation did not comply with the requirement in Section 3 that only a single non-
judicial position should intervene in her judicial service record.
Reduced to the bare essentials, the issue for us is whether we should apply with liberality a ruling that
had already been very liberally interpreted by this Court, under facts that do not entitle Justice Fernando
to recognition of continuous service under the requirements of Section 3.
Our brief and direct answer is that we cannot and must not allow the crediting of Justice Salazar
Fernando’ s COMELEC service for longevity pay purposes. Acceding to her request will constitute an
outright judicial legislation that the Court cannot undertake under the Constitution. As earlier noted,
Justice Salazar-Fernando’s de tails do not at all approximate the factual circumstances Section 3 of BP
129 that speaks of, nor the factual situation in In Re: Justice Pardo.

If we had been liberal in the past and this liberal ruling is now cited, we should, at the very least, not go
beyond the facts under which our past liberality had been extended. If we further read liberally a Court
ruling that only came to being because of past liberality, we stand to hear a re-echo of the charge that
this Court selectively applies its liberality in favor of its own . (In fact, a favorable ruling in these
consolidated cases may already raise eyebrows and questions as the Court will be ruling on matters that
will directly affect some of its participating Members .)
To sum up, Justice Salazar-Fernando’s services as COMELEC Commissioner cannot be included in the
computation of her longevity pay, now or upon her retirement .
II. Letter-Request of Justice Gacutan in A.M. No. 12-9-5-SC
a. Longevity Pay for Services as NLRC Commissioner
We deny Justice Gacutan’s request that her past services in the NLRC be recognized for purposes of her
longevity pay. She served as a Commissioner IV of the NLRC from March 3, 1998 to November 5, 2009, or
for a period of eleven years and eight months.
Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 is clear and explicit: a judge or justice should have rendered five years of
continuous, efficient and meritorious service in the Judiciary in order to qualify for a monthly longevity
pay equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic pay.
We point out that the NLRC is an agency attached to the Department of Labor and Employment – an
adjunct of the Executive Department – albeit for policy and program coordination only. Under the
circumstances, Justice Gacutan’s past service as NLRC Commissioner cannot be credited as judicial
service for longevity pay purposes since she did not render such service while with the Judiciary.
b. NLRC Services Considered in Retirement Pay
Nonetheless, Justice Gacutan’s service as NLRC Commissioner is creditable as part of overall government
service for retirement purposes under RA 910, as amended. Section 1 of this law provides:
Section 1. When a Justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals who has rendered at least
twenty years' service either in the judiciary or in any other branch of the Government, or in both, (a)
retires for having attained the age of seventy y ears, or (b) resigns by reason of his incapacity to
discharge the duties of his office, he shall receive during the residue of his natural life, in the manner
hereinafter provided, the salary which he was receiving at the time of his retirement or resignation. And
when a Justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals has attained the age of fifty-seven years
and has rendered at least twenty years' service in the Government, ten or more of which have been
continuously rendered as such Justice or as judge of a court of record, he shall be likewise entitled to
retire and receive during the residue of his natural life, in the manner also hereinafter prescribed, the
salary which he was then receiving. It is a condition of the pension provided for herein that no retiring
Justice during the time that he is receiving said pension shall appear as counsel before any court in any
civil case wherein the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party, or
in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense
committed in relation to his office, or collect any fee for his appearance in any administrative
proceedings to maintain an interest adverse to the Government, insular, provincial or municipal, or to
any of its legally constituted officers.
85
Considering the express wordings of RA 910, which include service "in all other branches of the
Government" as creditable service in the computation of the retirement benefits of a justice or judge,
Justice Gacutan’s service as NL RC Commissioner should be credited as part of her government service
for retirement purposes under RA 910, as amended.
III. Motion for Reconsideration of Justice Veloso in A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA
a. Background.
The chairman and members of the NLRC were entitled to receive an annual salary at least equivalent to
the allowances and benefits of the Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the CA, respectively, prior
to the amendment of Article 216 of the Labor Code by RA 9347 .
Under RA 9347 (which took effect on August 26, 2006),17 NLRC commissioners were given the equivalent
rank of a CA Justice. The Labor Code, as now amended by Section 4 of RA 9347, reads:
Article 216. Salaries, Benefits and Emoluments. The Chairman and members of the Commission shall
have the same rank , receive an annual salary equivalent to, and be entitled to the same allowances,
retirement and benefits as those of the Presiding and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals,
respectively. [italics supplied, emphasis ours]
In his present motion, Justice Veloso claims that RA 9347 should be given a retroactive application. With
the equivalent rank of a CA Justice from the time RA 9347 was amended, his service as NLRC
Commissioner should be considered as judicial service for purposes of his longevity pay.
b. Our ruling and the reasons therefore
b.1. RA 9347 does not provide for retroactivity.
We disagree with Justice Veloso’s position and thus deny his motion.
First, nothing in the language of RA 9347 expressly indicates the intention to give it retroactive effect.
We emphasize that statutes, as a rule, apply prospectively, unless the legislative intention to give them
retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used.18 In "case of
doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the retroactive effect."19
Nor is retroactivity discernible, even by implication, from the provisions of RA 9347. It is not implied from
the law’s legislative intent, nor from the deliberations in Senate Bill No. 2035 (which became RA 9347).20
In Re: Request of Retired Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo T. Ponferrada for Automatic Adjustment
of His Retirement Benefits to Include Special Allowance Under R.A. 9227,21 the Court refused to extend
the benefits provided by RA 9227 to official s of the Judiciary who retired prior to the passage of this law.
RA 9227 granted a special allowance to justices, judges, and all other positions in the Judiciary with the
equivalent rank of justices of the CA or judges of the RTC. Since the position of Deputy Court
Administrator (DCA) carries the same rank as an Associate Justice of the CA,22 retired DCA Ponferrada
asked for the inclusion of the RA 9227 special allowance in his retirement pay.

The Court denied the request, noting that RA 9227 did not expressly provide for retroactivity so that
those who had retired at the time of its enactment would be covered. Although the grant was extended
to retired SC and CA justices, this was justified under Section 3-A of RA 910, as amended, which states:
SEC. 3-A. In case the salary of Justices of the Supreme Court or of the Court Appeals is increased or
decreased, salary shall, for the purpose of this Act, be deemed to be the salary or the retirement pension
which a Justice x x x who retired was receiving at the time of his cessation in the office: Provided, That
any benefits that have already accrued prior to such increase or decrease shall not be affected
thereby.23 [underscore ours]
According to the Court, parity in rank and salary does not automatically mean parity in retirement
benefits under Section 3-A of RA 910. Notably, the automatic adjustment of retirement benefits was
expressly extended by RA 910, as amended, but only to Justices of the SC and the CA, not to judicial
officials with the equivalent rank. Additionally, since he retired prior to the passage of RA 9227, DCA
Ponferrada could not even invoke the automatic adjustment of his retirement pay under Section 3-A of
RA No. 910, as amended, to support his request.24
In the same way, RA 9347 was en acted into law only on July 27, 2006. Justice Veloso had, by then (on
February 4, 2004) left his post as NLRC Commissioner to assume the position of Associate Justice of the
Court of Appeals. In the absence of any clear intent to give RA 9347 any retroactive effect, Justice Veloso
cannot validly claim that he held the rank of a CA justice during his stint as NLRC Commissioner from
1989 to 2004.
b.2. RA 9347 is not a curative statute.
"A curative statute is enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings, instruments
or acts of public authorities[,] which would otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain
existing legal requirements."25Simply put, curative laws are enacted to validate acts done that otherwise
would be invalid under existing laws.
RA 9347 is not a curative statute since it was not intended to supply deficiencies, abridge superfluities in
existing laws, or curb evils; the insertion of the word "rank" in Article 216 was merely to emphasize the
increase in salaries and benefits of the NLRC Commissioners and labor arbiters.
b.3. Grant of Equivalent Rank is not Service in the Judiciary
At any rate, even if we recognize retroactivity as requested, the conferment of the rank of a CA Justice to
Justice Veloso during his tenure as NLRC Commissioner would not entitle him to longevity pay.
Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 is clear: a judge or justice shall be paid a monthly longevity pay equivalent to
5% of the monthly basic pay for each five years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service
rendered in the Judiciary. Service in the NLRC, even with the rank of a CA Justice, is not service with the
Judiciary for purposes of longevity pay. Justice Veloso’s service in the NLRC, however, m ay be credited
as part of his government service for retirement purposes under RA 910, as in the case of Justice
Gacutan .
IV. General Discussions
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With each of the consolidated petitions directly ruled upon, the following discussions are submitted to
expound on the conclusions reached and to generally comment on the issues the Dissents raised.
At the core of the issues raised is the question: should the past service of incumbent justices and judges,
rendered at the Executive Department, be recognized under Section 42 of BP 129 ( the longevity pay
provision ) on the ground that their previous executive positions now carry the rank, salary, and benefits
of their counterparts in the Judiciary?
The law governing this issue is of course the longevity pay provision, heretofore quoted,26 whose salient
points are summarized below:
1. The longevity pay is a monthly pay equivalent to 5% of monthly basic pay;
2. Recipients are the Justices and Judges of courts;
3. For each five years of continuous, efficient and meritorious service;
4. The service is to be rendered in the Judiciary;
5. In no case shall the total salary of each Justice or Judge, after his longevity pay is added,
exceed the salary of the Justice or Judge next in rank.
What would otherwise be a simple stand-alone provision is complicated by subsequent laws that grant
the same ranks, salaries and benefits.
- "as those of" their counterpart judge or justice (for the National Prosecution Service), or
- "as those of the Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals (for the
National Labor Relations Commission), and
- the [ "rank, prerogatives, salaries, allowances, benefits and privileges"] as their counterpart
Justice or Judge (for the Office of the Solicitor General).
These new levels of rank and salary are essentially what the present petitioners and the incumbent
justices and judges cite as basis for the grant or increase of their longevity pay.
Another complicating factor involves the past rulings of this Court where past executive service had been
recognized, not only for retirement pay purposes, but for longevity pay purposes upon retirement.
Interestingly, no in-depth look appears to have been made in these past rulings, although their results
cannot be in doubt ― the Court recognized past executive services for longevity pay purposes.
Interestingly, the Dissents, led by Justice De Castro, take a multi-pronged critique of the ponencia
generally chastising it for being overly strict in its reading of Section 42.
Among others, she posits that the ponencia disregards long established rulings of the Court on longevity
pay without a clear finding of the legal error made, and disregards as well the liberal interpretation the
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Court has applied in these rulings; that the ponencia disregards too the intent of the relevant laws Section 42 of this law has heretofore been quoted, but for convenience is again quoted below –
(referring to the subsequent laws that grants ranks, salaries and benefits similar to those of their
counterparts in the Judiciary), the legal presumption of legislative awareness, and consideration of prior
Section 42. Longevity pay . – A monthly longevity pay equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic pay shall be
laws and jurisprudence in enacting a statute; and claims that the contemporaneous construction given
paid to the Justices and Judges of the courts herein created for each five years of continuous, efficient,
by the Department of Justice and other Executive branch officers, which disc loses a similar treatment of
and meritorious service rendered in the judiciary ; Provided , That in no case shall the total salary of each
the longevity pay provision of Section 42, de serves the court’s respect. Last but not the least, Justice De
Justice or Judge concerned, after this longevity pay is added, exceed the salary of the Justice or Judge
Castro analyzes Section 42 and concludes that longevity pay is not a mere benefit but is a component of
next in rank. [italics supplied; emphasis and underscore ours ]
the salary that should not be withheld from executive officers with the same rank, salary and benefits as
their counterparts in the Judiciary.
As written, the language and terms of this provision are very clear and unequivocal: longevity pay is
granted to a judge or justice (and to none other) who has rendered five years of continuous, efficient
For his part, Justice Velasco essentially joins the Dissent of Justice De Castro and questions the
and meritorious service in the Judiciary. The granted monthly longevity pay is equivalent to 5% of the
ponencia’s proposal to "freeze" the longevity pay grants for justices and judges who have been credited
monthly basic pay.
with their past service in the Executive Department. He posits too that "what matters is their receiving,
for purposes of computing longevity pay, the salary of a Justice of the CA at the time they served as NLRC
Commissioners." If this is the case, Justice Veloso claims they should be credited with their service with The plain reading of Section 42 shows that longevity pay is not available even to a judicial officer who is
the NLRC for purposes of their longevity pay. not a judge or justice. It is likewise not available, for greater reason, to an officer in the Executive simply
because he or she is not serving as a judge or justice. It cannot also be available t o a judge or justice for
past services he or she did not render within the Judiciary as services rendered outside the Judiciary for
Faced with these complications and dissents, the Court should not forget that our duty, first and
purposes of longevity pay is not contemplated by law.
foremost, is to correctly interpret the law as written, not to stick to our past rulings at all costs nor to
consider our personal interests. In doing this, we must also be reminded that at the center of the dispute
is Section 42 of BP 129 – the provision on longevity pay that we must consider with a fresh eye. Significantly, the Court has had occasion to speak about the purpose of longevity pay. In In Re: Request
of Justice Bernardo P. Pardo for Adjustment of His Longevity Pay,28 the Court categorically declared that
the purpose of the law in granting longevity pay to judges and justices is to recompense them for each
The consolidated cases, too, do not embody claims by executive officers against their own Department
five y ears of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the Judiciary; it is the long service
for the enforcement of what the law involving their Department provides. These cases involve claims by
in the Judiciary - from the lowest to the highest court of the land – and not in any other branch of
CA justices – members of the Judiciary – who look up to laws involving the Executive Department to
government, that is rewarded,29
secure, maintain or increase the longevity pay that provides benefit for judges and justices. Our primary
focus, however, must be the interpretation of our own law ― BP 129 and its Section 42.
In the case of the judge or justice now asking for the tacking of his/her past executive service, the reason
for the denial is simple and needs no intricate or complicated exercise in interpretation: these past
A. Statutory Construction & Interpretation Perspectives
services were undertaken outside the Judiciary and are not the services the law contemplates. The
tacking, to put it bluntly, violates the clear purpose and wording of Section 42 of BP 129.
a. First rule of statutory construction: the plain meaning rule.
To look at Section 42 from another perspective, if indeed (as some would argue) the intent is to grant
The primary rule in addressing any problem relating to the understanding or interpretation of a law (in executive officers longevity pay pursuant to their respective grants of benefits similar to that provided
this case, the provision granting longevity pay) is to examine the law itself to see what it plainly says. This under Section 42 of BP 129, this presumed grant should be understood to be limited to the executive
is the plain meaning rule of statutory construction.27 officer’s continued, efficient and meritorious service in the Executive Department, to be given while the
executive officer is still with that department.
The first aspect that offers itself in the examination of the law is its title, which gives us a direct indicator
of the exact subject matter of the law. In the present cases, the law under which the disputed longevity When the public officer with equivalent rank, salary and benefits transfers to the Judiciary , the longevity
provision can be found is B.P. Blg. 129, An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefore pay to which he may have been entitled under the law applicable to his previous Executive Department
and For Other Purposes (simplified as BP 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980). position, and which he may have been receiving because of his continued service in that department,
will simply have to be disregarded and discontinued.
This title alone already suggests that its provisions specifically relate to members of the judiciary, unless
an express contrary intent is made by the legislature. No such exception clause is evident under the At the point of transfer, Section 42 of BP 129 will now apply and operate, and will require five (5) years
terms of BP 129 or in any of the other related laws (specifically, in R. A. 9347, 9417, and 10071) discussed of continued and efficient service in the Judiciary before it can start to be earned. This application may
in this ponencia . sound hard and illiberal, but this is the logical consequence of the combined effect of the Judiciary’s BP
129 longevity provision and the laws granting parity to benefits applicable to the Judiciary.
As discussed more extensively below, these other general laws do not specifically mention at all the
longevity provision under BP 129, a specific grant made only to the judges and justices in the Judiciary.

To reiterate for emphasis, for a transferring public official, now a new justice or judge, to be entitled to
longevity pay under the terms of Section 42, he must first render continued, efficient and meritorious
service in the Judiciary for at least five years; his prior continued service in his previous department will
not and should not be counted.
b. The general laws that the Dissents cite cannot prevail over a specific law.
General laws (such as Republic Act Nos. [RA] 9347, 9417, and 10071) that generally grant the same ranks,
salaries and benefits to public officers in the Executive Department as those of their specified
counterparts in the Judiciary, cannot prevail over a special law such as BP 129 that specifically grants
longevity pay solely to justices and judges who have rendered five (5) years of continuous, efficient, and
meritorious service rendered in the Judiciary.
A basic principle of statutory construction is that a special law prevails over a general law.30 A later
enactment like RA 9347 and RA 10071 cannot override BP 129 because the latter, as a special law, must
prevail regardless of the dates of the enactment of these other laws.31
As we held in Hon. Bagatsing v. Judge Ramirez,32 a general provision must give way to a particular
provision. As a special provision on the grant of longevity pay, Section 42 of BP 129 governs and is
controlling; to hold otherwise, as the dissent suggests, is to violate its clear mandate.
Following the rule on general and special laws, the general laws granting the same salaries and benefits
cannot apply to the longevity pay provision that, by its specific and express terms, is solely for the
benefit of judges and justices who have shown loyal service to the Judiciary; it is not for those who have
been granted similar ranks, salaries and benefits as those of their counterpart judges and justices. That
they cannot be beneficiaries of longevity pay is clinched by its purpose – the reward is intended for those
with loyal service to the Judiciary.
c. Is there room for liberality in reading and interpreting Section 42?
As a general rule and contrary to the Dissent’s view, no room or occasion exists for any liberal
construction or interpretation; only the application of the letter of the law is required by basic statutory
construction principles.
We should not forget that liberality is not a magic wand that can ward off the clear terms and import of
express legal provisions; it has a place only when, between two positions that the law can both
accommodate, the Court chooses the more expansive or more generous option. It has no place where no
choice is available at all because the terms of the law are clear and do not at all leave room for
discretion.
In terms of the longevity pay’s purpose, liberality has no place where service is not to the Judiciary, as
the element of loyalty – the virtue that longevity pay rewards – is not at all present.
We cannot overemphasize too that the policy of liberal construction cannot and should not be to the
point of engaging in judicial legislation – an act that the Constitution absolutely forbids this Court to do.
We may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute or include, under its terms,
situations that were not provided nor intended by the lawmakers. We cannot rewrite the law to conform
to what we think should be the law.
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In the present case, where the law is clear, we should likewise be clear and decisive in its application lest
we be accused of favoritism or accommodating former colleagues, or indirectly, ourselves, who will all
inevitably retire from our judicial posts.
d. Administrative construction is merely advisory and is not binding upon the courts.
We take exception to the Dissent’s invocation of the doctrine of contemporaneous construction to
support its expansive reading of RA 9347 in relation with Section 42 of BP 129.
The Dissent conveniently fails to mention that contemporaneous constructions of administrative or
executive agencies are merely at best advisory and not binding on the courts, for by the Constitution and
the law, the courts are given the task of finally determining what the law means.33
We do so under our authority to state what the law is34 and deference to an agency’s statutory
interpretation should be withheld whenever it conflicts with the language of the statute, as in the
present case.
In Peralta v. Civil Service Commission,35 the Court had occasion to state and held:
Administrative construction, if we may repeat, is not necessarily binding upon the courts. Action of an
administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law,
or abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the
letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment.
Thus, while the Executive possesses discretion in the implementation of laws, we should not forget the
reason for the Judiciary’s existence. We are the interpreters of the law and the Constitution, not the
Executive, and when a legal error exists, we must step in and intervene, however long and hard the
Executive’s previous implementation of the law had been.
e. The question of Judicial Legislation
Judicial legislation, in simplest terms, happens when the Court adds to what the law provides and does
so in the guise of interpretation, as the present dissents now want to do by seeking to tack and to credit,
for longevity pay purposes, the past services that justices and judges rendered in the Executive
Department.
In fact, in their discussions, the Dissents take the view that the ponencia has engaged in judicial
legislation because it restricts the concept of salary merely to the "basic pay."
This Resolution does, in fact, reflect the views imputed to it and it has not been shy or hesitant from the
very start in taking this position. But rather than being narrow and illiberal in doing this, we believe that
our position hews to the letter of the law so that our stance cannot be the basis for the charge of judicial
legislation.
Judicial legislation in fact transpires when the Court reads into the law an interpretation that the four
corners of that law cannot b ear. This expansive interpretation – i.e., that the term "salary" under Section
42 includes longevity pay so that equivalency of "salary" translates to the mandatory recognition of

longevity pay – is unfortunately what the dissents espouse, driven perhaps by thoughts of what the law
ought to be.
What "ought to be" as a matter of policy is not within the jurisdiction of this Court to decide upon. The
Court eloquently spoke in Canet v. Mayor Decena about this judicial limit, albeit in the context of
discussing the maxim expression unius est exclusio alterius (literally, what is expressed puts an end to
what is implied). The Court said:36
In other words, it is a basic precept of statutory construction that the express mention of one person,
thing, act, or consequence excludes all others, as expressed in the oft-repeated maxim expressio unius
est exlusio alterius. Elsewise stated, expressium facit cessare tacitum – what is expressed puts an end to
what is implied. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislative body would not have made
specific enumerations in a statute, if it had the intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms
to those expressly mentioned.
Even on the assumption that there is in fact a legislative gap caused by such an omission, neither could
the Court presume otherwise and supply the details thereof, because a legislative lacuna cannot be filled
by judicial fiat. Indeed, courts may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and
include therein situations not provided nor intended by the lawmakers. An omission at the time of the
enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however after later wisdom
may recommend the inclusion. Courts are not authorized to insert into the law what they think should
be in it or to supply what they think the legislature would have supplied if its attention has been called to
the omission.
Courts should not, by construction, revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislature,
nor rewrite the law to conform with what they think should be the law. Nor may they interpret into the
law a requirement which the law does not prescribe. Where a statute contains no limitations in its
operation or scope, courts should not engraft any. And where a provision of law expressly limits its
application to certain transactions, it cannot be extended to other transactions by interpretation. To do
any of such things would be to do violence to the language of the law and to invade the legislative
sphere. [emphases ours]
Applied to the present consolidated cases, we cannot go beyond the terms of Section 42 by expanding its
terms to what it does not include: when the law speaks of service "in the Judiciary," it means what it says
and cannot include service outside the Judiciary. To relate this to the statutory construction rule
discussed above give n the express and clear terms of the law, the basic rule to apply is: "legislative
intent is to be determined from the language employed, and where there is no ambiguity in the words,
there is no room for construction."37
B. The Grant of Rank, Benefits and their Implications
a. Judicial Rank and Executive Rank.
The grant of a "rank" equivalent to (or even "the same as" ) "those of the" grantee’s counterpart judge
or justice is a matter that has not been the subject of extensive jurisprudential c overage. Hence, the
subject of this Resolution proceeds on a path that so far remains untrodden. The novelty of the issue
posed need not deter us as the matters before us call for resolution and should be written about if only
to serve as guides for the future.
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The Judiciary recognizes the ranks that the law accords to judges and justices. These judicial ranks wholly
pertain to the Judiciary as an independent, separate and co-equal branch of government. Under our
current constitutional set-up, no legislative or executive grant, fiat or recognition of rank can make the
grantee, who is not a judge or justice, a judicial officer, without violating the constitutional principles of
separation of powers and independence of the Judiciary.
As a consequence, the grant of rank at the same level as the grantees’ counterpart judges or justices is
not and cannot be a conferment of "judicial rank" and does not thereby accord the grantees recognition
as members of the Judiciary. For incumbent judges and justices who had previous government service
outside the Judiciary , it follows that the grant of rank to them under their old executive positions does
not render their service in these previous positions equivalent to and creditable as judicial service, unless
Congress by law says otherwise and only for purposes of entitlement to salaries and benefits.
To be sure, Congress can create and recognize ranks outside of the Judiciary that are equivalent to the
ranks it has created for the Judiciary, but again, this recognition doe s not thereby create "judicial ranks"
outside of the Judiciary, nor constitute the grantees of these ranks as judges and justices. Technically,
what Congress creates or grants are executive ranks that are equivalent to judicial ranks.
Notably, even for those within the Judiciary itself, the recognition of "judicial rank" in favor of those who
are not justices or judges does not thereby make the grantee a justice or a judge who is entitled to this
formal title; the grantee may be entitled to the benefits of the rank but he/she remains an administrative
official in the Judiciary, separate and distinct from the justices and judges who directly exercise judicial
power, singly or collegially.
b. Commonalities and Divergence of Terms and Conditions of Government Service.
The principle of separation of powers between the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches of
government ordains that each of these three (3) great branches of government has exclusive cognizance
of, and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere.38
Each branch cannot invade the domain of the others.39 This principle presupposes mutual respect by and
between the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial departments and entitles them to be left alone to
discharge their assigned duties as they see fit.40
We generally draw attention to this constitutional principle to emphasize that while all officials in the
three branches of government are government officials, vast differences may exist in the terms and
conditions of their government service; these are ultimately traceable to the separation of power
principle.
Government officials perform specifically assigned functions peculiar to their respective departments
and these functions justify their differing terms and conditions of government service. In the context of
the present consolidated cases, distinctions must necessarily exist between one who is appointed to the
position of a judge or justice, (which position carries law-defined salaries, benefits, and conditions
specific to judges and justices), and one who is appointed to an executive position with the equivalent
rank, salary or benefits of a justice or judge in the Judiciary.
The extent to which those with equivalent executive and judicial ranks have commonalities or diverge in
their salaries and benefits is a matter that the Constitution leaves, within limits, to the discretion of the

Legislature as a matter of policy. What is important to recognize is the legal reality that the divergence of
salaries and benefits across government, even among those with equivalent ranks, is not at all unusual
because these positions belong to different branches of government and undertake functions peculiar to
their departments.
A convenient example to cite is the allowance benefit that members of the Office of the Solicitor General
are given as peculiarly their own – honoraria and allowances from client departments, agencies and
instrumentalities.41Members of the Judiciary do not enjoy these same benefits.
On the part of the Judiciary, the disputed longevity pay also serves as a good example. By its terms,
longevity pay is peculiar to the Judiciary as discussed above. Significantly, in all the cited laws that grant
similarity of ranks, salaries, and benefits between executive officials and their counterparts in the
Judiciary, no mention at all is made of longevity pay and its enjoyment outside the Judiciary. Longevity
pay, of course, is not unique as a feature of judicial life that is wholly the Judiciary’s own; there are other
benefits that the Judiciary enjoys – by law, by rule or by practice – that are not replicated in the
executive agencies, in the same manner that there are benefits in executive agencies that the Judiciary
does not share.
In this sense, it approximates the absurd to claim that the grant of the "same" benefits to executive
officials with the "same" rank should encompass all the benefits that the comparator judge or justice
enjoys.
b.1. The Question of Fairness.
A tempting question to raise when comparisons are made across branches of government and when
equivalency of salaries and benefits comes into focus, is the essential fairness, or lack of it, that results or
should result.
The Judiciary, for example, may raise the point – if we are the comparators and all our benefits should be
enjoyed by the Solicitors, is there no resulting unfairness because no la w grants the Judiciary the same
privilege of enjoying the benefits that the Office of the Solicitor General enjoys?
To be sure, unfairness may factually result, but this is not a matter for the Judiciary to examine in the
absence of a case where this factual issue is raised and is relevant. Nor is there any indefensible
inequality as a matter of law viewed from the prism of the legal measuring standard ― the equal
protection clause. Notably, the Judiciary and the Executive Department belong to different branches of
government whose roles and functions in government differ as pointed out above. Thus, ground/s for
distinctions may exist that render any seeming unfairness not legally objectionable.
If the issue of unfairness will surface at all, this would transpire when the terms of the longevity
provision under BP 129 would be disregarded, i.e., if longevity pay would be recognized in favor of the
NLRC, the prosecutors and the solicitors under the terms of their respective laws, when longevity pay –
by the express terms fashioned out by Congress – should be granted only to those who have served
continuous, efficient, and meritorious service in the judiciary.
Similarly unfair would be the tacking of previous services outside of the Judiciary rendered by judges and
justices, incumbent or retired, for purposes of longevity pay under Section 42. Of course, the main issue
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in this situation would be legality, but this situation, to our mind, is one that is both illegal and unfair.
Unfairness comes in because of the grant of what is not legally due.
D. The Salary and Longevity Pay
a. The Applicable Law on Salary
An examination of BP 129 shows that its Section 41 treats of "salaries" of judges, while Section 42
provides for longevity pay.
Under Section 41, the "salaries" or compensation (and allowances) that judges shall receive shall be the
amount that the President may authorize following the guidelines set fort h in Letter of Implementation
(LOI) No. 93, pursuant to Presidential Decree (PD) No. 985, as amended by PD 1597.
PD 985, as amended by PD 1597, implemented a position classification and compensation
standardization scheme (Scheme) :
(1) under which positions are classified by occupational groups, series and classes according
to the similarities or differences in duties, responsibilities, and qualification requirements;
and
(2) by which the rates of pay for each of the positions and employee groups/classes are
determined according to the salary and wage schedules fixed by the Decree to be uniformly
app lied to all belonging to a particular position.
Under Section 4 of PD 985, this position classification and compensation standardization scheme shall
apply to all positions in the national government, that under PD 1597’s amendment now includes the
justices and judges in the Judiciary.
Section 11 of PD 985 provides for the "Salary Schedule " under the compensation system for positions pa
id on annual or monthly basis. The Schedule consists of twenty-eight grades with each grade having eight
prescribed steps. Each grade represents a level of work difficulty and responsibility that distinguishes it
from the other grades in the Schedule. Each class of position in the Position Classification System is
assigned a "salary grade" and determines the position’s salary rate.42
Under the Scheme, every covered position receives a "salary" or compensation corresponding to the
position’s "salary grade" under the "Salary Schedule." Otherwise stated, all covered positions or
employees belonging to a particular "salary grade," regardless of the department, bureau, office, etc., to
which they belong, shall receive the same "salary rate," expressed as annual, in pesos, as fixed under the
"Salary Schedule" (subject to certain salary rate increments for each step within each salary grade). In
short, a particular "salary grade" equates to a specific, fixed "salary rate."
Prior to its amendment by PD 1597, Section 4 of PD 985 exempted from the position classification and
compensation standardization scheme the following positions or group of government officials and
employees: (1) elected officers and those whose compensation is fixed by the Constitution; (2) heads of
executive departments and officials of equivalent rank: (3) chiefs of diplomatic missions, ministers, and
Foreign Service officers; (4) Justices and Judges of the Judicial Department; (5) members of the armed

forces; (6) heads and assistant heads of GOCCs, including the senior management and technical
positions; (7) heads of state universities and colleges; (8) positions in the career executive service; and
(9) provincial, city, municipal and other local government officials and employees. The salaries or
compensation and allowances of these exempted positions are those to be authorized by the President.
Pursuant to PD 985’s mandate, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Letter of Implementation (L OI
93) adopting an integrated compensation scheme for positions in the Judiciary. In almost the same
fashion as PD 985, Para graph 3.0 of LOI 93 enumerated the various positions in the Judicial Component
of the Judiciary, i.e., Justices and Judges of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court
of Tax Appeals, Court of Agrarian Relations, the First and Second Level Courts, the Clerks of Court of the
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, and the corresponding "salary rates" for each position, expressed
as annual, in pesos.
With PD 1597’s amendment, those previously exempted positions, i.e., Justices and Judges of the Judicial
Department, are now included in the coverage of Section 4 of PD 985. PD 985, as amended by PD 1597,
now limits the exemptions to elected officers; to those whose compensation is fixed by the Constitution;
and to local government officials and employees.
Note that Section 11 of PD 985, as amended by PD 1597, and even Paragraph 3.0 of LOI 93, provided for
fixed "salary rates" for each "salary grade" expressed as annual, in pesos. As matters now stand, the
"salary" or compensation that an employee or a position in the government will receive is the prevailing
"salary rate," fixed under the "Salary Schedule," that corresponds to the employee or position’s "salary
grade."
The "salary rate" as expressed in annual fixed rates, based on the "salary grade" referred to under LOI 93
pursuant to PD 985, as amended by PD 1597 is the "salary" referred to in Section 41 of BP 129, i.e., an
amount or salary rate fixed as annual, in pesos, that is based on the recipient’s salary grading.
b. Longevity Pay under Section 42.
Section 42 of BP 129 provides for the payment and the manner of computing longevity pay, i.e., to be
paid monthly, based on the recipient’s monthly basic pay at the rate of 5% for each five years of
continuous, efficient and meritorious service rendered in the judiciary. Note that the amount of
longevity pay to which a recipient shall be entitled is not a fixed amount, in contrast with the "salary"
under Section 41; it is a percentage of the recipient’s monthly basic pay which, at the least, is equivalent
to 5%.
Also, the payment of longevity pay is premised on a continued, efficient, and meritorious service: (1) in
the Judiciary; and (2) of at least five years. Long and continued service in the Judiciary is the basis and
reason for the payment of longevity pay; it rewards the loyal and efficient service of the recipient in the
Judiciary.
From these perspectives, longevity pay is both a branch specific (i.e., to the judges and justices of the
Judiciary) and conditional (i.e., due only upon the fulfillment of certain conditions) grant. In negative
terms, it is not an absolute grant that is easily transferrable to other departments of government.
b.1. Salary and Longevity Pay compared.
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In contrast with longevity pay, the "salary" under Section 41 entitles the official or employee to its
receipt from day one (or the first day of the first month) of his service. Its basis or reason for payment is
the actual performance of service or assigned duties, without regard to the months or years the recipient
has been rendering the service.
Note, too, that the service contemplated under Section 42 for entitlement to longevity pay is service in
the judiciary. This intent is clear not only from Section 42’s explicit use of the word "judiciary" to qualify
"service," but also from the title of the statute to which this specific provision belongs, i.e., "The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980." In these lights, the "same salary" that Article 216 of the Labor Code speaks
of and to which the NLRC Commissioners shall be entitled, should be read and understood as the salary
under Section 41 or the "salary rate," as provided under the "Salary Schedule" that corresponds to the
"salary grade" of their counterpart justice or judge. Other laws that grant other public officers in the
executive department with the "same salary" as their counterpart justice or judge (i.e., RA Nos. 9417 and
10071) should likewise be read and understood in this way.
b.2. Nature of Longevity Pay.
Based on these considerations, longevity pay should be treated as a benefit or an "add-on" and not a
part, let alone an integral component of "salary," contrary to the Dissents’ position.
This consequence necessarily results as "salary" and longevity pay: (1) are treated under different
sections of BP 129; (2) have different bases for determination or computation; and (3) have different
reasons for the payment or grant.
In addition, Section 42 of BP 129 does not categorically state that the monthly longevity pay shall form
part of the "salary" or is an integral or inseparable component of “salary.” Even the most liberal
interpretation of Section 42 does not reveal any intention to treat longevity pay in this manner ― as
part, or as an integral component, of “salary.”
On the contrary, Section 42 makes it clear that the "salary," which the Dissents submit serve as basis of
the "salary" of executive officers with the same rank of a justice or judge, is that referred to or
contemplated in Section 41.
b.3. Section 42 Analyzed.
Note in this regard that the last clause of Section 42 which states that: "in no case shall the total salary of
each Justice or Judge concerned, after this longevity pay is added , exceed the salary of the Justice or
Judge next in rank."
The use of the term "total salary" under the first portion of Section 42’s last clause, presupposes an
addition of components, and should be understood to refer to the total compensation received . This
"total salary" is the "salary" (or the salary rate fixed under the "Salary Schedule" as the recipient’s
monthly compensation corresponding to his "salary grade") plus the "add-on" longevity pay (or that
portion or percentage of the "salary" as fixed under the Salary Schedule) equivalent to at least 5% of the
monthly salary.
In formula form, this should read –

Section 41 Salary + Section 42 Longevity Pay = Total Salary
Where:
Salary = monthly salary rate of position per the Salary Schedule
Longevity Pay = monthly salary rate x 5%.
That the word "total" was added to "salary" under the first portion of Section 42’s last clause, in no way
signifies that longevity pay is an integral part of the "salary" which a Justice or Judge will receive each
month by virtue of his position/rank/salary grade.
The word "total" was added simply to qualify "salary" (the recipient’s "salary" fixed under the "Salary
Schedule") plus any longevity pay to which he may be entitled. This treatment, to be sure, does not make
the longevity pay a part of the "salary."
In short, "total" simply modified "s alary," and in effect denotes that amount received or to be received
as total compensation, and distinguishes this resulting amount from the "salary" received each month by
virtue of the position/salary grade.
Note, too, the word "salary" under the last portion of Section 42’s last clause which is not qualified or
modified by the word "total," in contrast with the "total salary" under the first portion.
The last portion states: the salary of the Justice or Judge next in rank: this "salary" of the Justice or Judge
next in rank should not be exceeded by the "total salary" (or total compensation) of the recipient. The
"salary" under the last phrase, when read together with the "total salary" under the first phrase, shows
that "salary" is distinct, and to be pa id separately from longevity pay, so that the latter cannot be an
integral part of "salary."
To sum up, the "same salary" to be received by the public officials in the Executive Department, with the
same rank of justice or judge, is the "salary" of the justice or judge under Section 41. The "salary"
referred to in Section 41, in turn, and as explained above, is the "salary rate" fixed under the "Salary
Schedule" corresponding to the position’s "salary grade."
Notably, Justice De Castro’s proposition that the term "salary" constitutes the basic monthly salary plus
the longevity pay when the Congress enacted RA Nos. 9417, 9347, and 10071 is not reflected in any of
the congressional deliberations. What the deliberations clearly reveal is simply the intention to increase
the "salaries" of the covered public officers in the Executive Department to the level of the "salaries"
received by or granted to their counterpart in the Judiciary.
This "salary" cannot but refer to the fixed sum that the system of "salary rate," "Salary Schedule," and
"salary grade" speaks of. It cannot refer to the variable amount of "total salary" that the dissent refers
to, as the basis or comparator cannot be a variable amount that reflects the seniority that a judge or
justice has attained after years in the service.
Ironically, Justice De Castro’s cited case – Re Longevity pay of Justices of the Sandiganbayan, appearing
at page 42 of this ponencia – best illustrates how the "salary" and "total salary" concepts operate.
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E. The complete parity that the dissent advocates is a policy matter that Congress has not so far
expressed.
The legislative history and record of the laws (that grant the same ranks, salaries, and benefits to officers
in the Executive department equivalent to their specified counterparts in the Judiciary) do not support
the Dissent’s view that these laws grant full parity in rank, salaries, and benefits or equal treatment
between the executive officers/grantees and the comparator judges and justices whose longevity pay
arises from BP 129.
In fact, the legislative history and record of these statutes positively show that Congress has not yet gone
as far as the Dissents would want them to go―to recognize full parity that includes the grant of longevity
pay under BP 129 to executive officers in the Executive Department.
As the discussions below will show, the Dissent, without delving deep into legislative history and record
of the statutes it cited as bases, took the easy route of resorting to hasty generalizations to support its
tenuous theory that these laws operate under the principle of " equal in qualifications and equal in rank,
equal in salaries and benefits received."
This interpretative route may be easy but is a very dangerous one in its implications, as Congress has not
in any way shown that it has intended officers with the same rank and qualifications across government
to receive equal pay and equal benefits.
For this kind of "equalization" to prevail, the government must be ready to embark on a comparison, not
only of rank and qualifications, but on the quantification of job content and valuation of jobs of equal
value, involving similar or allied activities undertaken across government.
This is the requirement that the "equal pay for equal work" principle established in jurisdictions with
more advanced social legislation than the Philippines.43 To be sure, this is a serious policy matter that,
under the terms of the Constitution, is not for this Court but for Congress to establish .
To fully support these contentions, we embark on a brief look into the laws that the Dissent itself cited.
a. RA 934744 affecting the NLRC.
RA 9347 lapsed into law on July 27, 2006. This law was passed to address the then urgent need to
improve the administrative and operational efficiency of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), particularly its rate of disposition of pending cases and the reduction of its ballooning backlog of
labor cases.45 In dealing with these issues, Congress then focused on measures that would encourage
productivity and efficiency and boost the morale of NLRC officials.
The congressional measures Congress passed included the increase in the number of commissioner-
members of the NLRC, the creation of positions for commission attorneys who would assist the NLRC
commissioners in deciding the labor cases, and a provision for retirement benefits to NLRC
commissioners and labor arbiters equivalent to the retirement benefits of justices of the CA and judges
of the RTCs, respectively.

In appreciating RA 9347, note that as early as Presidential Decree No. (PD) 442, the commissioners of the
NLRC were already given the same salary and benefits as justices of the CA . As the old Article 216 of the
Labor Code provided, before the amendment:
Article 216. Salaries, benefits and other emoluments. The Chairman and members of the Commission
shall receive an annual salary at least equivalent to, and be entitled to the same allowances and benefits
as those of the Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, respectively. The
Executive Labor Arbiters shall receive an annual salary at least equivalent to that of an Assistant Regional
Director of the Department of Labor and Employment and shall be entitled to the same allowances and
benefits as that of a Regional Director of said Department. The Labor Arbiters shall receive an annual
salary at least equivalent to, and be entitled to the same allowances and benefits as that of an Assistant
Regional Director of the Department of Labor and Employment. In no case, however, shall the provision
of this Article result in the diminution of existing salaries, allowances and benefits of the aforementioned
officials. (As amended by Section 8, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)46
This old provision did not include retirement benefits in its wording. Thus, as enumerated, entitlement to
equivalence was limited to salaries, allowances and benefits. To address the perceived legislative gap,
the amendatory RA 9347 expressly included the word retirement in the enumeration. This grant applied
to both commissioners and labor arbiters of the NLRC.
Aside from this observation, note too that the old Article 216 of the Labor Code did not give labor
arbiters the salary, allowances and benefits equivalent to those of the Regional Trial Court (RTC ) judges.
Apart from addressing the issue on retirement benefits, RA 9347 also sought to deal with the then
situation of labor arbiters in terms of their salaries and emoluments.
Thus, the congressional intent in RA 9347 was to deal with two gaps in PD 442 with respect to the
salaries, benefits, and emoluments of the members of the NLRC.
The first was the grant of salaries and benefits to labor arbiters equivalent to those of RTC judges, and
the second was the express inclusion of the retirement benefits of the labor arbiters and NLRC
commissioners at the levels equivalent to those of RTC judges and CA justices, respectively.
In the discussions and exchanges among the members of Congress – among them, the explanatory note
of Senator Ramon Revilla Jr. in Senate Bill No. 120447 and the sponsorship speech of Senator Jinggoy
Ejercito Estrada of Senate Bill No. 2035 (the senate bill that led to RA 9347)48 – nowhere did they deal
with the issue of longevity pay as a benefit that should be accorded to labor arbiters and commissioners
of the NLRC.
In this light, we believe that to make the hasty generalization that the word benefit as enumerated in
Article 216 of the Labor Code should include longevity pay would run counter to the intention of the law.
Note that had it been the intent of Congress to give the labor arbiters and commissioners of the NLRC all
the benefits enjoyed by the members of the Judiciary as provided in BP 129 and in other laws specifically
applicable to members of the Judiciary, then it should not have amended Article 216 of the Labor Code
by including "retirement benefits" in the enumeration. Congress should have left the provision as it is
since it already provides for the general term benefit.
Parenthetically, retirement pay is a specific form of allowance under the general term benefits. Congress
had to include this item as an express benefit precisely because the use of the general word benefit in
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the old Article 216 of the Labor Code did not include all the benefits then being enjoyed by judges and
justices of the Judiciary.
In providing for retirement benefits, Congress significantly did not simply state that the NLRC shall enjoy
the terms and benefits of judges and justices under their retirement law, RA 910, where longevity pay is
a special and specific provision. Congress contented itself with the plain insertion of "retirement pay"
and stopped there.
Thus, as matters now stand, NLRC officials retire under the retirement law applicable to executive
officials, with parity of the terms of this retirement law with those of their counterparts in the Judiciary.
Retirement benefits specific to the Judiciary, however, were not and should not be interpreted to be
wholly included.
b. RA 941749 affecting the OSG.
RA 9417 passed into law on March 30, 2007. As in the case of RA 9347, this law was passed to address
the plight of the members of the Office of the Solicitor General ( OSG ) by upgrading their salaries and
benefits to improve their efficiency as the Republic’s counsel.
In the sponsorship speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile regarding Senate Bill No. 2249, the predecessor
Senate Bill of RA 9417, Senator Enrile pointed out that the Senate’s Committee on Justice and Human
Rights, in crafting Senate Bill 2249, aimed to address the following issues regarding the OSG:
1. Increase the number of staff of the OSG and upgrade their positions;
2. Increase the existing 15 legal divisions of the OSG to 30;
3. Provide health care services, insurance coverage and scholarship and other benefits to all
OSG employees subject to the availability of funds;
4. Grant franking privileges to the OSG;
5. Establish a provident fund within the OSG; and
6. Grant retirement benefits to qualified employees.50
As in the case of the NLRC, it must again be noted that this enumeration is specific with respect to the
benefits granted to members of the OSG: it particularly referred to the benefits to be granted. Although
Section 3 of RA 941751 provides that the Solicitor General shall have the same qualifications for
appointment, rank, prerogatives, salaries, allowances, benefits and privileges as the Presiding Justice of
the CA (and an Assistant Solicitor General as that of a CA Associate Justice), RA 9417 still allocated
express provisions for the other benefits to be enjoyed by the members of the OSG. These provisions are
the following:
Section 4- Compensation52

Section 5- Benefits and Privileges53
Section 6- Seminar and Other Professional Fees54
Section 7- Transportation Benefits55
Section 8- Other Benefits56
Section 10- Grant of Special Allowances57
Had Congress really intended to grant the benefit of longevity pay to the members of the OSG, then it
should have also included in the list of benefits granted under RA 9417 a provision pertaining to
longevity pay. This provision is glaringly missing and thus cannot be included via this Court’s decision
without running afoul of the rule that prohibits judicial legislation. Nor can this Court recognize the past
service rendered by a current judge or justice in the OSG for purposes of longevity pay.
A closer examination of this law shows that what Congress did was to grant benefits that were applicable
to the type of service that the OSG provides.
For example, OSG lawyers are entitle d to honoraria and allowances from client departments, agencies
and instrumentalities of the Government.58
This benefit is only proper as the main function of the OSG is to act as the counsel of the Government
and its officers acting in their official capacity. On the other hand, this benefit is not applicable to
member s of the Judiciary as they do not act as advocates but rather as impartial judges of the cases
before them, for which they are not entitled to honoraria and allowances on a per case basis.
Another indicator that should be considered from the congressional handling of RA 9417 is that Congress
did not intend to introduce a strict one-to-one correspondence between the grant of the same salaries
and benefits to members of the executive department and of the Judiciary. The congressional approach
apparently was for laws granting benefits to be of specific application that pertains to the different
departments according to their personnel’s needs and activities. No equalization or standardization of
benefits was ever intended on a generalized or across-the-board basis.
F. The structure of the laws providing for the salaries and benefits of members of the Judiciary,
prosecutors, and public officers in the OSG and the NLRC further negate the Dissent’s view that these
laws intended equal treatment among them.
We cannot also agree with the Dissent’s position that the laws providing for the salaries and benefits of
members of the Judiciary, the prosecution service, the OSG solicitors , and the members of the NLRC aim
to provide equality among these public officers in their salaries and benefits.
In terms of salaries, their rationalization has been addressed through Position Classification and
Compensation System of the government under PD 985, PD 1597 and LOI 93, heretofore discussed. It is
through the amendments of these legislative enactments that parity and equity can both be achieved in
government.
94
On the other hand, a look at the structure of the laws affecting the Judiciary, the prosecutors, the OSG,
and the NLRC shows that there could be no equal treatment among them. Notably, under Section 16,
par. 6 of RA 10071,59only the prosecutors would have an automatic increase in salaries and benefits in
case the salaries and benefits in the Judiciary increase. This provision, by itself, shows that Congress did
not intend full parity, because increases in the salaries and benefits of prosecutors would not lead to an
automatic increase in the salaries and benefits of members of the Judiciary.
Extending our judicial lens even further, the laws increasing the salaries and benefits of executive officers
in the OSG and the NLRC do not also provide for an automatic increase should there be increases in the
salaries and benefits of the Judiciary; neither do these laws increase the salaries and benefits of the
members of the Judiciary should the salaries and benefits of these public officers increase.
Had Congress really intended full parity between the Judiciary and other public officers in the executive
department, it would have provided for reciprocity in the automatic increase of salaries, benefits and
allowances, and the upgrading of the grades or levels of the emoluments of these public officers.
Instead, the laws, as currently worded, allow for a situation where an increase in the salaries and
benefits of prosecutors would not result in the increase in the salaries of members of the Judiciary, the
OSG and NLRC. Thus, instead of equalization, the prosecutors (who were merely granted a rank at par
with their named counterparts in the Judiciary) would be in a better position than the actual judges and
justices themselves, in the absence of a similar provision of law giving the same benefits to justices and
judges in the event additional emoluments would be given to these prosecutors.
The inevitable conclusion from all these is that Congress, in increasing the salaries and benefits of these
officers, merely used the salary levels and benefits in the Judiciary as a yardstick to make their salaries
and benefits comparable to fellow government employees engaged in the administration of justice.
At the risk of endlessly belaboring a point, we cannot, without engaging in the prohibited act of judicial
legislation, construe that the Dissent’s cited laws fully intend and recognize full parity in rank, salaries,
benefits, and other emoluments among the public officers mentioned.
G. The Dissent’s cited cases of Santiago, Gancayco, Dela Fuente and Guevara-Salonga are not controlling
in the present case, as they are a strained and erroneous application of Section 42 of BP 129 that should
be abandoned.
The dissent’s invocation of the cases of Judge Santiago and Justices Gancayco, Dela Fuente, and Guevara-
Salonga cannot be applied to the present case as they are erroneous applications of Section 42 of BP 129
in relation with RA 910 or the Judiciary’s retirement law.
Nor can these cases be cited to support the position that these past rulings already established that the
past services in the Executive Department of incumbent and retired justices and judges, should be given
credit for purposes of longevity pa y under Section 42 of BP 129.
a. The Guevarra-Salonga & Dela Fuente Cases
The grants of longevity pay to Justice Guevara-Salonga and Justice Dela Fuente, in particular, were based
on a misinterpretation and misunderstanding of the Judiciary’s retirement law ― RA 910, read in relation

to Section 42 of BP 129 ― and its interaction with RA 10071, which granted prosecutors the same rank
and benefits (including retirement benefits) of their counterparts in the Judiciary.
Although RA 910 recognized, for purposes of retirement pay, past services in the Judiciary or in any other
branch of the Government, the longevity pay provision under Section 42 of BP 129 recognizes only
services in the Judiciary in determining the longevity pay of 5% of the basic salary (given for each five
years of service) that is carried over into retirement from the service.
In considering the longevity pay in the cases of Justices Guevarra-Salonga and Dela Fuente, the Court
mistakenly recognized their services as prosecutors to be services in the Judiciary, because RA
1007160 granted prosecutors the same rank and benefits (including retirement benefits) as their
counterparts in the Judiciary.
The Court failed to fully appreciate that the longevity pay provision under RA 910, in relation with
Section 42 of BP 129, is unique to the Judiciary and can be enjoyed only for services actually rendered,
and by those who retired, in this branch of government. Thus, services at the Department of Justice, i.e.,
outside of the Judiciary, should not have been recognized as additional judicial service for purposes of
longevity pay on retirement.
Notably, the Court did not comprehensively discuss in these cited rulings the nature of service required
for the longevity provision to apply, nor the purpose, reason and history of the longevity pay provision
under BP 129, for the Dissents to conclude that the Court already treated the past service in the
Executive Department to be equivalent to service in the Judiciary.
As we earlier discussed, under our system of Government, the Judiciary is separate from, serves a
purpose and functions, and has powers, duties and prerogatives distinct from those of the Executive
Department. Hence, the Court, in these Resolutions, could not have regarded service in the Executive as
unqualifiedly equivalent to service in the Judiciary.
It should be considered, too, that an acceptance of past service in the Executive as service in the
Judiciary may have no basis. The qualification for the grant by the Judiciary should be its determination
that there had been continuous, efficient, and meritorious service. No such determination can be done
by the Judiciary if it will simply recognize longevity pay based solely on service in a position under the
Executive Department with rank, salaries, and benefits equivalent to specified positions in the Judiciary.
To reiterate, for clarity and emphasis, if the Judiciary would recognize past service in the Executive
simply because of the equivalency of rank, salaries and benefits, the situation would be legally
problematic as it would have no way of knowing for itself if the grantee would qualify (based on efficient
and meritorious service) since the past service would be with the Executive, not with the Judiciary. Of
course, for this Court to simply recognize that past executive service w ill be credited under Section 42 of
BP 129 constitutes prohibited judicial legislation for going beyond the requirement that service should
be in the Judiciary.
b. The cited Sandiganbayan case.
Re: Longevity Pay of the Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan (Sandiganbayan case)61 is a very
interesting case that Justice De Castro uses as part of her argument on the liberal stance the Court has
taken on longevity pay.
95
Significantly, this case did not treat the longevity pay under Section 42 as an integral component of the
salary of the recipient, to be given to and applied in equal degree and force, and under absolute
circumstances to public officials in the Executive Department granted the "same salary" as their
counterpart in the Judiciary.
The Sandiganbayan ruling, in fact, does not apply to the factual situation of the present case; it solely
involves Justices of the Sandiganbayan ― members of the Judiciary. Note the following pronouncement
in that case:
x x x longevity pay once earned and enjoyed becomes a vested right and forms part of the salary of the
recipient thereof which may not be reduced despite the subsequent appointment of a justice or judge
next higher in rank who is not entitled to longevity pay for being new and not having acquired any
longevity in the government service. Furthermore, diminution or decrease of the salary of an incumbent
justice or judge is prohibited by Section 10 of Article X of the Constitution; hence, such recipient continue
to earn and receive addition l longevity pay as may be warranted by subsequent services in the judiciary,
because the purpose of the Longevity Pay Law is to reward justices and judges for their long and
dedicated service as such. The provision of the law that the total salary of each justice or judge
concerned, after adding his longevity pay, should not exceed the salary plus longevity pay of the justice
or judge next higher in rank, refers only to the initial implementation of the law and does not proscribe a
justice or judge who is already entitled to longevity pay, from continuing to earn and receive longevity
pay for services rendered in the judiciary subsequent to such implementation, by the mere accident of a
newcomer being appointed to the position next higher in rank.
These pronouncements reveal the Court’s recognition of a situation where a Justice or Judge who has
rendered service in the Judiciary for a considerable length of time and who will receive a total
compensation that far exceeds the "salary" that a newly appointed Justice or Judge, who has not
rendered any prior service in the Judiciary, will earn or receive based simply on his "salary grade." The
former, the "long-serving" Justice or Judge, will earn far more than the latter, the "newly-serving" Justice
or Judge, because of the "add-on" longevity pay that he (the long-serving Justice or Judge) will receive
for his continued long service in the Judiciary, aside from the "salary" to which the latter (the newly-
serving Justice or Judge) shall only be entitled.
The Court realized this scenario as problematic and the obvious inequity it may bring if it were to cons
true strictly the words of Section 42. It is iniquitous for the "long-serving" Justice or Judge if the "add-on"
pay (longevity pay) that he earned under the law for his long and dedicated service in the Judiciary would
be reduced or eliminated altogether simply because of a new Justice or Judge w ho will not be entitle d
to any "add-on" pay for lack of the required long and dedicated service in the Judiciary, and who will thus
receive lesser total compensation.
The Court met the case head on and declared that the limitation refers only to the "initial
implementation of the law and does not proscribe a justice or judge, who is already entitled to longevity
pay, from continuing to earn and receive longevity pay for services rendered in the judiciary subsequent
to such implementation, by the mere accident of a newcomer being appointed to the position next
higher in rank." This case assumes importance in the present consolidated cases as it stresses the
purpose of longevity pay as discussed and interpreted in these pronouncements: " to reward justices and
judges for their long and dedicated service as such, " i.e., as justices or judges.

It highlights, too, that " salary" and the "longevity pay" are separate components of a judge’s or justice’s
total compensation , and that such total compensation can be variable because seniority or years in the
service is a factor taken into account.
Most importantly, this case is an example of the Court’s prompt decisive action to act with liberality
when such action is called for.
c. Moving On
Construing Section 42 as we do in this Resolution does not and will not negate the applicable laws,
contrary to Justice De Castro’s Dissent. Rather, the interpretation that the term "salary" does not include
longevity pay will rectify the error that the Court’s past rulings have created on this subject.
To recapitulate, the Court’s prior rulings treated longevity pay as part of the "salary" – a ruling that, as
explained, runs counter to the express and implied intent of BP 129. They are erroneous because they
introduced and included in the definition and composition of "salary" under Section 41 an element that
the law did not intend to include, either expressly or impliedly.
Hence, the most compelling reason now exists to abandon the above-cited cases: they were clear and
grossly erroneous application of the law. In jurisdictional terms, they involved an interpretation not
within the contemplation of words expressed by the statute; hence, they were gravely abusive
interpretation62 that did not and cannot confer any vested right protected by the due process clause. The
worst approach the Court can take now is to compound the problem by perpetuating our past mistakes
and simply burying our heads in the sand of past-established rulings.
The first decisive move for the Court is to declare, as it hereby declares, the abandonment of our rulings
on longevity pay in the cases of Santiago, Gancayco, Dela Fuente, and Guevara-Salonga and to strike
them out of our ruling case law, without, however, withdrawing the grants to those who have benefitted
from the Court’s misplaced final rulings.
Along these lines, the Court also hereby expressly declares that it does not disavow the longevity pay
previously granted to the retired justices and judicial officials for services rendered outside the Judiciary.
They may continue enjoying their granted benefits as their withdrawal now will be inequitable.
With the same objective, those still in the service who are now enjoying past longevity pay grants due to
past services outside the Judiciary, shall likewise continue with the grants already made, but their grants
will have to be frozen at their current levels until their services outside the Judiciary are compensated for
by their present and future judicial service.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we resolve to:
(1) NOT the Memorandum dated February 18, 2013 of Atty. Eden T. Candelaria and the
Report and Recommendation dated February 15, 2013 of Atty. Corazon G. Ferrer-Flores;
(2) GRANT the request of Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando that her services as
Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Rita, Pampanga be included in the computation of
her longevity pay;
96
(3) DENY the request of Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Femando that her services as
COMELEC Commissioner be included in the computation of her longevity pay;
(4) DENY the request of Associate Justice Angelita Gacutan that her services as NLRC
Commissioner be included in the computation. of her longevity pay from the time she started
her judicial service;
(5) DENY with finality the motion for reconsideration of Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso
for lack of merit; and
(6) DIRECT the Clerk of this Court to proceed with the handling of granted longevity pay
benefits under Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, pursuant to the guidelines and
declarations outlined in the Moving On portion of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
DISPOSITIVE:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration of CA
Justice Gacutan and MODIFY the Resolution dated June 16, 2015 in A.M. Nos. 12-8-07-CA, 12-9-5-SC, and
13w02·07-SC, insofar as to GRANT CA Justice Gacutan’s request that her services as NLRC Commissioner
be included in the computation of her longevity pay, but reckoned only from August 26, 2006, when
Republic Act No. 9347 took effect.
SO ORDERED.”
SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:
WHAT IS MEANT BY CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTION?
IT IS THE INTERPRETATION OR CONSTRUCTION PLACED UPON THE STATUTE BY AN EXECUTIVE OR
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER CALLED UPON TO EXECUTE OR ADMINISTER THE STATUTE.
IT INCLUDES THE CONSTRUCTION BY THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE CHIEF LEGAL
ADVISER OF THE GOVERNMENT.
CERTAIN LAWS GRANT TO CERTAIN OFFICIALS OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT THE RANK AND SALARY
OF A MEMBER OF THE JUDICIARY. MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY ENJOY LONGEVITY PAY. DO THOSE
CERTAIN OFFICIALS ALSO ENJOY LONGEVITY PAY?
YES.
THIS WAS THE INTERPRETATION OF THE JUSTICE SECRETARY.
THE RULE IS THAT COURTS SHOULD RESPECT THE CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTION PLACED UPON
A STATUTE BY THE EXECUTIVE OFFICERS WHOSE DUTY IS TO ENFORCE IT, AND UNLESS SUCH
INTERPRETATION IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS WILL ORDINARILY BE CONTROLLED THEREBY.
 97

IN THE CASE OF JUDGES, WHAT LAW DEFINES LONGEVITY AS PART OF SALARY?

SECTION 42 OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 129 CLEARLY STATES THAT THE LONGEVITY PAY IS “ADDED” TO
THE BASIC MONTHLY SALARY AND FORMS PART OF THE “TOTAL SALARY” OF A JUDGE OR JUSTICE.

THUS, THE SALARY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY REFERS TO THEIR RESPECTIVE BASIC PAY PLUS
THE. LONGEVITY PAY TO WHICH THEY MAY BE ENTITLED BY VIRTUE OF THEIR CONTINUOUS, EFFICIENT,
AND MERITORIOUS SERVICE IN THE JUDICIARY.

WHY WOULD LONGEVITY PAY BE ALSO PART OF SALARY IN THE CASE OF THOSE IN THE EXECUTIVE
WHICH BY LAW ARE GIVEN THE EQUIVALENT RANK AND SALARY OF THOSE IN THE JUDICIARY?

BECAUSE THAT IS WHAT CONGRESS INTENDED IT. THE PERTINENT LAWS GRANTING THESE OFFICERS IN
THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT THE SAME RANKS AS THOSE IN THE JUDICIARY DO NOT DISTINGUISH
SALARY WITH LONGEVITY PAY AND SALARY WITHOUT LONGEVITY PAY.

EN BANC
March 6, 2018
A.M. No. 15-11-01-SC
RE: APPLICATION FOR OPTIONAL RETIREMENT UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 910, AS AMENDED BY
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5095 AND REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9946, OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MARTIN S. VILLARAMA,
JR.
RESOLUTION
MARTIRES, J.:
The present matter concerns the computation of the longevity pay of Associate Justice Martin S.
Villarama, Jr. (Justice Villarama), a former member of this Court.
Previously, Justice Villarama, in a letter1 dated 2 November 2015, applied for optional retirement under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 910, as amended by R.A. No. 5095 and R.A. No. 9946, to be effective on 15
January 2016. In a Resolution2 dated 10 November 2015, the Court granted Justice Villarama's request
for optional retirement and approved the payment of Justice Villarama's retirement gratuity and
terminal leave benefits, exclusive of the longevity pay component, pending the resolution of his requests
for adjustments to his longevity.
We are tasked to determine the amount of longevity pay due to Justice Villarama.
THE FACTS
Antecedents
On 14 August 1981, Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 (B.P. Blg. 129), known as "The Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980," became effective and, by virtue thereof, created or established the Court of Appeals,
Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts. Section 42 of the law granted to justices and judges of the said courts a monthly longevity pay
equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic pay for each five-year period of continuous, efficient, and
meritorious service in the judiciary.
Since the Supreme Court, the Sandiganbayan, and the Court of Tax Appeals were not covered by B.P. Blg.
129, the justices and judges of these courts were not entitled to the monthly longevity pay provided in
Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129. Presidential Decree No. 1927, approved on 2 May 1985, corrected the gap.
On 25 September 2003, Justice Josue N. Bellosillo (Justice Bellosillo), a former member of this Court who
was then due to retire compulsorily, requested that his earned leave credits be tacked to his judicial
service in order to increase his longevity pay. Justice Bellosillo’s letter-request was docketed as A.M. No.
03-9-20-SC. He wrote:
98
In the past, the Court had allowed the tacking of earned leave credits to government service in order to
enable retiring members of the judiciary to complete the age/service requirement under R.A. No. 910 or
to increase their longevity pay for purposes of computing their retirement benefits.
Invoking past judicial precedents, may I request that my earned leave credits be tacked to my judicial
service to increase my longevity pay.
Tacking my earned leave credits to my judicial service I would have served, upon my retirement, for
thirty-seven (37) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days, that would entitle me to additional longevity
pay in accordance with B.P. Blg.129.
While Sec. 42 provides for entitlement to longevity pay for every five (5)-year period of judicial service,
fairness and justice dictate a liberal construction of the provision if the member of the judiciary
concerned is retiring compulsorily and therefore is left with no option, unlike one who retires optionally,
to complete the five (5)-year period requirement in order to be entitled to the whole five percent (5%)
additional longevity pay.
In other words, even if he opts to extend his stay to complete at least another five (5)-year period, he
cannot do so because of the constitutional limitation to his term of office.3 (emphasis omitted)
In its resolution in A.M. No. 03-9-20-SC, the Court granted the request of Justice Bellosillo. The approved
resolution became the basis of Administrative Circular (A. C.) No. 58-2003 which this Court approved on
11 November 2003. Entitled "ALLOWING THE TACKING OF EARNED LEAVE CREDITS IN THE
COMPUTATION OF LONGEVITY PAY UPON COMPULSORY RETIREMENT OF JUSTICES AND JUDGES," the
circular reads:
WHEREAS, The Court has studied proposals to allow the tacking of earned leave credits to the length of
judicial service for computation of the-longevity pay.
WHEREAS, Section 42 of Batas Pambansa (BP) 129 provides for a monthly longevity pay equivalent to 5%
of the monthly basic pay for every five years of service rendered in the judiciary;
WHEREAS, it is true that vacation and sick leave credits earned during the period of employment are, by
their nature and purpose, generally enjoyed during employment; however, the law does not preclude
the accumulation of these leave credits, not to be paid while one is working, but to be reserved for
senior age;
WHEREAS, retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because their intention is to
provide for his sustenance, and hopefully even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to continue
earning his livelihood and the liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in
order that the efficiency, security, and well-being of government personnel may be enhanced;
WHEREAS, laws pertaining to retiring government personnel should be liberally construed to benefit
retiring personnel, following an interpretation that rightly expresses the nation’s gratitude towards the
women and men who have tirelessly and faithfully served the government;
 99

WHEREAS, earned leave credits, computed in accordance with Section 40, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules The recommendation of the committee
on Leave, should accordingly be allowed to increase the longevity pay of Justices and Judges reaching the
age of compulsory retirement;
Based on its 12 January 2017 memorandum, the committee recommended the denial of the requests of
Justice Villarama.
NOW, THEREFORE, the COURT RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, that earned leave credits shall be
allowed to be tacked to the length of judicial service for the purpose of increasing the longevity pay of
The committee's recommendation is based on the consideration that A.C. No. 58-2003 was intended to
Justices and Judges who reach the age of compulsory retirement. The computation should also include
apply only to those who retire compulsorily. Further, the committee believes that the pro hac vice ruling
the additional percentage of longevity pay that corresponds to any fraction of a five-year period in the
in the case of Justice Austria-Martinez cannot be considered a precedent to be applied in subsequent
total number of years of continuous, efficient and meritorious service rendered, considering that the
cases as in the case of Justice Villarama. The committee also adds that neither tacking of leave credits
retiree would no longer be able to complete the period because of his compulsoryretirement.4(emphasis
nor fractional longevity pay finds support in Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129; thus, it recommends that A.C.
supplied)
No. 58-2003 be abandoned.

Gleaned from the text of A.C. No. 58-2003, the benefits provided therein seemed to apply only to
Anent Justice Villarama's service as bar examiner, the committee opines that it cannot also be tacked to
justices and judges who retire compulsorily.
his judicial service because at the time Justice Villarama served as such, he was an incumbent member of
the Judiciary. A.M. No. 08-12-7-SC6 adverted to by Justice Villarama, as the committee puts it, explicitly
Perhaps cognizant of the limitation, Justice Ma. Alicia AustriaMartinez (Justice Austria-Martinez), also a covers only service prior to appointment to the Judiciary.
former member of this Court who was to retire optionally, requested that the tacking of leave credits
under A.C. No. 58-2003 be applied in her favor. The Court, in a resolution dated 24 February 2009,
THE ISSUES
approved the request of Justice Austria-Martinez but with a qualification that the ruling be only pro hac
vice.
At the outset, we note the letter-request of Justice Villarama seeking a pro hac vice ruling. However, in
order to put to rest this lingering issue, our disposition of the present matter should not bind Justice
The letter-request of Justice Villarama
Villarama only but include other members of the judiciary who may be similarly situated in the present
or will be so in the future.
Like Justice Austria-Martinez, Justice Villarama also applied for optional retirement. In his 2 November
2015 letter, Justice Villarama requests that the benefits of A.C. No. 58-2003 be applied in computing his
Thus, the issues may be couched in broad terms to cast a general interpretative effect for the guidance
longevity pay in view of the following considerations:
of the Bar and the bench in future cases, viz:

1. He would have completed 28 years, 2 months and 8 days of judicial service by 6 January 2016, lacking
I. Whether the benefits under A.C. No. 58-2003 may be applied to optional retirees, particularly that: (a)
only 2 months and 29 days to reach the mandatory age of 70 for compulsory retirement from the
earned leave credits are tacked to judicial service, thereby increasing longevity pay, and (b) the fraction
judiciary on 14 April 2016;
of a five-year period is included in computing longevity pay; and

2. In its resolution adopted on 24 February 2009, the Court considered Administrative Circular No. 58-
II. Whether the service rendered by a member of the judiciary as bar examiner is credited as part of
2003 applicable, pro hac vice, to Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez who optionally retired on 30 April
judicial service, thereby increasing longevity pay.
2009 and whose compulsory retirement date was on December 19, 2010 or 1 year and 8 months short of
the mandatory date of compulsory retirement;
OUR RULING
3. In its Resolution adopted on 3 February 2009, the Court allowed the service as bar examiner be
credited as part of government service and be tacked in the computation of the longevity pay upon After careful deliberation, the Court rules to grant Justice Villarama’s request to tack his earned leave
compulsory or optional retirement.5 credits, but not his services as Bar Examiner in 2004, to his years in judicial service for purposes of
computing his longevity pay. The fraction of the five-year period immediately prior to Justice Villarama’s
optional retirement shall also be included in the computation.
Justice Villarama prays that, in the light of his attendant circumstances, A.C. No. 58-2003 should be
applied to him, pro hac vice. He also prays that his earned leave credits and services as Bar Examiner in
2004 be tacked to the length of his judicial service for purposes of computing his longevity pay. On the application of A.C. No. 58-2003

We referred the matter to the Special Committee on Retirement and Civil Service Benefits (the The committee insists that A.C. No. 58-2003 should not be construed liberally to extend its benefits to
committee) for its recommendation. those who retire optionally.1âwphi1 It explains that the circular was issued, through A.M. No. 03-9-20-
SC,7 in response to the request of Justice Bellosillo to adjust his longevity pay by tacking his earned leave
credits to government service. Such issuance was already a liberal interpretation of Section 42 of B.P.

Blg. 129 and must, accordingly, no longer be given further liberal interpretation without undermining the
proscription against judicial legislation. The committee lengthily quotes this Court's discussion in Re:
Letter of Court of Appeals Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso for Entitlement to Longevity Pay for his Services as
Commission Member III of the National Labor Relations Commission8 (Veloso case).
We are not persuaded. It is unnecessary even to treat whatever beclouds the committee's mind in
suggesting that the Court is crossing the realm of judicial legislation when it (the Court) topped the
exercise of liberal interpretation in Sec. 42 of B.P. Big. 129 with another liberal interpretation, as was this
Court’s fear in Veloso. Incidentally, we would be amiss not to mention that whatever result was reached
by this Court in Veloso was later reversed in our 26 July 2016 resolution on the motion for
reconsideration in A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA.9
A.C. No. 58-2003 is an implementation of Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129, or the basic provision on longevity
pay granted by law to justices and judges in the judiciary.
Section 42 of B.P. Big. 129 is intended to recompense justices and judges for each five-year period of
continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the Judiciary.10 The purpose of the law is to
reward long service, from the lowest to the highest court in the land.11
A plain reading of Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 readily reveals that the longevity pay is given the justice or
judge on a monthly basis together with his or her basic pay, provided that the justice or judge has
completed at least five (5) years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service in the Judiciary. The
amount is equivalent to five percent (5%) of the monthly basic pay, and it increases by an increment of
5o/o for every additional cycle of five (5) years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service. It is
given while the justice or judge is still in active service andbecomes part of the monthly pension benefit
upon his or her retirement, or survivorship benefit upon his or her death after retirement.
In granting the longevity pay to the justice or judge still in active service, taking into consideration its
salutary purpose, the law did not qualify whether the recipient is to subsequently retire compulsorily or
optionally. Upon his or her retirement, whether compulsory or optional, the justice or judge continues to
enjoy the longevity pay by receiving the same together with the monthly pension benefit. Thus, if a
justice or judge has rendered long service in the judiciary, he or she must be rewarded even if the
retirement is optional; and the purpose of the law is served no more than it would be in the case of one
who is retired compulsorily. Hence, there is no rhyme or reason why the benevolent objective of the law
should be limited to justices or judges who retire compulsorily.
On the other hand, A.C. No. 58-2003 was issued by this Court pursuant to its constitutional power to
interpret laws and, as such, has the force and effect of law. In crafting the circular, the Court duly
considered the long-standing policy of according liberal construction to retirement laws covering
government personnel. The liberal approach in construing retirement laws, which are enacted as social
legislations, is necessary in order to achieve the humanitarian considerations of promoting the physical
and mental well-being of public servants.12 Given this legal milieu, the Court allowed the tacking of
earned leave credits to the length of judicial service in order to increase the longevity pay of justices and
judges. Thus, the wisdom behind the issuance of A.C. No. 58-2003 is to ensure the comfort and security
of retired justices and judges who had tirelessly and faithfully served the government.13
As noted above, A.C. No. 58-2003 was issued as the Court's response to the letter-request of Justice
Bellosillo who sought the adjustment of his longevity pay by tacking his earned leave credits to the
length of his judicial service andat the same time recognizing the fractional portion of the unexpired 5-
100
year period of his service immediately prior to his compulsory retirement. In circularizing the tacking of
earned leave credits and recognition of fractional longevity pay, however, the Court styled A.C. No. 58-
2003 as "ALLOWING THE TACKING OF EARNED LEAVE CREDITS IN THE COMPUTATION OF LONGEVITY PAY
UPON COMPULSORY RETIREMENT OF JUSTICES AND JUDGES. " Under the circular, all those who may be
similarly situated with Justice Bellosillo can then be entitled to its benefits.
The seeming express limitation of the benefits of A.C. No. 58-2003 only to justices and judges who retire
compulsorily apparently developed the view that the circular's benevolent provisions are beyond the
reach of those who retire optionally. This is the same view advanced by the committee when it
mentioned in its memorandum that on the face and articulated rationale of A.C. No. 58-2003, it applies
to and is intended only for those who retire compulsorily.
Upon deeper reflection, no discernible reason exists to deny optional retirees the tacking of leave credits
for purposes of computing their longevity pay. If the rationale of such longevity pay is to reward loyalty
to the government, then it makes no sense to limit the tacking of earned leave credits to the service of
compulsory retirees only. The question therefore arises:
Are members of the judiciary who optionally retire necessarily considered less loyal, and therefore less
deserving, than those who compulsorily retire?
An affirmative answer can hardly be justified. Otherwise, an absurd situation ensues when a justice or
judge who had rendered, say, only 7 years of judicial service but is compulsorily retired because he
entered the judiciary at a late stage in his professional career, is allowed to tack earned but relatively few
leave credits to his judicial service thus gaining from an increase in his longevity pay; as compared to
another justice or judge, who had rendered 30 long years of service in the judiciary and had opted to
retire before reaching the compulsory retirement age, yet is precluded from tacking a possibly
substantial amount of earned leave credits, and is thus denied the reward intended for long and loyal
service to the public.
When juxtaposed with Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129, the very same law sought to be implemented by A.C.
No. 58-2003, it becomes evident that limiting its scope only to justices and judges who retire
compulsorily cannot stand. As previously discussed, the longevity pay is paid to justices or judges who
had proven their loyalty to the judiciary, regardless of the manner by which they retire.
Thus, for purposes of computing longevity pay, the tacking of leave credits to the length of judicial
service rendered by qualified justices and judges should be applied to optional retirees as well.
What comes to the fore in our discussion is that allowing the tacking of leave credits only to compulsory
retirees is simply wrong. To avoid this error, A.C. No. 58-2003, regardless of its title and the contents of
its dispositive portion, should be read to likewise cover justices and judges who retire optionally.
We believe it a better policy to consider A.C. No. 58-2003 as complete in its scope, effectively covering
both compulsory and optional retirees. Not only is it consistent with the moral fiber of B.P. Blg. 129, it
makes unnecessary the issuance of a separate circular to cover optional retirees only.
On the pro hac vice ruling in Austria-Martinez

It is unfortunate that the ruling of this Court in the case of Justice Austria-Martinez was qualified as pro
hac vice. As discussed herein, this qualification could have been avoided and the result could have been
just as persuasive.
To recall, Justice Villarama cites the ruling in Austria-Martinez wherein the Court, taking cognizance of
the special circumstances of Justice Austria-Martinez, granted the magistrate's request to tack her
earned leave credits to her judicial service even though she had not reached the compulsory retirement
age. Justice Villarama, an optional retiree, also points to special circumstances that, according to him,
justify a pro hac vice application of A.C. No. 58-2003.
The committee asserts that Justice Villarama may not benefit from the pro hac vice ruling in Austria-
Martinez. As the committee has pointed out, the said ruling does not in any way detract from the
prevailing ruling that A.C. No. 58-2003 applies only to those who retire compulsorily, nor should it be
considered as an exception to nor a departure from it.
Concededly, the Court had, in not a few occasions, disposed of a matter before it on a pro hac vice basis.
From a survey of these cases, we have invariably imputed to the term pro hac vice the meaning of "for
this one particular occasion." 14 We have also said that a ruling expressly qualified as such cannot be
relied upon as a precedent to govern other cases.15
Yet, a pro hac vice ruling in favor of Justice Villarama in this case is decidedly pointless. As has already
been presented, justices and judges who retire optionally are also entitled to the benefit of tacking their
earned leave credits to their judicial service in order to increase the longevity pay due them.
To reiterate, the idea that the tacking of leave credits, as authorized by A.C. No: 58-2003, is for
compulsory retirees only is erroneous. By consequence, the inference that A.C. No. 58-2003 may be
applied to optional retirees pro hac vice, proceeding as it does from a wrong premise, must be rejected.
The application of A.C. No. 58-2003 to justices and judges who optionally retire need not be on pro hac
vice basis but on due consideration of the manifest intent of the law to make the longevity pay available
to all types of retirees.
Thus, Justice Villarama’s earned leave credits should be included in the computation of his longevity pay
upon his optional retirement.
On the submission that the tacking of leave credits to judicial service has no legal basis
In essence, the committee proposes that when Section 42 of B.P. Big. 129 states that the grant of
longevity pay is based on continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the judiciary, the law
means actual service. Unused but earned leave credits, according to the committee, refer to
commutable terminal leave. Following the prevailing treatment of terminal leave as excluded from
"service," unused leave credits cannot therefore be tacked to lengthen one's actual years of service.
Such view is not novel.
In Re: Computation of Longevity Pay Upon Compulsory Retirement, 16 the question on whether the
continuous, efficient, and meritorious service contemplated by A.C. No. 58-2003 is "actual" or not was
101
squarely raised. The incident stemmed from the refusal by the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) to release Justice Bellosillo’s longevity pay, computed in accordance with A.C. No.
58-2003. It appeared that the DBM’s negative response to the application of the subject circular was
rooted in its view that Section 42 of B.P. Big. 129 covers actual service only. Then Secretary Emilia T.
Boncodin (Secretary Boncodin) of the DBM expressed her observations on the tacking of leave credits in
a letter, dated 6 May 2004, that was conveyed to the Court. To Secretary Boncodin, unused leave credit
is not actual service and, thus, cannot be tacked to the length of service in computing longevity pay.
In no uncertain terms, the Court rejected the view of Secretary Boncodin. The Court emphasized that it
had already sufficiently settled its position on the matter in the resolution of Justice Bellosillo’s request.
Accordingly, A.C. No. 58-2003 explicitly dictates the tacking of earned leave credits.
On the payment of fractional longevity pay
We uphold the computation of the longevity pay to include the fractional percentage of the unexpired
five-year period.
The position taken by the Committee against the payment of fractional longevity pay in favor of retired
justices and judges was also taken up in Re: Computation of Longevity Pay Upon Compulsory
Retirement. Secretary Boncodin also held the view that the payment of longevity pay is conditioned on
the full expiration of the five-year period; it cannot be granted before the expiration of the five-year
period.
Such reasoning failed to convince us then; it fails to persuade us now.
We reiterate our reason for including any fraction of the five-year period in computing the longevity pay
of retiring Justices and Judges. When the Court approved A.C. No. 58-2003, it was with due consideration
of Justice Bellosillo’s observation that despite the predilection to extend one's service in the judiciary in
order to complete the five-year period, a retiring justice or judge is precluded from doing so because of
the constitutional limitation to his term of office. In line with the liberal approach, we adopted Justice
Bellosillo's viewpoint which has since been the norm.
We hasten to add that the fractional portion of the five-year period is actual service rendered, a fact that
cannot be reversed. It would be a mockery of the liberal approach in the treatment of retirement laws
for government personnel if such fractional portion is disregarded to the detriment of the retiring justice
or judge. Going back to the rationale behind the grant of longevity pay, it cannot be gainsaid that service
during such fractional portion of the five-year period is an eloquent manifestation as well of the justice's
or judge’s loyalty to the judiciary as the service rendered during the previously completed five-year
periods.
Rounding off the fractional period
We are fully aware that the fractional portion of the unexpired fiveyear period immediately preceding
retirement is the direct consequence of the tacking of leave credits to the judicial service of every retired
justice or judge. However, we also recognize that Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 was crafted in such a way as
to grant a full 5% adjustment of the longevity pay for every cycle of five years of judicial service. All
attempts must be made in order to realize the granting of a full 5% as adjustment in the computation of
the longevity pay. Thus, in order to align the tacking of leave credits under A.C. No. 58-2003 with the full
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5% adjustment for every five-year expired period specified in Section 42 of B.P. Big. 129, and in
pursuance of our rule-making power under Section 10 of Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of Executive Order No. 292,17 we deem it appropriate to consider a fraction of at least two (2)
years and six (6) months as one whole 5-year cycle. In this instance, the additional percentage of
monthly basic pay which is added to the monthly pension pay of a retired justice or judge as longevity
pay is always divisible by five (5).
For those whose service (inclusive of the tacked-in leave credits) during the unexpired 5-year period
immediately preceding retirement is below the threshold above, the adjustment of the computation of
additional longevity pay shall be an additional one percent (1% ) for every year of service in the judiciary.
Thus, in the case of Justice Villarama whose total judicial service is 28 years, 2 months, and 8 days, and
whose total leave credits (1,3 86 days) is equivalent to 5 years and 3 months, his judicial service for
purposes of the longevity pay is 33 years, 5 months and 8 days. The fraction of 3 years, 5 months and 8
days in the unexpired 5-year period immediately preceding Justice Villarama's optional retirement is well
above the aforestated threshold. Thus, consistent with the foregoing formula, the longevity pay of
Justice Villarama shall be thirty-five percent (35%) of his basic monthly pay.
On Justice Villarama’s service as bar examiner
The committee likewise recommended the denial of Justice Villarama’s request to count his service as
bar examiner part of his judicial service. It explains that A.M. No. 08-12-7-SC, the basis of Justice
Villarama’s claim, is inapplicable because while the subject resolution of the Court coyers service (as bar
examiner) prior to one's appointment to the judiciary, Justice Villarama was already a member of the
judiciary when he served as such.
We agree.
Thus, for purposes of computing longevity pay, we find no justifiable reason in tacking the service as bar
examiner to the judicial service of one who is already a member of the judiciary. Accordingly, Justice
Villarama’s service as bar examiner could not be credited in the computation of his longevity pay.
In sum, a justice or judge who retires optionally, just like Justice Villarama, is entitled to the tacking of
leave credits provided in A.C. No. 58- 2003 for .the purpose of computing the longevity pay as granted in
Section 42 of B.P. 129; likewise, a fraction of the unexpired five-year period immediately prior to
retirement is with sufficient basis. In the case of Justice Villarama, there remains a fraction of the 5-year
period prior to his optional retirement on 6 January 2016 which must correspondingly be counted in
computing his longevity pay. Lastly, service as bar examiner by a member of the judiciary is not to be
factored in computing longevity pay.
It bears repeating that despite Justice Villarama’s plea for a pro hac vice ruling, what we have forged
today henceforth lays a precedent. Members of the judiciary who are similarly situated can find doctrinal
value in this decision.
WHEREFORE, the request of Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
Court DIRECTS that Justice Martin S. Villarama be paid his longevity pay in accordance with
Administrative Circular No. 58-2003, that is, to include his unused and earned leave credits, subject to
adjustment in accordance with the "Rounding off the Fractional Period" portion of this resolution, but to
exclude his service as Bar Examiner in 2004.
The 12 January 2017 Memorandum of the Special Committee on Retirement and Civil Service Benefits
is NOTED.
SO ORDERED.

Indeed, by the express terms of A.M. No. 08-12-7-SC relied upon by Justice Villarama, we quote:

Henceforth, services rendered by all Justices of the Supreme Court as Bar Examiners prior to their
appointment to the Judiciary shall be credited as part of their government service and be tacked in the
computation of their longevity pay upon compulsory or optional retirement.18

Clearly, this does not apply to Justice Villarama since he was already a member of the judiciary when he
was tasked to serve as bar examiner.

The reason for denying an incumbent member of the judiciary the inclusion of his or her service as bar
examiner in the computation of the longevity pay is simple. At the time of his or her appointment as bar
examiner, an incumbent justice or judge is already concurrently serving in the judiciary. The regular
functions of the justice or judge and the service performed as bar examiner cannot appropriately be
considered as two separable and finite judicial services if they supposedly coincide at the same time or
period. It would be defying logic and sensible reasoning if one is to be tacked to the other, in effect
extending the length of judicial service, even if no additional time was really spent in the performance
of the service as bar examiner outside of the time or period actually served as justice or judge. Not
even the liberal approach in the treatment of retirement laws could save the argument for tacking such
service as bar examiner in favor of an incumbent justice or judge.