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DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS
GROUNDS FOR DISMISSAL
 LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER HIS PERSON
 LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
 LITIS PENDENCIA
 RES JUDICATA
 NO CAUSE OF ACTION
LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER HIS PERSON
AMIGO AND VDA DE SALINAS V. CA
GR NO. 102833 FEBRUARY 9, 1996
Facts:
Lolita Amigo and Estelita vda de Salinas, hereinafter called “Lolita” and
“Estelita” leased from Mercedes Inigo hereinafter called “Mercedes” a land. They
constructed their houses on the land. Meanwhile, Mercedes sold the land to
Bosquit and Wee. Bosquit and Wee instituted a deed of exchange with the city of
Davao. Later on, they filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the City of
Davao but was dimissed. Bosquit sold his rights to Wee.
Later on, Wee instituted a complaint for recovery of real property against
Lolita and Estelita before the CFI. After Lolita and Estelita filed their answer, the
court appointed a geodetic engineer to survey the property. The court allowed
Wee’s amended complaint, where he also prayed for the abatement of nuisance
over portions of improvements introduced by Lolita and Estelita. In their amended
answer, Lolita and Estelita denied the material allegations of the amended
complaint. They insisted that their properties are not nuisances. After full reception
of evidence, CFI ruled in favour of Wee.
Estelita and Lolita appealed before the CA. CA dismissed for appeal
because they did not submit their brief. A petition for relief from the order of the
dismissal was likewise denied because it was filed beyond the reglementary period.
Wee was able to secure a writ of execution from the CFI. CFI denied Estelita and
Lolita’s omnibus motion to quash the writ of execution. CFI granted Wee’s motion
for special order for demolition.
1
Estelita and Lolita filed an action for annulment of the CFI’s decisions.
They point out that the judgements are void for being coram non judice and for
want of jurisdiction. CA dismissed the petition.
Issue:
1. Was the judgement void for being coram non judice?
2. Did the CFI acquire jurisdiction over the persons of Estelita and Lolita?
Held:
1. No.
a. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and determined by the
allegations of the complaint. It does not matter if later on, the
merits of case veer away from the claims asseverated by the
plaintiff.
i. The suit is for the recovery of real property, which fell
within the jurisdiction of the RTC
ii. That the City of Davao owns the land is belied by the
titles showing that Wee owned the subject property.
2. Yes.
a. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in a civil action is
acquired either by his voluntary appearance in court and his
submission to its authority or by service of summons.
i. by their filing of an answer and amended answer,
Estelita and Lolita are deemed to have formally and
effectively appeared before the lower court.
b. Estelita and Loliita have allowed the issue of jurisdiction over
their persons to pass unquestioned until the rendition of
judgment. It is now too late for them to assail the lower court’s
jurisdiction over them.
Notes:
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1. Voluntary appearance is a waiver of the necessity of a formal
notice.
a. Appearance in whatever form, without expressly
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the
person, is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court
over the person.
b. While the formal method of entering an appearance in a
cause pending in the courts is to deliver to the clerk a
written direction ordering him to enter the appearance
of the person who subscribes it, an appearance may
be made by simply filing a formal motion or plea
or answer.
c. The formal method is not necessary.
2. Unlike the question over the subject matter which may be
invoked at any stage of the proceedings [ even on appeal], the
issue of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant must be
seasonably raised.
a. It can be pleaded in a motion to dismiss or by way of an
affirmative defense in answer.
LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
LA NAVAL DRUG V. CA
GR NO. 103200 AUGUST 31 1994
Facts:
La Naval rented a portion of the commercial owned by Yao. When the
lease expired on April 30, 1989, La Naval considered extending the lease for
another five years. Given the disagreement as to the rental rate, both La Naval
agreed to submit it for arbitration. La Naval appointed Domingo Almarez Jr as his
arbitrator, while Yao chose Atty Sabile. With respect to the third arbitrator, the
appointment of Mr. Aurelio was held in abeyance, since La Naval insisted the Board
of Directors approve Mr. Aurelio’s appointment. Subsequently, Yao filed an
amended petition for the enforcement of the Arbitration agreement with damages.
Notwithstanding La Naval Drug’s opposition, the lower court admitted it.
2
Thereafter, in response to the amended petition, La Naval prayed for
dismissal of the action for failure to pay the filing fees, apart from its averment
that as it is an ordinary civil action that requires a full blown trial, the prayer for
summary hearing of arbitration issue is procedurally untenable. It also filed a
motion to set the case for preliminary hearing of its special and affirmative
defenses which are grounds for its motion to dismiss.
The Court issued an order where it held that two arbitrators chose Mr.
Narciso as the third arbitrator, and that parties should submit position papers as
regards the issue of Yao’s claim for damages which may be litigated upon in
summary proceeding to enforce the arbitration agreement.
La Naval moved for the reconsideration of the order. It argued that the
lower court sits as a special court exercising limited jurisdiction. Hence it is not
competent to act on Yao’s claim for damages. The Regional Trial Court denied the
motion for reconsideration.
Responding to the original action for certiorari and prohibition for
annulment of that order filed by petitioner, the Court of Appeals ruled that the
Regional Trial Court, acting within the limits of its special jurisdiction, may rule on
the issue of whether the litigants may proceed to arbitration. It further held that La
Naval was in estoppel for failing to question the competence of the Trial court to
hear and decide yao’s claim for damages.
Issue:
Would the submission of other issues in the motion to dismiss or of an affirmative
defense in the answer bar the defendant from setting up lack of jurisdiction over
his person?
Held:
Not inevitably.
1. Jurisdiction over the person must be seasonably raised, i.e., that it is
pleaded in a motion to dismiss or by way of an affirmative defense in an
answer.
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a. Voluntary appearance shall be deemed a waiver of this defense. a.a special law has limited the exercise of its normal
b. The assertion, however, of affirmative defenses shall not be jurisdiction on a particular matter or
constructed as an estoppel or as a waiver of such defense. b. the type of action has been reposed by law in certain
other courts or quasi-judicial agencies for
determination.
3. the rules relating to the effects of want of jurisdiction over the
subject matter should apply with equal vigor to cases where the
2. Where the court itself clearly has no jurisdiction over the subject matter
court is similarly bereft of jurisdiction over the nature of the
or the nature of the action, the invocation of this defense may be done at action.
any time.
a. It is neither for the courts nor the parties to violate or disregard
that rule, let alone to confer that jurisdiction, this matter being ILOCOS SUR ELECTRIC V. NLRC
legislative in character. GR NO. 106161 FEBRUARY 1, 1995
b. Barring highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances, such
as hereinbefore exemplified, neither estoppel nor waiver shall Facts:
apply.
Engr Sabio filed a case before the Labor Arbiter against ISECO for illegal dismissal.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in his favour. ISECO appealed to the NLRC.
The want of jurisdiction by the court is indisputable, given the nature of NLRC dismissed the appeal as the appeal had been filed out of time. The motion
the controversy. The arbitration law explicitly confines the court's authority only to
for reconsideration has been denied. ISECO filed a petition for certiorari before the
pass upon the issue of whether there is or there is no agreement in writing Supreme Court.
providing for arbitration.
Issue:
All considered, the court a quo must then refrain from taking up the
claims of the contending parties for damages, which, upon the other hand, may be 1. Does NLRC have jurisdiction over the case of Engr Sabio?
ventilated in separate regular proceedings at an opportune time and venue. The 2. will ISECO be estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of NLRC
circumstances obtaining in this case are far, we hold, from justifying the over the case?
application of estoppel against either party.
Held:
Notes:
1. yes
a. PD 269 as amended by PD 1645 has given NEA the power of
1. Jurisdiction over the nature of the action, in concept, differs from
supervision and control over electric cooperatives and other
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
borrowers. It does not give NEA authority to hear and decide
2. Illustrated, lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action is the
termination cases of employees in electric cooperatives. The
situation that arises when a court, which ordinarily would have
authority is vested in the labor arbiter.
the authority and competence to take a case, is rendered without
2. yes.
it either because:

3
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a. while jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a party’s active
participation in the proceedings before the court without
jurisdiction will estop him from assailing the lack of it.
i. NLRC’s jurisdiction was only raised for the first time in
this petition
ii. ISECO did not question the jurisdiction of the labor
arbiter either in a motion to dismiss or in their answer
iii. In fact, ISECO participated in the proceedings before
the labor arbiter as well as in the NLRC to which they
appealed the labor arbiter’s decision.
b. it is an undesirable practice of a party participating in the
proceedings and submitting his case for decision and then
accepting the judgment only if favourable, and attacking it for
lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.
ANDAYA V. ABADIA
GR NO. L-104033 DECEMBER 27, 1993
Facts:
Andaya sued Abadia et al as directors of AFPSLAI before the trial court for
acting in concert in ousting him from his position as president and general
manager of AFPSLAI. Abadia et al filed an urgent motion to dismiss it on the
ground that the complaint raised intra-corporate controversies over which SEC
and not RTC, has exclusive original jurisdiction. After Andaya filed an amended
complaint impleading therein the Central Bank Governor, Managing Director and
Central Bank SEC Acting director, Abadia et al filed an Omnibus Motion alleging
that the filing of the amended complaint is improper and should be disallowed. The
trial court issued an order dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. Motions for
reconsideration had been denied by the trial court.
On Appeal before the Supreme Court, Andaya asserts that the complaint
is based not so much on plaintiff’s attempted removal but rather on the manner of
his removal and the consequent effects thereof. He argues that from the foregoing
it should be the RTC and not the SEC that has jurisdiction over the complaint.
Issue:
4
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over Andaya’s complaint?
2. can the court dismiss the case motu proprio on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction?
Held:
1. No.
a. The determination of the rights of the Andaya arising from the
alleged illegal convening of the meeting off AFPSLAI Board of
Directors and his subsequent ouster from corporate officers as a
result of the voting for the reorganization of management are
intracorporate controversies subject to the jurisdiction of SEC.
b. The supposed violation of the civil code on human relations and
his claim for damages either depends on, or is inextricably linked
with the resolution of the corporate controversies.
c. In his Supplemental Appeal by Certiorari With Prayer for
Issuance of Preliminary Injunction or Restraining Order, Andaya
refers to allegations in pars. 7, 11, 15 and 16 17 of the complaint
which supposedly disclose that the case is within the jurisdiction
of the court a quo. He wilily, but unavailingly, tries to mangle his
complaint, dismember its parts, and present to us only those
paragraphs which he considers are beyond the jurisdiction of
SEC.
i. In giving utmost importance to these paragraphs and in
treating them as his strongest arguments to support his
position, Andaya unwittingly exposes his achilles' heel.
ii. These paragraphs themselves show that the allegations
of violations of the rules on human relations also fall
within the jurisdiction of SEC because they are treated
merely as ingredients of "malevolent and illegal acts
calculated to realize and accomplish the threatened
illegal removal of plaintiff from his (corporate)
positions."
2. yes.
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a. last sentence of Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court, expressly states:
"Whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter, it shall dismiss the action. Sec. 2, Rule 9 uses
the word "shall," leaving the court no choice under the given
situation but to dismiss the case.
b. The same Rule also uses the phrase "whenever it appears,"
which means at anytime after the complaint or amended
complaint is filed, because the lack of jurisdiction may be
apparent from the allegations therein.
c. Hence, from the foregoing, even if no answer or motion to
dismiss is filed the court may dismiss the case for want of
jurisdiction. In this sense, dismissal for lack jurisdiction may be
ordered by the court motu propio.
Notes:
1. Erroneous assumption of jurisdiction over the subject matter may
put at naught whatever proceedings the court might have had.
a. Hence, even on appeal, and even if the parties do not
raise the issue of jurisdiction, the reviewing court is not
precluded from ruling that it has no jurisdiction over the
case.
b. jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or
waived by the parties or even by the judge.
c. It is also irrefutable that a court may at any stage of the
proceedings dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction.
For this matter, the ground of lack of jurisdiction in
dismissing a case is not waivable.
2. With the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction, it then
becomes inconsequential whether the court acted on the Urgent
Motion to Dismiss or on the Omnibus Motion without the
requisite notice as provided in Secs. 4 and 6 of Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court.
3. The determination of lack of jurisdiction over Abadia being
apparent from the face of the amended complaint, the defect of
want of prior notice and hearing of the Omnibus Motion could
not by itself confer jurisdiction upon the court a quo.
5
REPUBLIC V. BANTIGUE POINT DEVELOPMENT
GR NO. 162322 MARCH 14, 2012
Facts:
Bantigue Point filed an application for original registration of title with
RTC. Republic filed its opposition. However, the RTC clerk of court transmitted
motu proprio the records of the case to MTC San Juan as the property was less
than P100,000.00. MTC entered a general order of default and commenced with
the reception of evidence. Thereafter, MTC awarded the land to Bantigue. On
Appeal by the Republic before the CA, the appellate court ruled that the Republic is
estopped from raising the jurisdictional challenge since it actively participated in
the proceedings.
Issue:
1. Was the Republic Estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction?
2. did the MTC have jurisdiction over the case?
Held:
1. No.
a. the CA’s ruling that a party may be estopped from raising such
[jurisdictional] question if he has actively taken part in the very
proceeding which he questions, belatedly objecting to the courts
jurisdiction in the event that the judgment or order subsequently
rendered is adverse to him [22] is based on the doctrine of
estoppel by laches. this ruling is inapplicable.
i. Republic filed its Opposition to the application for
registration when the records were still with the RTC.
ii. At that point, it could not have questioned the
delegated jurisdiction of the MTC, simply because the
case was not yet with that court. When the records
were transferred to the MTC, Republic neither filed
pleadings nor requested affirmative relief from that
court.
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iii. On appeal, Republic immediately raised the
jurisdictional question in its Brief.[26]Clearly, the
exceptional doctrine of estoppel by laches is
inapplicable to the instant appeal.
b. Republic has not displayed such unreasonable failure or neglect
that would lead us to conclude that it has abandoned or declined
to assert its right to question the lower court's jurisdiction.
2. yes.
a. the MTC has delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land
registration cases in two instances: first, where there is no
controversy or opposition; or, second, over contested lots, the
value of which does not exceed ₱100,000.
b. the value of the property sought to be registered may be
ascertained in three ways: first, by the affidavit of the
claimant; second, by agreement of the respective claimants, if
there are more than one; or, third, from the corresponding tax
declaration of the real property.
i. In this case, the value of the property cannot be
determined using the first method as the records are
bereft of any affidavit executed by Bantigue as to the
value of the property.
ii. Likewise, valuation cannot be done through the second
method, because this method finds application only
where there are multiple claimants who agree on and
make a joint submission as to the value of the property.
Here, only Bantigue Point Development Corporation
claims the property.
iii. The value of the property must therefore be
ascertained with reference to the corresponding Tax
Declarations submitted by Corporation together with its
application for registration.
c. From the records, we find that the assessed value of the
property is ₱4,330, ₱1,920 and ₱8,670, or a total assessed value
of ₱14,920 for the entire property.[43] Based on these Tax
Declarations, it is evident that the total value of the land in
question does not exceed ₱100,000.
6
Note:
1. In Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, [23]the party-litigant actively participated
in the proceedings before the lower court and filed pleadings
therein. Only 15 years thereafter, and after receiving an adverse
Decision on the merits from the appellate court, did the party-
litigant question the lower courts jurisdiction. Considering the
unique facts in that case, we held that estoppel by laches had
already precluded the party-litigant from raising the question of
lack of jurisdiction on appeal.
2. Tijam must be construed as an exception to the general rule and
applied only in the most exceptional cases whose factual milieu is
similar to that in the latter case.
3. Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which,
by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.
LITIS PENDENCIA
ANDERSONS GROUP V. CA
GR NO. 114928 JANUARY 21 1997
Facts:
Denate entered into an agency agreement with Andersons group as its
commission agent for the sale of distilled spirits in Davao City, three davao
provinces and Northern cotabato.
Denate filed a civil action for collection of sum of money [c1] against
Andersons before RTC Davao. Later on, Andersons filed a complaint [ c2] against
Denate before RTC Caloocan on the alleged amounts not remitted by Denate.
Denate filed a MTD for [c2] on the ground that there was another action pending
between the same parties for the same cause of action, citing [c1]. Anderson filed
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its opposition on the ground that RTC Davao had not acquired jurisdiction over
[c1]. RTC rendered its order in Anderson’s favour. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
set aside the orders of the RTC.
Issue:
Should the action in Kalookan RTC be dismissed on the ground of lis pendens?
Held:
Yes.
1. All the requisites for lis pendens are present. The parties in the
Davao and Caloocan cases are the same. They are suing each other
for sums of money which arose from their contract of agency. As
observed by the appellate court, the relief prayed for is based on the
same facts and there is identity of rights asserted. Any judgment
rendered in one case would amount to res judicata in the other.
a. In conceptualizing lis pendens, we have said that
like res judicata as a doctrine, litis pendentia is a sanction of
public policy against multiplicity of suits. [5]The principle upon
which a plea of another action pending is sustained is that the
latter action is deemed unnecessary and vexatious.
2. That the Davao Court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the
parties as summons had not yet been served and its claim that
pendency of a case as contemplated by law on lis pendens,
presupposes a valid service of summons are not meritorious.
a. A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.
[7]
b. The phraseology adopted in the Rules of Court merely states
that another action pending between the same parties for the
same cause is a ground for motion to dismiss.
7
c. As worded, the rule does not contemplate that there be a prior
pending action, since it is enough that there is a pending
action.[8]
d. Neither is it required that the party be served with summons
before lis pendens should apply.
3. the rule on litis pendentia does not require that the later case should
yield to the earlier.[10] The criterion used in determining which case
should be abated is:
a. which is the more appropriate action[11] or
b. which court would be "in a better position to serve the interests
of justice.
4. Applying these criteria, and considering that both cases involve a
sum of money collected in and around Davao, the Davao Court would
be in a better position to hear and try the case, as the witnesses and
evidence would be coming from said area.
Notes:
1. Lis pendens as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers
to that situation wherein another action is pending between the
same parties for the same cause of action.[2]
a. To constitute the defense of lis pendens, it must appear
that not only are the parties in the two actions the same
but there is substantial identity in the cause of action
and relief sought.[3]
b. Further, it is required that the identity be such that any
judgment which may be rendered in the other would,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata on the case on hand
2. The rule of lis pendens refers to another action. An action starts
only upon the filing of a complaint in court.
a. The fact that when appellant brought the present case,
it did not know of the filing of a previous case against it
by appellees, and it received the summons and a copy
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of the complaint only after it had filed its own action
against them, is immaterial.
3. The fact is, at the time it brought the present case, there was
already another pending action between the same parties
seeking to assert identical rights with identical prayers for relief
based on the same facts, the decision in which would be res
judicata herein.
RAMOS V. PERALTA
GR NO 108538 JANUARY 22 1996
Facts:
Ramos leased a fishpond to Sps Ortanez. Unknown to him, the property
was in the name of Philippine International Surety, a corporation founded and
99.5% owned by the Salgado Spouses. Later renamed Mindanao Insurance, it was
placed under receivership upon application of the Insurance Commissioner.
PR Roman Inc. purchased from Mindanao Insurance the fishpond. The
deed of sale was signed by the receiver and duly approved by the liquidation court.
Later on, Ramos received a letter from PR Roman informing him that of the sale
and extended him the company’s intention of possessing the fishpond.
Ramos filed before CFI a complaint [c1] against sps cruz, Mindanao
Insurance and PR Roman Inc. for consignation of 70,000.00 representing advance
rentals of the fishpond which was previously tendered to, but refused by Sps
Ortanez and Pablo Roman.
PR Roman inc filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that venue is
improperly laid, the complaint states no cause of action and the court has not
jurisdiction over the subject of the action or suit. It cited the case it filed and
pending before in CFI bataan [c2] against Ramos to quiet the title over the
fishpond. CFI dismissed the complaint, averring that there is already a case
pending between the same parties and for the same cause of action in CFI Bataan.
Ramos’ motion for reconsideration was denied.
Issue:
8
Was the dismissal proper?
Held:
Yes.
1. in his basic petition for review, one of the assigned errors of Ramos is
that the lower court erred in not holding that the parties in [c1] are not
the same as the parties in [c2]. 8
a. However, in his brief, no further mention of this assigned error
was made; a clear indication of Ramos’ admission of the identity
of parties in [c1] and [c2], particularly as he filed a third party
complaint in [c1] against the spouses Ortanez and Mindanao
Insurance.
2. Ramos’ approach to his consignation case is quite constricted.
3. Whatever decision may be handed down in [c1] would constitute res
judicata. Should CFI Bataan rule that the lease is valid and effective
against PR Roman.
a. His contention that the only issue in a consignation case is
whether or not the defendant is willing to accept the proffered
payment is true only where there is no controversy with respect
to the obligation sought to be discharged by such payment. His
consignation case, however, is not as simple.
b. While ostensibly, the immediate relief sought for in his
consignation case is to compel therein defendants to accept his
advance rentals, the ultimate purpose of such action is to
compel the new owner of the fishpond to recognize his leasehold
rights and right of occupation.
c. In the last analysis, therefore, the issue involved in [c2] is the
right of possession over the fishpond intertwined with the
validity and effectivity of the lease contract.
Notes:
1. the rules of venue of personal actions are laid down generally for
the convenient of the plaintiff and the witnesses.
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2. the rule on litis pendencia does not require that the later case
should yield to the earlier case. What is required merely is that
there be another pending action, not a prior pending action.
a. Considering the broder scope of inquiry involved [c2]
and the location of the property involved, the lower
court decision should be sustained.
YAP V CHUA
GR NO. 186730 JUNE 13 2012
Facts:
Yap filed a complaint against Chua and Te [c1] with RTC Makati for the
cancellation and discharge of several checks that he drew against his account in
BPI. Thereafter, Chua also filed with RTC Gen San [c2] a complaint for sum of
money against Yap and his wife, Bessie. RTC General Santos rendered its decision
in favour of Yap. Thereafter, Chua moved for the dismissal of [c1] on the grounds
of litis pendentia and forum shopping. Chua averred that Yap committed forum
shopping when he failed to inform RTC Makati of [c2]. RTC Makati refused to
dismiss the case. Upon RTC’s denial of Chua’s Motion for reconsideration, Chua
filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. CA ordered the dismissal of [c1].
Issue:
Did the CA err when it dismissed [c1]?
Held:
No. The Court agrees with the CA that all the elements of litis pendencia are
present.
1. The first requisite of litis pendentia is present as there is identity of
parties. The second and third requisites are likewise present. Apart
from the fact that the same factual antecedents prompted the filing
of the two cases, that Yaps defense in [c1] constitutes his cause of
action in [c2] necessarily implies reliance on the same evidence for
the resolution of both cases.
9
2. Yap filed his complaint for the annulment of the checks he issued to
Chua after he was adjudged by the RTC of General Santos City
liable.
a. This strikes the Court as indicative of his deliberate and willful
attempt to render nugatory and defeat the adverse decision of
the RTC of General Santos City and relieve himself of his
obligation to pay by having the checks he issued annulled,
albeit the remedy of appeal was available and which he, in
fact, resorted to.
b. Chuas complaint is anchored on the amounts Yap received
from her and the RTC of General Santos City decided in her
favor on the strength of the checks that Yap issued and
endorsed to her.
c. By seeking to cancel or discharge such checks, Yap attempted
to use the RTC of Makati City to destroy the evidentiary
foundation of the decision of the RTC of General Santos City.
d. In doing so, Yap trifled with court processes and exposed the
courts to the possibility of rendering conflicting
decisions. Worse, Yap sought to accomplish the prohibited - a
court reversing a decision rendered by a court of co-equal
rank.
Notes:
1. The requisites of litis pendentia are:
a. the identity of parties, or at least such as representing
the same interests in both actions;
b. the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts; and
c. the identity of the two cases such that judgment in
one, regardless of which party is successful, would
amount to res judicata in the other.
2. Identity of causes of action does not mean absolute identity;
otherwise, a party could easily escape the operation of res
judicata by changing the form of the action or the relief sought.
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3. The test to determine whether the causes of action are identical
is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both
actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to
the maintenance of the two actions.
a. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two
actions are considered the same, and a judgment in the first
case is a bar to the subsequent action.
b. Hence, a party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting
a different method of presenting his case, escape the operation
of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not
be twice litigated between the same parties or their privies.
4. Among the several tests resorted to in ascertaining whether two suits
relate to a single or common cause of action are:
a. whether the same evidence would support and sustain both the
first and second causes of action; and
b. whether the defenses in one case may be used to substantiate
the complaint in the other.[17]
c. Also fundamental is the test of determining whether the cause of
action in the second case existed at the time of the filing of the
first complaint.
VDA DE CRUZO V. CARIAGA
GR NO. 75109-10 JUNE 28, 1989
Facts:
Machoca borrowed a sum of money to Ang. She mortgaged her lot and
delivered the certificate of title to him. Machoca borrowed another sum of money.
It was claimed that Ang prepared a deed of sale over the lot and had Machoca, an
illiterate, affix her thumb mark in the belief that the deed of sale was similar to the
deed of mortgage. On the following day, Machoca sought the reformation of the
instrument. Instead of reforming the instrument, Ang prepared a deed of
agreements where it was stipulated that Gabina has the right to repurchase the
property within three yrs from the execution of the deed of sale. Machoca did not
redeem the property during her lifetime. Ang sold the lot to Suarez.
10
Suarez and Delos Reyes sued the heirs of Machoca for unlawful detainer.
The lower court ruled in their favour. Since the appeal filed by the heirs was
dismissed, the decision became final and executory. A writ of execution and order
of demolition were issued.
While the case for unlawful detainer was pending, the heirs of Machoca
filed an action for prohibition before CFI against the judge hearing the unlawful
detainer. [c1]. However, it was dismissed. The heirs filed a complaint with the
same CFI for removal of clouds of title but it was dismissed for failure to prosecute
[c2]. They moved for reconsideration but it was denied. The decision became final.
The heirs filed another case, this time before the RTC for conventional redemption
and damages [c3]. The complaint was dismissed on the ground of res judicata.
Issue:
Did the lower court err when dismissed the complaint for conventional redemption
on the ground of res judicata?
Held:
No.
1. The order of dismissal rendered in [c2] had become final because the
heirs failed to appeal after their MFR has been denied. While the dismissal
was for failure to prosecute, it had the effect of adjudication on the merits
and operates as res judicata, since the court did not direct that the
dismissal was without prejudice.
2. Actions [c2] and [c3] seek to have the deed of agreement considered as
mere equitable mortgage and the titles issued in the name of Suarez null
and void on the ground of fraud. Parties are in effect litigating for the
same thing and seeking the same relief- that is to recover possession and
ownership of the lot.
3. it is of no moment that the later remedy is for conventional redemption
while [c2] was for removal of clouds on the title. Both actions are
anchored on exactly the same cause of action, are based on
identical facts, and even claim the same relief. The present petition
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is therefore, although presented in different form, barred by the former
decision in [c2].
Notes:
1. The doctrine of res judicata thus lays down two main rules which may be
stated as follows:
Bar by former judgment
The judgment or decree of a court
of competent jurisdiction on the
merits concludes the parties and
their privies to the litigation and
constitutes a bar to a new action or
suit involving the same cause of
action either before the same or
any other tribunal
the judgment rendered in the first
case is an absolute bar to the
subsequent action since said
judgment is conclusive not only as
to the matters offered and received
to sustain that judgment but also
as to any other matter which might
have been offered for that purpose
and which could have been
adjudged therein.
REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW
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Conclusiveness of judgment
Any right, fact, or matter in issue
directly adjudicated or
necessarily involved in the
determination of an action before
a competent court in which a
judgment or decree is rendered
on the merits is conclusively
settled by the judgment therein
and cannot again be litigated
between the parties and their
privies whether or not the claim
or demand, purpose, or subject
matter of the two suits is the
same.
the judgment in the prior action
operates as an estoppel only as
to the matters actually
determined therein or which
were necessarily included
therein. Consequently, since
other admissible and relevant
matters which the parties in the
second action could properly
offer are not concluded by the
said judgment, the same is not
a bar to or a ground for
dismissal of the second
action.
11
2. The fundamental difference is that in bar by former judgment, there is
identity in the cause of action in both cases, whereas in conclusiveness of
judgment, the cause of action in the first case is different from that in the
second case.
a. In conclusiveness of judgment, only the findings in the
first judgment are conclusive and deemed established if
raised for purposes of the second action which may
proceed independently of the anterior case.
b. As for bar by former judgment, even if diverse reliefs
should be awarded due to contingencies in the results
of proof, the judgment in the first action bars the
second since the defendant admittedly committed one
and the same wrong for which he should not be tried
twice under the rule of non bis in idem.
3. to bar a subsequent action by a prior judgement:
a. the former judgment or order must be final; (2) it
b. must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it
was rendered after a consideration of the evidence or
stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the
case;
c. it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and
d. there must be, between the first and second actions,
identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of
action.
4. a party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different
method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that
one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated.
a. In fact, authorities tend to widen rather than to restrict
the doctrine of res judicata on the ground that public
interest, as well as private interest, demand the ending
of suits by requiring the parties to sue once and for all
in the same case all the special proceedings and
remedies to which they are entitled. 26
5. In determining whether causes of action are identical so as to warrant
application of the rule of res judicata, the test most commonly stated is to
ascertain whether the same evidence which is necessary to
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sustain the second action would have been sufficient to
authorize a recovery in the first, 27 even if the forms or nature of
the two actions be different. 28
a. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the
two actions are considered the same within the rule that
the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent
action; otherwise it is not.
b. this method is the best and most accurate test as to
whether a former judgment is a bar in subsequent
proceedings between the same parties, and it has even
been designated as infallible
HACIENDA BIGAA V CHAVEZ
GR NO. 174160 APRIL 20 28 2010
Facts:
Hacienda Bigaa filed with MTC a complaint for ejectment ( forcible entry)
and damages with application for writ of preliminary injunction against Chavez.
Chavez alleged in his answer that his mother was a fishpond permitee and lessee
of the Bureau of fisheries. The areas covered by the permits are the same parcels
of land that her mother and the hacienda claims. As Hacienda Bigaa’s predecessor
in interest, the Ayalas and the Zobels illegally expanded their property to include
lots that form part of the public land, Hacienda Bigaa’s titles covering the lot in
dispute have no probative value as they are dubious and nullified by the Supreme
Court.
Chavez also argues that the suit is barred by prior judgments in (1) the
suit for unlawful detainer filed by Zobels against her mother before the justice of
the peace [c1] and (2) the case for accion reinvindicatoria with prayer for
preliminary injunction against Zobels [c2]. As the subject matter and issues
involved in the previous suits are squarely similar and /or identical to the subject
matter and issues involved in the present ejectment care, the ruling in [c1] and
[c2] constitute res judicata with respect to the present ejectment case.
The MTC dismissed the complaint of forcible entry on the ground of res
judicata. Upon appeal before the RTC, the decision of the MTC was affirmed in
12
toto. Hacienda filed a petition for review before CA. CA dismissed the petition,
totally affirming the RTC and MTC decision.
Issue:
Was the dismissal of the forcible entry case on the ground of res judicata proper?
Held:
Yes.
1. The issue of possession as it related with the ownership of the disputed
property has been conclusively resolved in the antecedent cases.
a. in the cases of Dizon, Ayala y Cia, and Delos Angeles, the Court
held that all expanded subdivision titles issued in the names of
Ayala y Cia, Zobels and the Hacienda Calatagan are null and
void. In Delos Angeles, it was further held that the Republic, as
the rightful owner of the expanded areas of the public domain
has the right to place its lessees and permitees ( among them
Zoila, Chavez’ mother) in possession of the fishpond lots whose
ownership and possession were in issue in the case.
2. In conclusiveness of judgment, the dictum laid down in the earlier final
judgment or order becomes conclusive and continues to be binding
between the same parties, their privies and successors in interest, as long
as the facts on which that judgement was predicated continue to be the
facts of the case or incident before the court in a later case.
a. The binding effect and enforceability of the earlier dictum can no
longer be re-litigated in a later case since the issue has already
been resolved and finally laid to rest in the earlier case.
3. in this case:
Identity of Virtually the same parties i..e. Enrique zobel
parties predecessor of Hacienda Bigaa and Zoila Chavez,
predecessor in interest of Chavez
Identity of the Lot in dispute form part of the areas made to
subject matter appear as covered by the title held by Zobels,
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Ayalas and Hacienda Calatagan, and declared public
domain by the Supreme Court
Identity of Ownership and better right of possession.
issues
4. Hacienda Bigaa never bothered to object to or rebut the allegation that
the areas in dispute are the same areas covered by the fishpond permit,
to show that the presently disputed lot are not part of the areas
expanded by Ayala et al titles and reverted to the Republic.
5. The right of Republic’s lessees and public fishpond permitees ( among
them Zoila, Chavez’ mother and predecessor in interest) to possess the
fishpond lots in question are recognized in De los Angeles. They derive
their right of possession from the Republic the rightful owner of these
lots.
6. that there can be no res judicata because the present suit is for forcible
entry while the antecedent cases were based on different causes of action
i.e. quieting of title, annulment of titles, and accion reinvindicatoria does
not hold.
a. Res judicata under the scope of conclusiveness of
judgment operated even if no absolute identity of
cause of action exists.
b. Res judicata, it its conclusiveness of judgment concept,
merely requires an identity of issues.
Notes:
1. Only the identities of parties and issues are required for the
operation of the principle of conclusiveness of judgment.
2. While conclusiveness of judgment does not have the same
barring effect as that of a bar by former judgment that
proscribes subsequent actions, the former nonetheless estops
the parties from raising in a later case the issues or points that
were raised and controverted, and were determinative of the
ruling in the earlier case. [42]
3. In other words, the dictum laid down in the earlier final judgment
or order becomes conclusive and continues to be binding
13
between the same parties, their privies and successors-in-
interest.
a. as long as the facts on which that judgment was
predicated continue to be the facts of the case or
incident before the court in a later case;
b. the binding effect and enforceability of that earlier
dictum can no longer be re-litigated in a later case since
the issue has already been resolved and finally laid to
rest in the earlier case.
4. res judicata, under the concept of conclusiveness of judgment,
operates even if no absolute identity of causes of action
exists. Res judicata, in its conclusiveness of judgment concept,
merely requires identity of issues.
NO CAUSE OF ACTION
SAN LORENZO VILLAGE ASSOCIATION V. CA
GR NO. 116825 MARCH 26, 1998
Facts:
ADEC filed a case against San Lorenzo Company [ SL]. It prayed for the
issuance of Temporary Restraining Order directing SL and its agents to cease and
desist from making ADEC a member of the San Lorenzo Village Association [ SLVI],
prohibit SL from constructing a taller building on its lot and prohibit San Lorenzo
Village Association from collection membership fees and monthly dues. ADEC also
prayed for the cancellation of the entries in their title.
SLVAI filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds of lack of
cause of action and lack of ADEC’s personality to sue. It pointed out thata ADEC
was not the registered owner of the lot and that the sale by Almeda to ADEC could
not bind third parties and that as ADEC is not the owner of the lot, it had no right
to pray for the cancellation of entry on the title.
ADEC opposed the motion to dismiss. ADEC argued that that it had a cause of
action against SLVAI because as the new owner of the lot in question, it cannot be
compelled to become a member of the association, for doing so unduly limits its
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uses of the property. It also asserted that it had the capacity and personality to
sue because the actual notice of sale is equivalent to registration.
The RTC denied the Motion to dismiss. Upon the denial of the motion for
reconsideration, SLVAI filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. CA denied the
petition.
Issue:
Did the lower court err when it denied the MTD filed by SLVAI?
Held:
No.
1. A motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action in
the complaint hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged therein.
However, the hypothetical question is limited to the relevant and
material facts well pleaded in the complaint and the inferences
deductible therefrom.
2. SLVAI cannot successfully invoke the ground that the complaint fails to
state a cause of action in its motion to dismiss.
a. the complaint asserts that plaintiff purchased the property in
question from the person admittedly holding title thereto. It then
infers that by this mode, it became the successor in interest of
the vendor, if not indeed the owner of the property. Hence the
restrictions in the title should be nullified not only because it is
contary to law but also conditions under which they were
imposed had ceased to exist.
b. The averments in the complaint like the title of ADECs vendor,
the execution of the sale by said vendor to ADEC, the latters
status as the vendors successor-in-interest, and the altered
physical environment along Pasay Road, are allegations well
within the hypothetical-admission principle.
14
i. These averments satisfy the three (3) elements of a
cause of action.
ii. In other words, the complaint did state a cause of
action.
3. what SLVAI essentially puts at issue is whether substantively, ADEC, as
plaintiff in the case below, possesses a tenable right of action.
a. said issue is not a ground for a motion to dismiss.
b. As a matter of law, neither are the efficacy of the sale
to pass title to the property, and consequently, ADECs
acquisition of the status of successor-in-interest, specific
mandatory modes to challenge the restrictions in
question, or the change in the physical environment
along Pasay Road, grounds for a motion to dismiss
under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.
c. Instead, the aforementioned issues may be properly
raised in the Answer.
4. the third issue of whether ADEC is a real party in interest, said issue is
likewise not a proper ground for a motion to dismiss.
a. Certainly, as successor-in-interest of the original vendor,
who is the unquestioned title holder, ADEC has the
prerogative to assert all the latters rights, including the
impugnation of the restrictions on the title.
b. The tenability of the grounds for that
impugnation, while proper under the pleadings,
should be threshed out at the trial on the merits.
5. “That even assuming ADEC became owner of the property; it cannot seek
cancellation because, under SLVAIs rules, the cancellation process can
only be initiated by members of the SLVAI who are the registered owners
of the lots in the village and by their two-thirds vote” cannot be raised in
MTD.
a. those rules were not dealt with in the complaint at all.
b. They may thus be raised only by way of defense in the
Answer, but not as ground for a motion to dismiss
available as cause for dismissal of the action at this
early stage.
6. Even assuming that the allegation of the facts constituting ADECs cause
of action is not as clear and categorical as would otherwise be desired,
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any uncertainty thereby arising should be so resolved as to enable a full

inquiry into the merits of the action. a. malicious and unjustified institution of an action;
a. Such a course would preclude that multiplicity of suits b. acting maliciously and for the purpose of political
which the law abhors, and conduce to the definitive persecution and vengeance, with intent of
determination and termination of the dispute. circumventing a constitutional provision;
b. On the other hand, the abortion of the action on c. usurping the office of Senator of the Philippines;
account of the alleged fatal flaws of the complaint d. that the master had breached the contract, or
would obviously be indecisive; it would not end the discharged an employee in a wrongful, illegal, unlawful,
controversy, since the institution of another action upon unjust manner, etc.
a revised complaint would not be foreclosed.

Notes: SPOUES CALALANG V. IAC

GR NO. 74613 FEBRUARY 27, 1991
1. A complaint states a cause of action where it contains the three
(3) essential elements of a cause of action, namely: Facts:

a. the legal right of the plaintiff, Erlinda Gruta was employed as house helper of Sps Calalang. She died of
b. the correlative obligation of the defendant, and Malathion Poisoning. The son of the sps, Ferdinand, was charged with the crime of
c. the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said murder. The fiscal dismissed the complaint on the ground of failure to prove a
legal right. prima facie case of the offense charged. Two years after the death of Erlinda, a
complaint for damages had been filed by the heirs of Erlinda against the
If these elements are absent, the complaint becomes Ferdinand and the sps. Ferdinand and the sps filed their answer with affirmative
vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to defenses and counterclaim. They also submitted a request for admission.The heirs
state a cause of action. of Erlinda filed an opposition to the motion for admission which was not resolved
by the trial court. After the preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses of
2. If the allegations are vague, indefinite, or in the form of Ferdinand and sps Calalang, the court issued an order dismissing the case on the
conclusions, the defendants recourse is not a motion to dismiss ground of lack of cause of action. On appeal, the IAC reversed the lower court’s
but a bill of particulars. order of dismissal.

3. A movant to dismiss on the ground of failure of the complaint to Issue:

state a cause of action is burdened with the implied admission of
the truth of all material and relevant facts which are well pleaded 1. did the lower court commit an error when it conducted a preliminary
in the complaint, hearing of the affirmative defenses of Ferdinand and sps Calalang?
2. Was the decision of the IAC reversing the order of dismissal of the
4. The admission does not include mere epithets charging fraud, or lower court proper?
legal conclusions, or mere inferences, or matters of 3. did the lower court err when it dismissed the case motu proprio?
evidence. Said case gave examples of allegations not within the
hypothetical-admission rule, to wit: Held:

15
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1. no.
a. in a motion to dismiss based on the failure of the complaint to
state a cause of action, the question submitted for determination
is sufficiency of allegation in the complaint itself. The sufficiency
of the cause of action must appear on the face of the complaint
itself in order to sustain a dismissal on the ground. (Clavano vs.
Genato, 80 SCRA 217).
i. This rule applies when the only affirmative
defense is the failure of the complaint to state
a cause of action.
ii. It does not apply when the grounds relied
upon by way of affirmative defenses state
other matters. Thus the trial court did not
commit any error in conducting a preliminary
hearing on the affirmative defenses of
Ferdinand and Sps Calalang.
2. no.
a. A perusal of the preliminary hearing indicates that the cause of
action of respondents (plaintiffs in the Civil Case) is based on the
crime of murder allegedly committed by Ferdinand Calalang.
i. The alleged ambiguity of the cause of action in
the complaint was clarified by the admission of
the respondents' counsel.
ii. The complementary service is evidenced by an
affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the
summons and order for publication in the post
office, postage prepaid, directed to the
defendant by registered mail to his last known
address.
b. Since the only cause of action of the case is based on the
criminal act, there is no reason to implead the Calalang spouses.
In their Memorandum in Support of Affirmative Defenses, the
Calalang spouses reiterated that he complaint does not show
any legal, statutory basis as to why and under what law are they
being included as defendants since the complaint admits that
16
Ferdinand Calalang has the capacity to sue; the truth is he
Ferdinand Calalang) is of age.
c. Order of Dismissal of the Regional Trial Court indicates that the
present case was not dismissed solely on the ground that the
complaint failed to state a cause of action, but also on the
ground that there is no valid cause of action against Ferdinand
Calalang, upon considering the "pleadings, memorandum,
motion for reconsideration and opposition" therein.
i. There is no valid legal ground for impleading
the spouses Dr. and Mrs. Maria Calalang. The
complaint shows that except for the fact that
the spouses Calalang are said to be the
employer of the deceased Erlinda Gruta; and,
that the other defendant Ferdinand Calalang is
their son, there is nothing in the complaint
which would connect them to the
untimely death of Erlinda Gruta.
ii. The complaint alleges that all of the
defendants (Ferdinand Calalang and spouses
Calalang) are said to have the "capacity to sue
and be sued."
iii. Therefore, if Ferdinand Calalang has the
"capacity to sue and be sued," then the
spouses Calalang can no longer be held civilly
liable for any of his misdeeds, if any. . . . There
being no legal ground to implead the
defendants-spouses Calalang, the case against
them should be dismissed
d. the insufficiency of evidence to support a murder charge does
not imply that there is no sufficient evidence to support the civil
case based on the same alleged act.
i. the dismissal of the information or the criminal
action (upon motion of the fiscal) does not
affect the right of the offended party to
institute or continue the civil action already
instituted arising from the offense, because
such dismissal or extinction of the penal action
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does not carry with it the extinction of the civil
action.
ii. The reason most often given for this holding is
that the two proceedings are not between the
same parties. Different rules as to the
competency of witnesses and weight of
evidence necessary to the findings in the two
proceedings also exist
3. yes
a. the trial court dismissed the case against Ferdinand
Calalang motu proprio based on the ground that there is no valid
cause of action against him.
i. This is not a ground for dismissal of action
under Rule 16; but the failure of the complaint
to state a cause of action.
ii. The pleadings, memorandum and motion for
reconsideration and opposition, thereto, might
show that there is no valid cause of action
against Ferdinand Calalang;
b. the court is not allowed by law to dismiss the case motu
proprio. As long as there is a cause of action in the complaint
itself, procedural due process demands that there must be a
hearing on the merits with the complaint as "prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
Note:
1. Under Section 5, Rule 16 "Any of the grounds for dismissal
provided for in this rule, except improper venue, may be pleaded
as an affirmative defense, and preliminary hearing may be had
thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been Med." This is to save
the expense involved in the preparation and trial when the case
can be otherwise disposed of. The preliminary hearing should be
conducted as ordinary hearings: the parties should be allowed to
present evidence and the evidence recorded (Asejo vs. Leonosa,
78 Phil. 467), except when the affirmative defense is based on
17
par. g., Section 1, Rule 16 "that the complaint states no cause of
action." In determining sufficiency of cause of action, only the
facts alleged in the complaint should be considered.
2. In a motion to dismiss based on the failure of the complaint to
state a cause of action, the question submitted for determination
is sufficiency of allegation in the complaint itself. The sufficiency
of the cause of action must appear on the face of the complaint
itself in order to sustain a dismissal on the ground This rule
applies when the only affirmative defense is the failure of the
complaint to state a cause of action. It does not apply when the
grounds relied upon by way of affirmative defenses state other
matters.
3. the court is not allowed to dismiss the case motu proprio
when the ground for dismissal is failure of the complaint to
state a cause of action. As long as there is a cause of action in
the complaint itself, procedural due process demands that there
must be a hearing on the merits with the complaint as "prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated."
PERPETUAL SAVINGS BANK V JOSE ORO B. FAJARDO AND EMMANUEL DEL MUNDO
GR NO. 79760 JUNE 28 1993
Facts:
Perpetual Savings Bank filed a complaint against JJ Mining and
Exploration Corporation for the collection of sum of money as stated in the
promissory executed by JJ mining in the bank’s favour. Acting on their own behalf
or in behalf of JJ Mining, Fajardo and Del Mundo filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. The Bank filed an
opposition to the motion to dismiss. Fajardo and Del Mundo filed a reply to the
Bank’s opposition. RTC denied the Motion to dismiss as it found that the grounds
in the motion to dismiss are not indubitable. Del Mundo and Fajardo moved for
reconsideration of the Order, but the trial court denied it.
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Del Mundo and Fajardo filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA
rendered its decision granting their petition, and reversed the Order of the RTC.
The CA ruled that the Bank’s complaint did not state a cause of action against
Fajardo and Del Mundo in their personal and individual capacities as no evidence
had been presented to support the liability on the so called “alternative cause of
action” ( hearsay and/or third hand information).
Issue:
1. did the complaint have a cause of action?
2. is the rule on alternative defendants applicable in this case?
Held:
1. yes.
a. the complaint states a cause of action not only against the
borrower corporation and Fajardo and Del Mundo in their
personal and individual capacities.
b. It was was quite premature for the Court of Appeals to consider
evidence ( or lack of evidence) outside of the four corners of the
complaint and to reach the conclusion that the complaint failed
to state a cause of action, since the fraud consisting of false
representations has yet to be proved by the Bank in the course
of the trial.
c. By the same token, Del Mundo and Fajardo’s innocence and
non-utilization, or fraud and conversion, of the loan proceeds for
their private and personal benefit are precisely defenses to be
proved by Fajardo and Del Mundo in the course of trial.
d. The CA overlooked the fact that the trial has yet to begin, for it
assumed as real and established the defenses which need to be
proved during the trial.
2. yes
a. the state of mind of the Bank, “whether it was uncertain or
whether it was dead sure as night follows the day” against which
of several defendants it is entitled to relief is immaterial, except
to the extent that such state of minds is externalized by the
allegations of the complaint.
18
b. the bank had pleaded with sufficient clarity its claimed rights
against alternative defendants : JJ Mining and Fajardo and Del
Mundo.
c. That the rights pleaded against JJ are prima facie inconsistent
with the rights pleaded against Fajardo and Del Mundo is also
clear:
i. either JJ corporation alone is liable or
ii. Fajardo and Del Mundo are alone liable in lieu
of JJ Mining or
iii. Fajardo and Del Mundo are solidarily liable with
JJ Miing.
CITY OF CEBU V. CA
GR NO. 109173 JULY 5 1996
Facts:
The city of cebu filed a complaint for eminent domain against Merlita
Cardeno her parcel of land, pursuant to a Resolution and an ordinance. The land
for the city’s socialized housing project for the landless and low-income city
residents. Cardeno filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of
action. She alleged that condition precedent for the complaint of eminent domain
had not been complied with i.e. valid and definite offer has been previously made
to the owner and such offer was not accepted. The City of Cebu filed its
opposition by alleging that it had complied with such condition precedent. The RTC
dismissed the complaint, citing the fact that the city failed to comply with the
condition precedent. It also ruled that where the ground of dismissal is that the
complaint states no cause of action, its sufficiency can only be determined from
the facts alleged in the complaint and no other.
The city filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. the CA affirmed the
order of RTC dismissing the complaint for eminent domain.
Issue:
1. does the complaint state a cause of action?
2. was the dismissal proper?
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Held:
Yes.
1. even on the face of the complaint alone, there is extant a cause of action
in paragraph I thereof that, under R.A. 7160, Sec. 9 thereof, the City of
Cebu is legally vested with the power of eminent domain and pursuant
thereto is filing this petition/complaint as authorized by Ordinance
No.1418 passed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod on February 17,1992, a
photocopy of which is herein attached as Annex A, and made an integral
part of this complaint.
2. All documents attached to a complaint, the due execution and
genuineness of which are not denied under oath by the defendant, must
be considered as part of the complaint without need of introducing
evidence thereon.[23]
3. Additionally, the general rule is that a motion to dismiss hypothetically
admits the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. [24]
a. Thus, Ordinance No.1418, with all its provisions, is not only
incorporated into the complaint for eminent domain filed by the
city, but is also deemed admitted by Cardeno. A perusal of the
copy of said ordinance which has been annexed to the complaint
shows that the fact of City having made a previous valid and
definite offer to is categorically stated therein.
no.
1. Notwithstanding the rule “ when the motion to dismiss is based on the
ground that the complaint states no cause of action no evidence may
be allowed and the issue should only be determined in light of the
allegations of the complaint”, the Court may apply the concept of
liberality where the trial court had the opportunity to examine the
merits of the complaint, the answer with counterclaim, the petitioners
answer to the counterclaim and its answer to the request for
admission.[21]
2. The same liberality should be applied in the instant case where an
examination of petitioners Comment and Opposition to private
respondents Motion to Dismiss leaves no room for doubt that petitioner
19
had indeed made a valid and definite offer to private respondent as
required by law.
 REMEDY IN CASE OF GRANTING/DENIAL OF MOTION TO DISMISS
 ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS IS INTERLOCUTORY, HENCE PROPER REMEDY IS
TO APPEAL AFTER A DECISION HAS BEEN RENDERED
INDIANA AEROSPACE UNIVERSITY V. CHED
GR NO. 139371 APRIL 4, 2001
Facts:
Indiana Aerospace University filed a complaint for damages with prayer
for writ of preliminary and mandatory injunction and temporary restraining order
against CHED on the ground that CHED restrained the school from using the word
“university”. CHED filed a special appearance with Motion to dismiss based on
improper venue, lack of authority of the person instituting the action and lack of
cause of action. After the formal offer evidence by both CHED and Indiana, the
trial court rendered an order denying the motion to dismiss and issued a writ of
preliminary injunction in favour of Indiana. Later on, Indiana filed a motion to
declare CHED in default. It also filed a motion for extension of time to file its
answer. CHED filed its opposition for extension of time to file the answer. Indiana
also filed a motion to expunge CHED’s answer. The Judge issued an order directing
the Solgen to file within 10 days its written opposition to the motion to expunge
CHED answer, but SOLGEN filed a motion to admit the previous written opposition.
The lower court declared CHED in default.
A petition for certiorari had been filed before the CA. CA ruled that
Indiana had no cause of action against CHED. It added that the writ of preliminary
injunction had been improvidently issued. It also held that the declaration of
default does not serve the ends of justice.
Issue:
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Did the CA err when it dismissed the complaint on the ground of lack of cause of
action?
Held:
Yes.
1. An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory, and so the proper
remedy in such a case is to appeal after a decision has been rendered.
a. A writ of certiorari is not intended to correct every
controversial interlocutory ruling; it is resorted to only to
correct a grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical
exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
b. Its function is limited to keeping an inferior court within
its jurisdiction and to relieve persons from arbitrary acts
-- acts which courts or judges have no power or
authority in law to perform.
c. It is not designed to correct erroneous findings and
conclusions made by the court.
2. There is no grave abuse of discretion in the RTC’s denial of the motion to
dismiss.
a. The trial court stated in its Decision that petitioner was an
educational institution, originally registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission as the Indiana School of Aeronautics,
Inc. That name was subsequently changed to Indiana Aerospace
University after the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
had interposed no objection to such change.
3. CHED issued a formal Cease and Desist Order directing petitioner to stop
using the word university in its corporate name. The former also
published an announcement in the March 21, 1998 issue of Freeman, a
local newspaper in Cebu City, that there was no institution of learning by
that name. The counsel of respondent was quoted as saying in the March
28, 1998 issue of the newspaper Today that Indiana had been ordered
20
closed by the respondent for illegal advertisement, fraud and
misrepresentation of itself as a university.
a. Such acts, according to the RTC undermined the public’s
confidence in Indiana as an educational institution.
[18]
This was a clear statement of a sufficient cause of
action.
4. When a motion to dismiss is grounded on the failure to state a cause of
action, a ruling thereon should be based only on the facts alleged in the
complaint.[19]
a. The court must pass upon this issue based solely on such
allegations, assuming them to be true.
b. For it to do otherwise would be a procedural error and a denial
of plaintiffs right to due process
BANGKO SILANGAN DEVELOPMENT BANK V. CA
GR NO. 110480 JUNE 29 2001
Facts:
Banko Silangan filed with RTC Manila a complaint for damages [c1]
against Bausas, Villadolid, Philippine Journalist Inc, Nuguid (publisher), Marquez
( managing editor), Cabaluna ( News Editor) and Ayllon ( City Editor) and Beltran (
reporter) for the series of publications that are clearly defamatory and libellous
under the ART 353 of the RPC. In their answer with compulsory counterclaim,
Bausas and Villadolid alleged lack of actual malice as a defense and interposed a
compulsory counterclaim. On the other hand, Bausas filed a complaint for a sum of
money with damages against Bangko Silangan before RTC Batangas. Instead of
filing a responsive pleading, the bank filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that there
was another action pending between the same parties for the same case; the
action caused the splitting of cause of action raised in the answer and
counterclaim in [c1]; action violated the principle of multiplicity of suits; and the
filing of the complaint constituted forum shopping.
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RTC Batangas issued a resolution denying the motion to dismiss. Upon
the denial of the Bank’s MFR, it filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus before the CA. CA dismissed the petition and held that an order
denying a motion to dismiss, being interlocutory, cannot be the subject of a
petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Did the CA err when it dismissed the petition?
Held:
No.
1. The petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus interposed by banko
silangan before the Court of Appeals is not the proper remedy to question
the denial of its motion to dismiss in [c2].
2. The Resolution and Order of the RTC of Batangas denying the motion to
dismiss are merely interlocutory
a. An interlocutory order does not terminate nor finally
dispose of the case, but leaves something to be done by
the court before the case is finally decided on the
merits.[25]
b. It is always under the control of the court and may be
modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds shown at
any time before final judgment.
c. This proceeds from the court's inherent power to control
its process and orders so as to make them conformable
to law and justice.
d. The only limitation is that the judge cannot act with
grave abuse of discretion, or that no injustice results
thereby.[26]
3. These limitations were not transgressed by the trial court in the case at
bar when it denied the Banko Silangan's motion to dismiss.
4. The alleged "chaos and confusion" arising from conflicting decisions that
petitioner purportedly seeks to avert by the dismissal of [c2] are actually
far-fetched and contrived considering that any adverse decision of the
CTA can be made the subject of a proper appeal.
Notes:
1. citing Espao Sr v CA, the order denying the motion to dismiss
may only be reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an appeal
from the judgment after trial.
2. The ordinary procedure to be followed in that event is to file an
answer, go to trial, and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the
issue on appeal from the final judgment.
YUTINGCO V. CA
GR NO. 137264 AUGUST 1 2002
Facts:
DBP filed a complaint against Tensuan for the collection of sum of money
with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment before RTC Makati.
Yutingco, Tensuan et al filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint
failed to state a cause of action; that the condition precedent for filing of the claim
was not complied with and the Court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter.
RTC denied the Motion to dismiss. Upon the denial of Tensuan Yutingco et al
motion for reconsideration, they filed motion for extension of time to file petition
for certiorari [ 15 days] before the CA. Three weeks later, they filed their petition
for certiorari before the CA. The CA denied the motion for extension of time.
Subsequently, CA dismissed the petition as Tensuan, Yutingco et al filed to file it
within the reglementary period.

21
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In the case filed before the SC, Tensuan, Yutingco et al assert that their petition
should not have been dismissed on a technicality, considering that what was being
questioned in their petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, was the
propriety of the lower courts denying their motion to dismiss.
Issue:
Was the dismissal of CA proper?
Held:
Yes.
1. as a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory
and cannot be the subject of the extraordinary petition for certiorari or
mandamus. Petitioners recourse is to file an answer and to interpose as
defenses the objections raised in their motion to dismiss, proceed to trial,
and in case of an adverse decision, elevate the entire case by appeal in
due course
2. In the present case, however, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss
since it perceived the issue therein was one of default, a factual issue
which must await trial. Clearly, tensuan, yutingco et al cause is not
covered by any of the recognized exception to the rule that appeal,
instead of certiorari, is the proper remedy for the denial of the motion to
dismiss.
a. They should proceed to trial and if the result is
unfavorable to them, then their recourse is to elevate
the entire case on appeal in accordance with the rules.
b. For indeed, while technicalities should not unduly
hamper our quest for justice, orderly procedure is
essential to the success of that quest to which all courts
are devoted.
Notes:
22
1. exception to the rule that appeal, not certiorari, is proper remedy for the
denial of MTD:
a. when the trial court issued the order without or in
excess of jurisdiction;
b. when there is patent grave abuse of discretion by the
trial court
c. when appeal would not prove to be a speedy and
adequate remedy as when an appeal would not
promptly relieve a defendant from the injurious effects
of the patently mistaken order maintaining the plaintiffs
baseless action and compelling the defendants to
needlessly go through a protracted trial and clogging
the court dockets with another futile case
 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS DISPOSES OF THE CASE HENCE, APPEAL
UNDER RULE 41 IS APPLICABLE.
DISMISSAL OF ACTION (RULE 17)
PINGA V. HEIRS OF SANTIAGO
GR NO. 170354 JUNE 30, 2006.
DOCTRINE: The dismissal of the complaint due to the fault of the
plaintiff does not necessarily carry with it the dismissal of the
counterclaim, compulsory or otherwise. The same is without prejudice to
the right of defendants to prosecute the counterclaim.
Facts:
A complaint for injunction was filed in 1998 against Eduardo Pinga for allegedly
unlawfully entering the coco lands of German Santiago and committing acts of
depredation on their properties. Pinga filed an Amended Answer with Counterclaim
disputing the ownership of the properties.
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Fast forward to 2005, the trial of the case had not yet been completed. Moreover,
the heirs failed to present their evidence. As the heirs’ counsel on record failed to
appear, the RTC dismissed the complaint for their failure to prosecute but Pinga
was allowed to present evidence ex-parte.
The heirs filed an MR praying for the dismissal of the entire action and that Pinga
be disallowed from presenting evidence ex-parte as the same was not in accord
with established jurisprudence. The RTC granted the MR and dismissed the
counterclaim, citing as the only ground therefor that “there is no opposition to the
MR of the respondents.”
Issue:
W/N the dismissal of the complaint, upon motion of the defendant, on the ground
of the failure to prosecute on plaintiff’s part carries with it the dismissal of pending
counterclaims
Held:
NO. The RTC clearly erred when it ordered the dismissal of the counterclaim, since
S3R17 mandates that the dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to the
right of the defendant to prosecute the counterclaim in the same or separate
action. If the RTC were to dismiss the counterclaim, it should be on the merits of
such counterclaim. Reversal of the RTC is in order, and a remand is necessary for
trial on the merits of the counterclaim.
The present rule embodied in Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 17 ordains a more equitable
disposition of the counterclaims by ensuring that any judgment thereon is based
on the merit of the counterclaim itself and not on the survival of the main
complaint. Certainly, if the counterclaim is palpably without merit or suffers
jurisdictional flaws which stand independent of the complaint, the trial court is not
precluded from dismissing it under the amended rules, provided that the judgment
or order dismissing the counterclaim is premised on those defects. At the same
time, if the counterclaim is justified, the amended rules now unequivocally protect
such counterclaim from peremptory dismissal by reason of the dismissal of the
complaint.
FILINVEST V. CA
23
GR NO. 142439 DECEMBER 6, 2006
DOCTRINE: A dismissal for failure to prosecute has the effect of an
adjudication on the merits, and operates as res judicata, particularly
when the court did not direct that the dismissal was without prejudice.
Facts:
DAR awarded Ricardo Alvarez the right to purchase land of the Laguna
Resettlement Project. Alvarez purchased the same and under the Deed of Sale, it
specifically prohibited the transfer of the land within 10 years from the issuance of
the Cert. of Title to any person other than the vendee’s relatives within the 3rd
civil degree by consanguinity or affinity who are, at the same time, qualified
beneficiaries.
Pending issuance of the certificate, PD 1474 was passed so it repealed the
prohibition found in the Deed of Sale as such prohibition was by virtue of RA 3844.
The RD of Laguna issued the TCT and 16 days after, Alvarez sold the land to
Mercedes Oliver. 10 years later, Oliver sold the land to Filinvest.
Heirs of Alvarez filed a case for reconveyance, redemption and damages against
Oliver, Ramos and Nunez before RTC Biñan. They later filed an Amended
Complaint for Annulment of Title with Reconveyance as the sale was void since it
was executed in violation of the law prohibiting the sale of the land.
The case was however dismissed for failure of the heirs and counsel to appear
during hearing for the reception of their evidence, despite due notice and after 8
postponements. The RTC ordered for the dismissal of the complaint as well as the
counterclaim as the defendants manifested that they were waiving their right to a
counterclaim. The order became final and executory as the heirs failed to file a MR
despite receipt of the order.
Heirs filed a complaint with the PARAD seeking the annulment of the Deed of Sale
and subsequent transfer of the land on grounds similar to the previous complaint
filed. Oliver filed a MTD on the grounds of res judicata and lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter by PARAD. Filinvest also filed a MTD based on res judicata and
laches. PARAD dismissed the complaint on the ground of res judicata and ruled
that the sale was valid. However, DARAB reversed the decision as there was no
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adjudication on the merits on the complaint previously filed at RTC Biñan and
ordered reversion of the property to the government. CA affirmed DARAB’s
decision.
Issue:
W/N DARAB’s ruling that res judicata does not apply is correct as there was no
adjudication of the merits on the case previously filed at RTC Biñan.
Held:
NO.
The heirs filed the case before the PARAD because they were already barred from
filing the case before the proper forum. The allegations and relief found in the
Complaint filed by the heirs before the PARAD are conspicuously similar to those in
the Amended Complaint which they had earlier filed before the trial court of Binan.
As earlier discussed, the trial court ordered the dismissal of the case for failure to
prosecute. When the respondents failed to file a motion for reconsideration,
despite due notice, such order became final.
Res judicata applies in the present case as there was a concurrence of the
requisites. The Order is clearly final as it disposed of all the rights and obligations
of the parties before it. At the same time, the decision or order was based on the
merits of the case as the same fell in situations contemplated in S3R17, where a
complaint is dismissed for failure to comply with a lawful order of the court, such
dismissal has the effect of an adjudication upon the merits. A dismissal for failure
to prosecute has the effect of an adjudication on the merits, and operates as res
judicata, particularly when the court did not direct that the dismissal was without
prejudice.
HEIRS OF GAUDIANE V. CA
GR NO. 119879 MARCH 11, 2004
DOCTRINE: Partition and an action for Quieting of Title have identical
cause of action and can therefore be the subject of res judicata.
24
Facts:
Felix and Juana were siblings and co-owners of a parcel of land. Felix sold to Juana
his one-half share in lot 4156 when he executed Escritura. A statement in the
Escritura said that the lot was declared under a certain tax declaration but the
same was for another parcel of land, lot 4389..
Juana’s heirs, the Isos, believed that the sale included two lots so they filed a
pleading to direct the RD to issue them a new title. Felix’s heirs opposed the same
so the pleading was withdrawn.
The Isos tried two more times to acquire title in their name but it was dismissed
on the second time for their failure to prosecute and to comply with the orders of
the court. When the judgment on the second try became final, the Isos refused to
surrender possession of Felix’s one-half portion to his heirs.
Felix’s heirs then filed the present case for partition of Lot 4389 and the trial court
rendered a decision in their favor because Felix did sell his one-half portion in lot
4389 to Juana; what was sold was lot 4156. Moreover, the dismissal of the Isos’
second case for quieting of title due to failure to prosecute and for failure to
comply with court orders had the effect of adjudication on the merits so their claim
of exclusive ownership over Lot 4389 was without merit because it was barred by
the order of dismissal dated Jan. 10, 1985. The CA affirmed the trial court’s
decision.
Issue:
W/N the dismissal of the quieting of title case barred the Isos from pursuing their
cause of action in their present defense
Held:
YES. SC can no longer dwell into the legality and validity of the order of dismissal
dated Jan. 10, 1985 as it had already become final and executory for failure to file
an appeal. The order thus had the effect of judgment on the merits although no
trial was conducted because it did not contain any statement that the case was
dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a similar future action.
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Based on the principle of res judicata, they are barred in another action (involving
the same subject matter, parties and issues) from raising a defense and from
asking for a relief inconsistent with an order dismissing an earlier case with
prejudice.
Partition and an action for Quieting of Title have identical cause of action and can
therefore be the subject of res judicata. Considering the similarity of petitioners’
defense in this case with their main averment in the case for quieting of title,
petitioners are barred by res judicata from claiming sole ownership of Lot 4389.
CRUZ V. CA
GR NO. 164797 FEBRUARY 13 2006
DOCTRINE: A ruling based on a motion to dismiss, without any trial on
the merits or formal presentation of evidence, can still be a judgment on
the merits.
Facts:
The controversy involves four cases filed between the parties: first (Unlawful
Detainer) was decided in favor of Cruz and Concepcion; second (Quieting of Title)
was dismissed for failure to prosecute; third (Injunction) was dismissed because of
res judicata due to substantial identity of parties in this case and the previous; and
fourth (Annulment of Title with Damages).
Cruz and Concepcion filed a Motion for Outright Dismissal of the present case and
the court granted the same due to res judicata. However, the same court reversed
itself after the Bunags filed their MR and the court reinstated the case.
The CA dismissed the petition filed by Cruz and Concepcion because one of the
elements of res judicata was not present.
Issue:
W/N the dismissal on the Quieting of Title case was a dismissal on the merits as
there was no litigious consideration of the evidence as well as submitted
stipulations
25
Held:
YES. Once a case is dismissed for failure to prosecute, this has the effect of an
adjudication on the merits and is understood to be with prejudice to the filing of
another action unless otherwise provided in the order of dismissal. In other words,
unless there be a qualification in the order of dismissal that it is without prejudice,
the dismissal should be regarded as an adjudication on the merits and is with
prejudice.
The court order said that the case was dismissed, upon petitioners’ motion, for
failure of private respondents and their counsel to attend several scheduled
hearings for the presentation of their evidence.
Since the order did not contain a qualification whether same is with or without
prejudice, following Section 3, it is deemed to be with prejudice and shall have the
effect of an adjudication on the merits.
DAEL V. SPS BELTRAN
GR NO. 156470 APRIL 30 2008
DOCTRINE: Under S1R17, it is mandatory that the trial court issue an
order confirming such dismissal and, unless otherwise stated in the
notice, the dismissal is without prejudice and could be accomplished by
the plaintiff through mere notice of dismissal, and not through motion
subject to approval by the court. Dismissal is ipso facto upon notice, and
without prejudice unless otherwise stated in the notice. The trial court
has no choice but to consider the complaint as dismissed, since the
plaintiff may opt for such dismissal as a matter of right, regardless of the
ground.
Frederick Dael filed a complaint for breach of contract and damages against sps
Beltran alleging that when the latter sold to him a parcel of land, they did not
disclose that the land was previously mortgaged and it was only later when he
discovered that an extrajudicial foreclosure of the property was already instituted.
The spouses filed a MTD on the ground that Dael had no cause of action as he had
entered the contract to sell with a certain Frederick George Ghent Dael.
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The RTC ordered Dael to clarify whether he and Frederick George Ghent Dael were
one and the same, among other things. Dael did not comply and instead filed a
Notice of Dismissal. The RTC dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
Issue:
W/N the order of dismissal with prejudice was proper despite the Notice of
Dismissal filed by Dael
Held:
NO. Beltrans’ argued that the MTD they filed precedes the Notice of Dismissal filed
by the Dael so the RTC correctly dismissed the complaint based on the MTD.
The Court ruled that such argument is erroneous as S1R17 does not encompass a
MTD. The provision specifically provides that a plaintiff may file a notice of
dismissal before service of the or a motion for answer summary judgment. Thus,
upon the filing of the Notice of Dismissal by the plaintiff, the Motion to Dismiss
filed by respondents became moot and academic and the trial court should have
dismissed the case without prejudice based on the Notice of Dismissal filed by the
petitioner.
Moreover, to allow the case to be dismissed with prejudice would erroneously
result in res judicata and imply that petitioner can no longer file a case against
respondents without giving him a chance to present evidence to prove otherwise.
Mendoza v. Paule
GR No. 175885 February 13, 2009
DOCTRINE: Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure ordains a more equitable disposition of the counterclaims by
ensuring that any judgment thereon is based on the merit of the
counterclaim itself and not on the survival of the main complaint.
Engr. Paule, owner of EMPCT, authorized Zenaida Mendoza through a SPA to
participate in the pre-qualification and bidding of a NIA project and to represent
him in all transactions related thereto.
26
EMPCT participated in the bidding of NIA-Casecnan Multi-Purpose Irrigation and
Power Project (NIA-CMIPP) and was awarded Packages A-10 and B-11. Mendoza
received the Notice of Award signed by the Acting Proj. Manager of NIA-CMIPP.
Then Cruz, through meetings with Mendoza and Paule, signed two Job
Orders/Agreements for the lease of his heavy equipments to EMPCT as the latter
was in need of heavy equipment for use in the NIA project.
After a year, Paule revoked the SPA he previously issued in favor of Mendoza;
consequently, NIA refused to make payment to Mendoza on her billings. Cruz was
also unpaid for the rent of the equipment and NIA refuse to acknowledge the lease
rentals as it would only be remitting payment to EMPCT.
Cruz demanded payment of outstanding rentals from Mendoza and/or EMPCT. He
then filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against Paule, Coloma, and
NIA. Paule in turn filed a third-party complaint against Mendoza, who filed her
Answer with a cross-claim against Paule.
The other parties were declared in default during pre-trial conference and the RTC
decided in Cruz’s favor when it rendered judgment. Paule and Mendoza appealed
the decision to the CA and the CA dismissed the complaint as well as Mendoza’s
appeal.
ISSUE:
W/N Mendoza’s cross-claim against Paule was properly dismissed
Held:
NO. The Court ruled that her cross-claim against Paule was a proper counterclaim.
Where the defendant has interposed a counterclaim (whether compulsory or
permissive) or is seeking affirmative relief by a cross-complaint, the plaintiff cannot
dismiss the action so as to affect the right of the defendant in his counterclaim or
prayer for affirmative relief.
When the answer sets up an independent action against the plaintiff, it then
becomes an action by the defendant against the plaintiff, and, of course, the
plaintiff has no right to ask for a dismissal of the defendant's action.
BENEDICTO V. LACSON
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GR NO. 142508 MAY 5 2010

DOCTRINE: There is no danger of conflicting decisions when the court
orders the dismissal of a complaint upon notice of the plaintiff and the
same is without prejudice to re-filing thereof.
Facts:
Manuel Lacson et al. filed a complaint for unpaid shares based on two Sugar
Orders issued by PHILSUCOM. The claims cover the sugar export sales supposedly
undervalued by NASUTRA and coursed through Traders Royal Bank. Benedicto
filed a MTD, arguing that there has been a violation of forum shopping, no cause
of action, issues involved are res judicata, and claim/demand has already been
paid.
Later, Lacson et al. filed a Consolidated Opposition to MTD and Amended
Certification to the following effect: that, except for Manuel Lacson v. Benedicto et
al (the case filed at RTC Pasig) and subsequently withdrawn by them without
prejudice pursuant to S1R17, they have not commenced any other action or
proceeding involving the same issues in any other tribunal or agency.
NO. After reviewing the records, the SC ruled that despite the strong semblance
of the Pasig case to the Bacolod case, the former case was dismissed upon the
instance of the plaintiffs before the latter case was filed.
The RTC Pasig’s Order allowing the dismissal of the complaint stated “herein
complaint is hereby DISMISSED and without prejudice to the re-filling
thereof.”
There is no dispute that the dismissal of the complaint in the Pasig case, upon
notice of the plaintiffs herein, was sanctioned by R1S17 of the ROC.
Even if the same were tested under the rules on litis pendentia and res judicata,
the danger of conflicting decisions cannot be present, since the Pasig case was
dismissed even before a responsive pleading was filed by petitioner. Since a party
resorts to forum shopping in order to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable
decision or action, it has been held that a party cannot be said to have sought to
improve his chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action where no
unfavorable decision has even been rendered against him in any of the cases he
has brought before the courts.

RTC granted Benedicto’s MTD as the respondents were guilty of forum shopping
for failure to report in their original anti-forum shopping certification that they had
filed a similar case with the RTC Pasig; that a perusal of the copies of the
complaints in two cases (Hector Lacson and Ramon Monfort Cases) show
similarities with the present Bacolod Case such that different decisions or rulings
would give rise to conflicting rules on law on similar issues.

Lacson et al. appealed the RTC order to the CA. CA reversed the RTC after finding
merit in the appeal.

Issue:

W/N Lacson et al.’s failure to disclose the commencement and subsequent

withdrawal of the case filed at RTC Pasig was fatal to the present case filed at
Bacolod

Held:

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