Phil. Rabbit bus lines vs. IAC. G.R. Nos.
L-66102- the owners and drivers of two colliding vihicles
04 August 30, 1990. A TRANSPORTATION CASE.
BY C Y.
Phil. Rabbit bus lines vs. IAC.
FACTS.
1.The passengers boarded the jeep owned by
the Mangune Spouses and driven by Manalo to
bring them to Carmen Rosales Pangasinan.
2. Upon reaching barrio Sinayoan Tarlack,The
right rear wheel of the truck was detouch so the
driver steps on the brake as a result of which,
the jeep
who is running unbalance made a uturn so that
the front part face the south where it come
from and its rear face the north where it is
going.
3. The bus of the petitioner driven by Delos
Reyes bump the jeep resulting in the death of
the three passengers of the jeepney and injuries
to others.
4. The two drivers was charged of multiple
homicide before the MTC of SanMiguel Tarlack.
5. A probable cause was found with respect to
the case of Manalo and the case of Delos Reyes
was dismissed and Manalo was convicted By
the court of first
instance of Pangasinan.
6. Then the heirs of the deceased passengers
filed a complaint for recovery of civil damages
before the court of first instance impleading
both the defendant
and the respondent.
7. the CFI found Manalo guilty of negligence but
this was reverse by the IAC.
ISSUE.
Who is liable for the death and physical injuries
suffered by the passengers of the jeepney?
According to the supreme court, The IAC erred
in applying the doctrine of last clear chance in
this case because this doctrine applies only in a
suit between
and not in a suit where passengers demand
responsibility from a carries to enforce its
contractual obligation.
So the decision of the IAC was set aside and the
decision of the CFI was reinstated.
1. Negligence is the omission to do something
which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs, would do, or the
doing of something which a prudent and
reasonable man would not do.
The failure to observe for the protection of the
interest of another person, that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such
person suffers injury. (Mckee vs IAC, 211 SCRA
517, ’92, citing Black Law Dictionary and Judge
Cooley: J. Davide Jr)
2. Emergency Rule – one who suddenly finds
himself in a place danger, and is required to act
without time to consider the best means that
may be adopted to avoid the impending danger,
is not guilty of negligence, if he fails not to
adopt what subsequently and upon reflection
may appear to be the better method, unless the
emergency in which he finds himself is brought
about by his own negligence. (Gan vs CA, 165
SCRA 378, ’88, cited in McKee case)
McKee vs IAC:
Facts: Two boys suddenly darted before
McKee’s car forcing McKee to swerve the car to
avoid hitting the boys and in the process
entered into the opposite lane and collided with
the oncoming cargo truck in the opposite lane.
79050-51 November 14, 1989
Lessons Applicable: Last Clear Chance (Torts and
Damages)
FACTS:
Spouses Baesa, their 4 children, the Ico spouses
and their son and 7 other people boarded a
passenger jeep driven by David Ico to go to a
picnic in Isabela, to celebrate the 5th wedding
anniversary of the Baesa spouses
While they were proceeding towards Malalam
River at a speed of about 20 kph, a speeding
PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on a route to
Manila, encroached on the jeepney’s lane while
negotiating a curve, and collided with it.
As a result, the entire Baesa family, except for
their daughter Maricar Baesa, as well as David
Ico, died, and the rest suffered from injuries.
Maricar Baesa, through her guardian filed
separate actions for damages arising from
quasi-delict against PANTRANCO.
PANTRANCO: alleged David Ico's negligence as a
proximate cause of the accident and invoked
the defense of due diligence in the selection
and supervision of its driver.
CA upheld RTC: favor of Baesa
ISSUE: W/N the last clear chance applies
thereby making David Ico who had the chance
to avoid the collision negligent in failing to
utilize with reasonable care and competence
HELD: NO.
Generally, the last clear change doctrine is
invoked for the purpose of making a defendant
liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or
antecedent negligence, although it may also be
raised as a defense to defeat claim for damages
For the last clear chance doctrine to apply, it is
necessary to show that the person who
allegedly has the last opportunity to avert the
accident was aware of the existence of the
peril, or should, with exercise of due care, have
been aware of it
there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver
David Ico knew of the impending danger
When he saw at a distance that the
approaching bus was encroaching on his lane,
he did not immediately swerve the jeepney to
the dirt shoulder on his right since he must have
assumed that the bus driver will return the bus
to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney
approaching form the opposite direction
Even assuming that the jeepney driver
perceived the danger a few seconds before the
actual collision, he had no opportunity to avoid
it
last clear chance doctrine can never apply
where the party charged is required to act
instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be
avoided by the application of all means at hand
after the peril is or should have been discovered
G.R. No. 97626, March 14, 1997
The negligence must be the proximate cause of
the loss
0
FACTS:
Rommel’s Marketing Corporation (RMC)
maintained two separate current accounts with
PBC in connection with its business of selling
appliances. The RMC General Manager Lipana
entrusted to his secretary, Irene Yabut, RMC
funds amounting to P300,000+ for the purpose
of depositing the same to RMC’s account with
PBC. However, it turned out that Yabut
deposited the amounts in her husband’s
account instead of RMC. Lipana never checked
his monthly statement of accounts regularly
furnished by PBC so that Yabut’s modus
operandi went on for the span of more than
one year.
ISSUE:
What is the proximate cause of the loss –
Lipana’s negligence in not checking his
monthly statements or the bank’s negligence
through its teller in validating the deposit
slips?
HELD:
The bank teller was negligent in validating,
officially stamping and signing all the deposit
slips prepared and presented by Yabut, despite
the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not
completely accomplished contrary to the self-
imposed procedure of the bank with respect to
the proper validation of deposit slips, original or
duplicate.
The bank teller’s negligence, as well as the
negligence of the bank in the selection and
supervision of its bank teller, is the proximate
cause of the loss suffered by the private
respondent, not the latter’s entrusting cash to a
dishonest employee. Xxx Even if Yabut had the
fraudulent intention to misappropriate the
funds, she would not have been able to deposit
those funds in her husband’s current account,
and then make plaintiff believe that it was in
the latter’s accounts wherein she had deposited
them, had it not been for the bank teller’s
aforesaid gross and reckless negligence.
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance – where both
parties are negligent, but the negligent act of
one is appreciably later in time than that of the
other, or when it is impossible to determine
whose fault or negligence should be attributed
to the incident, the one who had the last clear
opportunity to avoid the impending harm and
failed to do so is chargeable with the
consequences thereof. It means that the
antecedent negligence of a person does not
preclude the recovery of damages for the
supervening negligence of, or bar a defense
against liability sought by another, if the latter,
who had the last fair chance, could have
avoided the impending harm by exercise of due
diligence. (Phil. Bank of Commerce v. CA, supra)
NPC v. CA
Facts:
At the height of the typhoon “Kading”, a flash
flood covered the towns near the Angat Dam,
causing deaths and destructions to residents
and their properties. Respondents blamed the
tragedy to the reckless and imprudent opening
of the 3 floodgates by petitioner, without prior
warning to the residents within the vicinity of
the dam. Petitioners denied the allegations and
contended that they have kept the water at a
safe level, that the opening of floodgates was
done gradually, that it exercises diligence in the
selection of its employees, and that written
warnings were sent to the residents. It further
contended that there was no direct causal
relationship between the damage and the
alleged negligence on their part, that the
residents assumed the risk by living near the
dam, and that what happened was a fortuitous
event and are of the nature of damnum absque
injuria.
Issues:
(1) Whether the petitioner can be held liable
even though the coming of the typhoon is a
fortuitous event
(2) Whether a notice was sent to the residents
(3) Whether the damage suffered by
respondents is one of damnum absque injuria
Held:
(1) The obligor cannot escape liability, if upon
the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of
God, a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay
or violation or contravention in any manner of
the tenor of the obligation as provided in Article
1170 of the Civil Code which results in loss or
damage. Even if there was no contractual
relation between themselves and private
respondents, they are still liable under the law
on quasi-delict. Article 2176 of the Civil Code
explicitly provides "whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another there being fault or
negligence is obliged to pay for the damage
done." Act of God or force majeure, by
definition, are extraordinary events not
foreseeable or avoidable, events that could not
be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, are
inevitable. It is therefore not enough that the
event should not have been foreseen or
anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it
must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid.
The principle embodied in the act of God
doctrine strictly requires that the act must be
occasioned solely by the violence of nature.
Human intervention is to be excluded from
creating or entering into the cause of the
mischief. When the effect is found to be in part
the result of the participation of man, whether
due to his active intervention or neglect or
failure to act, the whole occurrence is then
humanized and removed from the rules
applicable to the acts of God. In the case at bar,
although the typhoon "Kading" was an act of
God, petitioners can not escape liability
because their negligence was the proximate
cause of the loss and damage.
(2) The letter itself, addressed merely "TO ALL
CONCERNED", would not strike one to be of
serious importance, sufficient enough to set
alarm and cause people to take precautions for
their safety's sake. The notices were not
delivered, or even addressed to responsible
officials of the municipalities concerned who
could have disseminated the warning properly.
They were delivered to ordinary employees and
policemen. As it happened, the said notices do
not appear to have reached the people
concerned, which are the residents beside the
Angat River. The plaintiffs in this case definitely
did not receive any such warning. Indeed, the
methods by which the defendants allegedly
sent the notice or warning was so ineffectual
that they cannot claim, as they do in their
second assignment of error, that the sending of
said notice has absolved them from liability.
(3) We cannot give credence to petitioners'
third assignment of error that the damage
caused by the opening of the dam was in the
nature of damnum absque injuria, which
presupposes that although there was physical
damage, there was no legal injury in view of the
fortuitous events. There is no question that
petitioners have the right, duty and obligation
to operate, maintain and preserve the facilities
of Angat Dam, but their negligence cannot be
countenanced, however noble their intention
may be. The end does not justify the means,
particularly because they could have done
otherwise than simultaneously opening the
spillways to such extent. Needless to say,
petitioners are not entitled to counterclaim.
AIR FRANCE V CARRASCOSO September 28,
1966 AIR FRANCE, petitioner, vs. RAFAEL
CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a
group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for
Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France,
through its authorized agent, Philippine Air
Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class"
round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome.
From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in
"first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the
defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the
"first class" seat that he was occupying because,
in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento,
there was a "white man", who, the Manager
alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When
asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the
plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and
told defendant's Manager that his seat would
be taken over his dead body. After some
commotion, plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first
class" seat in the plane.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
1. CFI – Manila: sentenced petitioner to pay
respondent Rafael Carrascoso P25,000.00 by
way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages; P393.20 representing the
difference in fare between first class and tourist
class for the portion of the trip Bangkok- Rome,
these various amounts with interest at the legal
rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint
until paid; plus P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees;
and the costs of suit.
2. CA: slightly reduced the amount of refund on
Carrascoso's plane ticket from P393.20 to
P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed
decision "in all other respects", with costs
against petitioner.
Air France contends that respondent knew that
he did not have confirmed reservations for first
class on any specific flight, although he had
tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the
issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee
that he would have a first class ride, but that
such would depend upon the availability of first
class seats.
ISSUE:
Is Carrascoso entitled to damages?
RULING:
Yes. The manager not only prevented
Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class
seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he
forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him
suffer the humiliation of having to go to the
tourist class compartment - just to give way to
another passenger whose right thereto has not
been established. Certainly, this is bad faith.
Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a
meaning different from what is understood in
law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of
mind affirmatively operating with furtive
design or with some motive of self-interest or
will or for ulterior purpose."
For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's
manager, petitioner, his employer, must
answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss
or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
The contract of air carriage, therefore,
generates a relation attended with a public
duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's
employees, naturally, could give ground for an
action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for
transportation. They have a right to be treated
by the carrier's employees with kindness,
respect, courtesy and due consideration.
Although the relation of passenger and carrier
is "contractual both in origin and nature"
nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract
may be also a tort". The stress of Carrascoso's
action as we have said, is placed upon his
wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public
duty by the petitioner air carrier — a case
of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
AFRICA vs CALTEX
16 SCRA 448 – Civil Law – Torts and Damages –
Res Ipsa Loquitur
In March 1948, in Rizal Avenue, Manila, a tank
truck was hosing gasoline into the underground
storage of Caltex. Apparently, a fire broke out
from the gasoline station and the fire spread
and burned several houses including the house
of Spouses Bernabe and Soledad Africa.
Allegedly, someone (a passerby) threw a
cigarette while gasoline was being transferred
which caused the fire. But there was no
evidence presented to prove this theory and no
other explanation can be had as to the real
reason for the fire. Apparently also, Caltex and
the branch owner (Mateo Boquiren) failed to
install a concrete firewall to contain fire if in
case one happens.
ISSUE: Whether or not Caltex and Boquiren are
liable to pay for damages.
HELD: Yes. This is pursuant to the application on
the principle of res ipsa loquitur (“the
transaction speaks for itself”) which states:
“where the thing which caused injury, without
fault of the injured person, is under the
exclusive control of the defendant and the
injury is such as in the ordinary course of things
does not occur if he having such control use
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in
the absence of the explanation, that the injury
arose from defendant’s want of care.” The
gasoline station, with all its appliances,
equipment and employees, was under the
control of Caltex and Boquiren. A fire occurred
therein and spread to and burned the
neighboring houses. The persons who knew or
could have known how the fire started were
Boquiren, Caltex and their employees, but they
gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a
fair and reasonable inference that the incident
happened because of want of care.
Note that ordinarily, he who charges negligence
shall prove it. However, res ipsa loquitur is the
exception because the burden of proof is
shifted to the party charged of negligence as
the latter is the one who had exclusive control
of the thing that caused the injury complained
of.
Espiritu vs. Philippine Power and Development
Co.
(CA-G.R. No. 3240-R, September 20,
1949)Reyes, JBL:In the afternoon of May 5,
1946while the plaintiff-appellee and other
companions were loading grass,an electric
transmission wire, installed and maintained by
the defendant Philippine Power
andDevelopment Co., Inc., alongside the road
suddenly parted, and one of the broken ends hit
the head of the plaintiff as he was about to
board the truck. As a result, plaintiff received
the full shock of 4,400volts of the wire. The
electric charge coursed through his body and
caused extensive and seriousmultiple burns
from skull to eyes, leaving the bone exposed in
some parts and causing intense pain
andwounds that were not completely healed
when the case was tried on June 18, 1947, over
one year afterthe incident. Defendant
disclaimed such liability on the ground that the
plaintiff had failed to show anyspecific act of
negligence.
The appellate court, in overruling this defense,
held: “While it is the rule, as contended by the
appellant,
that in case of non-contractual negligence,
or culpa aquiliana, the burden of proof is on
the plaintiff toestablish that the proximate
cause of injury was the negligence of the
defendant, it is also a recognized
principle that ‘where the thing that causes
injury, without fault of the injured person, is
under the
exclusive control of the defendant and
the injury is such as in the ordinary course of
things does notoccur as if he having such
control used proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of the
explanation, that the injury arose from the
defendant’s want of care.’ And the burden of
evidence is
shifted to him to establish that he had
observed due diligence and care. This rule is
known by the nameof res ipsa loquitur (the
thing or transaction speaks for itself), and is
peculiarly applicable to the case atbar, where it
is unquestioned that the plaintiff had every
night to be on the highway, and the electricwire
was under the sole control of the defendant
company. In the ordinary course of events,
electricwires do not part suddenly in fair
weather and injure people, unless they
are subject to unusual strainand stress or
there are defects in their installation,
maintenance and supervision, just as barrels
do notordinarily roll out of the warehouse
windows to injure passers-by, unless someone
is negligent (which isadmittedly not present),
the fact that the wire snapped suffices to raise a
reasonable presumption of
negligence in its installation, care and
maintenance. Thereafter, as observed by Chief
Baron Pollock “if
there are any facts inconsistent with negl
igence, it is for the defendant to prove.”
Republic vs Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (GR
No. L-21749, September 29, 1967)
Facts: A barge being towed by tugboats
"Bangus" and "Barbero" all owned by Luzon
Stevedoring Corp. rammed one of the wooden
piles of the Nagtahan Bailey Bridge due to the
swollen current of the Pasig after heavy rains
days before. The Republic sued Luzon
Stevedoring for actual and consequential
damages. Luzon Stevedoring claimed it had
exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees; that the damages
to the bridge were caused by force majeure;
that plaintiff has no capacity to sue; and that
the Nagtahan bailey bridge is an obstruction to
navigation.
Issue: Whether or not the collision of
appellant's barge with the supports or piers of
the Nagtahan bridge was in law caused by
fortuitous event or force majeure.
Held: There is a presumption of negligence on
part of the employees of Luzon Stevedoring, as
the Nagtahan Bridge is stationary. For caso
fortuito or force majeure (which in law are
identical in so far as they exempt an obligor
from liability) by definition, are extraordinary
events not foreseeable or avoidable, "events
that could not be foreseen, or which, though
foreseen, were inevitable" (Art. 1174, Civ. Code
of the Philippines). It is, therefore, not enough
that the event should not have been foreseen
or anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it
must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid.
The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is
not impossibility to foresee the same. Luzon
Stevedoring knew the perils posed by the
swollen stream and its swift current, and
voluntarily entered into a situation involving
obvious danger; it therefore assured the risk,
and can not shed responsibility merely because
the precautions it adopted turned out to be
insufficient. It is thus liable for damages.
Maravill-Ilustre vs CA
G.R. No. L-68635
March 12, 1987
Facts:
In almost identical letters dated 20 October
1986, personally sent to Justices Andres R.
Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, and Isagani A.
Cruz, and a fourth letter, dated 22 October
1986 addressed to Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano, all members of the First Division of
this COURT, in feigned ignorance of the
Constitutional requirement that the Court's
Divisions are composed of, and must act
through, at least five (5) members, and in a
stance of dangling threats to effect a change of
the Court's adverse resolution, petitioner Eva
Maravilla Ilustre wrote in part: Please forgive us
for taking the Liberty of addressing you this
letter which we do hope you will read very
carefully. The letter called the attention of the
magistrates for the dismissal of her case, thus,
considering the three minute-resolution: the
first dated 14 May 1986; the second, dated 9
July 1986; and the third, 3 September 1986,
railroaded with such hurry/ promptitude
unequaled in the entire history of the Supreme
Court under circumstances that have gone
beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethic.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner could be liable for
contempt in court and her counsel be imposed
of grave professional misconduct?
Held:
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Eva Maravilla Ilustre
is hereby held in contempt, and is hereby fined
in the amount of P1,000.00 only, mindful that
the power of contempt should be exercised on
the preservative and not on the vindictive
principle of punishment; and
Atty. Wenceslao Laureta is found guilty of grave
professional misconduct, rendering him unfit to
continue to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities belonging to the office of an
attorney, and is hereby suspended from the
practice of law until further Orders, the
suspension to take effect immediately.
LazatinGarcia-Rueda vs.
PascasioFacts:Florencio V. Rueda, husband of
petitioner Leonila Garcia-Rueda,
underwentsurgical operation at the UST
hospital for the removal of a stone blocking
hisureter. He was attended by Dr. Domingo
Antonio, Jr. who was the surgeon,while Dr.
Erlinda Balatbat Reyes was the anesthesiologist.
Six hours after thesurgery, Florencio died of
complications of “unknown cause,” according
too±cials of the UST Hospital.Leonila requested
that the NBI perform an autopsy on her
husband’s body.The NBI found that he had died
because of “lack of care by the
attendingphysician in administering
anesthesia.” They recommended that Dr.
Antonioand Dr. Reyes be charged for Homicide
through Reckless Imprudence beforethe Office
of the City Prosecutor.A series of nine
prosecutors tossed the responsibility of
conducting apreliminary investigation to each
other with contradictory
recommendations(they “played ping pong” with
the case).Frustrated, Leonila ²led graft charges
speci²cally for violation of Section 3(e)of
Republic Act No. 3019 against Prosecutors
Guerrero, Macaraeg, andArizala for manifest
partiality in favor of Dr. Reyes before the O±ce
of theOmbudsman. On July 11, 1994, the
Ombudsman issued the assailed
resolutiondismissing the complaint for lack of
evidence.Petitioner faults the Ombudsman for,
allegedly in grave abuse of discretion,refusing
to ²nd that there exists probable cause to hold
public respondentCity Prosecutors liable for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. In
²ne,petitioner assails the exercise of the
discretionary power of the Ombudsmanto
review the recommendations of the
government prosecutors and to approveand
disapprove the same.Issue:1. W/N the
Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of
discretion in “refusing to²nd that there exists
probable cause to hold public respondent
CityProsecutors liable for violation of RA
3019.”Held:No. The powers and functions of
the Ombudsman are: investigatory
powers,prosecutory power, public assistance
function, authority to inquire and
obtaininformation, and function to adopt,
institute and implement preventivemeasures.As
protector of the people, the O±ce of the
Ombudsman has the power,function and duty
“to act promptly on complaints ²led in any form
or manneragainst public o±cials” and “to
investigate any act or omission of any
publico±cial when such act or omission appears
to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.”
RAMOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 124354. December 29, 1999.
Ponente: Kapunan
FACTS:
Erlinda Ramos underwent a surgical procedure
to remove stone from her gall bladder
(cholecystectomy). They hired Dr. Hosaka, a
surgeon, to conduct the surgery at the De Los
Santos Medical Center (DLSMC). Hosaka
assured them that he would find a good
anesthesiologist. But the operation did not go
as planned, Dr. Hosaka arrived 3 hours late for
the operation, Dra. Gutierrez, the
anesthesiologist “botched” the administration
of the anesthesia causing Erlinda to go into a
coma and suffer brain damage. The botched
operation was witnessed by Herminda Cruz,
sister in law of Erlinda and Dean of College of
Nursing of Capitol Medical Center.
The family of Ramos (petitioners) sued the
hospital, the surgeon and the anesthesiologist
for damages. The petitioners showed expert
testimony showing that Erlinda's condition was
caused by the anesthesiologist in not exercising
reasonable care in “intubating” Erlinda.
Eyewitnesses heard the anesthesiologist saying
“Ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang
pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan.”
Diagnostic tests prior to surgery showed that
Erlinda was robust and fit to undergo surgery.
The RTC held that the anesthesiologist
ommitted to exercise due care in intubating the
patient, the surgeon was remiss in his obligation
to provide a “good anesthesiologist” and for
arriving 3 hours late and the hospital is liable for
the negligence of the doctors and for not
cancelling the operation after the surgeon failed
to arrive on time. The surgeon, anesthesiologist
and the DLSMC were all held jointly and
severally liable for damages to petitioners. The
CA reversed the decision of the Trial Court.
ISSUES: Whether or not the private
respondents were negligent and thereby caused
the comatose condition of Ramos.
HELD:
Yes, private respondents were all negligent and
are solidarily liable for the damages.

RATIO:
Res ipsa loquitur – a procedural or evidentiary
rule which means “the thing or the transaction
speaks for itself.” It is a maxim for the rule that
the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken
with the surrounding circumstances, may
permit an inference or raise a presumption of
negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie
case, and present a question of fact for
defendant to meet with an explanation, where
ordinarily in a medical malpractice case, the
complaining party must present expert
testimony to prove that the attending physician
was negligent.
This doctrine finds application in this case. On
the day of the operation, Erlinda Ramos already
surrendered her person to the private
respondents who had complete and exclusive
control over her. Apart from the gallstone
problem, she was neurologically sound and fit.
Then, after the procedure, she was comatose
and brain damaged—res ipsa loquitur!—the
thing speaks for itself!
Negligence – Private respondents were not able
to disprove the presumption of negligence on
their part in the care of Erlinda and their
negligence was the proximate cause of her
condition. One need not be an anesthesiologist
in order to tell whether or not the intubation
was a success. [res ipsa loquitur applies here].
The Supreme Court also found that the
anesthesiologist only saw Erlinda for the first
time on the day of the operation which
indicates unfamiliarity with the patient and
which is an act of negligence and
irresponsibility.
The head surgeon, Dr. Hosaka was also
negligent. He failed to exercise the proper
authority as the “captain of the ship” in
determining if the anesthesiologist observed
the proper protocols. Also, because he was late,
he did not have time to confer with the
anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia
delivery.
The hospital failed to adduce evidence showing
that it exercised the diligence of a good father
of the family in hiring and supervision of its
doctors (Art. 2180). The hospital was negligent
since they are the one in control of the hiring
and firing of their “consultants”. While these
consultants are not employees, hospitals still
exert significant controls on the selection and
termination of doctors who work there which is
one of the hallmarks of an employer-employee
reationship. Thus, the hospital was allocated a
share in the liability.
Case Digest: Dr. Li vs Spouses Soliman
G.R. No.165279: June 7, 2011
DR. RUBI LI, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES REYNALDO
and LINA SOLIMAN, as parents/heirs of
deceased Angelica Soliman,Respondent.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FACTS:
OnJuly 7, 1993, respondents 11-year old
daughter, Angelica Soliman, underwent a
biopsy of the mass located in her lower
extremity at the St. Lukes Medical Center
(SLMC).Results showed that Angelica was
suffering fromosteosarcoma,osteoblastic type,a
high-grade (highly malignant) cancer of the
bone which usually afflicts teenage
children.Following this diagnosis and as primary
intervention, Angelicas right leg was amputated
by Dr. Jaime Tamayo in order to remove the
tumor.As adjuvant treatment to eliminate any
remaining cancer cells, and hence minimize the
chances of recurrence and prevent the disease
from spreading to other parts of the patients
body (metastasis), chemotherapy was
suggested by Dr. Tamayo.Dr. Tamayo referred
Angelica to another doctor at SLMC, herein
petitioner Dr. Rubi Li, a medical oncologist.
OnAugust 18, 1993, Angelica was admitted to
SLMC.However, she died onSeptember 1, 1993,
just eleven (11) days after the (intravenous)
administration of the first cycle of the
chemotherapy regimen.Because SLMC refused
to release a death certificate without full
payment of their hospital bill, respondents
brought the cadaver of Angelica to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory atCampCramefor post-mortem
examination.The Medico-Legal Report issued by
said institution indicated the cause of death as
"Hypovolemic shock secondary to multiple
organ hemorrhages and Disseminated
Intravascular Coagulation."
OnFebruary 21, 1994, respondents filed a
damage suitagainst petitioner, Dr. Leo Marbella,
Mr. Jose Ledesma, a certain Dr. Arriete and
SLMC. Respondents charged them with
negligence and disregard of Angelicas safety,
health and welfare by their careless
administration of the chemotherapy drugs,
their failure to observe the essential
precautions in detecting early the symptoms of
fatal blood platelet decrease and stopping early
on the chemotherapy, which bleeding led to
hypovolemic shock that caused Angelicas
untimely demise.
On her part, Dr. Balmaceda declared that it is
the physicians duty to inform and explain to the
patient or his relatives every known side effect
of the procedure or therapeutic agents to be
administered, before securing the consent of
the patient or his relatives to such procedure or
therapy.The physician thus bases his assurance
to the patient on his personal assessment of the
patients condition and his knowledge of the
general effects of the agents or procedure that
will be allowed on the patient.Dr. Balmaceda
stressed that the patient or relatives must be
informed of all known side effects based on
studies and observations, even if such will
aggravate the patients condition.
In dismissing the complaint, the trial court held
that petitioner was not liable for damages as
she observed the best known procedures and
employed her highest skill and knowledge in the
administration of chemotherapy drugs on
Angelica but despite all efforts said patient died.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner can be held liable
for failure to fully disclose serious side effects to
the parents of the child patient who died while
undergoing chemotherapy, despite the absence
of finding that petitioner was negligent in
administering the said treatment
HELD: No
CIVIL LAW: Torts and Damages, Medical
Negligence
There are four essential elements a plaintiff
must prove in a malpractice action based upon
the doctrine of informed consent: "(1) the
physician had a duty to disclose material risks;
(2) he failed to disclose or inadequately
disclosed those risks; (3) as a direct and
proximate result of the failure to disclose, the
patient consented to treatment she otherwise
would not have consented to; and (4) plaintiff
was injured by the proposed treatment." The
gravamen in an informed consent case requires
the plaintiff to "point to significant undisclosed
information relating to the treatment which
would have altered her decision to undergo it.
Examining the evidence on record, we hold that
there was adequate disclosure of material risks
inherent in the chemotherapy procedure
performed with the consent of Angelicas
parents.Respondents could not have been
unaware in the course of initial treatment and
amputation of Angelicas lower extremity, that
her immune system was already weak on
account of the malignant tumor in her knee.
When petitioner informed the respondents
beforehand of the side effects of chemotherapy
which includes lowered counts of white and red
blood cells, decrease in blood platelets, possible
kidney or heart damage and skin darkening,
there is reasonable expectation on the part of
the doctor that the respondents understood
very well that the severity of these side effects
will not be the same for all patients undergoing
the procedure.In other words, by the nature of
the disease itself, each patients reaction to the
chemical agents even with pre-treatment
laboratory tests cannot be precisely determined
by the physician.That deathcanpossibly result
from complications of the treatment or the
underlying cancer itself, immediately or
sometime after the administration of
chemotherapy drugs, is a risk that cannot be
ruled out, as with most other major medical
procedures,butsuch conclusion can be
reasonably drawn from the general side effects
of chemotherapy already disclosed.
As a physician, petitioner can reasonably expect
the respondents to have considered the
variables in the recommended treatment for
their daughter afflicted with a life-threatening
illness.On the other hand, it is difficult to give
credence to respondents claim that petitioner
told them of 95% chance of recovery for their
daughter, as it was unlikely for doctors like
petitioner who were dealing with grave
conditions such as cancer to have falsely
assured patients of chemotherapys success
rate.Besides, informed consent laws in other
countries generally require only a reasonable
explanation of potential harms, so specific
disclosures such as statistical data, may not be
legally necessary.
The element of ethical duty to disclose material
risks in the proposed medical treatment cannot
thus be reduced to one simplistic formula
applicable in all instances.Further, in a medical
malpractice action based on lack of informed
consent, "the plaintiff must prove both the duty
and the breach of that duty through expert
testimony.Such expert testimony must show
the customary standard of care of physicians in
the same practice as that of the defendant
doctor.
Pacifico Mabasa owns a property behind
the properties of spouses Cristino and
Brigida Custodio and spouses Lito and
Ma. Cristina Santos. The passageway
leading to Mabasa’s house passes
through the properties of the Custodios
and the Santoses.
Sometime in 1981, the spouses Lito and
Ma. Cristina Santos built a fence around
their property. This effectively deprived
Mabasa passage to his house. Mabasa
then sued the Custodios and the
Santoses to compel them to grant his right
of way with damages. Mabasa claims that In this case, the damage has to be borne
he lost tenants because of the blockade by Mabasa.
done by the families in front. The trial
Bachelor Express vs. CA
court ruled in favor of Mabasa. It ordered
GR 85691
the Custodios and the Santoses to give
July 31, 1990
Mabasa a permanent easement and right
FACT: On 1 August 1980, Bus 800,
of way and for Mabasa to pay just
owned by Bachelor Express, Inc. and
compensation. The Santoses and the
driven by Cresencio
Custodios appealed. The Court of
Rivera, came from Davao City on its way
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
to Cagayan de Oro City passing Butuan
court. However, the CA modified the
City. While at
ruling by awarding damages in favor of
Tabon-Tabon, Butuan City, the bus picked
Mabasa (Actual damages: P65k, Moral
up a passenger. About 15 minutes later, a
damages: P30k, Exemplary damages:
passenger
P10k).
at the rear portion suddenly stabbed a PC
ISSUE: Whether or not the grant of soldier which caused commotion and
damages by the CA is proper. panic among
the passengers which causes stampede.
HELD: No. The award is not proper. This
When the bus stopped, passengers
is an instance of damnum absque injuria.
Ornominio Beter
There is a material distinction between and Narcisa Rautraut were found lying
damages and injury. Injury is the illegal down the road, the former already dead
invasion of a legal right; damage is the as a result of
loss, hurt, or harm which results from the head injuries and the latter also suffering
injury; and damages are the recompense from severe injuries which caused her
or compensation awarded for the damage death later. The
suffered. Thus, there can be damage passenger assailant alighted from the bus
without injury in those instances in which and ran toward the bushes but was killed
the loss or harm was not the result of a by the
violation of a legal duty. police.
In this case, it is true that Mabasa may In their answer, the petitioners denied
have incurred losses (damage) when his liability for the death of Ornominio Beter
tenants left because of the fence made by and Narcisa
the Santoses. However, when Santos Rautraut. They alleged that ... the driver
built the fence, he was well within his was able to transport his passengers
right. He built the fence inside his safely to their
property. There was no existing easement respective places of destination except
agreement, either by contract or by Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut
operation of law, on his property. Hence, who jumped off
Santos has all the right to build the fence. the bus without the knowledge and
It was only after the judgment in the trial consent, much less, the fault of the driver
court that the easement was created and conductor and
which was even conditioned on the the defendants in this case; the defendant
payment of Mabasa of the just corporation had exercised due diligence in
compensation. Santos did not commit a the choice
legal injury against Mabasa when he built of its employees to avoid as much as
the fence, therefore, there is no actionable possible accidents; the incident on August
wrong as basis for the award of damages. 1, 1980 was
not a traffic accident or vehicular accident; posture that the
it was an incident or event very much death of the said passengers was caused
beyond the by a third person who was beyond its
control of the defendants; defendants control and
were not parties to the incident supervision. In effect, the petitioner, in
complained of as it was an order to overcome the presumption of
act of a third party who is not in any way fault or negligence
connected with the defendants and of under the law, states that the vehicular
which the latter incident resulting in the death of
have no control and supervision. passengers Beter and
Thereafter, the heirs of Ornomino Beter Rautraut was caused by force majeure or
and Narcisa Rautraut (Ricardo Beter and caso fortuito over which the common
Sergia Beter carrier did not
are the parents of Ornominio while Teofilo have any control.
Rautraut and Zotera Rautraut are the Article 1174 of the present Civil Code
parents of states:
Narcisa) filed a complaint for “sum of
Except in cases expressly specified by
money” against Bachelor Express, its
law, or when it is otherwise declared by
alleged owner
stipulations, or
Samson Yasay, and the driver Rivera.
when the nature of the obligation requires
After due trial, the trial court issued an
the assumption of risk, no person shall be
order dated 8
responsible
August 1985 dismissing the complaint.
for those events which could not be
Upon appeal however, the trial court’s
foreseen, or which though foreseen, were
decision was reversed and set aside. The
inevitable.
appellate
The running amuck of the passenger was
entered a new judgment finding Bachelor
the proximate cause of the incident as it
Express, Yasay, and Rivera jointly and
triggered off
solidarily liable
a commotion and panic among the
to pay the Beters and the Rautraut the
passengers such that the passengers
amount of P75,000.00 in loss of earnings
started running to the
and support,
sole exit shoving each other resulting in
moral damages, straight death indemnity
the falling off the bus by passengers Beter
and attorney’s fees to the heirs of
and Rautraut
Ornominio Beter;
causing them fatal injuries. The sudden
and the amount of P45,000.00 for straight
act of the passenger who stabbed another
death indemnity, moral damages and
passenger in
attorney’s fees
the bus is within the context of force
to the heirs of Narcisa Rautraut; with
majeure.
costs against Bachelor Express, et. al.
However, in order that a common carrier
Hence, the petition
may be absolved from liability in case of
for review.
force majeure,
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner's
it is not enough that the accident was
common carrier observed extraordinary
caused by force majeure. The common
diligence to
carrier must still
safeguard the lives of its passengers.
prove that it was not negligent in causing
HELD: No.
the injuries resulting from such accident.
Bachelor Express, Inc. denies liability for
the death of Beter and Rautraut on its
Austria v. Court of Appeals 31 SCRA before she was robbed was not a sign of
527, G.R. No. L-29640 (June 10, 1971) negligence on her part.
Facts:
Gacal vs. PAL Case Digest
Maria G. Abad received from Guillermo
Gacal vs. Philippine Airlines
Austria one (1) pendant with diamonds to
(183 SCRA 189, G.R. No. 55300 March
be sold on commission basis or to be
16, 1990)
returned on demand.
Maria Abad while walking home, two men
snatched her purse containing jewelry and
Facts: Plaintiffs Franklin Gacal, his wife
cash, and ran away.
and three others were passengers of PAL
Thus, Abad failed to return the jewelry or
plane at Davao Airport for a flight to
pay its value notwithstanding demands.
Manila, not knowing that the flight, were
Austria filed an action against Abad and
Commander Zapata with other members
Abad’s husband for recovery of the
of Moro National Liberation Front. They
pendant or of its value, and damages.
were armed with grenades and pistols.
Abad raised the defense that the alleged
After take off, the members of MNLF
robbery had extinguished their obligation.
announced a hijacking and directed the
Issue/s:
pilot to fly directly to Libya, later to Sabah.
Whether or not in a contract of agency
They were, however, forced to land in
(consignment of good for sole) it is
Zamboanga airport for refueling, because
necessary that there be prior conviction
the plane did not have enough fuel to
for robbery before the loss of the article
make direct flight to Sabah. When the
shall exempt the consignee from liability
plane began to taxi at the runaway of
for such loss.
Zamboanga airport, it was met by two
Whether or not Abad was negligent.
armored cars of the military.
Ruling:
No. To avail of the exemption granted in
the law, it is not necessary that the
An armored car subsequently bumped the
persons responsible for the occurrence
stairs leading inside the plane. That
should be found or punished, it would only
commenced the battle between the
be sufficient to establish that the
military and the hijackers, which led
enforceable event, the robbery in this
ultimately to the liberation of the plane’s
case did take place without any
surviving crew and passengers with the
concurrence fault on the debtor’s part,
final score of ten passengers and three
and this can be done by preponderance of
hijackers dead.
evidence.
A court finding that a robbery has
happened would not necessary mean that
Issue: Whether or not hijacking is a case
those accused in the criminal action
fortuito or force majeure, which would
should be found guilty of the crime; nor
exempt an aircraft from liability for,
would a ruling that those actually accused
damages to its passengers and personal
did not commit the robbery be
belongings that were lost during the
inconsistent with a finding that a robbery
incident?
did take place.
No. In 1961, when the robbery in question
did take place, for at that time criminality
Held: In order to constitute a caso fortuito
had not by far reached the levels attained
that would exempt from liability under Art
in the present day. The diligence that
1174 of the civil code, it is necessary that
Abad portrayed when she went home
the following elements must occur: (a) the
cause of the breach of obligation must be
independent of human will; (b) the event
must be unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c)
the event must be such as to render it
impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner; (d) the
debtor must be free from any participation
in or aggravation of the injury to the
creditor.
Applying the above guidelines, the failure
to transport the petitioners safely from
Davao to Manila was due to the
skyjacking incident staged buy the MNLF
without connection to the private
respondent, hence, independent of will of
PAL or its passengers.
The events rendered it impossible for PAL
to perform its obligation in a normal
manner and it cannot be faulted for
negligence on the duty performed by the
military. The existence of force majeure
has been established thus exempting PAL
from payment of damages.
115024 February 7, 1996
Lessons Applicable:
 Calculation of Risk (Torts and
Damages)
 Factors in Determining
Amount (Torts and Damages)
FACTS:
 June 24, 1990 2 am: While
driving from her restaurant at
Araneta avenue towards the
direction of Manila, Ma. Lourdes
Valenzuela noticed that she had
a flat tire so she parked along
the sidewalk about 1 1/2 feet
away, place her emergency
lights and seeked help
 She was with her
companion Cecilia Ramon
 While she was pointing her tools to
the man who will help her fixed the
tires, she was suddenly hit by
another Mitsubishi Lancer driven by
Richard Li who was intoxicated and
she slammed accross his windshield
and fell to the ground
 She was sent to UERM where she
stayed for 20 days and her leg was
amputated and was replaced with an
artificial one.
 Her expenses totalled 147, 000
[120,000 php (confinement) + 27,
000 (aritificial leg)]
 RTC: Richard Li guilty of gross
negligence and liable for
damages under Article 2176 of
the Civil Code. Alexander
Commercial, Inc., Li’s employer,
jointly and severally liable for
damages pursuant to Article
2180 P41,840 actual
damages, P37,500 unrealized
profits because of the stoppage of
plaintiffs Bistro La
Conga restaurant 3 weeks after the
accident on June 24,
1990, P20,000 a month as
unrealized profits of Bistro La
Conga restaurant, from August, 1990
until the date of this
judgment, P30,000.00, a month, for
unrealized profits in 2 Beauty
salons, P1,000,000 in moral
damages, P50,000, as exemplary
damages, P60,000, as
reasonable attorney’s fees and
costs.
 CA: there was ample evidence
that the car was parked at the
side but absolved Li's employer
 Li: 55 kph - self serving and
uncorraborated
 Rogelio Rodriguez, the owner-
operator of an establishment
located just across the scene of
the accident: Valenzuela’s car
parked parallel and very near
the sidewalk and Li was driving
on a very fast speed and there
was only a drizzle (NOT heavy
rain)
ISSUE:
1. W/N Li was driving at 55 kph - NO
2. W/N Valenzuela was guilty of
contributory negligence - NO
3. W/N Alexander Commercial, Inc.
as Li's employer should be held
liable - YES
4. W/N the awarding of damages is
proper. - YES.
HELD: CA modified with reinstating the
RTC decision
1. NO
 If Li was running at only about
55 kph then despite the wet and
slippery road, he could have
avoided hitting
the Valenzuela by the mere
expedient or applying his brakes
at the proper time and distance
 it was not even necessary for
him to swerve a little to the
right in order to safely avoid a
collision with the on-coming car
since there is plenty of space for
both cars, since Valenzuela car
was running at the right lane
going towards Manila and the
on-coming car was also on its
right lane going to Cubao
2. NO.
 Contributory negligence is
conduct on the part of the
injured party, contributing as a
legal cause to the harm he has
suffered, which falls below the
standard to which he is required
to conform for his own
protection
 emergency rule
 an individual who suddenly finds
himself in a situation of danger
and is required to act without
much time to consider the best
means that may be adopted to
avoid the impending danger, is
not guilty of negligence if he
fails to undertake what
subsequently and upon
reflection may appear to be a
better solution, unless the
emergency was brought by his
own negligence
 She is not expected to run the
entire boulevard in search for a
parking zone or turn on a dark
Street or alley where she would
likely find no one to help her
 She stopped at a lighted place
where there were people, to
verify whether she had a flat
tire and to solicit help if needed
 she parked along the sidewalk,
about 1½ feet away, behind a
Toyota Corona Car
3. YES.
 Not the principle of respondeat
superior, which holds the
master liable for acts of the
servant (must be in the course
of business), but that of pater
familias, in which the liability
 ultimately falls upon the
employer, for his failure to
exercise the diligence of a good
father of the family in the
selection and supervision of his
employees
 Ordinarily, evidence
demonstrating that the
employer has exercised diligent
supervision of its employee
during the performance of the
latter‘s assigned tasks would be
enough to relieve him of the
liability imposed by Article 2180
in relation to Article 2176 of the
Civil Code.
 situation is of a different
character, involving a practice
utilized by large companies with
either their employees of
managerial rank or their
representatives.
 Moreover, Li’s claim that he
happened to be on the road on
the night of the accident
because he was coming from a
social visit with an officemate in
Parañaque was a bare allegation
which was never corroborated in
the court below. It was obviously self-
serving. Assuming he really came from his
officemate’s place, the same could give rise to
speculation that he and his officemate had just
been from a work-related function, or they
were together to discuss sales and other work
related strategies.
 Alexander Commercial, Inc. has
not demonstrated, to our
satisfaction, that it exercised
the care and diligence of a good
father of the family in
entrusting its company car to Li
4. YES.
 As the amount of moral damages are
subject to this Court’s discretion, we are
of the opinion that the amount of
P1,000,000.00 granted by the trial court
is in greater accord with the extent and
nature of the injury -. physical and
psychological - suffered by Valenzuela
as a result of Li’s grossly negligent
driving of his Mitsubishi Lancer in the
early morning hours of the accident.
 the damage done to her would not only
be permanent and lasting, it would also
be permanently changing and adjusting
to the physiologic changes which her
body would normally undergo through
the years. The replacements, changes,
and adjustments will require
corresponding adjustive physical and
occupational therapy. All of these
adjustments, it has been documented, are
painful.
SPS. FABRE and PORFIRIO CABIL v COURT OF
APPEALS
FACTS: Sps. Fabre owned a minibus used as a
school service for children. They hired Cabil as
their driver. A group hired their minibus for the
transportation of 33 members from Manila to
La Union.
During the group’s travel, a bridge was
under repair so Cabil, though unfamiliar with
the area, was forced to take a detour. Cabil
came upon a sharp curve and the road was
slippery because it was raining. This caused the
bus to skid to the left road shoulder but only
came into a full stop after a series of impacts.
Several passengers were injured. Amyline
Antonio, who was seriously injured, filed a case
with the RTC of Makati.
Cabil, claimed he did not see the curve until it
was too late. He said he was not familiar with
the area and he could not have seen the curve
despite the care he took in driving the bus,
because it was dark and there was no sign on
the road.
The court ruled in favor of Amyline on the
ground that no convincing evidence was shown
that the minibus was properly checked for
travel to a long distance trip and that the driver
was properly screened and tested before being
admitted for employment. Indeed, all the
evidence presented has shown the negligent act
of the defendants which ultimately resulted to
the accident. The CA affirmed the decision of
the lower court.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners were
negligent.
HELD: YES. Considering the fact that it was
raining and the road was slippery, that it was
dark, that Cabil drove his bus at 50 kilometers
an hour when even on a good day the normal
speed was only 20 kilometers an hour, and that
he was unfamiliar with the terrain, Cabil was
grossly negligent and should be held liable for
the injuries suffered by Amyline Antonio.
Pursuant to Arts. 2176 and 2180 of the Civil
Code his negligence gave rise to the
presumption that his employers, the Fabres,
were themselves negligent in the selection and
supervision of their employee.
Due diligence in selection of employees is not
satisfied by finding that the applicant possessed
a professional drivers license. The employer
should also examine the applicant for his
qualifications, experience and record of
service. Due diligence in supervision, on the
other hand, requires the formulation of rules
and regulations for the guidance of employees
and the issuance of proper instructions as well
as actual implementation and monitoring of
consistent compliance with the rules.
In the case at bar, the Fabres, in allowing Cabil
to drive the bus to La Union, apparently did not
consider the fact that Cabil had been driving for
school children only. They had tested him for
certain matters, such as whether he could
remember the names of the children he would
be taking to school, which were irrelevant to his
qualification to drive on a long distance travel,
especially considering that the trip to La Union
was his first. The existence of hiring procedures
and supervisory policies cannot be casually
invoked to overturn the presumption of
negligence on the part of an employer.
CHARMINA BANAL v TOMAS TADEO
FACTS: Charmina filed a case against Rosario
for violation of BP 22. Judge Tomas Tadeo as
then presiding judge of the RTC rejected the
appearance of a private prosecutor on the
ground that the charge is BP 22 which does not
provide for any civil liability or indemnity thus;
it is not a crime against property but public
order.
Petitioner, relying on the legal axiom that
"Every man criminally liable is also civilly liable,"
contends that indemnity may be recovered
from the offender regardless of whether or not
BP 22 so provides.
ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in rejecting
the appearance of the private prosecutor.
HELD: YES. Article 20 of the New Civil Code
provides:
Every person who, contrary to law,
wilfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
While an act or omission is felonious because it
is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability
not so much because it is a crime but because it
caused damage to another. Damage or injury to
another is evidently the foundation of the civil
action. Such is not the case in criminal actions
for, to be criminally liable, it is enough that the
act or omission complained of is punishable,
regardless of whether or not it also causes
material damage to another.
Civil liability to the offended private party
cannot thus be denied, The payee of the check
is entitled to receive the payment of money for
which the worthless check was issued. Having
been caused the damage, she is entitled to
recompense.