Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and
1. Arnault v. Nazareno
Arnault v. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-3820, July 18, 1950
DECISION
(En Banc)
OZAETA, J.:
I. THE FACTS
The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of
two parcels of land, known as Buenavista and Tambobong estates.
An intriguing question that the Senate sought to resolve was the
apparent irregularity of the government’s payment to one Ernest
Burt, a non-resident American citizen, of the total sum of Php1.5
million for his alleged interest in the two estates that only amounted
to Php20,000.00, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long
before. The Senate sought to determine who were responsible for and
who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the
government.
Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt
in the subject transactions, was one of the witnesses summoned by
the Senate to its hearings. In the course of the investigation, the
petitioner repeatedly refused to divulge the name of the person to
whom he gave the amount of Php440,000.00, which he withdrew
from the Php1.5 million proceeds pertaining to Ernest Burt.
was committed to the custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for
imprisonment until he answers the questions. He thereafter filed a
petition for habeas corpus directly with the Supreme Court
questioning the validity of his detention.
II. THE ISSUE
1. Did the Senate have the power to punish the petitioner for contempt
for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the
Php440,000.00?
2. Did the Senate have the authority to commit petitioner for contempt
for a term beyond its period of legislative session?
3. May the petitioner rightfully invoke his right against self-
incrimination?
III. THE RULING
[The Court DENIED the petition for habeas corpus filed by
Arnault.]
1. Yes, the Senate had the power to punish the
petitioner for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the
person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00.
Although there is no provision in the [1935] Constitution
expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make
investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its
legislative functions as to be implied. In other words, the power of
inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting
the conditions which the legislation is intended to effect or change;
and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite
information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had
to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere
requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that
information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete;
so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.
xxx xxx xxx
[W]e find that the question for the refusal to answer which
the petitioner was held in contempt by the Senate is pertinent to the
matter under inquiry. In fact, this is not and cannot be disputed.
Senate Resolution No. 8, the validity of which is not challenged by
the petitioner, requires the Special Committee, among other things,
to determine the parties responsible for the Buenavista and
Tambobong estates deal, and it is obvious that the name of the
person to whom the witness gave the P440,000 involved in said deal
is pertinent to that determination — it is in fact the very thing sought
to be determined. The contention is not that the question is
impertinent to the subject of the inquiry but that it has no relation
or materiality to any proposed legislation. We have already indicated
that it is not necessary for the legislative body to show that every
question propounded to a witness is material to any proposed or
possible legislation; what is required is that is that it be pertinent to
the matter under inquiry.
xxx xxx xxx
If the subject of investigation before the committee is within
the range of legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony
of the witness called relates to that subject, obedience, to its process
may be enforced by the committee by imprisonment.
2. YES, the Senate had the authority to commit
petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its period of
legislative session.
We find no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative
body to punish for contempt to the end of every session and not to
the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body.
The very reason for the exercise of the power to punish for contempt
is to enable the legislative body to perform its constitutional function
without impediment or obstruction. Legislative functions may be
and in practice are performed during recess by duly constituted
committees charged with the duty of performing investigations or
conducting hearing relative to any proposed legislation. To deny to
such committees the power of inquiry with process to enforce it
would be to defeat the very purpose for which that the power is
recognized in the legislative body as an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to is legislative function. It is but logical to say that the
power of self-preservation is coexistent with the life to be preserved.
But the resolution of commitment here in question was
adopted by the Senate, which is a continuing body and which does
not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress . . . protection against an imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a
There is no limit as to time to the Senate’s power to punish for third person.
contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted
as in the present case. It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the
facts and circumstances of the case whether the witness is justified
3. NO, the petitioner may NOT rightfully invoke his in refusing to answer. A witness is not relieved from answering
right against self-incrimination. merely on his own declaration that an answer might incriminate
him, but rather it is for the trial judge to decide that question.
Since according to the witness himself the transaction was
legal, and that he gave the [P440,000.00] to a representative of Burt
in compliance with the latter’s verbal instruction, we find no basis
upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that
person might incriminate him. There is no conflict of authorities on
the applicable rule, to wit:

Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for

the determination of the Court. At least, it is not enough for the
witness to say that the answer will incriminate him as he is not the
sole judge of his liability. The danger of self-incrimination must
appear reasonable and real to the court, from all the circumstances,
and from the whole case, as well as from his general conception of
the relations of the witness. Upon the facts thus developed, it is the
province of the court to determine whether a direct answer to a
question may criminate or not. . . The fact that the testimony of a
witness may tend to show that he has violated the law is not
sufficient to entitle him to claim the protection of the constitutional
provision against self-incrimination, unless he is at the same time
liable to prosecution and punishment for such violation. The witness
cannot assert his privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse, for
 2. Arnault v. Balagtas OF PRISON TO CONTINUE HOLDING JEAN L. ARNAULT IN HIS
CUSTODY, AND IN CONFINEMENT AND DETENTION AT THE NEW
ARNAULT vs. BALAGTAS
BILIBID PRISON AT MUNTINLUPA, RIZAL, UNTIL THE SAID
Citation: G.R. No. L-6749; 97 Phil. 358; July 30, 1955
ARNAULT SHALL HAVE PURGED HIMSELF OF CONTEMPT OF THE
Ponente: Labrador
SENATE.

Topic: Legislative investigation; may Senate hold a person in

xxx
contempt as a punitive measure.

WHEREAS, the Senate holds and finds that the situation of the said
FACTS:
Jean L. Arnault has not materially changed since he was committed
This was a petition for habeas corpus filed by Jean Arnault against
to prison for contempt of the Senate, and since the Supreme Court
the Director of Prisons, Balagtas. Arnault was incarcerated pursuant
of the Philippines, in a judgment long since become final, upheld the
to a resolution by the Senate finding Arnault in contempt for refusing
power and authority of the Senate to hold the said Jean L. Arnault
to disclose the name of a person with whom he transacted business
in custody, detention, and confinement, said power and authority
in relation to a government purchase of of the Buenavista and
having been held to be coercive rather than punitive, and fully
Tambobong estates. The circumstances of Arnault's incarceration
justified until the said Jean L. Arnault should have given the
are described in the companion case Arnaultvs. Nazareno (1950)
information which he had withheld and continues contumaciously
which affirmed the Legislature's power to hold a person in contempt
to withhold;
for defying or refusing to comply with an order in a legislative
inquiry.
WHEREAS, the insolent and manifest untruthful statements made
by the said Jean L. Arnault on the occasions above referred to
Arnault eventually divulged that he had transacted with one Jess D.
constitute a continuing contempt of the Senate, and an added affront
Santos in relation to the Buenavista and Tambobong deal. Upon
to its dignity and authority, such that , were they to be condoned or
further inquiry, the Senate, obviously not satisfied with Arnault's
overlooked, the power and authority of the Senate to conduct
explanations, adopted Resolution No. 114. The title of the resolution
investigations would become futile and ineffectual because they
states:
could be defied by any person of sufficient stubbornness and malice;

RESOLUTION APPROVING THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL

xxx
COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE BUENAVISTA AND
TAMBOBONG ESTATES DEAL, AND ORDERING THE DIRECTOR
The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of Petitioner Arnault and
ordered his release.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner may be released from his Senate-imposed
incarceration.
1. Whether or not the CFI has the right to review the findings of the
Senate.
2. Whether or not the Senate may hold a person in contempt or
incarcerate him as a punitive rather than as a coercive measure.
HELD:
YES. The Senate may continue to keep Petitioner incarcerated.
1. NO. In the first place, the CFI did NOT have the right to review the
findings of the Senate. In the above quoted resolution, the Senate in
stating that petitioner “has failed and refused, and continues to fail
and refuse, to reveal the person to whom he gave the amount of
P440,000” and that the situation of petitioner “has not materially
charged since he was committed to prison”, clearly shows that the
Senate believes that Arnault was still trying to deceive them. The CFI
on the other hand arrogated unto itself to review such finding and
held that Arnault satisfactorily answered the questions of the Senate
in its investigation of the Buenavista and Tambobong deal.
There is an inherent fundamental error in the course of action that
the lower court followed. It assumed that courts have the right to
review the findings of legislative bodies in the exercise of the
prerogative of legislation, or interfere with their proceedings or their
discretion in what is known as the legislative process. The Judicial
department has no right or power or authority to do this, in the same
manner that the legislative department may not invade the judicial
realm in the ascertainment of truth and in the application and
interpretation of the law, in what is known as the judicial process,
because that would be in direct conflict with the fundamental
principle of separation of powers established by the Constitution.
The only instances when judicial intervention may lawfully be
invoke are when there has been a violation of a constitutional
inhibition, or when there has been an arbitrary exercise of the
legislative discretion.
2. YES. The legislature may hold a person in contempt or incarcerate
him as a punitive measure.
Although the resolution studiously avoids saying that the
confinement is a punishment, but merely seeks to coerce the
petitioner into telling the truth, the intention is evident that the
continuation of the imprisonment ordered is in fact partly punitive.
This may be inferred from the confining made in the resolution that
petitioner's acts were arrogant and contumacious and constituted
an affront to the Senate's dignity and authority.
The legislature has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses. This
power is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be
considered implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative power,
or necessary to effectuate said power. How could a legislative body
obtain the knowledge and information on which to base intended
legislation if it cannot require and compel the disclosure of such
knowledge and information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance of
its power and authority? The legislative department should not be
constrained to look to the courts whenever for every act of refusal,
every act of defiance, every act of contumacy with which it is faced.

The exercise of the legislature's authority to deal with the defiant and
contumacious witness should be supreme and is not subject to
judicial interference, except when there is a manifest and absolute
disregard of discretion and a mere exertion of arbitrary power coming
within the reach of constitutional limitations.

The judgment appealed from should be, as it hereby is, reversed, and
the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus denied. The
order of the court allowing the petitioner to give bail is declared null
and void and the petitioner is hereby ordered to be recommitted to
the custody of the respondent. With cost against the petitioner-
appellee.
 3. Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
Bengzon v. Blue Ribbon
FACTS:
On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG), filed a
complaint with Sandiganbayan against the petitioners of this case.
PCGG allege, among others, that: defendants (petitioners therein)
Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez and Juliette. Gomez Romualdez, alleged
cronies of former President Marcos and First Lady Imelda Romualdez
Marcos, engaged in schemes and stratagems to unjustly enrich
themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. Among these
stratagems are (1) obtained control of some big business enterprises
such as
MERALCO, Pilipinas Shell, and PCI Bank, (2) manipulated the
formation of Erectors Holding Inc, to appear viable and borrow more
capital, reaching a total of more that P2 billion, (3) collaborated with
lawyers (petitioners therein) of the Bengzon Law Offices in concealing
funds and properties, in maneuvering the purported sale of interests
in certain corporations, in misusing the Meralco Pension Fund worth
P25 million, and in cleverly hiding behind the veil of corporate entity.
On 13 September 1988, Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a speech
before the Senate on the alleged take-over of SolOil Incorporated by
Ricardo Lopa (who died during the pendency of this case) and called
upon the senate to look into possible violation of the Anti Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act or RA 3019. The Senate Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers or Blue Ribbon Committee (SBRC)
started its investigation through a hearing on 23 May 1989, but Lopa
and Bengzon declined to testify. The SBRC rejected petitioner
Bengzon s plea and voted to pursue its investigation. Petitioner
claims that the SBRC, in requiring their attendance and testimony,
acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose. Hence this
petition.
ISSUES:
1. WON the court has jurisdiction over this case.
2. WON the SBRC s inquiry has a valid legislative purpose.
3. WON the sale or disposition of the Romualdez corporations is a
purely private transaction which is beyond the power of the SBRC to
inquire into.
4. WON the inquiry violates the petitioners right to due process.
HELD:
1. YES. As the court held in Angara vs. Electoral Commission, the
Constitution provided for an elaborate system of checks and
balances to secure coordination in the workings of the departments
of the government, and it is the judiciary that was vested of the
powers to determine the scope, nature and extent of such powers.
2. NO. The speech of Sen. Enrile contained no suggestion on
contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look
into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA 3019. The purpose of the
inquiry to be conducted by respondent SBRC was to find out WON
the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Ricardo Lopa, had
violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36/39
corporations of Kokoy Romualdez to the Lopa Group. There appears,
therefore, no intended legislation involved. The inquiry also is not
conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 2123 (SR 2123), as
the committee alleges. The inquiry under SR 2123 is to look into the
charges against PCGG filed by stockholders of Oriental Petroleum in
connection with the implementation of Section 26 Article XVIII of the
Constitution.

3. YES. Mr. Lopa and the petitioners are not connected with the
government and did their acts as private citizens, hence such a case
of alleged graft and corruption is within the jurisdiction, not of the
SBRC, but of the courts. Sandiganbayan already took jurisdiction of
this issue before the SBRC did. The inquiry of the respondent
committee into the same justiciable controversy already before the
Sandiganbayan would be an encroachment of into the exclusive
domain of judicial jurisdiction.

4. NO. The Constitution provides the right of an accused of a crime

to remain silent; this extends also to respondents in administrative
investigation but only if they partake of the nature of a criminal
proceeding. This is not so in this case. BUT since the court already
held that the inquiry is not in aid of legislation, the petitioners
therein cannot be compelled to testify.
 4. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee v. Majaducon
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee vs. Majaducon (G.R. No. 136760)
Facts:
This case had its aegis when the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
conducted an inquiry into the alleged mismanagement of the funds
and investment of the Armed Forces Retirement and Separation
Benefits System (AFP-RSBS). During the public hearings by the Blue
Ribbon Committee, it appeared that the AFP-RSBS purchased a lot
from Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano worth P10,500 per square meter.
However, the deed of sale filed with the Register of Deeds indicated
that the purchase price of the lot was only P3,000 per square meter.
The Committee caused the service of a subpoena to Atty. Flaviano,
directing him to appear and testify before it. Respondent refused to
appear and filed a petition for prohibition and preliminary injunction
with prayer for temporary restraining order with the RTC of General
Santos City. The trial court issued a TRO directing the committee to
cease and desist from proceeding with the inquiry. The Committee
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and
failure to state a valid cause of action. The Trial Court denied the
motion to dismiss. Hence, this petition for certiorari alleging that
Judge Majaducon committed grave abuse of discretion and acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge Jose Majaducon committed grave
abuse of discretion when he dismissed the petition for prohibition
and issued the writ of preliminary injunction.
Ruling:
The assailed resolution of respondent Judge Majaducon was issued
without legal basis. The principle of separation of powers essentially
means that legislation belongs to Congress, execution to the
Executive, and settlement of legal controversies to the Judiciary.
Each is prevented from invading the domain of the others. When the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee served subpoena on respondent
Flaviano to appear and testify before it in connection with its
investigation of the alleged misuse and mismanagement of the AFP-
RSBS funds, it did so pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries
in aid of legislation. This is clearly provided in Article 6, Section 21
of the 1987 Constitution:
The Senate of the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
Hence, the RTC of General Santos City, or any court for that matter,
had no authority to prohibit the Committee from requiring
respondent t appear and testify before it.
Also, the ruling in Bengzon vs. Blue Ribbon Committee cited by the
respondent does not apply in this case. The factual circumstances
therein are different from those in the case at bar. In Bengzon, no
intended legislation was involved and the subject matter of the
inquiry was more within the province of the courts rather than the
legislature. On the other hand, there was in this case a clear
legislative purpose, and this is to look into the reported misuse and
mismanagement of the AFP-RSBS funds, with the intention of
enacting appropriate legislation to protect the rights and interests of
the officers and members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
Wherefore, the petition is GRANTED.
 5. Senate v. Ermita
Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the
President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464 “Ensuring
Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to
the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public
Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes”. Petitioners pray
for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines,
through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or
investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the
attendance of officials and employees of the executive department,
bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government
Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of
the Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers
in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of
massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and
the role of military in the so-called “Gloriagate Scandal”.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the
President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the
public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of
the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.
ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials,
enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President
prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and
constitutional?
RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is
covered by the executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege
is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of
necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The
privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to
disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be
of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing
that obligation in a particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive
branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive
branch withholds such information on the ground that it is
privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why
it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive
branch to evade congressional requests for information without need
of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons
therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the
power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
frustrated.
 6. Sabio v. Gordon
Camilo Sabio vs Richard Gordon
504 SCRA 704 – Political Law – Inquiry in aid of legislation – public
officers
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago
introduced Senate Res. No. 455 “directing an inquiry in aid of
legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines
Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and
PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged
improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of
Directors.” Pursuant to this, on May 8, 2006, Senator Richard
Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG inviting him to
be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly
conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and
Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. Chairman
Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment. At the
same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 “No member or
staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce
evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding
concerning matters within its official cognizance.” Apparently, the
purpose is to ensure PCGG’s unhampered performance of its task.
Gordon’s Subpoenae Ad Testificandum was repeatedly ignored by
Sabio hence he threatened Sabio to be cited with contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 of EO No. 1 is constitutional.
HELD: No. It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has
gained more solid existence and expansive construal. The Court’s
high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v.
Ermita, where it categorically ruled that “the power of inquiry is
broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch.” Verily, the
Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that “the operation of
government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper
subject for investigation” and that “the power of inquiry is co-
extensive with the power to legislate”. Subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a
policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest.
Article III, Section 7
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall
be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well
as to government research data used as basis for policy development,
shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote
transparency in policy-making and in the operations of the
government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to
enable them to exercise effectively their constitutional rights. Armed
with the right information, citizens can participate in public
discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and
their effective implementation.
 7. Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Bank
SCB Philippines vs Senate Committee on Banks, Financial
Institution and Currencies en banc
G.R. No. 167173 December 27, 2007
FACTS:
SCB Phil Branch had criminal and civil charges against them before
the courts in Metro Manila for selling unregistered foreign securities
in violation of Securities Regulation Code (RA 8799). Enrile, in his
privileged speech, urged the Senate to immediately conduct an
inquiry in aid of legislation, to prevent the occurrences of a similar
fraudulent in the future. The respondent Committee then set an
initial hearing to investigate, in aid of legislation thereto. SCB
stressed that there were cases allegedly involving the same issues
subject of legislative inquiry, thus posting a challenge to the
jurisdiction of respondent Committee to continue with the inquiry.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Committee, by aid of legislation,
would encroach upon the judicial powers vested solely in the courts
who took cognizance of the foregoing cases.
RULING:
Yes. The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in
the resolution, as initiated in the privileged speech of Senate
President Enrile, was simply "to denounce the illegal practices
committed by a foreign bank in selling unregistered foreign
securities xxx", and at the conclusion of the said speech "to
immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to prevent
the occurrence of a similar fraudulent in the future."
The mere filing of a criminal or administrative complaint before a
court or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the
conduct of legislation. The exercise of sovereign legislative authority,
of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component,
cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an administrative
investigation.
The intent of legislative inquiries is to arrive at a policy
determination, which may or may not be enacted into law. Except
only when it exercises the power to punish for contempt, the
committees of the Senate or the House of Representatives cannot
penalize violators even there is overwhelmingly evidence of criminal
culpability. Other than proposing or initiating amendatory or
remedial legislation, respondent Committee can only recommend
measures to address or remedy whatever irregularities may be
unearthed during the investigation, although it may include in its
Report a recommendation for criminal indictment of persons who
may appear liable. At best, the recommendation, along with the
evidence, contained in such Report would only be persuasive, but it
is still up to the prosecutorial agencies and the courts to determine
the liabilities of the offender.
 8. Neri v. Senate ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions sought by the SBRC to
be answered falls under executive privilege.
HELD: The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by
Neri v. Senate compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit
of legislation.

549 SCRA 77 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – The Legislative

Department – Inquiry in aid of legislation – Executive Privilege The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered
by the presidential communications privilege.
Legislative (Sec 21) & Oversight (Sec 22) Powers

1st, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-

In April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing
delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment
executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the
and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in
President to enter into executive agreements without the
the amount of $329,481,290.00 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos).
concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in
The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China.
Philippine jurisprudence.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. On
the other hand, Joe De Venecia issued a statement that several high
executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to
2nd, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the
push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s
Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was cabinet. And
interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of
COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his
approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed 3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would
President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the
him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
they discussed about the NBN Project, Neri refused to answer,
invoking “executive privilege“. In particular, he refused to answer the
questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the
NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve. He later refused to
attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the
SBRC averring that the communications between GMA and Neri is
privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita
be applied. The SBRC cited Neri for contempt.
 9. Garcillano v. House Committees
GARCILLANO vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, et.al G.R.
No. 170338 December 23, 2008
Facts:
Tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly
between the President of the Philippines and a high-ranking official
of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. The tapes,
notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained
the President’s instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio
Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential
elections. These recordings were to become the subject of heated
legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both
Houses of Congress.
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process
considering that he is summoned to attend the Senate hearings
without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the
publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which
underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer
bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds
involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings.
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and
even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of
general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the
present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of
half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was
undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened
their session.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally
mandated publication by arguing that the rules have never been
amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet
form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the
Senate’s internet web page.
Issue:
Whether or not publication of the Rules of Procedures Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation through the Senate’s website, satisfies
the due process requirement of law.
Held:
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the
Senate, or in pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not sufficient
under the Tañada v. Tuvera ruling which requires publication either
in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The
Rules of Procedure even provide that the rules "shall take effect
seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation," precluding any other form of publication. Publication in
accordance with Tañada is mandatory to comply with the due
process requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a person’s
liberty at risk. A person who violates the Rules of Procedure could
be arrested and detained by the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,
otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to
support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all
the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message
or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written
document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law
merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the
original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents.
It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules
and regulations.

Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore,

could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules
in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The
conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be
deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules,
because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure."
 10. Spouses dela Paz v. SCFR HELD: The SC ruled against De La Paz. Section 16(3), Article VI of
the Philippine Constitution states:”Each House shall determine the
rules of its proceedings.” This provision has been traditionally
Sps de la Paz v. Senate Committee on FR construed as a grant of full discretionary authority to the Houses of
Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own
Inquiry in Aid of Legislation – Jurisdiction and Publication rules. The challenge to the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, raised by petitioner in the case at bench, in
In October 2008, Gen. De La Paz, a senior officer of the PNP, headed
effect, asks this Court to inquire into a matter that is within the full
a delegation of 8 to attend an Interpol GA. De La Paz brought with
discretion of the Senate. The issue partakes of the nature of a
him his wife and 3 days after the scheduled GA, de la Paz is also
political question. Also, the signatures were properly obtained as
scheduled to retire. After the GA, De La Paz was apprehended in the
evidenced by the approval of the Senate president and it is shown
departure area for he was carrying with him €105,000.00
that the gathering of the signatures is in accordance with the Rules.
(P6,930,000.00). He was also carrying with him €45,000.00
It is also shown that the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in
(P2,970,000.00). He failed to declare in writing that he is carrying
Aid of Legislation were also published in two newspapers of general
such an amount and this is in violation of the United Nations
circulation.
Convention Against Corruption and the United Nations Convention
Against Transnational Organized Crime. De La Paz and his group
was later released but the €s were confiscated by the Russians. Upon
arrival to the Philippines, De La Paz was issued a subpoena by the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations for the investigation it was
to conduct involving the Moscow incident. De La Paz averred that
the said committee does not have jurisdiction of the case. De La Paz
argued that the Committee is devoid of any jurisdiction to investigate
the Moscow incident as the matter does not involve state to state
relations as provided in paragraph 12, Section 13, Rule 10 of the
Senate Rules of Procedure (Senate Rules). They further claim that
respondent Committee violated the same Senate Rules when it
issued the warrant of arrest without the required signatures of the
majority of the members of respondent Committee. They likewise
assail the very same Senate Rules because the same were not
published as required by the Constitution, and thus, cannot be used
as the basis of any investigation involving them relative to the
Moscow incident.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said Committee has jurisdiction over the
matter.
 11. Romero v. Estrada
GR No. 174105
Reghis Romero II et al vs. Jinggoy Estrada et al
Facts:
Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition with application for
temporary restraining order(TRO) and preliminary injunction under
Rule 65, assailing the constitutionality of the invitations and
compulsory processes issued by the Senate Committee on Labor,
Employment and Human Resources Development in connection
with its investigation on the investment of Overseas Workers Welfare
Administration(OWWA) funds in the Smokey Mountain project.
Pursuant to Resolution No. 537 and 543,Petitioner Reghis
Romero II as owner of R-II Builders Inc. was invited by the
Committee on Labor, Employment and Human Resources
Development to attend a public hearing at the Senate on August
23,2006 regarding the investment of OWWA (Overseas Workers
Welfare Administration) funds in the Smokey Mountain project. The
investigation is intended to aid the Senate in the review and possible
amendments to the pertinent provisions of RA 8042,The Migrant
Workers Act.
Petitioner Romero in his letter-reply requested to be excused
from appearing and testifying before the Committee at its scheduled
hearings of the subject matter and purpose of Philippine Senate
Resolution Nos. 537 and 543. The Committee denied his request.
On the same date, invitations were sent to the other six petitioners,
then members of the Board of Directors of R-II Builders Inc.
requesting them to attend the September 4,2006 Committee
hearing. The next day, Senator Jinggoy Estrada as Chairman of the
Committee issued subpoena ad testificandum to petitioner Romero II
directing him to appear and testify before the Committee relative to
the aforesaid Senate resolutions. The Committee later issued
subpoenas to the Board of Directors of R-II Builders Inc.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject matter of the Senate inquiry is sub
judice
Ruling:
NO. The Supreme court held that the sub judice issue has been
rendered moot and academic by the supervening issuance of the en
banc resolution of July 1, 2008 in GR No. 164527. An issue or a case
becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy, so that a determination of the issue would be without
practical use and value. In such cases, there is no actual substantial
relief to which the petitioner would be entitled and which would be
negated by the dismissal of the petition. Thus, there is no more
obstacle-on the ground of sub judice, assuming it is invocable to the
continuation of the Committee’s investigation challenged in this
proceeding.
As stated in Arnault vs. Nazareno, the power of inquiry with
process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions
which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the
legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which
is not infrequently true- recourse must be had to others who possess
it.
 The court further held that when the Committee issued
invitations and subpoenas to petitioners to appear before it in
connection with its investigation of its aforementioned investments,
it did so pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation. This is clearly provided in Art. VI, Sec.21 of the 1987
Philippine Constitution. The court has no authority to prohibit a
Senate committee from requiring persons to appear and testify
before it in connection with an inquiry in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its

respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearign in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected. (Art. VI, Section 21 of the 1987
Philippine Constitution)
12. Philcomsat v. Senate due proceedings, the respondents Senate Committees found
overwhelming mismanagement by the PCGG and its nominees over
G.R. No. 180308 : June 19, 2012 POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC, and that PCGG was negligent in
performing its mandate to preserve the government's interests in the
PHILCOMSAT HOLDINGS CORPORATION, ENRIQUE L. LOCSIN said corporations. In sum, Committee Report No. 312 recommended,
AND MANUEL D. ANDAL, Petitioners, v. SENATE OF THE inter alia, the privatization and transfer of the jurisdiction over the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE COMMITTEE ON shares of the government in POTC and PHILCOMSAT to the
GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, Privatization Management Office (PMO) under the Department of
SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SERVICES, HON. SEN. Finance (DOF) and the replacement of government nominees as
RICHARD GORDON AND HON. SEN. JUAN PONCE directors of POTC and PHILCOMSAT.
ENRILE,Respondents.
Petitioners filed the instant petition before the Court, questioning, in
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: particular, the haste with which the respondent Senate approved the
challenged Committee Report No. 312.
FACTS:
ISSUE: Whether or not Committee Resolution No. 312 should be
PHILCOMSAT is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Philippine nullified, having proposed no piece of legislation and having been
Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), a government- hastily approved by the respondent Senate?
sequestered organization in which the Republic of the Philippines
holds a 35% interest in shares of stocks. For the period from 1986 HELD: Committee Report No. 312 is sustained.
to 1996, the government, through the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG), regularly received cash dividends from CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: senate's power of inquiry
POTC. However, POTC suffered its first loss.
The respondents Senate Committees' power of inquiry relative to PSR
In view of the losses that the government continued to incur and in No. 455 has been passed upon and upheld in the consolidated cases
order to protect its interests in POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC, of In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Camilo L. Sabio,
Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, during the Second Regular which cited Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution, as follows:
Session of the Thirteenth Congress of the Philippines, introduced
Proposed Senate Resolution (PSR) No. 455 directing the conduct of "The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
an inquiry, in aid of legislation, on the anomalous losses incurred by committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance
POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC and the mismanagement committed with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
by their respective board of directors. appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected."

Respondents Senate Committees submitted the assailed Committee The Court explained that such conferral of the legislative power of
Report No. 312, where it noted the need to examine the role of the inquiry upon any committee of Congress, in this case the
PCGG in the management of POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC. After
respondents Senate Committees, must carry with it all powers
necessary and proper for its effective discharge.

On this score, the respondents Senate Committees cannot be said to

have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction when it submitted Committee Resolution No.
312, given its constitutional mandate to conduct legislative
inquiries. Nor can the respondent Senate be faulted for doing so on
the very same day that the assailed resolution was submitted. The
wide latitude given to Congress with respect to these legislative
inquiries has long been settled, otherwise, Article VI, Section 21
would be rendered pointless.

DISMISSED
 13. Kilbourn v. Thomson (3) The resolution authorizing the investigation must specify " a
- Can’t find a case brief – ang haba eh haha congressional interest in legislating on that subject."
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S.168 (1880), was a United (4) Where the inquiry can result in "no valid legislation," then
States Supreme Court case that dealt with the question the "Private affairs of individuals" are not valid targets for inquiry
whether or not the United States House of Representatives
may compel testimony.
Hallet Kilbourn was subpoenaed to testify before a Special
Committee established by the House of Representatives to
investigate the bankruptcy of Jay Cooke & Company. Though
he appeared, he refused to answer any questions and did not
tender requested documents. John G. Thompson, Sergeant-At-
Arms for the House, took Kilbourn into custody. Kilbourn
continued to refuse to testify and provided no explanation for
his refusal. The House resolved that Kilbourn was in contempt
and should be held in custody until he agreed to testify and
produce the requested documents. The Court found that the
House did not have the power to punish for contempt. However,
House members could not be sued for false imprisonment as
they were exercising their official duties and protected by the
Speech and Debate Clause, Art. I, § 6, cl. 1. In addition the
Supreme Court established several limits in the scope of
investigations, called the "Kilbourn Test".
The Kilbourn Test
(1) Inquiries must not "invade areas constitutionally reserved to
the courts or the executive"
(2) Inquiries must deal "with subjects on which Congress could
validly legislate"
14. McGrain vs. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927)
Facts of the case
A Senate Committee (Committee) undertook an investigation
into the activities of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the
Attorney General (AG) in order to determine whether each
entity was properly executing its responsibilities. As part of
the investigation, the Committee issued a subpoena,
compelling the testimony of a particular witness (defendant).
The witness did not comply with the subpoena. He was
consequently arrested, and he filed a habeas corpus petition
for release, arguing that the Senate was not constitutionally
empowered to carry out the investigation into executive
activities or compel him to appear and testify. The lower court
granted the habeas petition, and the Committee appealed.
Question
Was the Senate committee out-of-bounds in issuing its
contempt order since the purpose of the investigation had
nothing to do with the committee's legislative purpose?
Conclusion
The Court upheld Daugherty's contempt conviction,
establishing a presumption that congressional investigations
have a legislative purpose. This presumption was not
overcome by showing that the committee also had another
purpose, such as exposure of wrongdoing. This presumption
would later restrict the Court's hand in clear cases of
congressional overreaching while investigating communists
after World War II.
15. Sinclair vs. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929)
Syllabus
1. By the procurement of the defendant in a criminal case and of
others acting by his direction, the jurors, throughout the progress of
the trial, were systematically shadowed by a corps of private
detectives, each of whom, having at first identified his subject within
the courtroom, would follow him closely while away from it. Jurors
were thus kept under strict surveillance from early morning until
late at night, whenever not actually within the courthouse.
Investigations were also made by the operatives concerning
encumbrances on the home of one juror and to determine whether
another had indicated his views during the trial. Daily reports were
made by the operatives to one of their employers.
Held:
(1) That such surveillance of jurors was a criminal contempt, under
Jud.Code § 268, on the part of its instigators, although it did not
appear that any operative actually approached or communicated
with a juror, or attempted to do so, or that any juror was conscious
of observation.
(2) To establish misbehavior within the statute, it was not essential
to show some act both known to a juror and probably sufficient to
influence his mind. The reasonable tendency of the acts done was to
obstruct the honest and fair administration of justice, and this is the
proper criterion.
(3) The acts in question were sufficiently near the court to obstruct
the administration of justice, most of them having been within the
courtroom, near the door of the courthouse, or within the city where
the trial was held. P. 279 U. S. 765.

2. A defendant in a criminal trial and others acting for him, when
accused of contempt in causing the jurors to be shadowed, cannot
exculpate themselves by proving like wrongful conduct, amounting
to a practice, by the Department of Justice in other cases. P. 279 U.
S. 765.
3. A refusal to call and hear very numerous witnesses offered by
persons who had been convicted of contempt in the shadowing of
jurors and who sought by such witnesses to prove like conduct of
the Department of Justice in other cases in mitigation of their
punishment held within the proper discretion of the trial court, the
defendants having been allowed full opportunity to advise the court
of their knowledge, beliefs, and state of mind by answer and
affidavits and by the verbal statements of themselves and their
counsel. Cooke v. United States, 267 U. S. 517, distinguished.
4. The language used in an opinion must be read in the light of the
issues presented.
5. Where the court decides the fact and the law without the
intervention of a jury, the admission of illegal testimony, even if
material, is not of itself a ground for reversing the judgment. P. 279
U. S. 767.
16. US v. Rumely
Syllabus
Respondent was secretary of an organization which, among other
things, engaged in the sale of books of a political nature. He
refused to disclose to a committed of Congress the names of
those who made bulk purchases of these books for further
distribution, and was convicted under R.S. § 102, as amended,
which provides penalties for refusal to give testimony or to
produce relevant papers "upon any matter" under congressional
inquiry. Under the resolution empowering it to function, the
Committee was" authorized and directed to conduct a study and
investigation of (1) all lobbying activities intended to influence,
encourage, promote, or retard legislation; and (2) all activities of
agencies of the Federal Government intended to influence,
encourage, promote, or retard legislation."
Held: The Committee was without power to exact the information
sought from respondent. Pp. 345 U. S. 42-48.
(a) To construe the resolution as authorizing the Committee to
inquire into all efforts of private individuals to influence public
opinion through books and periodicals, however remote the
radiations of influence which they may exert upon the ultimate
legislative process, would raise doubts of constitutionality in
view of the prohibition of the First Amendment. P. 345 U. S. 46.
(b) The phrase "lobbying activities" in the resolution is to be
construed as lobbying in the commonly accepted sense of
"representations made directly to the Congress, its members, or
its committees," and not as extending to attempts "to saturate
the thinking of the community." P. 345 U. S. 47.
(c) The scope of the resolution defining respondent's duty to
answer must be ascertained as of the time of his refusal, and
cannot be enlarged by subsequent action of Congress.
17. United States vs. Orman, 207 F.2d 148 (Sept. 1953)
- Cant find a good brief

In United States v. Orman, 486 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 2007),
in what was clearly a consensual encounter, a police officer
working off-duty for a shopping mall approached the defendant
and asked to speak to him. After the defendant said "sure," the
officer told the defendant he had information the defendant was
carrying a gun and asked if that was true. 486 F.3d at 1172,
1175.

The defendant admitted he had a gun and apologized. Id. at

1172.

The officer noticed a small bulge under the defendant's shirt and
asked Orman where the gun was located. Id.

Orman pointed to his waist band and the officer then retrieved
the gun from the defendant. Id.

The entire encounter was calm and the defendant was

cooperative.

The court stated that "reasonable suspicion that Orman was

carrying a gun, which is all that is required for a protective
search under Terry, quickly rose to a certainty when Orman
confirmed that he was carrying a gun." Id. at 1176.

Although the officer testified that Orman was perfectly cordial,

the court held that a reasonably prudent man in the officer's
circumstances would be warranted in retrieving the gun for his
safety. Id.

The court considered the accessibility of the gun to Orman and

the fact that he was standing only inches from the officer. Id.
18. Thomas Quinn vs. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955)
Syllabus
Petitioner and two others were summoned to testify before a
congressional investigating committee. One of them refused to
say whether he was or had been a member of the Communist
Party, basing his refusal on "the First and Fifth Amendments,"
as well as "the First Amendment to the Constitution,
supplemented by the Fifth Amendment." Petitioner adopted the
other's statement as his own, and refused to answer the same
question. The committee did not ask him to state more
specifically the ground for his refusal to answer, and did not
specifically overrule his objection or direct him to answer.
Held: in his trial for contempt of Congress under 2 U.S.C. § 192,
the District Court should have entered a judgment of acquittal.
Pp. 349 U. S. 156-170.
1. Petitioner's references to the Fifth Amendment sufficiently
invoked his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.
Pp. 349 U. S. 160-165.
(a) The constitutional guaranty against self-incrimination must
be construed liberally in favor of the right it was intended to
secure -- especially in criminal trials for refusal to answer. Pp.
349 U. S. 161-162.
(b) An answer to the question whether he was a member of the
Communist Party might have tended to incriminate petitioner.
Blau v. United States, 340 U. S. 159. P. 349 U. S. 162.
(c) If an objection to a question is made in any language that a
committee may reasonably be expected to understand as an
attempt to invoke the privilege, it must be respected both by the
committee and by a court in a prosecution under § 192. Pp. 349
U. S. 162-163.
(d) The mere fact that petitioner also relied on the First
Amendment did not preclude his reliance on the Fifth
Amendment as well. P. 349 U. S. 163.
(e) Petitioner's references to the Fifth Amendment were sufficient
to put the committee on notice of an apparent claim of the
privilege; and it then became incumbent on the committee either
to accept the claim or to ask petitioner whether he was, in fact,
invoking the privilege. Pp. 349 U. S. 163-165.
2. On the record in this case, there was not adequate proof of a
deliberate intentional refusal to answer, which is an essential
element of a violation of 2 U.S.C. § 192. Pp. 349 U. S. 165-170.
(a) This element of the offense, like any other, must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. P. 349 U. S. 115.
(b) Unless the witness is clearly apprised that the committee
demands his answer notwithstanding his objection, there can be
no conviction under § 192 for his refusal to answer. Pp. 349 U.
S. 165-166.
(c) There is nothing in the record of the committee hearing from
which petitioner could have determined with a reasonable degree
of certainty that the committee demanded his answer despite his
objection. Pp. 349 U. S. 166-167.
(d) By the enactment of 2 U.S.C. § 192, Congress did not intend
to dispense with the traditional requirement that the witness
must be clearly apprised that an answer is demanded
notwithstanding his objection. Pp. 349 U. S. 167-170.
19. United States vs. Icardi, 140 F. Supp. 383 (1956
- No digest
20. Watkins v. US
Syllabus
Petitioner was convicted of a violation of 2 U.S.C. § 192, which
makes it a misdemeanor for any person summoned as a witness
by either House of Congress or any committee thereof to refuse
to answer any question "pertinent to the question under inquiry."
Summoned to testify before a Subcommittee of the House of
Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities, petitioner
testified freely about his own activities and associations, but he
refused to answer questions as to whether he had known certain
other persons to have been members of the Communist Party.
He based his refusal on the ground that those questions were
outside of the proper scope of the Committee's activities, and not
relevant to its work. No clear understanding of the "question
under inquiry" could be gleaned from the resolution authorizing
the full Committee, the legislative history thereof, the
Committee's practices thereunder, the action authorizing the
Subcommittee, the statement of the Chairman at the opening of
the hearings or his statement in response to petitioner's protest.
Held: Petitioner was not accorded a fair opportunity to determine
whether he was within his rights in refusing to answer, and his
conviction was invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Pp. 354 U. S. 181-216.
(a) The power of Congress to conduct investigations, inherent in
the legislative process, is broad, but it is not unlimited. P. 354
U. S. 187.
(b) Congress has no general authority to expose the private
affairs of individuals without justification in terms of the
functions of Congress. P. 354 U. S. 187.
(c) No inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to, and in
furtherance of, a legitimate task of Congress. P. 354 U. S. 187.
(d) The Bill of Rights is applicable to congressional investigations,
as it is to all forms of governmental action. P. 354 U. S. 188.
(e) A congressional investigation is subject to the command that
Congress shall make no law abridging freedom of speech or press
or assembly. Pp. 354 U. S. 196-197.
(f) When First Amendment rights are threatened, the delegation
of power to a congressional committee must be clearly revealed
in its charter. United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41. P. 354 U.
S. 198.
(g) A congressional investigation into individual affairs is invalid
if unrelated to any legislative purpose, because it is beyond the
powers conferred upon Congress by the Constitution. Kilbourn
v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168. P. 354 U. S. 198.
(h) It cannot simply be assumed that every congressional
investigation is justified by a public need that overbalances any
private rights affected, since to do so would be to abdicate the
responsibility placed by the Constitution upon the judiciary to
insure that Congress does not unjustifiably encroach upon an
individual's right of privacy nor abridge his liberty of speech,
press, religion or assembly. Pp. 354 U. S. 198-199.
(i) There is no congressional power to expose for the sake of
exposure where the predominant result can be only an invasion
of the private rights of individuals. P. 354 U. S. 200.
(j) In authorizing an investigation by a committee, it is essential
that the Senate or House should spell out the committee's
jurisdiction and purpose with sufficient particularity to insure
that compulsory process is used only in furtherance of a
legislative purpose. P. 354 U. S. 201.
(k) The resolution authorizing the Un-American Activities
Committee does not satisfy this requirement, especially when
read in the light of the practices of the Committee and
subsequent actions of the House of Representatives extending
the life of the Committee. Pp. 354 U. S. 201-205.
(l) Every reasonable indulgence of legality must be accorded to
the actions of a coordinate branch of our Government, but such
deference cannot yield to an unnecessary and unreasonable
dissipation of precious constitutional freedoms. P. 354 U. S. 204.
(m) Protected freedoms should not be placed in danger in the
absence of a clear determination by the House or Senate that a
particular inquiry is justified by specific legislative need. P. 354
U. S. 205.
(n) Congressional investigating committees are restricted to the
missions delegated to them -- to acquire certain data to be used
by the House or Senate in coping with a problem that falls within
its legislative sphere -- and no witness can be compelled to make
disclosures on matters outside that area. P. 354 U. S. 206.
(o) When the definition of jurisdictional pertinency is as
uncertain and wavering as in the case of the Un-American
Activities Committee, it becomes extremely difficult for the
Committee to limit its inquiries to statutory pertinency. P. 354
U. S. 206.
(p) The courts must accord to a defendant indicted under 2
U.S.C. § 192 every right which is guaranteed to defendants in all
other criminal cases, including the right to have available
information revealing the standard of criminality before the
commission of the alleged offense. Pp. 354 U. S. 207-208.
(q) Since the statute defines the crime as refusal to answer "any
question pertinent to the question under inquiry," part of the
standard of criminality is the pertinency of the questions
propounded to the witness. P. 354 U. S. 208.
(r) Due process requires that a witness before a congressional
investigating committee should not be compelled to decide, at
peril of criminal prosecution, whether to answer questions
propounded to him without first knowing the "question under
inquiry" with the same degree of explicitness and clarity that the
Due Process Clause requires in the expression of any element of
a criminal offense. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263. Pp.
354 U. S. 208-209.
(s) The authorizing resolution, the remarks of the chairman or
members of the committee, or even the nature of the proceedings
themselves, might make the "question under inquiry" sufficiently
clear to avoid the "vice of vagueness"; but these sources often
leave the matter in grave doubt. P. 354 U. S. 209.
(t) In this case, it is not necessary to pass on the question
whether the authorizing resolution defines the "question under
inquiry" with sufficient clarity, since the Government does not
contend that it could serve that purpose. P. 354 U. S. 209.
(u) The opening statement of the Chairman at the outset of the
hearings here involved is insufficient to serve that purpose, since
it merely paraphrased the authorizing resolution, and gave a very
general sketch of the past efforts of the Committee. Pp. 354 U. S.
209-210.
(v) Nor was that purpose served by the action of the full
Committee in authorizing the creation of the Subcommittee
before which petitioner appeared, since it merely authorized the
Chairman to appoint subcommittees "for the purpose of
performing any and all acts which the Committee as a whole is
authorized to do." Pp. 354 U. S. 211-212.

(w) On the record in this case, especially in view of the precise

questions petitioner was charged with refusing to answer, it
cannot be said that the "question under inquiry" was Communist
infiltration into labor unions. Pp. 354 U. S. 212-214.

(x) Unless the subject matter of the inquiry has been made to
appear with undisputable clarity, it is the duty of the
investigative body, upon objection of the witness on grounds of
pertinency, to state for the record the subject under inquiry at
that time and the manner in which the propounded questions
are pertinent thereto. Pp. 354 U. S. 214-215.

(y) The Chairman's response, when petitioner objected to the

questions on grounds of pertinency, was inadequate to convey
sufficient information as to the pertinency of the questions to the
"question under inquiry." Pp. 354 U. S. 214-215.

98 U.S.App.D.C.190, 233 F.2d 681, reversed and remanded.

 21. Barenblatt vs. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959)
Syllabus
Summoned to testify before a Subcommittee of the House of
Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities, which was
investigating alleged Communist infiltration into the field of
education, petitioner, formerly a graduate student and teaching
fellow at the University of Michigan, refused to answer questions as
to whether he was then or had ever been a member of the
Communist Party. He disclaimed reliance upon the privilege against
self-incrimination, but objected generally to the right of the
Subcommittee to inquire into his "political" and "religious" beliefs or
any "other personal or private affairs" or "associational activities"
upon grounds set forth in a previously prepared memorandum,
which was based on the First, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments, the
prohibition against bills of attainder and the doctrine of separation
of powers. For such refusal, he was convicted of a violation of 2
U.S.C. § 192, which makes it a misdemeanor for any person
summoned as a witness by either House of Congress or a committee
thereof to refuse to answer any question pertinent to the question
under inquiry. He was fined and sentenced to imprisonment for six
months.
Held: Petitioner's conviction is sustained. Pp. 360 U. S. 111-134.
1. In the light of the Committee's history and the repeated extensions
of its life, as well as the successive appropriations by the House of
Representatives for the conduct of its activities, its legislative
authority and that of the Subcommittee to conduct the inquiry under
consideration here is unassailable, and House Rule XI, 83d
Congress, which defines the Committee's authority, cannot be said
to be constitutionally infirm on the score of vagueness. Watkins v.
United States, 354 U. S. 178, distinguished. Pp. 360 U. S. 116-123.
(a) Rule XI has a "persuasive gloss of legislative history" which shows
beyond doubt that, in pursuance of its legislative concerns in the
domain of "national security," the House of Representatives has
clothed the Committee with pervasive authority to investigate
Communist activities in this country. Pp. 360 U. S. 117-121.
(b) In the light of the legislative history, Rule XI cannot be construed
so as to exclude the field of education from the Committee's
compulsory authority. Pp. 360 U. S. 121-123.
2. The record in this case refutes petitioner's contention that he was
not adequately apprised of the pertinency of the Subcommittee's
questions to the subject matter of the inquiry. Watkins v. United
States, supra, distinguished. Pp. 360 U. S. 123-125.
3. On the record in this case, the balance between the individual and
the governmental interests here at stake must be struck in favor of
the latter, and therefore the provisions of the First Amendment were
not transgressed by the Subcommittee's inquiry into petitioner's
past or present membership in the Communist Party. Pp. 360 U. S.
125-134.
(a) Where First Amendment rights are asserted to bar governmental
interrogation, resolution of the issue always involves a balancing by
the courts of the competing private and public interests at stake in
the particular circumstances shown. Pp. 360 U. S. 126-127.
(b) The investigation here involved was related to a valid legislative
purpose, since Congress has wide power to legislate in the field of
Communist activity in this Country and to conduct appropriate
investigations in aid thereof. Pp. 360 U. S. 127-129.

(c) Investigatory power in this domain is not to be denied Congress

solely because the field of education is involved, and the record in
this case does not indicate any attempt by the Committee to inquire
into the content of academic lectures or discussions, but only to
investigate the extent to which the Communist Party had succeeded
in infiltrating into our educational institutions persons and groups
committed to furthering the Party's alleged objective of violent
overthrow of the Government. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S.
234, distinguished. Pp. 360 U. S. 129-132.

(d) On the record in this case, it cannot be said that the true objective
of the Committee and of the Congress was purely "exposure," rather
than furtherance of a valid legislative purpose. Pp. 360 U. S. 132-
133.

(e) The record is barren of other factors which, in themselves, might

lead to the conclusion that the individual interests at stake were not
subordinate to those of the Government. P. 360 U. S. 134.

102 U.S.App.D.C. 217, 252 F.2d 129, affirmed.

 development of Smokey Mountain and reclaim 40 hectares of the
land at the Manila Bay Area. The latter together with the commercial
FOR THURSDAY ADDITIONAL: area to be built on Smokey Mountain will be owned by RBI as
CHAVEZ V. NHA enabling components. If the project is revoked or terminated by the
Government through no fault of RBI or by mutual agreement, the
Government shall compensate RBI for its actual expenses incurred
in the Project plus a reasonable rate of return not exceeding that
On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General Francisco Chavez, filed
stated in the feasibility study and in the contract as of the date of
an instant petition raising constitutional issues on the JVA entered
such revocation, cancellation, or termination on a schedule to be
by National Housing Authority and R-II Builders, Inc.
agreed upon by both parties.
On March 1, 1988, then-President Cory Aquino issued
To summarize, the SMDRP shall consist of Phase I and Phase II.
Memorandum order No. (MO) 161 approving and directing
Phase I of the project involves clearing, levelling-off the dumpsite,
implementation of the Comprehensive and Integrated Metropolitan
and construction of temporary housing units for the current
Manila Waste Management Plan. During this time, Smokey
residents on the cleared and levelled site. Phase II involves the
Mountain, a wasteland in Tondo, Manila, are being made residence
construction of a fenced incineration area for the on-site disposal of
of many Filipinos living in a subhuman state.
the garbage at the dumpsite.
As presented in MO 161, NHA prepared feasibility studies to turn
Due to the recommendations done by the DENR after evaluations
the dumpsite into low-cost housing project, thus, Smokey Mountain
done, the JVA was amended and restated (now ARJVA) to
Development and Reclamation Project (SMDRP), came into place. RA
accommodate the design changes and additional work to be done to
6957 (Build-Operate-Transfer Law) was passed on July 1990
successfully implement the project. The original 3,500 units of
declaring the importance of private sectors as contractors in
temporary housing were decreased to 2,992. The reclaimed land as
government projects. Thereafter, Aquino proclaimed MO 415
enabling component was increased from 40 hectares to 79 hectares,
applying RA 6957 to SMDRP, among others. The same MO also
which was supported by the issuance of Proclamation No. 465 by
established EXECOM and TECHCOM in the execution and
President Ramos. The revision also provided for the 119-hectare
evaluation of the plan, respectively, to be assisted by the Public
land as an enabling component for Phase II of the project.
Estates Authority (PEA).
Subsequently, the Clean Air Act was passed by the legislature which
Notices of public bidding to become NHA’s venture partner for
made the establishment of an incinerator illegal, making the off-site
SMDRP were published in newspapers in 1992, from which R-II
dumpsite at Smokey Mountain necessary. On August 1, 1998, the
Builders, Inc. (RBI) won the bidding process. Then-President Ramos
project was suspended, to be later reconstituted by President
authorized NHA to enter into a Joint Venture Agreement with RBI.
Estrada in MO No. 33.
Under the JVA, the project involves the clearing of Smokey Mountain
On August 27, 2003, the NHA and RBI executed a Memorandum of
for eventual development into a low cost housing complex and
Agreement whereby both parties agreed to terminate the JVA and
industrial/commercial site. RBI is expected to fully finance the
subsequent agreements. During this time, NHA reported that 34
temporary housing structures and 21 permanent housing structures
had been turned over by RBI.
ISSUES:
Whether respondents NHA and RBI have been granted the power
and authority to reclaim lands of the public domain as this power is
vested exclusively in PEA as claimed by petitioner
Whether respondents NHA and RBI were given the power and
authority by DENR to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands
Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed foreshore and
submerged lands considered as alienable and outside the commerce
of man
Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed lands when there
was no declaration that said lands are no longer needed for public
use
Whether there is a law authorizing sale of reclaimed lands
Whether the transfer of reclaimed lands to RBI was done by public
bidding
Whether RBI, being a private corporation, is barred by the
Constitution to acquire lands of public domain
Whether respondents can be compelled to disclose all information
related to the SMDRP
Whether the operative fact doctrine applies to the instant position
HELD:
Executive Order 525 reads that the PEA shall be primarily
responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating all
reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National Government.
This does not mean that it shall be responsible for all. The requisites
for a valid and legal reclamation project are approval by the
President (which were provided for by MOs), favourable
recommendation of PEA (which were seen as a part of its
recommendations to the EXECOM), and undertaken either by PEA
or entity under contract of PEA or by the National Government
Agency (NHA is a government agency whose authority to reclaim
lands under consultation with PEA is derived under PD 727 and RA
7279).
Notwithstanding the need for DENR permission, the DENR is
deemed to have granted the authority to reclaim in the Smokey
Mountain Project for the DENR is one of the members of the
EXECOM which provides reviews for the project. ECCs and Special
Patent Orders were given by the DENR which are exercises of its
power of supervision over the project. Furthermore, it was the
President via the abovementioned MOs that originally authorized the
reclamation. It must be noted that the reclamation of lands of public
domain is reposed first in the Philippine President.
The reclaimed lands were classified alienable and disposable via MO
415 issued by President Aquino and Proclamation Nos. 39 and 465
by President Ramos.
Despite not having an explicit declaration, the lands have been
deemed to be no longer needed for public use as stated in
Proclamation No. 39 that these are to be “disposed to qualified
beneficiaries.” Furthermore, these lands have already been
necessarily reclassified as alienable and disposable lands under the
BOT law.
Letter I of Sec. 6 of PD 757 clearly states that the NHA can acquire
property rights and interests and encumber or otherwise dispose of
them as it may deem appropriate.
There is no doubt that respondent NHA conducted a public bidding
of the right to become its joint venture partner in the Smokey
Mountain Project. It was noted that notices were published in
national newspapers. The bidding proper was done by the Bids and
Awards Committee on May 18, 1992.

RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 explicitly states that a contractor

can be paid “a portion as percentage of the reclaimed land” subject
to the constitutional requirement that only Filipino citizens or
corporation with at least 60% Filipino equity can acquire the same.
In addition, when the lands were transferred to the NHA, these were
considered Patrimonial lands of the state, by which it has the power
to sell the same to any qualified person.

This relief must be granted. It is the right of the Filipino people to

information on matters of public concerned as stated in Article II,
Sec. 28, and Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution.

When the petitioner filed the case, the JVA had already been
terminated by virtue of MOA between RBI and NHA. The properties
and rights in question after the passage of around 10 years from the
start of the project’s implementation cannot be disturbed or
questioned. The petitioner, being the Solicitor General at the time
SMDRP was formulated, had ample opportunity to question the said
project, but did not do so. The moment to challenge has passed.