In re LUIS B.

TAGORDA
G.R. No. 32329, March 23, 1929, 53 PHIL 37-43
Malcolm, J.

FACTS:
Respondent Luis B. Tagorda, a practicing attorney and a member of the provincial board of Isabela, admits
that previous to the last general elections he made use of a card listing his services as a notary public (such
as the execution of deeds for purchase of land, renewal of lost documents of animals, applications and final
requisites of homestead and execution of any kind of affidavit), and his services as a lawyer (such as help in
the collection of long overdue loans, as well as any complaint against another). The card also states that
one can come or write him in his town, that he offers free consultation, and that he is willing to help and
serve the poor. Respondent also admits the he wrote a letter addressed to a lieutenant of the barrio in his
home municipality, asking his suggestions or recommendations for the good of the province in general,
before his induction into office of the Provincial Board. In the same letter, respondent also made mention
of his legal profession as a lawyer and notary public, his legal services and availability, and requested the
lieutenant to transmit the said information to his barrio people in any of his meetings or social gatherings.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of having solicited cases.
Whether or not solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment.

HELD:
The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write down the applicable legal provisions. Section 21 of the
Code of Civil Procedure as originally conceived related to disbarments of members of the bar. In 1919 at the
instigation of the Philippine Bar Association, said codal section was amended by Act No. 2828 by adding at
the end thereof the following: "The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice."

The statue as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the American
Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. Canon 27 on Advertising, Direct or
Indirect and Canon 28 on Stirring Up Litigation, Directly or Through Agents.

The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension. That should be
distinctly understood.

Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the admitted facts, the respondent stands
convicted of having solicited cases in defiance of the law and those canons. The commission of offenses of
this nature would amply justify permanent elimination from the bar. But as mitigating circumstances
working in favor of the respondent there are, first, his intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of
his acts, second, his youth and inexperience mistake in the future.

Respondent Luis B. Tagorda be and is hereby suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the
period of one month from April 1, 1929.

DOCTRINE:
ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; DISBARMENT AND SUSPENSION; SECTION 21 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AS
AMENDED BY ACT No. 2828, AND CANONS 27 AND 28 OF THE CODE OF ETHICS ADOPTED BY THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND THE PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION CONSTRUED AND APPLIED;

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SOLICITATION OF CASES BY AN ATTORNEY AS GROUND FOR DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION. — Application is
given to section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2828, providing: "The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice," and to Canons 27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics adopted by the American Bar
Association in 1908 and by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917, to the case of the respondent lawyer.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — The law is a profession and not a business.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or
suspension.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — Solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications
or interviews not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional, and the commission of offenses of this
character amply justices permanent elimination from the bar. But as mitigating circumstances working in
favor of the respondent there are, first, his intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts,
second, his youth and inexperience at the bar, and, third, his promise not to commit a similar mistake in the
future. As a result, the respondent attorney is suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the
period of one month.

Dacanay vs. Baker & McKenzie

A.C. No. 2131, May 10, 1985
Aquino, J.

FACTS:
In a letter dated November 16, 1979, respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of Baker &
McKenzie, which contains the names of the ten lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of
Cathay Products International, Inc. H.E. Gabriel, a client. Complainant Attorney Adriano E. Dacanay, in his
reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel and requested that he be informed
whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie and if not questioned the purpose of using the
letterhead of another law office. Having received no reply, complainant filed a complaint seeking to
enjoying Juan G. Collas and nine other lawyers from practising under the name of Baker & McKenzie, a law
firm organized in Illinois.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents should be enjoined from practising law under the name of Baker & McKenzie,
a law firm organized in Illinois.

HELD:
We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule
138, Rules of Court). As admitted by the respondents in their memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a
professional partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members and associates in 30 cities
around the world. Respondents, aside from being members of the Philippine bar, practising under the firm
name of Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates of Baker & Mckenzie.

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a
representation that being associated with the firm they could "render legal services of the highest quality to

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multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment" (p. 3, respondents'
memo). This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practice law here.

DOCTRINE:
Attorneys; Use by Philippine lawyers of the firm name of an American law firm is unethical. – We hold that
Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of
Court). As admitted by the respondents in their memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a professional
partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members and associates in 30 cities around the
world. Respondents, aside from being members of the Philippine bar, practising under the firm name of
Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates of Baker & Mckenzie.

Same; Same. – As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm name Baker &
McKenzie constitutes a representation that being associated with the firm they could "render legal services
of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and
investment" (p. 3, respondents' memo). This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to
practice law here.

Director of Religious Affairs vs. Bayot

Adm. Case No. 1117, March 20, 1944
Ozaeta, J.

FACTS:
Respondent Estanislao R. Bayot, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for having published
an advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943 listing his legal assistance service, that is
procurement of marriage license. Respondent first denied having published said advertisement, but
subsequently he admitted having cause its publication, praying for “the indulgence and mercy” of the Court,
promising that he would not repeat such misconduct. Respondent alleged, in further mitigation, that said
advertisement was only published once and that he never had any case at law by reason thereof.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent violated the ethics of his profession.

HELD:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics
of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly
provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to
advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The
lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by
advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of
justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most
worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a well-
merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the
outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)

Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the Court is of the opinion
and so decides that the respondent should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded.

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DOCTRINE:
ATTORNEYS AT LAW; SOLICITATION OF BUSINESS FROM THE PUBLIC. — It is undeniable that the
advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being
a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other
things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or
skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself
and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or
offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary
activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a well- merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and
conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)

Uy v. Dizon-Capulong
A.M. No. RTJ-91-766, April 7, 1993
Per Curiam

FACTS:
Respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong is charged with gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law
and grave misconduct in a complaint filed by spouses Jose P. Uy and Rizalina C. Uy, relative to a special
proceedings for settlement of the estate of the late Ambrocio C. Pingco.

Herminia R. Alvos, claiming to be a niece of Paz Ramirez, surviving spouse of the late Ambrocio C. Pingco,
filed a petition for settlement of the estate of Ambrocio C. Pingco. Thereafter, respondent appointed
Herminia R. Alvos special administratix. On March 27, 1989, counsel for special administratix filed an urgent
motion stating that two parcels of land belonging to the late Ambrocio Pingco and his wife had been sold to
complainants Jose P. Uy and Rizalina C. Uy who registered the sale with the Register of Deeds Manila.
Counsel requested the court to direct the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela to “freeze any transaction
without the signature of Herminia Alvos” which respondent Judge then granted.

On April 18, 1989, upon order of respondent Judge, the Register Deeds of Valenzuela reported on the status
of the titles to the properties subject of the “freeze order,” informing the Court that on February 3, 1989, a
deed of absolute sale executed by the spouses Ambrocio C. Pingco and Paz Ramirez dated December 9,
1978 was filed with the Register of Deeds, describing therein 15 parcels of land; that, by virtue of deed of
sale, new transfer certificates of title were issued in the name of complainants. On May 5, 1989, counsel for
Alvos filed with the court an urgent motion to cancel the titles issued in the name of Jose P. Uy stating that
the latter was able to register the titles in his name through fraud, and the signatures of the vendors on the
deed were forged. On June 7, 1989, respondent Judge ordered the cancellation of the titles in the name of
complainant Jose P. Uy and the reinstatement of the names of the spouses Ambrocio C. Pingco and Paz
Ramirez or the issuance of new titles in their names.

On July 3, 1989, complainant filed with the Court of Appeals a petition to annul the Order of respondent
Judge, with prayer for a temporary restraining order enjoining the Register of Deeds Valenzuela from
implementing the Order, and that respondent Judge be restrained from further proceeding against him. On
September 28, 1989, the Court of Appeals granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition of

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complainants and set aside the Order of 7 June 1989 of respondent Judge, and enjoined her from
proceeding against complainant Jose P. Uy in the intestate proceedings.

In their complaint, the spouses Jose P. Uy and Rizalina C. Uy claim that despite the Decision of the Court of
Appeals of 28 September 1989 and the pendency of the petition for review by way of certiorari before this
Court, respondent Judge continued issuing various orders resulting in the issuance of new titles to the
properties in the name of persons stated in the project of partition, to the damage and prejudice of
complainants.

Complainants further contend that even after this Court had affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals that
respondent Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain further proceedings concerning the ownership of the
properties, respondent Judge still, in an attempt to defeat the proscription imposed by higher judicial
authority, issued, orders approving the sale of the properties to the further prejudice of complainants.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and grave misconduct.

HELD:
Elementary in our statutory law is the doctrine that when title to land has already been registered and the
certificate of title thereto issued, such Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked because the issue on the
validity of the title can only be raised in an action instituted expressly for the purpose. Corollary to this is
the constitutional mandate that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. In
cancelling the titles of complainants over their properties on mere motion of a party and without affording
them due process, respondent Judge violated her sworn obligation to uphold the law and promote the
administration of justice. It has been held that if the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one
does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

The foregoing transgressions of respondent Judge are further aggravated by her refusal to abide by the
Decision of the Court of Appeals annulling her Order of 7 June 1989 which directed the cancellation of the
titles of complainants. This utter disrespect for the judgment of a higher court constitutes grave misconduct
prejudicial to the interest of the public, the bench and the bar.

Moreover, the total disregard by respondent Judge of Our Resolution of 8 March 1991 cannot be condoned.
Therein, We affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals declaring her to have exceeded her jurisdiction in
cancelling the titles of complainants. Nonetheless, respondent Judge chose not to heed our
pronouncement. She issued two (2) more orders approving the sale to other persons of the remaining
properties which were titled in the name of complainants.

We consider this willful disobedience and continued disregard of Our Resolution as grave and serious
misconduct. Indeed, respondent Judge displayed open defiance to Our authority and utterly failed to show
proper respect for, and due and needed cooperativeness with resolutions of this Court.

By her acts and omissions, respondent Judge has failed to observe in the performance of her duties that
prudence and circumspection which the law requires for public service. She has made a mockery of the
judicial system of which she is a part and which she is sworn to uphold. This Court cannot countenance any
act or omission which would diminish the faith of the people in the administration of justice.

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WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG guilty of gross ignorance of
the law and grave misconduct prejudicial to the interest of the judicial service; consequently, she is hereby
DISMISSED from the service.

DOCTRINE:
JUDICIAL ETHICS; ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT AGAINST JUDGE; CONDUCT EXPECTED OF JUDGE AS VISIBLE
REPRESENTATION OF LAW AND JUSTICE. — Time and again We emphasize that the judge is the visible
representation of law and justice from whom the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law. For
the judge to return that regard, the latter must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for
the others to follow. The judge should be studiously careful to avoid even the slightest infraction of the law.
To fulfill this mission, the judge should keep abreast of the law, the rulings and doctrines of this Court. If the
judge is already aware of them, the latter should not deliberately refrain from applying them, otherwise
such omission can never be excused.

ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO KNOW LAW THAT IS SO ELEMENTARY CONSTITUTES GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW;
CASE AT BAR. — Elementary in our statutory law is the doctrine that when title to land has already been
registered and the certificate of title thereto issued, such Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked
because the issue on the validity of the title can only be raised in an action instituted expressly for the
purpose. Corollary to this is the constitutional mandate that no person shall be deprived of his property
without due process of law. In cancelling the titles of complainants over their properties on mere motion of
a party and without affording them due process, respondent Judge violated her sworn obligation to uphold
the law and promote the administration of justice. It has been held that if the law is so elementary, not to
know it or to act as if one does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

ID.; ID.; ACT OR OMISSION WHICH WOULD DIMINISH PEOPLE'S FAITH IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
NOT COUNTENANCED BY SUPREME COURT; RATIONALE THEREFOR; CASE AT BAR. — By her acts and
omissions, respondent Judge has failed to observe in the performance of her duties that prudence and
circumspection which the law requires for public service. She has made a mockery of the judicial system of
which she is a part and which she is sworn to uphold. This Court cannot countenance any act or omission
which would diminish the faith of the people in the administration of justice. As Chief Justice Jose Abad
Santos articulated, "the power of the judiciary rests upon the faith of the people and the integrity of the
courts. Take this faith away and the moral influence of the court is gone and popular respect impaired."

Omar Ali vs. Atty. Mosib Bubong

A.C. No. 4018, March 8, 2005
Per Curiam

FACTS:
A verified petition for disbarment was filed against respondent Atty. Mosib Ali Bubong for having been
found guilty of grave misconduct while holding the position of Register of Deeds of Marawi City. The
disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the administrative case earlier filed by complainant against
respondent. In said case, which was initially investigated by the Land Registration Authority (LRA),
complainant charged respondent with illegal exaction; indiscriminate issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-2821 in the names of the Baudali Datus who were relatives of repondent; and manipulating the
criminal complaint filed against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and others for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law.

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The initial inquiry by the LRA was resolved in favor of respondent, recommending that the complaint
against respondent be dismissed for lack of merit and evidence. The case was then forwarded to the
Department of Justice for review where then Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon exonerated respondent of
the charges of illegal exaction and infidelity in the custody of documents. He, however, found respondent
guilty of grave misconduct for his imprudent issuance of TCT No. T-2821 and manipulating the criminal case
for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law, recommending respondent's dismissal from service. Thereafter,
President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 41 adopting in toto the conclusion reached by
Secretary Drilon and ordering respondent's dismissal from government service.

On the basis of the outcome of the administrative case, complainant is now before us, seeking the
disbarment of respondent. Complainant claims that it has become obvious that respondent had "proven
himself unfit to be further entrusted with the duties of an attorney" 8 and that he poses a "serious threat to
the integrity of the legal profession."

ISSUE:
Whether respondent may be disbarred for grave misconduct committed while he was in the employ of the
government.

HELD:
We resolve this question in the affirmative.

The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined
the government service. In fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the
conduct of lawyers "shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks."
Thus, where a lawyer's misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as
a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such
grounds. 31 Although the general rule is that a lawyer who holds a government office may not be
disciplined as a member of the bar for infractions he committed as a government official, he may, however,
be disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct constitutes a violation of his oath as a member of the legal
profession.

Respondent's conduct manifestly undermined the people's confidence in the public office he used to
occupy and cast doubt on the integrity of the legal profession. The ill-conceived use of his knowledge of the
intricacies of the law calls for nothing less than the withdrawal of his privilege to practice law.

DOCTRINE:
Attorneys; Disbarment; Grounds Misconduct; Where a lawyer’s misconduct as a government is of such
nature as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as
a member of the bar on such grounds. – The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to
a lawyer simply because he has joined the government service. In fact, by the express provision of Canon 6
thereof, the rules governing the conduct of lawyers "shall apply to lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official tasks." Thus, where a lawyer's misconduct as a government official is of such
nature as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as
a member of the bar on such grounds. 31 Although the general rule is that a lawyer who holds a
government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for infractions he committed as a
government official, he may, however, be disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct constitutes a violation of
his oath as a member of the legal profession.

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Same; Same; Same; Same; As an officer of the court one is subject to rigid discipline that demands that in
his every exertion that only criterion be that truth and justice triumph. – [A] person takes an oath when he
is admitted to the bar which is designed to impress upon him his responsibilities. He thereby becomes an
"officer of the court" on whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper,
fair, speedy and efficient administration of justice. As an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline
that demands that in his every exertion the only criterion be that truth and justice triumph. This discipline is
what has given the law profession its nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase
Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected those qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor,
intellectual honesty, and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility — all of which, throughout the
centuries, have been compendiously described as moral character.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The ill-conceived use of his knowledge of the intricacies of the law calls for
nothing less than the withdrawal of his privilege to practice law. – Respondent's conduct manifestly
undermined the people's confidence in the public office he used to occupy and cast doubt on the integrity
of the legal profession. The ill-conceived use of his knowledge of the intricacies of the law calls for nothing
less than the withdrawal of his privilege to practice law.

Suarez vs. Platon

G.R. No. 46371, February 7, 1940
Laurel, J.

FACTS:
On May 9, 1935, respondent Lieutenant Vivencio Orais, and petitioner Attorney Fortunato Suarez were
both in the train on their way to Calauag, Tayabas. In the conversation which ensued between them,
Attorney Fortunato Suarez made certain remarks about the abuses of authority committed by the officers
of the Government who conducted the raid against the Sakdalistas at Sariaya. When Lieutenant Orias asked
whether or not Attorney Suarez was a Sakdalista, Attorney Suarez replied "may be". On the strength of
these facts, Lieutenant Orais arrested Attorney Suarez for the alleged offense of uttering seditious words,
and conducted him to the municipal building of Calauag and there lodged him in jail. He filed in the justice
of the peace court of the same municipality an information against Attorney Suarez for uttering seditious
words, in violation of article 142 of the Revised Penal Code. On the day following, Lieutenant Orais, acting
under the instruction of his superior, moved for the dismissal of the case. Thereafter, the deputy provincial
fiscal of Tayabas, at the instance of Attorney Suarez, filed an information against Lieutenant Orais and
Damian Jimenez, the latter as justice of the peace of Calauag, Tayabas, for the crime of arbitrary detention.

The justice of the peace of Calauag, being one of the accused, the preliminary examination was conducted
by the justice of the peace of Lopez, Tayabas. While the case was pending in the latter court, on petition of
the accused, the provincial fiscal of Tayabas, Ramon Valdez y Nieto, reinvestigated the case. After such
reinvestigation, he filed a motion for the dismissal of the case. Subsequently, petitioner asked the court to
appoint Attorney Godofredo Reyes as acting provincial fiscal to handle the prosecution, alleging, among
other things, that the provincial fiscal had no courage to prosecute the accused. Attorney Godofredo Reyes
vigorously objected to the motion of dismissal filed by the provincial fiscal. The Bar Association of Tayabas,
through its president, Emiliano A. Gala, entered its appearance as amicus curiae and likewise objected to
the dismissal of the case.

Then presiding judge Hon. Ed. Gutierrez David, after hearing, denied the motion, ruling that there was
prima facie case against the accused. The court, upon petition of the provincial fiscal, designated Deputy

8
Provincial Fiscal Perfecto R. Palacio to handle the prosecution. But Fiscal Palacio, being apparently of the
same opinion as the provincial fiscal, declined to proceed, and moved that a practicing attorney or a
competent attorney in the Bureau of Justice be designated in his stead. Accordingly, the provincial fiscal of
Sorsogon, Jacinto Yamson, at the request of the judge a quo was assigned by the Department of Justice to
handle the prosecution of the case. Fiscal Yamson after going over the case likewise entered a nolle
prosequi. Fiscal Yamson moved for reconsideration of the court's order denying the motion for dismissal
presented by the provincial fiscal. Attorney Godofredo Reyes again vigorously objected to this motion on
the ground that there was sufficient proof to warrant the prosecution of the accused. The case was in this
state when Judge Emilio Peña was appointed to take the place of Judge Gutierrez David.

Later, respondent Judge Servillano Platon was appointed to preside over the said criminal case. Respondent
judge, after consideration of all the facts and proofs submitted in the case, reconsidered the court's order
and dismissed the case, holding that the evidence was insufficient to convict the accused of the crime
charged. From this order, the petitioner herein appealed to this Court and the case was here docketed, by a
closely divided court, the appeal was dismissed.

Thereafter, an original petition for the peremptory writ of mandamus filed by Fortunato N. Suarez with this
court, to compel the respondent judge to reinstate criminal case No. 6426 of the Court of First Instance of
Tayabas so that the case may proceed to trial in the ordinary course.

ISSUE:
Should the writ of mandamus prayed for be issued?

HELD:
Considering all the circumstances, we cannot say that Judge S. P., in granting the motion for the dismissal of
the case for arbitrary detention against Lieutenant O and the justice of the peace of Lopez, abused his
discretion so flagrantly as to justify, in the interest of justice, a departure from the well-settled rule that an
inferior tribunal in the performance of a judicial act within the scope of its jurisdiction and discretion cannot
be controlled by mandamus. This is especially true in a matter involving the examination of evidence and
the decision of questions of law and fact, since such duty is not ministerial. ( High, Extraordinary Legal
Remedies, sec. 156, pp. 173-175.) Upon the other hand, it should be observed that in the case of Lieutenant
O, in the face of the circumstances surrounding the arrest as set forth in the two motions for dismissal by
the provincial fiscal of Tayabas, which facts and circumstances must have been investigated and duly
weighed and considered by the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, the arrest
effected by Lieutenant O cannot be said to have been entirely unjustified. If, "under trying circumstances
and in a zealous effort to obey the orders of his superior officer and to enforce the law, a peace officer
makes a mere mistake in good faith, he should be exculpated. Otherwise, the courts will put a premium on
crime and will terrorize peace officers through a fear of themselves violating the law. See generally
Voorhees on Arrest; 5 Corpus Juris, pp. 399, 416; 2 R. C. L., 450. (United States vs. Santos, 36; Phil., 853,
855.)"

DOCTRINE:
MANDAMUS; PROSECUTION OF PUBLIC OFFENSES; DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF PROSECUTING
OFFICERS. — We cannot overemphasize the necessity of close scrutiny and investigation of prosecuting
officers of all cases handled by them, but whilst this court is averse to any form of vacillation by such
officers in the prosecution of public offenses, it is unquestionable that they may, in appropriate cases, in
order to do justice and avoid injustice, reinvestigate cases in which they have already filed the
corresponding informations. In the language of Justice Sutherland of the Supreme Court of the United

9
States, the prosecuting officer "is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is
that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor — indeed, he
should do so. But while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his
duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every
legitimate means to bring about a just one." (69 United States Law Review, June, 1935, No. 6, p. 309.)

PCGG vs. Sandiganbayan, et. al.

G.R. Nos. 151809-12, April 12, 2005
Puno, J.

FACTS:
In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. The Central Bank
later found out that GENBANK had approved various loans to directors, officers, stockholders and related
interests totaling P172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as doubtful and P0.505 million as
uncollectible. As a bailout, the Central Bank extended emergency loans to GENBANK, however, despite the
mega loans, GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. Later, the Central Bank issued a resolution
declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the
general public, and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANK's assets was held, wherein the
Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid. Subsequently, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed
a petition with the then Court of First Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in
GENBANK's liquidation as mandated by Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.

On July 17, 1987, the PCGG, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for "reversion, reconveyance,
restitution, accounting and damages" against respondents. In connection therewith, the PCGG issued
several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by taking
advantage of their close relationship and influence with former President Marcos. Respondents Tan, et al.
repaired to this Court and filed petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction to nullify, among others,
the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG. After the filing of the parties' comments, this Court referred
the cases to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition. In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. were
represented by their counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, who has then resumed his
private practice of law.

Thereafter, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al.
with the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in the sequestration cases. The motions alleged that
respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General and counsel to Central Bank, "actively intervened" in the
liquidation of GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied
Banking Corporation. Respondent Mendoza allegedly "intervened" in the acquisition of GENBANK by
respondents Tan, et al. when, in his capacity as then Solicitor General, he advised the Central Bank's officials
on the procedure to bring about GENBANK's liquidation and appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in
connection with its petition for assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK which he filed with the Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila and was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 107812. The
motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits
former government lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in connection with any matter in
which he had intervened while in said service.

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The Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying PCGG's motion to disqualify
respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005. It found that the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an
inconsistency between respondent Mendoza's former function as Solicitor General and his present
employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that respondent Mendoza did not take a position
adverse to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank during his term as Solicitor General. It further ruled that
respondent Mendoza's appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year
prohibited period under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the
year 1986. The said section prohibits a former public official or employee from practicing his profession in
connection with any matter before the office he used to be with within one year from his resignation,
retirement or separation from public office. The PCGG did not seek any reconsideration of the ruling.

The sequestration cases were then transferred from the Sandiganbayan's Second Division to the Fifth
Division. In its resolution dated July 11, 2001, the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the other
PCGG's motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza. Hence, this petition assailing the resolutions dated July
11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan. The PCGG alleged that the Fifth
Division acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed resolutions contending that: 1) Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a
former government lawyer from accepting employment in connection with any matter in which he
intervened; 2) the prohibition in the Rule is not time-bound; 3) that Central Bank could not waive the
objection to respondent Mendoza's appearance on behalf of the PCGG; and 4) the resolution in Civil Case
No. 0005 was interlocutory, thus res judicata does not apply.

ISSUE:
Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. Again, the
prohibition states: "A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service."
1. Whether his act of advising the Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is
included within the concept of “matter” under Rule 6.03.
2. Whether the intervention of respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is significant and
substantial.
HELD:

1. Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the "matter" which was the subject of intervention by
respondent Mendoza while he was the Solicitor General. The PCGG relates the following acts of
respondent Mendoza as constituting the "matter" where he intervened as a Solicitor General.

Beyond doubt, therefore, the "matter" or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General
involved in the case at bar is "advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank's
liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila." In fine, the Court
should resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate
GENBANK is included within the concept of "matter" under Rule 6.03. The procedure of liquidation
is given in black and white in Republic Act No. 265, section 29.

We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is
not the "matter" contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal
Opinion No. 342 is clear as daylight in stressing that the "drafting, enforcing or interpreting

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 government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law" are
acts which do not fall within the scope of the term "matter" and cannot disqualify.

Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that the above act of respondent
Mendoza falls within the definition of matter per ABA Formal Opinion No. 342. Be that as it may,
the said act of respondent Mendoza which is the "matter" involved in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is
entirely different from the "matter" involved in Civil Case No. 0096.

It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly disfavors
lawyers who "switch sides." It is claimed that "switching sides" carries the danger that former
government employee may compromise confidential official information in the process. But this
concern does not cast a shadow in the case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of respondent
Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on the procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is a different
matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about the sequestration of the
shares of respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. Consequently, the danger that confidential official
information might be divulged is nil, if not inexistent.

2. We disagree. For one, the petition in the special proceedings is an initiatory pleading, hence, it has
to be signed by respondent Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. For another, the record is
arid as to the actual participation of respondent Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings. Indeed,
the case was in slumberville for a long number of years. None of the parties pushed for its early
termination. Moreover, we note that the petition filed merely seeks the assistance of the court in
the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of the court in this type of proceedings is to assist
the Central Bank in determining claims of creditors against the GENBANK. The role of the court is
not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims
of creditors. In such a proceeding, the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General is not that
of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government.

But again, this particular concern is a non factor in the case at bar. There is no charge against respondent
Mendoza that he advised Central Bank on how to liquidate GENBANK with an eye in later defending
respondents Tan, et al. of Allied Bank. Indeed, he continues defending both the interests of Central Bank
and respondents Tan, et al. in the above cases.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of the
Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 is denied.

DOCTRINE:
Attorneys; Legal Ethics; As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form and function of the
canons. Among their concerns was the "revolving door" or "the process by which lawyers and others
temporarily enter government service from private life and then leave it for large fees in private practice,
where they can exploit information, contacts, and influence garnered in government service." 25 These
concerns were classified as "adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest conflicts." "Adverse-
interest conflicts" exist where the matter in which the former government lawyer represents a client in
private practice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while employed by the
government and the interests of the current and former are adverse. 26 On the other hand, "congruent-
interest representation conflicts" are unique to government lawyers and apply primarily to former
government lawyers. 27 For several years, the ABA attempted to correct and update the canons through
new canons, individual amendments and interpretative opinions. In 1928, the ABA amended one canon and

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added thirteen new canons. 28 To deal with problems peculiar to former government lawyers, Canon 36
was minted which disqualified them both for "adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest
representation conflicts." 29 The rationale for disqualification is rooted in a concern that the government
lawyer's largely discretionary actions would be influenced by the temptation to take action on behalf of the
government client that later could be to the advantage of parties who might later become private practice
clients.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of "matter"
referred to in the rule and, second, the metes and bounds of the "intervention" made by the former
government lawyer on the "matter." The American Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342, defined
"matter" as any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular
situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or
agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.

Same; Same; Same; Same; here are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word "intervene." Under
the first interpretation, "intervene" includes participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is
irrelevant or has no effect or little influence. 43 Under the second interpretation, "intervene" only includes
an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings. 44 We hold that this second
meaning is more appropriate to give to the word "intervention" under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility in light of its history. The evils sought to be remedied by the Rule do not exist where the
government lawyer does an act which can be considered as innocuous such as ". . . drafting, enforcing or
interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law."

In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant. Originally, Canon 36 provided that a
former government lawyer "should not, after his retirement, accept employment in connection with any
matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ." As aforediscussed, the
broad sweep of the phrase "which he has investigated or passed upon" resulted in unjust disqualification of
former government lawyers. The 1969 Code restricted its latitude, hence, in DR 9-101(b), the prohibition
extended only to a matter in which the lawyer, while in the government service, had "substantial
responsibility." The 1983 Model Rules further constricted the reach of the rule. MR 1.11(a) provides that "a
lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated
personally and substantially as a public officer or employee."

Same; Same; Same; Same; It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 is intended to avoid
conflict of loyalties, i.e., that a government employee might be subject to a conflict of loyalties while still in
government service.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the
congruent interest prong of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility should be subject to a
prescriptive period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the rule cannot apply retroactively to respondent
Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly so, they are disquieted by the fact that (1) when respondent Mendoza was
the Solicitor General, Rule 6.03 has not yet adopted by the IBP and approved by this Court, and (2) the bid
to disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the lapse of time whose length cannot, by any standard,
qualify as reasonable. At bottom, the point they make relates to the unfairness of the rule if applied
without any prescriptive period and retroactively, at that. Their concern is legitimate and deserves to be
initially addressed by the IBP and our Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court.

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