Neutron Poisons

Page 1 of 27 SUPPORT OF NDA RWMD GDF PROGRAMME
RWMD/04/006 – Term Contract in Support of

RWMD Upstream Optioneering Studies:
Use of Neutron-absorbing Materials
The use of Neutron-absorbing Materials in

ILW and Spent Fuel Packages for Criticality
Control
J.M. Solano1, T. Page2, T.W. Hicks1, P. Thorne2
Version 1
1
Galson Sciences Ltd, 5 Grosvenor House, Melton Road, Oakham, Rutland
LE15 6AX
2
Nuclear Technologies plc, Ennerdale Pavilion, Westlakes Science & Technology
Park, Moor Row, Cumbria CA24 3JZ
1222g-1 v1 20th November 2012

The use of Neutron-absorbing Materials in

ILW and Spent Fuel Packages for Criticality
Control
J.M. Solano, T. Page, T.W. Hicks, P. Thorne
Version 1
Name Signature Date

Prepared by: James Solano 20/11/12
Reviewed by: Tim Hicks 20/11/12
Approved by: Dan Galson 20/11/12

Conditions of Publication
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is seeking to make information on its activities readily available, and to enable interested parties to
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© Nuclear Decommissioning Authority 2012. All rights reserved.
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Executive Summary
As part of the development of disposal concepts, RWMD is investigating opportunities for
optimisation of a geological disposal facility (GDF) in combination with earlier phases of the
radioactive waste management lifecycle (in particular waste treatment, conditioning and
packaging) in order to achieve the most favourable balance between factors such as cost, risk,
environmental impact and hazard.
This report has been produced under the Upstream Optioneering work programme in support of
RWMD’s work programme. The Upstream Optioneering project was set up to help identify and
implement opportunities for improved management of higher activity radioactive waste in the UK.
These improvements could lead to quicker and more cost effective hazard reduction, reduced
environmental and safety impacts and other benefits. Over the past two years, RWMD has:
• Identified opportunities to improve waste management practices, in conjunction with waste
producers.
• Developed a multi-year programme of work to deliver these opportunities.
• Reacted to the needs of waste producers by delivering other work to facilitate ongoing
waste management.
• Engaged with Site Licence Companies on specific projects of national significance.
The aim of this document is to inform the Upstream Optioneering project by considering the
potential use of neutron poisons as a criticality control in waste packages. It also aims to provide
input to waste producers on potential opportunities available regarding neutron poisons and their
uses in waste packaging.
This study provides details of the potential business drivers that may be realised should such a
strategy be adopted for waste packaging in the UK, highlighting benefits where relevant. Potential
neutron absorbing materials which could be used as poisons are discussed and both ILW and
spent fuel packages ultimately destined for a GDF in the UK have been considered in this work.
Three generic scenarios that incorporate neutron-absorbing materials into waste packages have
been identified: blending with the waste; use as an immobilisation matrix or package filler; and use
as a package material. Other methodologies, e.g. strategic emplacement of wastes, have also
been identified and alternatives to the use of neutron poisons which could be pursued for criticality
control are presented.

CONTENTS
Page No
1. INTRODUCTION 6
1.1 Background 6
1.2 Objectives and Scope 6
1.3 Report Structure 7
2. BUSINESS DRIVERS 8
2.1 Ensuring Criticality Safety of Waste Packages with High Fissile Material Contents 8
2.2 Enabling the use of Larger Waste Packages 10
2.3 Reduction in Orphan Wastes 10
2.4 Taking Advantage of the Disposal of Other Wastes 11
2.5 Defence in Depth in Criticality Safety 11
3. POISONS 12
3.1 Depleted Uranium (DU) 12
3.2 Boron 13
3.3 Chlorine 13
3.4 Gadolinium 14
3.5 Hafnium 14
3.6 Cadmium 14
3.7 Other Materials 14
4. PACKAGING SCENARIOS 15
4.1 Blending with Fissile Material 15
4.2 Use in an Immobilisation Matrix or as a Package Filling Medium 17
4.3 Use as a Packaging Material 18
4.4 Strategic Emplacement 22
5. ALTERNATIVES TO THE USE OF POISONS WITHIN WASTE PACKAGES 24
6. SUMMARY 26
7. REFERENCES 27

1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
The use of neutron absorbing materials (neutron poisons) as an additive to waste packages
that contain fissile material has been identified as a potential upstream opportunity for the
safe packaging and disposal of intermediate level waste (ILW) and spent fuel.
The basic premise for the use of neutron absorbers for criticality safety is that they result in
a reduction in neutron flux within a system to a level at which, for a fixed mass of fissile
material, a neutron-induced nuclear chain reaction is not possible. Generally, neutron
absorbing materials are used for criticality control operations involving processing of fissile
material, where the control cannot be administered through more favourable passive
means, such as using safe geometry vessels or through control of neutron moderators.
The use of neutron poisons is less desirable than some other methods of criticality control
because of the significant challenges associated with substantiation of the continued
presence of the poison within the system and demonstration of its efficacy.
Research and development in the use of poisons for criticality control in waste disposal is
generally concerned with wastes containing high concentrations of plutonium residues,
highly enriched uranium (HEU) or spent fuel. As such, the technology readiness level for
the approach when applied to ILW is considered to be low. However, development of
methods for using poisons in ILW packaging and disposal may benefit from understanding
how they are being considered in the management of other waste types. This study
identifies where lessons can be learnt from approaches to using poisons for criticality
control in the packaging of different types of waste for disposal. In addition to documenting
the uses of neutron poisons and the associated technologies, business drivers and benefits
of using poisons are discussed.
1.2 Objectives and Scope
The aim of this work is to inform the decision-making process for the packaging of ILW and
spent fuel by consolidating available information on the use of poisons in operations
involving fissile materials. Generic waste types are considered rather than specific waste
streams. Post-closure criticality is outside the scope of this work and is not considered in
detail, although reference is made to the long term behaviour of neutron poisons under
disposal conditions.
In addition to discussing the efficacy of neutron poisons when applied to a specific
packaging scenario, broader implications for their application are discussed. For instance,
neutron absorbers may introduce chemotoxic or radiological hazards that may counter any
criticality safety benefit, or additional waste processing requirements may introduce
substantial costs. This study aims to demonstrate the benefits of using neutron poisons in
terms of criticality safety alongside a broader and holistic consideration of their advantages
and disadvantages.
Different options for incorporating neutron poisons into waste packages are described. The
poison material is described in detail for each option along with the types of waste stream
to which the poison could be applied. The advantages and disadvantages of each of the
options are considered. The state of technical readiness of packaging scenarios is
discussed and knowledge gaps are identified. The nature and quantity of work involved in
progressing the scenario through to its successful application to the waste are also
discussed.

1.3 Report Structure

Section 2 discusses the need for neutron poisons, the waste packaging challenges for
fissile materials and the overarching business drivers for the use of poisons. Section 3
discusses the various poisons that are available and Section 4 identifies current
applications of poisons. Section 5 presents a summary of the alternative techniques which
may be used to demonstrate criticality safety with respect to packaging ILW and spent fuel.

2. BUSINESS DRIVERS
In this section, the main business drivers behind the use of neutron poisons are discussed.
Whilst specific waste streams are not discussed and a generic approach is taken, the
existence of certain waste types that may challenge current fissile limits is recognised.
2.1 Ensuring Criticality Safety of Waste Packages with High Fissile Material Contents
One of the main drivers for the use of neutron poisons is to facilitate higher fissile material
limits for radioactive waste disposal packages than might otherwise be possible. Current
IAEA transport regulations do not preclude the use of poisons within waste packages. The
IAEA requirements state that the packages should maintain sub-criticality during normal
and accident conditions [1] and part of this requirement (para. 671) specifies that the
consideration of the loss of efficiency of any built in neutron absorbers should be included
as a contingency within any transport criticality safety assessment. This implies that the
continued substantiation of the efficacy of a neutron poison is of prime importance. At the
point at which substantiation of an absorbing material is no longer possible, whether during
normal conditions or as a result of an accident, credit cannot be taken for its presence
within a bounding package model to determine the neutron multiplication factor.
Neutron poisons are also discussed within the Office of Nuclear Regulation (ONR) Safety
Assessment Principles (SAPs) [2], which treat these materials in much the same way as
the IAEA transport regulations. The SAPs specify that:
“Where sub-criticality cannot be maintained through geometrical constraint alone,
additional engineered safety measures should be specified, such as fixed neutron
absorbers. Reliance on neutron absorbers requires assurance of their continued
presence and effectiveness.”
This indicates that preference is given to passive safety measures in the first instance.
Failing this, then the introduction of fixed neutron poisons may be justified. Again the
continued substantiation of the poisons efficacy is emphasised. Additional guidance can be
found in the ONR Technical Assessment Guide (TAG) relating to criticality safety [3]. The
following guidance is given:
“Regarding neutron poisons, it should be noted that such materials are generally
only effective for thermal neutrons. Hence, in cases where reliance is placed on
neutron poisons to maintain criticality safety, the licensee must provide assurance
that sufficient neutron poison and sufficient neutron moderating material will be
present to ensure the effectiveness of the poison under all reasonably foreseeable
conditions. Strong preference should be given to the use of fixed poisons rather
than soluble poisons, since the latter require continuous demonstration of their
presence and appropriate concentration during operations.”
Nuclear waste producers and consignors are considering options to increase fissile loading
limits in waste packages whilst maintaining criticality safety, potentially through the
introduction of neutron poisons either through processing of the wasteform or addition to
the waste package as filler or construction material. The advantages of increased fissile
masses in packages are potentially:
• Reducing cost by reducing the number of packages required.
• Reducing costs by reducing processing costs to produce acceptable packages.
• Reducing the time taken to decommission a waste facility which may be
deteriorating.
• Reducing the requirement for, and cost of, additional interim storage facilities.
• Reducing the number of handling operations and hence reducing risk to operators.
• Reducing the dose to workers.
• Reducing cost by reducing the number of transport movements and also benefiting
the environment.
• Making waste processing plants viable in terms of costs per package.
Note that these are only potential business drivers. In addition they are general statements
at this stage and further detail will be required before they can truly be defined as a
business driver. If the decision is made to further develop the scenarios involving the
addition of neutron poisons then as the potential benefits and disadvantages become clear,
the business drivers themselves will also be clarified. It is possible that the statements
above may prove unfounded, or alternatively that they are only applicable to certain waste
streams which have certain characteristics. There is however, a potentially significant
advantage to be gained from the use of neutron poisons, although it is important to perform
detailed assessments to demonstrate safety and cost benefit for different packaging
approaches and types of poison.
It is important to note, however, that neutron poisons have a material cost associated with
them which may be prohibitive to their use (e.g. hafnium and gadolinium). This may not be
true of materials such as depleted uranium that may otherwise be classified as wastes if not
used as a neutron absorber in packaging materials. Incorporating neutron absorbers in the
wasteform requires some form of processing of the waste and this will also have an
increased cost associated with it, as will the incorporation of poisons in container materials.
Also, the use of poisons will result in a new set of fault sequences requiring consideration in
criticality safety assessments (CSAs) including ‘Failure to add poison’ and ‘Degradation or
loss of poison’. Reduced risk of criticality will also be highly dependent on the form and
location of the poison and the fissile material in the waste package. The degree of credit
that can be taken for poisons will be key to criticality safety arguments, and substantiation
of the on-going efficacy of the poison will be a fundamental part of a safety case.
2.1.1 The use of Poisons in ILW Disposal Packages
Various screening levels for the packaging of fissile material are presented in the Disposal
System Safety Case (DSSC) and require increasing levels of detailed criticality safety
assessment in order to be justified for a waste stream [4]. The generic screening level
(GSL) is 50g 239Pu (or equivalent masses of other fissile isotopes in terms of contribution to
reactivity) per package which requires only a basic description of the fissile material and
contents. Lower screening levels (LSLs) require a full description of the fissile material,
whereas upper screening levels (USLs) require a full description of fissile materials and
other wasteform characteristics (e.g. mixing of fissile material in immobilising grout).
For example, generic CSAs have been produced for ILW packages that include plutonium
[5] and ILW packages that include highly enriched uranium (HEU) [6]. For plutonium-
bearing 500 litre drums the screening levels are:
• LSL: (0.65 × 235U) + 239Pu + 241
Pu < 240g
• USL: (0.65 × 235U) + 239Pu + 241
Pu < 2,150g
For HEU-bearing 500 litre drums, assuming no polythene content, the screening levels are:
• LSL: 235U + 1.6 ×(239Pu + 241Pu) = 160g
• USL: 235U + 1.6×(239Pu + 241Pu) = 1,400g

Generic CSAs have also been produced for ILW packages that contain irradiated natural
uranium and low enriched uranium (LEU). These generic CSAs take credit for the
presence of the neutron absorbing 238U in the wastes.
In addition to limits on fissile material, the generic CSAs place limits on neutron
moderators/reflectors, such as beryllium and graphite. These materials may act as neutron
reflectors around a fissile mass, thereby increasing the reactivity of the fissile material.
Package-specific CSAs are required for waste packages that do not meet the GSL or the
relevant generic screening levels. Package-specific CSAs may take account of specific
geometry, isotopic concentrations of fissile material and the presence of neutron absorbing
materials in order to derive package-specific USLs.
Note that the transition from packaging to an LSL to packaging to a USL is based on a
combination of waste characterisation and ALARP arguments. To aid decision making, any
criticality safety analysis from which package fissile limits may be derived should be based
on an approach that considers both conservative (LSL) and more credible assumptions
(USL).
2.1.2 The use of Poisons in Spent Fuel Disposal Packages
The addition of neutron poisons may mitigate a specific fault sequence that presents a
criticality safety hazard in spent fuel management. For instance, neutron transport
calculations have shown that fresh or low irradiated MOX and UO2 fuel assemblies may
become supercritical if placed in a disposal package that is subsequently flooded with
water. The addition of poisons, either as a packaging material or as a filler material that
reduces void space, could mitigate the effects of flooding such that spent fuel disposal does
not present a criticality hazard.
2.2 Enabling the use of Larger Waste Packages
Another driver for using neutron poisons is their potential for facilitating the use of larger
waste packages that might otherwise have prohibitively low fissile material limits. The use
of larger waste packages would have the benefits of reduced dose and conventional risk to
operators, because they may remove the need to size reduce decommissioning waste prior
to packaging. In addition, waste package filling and handling times may be reduced.
The viability of larger waste packages for transport and disposal is based on the
assumption that larger fissile mass limits can be derived with credit taken for the presence
of neutron poisons. The potential for developing larger packages is therefore closely linked
to the wasteform type (i.e. the inclusion of poisons in the wasteform) and the materials used
to construct the container.
2.3 Reduction in Orphan Wastes
Orphan wastes are those wastes which do not have a treatment and/or disposal route.
They typically include ion exchange resins, sources, filters, mercury, oil, solvents and other
mobile wastes. Increasing fissile limits or moderator limits through the addition of neutron
poisons may present a disposal route for certain orphan wastes, providing significant cost
savings in research and development of treatment and disposal techniques. One example
is where liquid wastes could present a criticality safety issue. The addition of a poison such
as boron in the form of borosilicate glass moulded into Raschig rings may allow safe
disposal of such wastes. Also, other materials that present a challenge from the
perspective of criticality safety (e.g. exceptional neutron moderators or reflectors such as
heavy water, graphite or beryllium) may be disposed of safely with the incorporation of
neutron poison in the waste packages. Note this technique is only applicable to orphan
waste streams which may contain significant fissile material content.
2.4 Taking Advantage of the Disposal of Other Wastes

Nuclear or potentially non-nuclear origin waste streams that have a neutron absorbing
effect could be disposed of with fissile material. Depleted uranium (uranium in which the
235
U fraction is less than that in natural uranium) has both civilian and military applications.
If currents stocks are declared as a waste in future, their inclusion in waste packages as a
neutron poison may allow fissile material limits to be increased, whilst also disposing of an
additional waste stream. The use of such wastes as poisons in waste packaging may be
relatively inexpensive compare to the use of other materials.
However, the introduction of a material such as depleted uranium into package design may
require costly manufacturing processes. The waste material is unlikely to be in the ideal
form for addition to waste packages and will therefore require processing, increasing cost.
Depleted uranium is stored as chemically reactive UF6 and would need to be converted to a
more chemically stable uranium oxide such as UO2, U2O3 or U3O8 before use.
2.5 Defence in Depth in Criticality Safety
The addition of neutron poisons to waste packages that already meet available fissile mass
limits would provide defence in depth with regard to criticality safety. That is, the addition of
poisons will increase criticality safety margins. Should the overall costs and risks (of
hazards such as chemotoxic/radiological or other conventional) associated with the addition
of neutron absorbing materials be sufficiently low, then this approach could be justified on
an overall ALARP basis.
Alternatively, neutron poison may only be required to demonstrate safety through one
phase of waste management. However in other waste management phases, the addition
of poisons may provide additional defence in depth, where criticality safety has otherwise
been assured.

3. POISONS
A neutron poison is a material with a high absorption cross section for neutrons. The
intended use for a neutron poison is to reduce neutron flux within the system, making a
nuclear chain reaction unsustainable.
Two types of neutrons must be considered: fast and thermal. Fast neutrons typically have
kinetic energies close to 1 MeV and are able to easily fission 238U and other non-fissile
actinides. Thermal neutrons typically have energies around 0.025 eV and have higher
absorption cross-sections than fast neutrons. Moderation of fast neutrons by materials such
as heavy or light water and graphite produces thermal neutrons which are more easily
absorbed by other nuclei.
The inclusion of neutron poisons in waste packages needs to consider both the moderation
of neutrons in addition to high absorption cross-sections of thermal neutrons. Note that the
effect of neutron moderation needs to be considered holistically, since a well moderated
neutron will be readily absorbed within a poison material nucleus. However, conversely it
will also be readily absorbed in a fissile material nucleus and cause fission. These are two
competing effects on the overall reactivity of a waste system and must be fully understood
through detailed criticality safety assessment such as Monte-Carlo modelling. This process
would need to be done on a waste stream specific basis.
3.1 Depleted Uranium (DU)
Depleted uranium has a 235U content which is lower than that of natural uranium (~0.72%).
This fraction of 235U in uranium is too low to sustain a neutron chain reaction. However, DU
is of interest to criticality safety for its ability in sufficient quantity to dilute fissile isotopes so
that the resulting system will be unable to sustain a nuclear reaction.
The thermal neutron cross section for 238U is relatively low (a cross section of 2.7 barns
compared to 259,000 barns for 157Gd). However provided that the depleted uranium has
been blended sufficiently with the fissile isotopes, there is greater potential for capture as
the neutron loses energy through the resonance region within the 238U. Within this region
the absorption cross sections are greatly enhanced, potentially approaching 10,000 barns
for specific energies. As such, it is important that the 238U remains closely associated with
the fissile isotopes if the resonance regions are to be exploited for neutron capture. The
benefit of DU as an absorber material is therefore not clear if it is positioned in a physically
separate region of the package to the fissile material.
It was noted in [7] that civilian stocks of 60,000 tonnes of depleted uranium generated
through processing and enrichment or uranic fuel exist and that 130,000 tonnes could
require disposal if DU is declared as a waste in the future. DU is not currently classified as
a waste.
DU can be employed in a number of forms for use as a neutron poison including:
• DUCRETE - depleted uranium concrete which contains depleted uranium
aggregates.
• DUPoly - manufactured using a depleted uranium oxide powder as the filler material
in a thermoplastic polyethelene binder material to produce high-density shielding
material.
• PYRUC - micro-aggregates of DUO2 (uranium oxide) which are the mixed with an
organic binder and then pyrolysed to make uranium carbide and/or uranium oxide-
carbon matrices.

• Cermet - a ceramic metallic composite which consists of DUO2 particulates

embedded in a continuous steel phase, sandwiched between clean uncontaminated
steel layers.
The above materials have been discussed extensively in [7]. The various techniques
available which use depleted uranium and the above materials are discussed further in
Section 4.
3.2 Boron
Boron is a low atomic number material (Z=5) and has a natural isotope ratio of ~80% 11B
and ~20% 10B. It is the isotope 10B which has a high absorption cross section for thermal
neutrons (3,800 barns compared to 2.7 barns for DU and 259,000 barns for 157Gd). Fast
neutrons have a low absorption cross section for boron so it must be used in conjunction
with a moderating material to be fully effective.
Boron is a relatively inexpensive material which can be incorporated into a number of other
materials with a range of uses:
• Boronated concrete - a material commonly used in the shielding of neutrons for
radiological protection purposes. Boron captures thermal neutrons which have been
moderated by the lighter components of the concrete.
• Boral steel - an inert and inexpensive steel alloy which incorporates boron. One
major advantage of boral steel is its wide availability and common usage as a
thermal neutron shield.
• Borax powder - sodium boronate (Na2B4o7) used as a control in criticality recovery
situations to reduce reactivity.
• Borosilicate glass - commonly used to encapsulate fissile material as high level
waste and used in the can-in-canister concept developed for separated plutonium
disposal. It can also be used to manufacture Raschig rings for use in solutions of
fissile materials.
• Borated polythene - with up to 30% boron can be used as a neutron absorber,
although high degradation rates and loss of efficacy may be a concern after
geological disposal.
• Metamic-HT - an aluminium and boron carbide (B4C) nano-composite manufactured
using powder metallurgy. The material is currently licensed by the US NRC as the
basket material for spent fuel transport (HI-STAR 180, see Section 4 for further
details on design).
• MAXUS - a sandwich of 100% dense metal matrix composites (boron
carbide/aluminium) and thin aluminium skins developed in Japan using powder
metallurgy.
Note that neutron capture by 10B results in the formation of 7Li plus a helium nucleus.
Helium build up (hence a build up of pressure threatening the integrity of the waste) over
long periods of time may need to be considered in safety assessments.
3.3 Chlorine
Natural chlorine consists of two stable isotopes, 25% 37Cl and the neutron absorbing 35Cl
which makes up 75%. The neutron absorption cross section for 35Cl is on the order of 100
barns. PolyVinyl Chloride (PVC) is a plastic, which contains 56% chlorine and can act as a
neutron absorber. However, PVC will gradually degrade under geological disposal

conditions and loss of its efficacy may be a criticality concern as well as affect conditions in
the disposal facility. On this basis, the use of PVC or other chlorine based neutron poisons
is unlikely to be viable. PVC is present in large quantities in certain PCM waste streams
and the potential impact of this as a poison is discussed later in this document.
3.4 Gadolinium
Gadolinium is a malleable and ductile rare earth metal with a very high thermal neutron
capture cross section (~259,000 barns for 157Gd). It is often used as a burnable poison in
nuclear reactors but has poor corrosion resistance. Gadolinium is soluble in water as
gallium nitrate Gd(NO3)3 and has been used in reactor coolants.
In the US, gadolinium has been proposed as a neutron poison which could be combined
with plutonium to prevent criticality [8]. In the UK is has been suggested as one of the
components of a ceramic waste form used to immobilise plutonium [11].
3.5 Hafnium
Hafnium is a corrosion resistant, ductile metal with a thermal neutron absorption cross-
section of just under 2000 barns for natural hafnium and a cross section for thermal
neutrons of ~7200 barns for 177Hf [9]. It is currently used in nuclear reactor control rods and
a ceramic compound hafnium boride has been proposed for the same purpose.
Alloys of hafnium and zirconium (a metal with similar chemical properties but a neutron
cross section 600 times lower) have been suggested as possible waste package basket
materials [10]. Along with gadolinium, hafnium is a component of the ceramic wasteform
proposed to immobilise separated plutonium and HEU [11].
3.6 Cadmium
Cadmium is a malleable and ductile metal with high corrosion resistance. Natural cadmium
contains eight isotopes, of which 113Cd is the most important with a cross section for
thermal neutrons of 62,000 barns. Cadmium is widely used in neutron shielding although
high cost has led to other materials being used in its place.
3.7 Other Materials
There are potentially a number of other materials that have high neutron absorption cross
sections and as such may have the potential to be deployed within waste packages as a
poison. Samarium and Dysprosium are two such examples and indeed these materials
have been used previously as control rods in nuclear reactors. Iridium and Europium are
two further examples. However, the low abundance and therefore high cost of these
elements within the earth’s crust would most likely see them excluded from any further
study. Mercury has a reasonably high capture cross section and is found in many nuclear
and non-nuclear waste streams (in nuclear waste streams it is generally an orphan waste).
Should a chemically stable enough form for the mercury be proposed, then its properties as
a neutron absorber could potentially be exploited if it were co-packaged in sufficient
masses with other fissile waste items.

4. PACKAGING SCENARIOS
This section presents a number of different scenarios that are used currently for the
purpose of criticality control for packaging of fissile material. Three main packaging
scenarios are described in detail for the use of poisons, these are:
• Blending with fissile material.
• Use as a package filling material.
• Use as a package construction material.
For each of the three packaging scenarios, a brief description of how the scenario would be
applied to the package is given. Subsequently, an outline of the ILW or Spent Fuel waste
streams to which the scenario could be applied is provided. The benefits and
disadvantages of the scenario are presented and the current status of the scenario is
summarised. If applicable, a discussion of where the scenario has been implemented
previously is included. Finally, a brief discussion is provided of the research and
development required, if any, to apply the technique to UK ILW and spent fuel packages.
In addition to the discussion of the three packaging scenarios, some commentary is also
presented on the use of poisons as part of an emplacement strategy within a geological
disposal facility (GDF).
4.1 Blending with Fissile Material
Description – This scenario involves the direct blending of the neutron absorbing material
with the waste itself, which would require either the mechanical blending or chemical
dissolution of the waste within the poison material. The level of mixing could be at the
molecular level, where the waste is effectively homogeneously distributed with the
absorber, or on a much more heterogeneous level, depending on the technique used and
the specific criticality safety requirements.
Waste Streams – This scenario could in theory be applied to either spent fuel or ILW. ILW
types that would lend themselves most readily to direct blending are liquor waste streams,
such as raffinates, that could be mixed with a poison prior to encapsulation. Spent fuels
and solid ILW would need to be processed into a form that could be blended with the
neutron absorbing medium.
Absorbing Materials – Any of the neutron poison materials discussed in the previous
section could be applied in this way. However, DU probably lends itself most readily to
direct blending with fissile-bearing waste.
Potential Benefits – It is likely that the largest benefit in terms of criticality safety would be
realised through the direct blending of the fissile waste within the neutron absorbing
material. For DU as an absorber this would more readily facilitate the exploitation of the
resonance regions within the absorber material as described previously. There would also
be benefits in terms of the long term evolution of the package under disposal conditions,
because close association of the poison with the fissile material (in a similar chemical form)
may allow credit to be taken for the absorbing effect of the poison material in assessments
of long-term post-closure criticality scenarios.
Potential Disadvantages – Direct blending of absorber material with the waste would most
likely be expensive and in the case of solid ILW or spent fuel would involve many
processing steps. This will likely require the installation of bespoke waste processing
facilities. As well as having a high financial cost associated with it there may be additional
dose and conventional hazards associated with the process. An overall ALARP argument

would need to be made which considered these increased risks and cost alongside any
reduction in the criticality safety hazard.
Current Status – The bulk of the research into the direct blending of waste with a poison
material for criticality control has focused on DU as the absorber medium. For wastes that
are processed before disposal, the mixing of DU with the wasteform on a molecular scale
would be the preferential option for long-term criticality control. The authors are not aware
of any prototype or production facilities that currently apply this scenario. However, there
has been some research in the area.
In particular, the form that the DU should take has been considered. Uranium tailings in the
form of UF6 are corrosive and hazardous and they would need to be converted to a more
stable form before use. Conversion to uranium tetrafluoride or to a uranium oxide state
would be the most likely options, with U3O8 and UO2 having been recognised as the most
stable forms [7]. The neutron absorption benefit of each form of DU would need to be
considered before any choice was made.
Three forms of blending were discussed in a study for RWMD of options for using DU in
criticality control [7] and these are summarised below:
• Dilution of enriched uranium – this would entail the blending of uranium metal in
molten form or in the form of uranyl nitrate, which is then converted to oxide prior to
conditioning for disposal.
• Dilution of uranium enriched in 233U – this is applicable to the blending of 233
U with
DU in order to ensure criticality safety.
• In the case of dilution of aluminium based spent nuclear fuel – three mechanisms
have been identified:
- Melt and dilute, which is melting followed by the addition of DU.
- Mechanical dilution involving pressing and chopping before diluting with DU.
- Vitrification involving dissolution of the wasteform and then the manufacture
of a glass.
As discussed above, dilution on a molecular level provides maximum benefit for neutron
absorption and greater potential for resonance regions within the 238U to be utilised. It will
also be more likely that 238U will remain with the wasteform through storage, transport and
disposal, allowing credit to be taken during all phases of criticality assessment.
In addition to the research into the use of DU, work has also been carried out to consider
the direct blending of gadolinium and hafnium with high concentrations of plutonium (Pu)
and highly enriched uranium (HEU) encapsulated in ceramic. This provides another
application for introducing neutron poisons directly into the waste form [11]. Again no
working facility has to date been operated based on this principle but research has been
carried out both in the UK and the US into the feasibility of packaging fissile material in this
way.
In this scenario the fissile material is converted into pucks with a diameter of 6.9 cm and a
thickness of 2.5 cm. Typical fissile loadings are 50 g of Pu/HEU per puck. The fissile
material is immobilised in a titanium oxide based ceramic which also contains hafnium and
gadolinium to act as neutron absorbers.
It is important to note that here the poison material is not required as a primary means of
criticality control because for normal conditions the ceramic material can be shown to be
safe without the absorbers included. However the purpose of these materials is to provide

defence in depth and to mitigate potential fault sequences occurring during all phases of
waste management.
Future Development – This particular scenario is still at the research and development
stage and there is still considerable work required in order to apply it to a particular
wastestream. Two potential applications have been discussed here. However, it may be
possible to apply the scenario of direct blending to other waste streams. One of the key
considerations when developing the application of poison materials is the understanding of
the behaviour of the poisons materials as they become intermingled with the fissile
material. It is important that the effects of differential mixing, non-homogenous/non-uniform
mixing and sub-specification mixing are understood and their criticality safety impacts
assessed. Such studies would need to be undertaken using an appropriate criticality safety
assessment code such as MCNP.
4.2 Use in an Immobilisation Matrix or as a Package Filling Medium
Description – The basic premise for this scenario is that the poison or a poison-bearing
matrix is added to the waste as part of an immobilisation matrix, such as a grout, or in order
to fill any void space within the package.
Waste Streams – In theory this scenario could be applied to any waste stream where void
space exists within the waste form and an encapsulation matrix is used. For example, a
poison-bearing grout matrix could be used to encapsulate supercompacted drums of Pu-
bearing ILW in 500 litre drums as an additional criticality control measure. In general, for
compactable ILW, it may be preferable to incorporate the neutron poison into the
encapsulation grout rather than the waste to avoid reducing the level of compaction that
could be achieved.
Another option would be to introduce a poison-bearing filler material into the void space
between fuel elements within a spent fuel assembly and around the fuel assembly when
placed in a disposal canister. Such an approach would serve two purposes with regard to
criticality safety: it will reduce the space available for water to flood the disposal canister
and provide neutron moderation after any loss of canister integrity as well as acting as a
neutron absorber.
Absorbing materials – As for direct blending, it is likely that most of the absorber materials
described in the previous sections could be utilised as a package filling medium. Solubility
may be an important factor as the material needs to remain within the encapsulant matrix
and container in order to be effective as an absorber. As such gadolinium, which is highly
soluble, may not be the most appropriate choice of neutron poison for some waste streams.
Also, the use of DU would require substantiation of the material’s effectiveness as an
absorber within a heterogeneous waste matrix. If the configuration is such that the
resonance regions within the 238U are not fully exploited then the poison material may not
be efficient as a neutron absorber.
Potential Benefits – The addition of a neutron absorbing medium directly to the package is
likely to be a less onerous and costly process than blending with the waste. Their use
would provide the added benefit of enhanced neutron absorbance where void space
reduction would anyway provide a means of criticality control by reducing the space
available for water entry.
Potential Disadvantages – A criticality assessment would need to determine an
appropriate and measurable level of credit that could be taken for the presence of a poison.
Given that the configuration within the container and the mass of poison material packaged
could vary significantly between packages, the determination of a bounding case may be
difficult. For example supercompacted PCM waste may benefit very little from poison
materials within the package unless they are present in between the supercompacted
pucks themselves. This may require physically engineered mechanisms such as spacers
between the pucks to ensure they could be credited in a criticality assessment. Without
such measures, then this may lead to adoption of a level of pessimism that limits the
criticality safety benefit that can be assumed or alternatively to challenging compliance
assurance requirements for waste producers.
The addition of DUO2 powder as a package filling medium has been suggested [7]. One
potential disadvantage of this method is that the powdered DUO2 may degrade or migrate
in groundwater at different rates to the fissile material and, thus, its role as a neutron
absorber may be reduced in the long-term after disposal.
Current Status – Little research has been identified on the use of poisons in waste
encapsulation of package fill materials. It was noted in [7] that the incorporation of DU into
grout used to encapsulate ILW may provide a method of reducing neutron flux. A material
similar to borated concrete could also be used as an encapsulant grout. However, no
research has been identified that considers the properties of such materials in any detail.
Future Development – Given that little research appears to have been undertaken on this
scenario, its feasibility in application to spent fuel and ILW packages is uncertain.
Research into the effect of the addition of a poison material to an encapsulant would need
to be understood from the perspective of chemical stability as well as from the perspective
of criticality safety. As well as resolving the issue of how much credit could be taken in a
criticality assessment for the effect of adding the absorber, it will be important to understand
the physical and chemical implications of addition of these materials to a grout matrix. For
instance if there is potential for high density grout additives to sink as the grout cures then
this would need to be understood, prevented and then substantiated. Also, where such
materials are added to a spent fuel disposal canister, the implications on heat transfer
through the canister would need to be assessed.
4.3 Use as a Packaging Material
Description – This scenario involves the use of a neutron absorbing material within part of
the fabric of the package itself. This could be achieved by blending the poison materials
with the construction materials used for the package or by incorporating the poison
materials as standalone features within the design of the package.
Waste Streams – This scenario could be applied to any packaged fissile-bearing waste
stream. However, the criticality safety benefits realised could be highly dependent on the
type of package used and the nature of the waste matrix itself. A greater benefit may be
obtained for waste packages for which neutronic interaction is significant, either between
fissile elements within the package or between adjacent packages, than for those in which
neutron interaction is not significant.
Absorbing Materials – It is likely that most neutron absorbers could be deployed as part of
the structure of the waste package. The solubility of the poison material would be an
important factor and so the less soluble poisons such as boron and cadmium may be a
more appropriate choice to incorporate into the package. Again, the use of DU in a
container material would require detailed substantiation of the material’s effectiveness as
an absorber because the fissile material would be separated from the poison material and
as such the resonance regions within the 238U may not be fully exploited.
Potential Benefits – The use of a poison within the fabric of the container material would
probably be a lot less onerous and costly than incorporating it into the matrix by direct
blending. In addition, the substantiation of the presence of the material is likely to be
simpler because the fabrication of the container is a more consistent process than the
inclusion of poisons in waste streams that have varying properties, such as plutonium
contaminated materials. As such, greater control can be maintained over the addition of
the poison material to the package during its construction. In addition, the process of
poison introduction is separate from the process of waste packaging. Therefore, the use of
poisons in this way is less likely to introduce additional radiological hazards during waste
packaging.
Potential Disadvantages – Where the reactivity of an array of packages in a store or
disposal vault is only weakly dependent on neutron interaction between the neighbouring
packages, the addition of a poison to the container material may have little or no effect on
the overall reactivity of the system. Also the potential degradation of the container over the
long term under disposal conditions may lead to a loss of effectiveness of the absorber as it
is dispersed, which may present long-term criticality safety concerns.
Current Status – The scenario of including neutron absorbers in container materials or
components has been subject to more research and development work than the three other
scenarios discussed in this report. The technique is deployed in transport and storage
packages for wastes that contain fissile material, some examples of which are described
below.
Criticality safety assessments of the disposability of spent fuel from Pressurised Water
Reactors (PWRs) have shown that flooding following breach of the disposal canister could
result in supercritical conditions being achieved if the fuel is un-irradiated or of low burn-up.
As a result, waste package designs have been developed that employ neutron absorbers in
the structure of the waste package to facilitate criticality safety. These designs primarily
employ boron either in pure or in compound form. Whilst these packages have been
designed primarily for spent fuel management, the same principles could be applied to ILW
packaging.
Three packages that have been designed for MOX fuel management are as follows:
• The TN®12/2 cask, originally designed for transport of UO2 fuels has been adapted
for the transport of spent MOX fuel [12] as shown in Figure 4.1. This package has
been used in France to transport spent and fresh MOX fuel to Japan by sea [12].
Within the container, boron carbide plates are used as the neutron absorber
material.
• The CASTOR casks, developed for the transport and storage of MOX fuel contain
neutron absorbing materials within their structure. The CASTOR V/19 cask
(Figure 4.2) has a fuel basket which is made of partly boronated steel [13] whilst the
newer CASTOR X/32 has a basket structure made of an aluminium/boron carbide
compound material [14].
• The HISTAR-100 metal cask system contains a fuel basket which is constructed
from Metamic-HT, which is an aluminium and boron carbide composite material.
This material will then serve as both the primary structural material and a neutron
absorber [15].

Figure 4.1: TN®12/2 Cask [16].
Figure 4.2: CASTOR V/19 cask [17].
In Germany, scenarios for the storage of spent MOX fuel which incorporate neutron
absorbers have been developed. The POLLUX cask contains borated steel plates between
the fuel compartments which ensure the system remains sub-critical, even if flooding of the
cask occurs [18]. It has also been suggested that gadolinium and hafnium oxides could be
added to the cask to further reduce neutron flux.
Depleted uranium has also been proposed as a possible material for waste package
manufacture for HLW and spent fuel [19]. The use of materials such as DUCRETE or
DUPoly (described in Section 3.1 [7]) allows the introduction of depleted uranium in all
aspects of container design.

Also a range of neutron-shielding materials have been developed for incorporation into
containers used for the transport/storage of nuclear materials. Their neutron absorbing
ability is a result of their high hydrogen and boron contents.
They are composed of mineral fillers (alumina hydrate, zinc borate) and a thermo-setting
resin such as polyester or vinyl-ester. The primary function of the resin component is to
provide hydrogen atoms in order to moderate neutrons; the fillers provide the neutron-
absorbing materials such boron and also improve fire resistance. The polymerisation of
these mixtures leads to a rigid three-dimensional lattice that maintains its performance
under a range of hypothetical accident conditions.
A range of tests have been performed, which have confirmed that these materials exhibit
good radiation and heat resistance. For example, accelerated tests at range of
temperatures show that they are suitable for long-term use at temperatures up to 160°C.
They have also been demonstrated to be fire resistant with self-extinguishing properties.
Containers that incorporate this type of neutron absorber have been subjected to drop and
puncture tests (as recommended in the IAEA Transport Regulations) where the “observed
damage was acceptable”.
Different processes are used to incorporate these materials: a direct pouring process (at
room temperature) enables the liquid mixture to be introduced into compartments within the
container (see Figure 4.3) to provide shielding with a high-level of homogeneity.
Figure 4.3: View of a Compartment Filled with Neutron Shielding Material

These materials are already in use in transport/storage casks in Germany, Belgium, France
and other countries.
Finally, neutron flux traps are a criticality safety feature that can be incorporated into the
design of a fissile waste container. This would involve the incorporation of poison-loaded
materials in engineered geometries that maximise the thermal capture of neutrons within
the poison materials. These materials can be used in the construction of transport
packages or storage containers for spent fuel elements [20]. Such packages incorporate a
‘sandwich’ of two layers of boron carbide, between which a layer of borated water or other
moderating medium is placed. The moderating medium provides a region in which fast
neutrons are slowed down thereby increasing the efficiency of the surrounding boron
carbide as a thermal neutron absorber. That is, fast neutrons enter at either side of the flux
trap, largely unaffected by the boron carbide due to the relatively low fast neutron
absorption cross section for the material. The neutrons are then moderated by the
intermediate layer, resulting in capture within this layer or capture as they pass through the
boron carbide on the other side of the ‘sandwich’. This technique is most beneficial when
applied to a fast neutron system, because the high thermal capture cross section for the
absorbing medium is exploited by first slowing down the incident neutron flux.
Future Development – The technologies utilised in this scenario are well developed and
have been applied to several spent fuel packages as described above. However, no
examples have been identified of the application of this scenario to ILW packages. Future
research into this scenario would need to consider the role and effectiveness of the neutron
poison as a criticality control during all phase of waste management (waste package
transport, GDF operations and after GDF closure). Research would be required to
understand the effects of potential fault scenarios such as impact or flooding that could
change the behaviour or location of the neutron absorber in the container.
4.4 Strategic Emplacement
Strategic emplacement involves the utilisation of waste packages containing only neutron
absorbers in specific locations in a store or disposal vault to ensure sub-critical
configurations are achieved and maintained. The scenario could be employed in a disposal
vault where neutronic interaction between waste packages may be sufficient to cause a
criticality safety concern. The use of neutron absorbers at strategic points in the lattice of
waste packages could reduce neutron interaction sufficiently to facilitate the emplacement
of higher fissile mass packages.
It is also proposed that waste packages with high fissile loadings could be distributed
among packages with high 238U loadings as a means of criticality control. This approach
could be achieved by packaging DU for direct disposal. Assuming UF6 is converted to an
oxide, the 500 litre drum may be a suitable container for disposing of uranium oxide. The
benefit to criticality safety of adopting such a strategy for waste emplacement is similar to
that from incorporation of DU into the container material, in that it will reduce the neutronic
interaction between packages in an array. As such the benefits and disadvantages are
similar. It may be difficult to take credit for the poison material after closure of the GDF,
although mixing and dilution of the fissile material with DU as waste packages degrade
would be beneficial. It is worth noting that physically handling packages which are loaded
with DU may prove challenging, since a 500 litre drum containing DU as oxide could
potentially weigh up to 5 tonnes.
Such emplacement strategies would rely on procedural control of waste packages to
ensure that they are commingled correctly. This may be undesirable from a criticality safety
perspective and it is likely that other more reliable (preferably passive or engineered)
criticality controls would need to be put in place during the GDF operational phase. It may
not be feasible to rely on the use of specific neutron absorber packages for criticality control
during transport operations, especially if the neutron absorber packages (such as DU
disposal packages) are produced at a different location to the fissile waste packages.

5. ALTERNATIVES TO THE USE OF POISONS WITHIN WASTE PACKAGES

The use of poisons for criticality safety control and to potentially increase safe mass limits is
a technique routinely practiced in the nuclear industry. However it should be noted that it
would be preferable to rely on the inherent properties of the waste package to demonstrate
safety rather than rely primarily on the introduction of a neutron absorber. Conversely, the
use of neutron absorbers may be preferable to administrative procedures such as enforcing
a package separation for criticality control when stacking packages.
A discussion of alternative methods and techniques that may allow increases in safe fissile
material limits for waste packages are presented below. An indication of the perceived
advantages and disadvantages of the different techniques when applied to ILW and spent
fuel disposal is given.
Taking credit for existing neutron absorbers in the wasteform – Criticality safety
assessments for waste package transport and disposal generally make pessimistic
assumptions about the materials present in the waste package. That is, many neutron
absorbing materials present in the wasteform are ignored in criticality calculations. Credit
could be taken for such materials if their presence could be substantiated. For example,
credit could be taken for the presence of steel or grout components in ILW packages or
fission products in spent fuel packages.
Steel acts as a diluent and a mild neutron absorber and 316L type stainless steel used in
the nuclear industry contains molybdenum, which has a moderately high neutron capture
cross section. In deriving the GDF operational phase USL, the generic CSA for plutonium-
bearing ILW packages took credit for the presence of a minimum mass of steel that would
be present in a waste package containing supercompacted drums. Other generic CSAs
took credit for the uniform distribution of fissile material in an immobilisation matrix, but did
not take credit for the presence of the neutron-absorbing elements in the grout. Another
prevalent neutron absorber is PVC, which is often used as an alternative to polythene, for
example as a liner for wastes in compactable 200 litre drums and also to double bag waste
items. It may be possible to derive increased safe fissile material limits for waste packages
by ensuring a minimum mass of these materials (i.e. a minimum mass of steel, grout or
PVC) in a waste package and by demonstrating an understanding of the location of these
materials and fissile materials in the waste package (e.g. uniform mixing). Without very
detailed waste stream characterisation and conditioning data to support this justification it
will be challenging to produce robust argument for this approach, although such
approaches may be no more difficult to justify than the deliberate inclusion of neutron
poisons.
CSAs for spent fuel transport and disposal do not generally take credit for the presence of
fission products that act as neutron absorbers. Again, it may be difficult to justify the role of
fission products in limiting spent fuel reactivity, because detailed spent fuel characterisation
and knowledge of the fuel’s irradiation history would be required. See also the discussion
of burn-up credit below.
Idealised geometries and optimised conditions – Criticality safety assessment of fissile
bearing waste packages relies on the adoption of justifiably pessimistic assumptions which
will bound all the important properties of the wasteform. Where there is variability or
uncertainty relating to a parameter then the assessment must show that a bounding value
has been adopted, otherwise application of any safe limits derived may be not be justifiable.
With increasing knowledge of the characteristics of the waste stream and conditioning
medium, it may be possible to relax the most pessimistic assumptions. This approach
underpins the methodology that has been instigated for deriving waste package USLs and
could be developed further in package-specific assessments. For instance, where there is a
thick grout annulus around a wasteform this could be taken into account in a CSA.
Alternatively knowledge of the provenance of plutonium or uranium in the wastes could be
considered. For example knowledge of the provenance of plutonium in feed drums of
plutonium contaminated material at Sellafield may allow the assessor to assume a less
onerous plutonium fingerprint than 100% 239Pu, taking credit for the minimum content of the
neutron absorber 240Pu. This approach is similar to the above-noted approach of taking
credit for neutron absorbers naturally present in the waste package.
Justification for Packaging above the LSL – USLs and LSLs have been derived as part
of generic CSAs. The application of the USLs could be considered broadly for different ILW
waste streams. Justification for packaging to a USL would be based on the alignment of
the waste package with the assumptions made in the USL model used to derive the limit.
For example, justification for packaging above the LSL will require knowledge of how well
mixed the wasteform is with an encapsulation grout or other wasteform materials. This
approach may allow higher package fissile material limits to be used without the need to
introduce neutron poisons.
Revision of the Transport Assessment Methodology – The limiting fissile masses for a
particular waste package are generally associated with the transport assessment rather
than the GDF operational or post-closure phase assessments. Work is being undertaken
by RWMD to revise the generic criticality safety assessment of the SWTC transport
package. This may lead to increased safe limits compared to the existing values. The IAEA
transport regulations are also currently being revised with a view to being reissued in 2013,
which may lead to a more flexible approach being permitted for transport safety
assessments. The revised approach may then be applicable to the derivation of higher
fissile material limits for waste package transport.
Burn up Credit – Burn up credit is a technique that could be applied to waste packages
containing spent fuel or potentially other irradiated waste streams. This approach permits
the criticality safety assessment to justify a bounding level of irradiation to be assumed,
which allows the concentration of the primary fissile isotopes to be reduced accordingly.
This approach must include consideration of the build-up of secondary fissile isotopes.
Some burn up credit cases allow for the build-up of levels of burnable and/or non-burnable
poisons within the waste which are generated as fission products. If credit is taken for
burn-up then consideration of the reactivity of the spent fuel in the long-term after disposal
must be considered, because maximum reactivity may occur in the long term after disposal
as a result of decay of neutron absorbers and ingrowth of fissile isotopes.
Multiple Water Barriers – Loss of disposal container integrity and subsequent ingress of
water could present a criticality safety concern for spent fuel disposal. The addition of
poisons is suggested as a potential mitigation for this fault occurring because these
materials could fill the void spacing between fuel elements and in fuel channels thereby
excluding water, as well as absorbing neutrons. An alternative approach to mitigate
flooding of packages, which has been justified for several transport containers, is the
incorporation of multiple water barriers. This is involves the inclusion of two or more
physically independent water barriers that provide protection against water ingress.
Demonstration of the effectiveness of such a system allows credit to be taken during the
assessment of flooding. Although effective during the transport phase, the continued
efficacy or applicability of a multiple water barrier approach throughout GDF operations and
after GDF closure would need to be assessed. If there is potential for failure of the barriers,
then full flooding would need to be assessed. However, a combination of approaches may
be effective, such as the use of poison materials as well as multiple water barriers.

6. SUMMARY
The aim of this document is to inform the decision-making process on the potential use of
neutron poisons as a criticality safety control in both ILW and spent fuel packages destined
for a GDF in the UK. It is also intended to act as an input to UK waste producers on
possible opportunities for the inclusion of neutron poisons in waste packages.
Potential business drivers for using neutrons poisons include:
• Increased fissile mass limits.
• Larger waste packages.
• Reduction in orphan wastes.
• Use of other wastes as neutron poisons.
• Defence in depth.
It is important to note that the true magnitude of potential business drivers cannot be
defined until the scenarios for the use of poisons are understood in greater detail.
Potential neutron absorbing materials which could be used as a poison have been
identified. Where these materials are currently or have previously been deployed as
neutron absorbers has been highlighted. In addition, materials not currently understood to
be used as poisons, but which may have a benefit in terms of their neutron absorbing
potential are proposed. Materials which can act as neutron absorbers include:
• Depleted Uranium (DU).
• Boron.
• Chlorine.
• Gadolinium.
• Hafnium.
• Cadmium.
Three generic scenarios for deploying poison materials within waste packages have been
identified: blending with the waste; use as an immobilisation matrix or package filler; and
use as a package material. Each scenario has been described and wastes to which they
may be applicable have been outlined. The current status of each scenario and any
research and development required to apply the technique to UK ILW and spent fuel
packages is also described.
Strategic emplacement of wastes including poisons and alternative techniques which do not
require the use of poisons have been identified. Where possible it would be preferable to
use the inherent properties of the wasteform to demonstrate safety rather than to add a
neutron-absorbing material.

7. REFERENCES
1 IAEA, Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, 2009 Edition, IAEA Safety Standards No.
TS-R-1, 2009.
2 HSE (ONR) – Safety Assessment Principles for Nuclear Facilities, 2006 edition, Version 1.
3 HSE (ONR) – Technical Assessment Guide 41 – Criticality Safety. T/AST/041 Issue 2, March 2009.
4 NDA, Geological Disposal: Criticality Safety Status Report, NDA Report No. NDA/RWMD/038, December
2010.
5 T.W. Hicks, Criticality Safety Assessment for Waste Packages Containing Separated Plutonium, Galson
Sciences Limited Report to the NDA, 0560-2, Version 1.1, May 2007.
6 T.W. Hicks, Criticality Safety Assessment for Waste Packages Containing High-enriched Uranium, Galson
Sciences Limited Report to the NDA, 0560-3, Version 1, May 2007.
7 T.W. Hicks, Review of the Use of Depleted Uranium for Criticality Control, Galson Sciences Report 0525,
November 2005
8 D.A. Eghbali and K.J McCoid, Use of Gadolinium as a Primary Criticality Control in Disposing Waste
Containing Plutonium at SRS, WSRC-MS-2005-00008, 2005
9 M.J. Trbovich, D.P. Barry, R.E. Slovacek, Y. Danon, R.C. Block, J.A. burke, N.J. Drindak, G Leinwebe and
R.V. Ballard, Hafnium Resonance Parameter Analysis using Neutron Capture and Transmission
Experiments, International Conference of Nuclear Data for Science and Technology, 2005
10 R.A. Van Konynenburg, P.G. Curtis and T.S.E Summers, Scoping Corrosion Tests on Candidate Waste
Package Basket Materials for the Yucca Mountain Project, UCRL-ID-130386
11 A.C. Adeogun and J.C. Povall, Production of the Derived Inventory for Uranium and Plutonium, Pöyry
Report to the NDA 390727/7
12 IAEA, Status and Advances in MOX Fuel Technology, Technical Report Series 415, May 2003
13 R. Diersch, G. Dreier and H. Stelzer, CASTOR V – The Package System for Transport and Storage of
Spent Fuel Assemblies, downloaded from http://www.sym.org/archives/1997/sess18/18-05.htm
14 G. Jobson, H. Spilker, D. Methling, CASTOR X/32 S – A New Dual-Purpose Cask for the Storage and
Transport of Spent Nuclear Fuel. WM’00 Conference, Ferbruary 27 – March 2, 2000, Tuscon, AZ.
15 Holtec International, HI-STAR Family of Metal Casks, downloaded from
http://www.holtecinternational.coom/divisions/products/hi-star-family-metal-casks on 10 July 2012.
16 Fortier, Overview of Used Fuel Transport Casks, NWRTB, Salt Lake City, 13-14 September 2011
17 Eon, EON Kernkraft Brokdorf Information on the Power Plant, EKK 05/2008, downloaded from
http://www.eon-kernkraft.com/pages/ekk_de/Standorte/_documents/Info_Standort_KBR_eng.pdf
18 J. Kang, F.N von Hippel, A. MacFarlane and R. Nelson, Storage MOX: A Third Way for Plutonium
Disposal, Science and Global Security, 10, pp. 85-101.
19 NEA and IAEA, Management of Depleted Uranium: A Joint Report by the OECD Nuclear Energy
Authority and the International Atomic Energy Authority, 2001.
20 Kovacki et al., Metal Hydride Flux Trap Neutron Absorber Arrangement for A Nuclear Fuel Storage Body,
US Patent 5,232,657, August 1993.

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Page 1 of 27 SUPPORT OF NDA RWMD GDF PROGRAMME

RWMD/04/006 – Term Contract in Support of

The use of Neutron-absorbing Materials in

1222g-1 v1 20th November 2012

The use of Neutron-absorbing Materials in

Name Signature Date

Reviewed by: Tim Hicks 20/11/12

Approved by: Dan Galson 20/11/12

1222g-1 v1 20th November 2012

1222g-1 v1 20th November 2012

1222g-1 v1 20th November 2012

1222g-1 v1 20th November 2012

1222g-1 v1 20th November 2012

1.3 Report Structure

1222g-1 v1 20th November 2012

1222g-1 v1 20th November 2012

2.4 Taking Advantage of the Disposal of Other Wastes

1222g-1 v1 20th November 2012

1222g-1 v1 20th November 2012

• Cermet - a ceramic metallic composite which consists of DUO2 particulates

1222g-1 v1 20th November 2012

1222g-1 v1 20th November 2012

1222g-1 v1 20th November 2012

1222g-1 v1 20th November 2012

1222g-1 v1 20th November 2012

Figure 4.1: TN®12/2 Cask [16].

Figure 4.2: CASTOR V/19 cask [17].

1222g-1 v1 20th November 2012

Figure 4.3: View of a Compartment Filled with Neutron Shielding Material

1222g-1 v1 20th November 2012

1222g-1 v1 20th November 2012

5. ALTERNATIVES TO THE USE OF POISONS WITHIN WASTE PACKAGES

1222g-1 v1 20th November 2012

1222g-1 v1 20th November 2012

1222g-1 v1 20th November 2012

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