FULL TEXT

CASE:

G.R. No. 75271-73 June 27, 1988

CATALINO N. SARMIENTO and 71 other striking workers of ASIAN TRANSMISSION

CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. JUDGE ORLANDO R. TUICO of the Municipal Trial Court of Calamba,
Laguna, ROBERTO PIMENTEL, NELSON C. TEJADA, and the COMMANDING
OFFICER, 224th PC Company at Los Baños Laguna, respondents.

No. L-77567 June 27, 1988

ASIAN TRANSMISSION, CORPORATION (ATC), petitioner,

vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), respondent.

Jose C. Espinas for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 75271-73.

Augusto Gatmaytan for petitioner ATC.

Emilio C. Capulong, Jr. for private respondents in G.R. Nos. 75271-73.

CRUZ, J.:

Two basic questions are presented in these cases, to wit:

1. Whether or not a return-to-work order may be validly issued by the National Labor
Relations Commission pending determination of the legality of the strike; and

2. Whether or not, pending such determination, the criminal prosecution of certain

persons involved in the said strike may be validly restrained.

The first issue was submitted to the Court in G.R. No. 77567, to which we gave due course
on July 1, 1987. 1 The case arose when on May 7, 1986, petitioner Asian Transmission
Corporation terminated the services of Catalino Sarmiento, vice-president of the Bisig ng
Asian Transmission Labor Union (BATU), for allegedly carrying a deadly weapon in the
company premises. 2 As a result, the BATU filed a notice of strike on May 26, 1986, claiming
that the ATC had committed an unfair labor practice. 3 The conciliatory conference held on
June 5, 1986, failed to settle the dispute. The ATC then filed a petition asking the Ministry of
Labor and Employment to assume jurisdiction over the matter or certify the same to the
NLRC for compulsory arbitration. 4 Noting that the impending strike would prejudice the
national interest as well as the welfare of some 350 workers and their families, the MOLE
issued an order on June 3, 1986, certifying the labor dispute to the NLRC. 5 At the same
time, it enjoined the management from locking out its employees and the union from
declaring a strike or similar concerted action. This order was reiterated on June 13, 1986,
upon the representation of the ATC that some 40 workers had declared a strike and were
picketing the company premises. 6 Proceedings could not continue in the NLRC, however,
because of the acceptance by President Aquino of the resignations of eight of its members,
leaving only the vice-chairman in office.7 For this reason, the MOLE, on September 9, 1986,
set aside the orders of June 9 and 13, 1986, and directly assumed jurisdiction of the dispute,
at the same time enjoining the company to accept all returning workers. 8 This order was
itself set aside on November 24,1986, upon motion of both the BATU and the ATC in view of
the appointment of new commissioners in the NLRC. The MOLE then returned the case to
the respondent NLRC and directed it to expeditiously resolve all issues relating to the
dispute, "adding that the union and the striking workers are ordered to return to work
immediately." 9 Conformably, the NLRC issued on January 13, 1987 the following resolution,
which it affirmed in its resolution of February 12, 1987, denying the motion for
reconsideration:

CERTIFIED CASE No. NCR-NS-5-214-86, entitled Asian Transmission Corporation,

Petitioner versus Bisig ng Asian Transmission Labor Union (BATU), et al., Respondents.-
Considering that the petitioner, despite the order dated 24 November 1986 of the Acting
Minister, "to accept all the returning workers" continues to defy the directive insofar as 44 of
the workers are concerned, the Commission, sitting en banc, resolved to order the petitioner
to accept the said workers, or, to reinstate them on payroll immediately upon receipt of the
resolution.

It is these orders of January 13 and February 12, 1987, that are challenged by the ATC in
this petition for certiorari and are the subject of the temporary restraining order issued by this
Court on March 23, 1987.10

The second issue was raised in G.R. Nos. 75271-73, which we have consolidated with the
first- mentioned petition because of the Identity of their factual antecedents. This issue was
provoked by three criminal complaints filed against the petitioning workers in the municipal
trial court of Calamba, Laguna, two by the personnel administrative officer of the ATC and
the third by the Philippine Constabulary. The first two complaints, filed on July 11 and July
15, 1986, were for "Violation of Article 265, par. 1, in relation to Article 273 of the Labor
Code of the Philippines." 11 The third, filed on July 17, 1986, was for coercion. 12 In all three
complaints, the defendants were charged with staging an illegal strike, barricading the gates
of the ATC plant and preventing the workers through intimidation, harassment and force
from reporting for work. Acting on Criminal Case No. 15984, Judge Orlando Tuico issued a
warrant of arrest against the petitioners and committed 72 of them to jail although he later
ordered the release of 61 of them to the custody of the municipal mayor of Calamba,
Laguna. 13 The petitioners had earlier moved for the lifting of the warrant of arrest and the
referral of the coercion charge to the NLRC and, later, for the dismissal of Criminal Cases
Nos. 15973 and 15981 on the ground that they came under the primary jurisdiction of the
NLRC. 14 As the judge had not ruled on these motions, the petitioners came to this Court in
this petition for certiorari and prohibition. On August 12, 1986, we issued a temporary
restraining order to prevent Judge Tuico from enforcing the warrant of arrest and further
proceeding with the case. 15 This order was reiterated on September 21, 1987, "to relieve
tensions that might prevent an amicable settlement of the dispute between the parties in the
compulsory arbitration proceedings now going on in the Department of Labor," and made to
apply to Judge Paterno Lustre, who had succeeded Judge Tuico. 16

That is the background. Now to the merits.

It is contended by the ATC that the NLRC had no jurisdiction in issuing the return-to-work
order and that in any case the same should be annulled for being oppressive and violative of
due process.

The question of competence is easily resolved. The authority for the order is found in Article
264(g) of the Labor Code, as amended by B.P. Blg. 227, which provides as follows:

When in his opinion there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts
adversely affecting the national interest, such as may occur in but not limited to public
utilities, companies engaged in the generation or distribution of energy, banks, hospitals, and
export- oriented industries, including those within export processing zones, the Minister of
Labor and Employment shall assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the
same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall
have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as
specified in the assumption order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption
or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the
employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same
terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Minister may seek the
assistance of law-enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as
such orders as he may issue to enforce the same.

The justification of the MOLE for such order was embodied therein, thus:

Asian Transmission Corporation is an export-oriented enterprise and its annual export

amounts to 90% of its sales generating more than twelve (12) million dollars per year. The
corporation employs three hundred fifty (350) workers with a total monthly take home pay or
approximately P1,300,000.00 a month.

Any disruption of company operations will cause the delay of shipments of export finished
products which have been previously committed to customers abroad, thereby seriously
hampering the economic recovery program which is being pursued by the government. It wig
also affect gravely the livelihood of three hundred fifty (350) families who will be deprived of
their incomes.

This Office is therefore of the opinion that a strike or any disruption in the normal operation
of the company will adversely affect the national interest. It is in the interest of both labor and
management that the dispute be certified for compulsory arbitration to National Labor
Relations Commission.

WHEREFORE, this Office hereby certifies the labor dispute to the National Labor Relations
Commission in accordance with Article 264(g) of the Labor Code, as amended. In line with
this Certification, the management is enjoined from locking out its employees and the union
from declaring a strike, or any concerted action which will disrupt the harmonious labor-
management relations at the company. 17
There can be no question that the MOLE acted correctly in certifying the labor dispute to the
NLRC, given the predictable prejudice the strike might cause not only to the parties but more
especially to the national interest. Affirming this fact, we conclude that the return-to-work
order was equally valid as a statutory part and parcel of the certification order issued by the
MOLE on November 24, 1986. The law itself provides that "such assumption or certification
shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike. If one has
already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out
employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume
operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before
the strike or lockout." The challenged order of the NLRC was actually only an
implementation of the above provision of the Labor Code and a reiteration of the directive
earlier issued by the MOLE in its own assumption order of September 9, 1986.

It must be stressed that while one purpose of the return-to-work order is to protect the
workers who might otherwise be locked out by the employer for threatening or waging the
strike, the more important reason is to prevent impairment of the national interest in case the
operations of the company are disrupted by a refusal of the strikers to return to work as
directed. In the instant case, stoppage of work in the firm will be hurtful not only to both the
employer and the employees. More particularly, it is the national economy that will suffer
because of the resultant reduction in our export earnings and our dollar reserves, not to
mention possible cancellation of the contracts of the company with foreign importers. It was
particularly for the purpose of avoiding such a development that the labor dispute was
certified to the NLRC, with the return-to-work order following as a matter of course under the
law.

It is also important to emphasize that the return-to-work order not so much confers a right as
it imposes a duty; and while as a right it may be waived, it must be discharged as a duty
even against the worker's will. Returning to work in this situation is not a matter of option or
voluntariness but of obligation. The worker must return to his job together with his co-
workers so the operations of the company can be resumed and it can continue serving the
public and promoting its interest. That is the real reason such return can be compelled. So
imperative is the order in fact that it is not even considered violative of the right against
involuntary servitude, as this Court held in Kaisahan ng Mga Manggagawa sa Kahoy v.
Gotamco Sawmills. 18 The worker can of course give up his work, thus severing his ties with
the company, if he does not want to obey the order; but the order must be obeyed if he
wants to retain his work even if his inclination is to strike.

If the worker refuses to obey the return-to-work order, can it be said that he is just
suspending the enjoyment of a right and he is entitled to assert it later as and when he sees
fit? In the meantime is the management required to keep his position open, unable to employ
replacement to perform the work the reluctant striker is unwilling to resume because he is
still manning the picket lines?

While the ATC has manifested its willingness to accept most of the workers, and has in fact
already done so, it has balked at the demand of the remaining workers to be also allowed to
return to work. 19 Its reason is that these persons, instead of complying with the return-to-
work order, as most of the workers have done, insisted on staging the restrained strike and
defiantly picketed the company premises to prevent the resumption of operations. By so
doing, the ATC submits, these strikers have forfeited their right to be readmitted, having
abandoned their positions, and so could be validly replaced.

The Court agrees.

The records show that the return-to-work order was first issued on June 3, 1986, and was
reiterated on June 13, 1986. The strike was declared thereafter, if we go by the criminal
complaints in G.R. Nos. 75271-73, where the alleged acts are claimed to have been done on
June 9,1986, and July 15,1986.

These dates are not denied. In fact, the petitioners argue in their pleadings that they were
engaged only in peaceful picketing, 20 which would signify that they had not on those dates
returned to work as required and had decided instead to ignore the said order. By their own
acts, they are deemed to have abandoned their employment and cannot now demand the
right to return thereto by virtue of the very order they have defied.

One other point that must be underscored is that the return-to-work order is issued pending
the determination of the legality or illegality of the strike. It is not correct to say that it may be
enforced only if the strike is legal and may be disregarded if the strike is illegal, for the
purpose precisely is to maintain the status quo while the determination is being made.
Otherwise, the workers who contend that their strike is legal can refuse to return to their
work and cause a standstill in the company operations while retaining the positions they
refuse to discharge or allow the management to fill. Worse, they win also claim payment for
work not done, on the ground that they are still legally employed although actually engaged
in activities inimical to their employer's interest.

This is like eating one's cake and having it too, and at the expense of the management.
Such an unfair situation surely was not contemplated by our labor laws and cannot be
justified under the social justice policy, which is a policy of fairness to both labor and
management. Neither can this unseemly arrangement be sustained under the due process
clause as the order, if thus interpreted, would be plainly oppressive and arbitrary.

Accordingly, the Court holds that the return-to-work order should benefit only those workers
who complied therewith and, regardless of the outcome of the compulsory arbitration
proceedings, are entitled to be paid for work they have actually performed. Conversely,
those workers who refused to obey the said order and instead waged the restrained strike
are not entitled to be paid for work not done or to reinstatement to the positions they have
abandoned by their refusal to return thereto as ordered.

Turning now to the second issue, we hold that while as a general rule the prosecution of
criminal offenses is not subject to injunction, the exception must apply in the case at bar.
The suspension of proceedings in the criminal complaints filed before the municipal court of
Calamba, Laguna, is justified on the ground of prematurity as there is no question that the
acts complained of are connected with the compulsory arbitration proceedings still pending
in the NLRC. The first two complaints, as expressly captioned, are for "violation of Art. 265,
par. 2, in relation to Art. 273, of the Labor Code of the Philippines," and the third complaint
relates to the alleged acts of coercion committed by the defendants in blocking access to the
premises of the ATC. Two of the criminal complaints were filed by the personnel
administrative officer of the ATC although he vigorously if not convincingly insists that he
was acting in his personal capacity.

In view of this, the three criminal cases should be suspended until the completion of the
compulsory arbitration proceedings in the NLRC, conformably to the policy embodied in
Circular No. 15, series of 1982, and Circular No. 9, series of 1986, issued by the Ministry of
Justice in connection with the implementation of B.P. Blg. 227. 21 These circulars, briefly
stated, require fiscals and other government prosecutors to first secure the clearance of the
Ministry of Labor and/or the Office of the President "before taking cognizance of complaints
for preliminary investigation and the filing in court of the corresponding informations of cases
arising out of or related to a labor dispute," including "allegations of violence, coercion,
physical injuries, assault upon a person in authority and other similar acts of intimidation
obstructing the free ingress to and egress from a factory or place of operation of the
machines of such factory, or the employer's premises." It does not appear from the record
that such clearance was obtained, conformably to the procedure laid down "to attain the
industrial peace which is the primordial objectives of this law," before the three criminal
cases were filed.

The Court makes no findings on the merits of the labor dispute and the criminal cases
against the workers as these are not in issue in the petitions before it. What it can only
express at this point is the prayerful hope that these disagreements will be eventually
resolved with justice to all parties and in that spirit of mutual accommodation that should
always characterize the relations between the workers and their employer. Labor and
management are indispensable partners in the common endeavor for individual dignity and
national prosperity. There is no reason why they cannot pursue these goals with open hands
rather than clenched fists, striving with rather than against each other, that they may
together speed the dawning of a richer day for all in this amiable land of ours.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In G.R. No. 77567, the petition is DENIED and the challenged Orders of the NLRC
dated January 13, 1986, and February 12, 1986, are AFFIRMED as above interpreted. The
temporary restraining order dated March 23, 1987, is LIFTED.

2. In G.R. Nos. 75271-73, the temporary restraining order of August 12,1986, and
September 21, 1986, are CONTINUED IN FORCE until completion of the compulsory
arbitration proceedings in the NLRC.

CASE:

G.R. No. 92742 May 6, 1991

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK, petitioner,

vs.
NILDA S. JACINTO and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.

Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for petitioner.

Arturo A. Dimain for private respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:

The responsibility of an employee of a bank for the loss of certain funds of the bank is the
issue in this case.

Private respondent Nilda S. Jacinto is an employee of petitioner PCI Bank assigned at its
Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) Branch as customer relation assistant (CRA) since
August 9, 1971. Her principal duties as CRA are described in the Desk Manual signed and
issued to her wherein it is also written that she acts as "alternate — FX Clerk or Teller."

On May 1, 1984, the bank discovered the loss of some travelers checks amounting to P
25,325.00 in peso equivalent transacted on April 30, 1984. As private respondent acted as
FX clerk on said day inasmuch as the regular FX clerk was on leave, an investigation was
conducted by petitioner of private respondent and other personnel who were interviewed and
allowed to explain their side.

As petitioner found private respondent to be guilty of gross negligence, she was meted ten
(10) days suspension without pay on March 7 to 20, 1984 and was required to pay the
amount of the loss of P25,325.00 by way of salary deductions of P200.00 a month plus 50%
of mid-year bonus; Christmas bonus and profit sharing. She was transferred to the Baclaran
branch of the bank on May 21, 1984.

Hence, private respondent filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) on August 14, 1986 questioning her suspension and the penalty imposed on her as
well as her transfer of assignment. After the parties flied their position papers a decision was
rendered by the designated labor arbiter on February 19, 1988 the dispositive part of which
reads as follows —

WHEREFORE, finding the ten (10) days suspension meted out to complainant as well as the
periodic deductions on her salary, bonuses, and 13th month pay for the payment of peso
equivalent of said lost travellers checks, to be unjustified, respondent PCIB should be, as it
is hereby ordered to erase from the service record or 201 file of complainant Nilda S. Jacinto
said suspension together with the merit increase and other benefits that she was deprived
of, and to return to her the amount so far deducted from her salary, bonuses and 13th month
pay. Said respondent is further directed to return complainant to her former assignment at
MIA branch, if she would prefer said assignment, there being no justifiable reason shown by
respondent to overcome complainant's contention that her said transfer to the Baclaran
branch is due to her purported gross negligence and which we, however, find to be
unfounded.

SO ORDERED.1

Petitioner appealed therefrom to the public respondent NLRC wherein in due course a
decision was rendered on October 23, 1989 affirming the appealed decision with the only
modification that the transfer of private respondent was found to be an appropriate
prerogative of management.

Hence, this petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction predicated on the following grounds—

1. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN HOLDING

THAT GROSS NEGLIGENCE CANNOT BE ATTRIBUTED TO RESPONDENT JACINTO
AS SHE WAS NOT FORMALLY DESIGNATED TO PERFORM THE FUNCTIONS OF AN
FX CLERK.

2. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN

SUSTAINING THE LABOR ARBITER'S FINDING OF NON-CULPABILITY IN FAVOR OF
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT, NOTWITHSTANDING THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD
SHOWING THE CONTRARY.2

The petition is impressed with merit.

There is no question in the fact that on April 30, 1984, private respondent was requested by
Mr. Gilberto C. Marquez, who was the OIC of the NAIA branch of the bank, to assume the
duties of Mrs. Bromeo, FX Clerk, who was on leave. Private respondent acting as FX clerk
stated that she received the travellers checks; she made the proof sheet thereof and
thereafter she placed the checks and proof sheet in the FX cash box. The following day, she
reported the loss of said travellers checks from the FX cash box.

In disclaiming any responsibility for the loss, she asserted that there was no memorandum or
written designation for her to act as FX Clerk, and that at the time, the one acting as FX
Clerk was Mr. Marquez, in the absence of Mrs. Bromeo so that she was only verbally
requested by Mr. Marquez to perform the duties of FX Clerk then. She also averred that the
FX cash box was defective and should have been repaired by the bank.

What cannot be denied is the fact that private respondent actually performed the duties of
the FX clerk on that fateful day of April 30, 1984 upon request of Mr. Marquez. In so doing
she assumed the responsibilities of the position. Although she claimed to have prepared the
proof sheet, none was found in the box. She did not microfilm the checks as a matter of
course. She did not formally endorse the FX box to the night shift FX clerk or to the cashier.
More so, considering that she knew the lock of the box was defective.

By and large, the Court holds that the finding of petitioner that private respondent was
grossly negligent is well-taken.

Any employee who is entrusted with responsibility by his employer should perform the task
assigned to him with care and dedication. The lack of a written or formal designation should
not be an excuse to disclaim any responsibility for any damage suffered by the employer due
to his negligence. The measure of the responsibility of an employee is that if he performed
his assigned task efficiently and according to the usual standards, then he may not be held
personally liable for any damage arising therefrom. Failing in this, the employee must suffer
the consequences of his negligence if not lack of due care in the performance of his duties.
The Court finds that the ten (10) days suspension of private respondent without pay as a
penalty is proper and in accordance with the prescribed rules of petitioner. However, the
requirement that she reimburse the full value of the loss to the bank is too harsh. Petitioner
has also contributed to the loss when it failed to have the lock of the FX box fixed and to
have taken other security measures in the bank premises. Hence, said penalty should be
mitigated by requiring private respondent to reimburse the petitioner only one-half (1/2) of
the loss by way of salary deduction.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned decision of the public respondent
dated October 23, 1989 and its resolution dated January 31, 1990 are hereby reversed and
set aside, and the complaint of private respondent is dismissed. However, the penalty
imposed by petitioner on private respondent is hereby modified by requiring private
respondent to indemnify petitioner the amount of P 12,600.00, through regular payroll
deductions. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

CASE:

G.R. Nos. L-58674-77 July 11, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. DOMINGO PANIS, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Zambales &
Olongapo City, Branch III and SERAPIO ABUG, respondents.

CRUZ, J:

The basic issue in this case is the correct interpretation of Article 13(b) of P.D. 442,
otherwise known as the Labor Code, reading as follows:

(b) Recruitment and placement' refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising
or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any
person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or
more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.

Four informations were filed on January 9, 1981, in the Court of First Instance of Zambales
and Olongapo City alleging that Serapio Abug, private respondent herein, "without first
securing a license from the Ministry of Labor as a holder of authority to operate a fee-
charging employment agency, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally operate a
private fee charging employment agency by charging fees and expenses (from) and
promising employment in Saudi Arabia" to four separate individuals named therein, in
violation of Article 16 in relation to Article 39 of the Labor Code. 1

Abug filed a motion to quash on the ground that the informations did not charge an offense
because he was accused of illegally recruiting only one person in each of the four
informations. Under the proviso in Article 13(b), he claimed, there would be illegal
recruitment only "whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any
employment for a fee. " 2

Denied at first, the motion was reconsidered and finally granted in the Orders of the trial
court dated June 24 and September 17, 1981. The prosecution is now before us on
certiorari. 3

The posture of the petitioner is that the private respondent is being prosecuted under Article
39 in relation to Article 16 of the Labor Code; hence, Article 13(b) is not applicable. However,
as the first two cited articles penalize acts of recruitment and placement without proper
authority, which is the charge embodied in the informations, application of the definition of
recruitment and placement in Article 13(b) is unavoidable.

The view of the private respondents is that to constitute recruitment and placement, all the
acts mentioned in this article should involve dealings with two or m•re persons as an
indispensable requirement. On the other hand, the petitioner argues that the requirement of
two or more persons is imposed only where the recruitment and placement consists of an
offer or promise of employment to such persons and always in consideration of a fee. The
other acts mentioned in the body of the article may involve even only one person and are not
necessarily for profit.

Neither interpretation is acceptable. We fail to see why the proviso should speak only of an
offer or promise of employment if the purpose was to apply the requirement of two or more
persons to all the acts mentioned in the basic rule. For its part, the petitioner does not
explain why dealings with two or more persons are needed where the recruitment and
placement consists of an offer or promise of employment but not when it is done through
"canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of) workers.

As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on the basic rule nor to
provide an exception thereto but merely to create a presumption. The presumption is that the
individual or entity is engaged in recruitment and placement whenever he or it is dealing with
two or more persons to whom, in consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of employment
is made in the course of the "canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring
or procuring (of) workers. "

The number of persons dealt with is not an essential ingredient of the act of recruitment and
placement of workers. Any of the acts mentioned in the basic rule in Article 13(b) win
constitute recruitment and placement even if only one prospective worker is involved. The
proviso merely lays down a rule of evidence that where a fee is collected in consideration of
a promise or offer of employment to two or more prospective workers, the individual or entity
dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in the act of recruitment and placement.
The words "shall be deemed" create that presumption.

This is not unlike the presumption in article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, for example,
regarding the failure of a public officer to produce upon lawful demand funds or property
entrusted to his custody. Such failure shall be prima facie evidence that he has put them to
personal use; in other words, he shall be deemed to have malversed such funds or property.
In the instant case, the word "shall be deemed" should by the same token be given the force
of a disputable presumption or of prima facie evidence of engaging in recruitment and
placement. (Klepp vs. Odin Tp., McHenry County 40 ND N.W. 313, 314.)

It is unfortunate that we can only speculate on the meaning of the questioned provision for
lack of records of debates and deliberations that would otherwise have been available if the
Labor Code had been enacted as a statute rather than a presidential decree. The trouble
with presidential decrees is that they could be, and sometimes were, issued without previous
public discussion or consultation, the promulgator heeding only his own counsel or those of
his close advisers in their lofty pinnacle of power. The not infrequent results are rejection,
intentional or not, of the interest of the greater number and, as in the instant case, certain
esoteric provisions that one cannot read against the background facts usually reported in the
legislative journals.

At any rate, the interpretation here adopted should give more force to the campaign against
illegal recruitment and placement, which has victimized many Filipino workers seeking a
better life in a foreign land, and investing hard- earned savings or even borrowed funds in
pursuit of their dream, only to be awakened to the reality of a cynical deception at the hands
of theirown countrymen.

WHEREFORE, the Orders of June 24, 1981, and September 17, 1981, are set aside and the
four informations against the private respondent reinstated. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

CASE:

G.R. No. 146964 August 10, 2006

ROSA C. RODOLFO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Petitioner was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati for illegal recruitment
alleged to have been committed as follows:

That in or about and during the period from August to September 1984, in Makati, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
representing herself to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for
employment abroad, did then and there willfully and unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and promise
employment/job placement abroad to VILLAMOR ALCANTARA, NARCISO CORPUZ, 1
NECITAS R. FERRE, GERARDO H. TAPAWAN and JOVITO L. CAMA, without first
securing the required license or authority from the Ministry of Labor and Employment. 2

After trial on the merits, Branch 61 of the Makati RTC rendered its Judgment on the case, 3
the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES ABOVE CONSIDERED, the Court finds the accused ROSA C.
RODOLFO as GUILTY of the offense of ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT and hereby sentences
her [to] a penalty of imprisonment of EIGHT YEARS and to pay the costs. 4 (Underscoring
supplied)

In so imposing the penalty, the trial court took note of the fact that while the information
reflected the commission of illegal recruitment in large scale, only the complaint of the two of
the five complainants was proven.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals correctly synthesized the evidence presented by the parties
as follows:

[The evidence for the prosecution] shows that sometime in August and September 1984,
accused-appellant approached private complainants Necitas Ferre and Narciso Corpus
individually and invited them to apply for overseas employment in Dubai. The accused-
appellant being their neighbor, private complainants agreed and went to the former’s office.
This office which bore the business name "Bayside Manpower Export Specialist" was in a
building situated at Bautista St. Buendia, Makati, Metro Manila. In that office, private
complainants gave certain amounts to appellant for processing and other fees. Ferre gave
P1,000.00 as processing fee (Exhibit A) and another P4,000.00 (Exhibit B). Likewise,
Corpus gave appellant P7,000.00 (Exhibit D). Appellant then told private complainants that
they were scheduled to leave for Dubai on September 8, 1984. However, private
complainants and all the other applicants were not able to depart on the said date as their
employer allegedly did not arrive. Thus, their departure was rescheduled to September 23,
but the result was the same. Suspecting that they were being hoodwinked, private
complainants demanded of appellant to return their money. Except for the refund of
P1,000.00 to Ferre, appellant was not able to return private complainants’ money. Tired of
excuses, private complainants filed the present case for illegal recruitment against the
accused-appellant.

To prove that accused-appellant had no authority to recruit workers for overseas

employment, the prosecution presented Jose Valeriano, a Senior Overseas Employment
Officer of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA), who testified that accused-
appellant was neither licensed nor authorized by the then Ministry of Labor and Employment
to recruit workers for overseas employment.

For her defense, appellant denied ever approaching private complainants to recruit them for
employment in Dubai. On the contrary, it was the private complainants who asked her help
in securing jobs abroad. As a good neighbor and friend, she brought the private
complainants to the Bayside Manpower Export Specialist agency because she knew
Florante Hinahon, 5 the owner of the said agency. While accused-appellant admitted that
she received money from the private complainants, she was quick to point out that she
received the same only in trust for delivery to the agency. She denied being part of the
agency either as an owner or employee thereof. To corroborate appellant’s testimony,
Milagros Cuadra, who was also an applicant and a companion of private complainants,
testified that appellant did not recruit them. On the contrary, they were the ones who asked
help from appellant. To further bolster the defense, Eriberto C. Tabing, the accountant and
cashier of the agency, testified that appellant is not connected with the agency and that he
saw appellant received money from the applicants but she turned them over to the agency
through either Florantino Hinahon or Luzviminda Marcos. 6 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

In light thereof, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court but modified the
penalty imposed due to the trial court’s failure to apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

The appellate court thus disposed:

WHEREFORE, finding no merit in the appeal, this Court DISMISSES it and AFFIRMS the
appealed Decision EXCEPT the penalty x x x which is hereby changed to five (5) years as
minimum to seven (7) years as maximum with perpetual disqualification from engaging in the
business of recruitment and placement of workers. 7 (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, 8 the present petition was filed,
faulting the appellate court

x x x IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE COMPLAINING

WITNESSES, [AND]

II

x x x IN FINDING THE PETITIONER-ACCUSED GUILTY WHEN THE PROSECUTION

FAILED TO PROVE HER GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 9 (Underscoring
supplied)

Petitioner bewails the failure of the trial court and the Court of Appeals to credit the
testimonies of her witnesses, her companion Milagros Cuadra, and Eriberto C. Tabing who
is an accountant-cashier of the agency.

Further, petitioner assails the trial court’s and the appellate court’s failure to consider that the
provisional receipts she issued indicated that the amounts she collected from the private
complainants were turned over to the agency through Minda Marcos and Florante Hinahon.
At any rate, she draws attention to People v. Señoron 10 wherein this Court held that the
issuance or signing of receipts for placement fees does not make a case for illegal
recruitment. 11

The petition fails.

Articles 38 and 39 of the Labor Code, the legal provisions applicable when the offense
charged was committed, 12 provided:

ART. 38. Illegal Recruitment. – (a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited
practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or
non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this
Code. x x x
Article 39. Penalties. – x x x x

(c) Any person who is neither a licensee nor a holder of authority under this Title found
violating any provision thereof or its implementing rules and regulations shall, upon
conviction thereof, suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four years nor more
than eight years or a fine of not less than P20,000 nor more than P100,000 or both such
imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of the court;

x x x x (Underscoring supplied)

The elements of the offense of illegal recruitment, which must concur, are: (1) that the
offender has no valid license or authority required by law to lawfully engage in recruitment
and placement of workers; and (2) that the offender undertakes any activity within the
meaning of recruitment and placement under Article 13(b), or any prohibited practices
enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code. 13 If another element is present that the
accused commits the act against three or more persons, individually or as a group, it
becomes an illegal recruitment in a large scale. 14

Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defines "recruitment and placement" as "[a]ny act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and
includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not." (Underscoring supplied)

That the first element is present in the case at bar, there is no doubt. Jose Valeriano, Senior
Overseas Employment Officer of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration,
testified that the records of the POEA do not show that petitioner is authorized to recruit
workers for overseas employment. 15 A Certification to that effect was in fact issued by
Hermogenes C. Mateo, Chief of the Licensing Division of POEA. 16

Petitioner’s disclaimer of having engaged in recruitment activities from the very start does
not persuade in light of the evidence for the prosecution. In People v. Alvarez, this Court
held:

Appellant denies that she engaged in acts of recruitment and placement without first
complying with the guidelines issued by the Department of Labor and Employment. She
contends that she did not possess any license for recruitment, because she never engaged
in such activity.

We are not persuaded. In weighing contradictory declarations and statements, greater

weight must be given to the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses than to the
denial of the defendant. Article 38 (a) clearly shows that illegal recruitment is an offense that
is essentially committed by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority. A non-licensee means
any person, corporation or entity to which the labor secretary has not issued a valid license
or authority to engage in recruitment and placement; or whose license or authority has been
suspended, revoked or cancelled by the POEA or the labor secretary. A license authorizes a
person or an entity to operate a private employment agency, while authority is given to those
engaged in recruitment and placement activities.
xxxx

That appellant in this case had been neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for
overseas employment was certified by Veneranda C. Guerrero, officer-in-charge of the
Licensing and Regulation Office; and Ma. Salome S. Mendoza, manager of the Licensing
Branch – both of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration. Yet, as complainants
convincingly proved, she recruited them for jobs in Taiwan. 17 (Italics in the original;
underscoring supplied)

The second element is doubtless also present. The act of referral, which is included in
recruitment, 18 is "the act of passing along or forwarding of an applicant for employment
after an initial interview of a selected applicant for employment to a selected employer,
placement officer or bureau." 19 Petitioner’s admission that she brought private
complainants to the agency whose owner she knows and her acceptance of fees including
those for processing betrays her guilt.

That petitioner issued provisional receipts indicating that the amounts she received from the
private complainants were turned over to Luzviminda Marcos and Florante Hinahon does not
free her from liability. For the act of recruitment may be "for profit or not." It is sufficient that
the accused "promises or offers for a fee employment" to warrant conviction for illegal
recruitment. 20 As the appellate court stated:

x x x Sec. 13(b) of P.D. 442 [The Labor Code] does not require that the recruiter receives
and keeps the placement money for himself or herself. For as long as a person who has no
license to engage in recruitment of workers for overseas employment offers for a fee an
employment to two or more persons, then he or she is guilty of illegal recruitment. 21

Parenthetically, why petitioner accepted the payment of fees from the private complainants
when, in light of her claim that she merely brought them to the agency, she could have
advised them to directly pay the same to the agency, she proferred no explanation.

On petitioner’s reliance on Señoron, 22 true, this Court held that issuance of receipts for
placement fees does not make a case for illegal recruitment. But it went on to state that it is
"rather the undertaking of recruitment activities without the necessary license or authority"
that makes a case for illegal recruitment. 23

A word on the penalty. Indeed, the trial court failed to apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law
which also applies to offenses punished by special laws.

Thus, Section 1 of Act No. 4103 (An Act to Provide for an Indeterminate Sentence and
Parole for All Persons Convicted of Certain Crimes by the Courts of the Philippine Islands;
To Create A Board of Indeterminate Sentence and to Provide Funds Therefor; and for Other
Purposes) provides:

SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the

Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and
the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by
the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not
exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum
term prescribed by the same. (As amended by Act No. 4225) (Underscoring supplied)

While the penalty of imprisonment imposed by the appellate court is within the prescribed
penalty for the offense, its addition of "perpetual disqualification from engaging in the
business of recruitment and placement of workers" is not part thereof. Such additional
penalty must thus be stricken off.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the accessory penalty imposed by it
consisting of "perpetual disqualification from engaging in the business of recruitment and
placement of workers" is DELETED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

CASE:

[G.R. No. 125903. November 15, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMULO SAULO, AMELIA DE

LA CRUZ, and CLODUALDO DE LA CRUZ, accused.

ROMULO SAULO, accused-appellant.

DECISION

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Accused-appellant, together with Amelia de la Cruz and Clodualdo de la Cruz, were charged
with violation of Article 38 (b) of the Labor Code[1] for illegal recruitment in large scale in an
information which states

CRIM. CASE NO. Q-91-21911

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses ROMULO SAULO, AMELIA DE LA

CRUZ and CLODUALDO DE LA CRUZ, of the crime of ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN
LARGE SCALE (ART. 38(b) in relation to Art. 39(a) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as
amended by P.D. No. 2018, committed as follows:

That on or about the period comprised from April 1990 to May 1990 in Quezon City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, by falsely
representing themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist and recruit workers for
employment abroad, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously for a fee, recruit
and promise employment/job placement abroad to LEODEGARIO MAULLON, BENY
MALIGAYA and ANGELES JAVIER, without first securing the required license or authority
from the Department of Labor and Employment, in violation of said law.

That the crime described above is committed in large scale as the same was perpetrated
against three (3) persons individually or as [a] group penalized under Articles 38 and 39 as
amended by PD 2018 of the Labor Code (P.D. 442).

CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]

In addition, accused were charged with three counts of estafa (Criminal Case Nos. Q-91-
21908, Q-91-21909 and Q-91-21910). Except for the names of the complainants, the dates
of commission of the crime charged, and the amounts involved, the informations[3] were
identical in their allegations

CRIM. CASE NO. Q-91-21908

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses ROMULO SAULO, AMELIA DE LA

CRUZ AND CLODUALDO DE LA CRUZ of the crime of ESTAFA (Art. 315, par. 2 (a) RPC),
committed as follows:

That on or about the period comprised from April 1990 to May 1990, in Quezon City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, with intent of gain,
by means of false pretenses and/or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with
the commission of the fraud, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
one BENY MALIGAYA, in the following manner, to wit: on the date and in the place
aforementioned, accused falsely pretended to the offended party that they had connection
and capacity to deploy workers for overseas employment and that they could secure
employment/placement for said Beny Maligaya and believing said misrepresentations, the
offended party was later induced to give accused, as in fact she did give the total amount of
P35,000.00, Philippine Currency, and once in possession of the said amount and far from
complying with their commitment and despite repeated demands made upon them to return
said amount, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with intent to
defraud, misappropriate, misapply and convert the same to their own personal use and
benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said offended party in the aforementioned amount
and in such amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to all the charges against him.
Meanwhile accused Amelia de la Cruz and Clodualdo de la Cruz have remained at large.

During trial, the prosecution sought to prove the following material facts and circumstances
surrounding the commission of the crimes:
Benny Maligaya, having learned from a relative of accused-appellant that the latter was
recruiting workers for Taiwan, went to accused-appellants house in San Francisco del
Monte, Quezon City, together with Angeles Javier and Amelia de la Cruz, in order to discuss
her chances for overseas employment. During that meeting which took place sometime in
April or May, 1990, accused-appellant told Maligaya that she would be able to leave for
Taiwan as a factory worker once she gave accused-appellant the fees for the processing of
her documents. Sometime in May, 1990, Maligaya also met with Amelia de la Cruz and
Clodualdo de la Cruz at their house in Baesa, Quezon City and they assured her that they
were authorized by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) to recruit
workers for Taiwan. Maligaya paid accused-appellant and Amelia de la Cruz the amount of
P35,000.00, which is evidenced by a receipt dated May 21, 1990 signed by accused-
appellant and Amelia de la Cruz (Exhibit A in Crim. Case No. Q-91-21908). Seeing that he
had reneged on his promise to send her to Taiwan, Maligaya filed a complaint against
accused-appellant with the POEA.[4]

Angeles Javier, a widow and relative by affinity of accused-appellant, was told by Ligaya,
accused-appellants wife, to apply for work abroad through accused-appellant. At a meeting
in accused-appellants Quezon City residence, Javier was told by accused-appellant that he
could get her a job in Taiwan as a factory worker and that she should give him P35,000.00
for purposes of preparing Javiers passport. Javier gave an initial amount of P20,000.00 to
accused-appellant, but she did not ask for a receipt as she trusted him. As the overseas
employment never materialized, Javier was prompted to bring the matter before the
POEA.[5]

On April 19, 1990, Leodigario Maullon, upon the invitation of his neighbor Araceli Sanchez,
went to accused-appellants house in order to discuss his prospects for gaining employment
abroad. As in the case of Maligaya and Javier, accused-appellant assured Maullon that he
could secure him a job as a factory worker in Taiwan if he paid him P30,000.00 for the
processing of his papers. Maullon paid P7,900.00 to accused-appellants wife, who issued a
receipt dated April 21, 1990 (Exhibit A in Crim. Case No. Q-91-21910). Thereafter, Maullon
paid an additional amount of P6,800.00 in the presence of accused-appellant and Amelia de
la Cruz, which payment is also evidenced by a receipt dated April 25, 1990 (Exhibit B in
Crim. Case No. Q-91-21910). Finally, Maullon paid P15,700.00 to a certain Loreta Tumalig,
a friend of accused-appellant, as shown by a receipt dated September 14, 1990 (Exhibit C in
Crim. Case No. Q-91-21910). Again, accused-appellant failed to deliver on the promised
employment. Maullon thus filed a complaint with the POEA.[6]

The prosecution also presented a certification dated July 26, 1994 issued by the POEA
stating that accused are not licensed to recruit workers for overseas employment (Exhibit A
in Crim. Case No. Q-91-21911).[7]

In his defense, accused-appellant claimed that he was also applying with Amelia de la Cruz
for overseas employment. He asserts that it was for this reason that he met all three
complainants as they all went together to Amelia de la Cruz house in Novaliches, Quezon
City sometime in May, 1990 in order to follow up their applications. Accused-appellant flatly
denied that he was an overseas employment recruiter or that he was working as an agent for
one. He also denied having received any money from any of the complainants or having
signed any of the receipts introduced by the prosecution in evidence. It is accused-
appellants contention that the complainants were prevailed upon by accused-appellants
mother-in-law, with whom he had a misunderstanding, to file the present cases against
him.[8]

The trial court found accused-appellant guilty of three counts of estafa and of illegal
recruitment in large scale. It adjudged:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Romulo Saulo:

A. In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21908, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa under Article
315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code as amended, without any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, and this Court hereby sentences the accused Romulo Saulo to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of three (3) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day of prision correccional as minimum to seven (7) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Beny Maligaya in the amount of
P35,000.00, with interest thereon at 12% per annum until the said amount is fully paid, with
costs against the said accused.

B. In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21909, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa under Article
315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code as amended, without any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, and this Court hereby sentences the accused Romulo Saulo to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Angeles Javier in the amount of P20,000.00
with interest thereon at 12% per annum until the said amount is fully paid, with costs against
said accused.

C. In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21910, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa under Article
315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code as amended, without any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, and this Court hereby sentences the accused Romulo Saulo to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Leodigario Maullon in the amount of
P30,400.00 with interest thereon at 12% per annum until the said amount is fully paid, with
costs against said accused.

D. In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21911, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment
in Large Scale as defined and punished under Article 38 (b) in relation to Article 39 (a) of the
Labor Code of the Philippines as amended, and this Court sentences the accused Romulo
Saulo to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00).

Being a detention prisoner, the accused Romulo Saulo shall be entitled to the benefits of
Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code as amended.

SO ORDERED.[9]

The Court finds no merit in the instant appeal.

The essential elements of illegal recruitment in large scale, as defined in Art. 38 (b) of the
Labor Code and penalized under Art. 39 of the same Code, are as follows:

(1) the accused engages in the recruitment and placement of workers, as defined under
Article 13 (b) or in any prohibited activities under Article 34 of the Labor Code;

(2) accused has not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, particularly with respect to the securing of a license or an authority to recruit
and deploy workers, whether locally or overseas; and

(3) accused commits the same against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a
group.[10]

Under Art. 13 (b) of the Labor Code, recruitment and placement refers to any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and
includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not; Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner,
offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in
recruitment and placement.

After a careful and circumspect review of the records, the Court finds that the trial court was
justified in holding that accused-appellant was engaged in unlawful recruitment and
placement activities. The prosecution clearly established that accused-appellant promised
the three complainants - Benny Maligaya, Angeles Javier and Leodigario Maullon
employment in Taiwan as factory workers and that he asked them for money in order to
process their papers and procure their passports. Relying completely upon such
representations, complainants entrusted their hard-earned money to accused-appellant in
exchange for what they would later discover to be a vain hope of obtaining employment
abroad. It is not disputed that accused-appellant is not authorized[11] nor licensed[12] by the
Department of Labor and Employment to engage in recruitment and placement activities.
The absence of the necessary license or authority renders all of accused-appellants
recruitment activities criminal.

Accused-appellant interposes a denial in his defense, claiming that he never received any
money from the complainants nor processed their papers. Instead, accused-appellant insists
that he was merely a co-applicant of the complainants and similarly deceived by the
schemes of Amelia and Clodualdo de la Cruz. He contends that the fact that Benny Maligaya
and Angleles Javier went to the house of Amelia and Clodualdo de la Cruz in Novaliches,
Quezon City, to get back their money and to follow-up their application proves that
complainants knew that it was the de la Cruz who received the processing fees, and not
accused-appellant. Further, accused-appellant argues that complainants could not have
honestly believed that he could get them their passports since they did not give him any of
the necessary documents, such as their birth certificate, baptismal certificate, NBI clearance,
and marriage contract.

Accused-appellants asseverations are self-serving and uncorroborated by clear and

convincing evidence. They cannot stand against the straightforward and explicit testimonies
of the complainants, who have identified accused-appellant as the person who enticed them
to part with their money upon his representation that he had the capability of obtaining
employment for them abroad. In the absence of any evidence that the prosecution witnesses
were motivated by improper motives, the trial courts assessment of the credibility of the
witnesses shall not be interfered with by this Court.[13]

The fact that accused-appellant did not sign all the receipts issued to complainants does not
weaken the case of the prosecution. A person charged with illegal recruitment may be
convicted on the strength of the testimonies of the complainants, if found to be credible and
convincing.[14] The absence of receipts to evidence payment does not warrant an acquittal
of the accused, and it is not necessarily fatal to the prosecutions cause.[15]

Accused-appellant contends that he could not have committed the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale since Nancy Avelino, a labor and employment officer at the POEA,
testified that licenses for recruitment and placement are issued only to corporations and not
to natural persons. This argument is specious and illogical. The Labor Code states that any
person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or
more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.[16] Corrolarily, a
nonlicensee or nonholder of authority is any person, corporation or entity which has not been
issued a valid license or authority to engage in recruitment and placement by the Secretary
of Labor, or whose license or authority has been suspended, revoked, or canceled by the
POEA or the Secretary.[17] It also bears stressing that agents or representatives appointed
by a licensee or a holder of authority but whose appointments are not previously authorized
by the POEA fall within the meaning of the term nonlicensee or nonholder of authority.[18]
Thus, any person, whether natural or juridical, that engages in recruitment activities without
the necessary license or authority shall be penalized under Art. 39 of the Labor Code.

It is well established in jurisprudence that a person may be charged and convicted for both
illegal recruitment and estafa. The reason for this is that illegal recruitment is a malum
prohibitum, whereas estafa is malum in se, meaning that the criminal intent of the accused is
not necessary for conviction in the former, but is required in the latter.[19]

The elements of estafa under Art. 315, paragraph 2 (a), of the Revised Penal Code are: (1)
that the accused has defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by deceit, and (2) that
damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third
person.[20] The trial court was correct in holding accused-appellant liable for estafa in the
case at bench. Owing to accused-appellants false assurances that he could provide them
with work in another country, complainants parted with their money, to their damage and
prejudice, since the promised employment never materialized.

Under Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the crime of estafa is as follows:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000
pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph
shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos;
but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases,
and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the provisions
of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case
may be.

xxx xxx xxx

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty shall be that
which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised
Penal Code, and the minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed for the offense. Since the penalty prescribed by law for the estafa charge against
accused-appellant is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty
next lower in degree is prision correccional minimum to medium. Thus, the minimum term of
the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere within six (6) months and one (1) day to
four (4) years and two (2) months.

In fixing the maximum term, the prescribed penalty of prision correccional maximum to
prision mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions of time, each of which
portion shall be deemed to form one period, as follows

Minimum Period : From 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 5 years, 5 months and 10 days

Medium Period : From 5 years, 5 months and 11 days to 6 years, 8 months and 20 days

Maximum Period : From 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years

pursuant to Article 65, in relation to Article 64, of the Revised Penal Code.

When the amounts involved in the offense exceeds P22,000, the penalty prescribed in
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one
year for each additional P10,000.00, although the total penalty which may be imposed shall
not exceed twenty (20) years.[21]

Accordingly, the following penalties shall be imposed upon accused-appellant:

In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21908 where accused-appellant defrauded Benny Maligaya in

the amount of P35,000.00, one year for the additional amount of P13,000.00 in excess of
P22,000.00 provided for in Article 315 shall be added to the maximum period of the
prescribed penalty of prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum. Thus,
accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, and two (2)
months of prision correccional medium, as minimum to nine (9) years of prision mayor as
maximum.[22] Accused-appellant shall also pay Benny Maligaya P35,000.00 by way of
actual damages.

In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21909 where accused-appellant defrauded Angeles Javier in the
amount of P20,000.00, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of one (1)
year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum to five (5)
years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional maximum. Accused-
appellant shall also pay Angeles Javier P20,000.00 by way of actual damages.
In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21910 where accused-appellant defrauded Leodigario Maullon in
the amount of P30,400.00, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as minimum to eight (8) years
of prision mayor, as maximum.[23] Accused-appellant shall also pay Leodigario Maullon
P30,400.00 by way of actual damages.

In addition, for the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale (Criminal Case No. Q-91-21911)
and pursuant to Article 39 (a) of the Labor Code, accused-appellant shall suffer the penalty
of life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).

WHEREFORE, the March 6, 1996 Decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa is
hereby AFFIRMED subject to the following modifications:

In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21908 where accused-appellant defrauded Benny Maligaya in

the amount of P35,000.00, one year for the additional amount of P13,000.00 in excess of
P22,000.00 provided for in Article 315 shall be added to the maximum period of the
prescribed penalty of prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum. Thus,
accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, and two (2)
months of prision correccional medium, as minimum to nine (9) years of prision mayor as
maximum. Accused-appellant shall also pay Benny Maligaya P35,000.00 by way of actual
damages.

In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21909 where accused-appellant defrauded Angeles Javier in the
amount of P20,000.00, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of one (1)
year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum to five (5)
years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional maximum. Accused-
appellant shall also pay Angeles Javier P20,000.00 by way of actual damages.

In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21910 where accused-appellant defrauded Leodigario Maullon in

the amount of P30,400.00, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as minimum to eight (8) years
of prision mayor, as maximum. Accused-appellant shall also pay Leodigario Maullon
P30,400.00 by way of actual damages.

In addition, for the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale (Criminal Case No. Q-91-21911)
and pursuant to Article 39 (a) of the Labor Code, accused-appellant shall suffer the penalty
of life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).

Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

CASE:

C.F. SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC.,

Petitioner
- versus -

HON. UNDERSECRETARY JOSE M. ESPANOL, JR., HON. SECRETARY LEONARDO A.

QUISUMBING and RIZAL INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING SERVICES,

Respondents.

G.R. No. 155903

Promulgated:

September 14, 2007

The petitioner C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. (C.F. Sharp) appeals by certiorari the
April 30, 2002 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 53747 and the
November 5, 2002 Resolution[2] denying its reconsideration.

In 1991, Louis Cruise Lines (LCL), a foreign corporation duly organized and existing under
the laws of Cyprus, entered into a Crewing Agreement[3] with Papadopolous Shipping, Ltd.
(PAPASHIP). PAPASHIP in turn appointed private respondent Rizal International Shipping
Services (Rizal) as manning agency in the Philippines, recruiting Filipino seamen for LCLs
vessel.

On October 3, 1996, LCL terminated the Crewing Agreement with PAPASHIP to take effect
on December 31, 1996. It then appointed C.F. Sharp as crewing agent in the Philippines.
C.F. Sharp requested for accreditation as the new manning agency of LCL with the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), but Rizal objected on the ground
that its accreditation still existed and would only expire on December 31, 1996.

Pending approval of the accreditation, Theodoros Savva and Adrias Tjiakouris of LCL
arrived in the Philippines and conducted a series of interviews for seafarers at C.F. Sharps
office. Rizal reported LCLs recruitment activities to the POEA on December 9, 1996, and
requested an ocular inspection of C.F. Sharps premises.

On December 17, 1996, POEA representatives conducted an inspection and found Savva
and Tjiakouris at C.F. Sharp interviewing and recruiting hotel staffs, cooks, and chefs for M/V
Cyprus, with scheduled deployment in January 1997.[4] The Inspection Report[5] signed by
Corazon Aquino of the POEA and countersigned by Mr. Reynaldo Banawis of C.F. Sharp
was thereafter submitted to the POEA.

On January 2, 1997, Rizal filed a complaint[6] for illegal recruitment, cancellation or

revocation of license, and blacklisting against LCL and C.F. Sharp with the POEA, docketed
as POEA Case No. RV-97-01-004. Then, on January 31, 1997, Rizal filed a Supplemental
Complaint[7] adding violation of Section 29 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, for
designating and/or appointing agents, representatives and employees, without prior approval
from the POEA.

For its part, C.F. Sharp admitted that Savva and Tjiakouris conducted interviews at C.F.
Sharps office, but denied that they were for recruitment and selection purposes. According to
C.F. Sharp, the interviews were held for LCLs ex-crew members who had various complaints
against Rizal. It belittled the inspection report of the POEA inspection team claiming that it
simply stated that interviews and recruitment were undertaken, without reference to who
were conducting the interview and for what vessels.[8] C.F. Sharp also averred that Rizal
was guilty of forum shopping, and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on this ground
and for its lack of merit. [9]

The POEA Administrator was not persuaded and found C.F. Sharp liable for illegal
recruitment. According to the Administrator, the inspection report of Ms. Aquino established
that Savva and Tjiakouris had conducted, and, at the time of the inspection, had been
conducting interviews, selection and hiring for LCL, without any authority from the POEA.
The Administrator also held that C.F. Sharp violated Section 29 of the Labor Code when it
designated officers and agents without prior approval of the POEA. [10]

Thus, the Administrator disposed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondent CF Sharp Agency is as it is hereby

ordered suspended for a period of six (6) months or in lieu thereof, it is ordered to pay a fine
of P50,000.00 for violation of Art. 29 of the Labor Code, as amended in relation to Sec. 6(b),
Rule II, Book II of the Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment in
accordance with the schedule of penalties.

Further, the respondent CF Sharp is as it is hereby ordered suspended for another period of
[eighteen] (18) months or to pay the fine of P180,000.00 for committing 9 counts of violation
of Article 29 of the Labor Code as amended in relation to Sec. 2(k), Rule I, Book VI of the
Rules and Regulations governing Overseas Employment.

The period of suspension shall be served cummulatively (sic).

The charges of violation of Sec. 6(b) of RA 8042 are hereby referred to the Anti-Illegal
Recruitment Branch for appropriate action.

SO ORDERED.[11]

C.F. Sharp elevated the Administrators ruling to the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE). On December 19, 1997, the then Secretary of Labor, Leonardo A. Quisumbing,[12]
issued an Order,[13] ruling that:

WHEREFORE, except as above MODIFIED, the Order dated March 13, 1997 of the POEA
Administrator is AFFIRMED.

Accordingly, the C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. is hereby found guilty of having
violated Sec. 6, R.A. 8042 in relation to Article 13 (b) and (f), and Article 16 of the Labor
Code as amended; Rule II (jj), Book I and Sec 1 and 6, Rule I, Book II, POEA Rules and
Regulations Governing Overseas Employment, for having conspired and confederated with
the [Louis] Cruise Lines, Theodorus Savva and Andrias (sic) Tjiakouris in the recruitment of
seafarers for LCLs ships, before it was duly accredited by POEA as the manning agency of
LCL, thus a non-holder of authority at the time. The penalty imposed against it of suspension
of its license for six (6) months or in lieu thereof, to pay a fine of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00), is AFFIRMED.

Further, C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. is hereby found guilty of one (1) count of
violation of Art. 29 of the Labor Code in relation to Sec. 2 (k), Rule I, Book VI of the Rules
and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment, and is imposed the penalty of two (2)
months suspension of its license or in lieu thereof, to pay a fine of P20,000.00.

The penalties of suspension for both violations shall be served cumulatively.

Out of the P230,000.00 cash supersedeas bond posted by the petitioner-appellant, let the
amount of P160,000.00 be released and refunded to it, retaining P70,000.00 to be applied to
the payment of the fines as imposed above, should the petitioner opt to pay the fine instead
of undergoing suspension of its license. However, the suspension shall remain in force until
such fine is paid, or in the event that the petitioner-appellant further appeals this Order.

The charge and finding of violation of Sec. 6 (b) of R.A. 8042 are hereby referred to the Anti-
Illegal Recruitment Branch for appropriate action.

SO ORDERED.[14]

C.F. Sharps motion for reconsideration having been denied on February 5, 1999 by the then
Undersecretary, Jose M. Espanol, Jr.,[15] it elevated the case to this Court on petition for
certiorari, with the case docketed as G.R. No. 137573. But, in the June 16, 1999 Resolution,
this Court referred the petition to the CA.

In the meantime, on April 15, 1999, C.F. Sharp requested the lifting of the suspension
decreed by the Secretary of Labor in his December 19, 1997 Order,[16] which was granted
by Deputy Administrator for Licensing and Adjudication Valentin C. Guanio. C.F. Sharp was
allowed to deploy seafarers for its principals.

Consequently, on April 30, 2002, the CA denied C.F. Sharps petition for certiorari,[17]
holding that C.F. Sharp was already estopped from assailing the Secretary of Labors ruling
because it had manifested its option to have the cash bond posted answer for the alternative
fines imposed upon it. By paying the adjudged fines, C.F. Sharp effectively executed the
judgment, having acquiesced to, and ratified the execution of the assailed Orders of the
Secretary of Labor. The CA also agreed with the POEA Administrator and the Secretary of
Labor that Savva and Tjiakouris of LCL, along with C.F. Sharp, undertook recruitment
activities on December 7, 9 to 12, 1996, sans any authority. Finally, it affirmed both labor
officials finding that C.F. Sharp violated Article 29 of the Labor Code and Section 2(k), Rule
I, Book VI of the POEA Rules when it appointed Henry Desiderio as agent, without prior
approval from the POEA. Thus, the appellate court declared that the Secretary of Labor
acted well within his discretion in holding C.F. Sharp liable for illegal recruitment.

C.F. Sharp filed a motion for reconsideration,[18] but the CA denied it on November 25,
2002.[19]
Hence, this appeal, positing these issues:

A. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN RULING THAT

PETITIONER IS IN ESTOPPEL IN QUESTIONING THE ORDER DATED DECEMBER 19,
1997 AND THE RESOLUTION DATED FEBRUARY 5, 1999.

B. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED WHEN IT RULED

THAT PETITIONER IS LIABLE FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 6[,] R.A. NO. 8042 IN
RELATION TO ARTICLE 13 (b) and (f) AND ARTICLE 66 (sic) OF THE LABOR CODE AS
AMENDED; RULE II (jj) BOOK I; AND SECTIONS 1 AND 6, RULE I, BOOK III POEA
RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RULED

THAT PETITIONER IS LIABLE FOR VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 29 OF THE LABOR CODE,
AS AMENDED, IN RELATION TO SECTION II (k)[,] RULE I, BOOK VI OF THE RULES
AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT.[20]

C.F. Sharp faults the CA for ruling that petitioner is estopped from questioning the
resolutions of the Secretary of Labor. It denied that it voluntarily executed, or acquiesced to,
the assailed resolutions of the Secretary.

The general rule is that when a judgment has been satisfied, it passes beyond review,
satisfaction being the last act and the end of the proceedings, and payment or satisfaction of
the obligation thereby established produces permanent and irrevocable discharge; hence, a
judgment debtor who acquiesces to and voluntarily complies with the judgment is estopped
from taking an appeal therefrom.[21]

In holding C.F. Sharp in estoppel, the CA apparently relied on the April 15, 1999 Order of the
POEA, and, thus, declared:

[P]etitioner C.F. Sharp had already manifested its option to have the cash bond posted as
an answer for the alternative fines imposed in the Orders dated December 19, 1997 as
stated in the Order dated April 15, 1999 of the POEA, Adjudication Office x x x. Thus, for
voluntary execution of the Order of the Secretary of DOLE dated December 19, 1997 by
paying the adjudged fines, the petitioner was then estopped from assailing such Order
before Us by way of petition for certiorari. Where a party voluntarily executes, partially or
totally a judgment or acquiesces or ratifies the execution of the same, he is estopped from
appealing therefrom. x x x.[22]

The April 15, 1999 Order of Deputy Commissioner Valentin C. Guanio reads:

Respondent C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc., thru counsel having manifested its option
to have the cash bond posted answer for the alternative fines imposed in the above-entitled
case; the alternative suspension imposed in the Order of the Secretary dated December 19,
1997 is hereby Lifted.

SO ORDERED.[23]
This Order was issued in response to C.F. Sharps request to lift the suspension decree of
the Secretary of Labor. The request stated, viz.:

[W]e write in behalf of our client, C.F. Sharp Crew Management Inc., regarding the Advice
To Operating Units dated April 15, 1999, which arose from the Decision of the Office of the
Secretary of Labor in the case entitled C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. versus Rizal
Shipping and docketed as RV 97-01-004.

In this connection, we would like to express our option to have the cash bond posted by us in
the case entitled C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. versus Rizal Shipping and docketed as
RV 97-01-044 to answer for any fine that the Supreme Court may finally decide that our
client should pay in the Case entitled, C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. vs. Secretary
Leonardo Quisumbing and Rizal International Shipping Services and docketed as G.R. No.
137573.

Under the circumstances, it is most respectfully requested that the aforesaid advice be
RECALLED and that a clearance be issued in favor of our client, C.F. Sharp Crew
Management, Inc.

Hoping for your immediate and favorable action on the matter.[24] (Emphasis supplied)

C.F. Sharps letter was explicit that the cash bond posted would be answerable for any fine
that it may ultimately be held liable to pay by virtue of a final decision. In fact, on March 25,
1999, prior to the filing of the above-quoted letter-request, C.F. Sharp had already filed a
petition for certiorari assailing the Orders of the Secretary of Labor. Furthermore, there is no
showing that the assailed Order of then Secretary Quisumbing was indeed executed to
warrant the appellate courts conclusion that C.F. Sharp was estopped from assailing the
said Order. Clearly, there is no basis for the CA to rule that C.F. Sharp voluntarily executed,
or acquiesced to, the execution of the unfavorable ruling of the Secretary of Labor.

The first issue having been settled, we now resolve whether C.F. Sharp is liable for illegal
recruitment.
C.F. Sharp denies committing illegal recruitment activities in December 1996. It posits that
the interviews undertaken by Savva and Tjiakouris do not amount to illegal recruitment under
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 or the Migrants Workers Act. Further, it contends that the
interviews conducted were not for selection and recruitment purposes, but were in
connection with the seamens past employment with Rizal, specifically, their complaints for
non-remittance of SSS premiums, withholding of wages, illegal exactions from medical
examinations and delayed allotments. It claims that it was only upon approval of its
application for accreditation that the employment contracts were entered into and actual
deployment of the seamen was made. C.F. Sharp, thus, concludes that it cannot be held
liable for illegal recruitment.

The reasoning is specious.

Undoubtedly, in December 1996, LCL had no approved POEA license to recruit. C.F. Sharps
accreditation as LCLs new manning agency was still pending approval at that time. Yet
Savva and Tjiakouris, along with C.F. Sharp, entertained applicants for LCLs vessels, and
conducted preparatory interviews.

Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as:

any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring

workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment,
locally or abroad whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which in any
manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed
engaged in recruitment and placement.

On the basis of this definition and contrary to what C.F. Sharp wants to portray - the conduct
of preparatory interviews is a recruitment activity.

The fact that C.F. Sharp did not receive any payment during the interviews is of no moment.
From the language of Article 13(b), the act of recruitment may be for profit or not. Notably, it
is the lack of the necessary license or authority, not the fact of payment, that renders the
recruitment activity of LCL unlawful.

C.F. Sharps claim that the interviews were not for selection and recruitment purposes does
not impress. As the Secretary of Labor aptly said:

This Office cannot conceive of a good reason why LCL/Savva/Tjiakouris should be

interested at the time in unearthing alleged violations committed by Rizal Shipping whose
representative status as manning agency was to be terminated in just a few weeks
thereafter, spending valuable time and money in the process. They stood to gain nothing
from such taxing exercise involving several hundreds of ex-crew members, which could be
handled by government agencies like the POEA, NLRC, SSS. The observation of the POEA
Administrator that the complaints of the crewmen were filed only after Rizal Shipping filed its
complaints with the POEA merely to bolster the defense of CF Sharp/LCL/Savva and
Tjiakouris, is telling.

Upon the other hand, it was more to LCLS gain to interview, select and recruit the
disembarking crewmen previously recruited by Rizal Shipping, using CF Sharps facilities, as
this would result in less recruitment time and cost.

Finally, the claim of Savva and Tjiakouris that Savva talked to the POEA representative
during their visit about these interviews and the violations which were confirmed, is just an
afterthought to support their defense; there is no entry in the Inspection Report confirming
such claim. If such claim were true, then the able officer of CF Sharp (LCLs Attorney-in fact)
who signed his conformity on the 4th page of the report, and put his initial on the last page of
the report containing the handwritten findings of the inspectors on the selection and
recruitment activities of Savva and Tjiakouris, would have insisted that an entry be made
thereon about what Savva told the inspectors, or he could simply himself have written
thereon that the two LCL officials merely conducted interviews on the violations committed
by Rizal Shipping. However, the report is bereft of anything to that effect. More significant is
the fact that the inspectors, in their Memorandum dated December 11, 1996 (the very same
day they conducted the inspection), stated that they approached said persons (referring to
Banawis, Savva and Tjiakouris) and told us that they were doing interview to select
applicants to complement the crew of a passenger ship for [LOUIS] CRUISE LINES.[25]

Indeed, it was Savva and Tjiakouris that conducted the interviews, and undertook selection
and hiring. However, C.F. Sharp cannot steer clear of liability for it conspired with LCL in
committing illegal recruitment activities. As the Secretary of Labor had taken pains to
demonstrate:

x x x [T]here is substantial evidence on record that as alleged by Rizal Shipping, CF Sharp

conspired with LCL and its officers Savva and Tjiakouris to conduct recruitment activities in
its offices, at a time when LCL was not yet its POEA-accredited principal, in violation of Sec.
6, R.A. 8042 in relation to Article 13(b) and (f) and Article 16 of the Labor Code as amended;
Rule II(jj) Book I, and Sec. 1 and 6, Rule I, Book III, all of the POEA Rules and Regulations
Governing Overseas Employment.

Indeed, C.F. Sharp was aware of these violations when it alleged in its Petition for Review
that:

in any and all events, the findings relied upon by the Public Respondent show, at best, that
the parties responsible for the alleged acts of illegal recruitment are LCL and its officers
alone, or at worst, LCL and its officers, in conspiracy with petitioner. Yet, it is petitioner
alone, who is severely punished and penalized. (underscoring supplied)

xxxx

The intention, agreement and both common design of both LCL and CF Sharp to engage in
recruitment of crewmen for LCLs ships had already been made manifest when LCL through
Savva had instructed, in the October 14, 1996 letter to disembarking crewmembers, for the
latter to report to CF Sharp for processing of their papers. This was followed by the
execution by LCL on October 17, 1996 of a Special Power of Attorney in favor of CF Sharp
as new manning agent and attorney-in-fact of LCL, with authority, among others, to sign,
authenticate and deliver all documents necessary to complete any transaction related to the
recruitment and hiring of Filipino seamen including the necessary steps to facilitate the
departure of recruited seamen; to assume, on our behalf and for our account, any liability
that may arise in connection with the recruitment of seamen and/or implementation of the
employment contract of said seamen. And on November 8, 1996, CF Sharp applied for
accreditation as manning agent of LCL for the latters five named vessels. The discovery by
the POEA inspectors of the selection and recruitment activities undertaken by Savva and
Tjiakouris at CF Sharps offices on December 11, 1996, followed. The interviews by Savva
and Tjiakouris at CF Sharps offices on December 7, 1996 with around 300 crewmen, as
sworn to by 98 crewmen (their affidavits were submitted in evidence by CF Sharp); the
interviews for selection and recruitment from December 9 to 12, 1996 as found by the POEA
inspectors; and the immediate deployment of 154 crewmen for LCL right after [the] POEA
approval of accreditation of LCL as principal of CF Sharp, could not have been undertaken
without the assistance and cooperation of CF Sharp, even before such transfer of
accreditation was granted by POEA.

The petitioner-appellant must be reminded that prior to approval of the transfer of

accreditation, no recruitment or deployment may be made by the principal by itself or
through the would-be transferee manning agency, or by the latter, as this would constitute
illegal recruitment by a non-holder of authority under Sec. 6, R.A. 8042 in relation to Article
13(b) and (f) and Article 16 of the Labor Code as amended; Rule II(jj), Book I, and Sec. 1
and 6, Rule 1, Book III, POEA Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment.

The petitioner-appellant alleges that there is no need for a license to enable LCLs officers to
conduct their alleged activities of interviewing, selecting and hiring crewmen. Indeed, LCLs
officers could have conducted these activities without a license.

Such claim is without legal basis, as direct hiring by employers of Filipino workers for
overseas employment is banned; they can only do so through, among others, licensed
private recruitment and shipping/mining agencies (Art. 18, Labor Code as amended; Sec. 1,
Rule 1, Book II, POEA Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment).[26]

We need not say more.

C.F. Sharp also denies violating Article 29 of the Labor Code. It insists that Henry Desiderio
was neither an employee nor an agent of C.F. Sharp. Yet, except for its barefaced denial, no
proof was adduced to substantiate it.

Desiderios name does not appear in the list of employees and officials submitted by C.F.
Sharp to the POEA. However, his name appeared as the contact person of the applicants for
the position of 2nd and 3rd assistant engineers and machinist/fitter in C.F Sharps
advertisement in the February 2, 1997 issue of The Bulletin Today.[27]

Article 29 of the Labor Code is explicit, viz.:

Art. 29. NON-TRANSFERABILITY OF LICENSE OR AUTHORITY

No license or authority shall be used directly or indirectly by any person other than the one
in whose favor it was issued or at any place other than that stated in the license or authority,
nor may such license or authority be transferred, conveyed or assigned to any other person
or entity. Any transfer of business address, appointment or designation of any agent or
representative including the establishment of additional offices anywhere shall be subject to
the prior approval of the Department of Labor. (Emphasis ours)

Thus, Section 2(k), Rule 1, Book VI of the POEA Rules Governing Overseas Employment
provides:

Section 2. Grounds for Suspension/Cancellation of License.

xxxx

k. Appointing or designating agents, representatives or employees without prior approval

from the Administration.

The appointment or designation of Desiderio as an employee or agent of C.F. Sharp,

without prior approval from the POEA, warrants administrative sanction. The CA, therefore,
correctly rejected C.F. Sharps posture.

Apparently, realizing the folly of its defenses, C.F. Sharp assails the admissibility of the
Memorandum and Inspection Report of the POEA. It contends that these are patently
inadmissible against C.F. Sharp for it was not given an opportunity to crossexamine the
POEA inspectors regarding the report.

The argument does not deserve even a short shrift. First, C.F. Sharp did not raise it before
the POEA and Secretary of Labor. The issue was raised for the first time in its petition for
certiorari with the CA, where the jurisdiction of the appellate court is limited to issues of
jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion. On numerous occasions, we have made it clear
that to allow fresh issues at this stage of the proceedings is violative of fair play, justice and
due process.[28]

Second, jurisprudence is replete with rulings that administrative bodies are not bound by the
technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in the courts of law.[29]
Hence, whatever merit C.F. Sharps argument might have in the context of ordinary civil
actions, where the rules of evidence apply with greater rigidity, disappears when adduced in
connection with labor cases.

The claim of denial of due process on the part of C.F. Sharp must also be rejected. The
essence of due process lies in the reasonable opportunity afforded a party to be heard and
to submit any evidence in support of its defense. What is vital is not the opportunity to cross-
examine an adverse witness, but an opportunity to be heard.[30]
In this case, C.F. Sharp was given ample opportunity to be heard, to adduce evidence in
support of its version of the material occurrences, and to controvert Rizals allegation and the
Inspection Report. It submitted its position paper with supporting affidavits and documents,
and additionally pleaded its causes on appeal before the Secretary of Labor. Under the
circumstances, a claim of denial of due process on C.F. Sharps part is completely
unavailing.

C.F. Sharp next impugns the probative value given by the Administrator and the Secretary of
Labor to the Inspection Report. It alleges that the POEA Administrator, the Labor Secretary
and the CA relied only on the Inspection Report and gave very little or no probative value to
the affidavits that it submitted in support of its claim.

C.F. Sharp would have us re-evaluate the factual veracity and probative value of the
evidence submitted in the proceedings a quo. C.F. Sharp may well be reminded that it is not
our function to review, examine, and evaluate or weigh the evidence adduced by the parties.
Elementary is the principle that this Court is not a trier of facts. Judicial review of labor cases
does not go beyond the evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the labor
officials' findings rest. Hence, where the factual findings of the labor tribunals or agencies
conform to, and are affirmed by, the CA, the same are accorded respect and finality, and are
binding upon this Court. It is only when the findings of the labor agencies and the appellate
court are in conflict that this Court will review the records to determine which findings should
be upheld as being more in conformity with the evidentiary facts. Where the CA affirms the
labor agencies on review and there is no showing whatsoever that said findings are patently
erroneous, this Court is bound by the said findings.[31]
Although the rule admits of several exceptions, none of them are in point in this case. In any
event, we have carefully examined the factual findings of the CA and found the same to be
borne out of the record and sufficiently anchored on the evidence presented.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP. No. 53747 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

CASE:

[G.R. NO. 197528 - September 5, 2012]

PERT/CPM MANPOWER EXPONENT CO., INC., Petitioner, v. ARMANDO A. VINUY A,

LOUIE M. ORDOVEZ, ARSENIO S. LUMANTA,. JR., ROBELITO S. ANIPAN, VIRGILIO R.
ALCANTARA, MARINO M. ERA, SANDY 0. ENJAMBRE and NOEL T. LADEA,
Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the present Petition for Review on Certiorari 1ςrνll assailing the decision2ςrνll
dated May 9, 2011 and the resolution3dated June 23, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 114353.

The Antecedents

On March 5, 2008, respondents Armando A. Vinuya, Louie M. Ordovez, Arsenio S. Lumanta,

Jr., Robelito S. Anipan, Virgilio R. Alcantara, Marino M. Era, Sandy O. Enjambre and Noel T.
Ladea (respondents) filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the petitioner Pert/CPM
Manpower Exponent Co., Inc. (agency), and its President Romeo P. Nacino.

The respondents alleged that the agency deployed them between March 29, 2007 and May
12, 2007 to work as aluminum fabricator/installer for the agency s principal, Modern Metal
Solution LLC/MMS Modern Metal Solution LLC (Modern Metal) in Dubai, United Arab
Emirates.

The respondents employment contracts,4ςrνll which were approved by the Philippine

Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), provided for a two-year employment, nine
hours a day, salary of 1,350 AED with overtime pay, food allowance, free and suitable
housing (four to a room), free transportation, free laundry, and free medical and dental
services. They each paid a P 15,000.00 processing fee.5ςrνllςrνll

On April 2, 2007, Modern Metal gave the respondents, except Era, appointment letters6ςrνll
with terms different from those in the employment contracts which they signed at the agency
s office in the Philippines. Under the letters of appointment, their employment was increased
to three years at 1,000 to 1,200 AED and food allowance of 200 AED.

The respondents claimed that they were shocked to find out what their working and living
conditions were in Dubai. They were required to work from 6:30 a.m. to 6:30 p.m., with a
break of only one hour to one and a half hours. When they rendered overtime work, they
were most of the time either underpaid or not paid at all. Their housing accommodations
were cramped and were shared with 27 other occupants. The lodging house was in Sharjah,
which was far from their jobsite in Dubai, leaving them only three to four hours of sleep a day
because of the long hours of travel to and from their place of work; there was no potable
water and the air was polluted.

When the respondents received their first salaries (at the rates provided in their appointment
letters and with deductions for placement fees) and because of their difficult living and
working conditions, they called up the agency and complained about their predicament. The
agency assured them that their concerns would be promptly addressed, but nothing
happened.

On May 5, 2007, Modern Metal required the respondents to sign new employment
contracts,7ςrνll except for Era who was made to sign later. The contracts reflected the terms
of their appointment letters. Burdened by all the expenses and financial obligations they
incurred for their deployment, they were left with no choice but to sign the contracts. They
raised the matter with the agency, which again took no action.

On August 5, 2007, despondent over their unbearable living and working conditions and by
the agency s inaction, the respondents expressed to Modern Metal their desire to resign. Out
of fear, as they put it, that Modern Metal would not give them their salaries and release
papers, the respondents, except Era, cited personal/family problems for their
resignation.8ςrνll Era mentioned the real reason "because I dont (sic) want the company
policy"9ςrνll for his resignation.

It took the agency several weeks to repatriate the respondents to the Philippines. They all
returned to Manila in September 2007. Except for Ordovez and Enjambre, all the
respondents shouldered their own airfare.

For its part, the agency countered that the respondents were not illegally dismissed; they
voluntarily resigned from their employment to seek a better paying job. It claimed that the
respondents, while still working for Modern Metal, applied with another company which
offered them a higher pay. Unfortunately, their supposed employment failed to materialize
and they had to go home because they had already resigned from Modern Metal.

The agency further alleged that the respondents even voluntarily signed affidavits of
quitclaim and release after they resigned. It thus argued that their claim for benefits, under
Section 10 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8042, damages and attorney s fees is unfounded.

The Compulsory Arbitration Rulings

On April 30, 2008, Labor Arbiter Ligerio V. Ancheta rendered a Decision10ςrνll dismissing
the complaint, finding that the respondents voluntarily resigned from their jobs. He also
found that four of them Alcantara, Era, Anipan and Lumanta even executed a compromise
agreement (with quitclaim and release) before the POEA. He considered the POEA recourse
a case of forum shopping.

The respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). They
argued that the labor arbiter committed serious errors in (1) admitting in evidence the
quitclaims and releases they executed in Dubai, which were mere photocopies of the
originals and which failed to explain the circumstances behind their execution; (2) failing to
consider that the compromise agreements they signed before the POEA covered only the
refund of their airfare and not all their money claims; and (3) ruling that they violated the rule
on non-forum shopping.

On May 12, 2009, the NLRC granted the appeal.11ςrνll It ruled that the respondents had
been illegally dismissed. It anchored its ruling on the new employment contracts they were
made to sign in Dubai. It stressed that it is illegal for an employer to require its employees to
execute new employment papers, especially those which provide benefits that are inferior to
the POEA-approved contracts.

The NLRC rejected the quitclaim and release executed by the respondents in Dubai. It
believed that the respondents executed the quitclaim documents under duress as they were
afraid that they would not be allowed to return to the Philippines if they did not sign the
documents. Further, the labor tribunal disagreed with the labor arbiter s opinion that the
compromise agreement they executed before the POEA had effectively foreclosed the illegal
dismissal complaint before the NLRC and that the respondents had been guilty of forum
shopping. It pointed out that the POEA case involved pre-deployment issues; whereas, the
complaint before the NLRC is one for illegal dismissal and money claims arising from
employment.

Consequently, the NLRC ordered the agency, Nacino and Modern Metal to pay, jointly and
severally, the respondents, as follows:ςηαñrοblεš �νιr†υαl �lαω �lιbrαrÿ

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 30 April 2008 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, a
new Decision is hereby issued ordering the respondents PERT/CPM MANPOWER
EXPONENTS CO., INC., ROMEO NACINO, and MODERN METAL SOLUTIONS, INC. to
jointly and severally, pay the complainants the following:

The agency moved for reconsideration, contending that the appeal was never perfected and
that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in reversing the labor arbiter s decision.The
respondents, on the other hand, moved for partial reconsideration, maintaining that their
salaries should have covered the unexpired portion of their employment contracts, pursuant
to the Court s ruling in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.13ςrνllςrνll

The NLRC denied the agency s motion for reconsideration, but granted the respondents
motion.14ςrνll It sustained the respondents argument that the award needed to be adjusted,
particularly in relation to the payment of their salaries, consistent with the Court s ruling in
Serrano. The ruling declared unconstitutional the clause, "or for three (3) months for every
year of the unexpired term, whichever is less," in Section 10, paragraph 5, of R.A. 8042,
limiting the entitlement of illegally dismissed overseas Filipino workers to their salaries for
the unexpired term of their contract or three months, whichever is less. Accordingly, it
modified its earlier decision and adjusted the respondents salary entitlement based on the
following matrix:

Again, the agency moved for reconsideration, reiterating its earlier arguments and,
additionally, questioning the application of the Serrano ruling in the case because it was not
yet final and executory. The NLRC denied the motion, prompting the agency to seek
recourse from the CA through a Petition for Certiorari.

The CA Decision

The CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit.16ςrνll It upheld the NLRC ruling that the
respondents were illegally dismissed. It found no grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC s
rejection of the respondents resignation letters, and the accompanying quitclaim and release
affidavits, as proof of their voluntary termination of employment.

The CA stressed that the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is inconsistent with
resignation. Moreover, it found nothing in the records to substantiate the agency s contention
that the respondents resignation was of their own accord; on the contrary, it considered the
resignation letters "dubious for having been lopsidedly-worded to ensure that the petitioners
(employers) are free from any liability."17ςrνllςrνll

The appellate court likewise refused to give credit to the compromise agreements that the
respondents executed before the POEA. It agreed with the NLRC s conclusion that the
agreements pertain to the respondents charge of recruitment violations against the agency
distinct from their illegal dismissal complaint, thus negating forum shopping by the
respondents.

Lastly, the CA found nothing legally wrong in the NLRC correcting itself (upon being
reminded by the respondents), by adjusting the respondents salary award on the basis of the
unexpired portion of their contracts, as enunciated in the Serrano case.

The agency moved for, but failed to secure, a reconsideration of the CA decision.18ςrνllςrνll

The Petition

The agency is now before the Court seeking a reversal of the CA dispositions, contending
that the CA erred in:ςηαñrοblεš �νιr†υαl �lαω �lιbrαrÿ

1. affirming the NLRC s finding that the respondents were illegally dismissed;

2. holding that the compromise agreements before the POEA pertain only to the
respondents charge of recruitment violations against the agency; andcralawlibrary

3. affirming the NLRC s award to the respondents of their salaries for the unexpired portion
of their employment contracts, pursuant to the Serrano ruling.

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The agency insists that it is not liable for illegal dismissal, actual or constructive. It submits
that as correctly found by the labor arbiter, the respondents voluntarily resigned from their
jobs, and even executed affidavits of quitclaim and release; the respondents stated family
concerns for their resignation. The agency posits that the letters were duly proven as they
were written unconditionally by the respondents. It, therefore, assails the conclusion that the
respondents resigned under duress or that the resignation letters were dubious.

The agency raises the same argument with respect to the compromise agreements, with
quitclaim and release, it entered into with Vinuya, Era, Ladea, Enjambre, Ordovez,
Alcantara, Anipan and Lumanta before the POEA, although it submitted evidence only for six
of them. Anipan, Lumanta, Vinuya and Ladea signing one document;19ςrνll Era20ςrνll and
Alcantara21ςrνll signing a document each. It points out that the agreement was prepared
with the assistance of POEA Conciliator Judy Santillan, and was duly and freely signed by
the respondents; moreover, the agreement is not conditional as it pertains to all issues
involved in the dispute between the parties.

On the third issue, the agency posits that the Serrano ruling has no application in the present
case for three reasons. First, the respondents were not illegally dismissed and, therefore,
were not entitled to their money claims. Second, the respondents filed the complaint in 2007,
while the Serrano ruling came out on March 24, 2009. The ruling cannot be given retroactive
application. Third, R.A. 10022, which was enacted on March 8, 2010 and which amended
R.A. 8042, restored the subject clause in Section 10 of R.A. 8042, declared unconstitutional
by the Court.

The Respondents Position

In their Comment (to the Petition) dated September 28, 2011,22ςrνll the respondents ask the
Court to deny the petition for lack of merit. They dispute the agency s insistence that they
resigned voluntarily. They stand firm on their submission that because of their unbearable
living and working conditions in Dubai, they were left with no choice but to resign. Also, the
agency never refuted their detailed narration of the reasons for giving up their employment.

The respondents maintain that the quitclaim and release affidavits,23ςrνll which the agency
presented, betray its desperate attempt to escape its liability to them. They point out that, as
found by the NLRC, the affidavits are ready-made documents; for instance, in Lumanta
s24ςrνll and Era s25ςrνll affidavits, they mentioned a certain G & A International Manpower
as the agency which recruited them a fact totally inapplicable to all the respondents. They
contend that they had no choice but to sign the documents; otherwise, their release papers
and remaining salaries would not be given to them, a submission which the agency never
refuted.

On the agency s second line of defense, the compromise agreement (with quitclaim and
release) between the respondents and the agency before the POEA, the respondents argue
that the agreements pertain only to their charge of recruitment violations against the agency.
They add that based on the agreements, read and considered entirely, the agency was
discharged only with respect to the recruitment and pre-deployment issues such as
excessive placement fees, non-issuance of receipts and placement misrepresentation, but
not with respect to post-deployment issues such as illegal dismissal, breach of contract,
underpayment of salaries and underpayment and nonpayment of overtime pay. The
respondents stress that the agency failed to controvert their contention that the agreements
came about only to settle their claim for refund of their airfare which they paid for when they
were repatriated.

Lastly, the respondents maintain that since they were illegally dismissed, the CA was correct
in upholding the NLRC s award of their salaries for the unexpired portion of their
employment contracts, as enunciated in Serrano. They point out that the Serrano ruling is
curative and remedial in nature and, as such, should be given retroactive application as the
Court declared in Yap v. Thenamaris Ship s Management.26ςrνll Further, the respondents
take exception to the agency s contention that the Serrano ruling cannot, in any event, be
applied in the present case in view of the enactment of R.A. 10022 on March 8, 2010,
amending Section 10 of R.A. 8042. The amendment restored the subject clause in
paragraph 5, Section 10 of R.A. 8042 which was struck down as unconstitutional in Serrano.

The respondents maintain that the agency cannot raise the issue for the first time before this
Court when it could have raised it before the CA with its Petition for Certiorari which it filed
on June 8, 2010;27ςrνll otherwise, their right to due process will be violated. The agency, on
the other hand, would later claim that it is not barred by estoppel with respect to its reliance
on R.A. 10022 as it raised it before the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 114353.28ςrνll They further
argue that RA 10022 cannot be applied in their case, as the law is an amendatory statute
which is, as a rule, prospective in application, unless the contrary is provided.29ςrνll To put
the issue to rest, the respondents ask the Court to also declare unconstitutional Section 7 of
R.A. 10022.

Finally, the respondents submit that the petition should be dismissed outright for raising only
questions of fact, rather than of law.

The Court s Ruling

The procedural question

We deem it proper to examine the facts of the case on account of the divergence in the
factual conclusions of the labor arbiter on the one hand, and, of the NLRC and the CA, on
the other.30ςrνll The arbiter found no illegal dismissal in the respondents loss of employment
in Dubai because they voluntarily resigned; whereas, the NLRC and the CA adjudged them
to have been illegally dismissed because they were virtually forced to resign.

The merits of the case

We find no merit in the petition. The CA committed no reversible error and neither did it
commit grave abuse of discretion in affirming the NLRC s illegal dismissal ruling.

The agency and its principal, Modern Metal, committed flagrant violations of the law on
overseas employment, as well as basic norms of decency and fair play in an employment
relationship, pushing the respondents to look for a better employment and, ultimately, to
resign from their jobs.
First. The agency and Modern Metal are guilty of contract substitution. The respondents
entered into a POEA-approved two-year employment contract,31ςrνll with Modern Metal
providing among others, as earlier discussed, for a monthly salary of 1350 AED. On April 2,
2007, Modern Metal issued to them appointment letters32ςrνll whereby the respondents
were hired for a longer three-year period and a reduced salary, from 1,100 AED to 1,200
AED, among other provisions. Then, on May 5, 2007, they were required to sign new
employment contracts33ςrνll reflecting the same terms contained in their appointment
letters, except that this time, they were hired as "ordinary laborer," no longer aluminum
fabricator/installer. The respondents complained with the agency about the contract
substitution, but the agency refused or failed to act on the matter.

The fact that the respondents contracts were altered or substituted at the workplace had
never been denied by the agency. On the contrary, it admitted that the contract substitution
did happen when it argued, "as to their claim for underpayment of salary, their original
contract mentioned 1350 AED monthly salary, which includes allowance while in their
Appointment Letters, they were supposed to receive 1,300 AED. While there was a
difference of 50 AED monthly, the same could no longer be claimed by virtue of their
Affidavits of Quitclaims and Desistance."34ςrνllςrνll

Clearly, the agency and Modern Metal committed a prohibited practice and engaged in
illegal recruitment under the law. Article 34 of the Labor Code provides:ςηαñrοblεš �νιr†υαl
�lαω �lιbrαrÿ

Art. 34. Prohibited Practices. It shall be unlawful for any individual, entity, licensee, or holder
of authority:

x � �x � �x

(i) To substitute or alter employment contracts approved and verified by the Department of
Labor from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the periods of
expiration of the same without the approval of the Secretary of Labor.

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Further, Article 38 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. 8042,35ςrνll defined "illegal
recruitment" to include the following act:ςηαñrοblεš �νιr†υαl �lαω �lιbrαrÿ

(i) To substitute or alter to the prejudice of the worker, employment contracts approved and
verified by the Department of Labor and Employment from the time of actual signing thereof
by the parties up to and including the period of the expiration of the same without the
approval of the Department of Labor and Employment.

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Second. The agency and Modern Metal committed breach of contract. Aggravating the
contract substitution imposed upon them by their employer, the respondents were made to
suffer substandard (shocking, as they put it) working and living arrangements. Both the
original contracts the respondents signed in the Philippines and the appointment letters
issued to them by Modern Metal in Dubai provided for free housing and transportation to and
from the jobsite. The original contract mentioned free and suitable housing.36ςrνll Although
no description of the housing was made in the letters of appointment except:
"Accommodation: Provided by the company," it is but reasonable to think that the housing or
accommodation would be "suitable."

As earlier pointed out, the respondents were made to work from 6:30 a.m. to 6:30 p.m., with
a meal break of one to one and a half hours, and their overtime work was mostly not paid or
underpaid. Their living quarters were cramped as they shared them with 27 other workers.
The lodging house was in Sharjah, far from the jobsite in Dubai, leaving them only three to
four hours of sleep every workday because of the long hours of travel to and from their place
of work, not to mention that there was no potable water in the lodging house which was
located in an area where the air was polluted. The respondents complained with the agency
about the hardships that they were suffering, but the agency failed to act on their reports.
Significantly, the agency failed to refute their claim, anchored on the ordeal that they went
through while in Modern Metal s employ.

Third. With their original contracts substituted and their oppressive working and living
conditions unmitigated or unresolved, the respondents decision to resign is not surprising.
They were compelled by the dismal state of their employment to give up their jobs;
effectively, they were constructively dismissed. A constructive dismissal or discharge is "a
quitting because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely,
as, an offer involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay."37ςrνllςrνll

Without doubt, the respondents continued employment with Modern Metal had become
unreasonable. A reasonable mind would not approve of a substituted contract that pays a
diminished salary from 1350 AED a month in the original contract to 1,000 AED to 1,200
AED in the appointment letters, a difference of 150 AED to 250 AED (not just 50 AED as the
agency claimed) or an extended employment (from 2 to 3 years) at such inferior terms, or a
"free and suitable" housing which is hours away from the job site, cramped and crowded,
without potable water and exposed to air pollution.

We thus cannot accept the agency s insistence that the respondents voluntarily resigned
since they personally prepared their resignation letters38ςrνll in their own handwriting, citing
family problems as their common ground for resigning. As the CA did, we find the
resignation letters "dubious,"39ςrνll not only for having been lopsidedly worded to ensure
that the employer is rendered free from any liability, but also for the odd coincidence that all
the respondents had, at the same time, been confronted with urgent family problems so that
they had to give up their employment and go home. The truth, as the respondents maintain,
is that they cited family problems as reason out of fear that Modern Metal would not give
them their salaries and their release papers. Only Era was bold enough to say the real
reason for his resignation to protest company policy.

We likewise find the affidavits40of quitclaim and release which the respondents executed
suspect. Obviously, the affidavits were prepared as a follow through of the respondents
supposed voluntary resignation. Unlike the resignation letters, the respondents had no hand
in the preparation of the affidavits. They must have been prepared by a representative of
Modern Metal as they appear to come from a standard form and were apparently introduced
for only one purpose to lend credence to the resignation letters. In Modern Metal s haste,
however, to secure the respondents affidavits, they did not check on the model they used.
Thus, Lumanta s affidavit41ςrνll mentioned a G & A International Manpower as his recruiting
agency, an entity totally unknown to the respondents; the same thing is true for Era s
affidavit.42ςrνll This confusion is an indication of the employer s hurried attempt to avoid
liability to the respondents.

The respondents position is well-founded. The NLRC itself had the same impression, which
we find in order and hereunder quote:ςηαñrοblεš �νιr†υαl �lαω �lιbrαrÿ

The acts of respondents of requiring the signing of new contracts upon reaching the place of
work and requiring employees to sign quitclaims before they are paid and repatriated to the
Philippines are all too familiar stories of despicable labor practices which our employees are
subjected to abroad. While it is true that quitclaims are generally given weight, however,
given the facts of the case, We are of the opinion that the complainants-appellants executed
the same under duress and fear that they will not be allowed to return to the
Philippines.43ςrνllςrνll

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Fourth. The compromise agreements (with quitclaim and release)44ςrνll between the
respondents and the agency before the POEA did not foreclose their employer-employee
relationship claims before the NLRC. The respondents, except Ordovez and Enjambre, aver
in this respect that they all paid for their own airfare when they returned home45ςrνll and that
the compromise agreements settled only their claim for refund of their airfare, but not their
other claims.46ςrνll Again, this submission has not been refuted or denied by the agency.

On the surface, the compromise agreements appear to confirm the agency s position, yet a
closer examination of the documents would reveal their true nature. Copy of the compromise
agreement is a standard POEA document, prepared in advance and readily made available
to parties who are involved in disputes before the agency, such as what the respondents
filed with the POEA ahead (filed in 2007) of the illegal dismissal complaint before the NLRC
(filed on March 5, 2008).

Under the heading "Post-Deployment," the agency agreed to pay Era47ςrνll and
Alcantara48ςrνllP 12,000.00 each, purportedly in satisfaction of the respondents claims
arising from overseas employment, consisting of unpaid salaries, salary differentials and
other benefits, including money claims with the NLRC. The last document was signed by (1)
Anipan, (2) Lumanta, (3) Ladea, (4) Vinuya, (5) Jonathan Nangolinola, and (6) Zosimo
Gatchalian (the last four signing on the left hand side of the document; the last two were not
among those who filed the illegal dismissal complaint).49ςrνllςrνll

The agency agreed to pay them a total of P 72,000.00. Although there was no breakdown of
the entitlement for each of the six, but guided by the compromise agreement signed by Era
and Alcantara, we believe that the agency paid them P 12,000.00 each, just like Era and
Alcantara.

The uniform insubstantial amount for each of the signatories to the agreement lends
credence to their contention that the settlement pertained only to their claim for refund of the
airfare which they shouldered when they returned to the Philippines. The compromise
agreement, apparently, was intended by the agency as a settlement with the respondents
and others with similar claims, which explains the inclusion of the two (Nangolinola and
Gatchalian) who were not involved in the case with the NLRC. Under the circumstances, we
cannot see how the compromise agreements can be considered to have fully settled the
respondents claims before the NLRC illegal dismissal and monetary benefits arising from
employment. We thus find no reversible error nor grave abuse of discretion in the rejection
by the NLRC and the CA of said agreements.

Fifth. The agency s objection to the application of the Serrano ruling in the present case is of
no moment. Its argument that the ruling cannot be given retroactive effect, because it is
curative and remedial, is untenable. It points out, in this respect, that the respondents filed
the complaint in 2007, while the Serrano ruling was handed down in March 2009. The issue,
as the respondents correctly argue, has been resolved in Yap v. Thenamaris Ship s
Management,50ςrνll where the Court sustained the retroactive application of the Serrano
ruling which declared unconstitutional the subject clause in Section 10, paragraph 5 of R.A.
8042, limiting to three months the payment of salaries to illegally dismissed Overseas
Filipino Workers.

Undaunted, the agency posits that in any event, the Serrano ruling has been nullified by R.A.
No. 10022, entitled "An Act Amending Republic Act No. 8042, Otherwise Known as the
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, As Amended, Further Improving the
Standard of Protection and Promotion of the Welfare of Migrant Workers, Their Families and
Overseas Filipinos in Distress, and For Other Purposes."51ςrνll It argues that R.A. 10022,
which lapsed into law (without the Signature of the President) on March 8, 2010, restored the
subject clause in the 5th paragraph, Section 10 of R.A. 8042. The amendment, contained in
Section 7 of R.A. 10022, reads as follows:ςηαñrοblεš �νιr†υαl �lαω �lιbrαrÿ

In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as

defined by law or contract, or any unauthorized deductions from the migrant worker s salary,
the worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement "of" his placement fee and the
deductions made with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the
unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less.52ςrνll (emphasis ours)

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This argument fails to persuade us. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided.53ςrνll By its very nature, the amendment introduced by R.A. 10022
restoring a provision of R.A. 8042 declared unconstitutional cannot be given retroactive
effect, not only because there is no express declaration of retroactivity in the law, but
because retroactive application will result in an impairment of a right that had accrued to the
respondents by virtue of the Serrano ruling - entitlement to their salaries for the unexpired
portion of their employment contracts.

All statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective application, unless the purpose
and intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective effect are expressly declared or
are necessarily implied from the language used.54ςrνll We thus see no reason to nullity the
application of the Serrano ruling in the present case. Whether or not R.A. 1 0022 is
constitutional is not for us to rule upon in the present case as this is an issue that is not
squarely before us. In other words, this is an issue that awaits its proper day in court; in the
meanwhile, we make no pronouncement on it.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated
May 9, 2011 and the Resolution dated June 23, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 114353 are AFFIRMED. Let this Decision be brought to the attention of the Honorable
Secretary of Labor and Employment and the Administrator of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration as a black mark in the deployment record of petitioner Pert/CPM
Manpower Exponent Co., Inc., and as a record that should be considered in any similar
future violations.

Costs against the petitioner.ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ

SO ORDERED.

CASE:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

- versus -

DOLORES OCDEN,

Accused-Appellant.

G.R. No. 173198

June 1, 2011

For Our consideration is an appeal from the Decision[1] dated April 21, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00044, which affirmed with modification the Decision[2]
dated July 2, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Baguio City, Branch 60, in Criminal
Case No. 16315-R. The RTC found accused-appellant Dolores Ocden (Ocden) guilty of
illegal recruitment in large scale, as defined and penalized under Article 13(b), in relation to
Articles 38(b), 34, and 39 of Presidential Decree No. 442, otherwise known as the New
Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, in Criminal Case No. 16315-R; and of the crime
of estafa under paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, in Criminal Case
Nos. 16316-R, 16318-R, and 16964-R.[3] The Court of Appeals affirmed Ocdens conviction
in all four cases, but modified the penalties imposed in Criminal Case Nos. 16316-R, 16318-
R, and 16964-R,

The Amended Information[4] for illegal recruitment in large scale in Criminal Case No.
16315-R reads:

That during the period from May to December, 1998, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously for a fee, recruit and promise employment as factory
workers in Italy to more than three (3) persons including, but not limited to the following:
JEFFRIES C. GOLIDAN, HOWARD C. GOLIDAN, KAREN M. SIMEON, JEAN S. MAXIMO,
NORMA PEDRO, MARYLYN MANA-A, RIZALINA FERRER, and MILAN DARING without
said accused having first secured the necessary license or authority from the Department of
Labor and Employment.

Ocden was originally charged with six counts of estafa in Criminal Case Nos. 16316-R,
16318-R, 16350-R, 16369-R, 16964-R, and 16966-R.

The Information in Criminal Case No. 16316-R states:

That sometime during the period from October to December, 1998 in the City of Baguio,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud JEFFRIES C. GOLIDAN, by
way of false pretenses, which are executed prior to or simultaneous with the commission of
the fraud, as follows, to wit: the accused knowing fully well that she is not (sic) authorized job
recruiter for persons intending to secure work abroad convinced said Jeffries C. Golidan and
pretended that she could secure a job for him/her abroad, for and in consideration of the
sum of P70,000.00 when in truth and in fact they could not; the said Jeffries C. Golidan
deceived and convinced by the false pretenses employed by the accused parted away the
total sum of P70,000.00, in favor of the accused, to the damage and prejudice of the said
Jeffries C. Golidan in the aforementioned amount of SEVENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P70,000,00), Philippine Currency.[5]

The Informations in the five other cases for estafa contain substantially the same allegations
as the one above-quoted, except for the private complainants names, the date of
commission of the offense, and the amounts defrauded, to wit:

All seven cases against Ocden were consolidated on July 31, 2000 and were tried jointly
after Ocden pleaded not guilty.

The prosecution presented three witnesses namely: Marilyn Mana-a (Mana-a) and Rizalina
Ferrer (Ferrer), complainants; and Julia Golidan (Golidan), mother of complainants Jeffries
and Howard Golidan.

Mana-a testified that sometime in the second week of August 1998, she and Isabel Dao-as
(Dao-as) went to Ocdens house in Baguio City to apply for work as factory workers in Italy
with monthly salaries of US$1,200.00. They were required by Ocden to submit their bio-data
and passports, pay the placement fee of P70,000.00, and to undergo medical examination.

Upon submitting her bio-data and passport, Mana-a paid Ocden P500.00 for her certificate
of employment and P20,000.00 as down payment for her placement fee. On September 8,
1998, Ocden accompanied Mana-a and 20 other applicants to Zamora Medical Clinic in
Manila for their medical examinations, for which each of the applicants paid P3,000.00.
Mana-a also paid to Ocden P22,000.00 as the second installment on her placement fee.
When Josephine Lawanag (Lawanag), Mana-as sister, withdrew her application, Lawanags
P15,000.00 placement fee, already paid to Ocden, was credited to Mana-a.[7]
 Mana-a failed to complete her testimony, but the RTC considered the same as no motion to
strike the said testimony was filed.

Ferrer narrated that she and her daughter Jennilyn were interested to work overseas. About
the second week of September 1998, they approached Ocden through Fely Alipio (Alipio).
Ocden showed Ferrer and Jennilyn a copy of a job order from Italy for factory workers who
could earn as much as $90,000.00 to $100,000.00.[8] In the first week of October 1998,
Ferrer and Jennilyn decided to apply for work, so they submitted their passports and pictures
to Ocden. Ferrer also went to Manila for medical examination, for which she spent
P3,500.00. Ferrer paid to Ocden on November 20, 1998 the initial amount of P20,000.00,
and on December 8, 1998 the balance of her and Jennilyns placement fees. All in all, Ferrer
paid Ocden P140,000.00, as evidenced by the receipts issued by Ocden.[9]

Ferrer, Jennilyn, and Alipio were supposed to be included in the first batch of workers to be
sent to Italy. Their flight was scheduled on December 10, 1998. In preparation for their flight
to Italy, the three proceeded to Manila. In Manila, they were introduced by Ocden to Erlinda
Ramos (Ramos). Ocden and Ramos then accompanied Ferrer, Jennilyn, and Alipio to the
airport where they took a flight to Zamboanga. Ocden explained to Ferrer, Jennilyn, and
Alipio that they would be transported to Malaysia where their visa application for Italy would
be processed.

Sensing that they were being fooled, Ferrer and Jennilyn decided to get a refund of their
money, but Ocden was nowhere to be found. Ferrer would later learn from the Baguio office
of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) that Ocden was not a
licensed recruiter.

Expecting a job overseas, Ferrer took a leave of absence from her work. Thus, she lost
income amounting to P17,700.00, equivalent to her salary for one and a half months. She
also spent P30,000.00 for transportation and food expenses.[10]

According to Golidan, the prosecutions third witness, sometime in October 1998, she
inquired from Ocden about the latters overseas recruitment. Ocden informed Golidan that
the placement fee was P70,000.00 for each applicant, that the accepted applicants would be
sent by batches overseas, and that priority would be given to those who paid their placement
fees early. On October 30, 1998, Golidan brought her sons, Jeffries and Howard, to Ocden.
On the same date, Jeffries and Howard handed over to Ocden their passports and
P40,000.00 as down payment on their placement fees. On December 10, 1998, Jeffries and
Howard paid the balance of their placement fees amounting to P100,000.00. Ocden issued
receipts for these two payments.[11] Ocden then informed Golidan that the first batch of
accepted applicants had already left, and that Jeffries would be included in the second batch
for deployment, while Howard in the third batch.

In anticipation of their deployment to Italy, Jeffries and Howard left for Manila on December
12, 1998 and December 18, 1998, respectively. Through a telephone call, Jeffries informed
Golidan that his flight to Italy was scheduled on December 16, 1998. However, Golidan was
surprised to again receive a telephone call from Jeffries saying that his flight to Italy was
delayed due to insufficiency of funds, and that Ocden went back to Baguio City to look for
additional funds. When Golidan went to see Ocden, Ocden was about to leave for Manila so
she could be there in time for the scheduled flights of Jeffries and Howard.

On December 19, 1998, Golidan received another telephone call from Jeffries who was in
Zamboanga with the other applicants. Jeffries informed Golidan that he was stranded in
Zamboanga because Ramos did not give him his passport. Ramos was the one who briefed
the overseas job applicants in Baguio City sometime in November 1998. Jeffries instructed
Golidan to ask Ocdens help in looking for Ramos. Golidan, however, could not find Ocden in
Baguio City.

On December 21, 1998, Golidan, with the other applicants, Mana-a and Dao-as, went to
Manila to meet Ocden. When Golidan asked why Jeffries was in Zamboanga, Ocden replied
that it would be easier for Jeffries and the other applicants to acquire their visas to Italy in
Zamboanga. Ocden was also able to contact Ramos, who assured Golidan that Jeffries
would be able to get his passport. When Golidan went back home to Baguio City, she
learned through a telephone call from Jeffries that Howard was now likewise stranded in
Zamboanga.

By January 1999, Jeffries and Howard were still in Zamboanga. Jeffries refused to accede
to Golidans prodding for him and Howard to go home, saying that the recruiters were already
working out the release of the funds for the applicants to get to Italy. Golidan went to Ocden,
and the latter told her not to worry as her sons would already be flying to Italy because the
same factory owner in Italy, looking for workers, undertook to shoulder the applicants travel
expenses. Yet, Jeffries called Golidan once more telling her that he and the other applicants
were still in Zamboanga.

Golidan went to Ocdens residence. This time, Ocdens husband gave Golidan P23,000.00
which the latter could use to fetch the applicants, including Jeffries and Howard, who were
stranded in Zamboanga. Golidan traveled again to Manila with Mana-a and Dao-as. When
they saw each other, Golidan informed Ocden regarding the P23,000.00 which the latters
husband gave to her. Ocden begged Golidan to give her the money because she needed it
badly. Of the P23,000.00, Golidan retained P10,000.00, Dao-as received P3,000.00, and
Ocden got the rest. Jeffries was able to return to Manila on January 16, 1999. Howard and
five other applicants, accompanied by Ocden, also arrived in Manila five days later.

Thereafter, Golidan and her sons went to Ocdens residence to ask for a refund of the
money they had paid to Ocden. Ocden was able to return only P50,000.00. Thus, out of the
total amount of P140,000.00 Golidan and her sons paid to Ocden, they were only able to get
back the sum of P60,000.00. After all that had happened, Golidan and her sons went to the
Baguio office of the POEA, where they discovered that Ocden was not a licensed
recruiter.[12]

The defense presented the testimony of Ocden herself.

Ocden denied recruiting private complainants and claimed that she was also an applicant
for an overseas job in Italy, just like them. Ocden identified Ramos as the recruiter.

Ocden recounted that she met Ramos at a seminar held in St. Theresas Compound, Navy
Base, Baguio City, sometime in June 1998. The seminar was arranged by Aida Comila
(Comila), Ramoss sub-agent. The seminar was attended by about 60 applicants, including
Golidan. Ramos explained how one could apply as worker in a stuff toys factory in Italy. After
the seminar, Comila introduced Ocden to Ramos. Ocden decided to apply for the overseas
job, so she gave her passport and pictures to Ramos. Ocden also underwent medical
examination at Zamora Medical Clinic in Manila, and completely submitted the required
documents to Ramos in September 1998.

After the seminar, many people went to Ocdens house to inquire about the jobs available in
Italy. Since most of these people did not attend the seminar, Ocden asked Ramos to
conduct a seminar at Ocdens house. Two seminars were held at Ocdens house, one in
September and another in December 1998. After said seminars, Ramos designated Ocden
as leader of the applicants. As such, Ocden received her co-applicants applications and
documents; accompanied her co-applicants to Manila for medical examination because she
knew the location of Zamora Medical Clinic; and accepted placement fees in the amount of
P70,000.00 each from Mana-a and Ferrer and from Golidan, the amount of P140,000.00 (for
Jeffries and Howard).

Ramos instructed Ocden that the applicants should each pay P250,000.00 and if the
applicants could not pay the full amount, they would have to pay the balance through salary
deductions once they start working in Italy. Ocden herself paid Ramos P50,000.00 as
placement fee and executed a promissory note in Ramoss favor for the balance, just like any
other applicant who failed to pay the full amount. Ocden went to Malaysia with Ramoss male
friend but she failed to get her visa for Italy.

Ocden denied deceiving Mana-a and Ferrer. Ocden alleged that she turned over to Ramos
the money Mana-a and Ferrer gave her, although she did not indicate in the receipts she
issued that she received the money for and on behalf of Ramos.

Ocden pointed out that she and some of her co-applicants already filed a complaint against
Ramos before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) offices in Zamboanga City and
Manila.[13]

On July 2, 2001, the RTC rendered a Decision finding Ocden guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes of illegal recruitment in large scale (Criminal Case No. 16315-R) and
three counts of estafa (Criminal Case Nos. 16316-R, 16318-R, and 16964-R). The
dispositive portion of said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 16315-R, the Court finds the accused, DOLORES OCDEN,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Recruitment committed in large
scale as defined and penalized under Article 13(b) in relation to Article 38(b), 34 and 39 of
the Labor Code as amended by P.D. Nos. 1693, 1920, 2018 and R.A. 8042. She is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P100,000.00;

2. In Criminal Case No. 16316-R, the Court finds the accused, DOLORES OCDEN,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa and sentences her to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from two (2) years, eleven (11) months and ten (10) days of
prision correccional, as minimum, up to nine (9) years and nine (9) months of prision mayor,
as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Jeffries Golidan the amount of P40,000.00;

3. In Criminal Case No. 16318-R, the Court finds the accused, DOLORES OCDEN,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa and sentences her to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from two (2) years, eleven (11) months and ten (10) days of
prision correccional, as minimum, up to nine (9) years and nine (9) months of prision mayor,
as maximum, and to indemnify Howard Golidan the amount of P40,000.00;

4. In Criminal Case No. 16350-R, the Court finds the accused, DOLORES OCDEN, NOT
GUILTY of the crime of estafa for lack of evidence and a verdict of acquittal is entered in her
favor;

5. In Criminal Case No. 16369-R, the Court finds the accused, DOLORES OCDEN, NOT
GUILTY of the crime of estafa for lack of evidence and a verdict of acquittal is hereby
entered in her favor;

6. In Criminal Case No. 16964-R, the Court finds the accused, DOLORES OCDEN,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa and sentences her to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of Four (4) years and Two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, up to Twelve (12) years and Nine (9) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
and to indemnify Rizalina Ferrer the amount of P70,000.00; and

7. In Criminal Case No. 16966-R, the Court finds the accused, DOLORES OCDEN, NOT
GUILTY of the crime of estafa for insufficiency of evidence and a verdict of acquittal is
hereby entered in her favor.

In the service of her sentence, the provisions of Article 70 of the Penal Code shall be
observed.[14]

Aggrieved by the above decision, Ocden filed with the RTC a Notice of Appeal on August 15,
2001.[15] The RTC erroneously sent the records of the cases to the Court of Appeals, which,
in turn, correctly forwarded the said records to us.

In our Resolution[16] dated May 6, 2002, we accepted the appeal and required the parties to
file their respective briefs. In the same resolution, we directed the Superintendent of the
Correctional Institute for Women to confirm Ocdens detention thereat.

Ocden filed her Appellant's Brief on August 15, 2003,[17] while the People, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Appellee's Brief on January 5, 2004.[18]

Pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo,[19] we transferred Ocdens appeal to the Court of
Appeals. On April 21, 2006, the appellate court promulgated its Decision, affirming Ocdens
conviction but modifying the penalties imposed upon her for the three counts of estafa, viz:

[T]he trial court erred in the imposition of accused-appellants penalty.

Pursuant to Article 315 of the RPC, the penalty for estafa is prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period. If the amount of the fraud exceeds
P22,000.00, the penalty provided shall be imposed in its maximum period (6 years, 8 months
and 21 days to 8 years), adding 1 year for each additional P10,000.00; but the total penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed 20 years.

Criminal Case Nos. 16316-R and 16318-R involve the amount of P40,000.00 each.
Considering that P18,000.00 is the excess amount, only 1 year should be added to the
penalty in its maximum period or 9 years. Also, in Criminal Case No. 16964-R, the amount
involved is P70,000.00. Thus, the excess amount is P48,000.00 and only 4 years should be
added to the penalty in its maximum period.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision, dated 02 July
2001, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 60 is hereby AFFIRMED with
the following MODIFICATIONS:

1. In Criminal Case No. 16316-R, accused-appellant is sentenced to 2 years, 11 months,

and 10 days of prision correccional, as minimum to 9 years of prision mayor, as maximum
and to indemnify Jeffries Golidan the amount of P40,000.00;

2. In Criminal Case No. 16318-R, accused-appellant is sentenced to 2 years, 11 months,

and 10 days of prision correccional, as minimum to 9 years of prision mayor, as maximum
and to indemnify Howard Golidan the amount of P40,000.00; and

3. In Criminal Case No. 16964-R, accused-appellant is sentenced to 4 years and 2

months of prision correccional, as minimum to 12 years of prision mayor, as maximum and
to indemnify Rizalina Ferrer the amount of P70,000.00.[20]

Hence, this appeal, in which Ocden raised the following assignment of errors:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF ILLEGAL

RECRUITMENT COMMITTED IN LARGE SCALE ALTHOUGH THE CRIME WAS NOT
PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF ESTAFA IN

CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 16316-R, 16318-R AND 16[9]64-R.[21]

After a thorough review of the records of the case, we find nothing on record that would
justify a reversal of Ocdens conviction.

Illegal recruitment in large scale

Ocden contends that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that she is
guilty of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale. Other than the bare allegations of the
prosecution witnesses, no evidence was adduced to prove that she was a non-licensee or
non-holder of authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers. No
certification attesting to this fact was formally offered in evidence by the prosecution.

Ocdens aforementioned contentions are without merit.

Article 13, paragraph (b) of the Labor Code defines and enumerates the acts which
constitute recruitment and placement:

(b) Recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services,
promising for advertising for employment locally or abroad, whether for profit or not:
Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and
placement.

The amendments to the Labor Code introduced by Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known
as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, broadened the concept of illegal
recruitment and provided stiffer penalties, especially for those that constitute economic
sabotage, i.e., illegal recruitment in large scale and illegal recruitment committed by a
syndicate. Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 8042 are reproduced below:

SEC. 6. Definition. - For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and
includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad,
whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority
contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise
known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-
holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more
persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise include the following acts, whether
committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of
authority:

(a) To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater than that specified in the
schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, or to
make a worker pay any amount greater than that actually received by him as a loan or
advance;

(b) To furnish or publish any false notice or information or document in relation to

recruitment or employment;

(c) To give any false notice, testimony, information or document or commit any act of
misrepresentation for the purpose of securing a license or authority under the Labor Code;

(d) To induce or attempt to induce a worker already employed to quit his employment in
order to offer him another unless the transfer is designed to liberate a worker from
oppressive terms and conditions of employment;

(e) To influence or attempt to influence any person or entity not to employ any worker who
has not applied for employment through his agency;

(f) To engage in the recruitment or placement of workers in jobs harmful to public health or
morality or to the dignity of the Republic of the Philippines;

(g) To obstruct or attempt to obstruct inspection by the Secretary of Labor and Employment
or by his duly authorized representative;

(h) To fail to submit reports on the status of employment, placement vacancies, remittance
of foreign exchange earnings, separation from jobs, departures and such other matters or
information as may be required by the Secretary of Labor and Employment;

(i) To substitute or alter to the prejudice of the worker, employment contracts approved and
verified by the Department of Labor and Employment from the time of actual signing thereof
by the parties up to and including the period of the expiration of the same without the
approval of the Department of Labor and Employment;

(j) For an officer or agent of a recruitment or placement agency to become an officer or

member of the Board of any corporation engaged in travel agency or to be engaged directly
or indirectly in the management of a travel agency;

(k) To withhold or deny travel documents from applicant workers before departure for
monetary or financial considerations other than those authorized under the Labor Code and
its implementing rules and regulations;

(l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as determined by the Department of Labor
and Employment; and

(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his
documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment
does not actually take place without the worker's fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by
a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage.

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3)
or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in
large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.

Sec. 7. Penalties.

(a) Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
not less than six (6) years and one (1) day but not more than twelve (12) years and a fine of
Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) nor more than Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00).

(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) nor more than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal
recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein.
Provided, however, That the maximum penalty shall be imposed if the person illegally
recruited is less than eighteen (18) years of age or committed by a non-licensee or non-
holder of authority. (Emphasis ours.)

It is well-settled that to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that appellant gave
complainants the distinct impression that he had the power or ability to send complainants
abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to part with their money in order to be
employed.[22] As testified to by Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidan, Ocden gave such an
impression through the following acts: (1) Ocden informed Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidan
about the job opportunity in Italy and the list of necessary requirements for application; (2)
Ocden required Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidans sons, Jeffries and Howard, to attend the
seminar conducted by Ramos at Ocdens house in Baguio City; (3) Ocden received the job
applications, pictures, bio-data, passports, and the certificates of previous employment
(which was also issued by Ocden upon payment of P500.00), of Mana-a, Ferrer, and
Golidans sons, Jeffries and Howard; (4) Ocden personally accompanied Mana-a, Ferrer, and
Golidans sons, Jeffries and Howard, for their medical examinations in Manila; (5) Ocden
received money paid as placement fees by Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidans sons, Jeffries and
Howard, and even issued receipts for the same; and (6) Ocden assured Mana-a, Ferrer, and
Golidans sons, Jeffries and Howard, that they would be deployed to Italy.

It is not necessary for the prosecution to present a certification that Ocden is a non-licensee
or non-holder of authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers.
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 enumerates particular acts which would constitute illegal
recruitment whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee
or holder of authority. Among such acts, under Section 6(m) of Republic Act No. 8042, is the
[f]ailure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation
and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not
actually take place without the workers fault.

Since illegal recruitment under Section 6(m) can be committed by any person, even by a
licensed recruiter, a certification on whether Ocden had a license to recruit or not, is
inconsequential. Ocden committed illegal recruitment as described in said provision by
receiving placement fees from Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidans two sons, Jeffries and Howard,
evidenced by receipts Ocden herself issued; and failing to reimburse/refund to Mana-a,
Ferrer, and Golidans two sons the amounts they had paid when they were not able to leave
for Italy, through no fault of their own.

Ocden questions why it was Golidan who testified for private complainants Jeffries and
Howard. Golidan had no personal knowledge of the circumstances proving illegal
recruitment and could not have testified on the same. Also, Jeffries and Howard already
executed an affidavit of desistance. All Golidan wants was a reimbursement of the
placement fees paid.

Contrary to Ocdens claims, Golidan had personal knowledge of Ocdens illegal recruitment
activities, which she could competently testify to. Golidan herself had personal dealings with
Ocden as Golidan assisted her sons, Jeffries and Howard, in completing the requirements
for their overseas job applications, and later on, in getting back home from Zamboanga
where Jeffries and Howard were stranded, and in demanding a refund from Ocden of the
placement fees paid. That Golidan is seeking a reimbursement of the placement fees paid
for the failed deployment of her sons Jeffries and Howard strengthens, rather than weakens,
the prosecutions case. Going back to illegal recruitment under Section 6(m) of Republic Act
No. 8042, failure to reimburse the expenses incurred by the worker when deployment does
not actually take place, without the workers fault, is illegal recruitment.

The affidavit of desistance purportedly executed by Jeffries and Howard does not exonerate
Ocden from criminal liability when the prosecution had successfully proved her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. In People v. Romero,[23] we held that:

The fact that complainants Bernardo Salazar and Richard Quillope executed a Joint
Affidavit of Desistance does not serve to exculpate accused-appellant from criminal liability
insofar as the case for illegal recruitment is concerned since the Court looks with disfavor the
dropping of criminal complaints upon mere affidavit of desistance of the complainant,
particularly where the commission of the offense, as is in this case, is duly supported by
documentary evidence.

Generally, the Court attaches no persuasive value to affidavits of desistance, especially

when it is executed as an afterthought. It would be a dangerous rule for courts to reject
testimonies solemnly taken before the courts of justice simply because the witnesses who
had given them, later on, changed their mind for one reason or another, for such rule would
make solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation of truth at the mercy of
unscrupulous witness.

Complainants Bernardo Salazar and Richard Quillope may have a change of heart insofar
as the offense wrought on their person is concerned when they executed their joint affidavit
of desistance but this will not affect the public prosecution of the offense itself. It is relevant
to note that the right of prosecution and punishment for a crime is one of the attributes that
by a natural law belongs to the sovereign power instinctly charged by the common will of the
members of society to look after, guard and defend the interests of the community, the
individual and social rights and the liberties of every citizen and the guaranty of the exercise
of his rights. This cardinal principle which states that to the State belongs the power to
prosecute and punish crimes should not be overlooked since a criminal offense is an outrage
to the sovereign State.[24]

In her bid to exculpate herself, Ocden asserts that she was also just an applicant for
overseas employment; and that she was receiving her co-applicants job applications and
other requirements, and accepting her co-applicants payments of placement fees, because
she was designated as the applicants leader by Ramos, the real recruiter.

Ocdens testimony is self-serving and uncorroborated. Ocdens denial of any illegal

recruitment activity cannot stand against the prosecution witnesses positive identification of
her in court as the person who induced them to part with their money upon the
misrepresentation and false promise of deployment to Italy as factory workers. Besides,
despite several opportunities given to Ocden by the RTC, she failed to present Ramos, who
Ocden alleged to be the real recruiter and to whom she turned over the placement fees paid
by her co-applicants.
 Between the categorical statements of the prosecution witnesses, on the one hand, and the
bare denial of Ocden, on the other, the former must perforce prevail. An affirmative
testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony especially when the former comes from
the mouth of a credible witness. Denial, same as an alibi, if not substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. It is
considered with suspicion and always received with caution, not only because it is inherently
weak and unreliable but also because it is easily fabricated and concocted.[25]

Moreover, in the absence of any evidence that the prosecution witnesses were motivated by
improper motives, the trial courts assessment of the credibility of the witnesses shall not be
interfered with by this Court.[26] It is a settled rule that factual findings of the trial courts,
including their assessment of the witnesses credibility, are entitled to great weight and
respect by the Supreme Court, particularly when the Court of Appeals affirmed such
findings. After all, the trial court is in the best position to determine the value and weight of
the testimonies of witnesses. The absence of any showing that the trial court plainly
overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of
the case, or that its assessment was arbitrary, impels the Court to defer to the trial courts
determination according credibility to the prosecution evidence.[27]

Ocden further argues that the prosecution did not sufficiently establish that she illegally
recruited at least three persons, to constitute illegal recruitment on a large scale. Out of the
victims named in the Information, only Mana-a and Ferrer testified in court. Mana-a did not
complete her testimony, depriving Ocden of the opportunity to cross-examine her; and even
if Mana-as testimony was not expunged from the record, it was insufficient to prove illegal
recruitment by Ocden. Although Ferrer testified that she and Mana-a filed a complaint for
illegal recruitment against Ocden, Ferrers testimony is competent only as to the illegal
recruitment activities committed by Ocden against her, and not against Mana-a. Ocden
again objects to Golidans testimony as hearsay, not being based on Golidans personal
knowledge.

Under the last paragraph of Section 6, Republic Act No. 8042, illegal recruitment shall be
considered an offense involving economic sabotage if committed in a large scale, that is,
committed against three or more persons individually or as a group.

In People v. Hu,[28] we held that a conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be
based on a finding in each case of illegal recruitment of three or more persons, whether
individually or as a group. While it is true that the law does not require that at least three
victims testify at the trial, nevertheless, it is necessary that there is sufficient evidence
proving that the offense was committed against three or more persons. In this case, there is
conclusive evidence that Ocden recruited Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidans sons, Jeffries and
Howard, for purported employment as factory workers in Italy. As aptly observed by the
Court of Appeals:

Mana-as testimony, although not completed, sufficiently established that accused-appellant

promised Mana-a a job placement in a factory in Italy for a fee with accused-appellant even
accompanying her for the required medical examination. Likewise, Julia Golidans testimony
adequately proves that accused-appellant recruited Jeffries and Howard Golidan for a job in
Italy, also for a fee. Contrary to the accused-appellants contention, Julia had personal
knowledge of the facts and circumstances surrounding the charges for illegal recruitment
and estafa filed by her sons. Julia was not only privy to her sons recruitment but also directly
transacted with accused-appellant, submitting her sons requirements and paying the
placement fees as evidenced by a receipt issued in her name. Even after the placement did
not materialize, Julia acted with her sons to secure the partial reimbursement of the
placement fees.[29]

And even though only Ferrer and Golidan testified as to Ocdens failure to reimburse the
placements fees paid when the deployment did not take place, their testimonies already
established the fact of non-reimbursement as to three persons, namely, Ferrer and Golidans
two sons, Jeffries and Howard.

Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042 prescribes a penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
not less than P500,000.00 nor more than P1,000,000.00 if the illegal recruitment constitutes
economic sabotage. The RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, imposed upon Ocden
the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of only P100,000.00. Since the fine of P100,000 is
below the minimum set by law, we are increasing the same to P500,000.00.

Estafa

We are likewise affirming the conviction of Ocden for the crime of estafa. The very same
evidence proving Ocdens liability for illegal recruitment also established her liability for
estafa.

It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment
under Republic Act No. 8042 in relation to the Labor Code, and estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. We explicated in People v. Yabut[30] that:

In this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who commits illegal recruitment may be charged
and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under par.
2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The offense of illegal recruitment is malum
prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction, while
estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of the accused is crucial for conviction.
Conviction for offenses under the Labor Code does not bar conviction for offenses
punishable by other laws. Conversely, conviction for estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the
Revised Penal Code does not bar a conviction for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code.
It follows that ones acquittal of the crime of estafa will not necessarily result in his acquittal of
the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, and vice versa.[31]

Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code defines estafa as:

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow x x x:

xxxx

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar
deceits.

The elements of estafa are: (a) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence
or by means of deceit, and (b) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is
caused to the offended party or third person.[32]

Both these elements are present in the instant case. Ocden represented to Ferrer, Golidan,
and Golidans two sons, Jeffries and Howard, that she could provide them with overseas
jobs. Convinced by Ocden, Ferrer, Golidan, and Golidans sons paid substantial amounts as
placement fees to her. Ferrer and Golidans sons were never able to leave for Italy, instead,
they ended up in Zamboanga, where, Ocden claimed, it would be easier to have their visas
to Italy processed. Despite the fact that Golidans sons, Jeffries and Howard, were stranded
in Zamboanga for almost a month, Ocden still assured them and their mother that they
would be able to leave for Italy. There is definitely deceit on the part of Ocden and damage
on the part of Ferrer and Golidans sons, thus, justifying Ocdens conviction for estafa in
Criminal Case Nos. 16316-R, 16318-R, and 16964-R.

The penalty for estafa depends on the amount of defraudation. According to Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code:

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000
pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph
shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos;
but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases,
and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose
of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be.

The prescribed penalty for estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, when the
amount of fraud is over P22,000.00, is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor
minimum, adding one year to the maximum period for each additional P10,000.00, provided
that the total penalty shall not exceed 20 years.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, we take the minimum term from the penalty next
lower than the minimum prescribed by law, or anywhere within prision correccional minimum
and medium (i.e., from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).[33] Consequently,
both the RTC and the Court of Appeals correctly fixed the minimum term in Criminal Case
Nos. 16316-R and 16318-R at 2 years, 11 months, and 10 days of prision correccional; and
in Criminal Case No. 16964-R at 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, since these
are within the range of prision correccional minimum and medium.
 As for the maximum term under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, we take the maximum
period of the prescribed penalty, adding 1 year of imprisonment for every P10,000.00 in
excess of P22,000.00, provided that the total penalty shall not exceed 20 years. To compute
the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, the time included in prision correccional
maximum to prision mayor minimum shall be divided into three equal portions, with each
portion forming a period. Following this computation, the maximum period for prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum is from 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days to
8 years. The incremental penalty, when proper, shall thus be added to anywhere from 6
years, 8 months, and 21 days to 8 years, at the discretion of the court.[34]

In computing the incremental penalty, the amount defrauded shall be substracted by

P22,000.00, and the difference shall be divided by P10,000.00. Any fraction of a year shall
be discarded as was done starting with People v. Pabalan.[35]

In Criminal Case Nos. 16316-R and 16318-R, brothers Jeffries and Howard Golidan were
each defrauded of the amount of P40,000.00, for which the Court of Appeals sentenced
Ocden to an indeterminate penalty of 2 years, 11 months, and 10 days of prision
correccional as minimum, to 9 years of prision mayor as maximum. Upon review, however,
we modify the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty imposed on Ocden in said
criminal cases. Since the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00 by P18,000.00, 1 year
shall be added to the maximum period of the prescribed penalty (anywhere between 6 years,
8 months, and 21 days to 8 years). There being no aggravating circumstance, we apply the
lowest of the maximum period, which is 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days. Adding the one
year incremental penalty, the maximum term of Ocdens indeterminate sentence in these two
cases is only 7 years, 8 months, and 21 days of prision mayor.

In Criminal Cases No. 19694-R, Ferrer was defrauded of the amount of P70,000.00, for
which the Court of Appeals sentenced Ocden to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 12 years of prision mayor, as maximum.
Upon recomputation, we also have to modify the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence imposed upon Ocden in Criminal Case No. 19694-R. Given that the amount
defrauded exceeds P22,000.00 by P48,000.00, 4 years shall be added to the maximum
period of the prescribed penalty (anywhere between 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days to 8
years). There likewise being no aggravating circumstance in this case, we add the 4 years of
incremental penalty to the lowest of the maximum period, which is 6 years, 8 months, and 21
days. The maximum term, therefor, of Ocdens indeterminate sentence in Criminal Case No.
19694-R is only 10 years, 8 months, and 21 days of prision mayor.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal of accused-appellant Dolores Ocden is DENIED. The

Decision dated April 21, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00044 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION to read as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 16315-R, the Court finds the accused, Dolores Ocden,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Recruitment committed in large
scale as defined and penalized under Article 13(b) in relation to Articles 38(b), 34 and 39 of
the Labor Code, as amended. She is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00;
2. In Criminal Case No. 16316-R, the Court finds the accused, Dolores Ocden, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa and sentences her to an indeterminate
penalty of 2 years, 11 months, and 10 days of prision correccional, as minimum, to 7 years,
8 months, and 21 days of prision mayor, as maximum, and to indemnify Jeffries Golidan the
amount of P40,000.00;

3. In Criminal Case No. 16318-R, the Court finds the accused, Dolores Ocden, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa and sentences her to an indeterminate
penalty of 2 years, 11 months, and 10 days of prision correccional, as minimum, to 7 years,
8 months, and 21 days of prision mayor, as maximum, and to indemnify Howard Golidan the
amount of P40,000.00; and

4. In Criminal Case No. 16964-R, the Court finds the accused, Dolores Ocden, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa and sentences her to an indeterminate
penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years, 8 months,
and 21 days of prision mayor, as maximum, and to indemnify Rizalina Ferrer the amount of
P70,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

CASE:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Petitioner,

- versus -

RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT,

Accused-Appellant,

FIDES PACARDO y JUNGCO and PILAR MANTA y DUNGO,

Accused.

G.R. No. 187730

Promulgated:

June 29, 2010

The Case

This is an appeal from the Decision[1] dated December 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02764 entitled People of the Philippines v. Rodolfo Gallo y
Gadot (accused-appellant), Fides Pacardo y Jungco and Pilar Manta y Dungo (accused),
which affirmed the Decision[2] dated March 15, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 30 in Manila which convicted the accused-appellant Rodolfo Gallo y Gadot (accused-
appellant) of syndicated illegal recruitment in Criminal Case No. 02-206293 and estafa in
Criminal Case No. 02-206297.

The Facts

Originally, accused-appellant Gallo and accused Fides Pacardo (Pacardo) and Pilar Manta
(Manta), together with Mardeolyn Martir (Mardeolyn) and nine (9) others, were charged with
syndicated illegal recruitment and eighteen (18) counts of estafa committed against eighteen
complainants, including Edgardo V. Dela Caza (Dela Caza), Sandy Guantero (Guantero)
and Danilo Sare (Sare). The cases were respectively docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 02-
2062936 to 02-206311. However, records reveal that only Criminal Case No. 02-206293,
which was filed against accused-appellant Gallo, Pacardo and Manta for syndicated illegal
recruitment, and Criminal Case Nos. 02-206297, 02-206300 and 02-206308, which were
filed against accused-appellant Gallo, Pacardo and Manta for estafa, proceeded to trial due
to the fact that the rest of the accused remained at large. Further, the other cases, Criminal
Case Nos. 02-206294 to 02-206296, 02-206298 to 02-206299, 02-206301 to 02-206307 and
02-206309 to 02-206311 were likewise provisionally dismissed upon motion of Pacardo,
Manta and accused-appellant for failure of the respective complainants in said cases to
appear and testify during trial.

It should also be noted that after trial, Pacardo and Manta were acquitted in Criminal Case
Nos. 02-206293, 02-206297, 02-206300 and 02-206308 for insufficiency of evidence.
Likewise, accused-appellant Gallo was similarly acquitted in Criminal Case Nos. 02-206300,
the case filed by Guantero, and 02-206308, the case filed by Sare. However, accused-
appellant was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case Nos. 02-206293 and
02-206297, both filed by Dela Caza, for syndicated illegal recruitment and estafa,
respectively.

Thus, the present appeal concerns solely accused-appellants conviction for syndicated
illegal recruitment in Criminal Case No. 02-206293 and for estafa in Criminal Case No. 02-
206297.

In Criminal Case No. 02-206293, the information charges the accused-appellant, together
with the others, as follows:

The undersigned accuses MARDEOLYN MARTIR, ISMAEL GALANZA, NELMAR MARTIR,

MARCELINO MARTIR, NORMAN MARTIR, NELSON MARTIR, MA. CECILIA M. RAMOS,
LULU MENDANES, FIDES PACARDO y JUNGCO, RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT, PILAR
MANTA y DUNGO, ELEONOR PANUNCIO and YEO SIN UNG of a violation of Section 6(a),
(l) and (m) of Republic Act 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipino Workers Act of 1995, committed by a syndicate and in large scale, as follows:

That in or about and during the period comprised between November 2000 and December,
2001, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and
confederating together and helping with one another, representing themselves to have the
capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then
and there willfully and unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement
abroad to FERDINAND ASISTIN, ENTICE BRENDO, REYMOND G. CENA, EDGARDO V.
DELA CAZA, RAYMUND EDAYA, SANDY O. GUANTENO, RENATO V. HUFALAR, ELENA
JUBICO, LUPO A. MANALO, ALMA V. MENOR, ROGELIO S. MORON, FEDILA G. NAIPA,
OSCAR RAMIREZ, MARISOL L. SABALDAN, DANILO SARE, MARY BETH SARDON,
JOHNNY SOLATORIO and JOEL TINIO in Korea as factory workers and charge or accept
directly or indirectly from said FERDINAND ASISTIN the amount of P45,000.00; ENTICE
BRENDO P35,000.00; REYMOND G. CENA P30,000.00; EDGARDO V. DELA CAZA
P45,000.00; RAYMUND EDAYA P100,000.00; SANDY O. GUANTENO P35,000.00;
RENATO V. HUFALAR P70,000.00; ELENA JUBICO P30,000.00; LUPO A. MANALO
P75,000.00; ALMA V. MENOR P45,000.00; ROGELIO S. MORON P70,000.00; FEDILA G.
NAIPA P45,000.00; OSCAR RAMIREZ P45,000.00; MARISOL L. SABALDAN P75,000.00;
DANILO SARE P100,000.00; MARY BETH SARDON P25,000.00; JOHNNY SOLATORIO
P35,000.00; and JOEL TINIO P120,000.00 as placement fees in connection with their
overseas employment, which amounts are in excess of or greater than those specified in the
schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the POEA Board Resolution No. 02, Series 1998,
and without valid reasons and without the fault of the said complainants failed to actually
deploy them and failed to reimburse the expenses incurred by the said complainants in
connection with their documentation and processing for purposes of their deployment.[3]
(Emphasis supplied)

In Criminal Case No. 02-206297, the information reads:

That on or about May 28, 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
conspiring and confederating together and helping with [sic] one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud EDGARDO V. DELA CAZA, in the following
manner, to wit: the said accused by means of false manifestations and fraudulent
representations which they made to the latter, prior to and even simultaneous with the
commission of the fraud, to the effect that they had the power and capacity to recruit and
employ said EDGARDO V. DELA CAZA in Korea as factory worker and could facilitate the
processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the requirements
thereof; induced and succeeded in inducing said EDGARDO V. DELA CAZA to give and
deliver, as in fact, he gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P45,000.00 on the
strength of said manifestations and representations, said accused well knowing that the
same were false and untrue and were made [solely] for the purpose of obtaining, as in fact
they did obtain the said amount of P45,000.00 which amount once in their possession, with
intent to defraud said [EDGARDO] V. DELA CAZA, they willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said amount of P45,000.00 to their own
personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said EDGARDO V. DELA
CAZA in the aforesaid amount of P45,000.00, Philippine currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

When arraigned on January 19, 2004, accused-appellant Gallo entered a plea of not guilty to
all charges.

On March 3, 2004, the pre-trial was terminated and trial ensued, thereafter.
During the trial, the prosecution presented as their witnesses, Armando Albines Roa, the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) representative and private
complainants Dela Caza, Guanteno and Sare. On the other hand, the defense presented as
its witnesses, accused-appellant Gallo, Pacardo and Manta.

Version of the Prosecution

On May 22, 2001, Dela Caza was introduced by Eleanor Panuncio to accused-appellant
Gallo, Pacardo, Manta, Mardeolyn, Lulu Mendanes, Yeo Sin Ung and another Korean
national at the office of MPM International Recruitment and Promotion Agency (MPM
Agency) located in Malate, Manila.

Dela Caza was told that Mardeolyn was the President of MPM Agency, while Nelmar Martir
was one of the incorporators. Also, that Marcelino Martir, Norman Martir, Nelson Martir and
Ma. Cecilia Ramos were its board members. Lulu Mendanes acted as the cashier and
accountant, while Pacardo acted as the agencys employee who was in charge of the records
of the applicants. Manta, on the other hand, was also an employee who was tasked to
deliver documents to the Korean embassy.

Accused-appellant Gallo then introduced himself as a relative of Mardeolyn and informed

Dela Caza that the agency was able to send many workers abroad. Together with Pacardo
and Manta, he also told Dela Caza about the placement fee of One Hundred Fifty Thousand
Pesos (PhP 150,000) with a down payment of Forty-Five Thousand Pesos (PhP 45,000) and
the balance to be paid through salary deduction.

Dela Caza, together with the other applicants, were briefed by Mardeolyn about the
processing of their application papers for job placement in Korea as a factory worker and
their possible salary. Accused Yeo Sin Ung also gave a briefing about the business and
what to expect from the company and the salary.

With accused-appellants assurance that many workers have been sent abroad, as well as
the presence of the two (2) Korean nationals and upon being shown the visas procured for
the deployed workers, Dela Caza was convinced to part with his money. Thus, on May 29,
2001, he paid Forty-Five Thousand Pesos (PhP 45,000) to MPM Agency through accused-
appellant Gallo who, while in the presence of Pacardo, Manta and Mardeolyn, issued and
signed Official Receipt No. 401.

Two (2) weeks after paying MPM Agency, Dela Caza went back to the agencys office in
Malate, Manila only to discover that the office had moved to a new location at Batangas
Street, Brgy. San Isidro, Makati. He proceeded to the new address and found out that the
agency was renamed to New Filipino Manpower Development & Services, Inc. (New
Filipino). At the new office, he talked to Pacardo, Manta, Mardeolyn, Lulu Mendanes and
accused-appellant Gallo. He was informed that the transfer was done for easy accessibility
to clients and for the purpose of changing the name of the agency.

Dela Caza decided to withdraw his application and recover the amount he paid but
Mardeolyn, Pacardo, Manta and Lulu Mendanes talked him out from pursuing his decision.
On the other hand, accused-appellant Gallo even denied any knowledge about the money.
After two (2) more months of waiting in vain to be deployed, Dela Caza and the other
applicants decided to take action. The first attempt was unsuccessful because the agency
again moved to another place. However, with the help of the Office of Ambassador Seeres
and the Western Police District, they were able to locate the new address at 500 Prudential
Building, Carriedo, Manila. The agency explained that it had to move in order to separate
those who are applying as entertainers from those applying as factory workers. Accused-
appellant Gallo, together with Pacardo and Manta, were then arrested.

The testimony of prosecution witness Armando Albines Roa, a POEA employee, was
dispensed with after the prosecution and defense stipulated and admitted to the existence of
the following documents:

1. Certification issued by Felicitas Q. Bay, Director II, Licensing Branch of the POEA to
the effect that New Filipino Manpower Development & Services, Inc., with office address at
1256 Batangas St., Brgy. San Isidro, Makati City, was a licensed landbased agency whose
license expired on December 10, 2001 and was delisted from the roster of licensed agencies
on December 14, 2001. It further certified that Fides J. Pacardo was the agencys
Recruitment Officer;

2. Certification issued by Felicitas Q. Bay of the POEA to the effect that MPM
International Recruitment and Promotion is not licensed by the POEA to recruit workers for
overseas employment;

3. Certified copy of POEA Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of 1999 regarding
placement fee ceiling for landbased workers.

4. Certified copy of POEA Memorandum Circular No. 09, Series of 1998 on the
placement fee ceiling for Taiwan and Korean markets, and

5. Certified copy of POEA Governing Board Resolution No. 02, series of 1998.

Version of the Defense

For his defense, accused-appellant denied having any part in the recruitment of Dela Caza.
In fact, he testified that he also applied with MPM Agency for deployment to Korea as a
factory worker. According to him, he gave his application directly with Mardeolyn because
she was his town mate and he was allowed to pay only Ten Thousand Pesos (PhP 10,000)
as processing fee. Further, in order to facilitate the processing of his papers, he agreed to
perform some tasks for the agency, such as taking photographs of the visa and passport of
applicants, running errands and performing such other tasks assigned to him, without salary
except for some allowance. He said that he only saw Dela Caza one or twice at the agencys
office when he applied for work abroad. Lastly, that he was also promised deployment
abroad but it never materialized.

Ruling of the Trial Court

On March 15, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision convicting the accused of syndicated
illegal recruitment and estafa. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

I. Accused FIDES PACARDO y JUNGO and PILAR MANTA y DUNGO are

hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-206293, 02-206297,
02-206300 and 02-206308;

II. Accused RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
in Criminal Case No. 02-206293 of the crime of Illegal Recruitment committed by a syndicate
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of ONE
MILLION (Php1,000,000.00) PESOS. He is also ordered to indemnify EDGARDO DELA
CAZA of the sum of FORTY-FIVE THOUSAND (Php45,000.00) PESOS with legal interest
from the filing of the information on September 18, 2002 until fully paid.

III. Accused RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT in Criminal Case No. 02-206297 is

likewise found guilty and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of FOUR
(4) years of prision correccional as minimum to NINE (9) years of prision mayor as
maximum.

IV. Accused RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime

charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-206300 and 02-206308.

Let alias warrants for the arrest of the other accused be issued anew in all the criminal
cases. Pending their arrest, the cases are sent to the archives.

The immediate release of accused Fides Pacardo and Pilar Manta is hereby ordered unless
detained for other lawful cause or charge.

SO ORDERED.[5]

Ruling of the Appellate Court

On appeal, the CA, in its Decision dated December 24, 2008, disposed of the case as
follows:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 30, in
Criminal Cases Nos. 02-206293 and 02-206297, dated March 15, 2007, is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case No. 02-206297, for estafa, appellant is sentenced
to four (4) years of prision correccional to ten (10) years of prision mayor.

SO ORDERED.[6]

The CA held the totality of the prosecutions evidence showed that the accused-appellant,
together with others, engaged in the recruitment of Dela Caza. His actions and
representations to Dela Caza can hardly be construed as the actions of a mere errand boy.

As determined by the appellate court, the offense is considered economic sabotage having
been committed by more than three (3) persons, namely, accused-appellant Gallo,
Mardeolyn, Eleonor Panuncio and Yeo Sin Ung. More importantly, a personal found guilty of
illegal recruitment may also be convicted of estafa.[7] The same evidence proving accused-
appellants commission of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale also establishes his
liability for estafa under paragragh 2(a) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

On January 15, 2009, the accused-appellant filed a timely appeal before this Court.

The Issues
Accused-appellant interposes in the present appeal the following assignment of errors:

The court a quo gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of illegal recruitment
committed by a syndicate despite the failure of the prosecution to prove the same beyond
reasonable doubt.

II

The court a quo gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of estafa despite the
failure of the prosecution to prove the same beyond reasonable doubt.

Our Ruling
The appeal has no merit.

Evidence supports conviction of the crime of Syndicated Illegal Recruitment

Accused-appellant avers that he cannot be held criminally liable for illegal recruitment
because he was neither an officer nor an employee of the recruitment agency. He alleges
that the trial court erred in adopting the asseveration of the private complainant that he was
indeed an employee because such was not duly supported by competent evidence.
According to him, even assuming that he was an employee, such cannot warrant his outright
conviction sans evidence that he acted in conspiracy with the officers of the agency.

We disagree.

To commit syndicated illegal recruitment, three elements must be established: (1) the
offender undertakes either any activity within the meaning of recruitment and placement
defined under Article 13(b), or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Art. 34 of
the Labor Code; (2) he has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to
lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers;[8] and (3) the illegal recruitment is
committed by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one
another.[9] When illegal recruitment is committed by a syndicate or in large scale, i.e., if it is
committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group, it is considered an
offense involving economic sabotage.[10]

Under Art. 13(b) of the Labor Code, recruitment and placement refers to any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and
includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not.

After a thorough review of the records, we believe that the prosecution was able to establish
the elements of the offense sufficiently. The evidence readily reveals that MPM Agency was
never licensed by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment.

Even with a license, however, illegal recruitment could still be committed under Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 8042 (R.A. 8042), otherwise known as the Migrants and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995, viz:

Sec. 6. Definition. For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and
includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad,
whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority
contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise
known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-
holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more
persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall, likewise, include the following act, whether
committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of
authority:

(a) To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater than that specified in the
schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, or to
make a worker pay any amount greater than that actually received by him as a loan or
advance;

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(l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as determined by the Department of Labor
and Employment; and

(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his
documentation and processing for purposes of deployment and processing for purposes of
deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without the workers
fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered
an offense involving economic sabotage.

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3)
or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in
large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.

The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals, accomplices and
accessories. In case of juridical persons, the officers having control, management or
direction of their business shall be liable.

In the instant case, accused-appellant committed the acts enumerated in Sec. 6 of R.A.
8042. Testimonial evidence presented by the prosecution clearly shows that, in
consideration of a promise of foreign employment, accused-appellant received the amount of
Php 45,000.00 from Dela Caza. When accused-appellant made misrepresentations
concerning the agencys purported power and authority to recruit for overseas employment,
and in the process, collected money in the guise of placement fees, the former clearly
committed acts constitutive of illegal recruitment.[11] Such acts were accurately described in
the testimony of prosecution witness, Dela Caza, to wit:

Essentially, Dela Caza appeared very firm and consistent in positively identifying accused-
appellant as one of those who induced him and the other applicants to part with their money.
His testimony showed that accused-appellant made false misrepresentations and promises
in assuring them that after they paid the placement fee, jobs in Korea as factory workers
were waiting for them and that they would be deployed soon. In fact, Dela Caza personally
talked to accused-appellant and gave him the money and saw him sign and issue an official
receipt as proof of his payment. Without a doubt, accused-appellants actions constituted
illegal recruitment.

Additionally, accused-appellant cannot argue that the trial court erred in finding that he was
indeed an employee of the recruitment agency. On the contrary, his active participation in
the illegal recruitment is unmistakable. The fact that he was the one who issued and signed
the official receipt belies his profession of innocence.

This Court likewise finds the existence of a conspiracy between the accused-appellant and
the other persons in the agency who are currently at large, resulting in the commission of the
crime of syndicated illegal recruitment.

In this case, it cannot be denied that the accused-appellent together with Mardeolyn and the
rest of the officers and employees of MPM Agency participated in a network of deception.
Verily, the active involvement of each in the recruitment scam was directed at one single
purpose to divest complainants with their money on the pretext of guaranteed employment
abroad. The prosecution evidence shows that complainants were briefed by Mardeolyn
about the processing of their papers for a possible job opportunity in Korea, as well as their
possible salary. Likewise, Yeo Sin Ung, a Korean national, gave a briefing about the
business and what to expect from the company. Then, here comes accused-appellant who
introduced himself as Mardeolyns relative and specifically told Dela Caza of the fact that the
agency was able to send many workers abroad. Dela Caza was even showed several
workers visas who were already allegedly deployed abroad. Later on, accused-appellant
signed and issued an official receipt acknowledging the down payment of Dela Caza.
Without a doubt, the nature and extent of the actions of accused-appellant, as well as with
the other persons in MPM Agency clearly show unity of action towards a common
undertaking. Hence, conspiracy is evidently present.

In People v. Gamboa,[13] this Court discussed the nature of conspiracy in the context of
illegal recruitment, viz:

Conspiracy to defraud aspiring overseas contract workers was evident from the acts of the
malefactors whose conduct before, during and after the commission of the crime clearly
indicated that they were one in purpose and united in its execution. Direct proof of previous
agreement to commit a crime is not necessary as it may be deduced from the mode and
manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused
pointing to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. As such,
all the accused, including accused-appellant, are equally guilty of the crime of illegal
recruitment since in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all.

To reiterate, in establishing conspiracy, it is not essential that there be actual proof that all
the conspirators took a direct part in every act. It is sufficient that they acted in concert
pursuant to the same objective.[14]

Estafa

The prosecution likewise established that accused-appellant is guilty of the crime of estafa
as defined under Article 315 paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, viz:

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any means mentioned
hereinbelow

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2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar
deceits.

The elements of estafa in general are: (1) that the accused defrauded another (a) by abuse
of confidence, or (b) by means of deceit; and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.[15] Deceit is the false
representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading
allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed; and which
deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it, to his legal injury.

All these elements are present in the instant case: the accused-appellant, together with the
other accused at large, deceived the complainants into believing that the agency had the
power and capability to send them abroad for employment; that there were available jobs for
them in Korea as factory workers; that by reason or on the strength of such assurance, the
complainants parted with their money in payment of the placement fees; that after receiving
the money, accused-appellant and his co-accused went into hiding by changing their office
locations without informing complainants; and that complainants were never deployed
abroad. As all these representations of the accused-appellant proved false, paragraph 2(a),
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code is thus applicable.

Defense of Denial Cannot Prevail

over Positive Identification

 Indubitably, accused-appellants denial of the crimes charged crumbles in the face of the
positive identification made by Dela Caza and his co-complainants as one of the
perpetrators of the crimes charged. As enunciated by this Court in People v. Abolidor,[16]
[p]ositive identification where categorical and consistent and not attended by any showing of
ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses on the matter prevails over alibi and denial.

The defense has miserably failed to show any evidence of ill motive on the part of the
prosecution witnesses as to falsely testify against him.

Therefore, between the categorical statements of the prosecution witnesses, on the one
hand, and bare denials of the accused, on the other hand, the former must prevail.[17]

Moreover, this Court accords the trial courts findings with the probative weight it deserves in
the absence of any compelling reason to discredit the same. It is a fundamental judicial
dictum that the findings of fact of the trial court are not disturbed on appeal except when it
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance that would have materially affected the outcome of the case. We find that the trial
court did not err in convicting the accused-appellant.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for failure to sufficiently show reversible error in the
assailed decision. The Decision dated December 24, 2008 of the CA in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 02764 is AFFIRMED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.