1. Imelda Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
disclosing its source to the parties and used it in
115132, August 9, 1995
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside as
arbitrary and in grave abuse of discretion resolutions
of the Sandiganbayan's First Division denying
petitioner's motion for leave to travel abroad for
medical treatment. The former first lady Imelda
Marcos was found guilty by the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan of violating 3 of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. After conviction she filed a
"Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad" to seek
diagnostic tests and treatment by practitioners of
oriental medicine in China allegedly because of "a
serious and life threatening medical condition
"requiring facilities not available in the Philippines
that was denied. Then she again filed an "Urgent Ex-
Parte Motion for Permission to Travel Abroad" to
undergo diagnosis and treatment in China. This was
supported by several medical reports that were
prepared by her doctor Roberto Anastacio. Again
another Motion to leave was filed by Mrs. Marcos to
US and Europe for treatment of several Heart
diseases alleging that the tests were not available
here. Thepresiding justice, Garchitorena, contacted
Dr. Gregorio B. Patacsil, Officer-in-Charge of the
Philippine Heart Center, and later wrotehim a letter,
asking for "expert opinion on coronary medicine".
The court still found no merit to allow the petitioners
motion to leaveand denied all of the motions.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and a
"Motion to Admit Clinical Summary and to Resolve
Motion for Reconsideration." Attached was a recent
medical report and letters of Vice-President Joseph E.
Estrada offering to be guarantor for the return of
petitioner and those of twenty four members of the
House of Representatives requesting the court to
allow petitioner to travel abroad. This was also
denied by the Court also stating their express
disapproval of the involvement of theVP and the
Cabinet members so as to influence the resolutions,
decisions or orders or any judicial action of
respondent court.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the Sandiganbayan erred in
disallowing the Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad
because it
(1) disregarded themedical findings
(2) it motu propio contacted a third party asking the
latter to give an opinion on petitioner's motion and
medicalfindings
(3) said that there was no necessity to get medical
treatment abroad.
HELD:
No. The contention of the petitioner that was invalid
to contact a third party asking the latter to give an
opinion on petitioner's motion and medical findings
was erroneous. Respondent court had to seek expert
opinion because petitioner's motion was based onthe
advice of her physician. The court could not be
expected to just accept the opinion of petitioner's
physician in resolving her request for permission to
travel. What would be objectionable would be if
respondent court obtained information without
deciding a case against them. In disregarding the
medical reports, the petitioner failed to prove the
necessity for a trip abroad. It should be emphasized
that considering the fact that she is facing charges
before the courts in several cases, in two of which she
was convicted although the decision is still pending
reconsideration, petitioner did not have an absolute
right to leave the country and the burden was on her
to prove that because of danger to health if not to her
life there was necessity to seek medical treatment in
foreign countries. On the third issue, the Court
ordered petitioner to undergo several tests which
summarily states that the required medical treatment
was available here in the Philippines and that the
expertise and facilities here were more than
adequate to cater to her medical treatment. The heart
ailments of the petitioner were not as severe as that
was reported by Dr. Anastacio.
Wherefore, the petition is Dismissed without
prejudice to the filling of another motion for leave to
travel abroad, should petitioner still desire, based on
her heart condition. In such an event the
determination of her medical condition should be
made by joint panel of medical specialists
recommended by both the accused and the
prosecution.
Discussion on Right to Travel
Considering the foregoing we cannot say that
respondent court trifled with petitioner's
constitutionally guaranteed right to life,
health and liberty. What petitioner denounces
as the "unusual and unorthodox conduct of
the trial" by the court's Presiding Justice
owed more, it would seem, from the latter's
robust and rather active personality rather
than to any ill motive or hostility he
entertained toward petitioner, the latter's
counsel or her witnesses. It is matter of
record that on three different occasions,
petitioner had been permitted to travel
abroad. But her later conviction in two cases
dictated the need for greater caution. To be
sure, conviction is not yet final view of a
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner.
But a person's right to travel is subject to the
usual constraints imposed by the very
necessity of safeguarding the system of
justice. In such cases, whether the accused
should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction
for humanitarian reason is a matter of the
court's sound discretion.
This Court quoted the following from Justice
Labrador's opinion Ventura v. Judge Yatco:
While judges should as much as possible
refrain from showing partiality to one party
and hostility to another, it does not mean that
a trial judge should keep mum throughout the
trial and allow parties to ask the questions
that they desire, on issues which they think
are the important issues, when the former are
Page 1 of 9
improper and the latter, immaterial. If trials
are to be expedited, judges must take a
leading part therein, by directing counsel to
submit the evidence on the facts in the
dispute by asking clarifying questions, and by
showing an interest in a fast and fair trial.
Judges are not mere referees like those of a
boxing bout, only to watch and decide the
result of a game; they should have as much
interest as counsel in the orderly and
expeditious presentation of evidence, calling
attention of counsel to point at issue that are
overlooked, directing them to ask the
question that would elicit the fact on the
issues involved, clarifying ambiguous
remarks by witnesses, etc. Unless they take
an active part in trials in the above form and
manner, and allow counsel to ask questions
whether pertinent or impertinent, material or
immaterial, the speedy administration of
justice which is the aim of the Government
and of the people cannot be attained. Counsel
should, therefore, not resent any interest that
the judge takes in the conduct of the trial,
they should be glad that a trial judge takes
such interest and help in the determination of
truth.

Page 2 of 9
2. Yap vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 141529, June 6, 2001
FACTS:
The right against excessive bail, and the liberty of
abode and travel, are being invoked to set aside two
resolutions of the Court of Appeals which fixed bail at
P5,500,000.00 and imposed conditions on change of
residence and travel abroad. For misappropriating
amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00, petitioner was
convicted of estafa and was sentenced to four years
and two months of prision correccional, as minimum,
to eight years of prision mayor as maximum, “in
addition to one (1) year for each additional
P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 but in no case
shall it exceed twenty (20) years.” He filed a notice of
appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional liberty
under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the
proceedings.
ISSUE:
Was the condition imposed by the CA on accused’s
bail bond violative the liberty of abode and right to
travel?
HELD: Imposing bail in an excessive amount could
render meaningless the right to bail. Under the
circumstances of this case, we find that appropriate
conditions have been imposed in the bail bond to
ensure against the risk of flight, particularly, the
combination of the hold-departure order and the
requirement that petitioner inform the court of any
change of residence and of his whereabouts.
Although an increase in the amount of bail while the
case is on appeal may be meritorious, we find that the
setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is
unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective
denial of petitioner’s right to bail.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
Petitioners bail pending appeal is reduced from
P5,500,000.00 to P200,000.00. In all other respects,
the resolutions of the Court of Appeals, dated October
6, 1999 and November 25, 1999, respectively, are
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
Discussion
The purpose for bail is to guarantee the
appearance of the accused at the trial,] or
whenever so required by the court The
amount should be high enough to assure the
presence of the accused when required but
no higher than is reasonably calculated to
fulfill this purpose. To fix bail at an amount
equivalent to the civil liability of which
petitioner is charged (in this case,
P5,500,000.00) is to permit the impression
that the amount paid as bail is an exaction of
the civil liability that accused is charged of;
this we cannot allow because bail is not
intended as a punishment, nor as a
satisfaction of civil liability which should
necessarily await the judgment of the
appellate court.
At the same time, we cannot yield to
petitioners submission that bail in the instant
case be set at P40,000.00 based on the 1996
Bail Bond Guide. (The current Bail Bond
Guide, issued on August 29, 2000, maintains
recommended bail at P40,000.00 for estafa
where the amount of fraud is P142,000.00 or
over and the imposable penalty 20 years of
reclusion temporal). True, the Court has held
that the Bail Bond Guide, a circular of the
Department of Justice for the guidance of
state prosecutors, although technically not
binding upon the courts, merits attention,
being in a sense an expression of policy of the
Executive Branch, through the Department of
Justice, in the enforcement of criminal laws.
Thus, courts are advised that they must not
only be aware but should also consider the
Bail Bond Guide due to its significance in the
administration of criminal justice. This
notwithstanding, the Court is not precluded
from imposing in petitioners case an amount
higher than P40,000.00 (based on the Bail
Bond Guide) where it perceives that an
appropriate increase is dictated by the
circumstances.
It militates emphasis that petitioner is
seeking bail on appeal. Section 5, Rule 114 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is
clear that although the grant of bail on appeal
in non-capital offenses is discretionary, when
the penalty imposed on the convicted accused
exceeds six years and circumstances exist
that point to the probability of flight if
released on bail, then the accused must be
denied bail, or his bail previously granted
should be cancelled. In the same vein, the
Court has held that the discretion to extend
bail during the course of the appeal should be
exercised with grave caution and for strong
reasons, considering that the accused had
been in fact convicted by the trial court.[19]
In an earlier case, the Court adopted Senator
Vicente J. Francisco’s disquisition on why bail
should be denied after judgment of conviction
as a matter of wise discretion; thus:
The importance attached to conviction is due
to the underlying principle that bail should be
granted only where it is uncertain whether
the accused is guilty or innocent, and
therefore, where that uncertainty is removed
by conviction it would, generally speaking, be
absurd to admit to bail. After a person has
been tried and convicted the presumption of
innocence which may be relied upon in prior
applications is rebutted, and the burden is
upon the accused to show error in the
conviction. From another point of view it may
be properly argued that the probability of
ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the
conviction that the accused is much more
likely to attempt to escape if liberated on bail
than before conviction. xxx [20]
Page 3 of 9
3. Marcos vs. Manglapus
G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989
FACTS:
This case involves a petition of mandamus and
prohibition asking the court to order the respondents
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel
documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate
members of his family and to enjoin the
implementation of the President's decision to bar
their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that
the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines
is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically
Sections 1and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is
without power to impair the liberty of abode of the
Marcoses because only a court may do so within the
limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair
their right to travel because no law has authorized
her to do so. They further assert that under
international law, their right to return to the
Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
which has been ratified by the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted
by the constitution, the President (Aquino) may
prohibit the Marcoses fromreturning to the
Philippines.
HELD:
It must be emphasized that the individual right
involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines
to other countries or within the Philippines. These
are what the right to travel would normally connote.
Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the
right to return to one's country, a distinct right under
international law, independent from although related
to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of
movement and abode within the territory of a state,
the right to leave the country, and the right to enter
one's country as separate and distinct rights. What
the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of
movement and residence within the borders of each
state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees
the right to liberty of movement and freedom to
choose his residence and the right to be free to leave
any country, including his own. Such rights may only
be restricted by laws protecting the national security,
public order, public health or morals or the separate
rights of others. However, right to enter one's
country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be
therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to
the right to return to ones country in the same
context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode
and the right to travel. The Bill of rights treats only
the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a
well-considered view that the right to return may be
considered, as a generally accepted principle of
International Law and under our Constitution as part
of the law of the land. The court held that President
did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of
discretion in determining that the return of the
Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious
threat to national interest and welfare. President
Aquino has determined that the destabilization
caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe
away the gains achieved during the past few years
after the Marcos regime. The return of the Marcoses
poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their
return to the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered
opinion that the President did not act arbitrarily or
with grave abuse of discretion in determining that
the return of former President Marcos and his family
at the present time and under present circumstances
poses a serious threat to national interest and
welfare and in prohibiting their return to the
Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Discussion on Right to Travel
The right to return to one's country is not
among the rights specifically guaranteed in
the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the
liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it
is our well-considered view that the right to
return may be considered, as a generally
accepted principle of international law and,
under our Constitution, is part of the law of
the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.]
However, it is distinct and separate from the
right to travel and enjoys a different
protection under the International Covenant
of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being
"arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
Thus, the rulings in the cases Kent and Haig
which refer to the issuance of passports for
the purpose of effectively exercising the right
to travel are not determinative of this case
and are only tangentially material insofar as
they relate to a conflict between executive
action and the exercise of a protected right.
The issue before the Court is novel and
without precedent in Philippine, and even in
American jurisprudence.
Consequently, resolution by the Court of the
well-debated issue of whether or not there
can be limitations on the right to travel in the
absence of legislation to that effect is
rendered unnecessary. An appropriate case
for its resolution will have to be awaited.
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Cruz
It is my belief that the petitioner, as a citizen
of the Philippines, is entitled to return to and
live-and die-in his own country. I say this
with a heavy heart but say it nonetheless.
That conviction is not diminished one whit
simply because many believe Marcos to be
beneath contempt and undeserving of the
very liberties he flounted when he was the
absolute ruler of this land.
The right of the United States government to
detain him is not the question before us, nor
Page 4 of 9
can we resolve it. The question we must
answer is whether or not, assuming that
Marcos is permitted to leave Hawaii (which
may depend on the action we take today), the
respondents have acted with grave abuse of
discretion in barring him from his own
country.
My reluctant conclusion is that they have,
absent the proof they said they were
prepared to offer, but could not, that the
petitioner's return would prejudice the
security of the State.
I was the one who, in the open hearing held
on June 27,1989, asked the Solicitor General if
the government was prepared to prove the
justification for opposing the herein petition,
i. that it had not acted arbitrarily. He said it
was. Accordingly, the Court, appreciating the
classified nature of the information expected,
scheduled a closed-door hearing on July
25,1988. The Solicitor General and three
representatives from the military appeared
for the respondents, together with former
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino, representing the
petitioners.
In about two hours of briefing, the
government failed dismally to show that the
return of Marcos dead or alive would pose a
threat to the national security as it had
alleged. The fears expressed by its
representatives were based on mere
conjectures of political and economic
destabilization without any single piece of
concrete evidence to back up their
apprehensions.
Amazingly, however, the majority has come
to the conclusion that there exist "factual
bases for the President's decision" to bar
Marcos's return. That is not my recollection of
the impressions of the Court after that
hearing.
In holding that the President of the
Philippines has residual powers in addition to
the specific powers granted by the
Constitution, the Court is taking a great leap
backward and reinstating the discredited
doctrine announced in Planas v. Gil (67 Phil.
62). This does not square with the announced
policy of the Constitutional Commission,
which was precisely to limit rather than
expand presidential powers, as a reaction to
the excesses of the past dictatorship.
I can only repeat Justice Black's wry
observation in the Steel Seizure Case (343
U.S. 579) that if it was true that the President
had been granted the totality of executive
power, "it is difficult to see why our
forefathers bothered to add several specific
items, including some trifling ones, . . . I
cannot accept the view that this clause is a
grant in bulk of all conceivable executive
power but regard it as an allocation to the
presidential office of the generic powers
thereafter stated."
I have no illusion that the stand I am taking
will be met with paeans of praise, considering
that Marcos is perhaps the most detested man
in the entire history of our country. But we
are not concerned here with popularity and
personalities. As a judge, I am not swayed by
what Justice Cardozo called the "hooting
throng" that may make us see things through
the prisms of prejudice. I bear in mind that
when I sit in judgment as a member of this
Court, I must cast all personal feelings aside.
The issue before us must be resolved with
total objectivity, on the basis only of the
established facts and the applicable law and
not of wounds that still fester and scars that
have not healed. And not even of fear, for fear
is a phantom. That phantom did not rise
when the people stood fast at EDSA against
the threat of total massacre in defense at last
of their freedom.
I cannot turn back on the lessons of liberty
that I taught for more than three decades as a
professor of Constitutional Law. These
principles have not changed simply because I
am now on the Court or a new administration
is in power and the shoe is on the other foot.
Like the martyred Ninoy Aquino who also
wanted to come back to the Philippines
against the prohibitions of the government
then, Marcos is entitled to the same right to
travel and the liberty of abode that his
adversary invoked. These rights are
guaranteed by the Constitution to all
individuals, including the patriot and the
homesick and the prodigal son returning, and
tyrants and charlatans and scoundrels of
every stripe.
I vote to grant the petition.
Page 5 of 9
4. Manotoc vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. L-62100, May 30, 1986
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with estafa. He posted bail.
Petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a
motion entitled, "motion for permission to leave the
country," stating as ground therefor his desire to go
to the United States, "relative to his business
transactions and opportunities. "The prosecution
opposed said motion and after due hearing, both trial
judges denied the same. Petitioner thus filed a
petition for certiorari and mandamus before the then
Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders dated
March 9 and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and
Pronove, respectively, as well as the communication-
request of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
denying his leave to travel abroad. He likewise
prayed for the issuance of the appropriate writ
commanding the Immigration Commissioner and the
Chief of the Aviation Security Command(AVSECOM)
to clear him for departure. The Court of Appeals
denied the petition. Petitioner contends that having
been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the
courts which granted him bail nor the Securities and
Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over
his liberty could prevent him from exercising his
constitutional right to travel.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not his constitutional right to travel has
been violated.
HELD:
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted
to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a
necessary consequence of the nature and function of
a bail bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner
to make himself available at all times whenever the
court requires his presence operates as a valid
restriction on his right to travel. Indeed, if the
accused were allowed to leave the Philippines
without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond
the reach of the courts. Petitioner has not shown the
necessity for his travel abroad. There is no indication
that the business transactions cannot be undertaken
by any other person in his behalf.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby
dismissed, with costs against petitioner.
Discussion on Right to Travel
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted
to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a
necessary consequence of the nature and function of
a bail bond.
Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail
as the security required and given for the release of a
person who is in the custody of the law, that he will
appear before any court in which his appearance may
be required as stipulated in the bail bond or
recognizance.
Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment
and the state of the burden of keeping him, pending
the trial, and at the same time, to put the accused as
much under the power of the court as if he were in
custody of the proper officer, and to secure the
appearance of the accused so as to answer the call of
the court and do what the law may require of him. 13
The condition imposed upon petitioner to make
himself available at all times whenever the court
requires his presence operates as a valid restriction
on his right to travel. As we have held in People vs. Uy
Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935).
... the result of the obligation assumed by appellee
(surety) to hold the accused amenable at all times to
the orders and processes of the lower court, was to
prohibit said accused from leaving the jurisdiction of
the Philippines, because, otherwise, said orders and
processes will be nugatory, and inasmuch as the
jurisdiction of the courts from which they issued does
not extend beyond that of the Philippines they would
have no binding force outside of said jurisdiction.
Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the
Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be
placed beyond the reach of the courts.
The effect of a recognizance or bail bond, when fully
executed or filed of record, and the prisoner released
thereunder, is to transfer the custody of the accused
from the public officials who have him in their charge
to keepers of his own selection. Such custody has
been regarded merely as a continuation of the
original imprisonment. The sureties become invested
with full authority over the person of the principal
and have the right to prevent the principal from
leaving the state.14
If the sureties have the right to prevent the principal
from leaving the state, more so then has the court
from which the sureties merely derive such right, and
whose jurisdiction over the person of the principal
remains unaffected despite the grant of bail to the
latter. In fact, this inherent right of the court is
recognized by petitioner himself, notwithstanding his
allegation that he is at total liberty to leave the
country, for he would not have filed the motion for
permission to leave the country in the first place, if it
were otherwise.
To support his contention, petitioner places reliance
upon the then Court of Appeals' ruling in People vs.
Shepherd (C.A.-G.R. No. 23505-R, February 13, 1980)
particularly citing the following passage:
... The law obliges the bondsmen to produce the
person of the appellants at the pleasure of the Court.
... The law does not limit such undertaking of the
bondsmen as demandable only when the appellants
are in the territorial confines of the Philippines and
not demandable if the appellants are out of the
country. Liberty, the most important consequence of
bail, albeit provisional, is indivisible. If granted at all,
liberty operates as fully within as without the
boundaries of the granting state. This principle
perhaps accounts for the absence of any law or
jurisprudence expressly declaring that liberty under
Page 6 of 9
bail does not transcend the territorial boundaries of
the country.
The faith reposed by petitioner on the above-quoted
opinion of the appellate court is misplaced. The
rather broad and generalized statement suffers from
a serious fallacy; for while there is, indeed, neither
law nor jurisprudence expressly declaring that
liberty under bail does not transcend the territorial
boundaries of the country, it is not for the reason
suggested by the appellate court.
As petitioner has failed to satisfy the trial courts and
the appellate court of the urgency of his travel, the
duration thereof, as well as the consent of his surety
to the proposed travel, We find no abuse of judicial
discretion in their having denied petitioner's motion
for permission to leave the country, in much the same
way, albeit with contrary results, that We found no
reversible error to have been committed by the
appellate court in allowing Shepherd to leave the
country after it had satisfied itself that she would
comply with the conditions of her bail bond.

Also, petitioner's case is not on all fours with the

Shepherd case. In the latter case, the accused was
able to show the urgent necessity for her travel
abroad, the duration thereof and the conforme of her
sureties to the proposed travel thereby satisfying the
court that she would comply with the conditions of
her bail bond. in contrast, petitioner in this case has
not satisfactorily shown any of the above. As aptly
observed by the Solicitor General in his comment:

A perusal of petitioner's 'Motion for Permission to

Leave the Country' will show that it is solely
predicated on petitioner's wish to travel to the United
States where he will, allegedly attend to some
business transactions and search for business
opportunities. From the tenor and import of
petitioner's motion, no urgent or compelling reason
can be discerned to justify the grant of judicial
imprimatur thereto. Petitioner has not sufficiently
shown that there is absolute necessity for him to
travel abroad. Petitioner's motion bears no indication
that the alleged business transactions could not be
undertaken by any other person in his behalf. Neither
is there any hint that petitioner's absence from the
United States would absolutely preclude him from
taking advantage of business opportunities therein,
nor is there any showing that petitioner's non-
presence in the United States would cause him
irreparable damage or prejudice. 15

Petitioner has not specified the duration of the

proposed travel or shown that his surety has agreed
to it. Petitioner merely alleges that his surety has
agreed to his plans as he had posted cash
indemnities. The court cannot allow the accused to
leave the country without the assent of the surety
because in accepting a bail bond or recognizance, the
government impliedly agrees "that it will not take
any proceedings with the principal that will increase
the risks of the sureties or affect their remedies
against him. Under this rule, the surety on a bail bond
or recognizance may be discharged by a stipulation
inconsistent with the conditions thereof, which is
made without his assent. This result has been
reached as to a stipulation or agreement to postpone
the trial until after the final disposition of other cases,
or to permit the principal to leave the state or
country." 16 Thus, although the order of March 26,
1982 issued by Judge Pronove has been rendered
moot and academic by the dismissal as to petitioner
of the criminal cases pending before said judge, We
see the rationale behind said order.

Page 7 of 9
5. Silverio vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 94284, April 8, 1991
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 2 (4)
of the revised securities act. Respondent filed to
cancel the passport of the petitioner and to issue a
hold departure order. The RTC ordered the DFA to
cancel petitioner’s passport, based on the finding that
the petitioner has not been arraigned and there was
evidence to show that the accused has left the
country without the knowledge and the permission
of the court.
ISSUE: Whether or Not the right to travel may be
impaired by order of the court.
HELD:
The bail bond posted by petitioner has been
cancelled and warrant of arrest has been issued by
reason that he failed to appear at his arraignments.
There is a valid restriction on the right to travel, it is
imposed that the accused must make himself
available whenever the court requires his presence. A
person facing criminal charges may be restrained by
the Court from leaving the country or, if abroad,
compelled to return (Constitutional Law, Cruz,
Isagani A., 1987 Edition, p.138). So it is also that "An
accused released on bail may be re-arrested without
the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart
from the Philippines without prior permission of the
Court where the case is pending (ibid., Sec. 20
[2ndpar. ]). Article III, Section 6 of the 1987
Constitution should be interpreted to mean that
while the liberty of travel may be impaired even
without Court Order, the appropriate executive
officers or administrative authorities are not armed
with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They
can impose limits only on the basis of "national
security, public safety, or public health" and "as
maybe provided by law," a limitive phrase which did
not appear in the 1973 text(The Constitution, Bernas,
Joaquin G.,S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p. 263).
Apparently, the phraseology in the1987 Constitution
was a reaction to the ban on international travel
imposed under the previous regime when there was
a Travel Processing Center, which issued certificates
of eligibility to travel upon application of an
interested party (See Salonga vs. Hermoso & Travel
Processing Center, No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97
SCRA 121).Holding an accused in a criminal case
within the reach of the Courts by preventing his
departure from the Philippines must be considered
as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he
may be dealt with in accordance with law. The
offended party in any criminal proceeding is the
People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest
that criminal prosecutions should run their course
and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an
accused holding himself amenable at all times to
Court Orders and processes.
WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner, Ricardo C.
Silverio.
Discussion on Right to Travel
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution
should by no means be construed as
delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to
use all means necessary to carry their orders
into effect in criminal cases pending before
them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred
on a Court or judicial officer, all auxillary
writs, process and other means necessary to
carry it into effect may be employed by such
Court or officer (Rule 135, Section 6, Rules of
Court).
Petitioner's argument that the ruling in
Manotoc, Jr., v. Court of Appeals, et al. (supra),
to the effect that the condition imposed upon
an accused admitted to bail to make himself
available at all times whenever the Court
requires his presence operates as a valid
restriction on the right to travel no longer
holds under the 1987 Constitution, is far from
tenable. The nature and function of a bail
bond has remained unchanged whether
under the 1935, the 1973, or the 1987
Constitution. Besides, the Manotoc ruling on
that point was but a re-affirmation of that laid
down long before in People v. Uy Tuising, 61
Phil. 404 (1935).
Petitioner is facing a criminal charge. He has
posted bail but has violated the conditions
thereof by failing to appear before the Court
when required. Warrants for his arrest have
been issued. Those orders and processes
would be rendered nugatory if an accused
were to be allowed to leave or to remain, at
his pleasure, outside the territorial confines
of the country. Holding an accused in a
criminal case within the reach of the Courts
by preventing his departure from the
Philippines must be considered as a valid
restriction on his right to travel so that he
may be dealt with in accordance with law.
The offended party in any criminal
proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It
is to their best interest that criminal
prosecutions should run their course and
proceed to finality without undue delay, with
an accused holding himself amenable at all
times to Court Orders and processes.
Page 8 of 9
6. Defensor-Santiago vs. Vasquez,
G.R. No. 99289-90, January 27, 1993
FACTS:
An information was filed against petitioner with the
Sandiganbayan for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. The order of arrest was issued
with bail for release fixed at Php.15,000 so she filed a
motion for acceptance of cash bail bond. On the same
day the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution
authorizing the petitioner to post cash bond which
the later filed in the amount of Php.15, 000. Her
arraignment was set, but petitioner asked for the
cancellation of her bail bond and that she be allowed
provisional release on recognizance. The
Sandiganbayan deferred it. The Sandiganbayan
issued a hold departure order against petitioner, by
reason of the announcement she made that she
would be leaving for the U.S. to accept a fellowship a
Harvard. In the instant motion she submitted before
the S.C. she argues that her right to travel is impaired.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the petitioner’s right to travel is
impaired.
HELD:
The petitioner does not deny and as a matter of fact
even made a public statement, that she has every
intension of leaving the country to pursue higher
studies abroad. The court upholds the course of
action of the Sandiganbayan in taking judicial notice
of such fact of petitioners pal to go abroad and in
thereafter issuing a sua sponte the hold departure
order is but an exercise of respondent court’s
inherent power to preserve and to maintain
effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the
person of the accused. Also, the petitioner assumed
obligations, when she posted bail bond. She holds
herself amenable at all times to the orders and
process of the court. She may legally be prohibited
from leaving the country during the pendency of the
case. (Manotoc v. C.A.)
WHEREFORE, with respect to and acting on the
motion now before us for resolution, the same is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Discussion on Right to Travel
One final observation. We discern in the
proceedings in this case a propensity on the
part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the
same may be said of a number of litigants
who initiate recourses before us, to disregard
the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system
by seeking relief directly from this Court
despite the fact that the same is available in
the lower courts in the exercise of their
original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even
mandated bylaw to be sought therein. This
practice must be stopped, not only because of
the imposition upon the precious time of this
Court but also because of the inevitable and
resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the
adjudication of the case which often has to be
remanded or referred to the lower court as
the proper forum under the rules of
procedure, or as better equipped to resolve
the issues since this Court is not a trier of
facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial
policy that this Court will not entertain direct
resort to it unless the redress desired cannot
be obtained in the appropriate courts or
where exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy
within and calling for the exercise of our
primary jurisdiction.
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we
elucidate that such policy includes the matter
of petitions or motions involving hold
departure orders of the trial or lower courts.
Parties with pending cases therein should
apply for permission to leave the country
from the very same courts which, in the first
instance, are in the best position to pass upon
such applications and to impose the
appropriate conditions therefor since they
are conversant with the facts of the cases and
the ramifications or implications thereof.
Where, as in the present case, a hold
departure order has been issued ex parte or
motu propio by said court, the party
concerned must first exhaust the appropriate
remedies therein, through a motion for
reconsideration or other proper submissions,
or by the filing of the requisite application for
travel abroad. Only where all the conditions
and requirements for the issuance of the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition
or mandamus indubitably obtain against a
disposition of the lower courts may our
power of supervision over said tribunals be
invoked through the appropriate petition
assailing on jurisdictional or clearly valid
grounds their actuations therein.
Page 9 of 9