MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.

G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940

Doctrine: Social Justice

LAUREL, J.:

Facts:

The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public
Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing
along the following for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:

1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas

Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and

2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to

Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm

The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in
pursuance of the provisions of theCommonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of
and traffic on national roads.

On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the recommendations made by the
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the
recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and
caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and
pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.

Issues:

1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO.
548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the right to personal liberty and
freedom of locomotion?

2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of
social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people?

Held:

1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads in the
interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of
public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public
safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the general
welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be
subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To
this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should
not be made to prevail over authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over
liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is
precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.

2) No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the humanization of laws and
the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception
may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the
Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the
maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of
powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi estsuprema lex.

Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a
society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and
economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and
quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest number.”
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform
November 6, 2010

175 SCRA 343 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Bill of Rights – Equal Protection – Valid Classification

Eminent Domain – Just Compensation

These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Act (R.A. No.
6657 and related laws i.e., Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).

Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by the
State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of
farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other
farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in
1972 to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify
maximum retention limits for landowners. In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land
ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree
as well as the manner of their payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP)
was enacted; later, E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its (PP131’s) implementation, was also enacted. Afterwhich is
the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law, while considerably changing the
earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its
provisions.

[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]

G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)

The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land distribution scheme provided
for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of landowners of ricelands and cornlands whose landholdings do not exceed 7
hectares. They invoke that since their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced to distribute their
land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves have shown willingness to till their own land. In short, they want
to be exempted from agrarian reform program because they claim to belong to a different class.

G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)

Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27, EO 228, and 229) on the ground that these laws
already valuated their lands for the agrarian reform program and that the specific amount must be determined by the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Manaay averred that this violated the principle in eminent domain which provides
that only courts can determine just compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated due process for under the constitution, no
property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.

Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be paid for their land in bonds and not necessarily
in cash. Manaay averred that just compensation has always been in the form of money and not in bonds.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.

2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.

3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be in terms of cash.

HELD:

1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class exempt from the agrarian reform
program. Under the law, classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain
particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following
requirements:

(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;

(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.

Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights
conferred and the liabilities imposed. The Association have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a
different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the
burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of
owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the
Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by
the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights. In the contrary, it
appears that Congress is right in classifying small landowners as part of the agrarian reform program.

2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts. However, there is no law which
prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from determining just compensation. In fact, just compensation can be that
amount agreed upon by the landowner and the government – even without judicial intervention so long as both parties
agree. The DAR can determine just compensation through appraisers and if the landowner agrees, then judicial intervention
is not needed. What is contemplated by law however is that, the just compensation determined by an administrative body is
merely preliminary. If the landowner does not agree with the finding of just compensation by an administrative body, then it
can go to court and the determination of the latter shall be the final determination. This is even so provided by RA 6657:

Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final
determination of just compensation.

3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept in traditional exercise of eminent domain. The
agrarian reform program is a revolutionary exercise of eminent domain. The program will require billions of pesos in funds if
all compensation have to be made in cash – if everything is in cash, then the government will not have sufficient money
hence, bonds, and other securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for just compensation.
Facts: Several petitions are the root of the case:

a. A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27, EO 228 and 229 and RA 6657. Subjects of the petition are a 9-hectare
and 5 hectare Riceland worked by four tenants. Tenants were declared full owners by EO 228 as qualified farmers under PD
27. The petitioners now contend that President Aquino usurped the legislature’s power.

b. A petition by landowners and sugarplanters in Victoria’s Mill Negros Occidental against Proclamation 131 and EO 229.
Proclamation 131 is the creation of Agrarian Reform Fund with initial fund of P50Billion.

c. A petition by owners of land which was placed by the DAR under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer.

d. A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares.

Issue: Whether or Not the aforementioned EO’s, PD, and RA were constitutional.

Held: The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of Police power and eminent domain.

The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was authorized under Sec. 6 of the Transitory
Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore it is a valid exercise of Police Power and Eminent Domain.

RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under CARP becomes necessary to deprive owners of whatever
lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain
for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the
land. What is required is the surrender of the title and the physical possession of said excess and all beneficial rights accruing
to the owner in favour of the farmer.

A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is concurrence of the lawful subject and the method.

Subject and purpose of the Agrarian Reform Law is valid, however what is to be determined is the method employed to
achieve it.
Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR
G.R. No. 86889 December 4, 1990

Facts:

On 10 June 1988, RA 6657 was approved by the President of the Philippines, which includes, among others, the raising of
livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage.

Petitioner Luz Farms, a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business, avers that it would be adversely affected
by the enforcement of sections 3(b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of the said law. Hence, it prayed that the said law be declared
unconstitutional. The mentioned sections of the law provies, among others, the product-sharing plan, including those
engaged in livestock and poultry business.

Luz Farms further argued that livestock or poultry raising is not similar with crop or tree farming. That the land is not the
primary resource in this undertaking and represents no more than 5% of the total investments of commercial livestock and
poultry raisers. That the land is incidental but not the principal factor or consideration in their industry. Hence, it argued that
it should not be included in the coverage of RA 6657 which covers “agricultural lands”.

Issue: Whether or not certain provisions of RA 6657 is unconstitutional for including in its definition of “Agriculture” the
livestock and poultyr industry?

Ruling:

The Court held YES.

Looking into the transcript of the Constitutional Commission on the meaning of the word “agriculture”, it showed that the
framers never intended to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally mandated agrarian
reform program of the government.

Further, Commissioner Tadeo pointed out that the reason why they used the term “farmworkers” rather than “agricultural
workers” in the said law is because “agricultural workers” includes the livestock and poultry industry, hence, since they do
not intend to include the latter, they used “farmworkers” to have distinction.

Hence, there is merit on the petitioner’s argument that the product-sharing plan applied to “corporate farms” in the
contested provisions is unreasonable for being consficatory and violative of the due process of law.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the
inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines
promulgated in accordance therewith, are hereby DECLARED null and void for being unconstitutional and the writ of
preliminary injunction issued is hereby MADE permanent
Natalia Realty Inc and Estate Developers & Investors Corp vs DAR
FACTS:

Petitioner Natalia is the owner of three contiguous parcels of land located in Banaba, Antipolo, Rizal.

On 18 April 1979, Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 set aside 20,312 hectares of land located in the Municipalities of
Antipolo, San Mateo and Montalban as townsite areas to absorb the population overspill in the metropolis which were
designated as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite. The Natalia properties are situated within the areas proclaimed as townsite
reservation.

EDIC, developer of Natalia, applied for and was granted preliminary approval and locational clearances by the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission. Petitioners were likewise issued development permits after complying with the
requirements. Thus the Natalia properties later became the Antipolo Hills Subdivision.

On 15 June 1988, CARL (Comprehensive Aggrarian Reform Law) was enacted.

DAR, through MARO, issued a Notice of Coverage on the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision which
consisted of roughly 90.3307 hectares.

Natalia and EDIC protested to this.

Members of the Samahan ng Magsasaka sa Bundok Antipolo, Inc. (SAMBA), filed a complaint against Natalia and EDIC before
the DAR Regional Adjudicator to restrain petitioners from developing areas under cultivation by SAMBA members.

DAR Regional ruled by temporarily restraining petitioners from further developing the subdivision.

Petitioners elevated their cause to DARAB but the latter merely remanded the case to the Regional Adjudicator for further
proceedings

Natalia wrote respondent Secretary of Agrarian Reform reiterating its request to set aside the Notice of Coverage. Neither
respondent Secretary nor respondent Director took action on the protest-letters.

Hence, this petition.

Natalia’s contention: Subject properties already ceased to be agricultural lands when they were included in the areas
reserved by presidential fiat for townsite reservation.

OSG’s contention: The permits granted petitioners were not valid and binding because they did not comply with the
implementing Standards, Rules and Regulations of P.D. 957, otherwise known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers'
Protective Decree," in that no application for conversion of the NATALIA lands from agricultural to residential was ever filed
with the DAR. In other words, there was no valid conversion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject properties shall be included in the coverage of CARP

HELD:NO. Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall "cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity
produced, all public and private agricultural lands." As to what constitutes "agricultural land," it is referred to as "land
devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. "Agricultural lands" are only
those lands which are "arable and suitable agricultural lands" and "do not include commercial, industrial and residential
lands."

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any language be
considered as "agricultural lands." These lots were intended for residential use. They ceased to be agricultural lands upon
approval of their inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan Reservation.
Central Mindanao University vs. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
215 SCRA 86 (1992)

Facts:

On 16 January 1958, President Carlos Garcia issued Proclamation No. 467 reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College,
now the CMU, a piece of land to be used as its future campus. In 1984, CMU embarked on a project titled "Kilusang Sariling
Sikap" wherein parcels of land were leased to its faculty members and employees. Under the terms of the program, CMU
will assist faculty members and employee groups through the extension of technical know-how, training and other kinds of
assistance. In turn, they paid the CMU a service fee for use of the land. The agreement explicitly provided that there will be
no tenancy relationship between the lessees and the CMU.

When the program was terminated, a case was filed by the participants of the "Kilusang Sariling Sikap" for declaration of
status as tenants under the CARP. In its resolution, DARAB, ordered, among others, the segregation of 400 hectares of the
land for distribution under CARP. The land was subjected to coverage on the basis of DAR's determination that the lands do
not meet the condition for exemption, that is, it is not "actually, directly, and exclusively used" for educational purposes.

Issue:

Is the CMU land covered by CARP? Who determines whether lands reserved for public use by presidential proclamation is no
longer actually, directly and exclusively used and necessary for the purpose for which they are reserved?

Held:

The land is exempted from CARP. CMU is in the best position to resolve and answer the question of when and what lands
are found necessary for its use. The Court also chided the DARAB for resolving this issue of exemption on the basis of
"CMU's present needs." The Court stated that the DARAB decision stating that for the land to be exempt it must be
"presently, actively exploited and utilized by the university in carrying out its present educational program with its present
student population and academic faculty" overlooked the very significant factor of growth of the university in the years to
come.