PILAPIL VS IBAY-SOMERA

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

PILAPIL vs. HON IBAY-SOMERA, VICTOR AND GEILING et al

G.R. No. 80116
June 30, 1989
FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich
Geiling, a German national, were married in Germany. After about three and a half
years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in Geiling initiating a
divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germany. The Local Court, Federal Republic of
Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the
spouses.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two
complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging in one that, while
still married to said Geiling, Pilapil “had an affair with a certain William Chia.” The
Assistant Fiscal, after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of
the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. However, upon review, the
respondent city fiscal Victor approved a resolution directing the filing of 2 complaint
for adultery against the petitioner. The case entitled “PP Philippines vs. Pilapil and
Chia” was assigned to the court presided by the respondent judge Ibay-Somera.

A motion to quash was filed in the same case which was denied by the respondent.
Pilapil filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a
TRO, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to
quash.

As cogently argued by Pilapil, Article 344 of the RPC thus presupposes that the
marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal
action for adultery.
ISSUE: Did Geiling have legal capacity at the time of the filing of the complaint for
adultery, considering that it was done after obtaining a divorce decree?
HELD: WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner’s MTQ is SET
ASIDE and another one entered DISMISSING the complaint … for lack of
jurisdiction. The TRO issued in this case … is hereby made permanent.
NO
Under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon
a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been
established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a
jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement.

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the
action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal
representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a logical
consequence since the raison d’etre of said provision of law would be absent where
the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the
time of the filing of the criminal case.

Stated differently, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the commencement

of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and
the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the
former against the latter.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal
effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is
concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status
of persons Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no
longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case
under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA VS. VINZON
G.R. No. 154705, 2003 June 26

FACTS

Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, entered into Maintenance Agreement with
respondent. The agreement stated that the respondent shall, for a consideration, maintain specified equipment at the
Embassy buildings and the official residence of petitioner. Petitioners claim that sometime prior to the date of
expiration of the said argument, they informed respondent that the renewal of the agreement shall be of the
discretion of the incoming Chief of Administration, Minister Consellor Azhari Kasim. When the latter assumed the
position, he allegedly found respondent's work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards
set in the Maintenance Agreement, Hence, the Indonesian embassy terminated the agreement, The respondent claims
that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and unlawful, hence, filing a complaint before the RTC.

ISSUE

1. Whether the petitioners have waived their immunity from suit by using as its basis the Maintenance Agreement

2. Whether the actual physic maintenance of the premises of the diplomatic mission is no longer a sovereign
function of the State

3. Whether the petitioners may be sued herein in their private capacities

RULING

1. No. The mere entering into a contract by a foreign State with a private party cannot be construed as the ultimate
test of whether or not it is an act jure imperii or jure gestionis. If the foreign State is not engaged regularly in a
business or commercial activity, and in this case it has not been shown to be engaged, the particular act or
transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof,
then it is an act jure imperii. Hence, the existence alone of a paragraph in a contract stating that any legal action
arising out of the agreement shall be settled according tot he laws of the Philippines and by a specified court is not
necessarily a waiver of sovereign immunity from suit. Submission of a foreign state must be clear and equivocal. It
must be given explicitly or by necessary implication, The Court finds no such waiver herein.

2. No. There is no dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act jure imperii. A sovereign State
establishes a diplomatic mission which necessarily include its maintenance and upkeep. Hence, the State may enter
into contracts with private entities for the same purpose. It is therefore clear that the petitioner was acting in pursuit
of a sovereign activity when it entered into contract with respondent.

3. Under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomat shall enjoy immunity from
criminal jurisdiction, except in case of: (a) a real action relating to private immovable property situated in the
territory of the recovering State; (b) an action relating to succession which the diplomatic agent is involved as
executor, administrator, heir or legatee as a private person; or (c) action relating to any professional or commercial
activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions. The act of the
petitioners in terminating the Maintenance Agreement is not covered by the exceptions.
 Kazuhiro Hasegawa vs Minoru Kitamura
538 SCRA 261 – Conflict of Laws – Private International Law – Jurisdiction – Lex Loci Celebrationis – Lex
Loci Solutionis – State of the Most Significant Relationship – Forum Non Conveniens
In March 1999, Nippon Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd, a Japanese firm, was contracted by the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) to supervise the construction of the Southern
Tagalog Access Road. In April 1999, Nippon entered into an independent contractor agreement (ICA)
with Minoru Kitamura for the latter to head the said project. The ICA was entered into in Japan and is
effective for a period of 1 year (so until April 2000). In January 2000, DPWH awarded the Bongabon-Baler
Road project to Nippon. Nippon subsequently assigned Kitamura to head the road project. But in
February 2000, Kazuhiro Hasegawa, the general manager of Nippon informed Kitamura that they are pre-
terminating his contract. Kitamura sought Nippon to reconsider but Nippon refused to negotiate. Kitamura
then filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against Nippon in the RTC of Lipa.
Hasegawa filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the contract was entered in Japan hence, applying
the principle of lex loci celebracionis, cases arising from the contract should be cognizable only by
Japanese courts. The trial court denied the motion. Eventually, Nippon filed a petition for certiorari with
the Supreme Court.
Hasegawa, on appeal significantly changed its theory, this time invoking forum non conveniens; that the
RTC is an inconvenient forum because the parties are Japanese nationals who entered into a contract in
Japan. Kitamura on the other hand invokes the trial court’s ruling which states that matters connected
with the performance of contracts are regulated by the law prevailing at the place of performance, so
since the obligations in the ICA are executed in the Philippines, courts here have jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint against Nippon should be dismissed.
HELD: No. The trial court did the proper thing in taking cognizance of it.
In the first place, the case filed by Kitamura is a complaint for specific performance and damages. Such
case is incapable of pecuniary estimation; such cases are within the jurisdiction of the regional trial court.
Hasegawa filed his motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens. However, such ground is
not one of those provided for by the Rules as a ground for dismissing a civil case.
The Supreme Court also emphasized that the contention that Japanese laws should apply is premature.
In conflicts cases, there are three phases and each next phase commences when one is settled, to wit:

1. Jurisdiction – Where should litigation be initiated? Court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter,
the parties, the issues, the property, the res. Also considers, whether it is fair to cause a defendant to
travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law
which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties.
2. Choice of Law – Which law will the court apply? Once a local court takes cognizance, it does not mean
that the local laws must automatically apply. The court must determine which substantive law when
applied to the merits will be fair to both parties.
3. Recognition and Enforcement of Judgment – Where can the resulting judgment be enforced?

This case is not yet in the second phase because upon the RTC’s taking cognizance of the case,
Hasegawa immediately filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied. He filed a motion for reconsideration,
which was also denied. Then he bypassed the proper procedure by immediately filing a petition for
certiorari. The question of which law should be applied should have been settled in the trial court had
Hasegawa not improperly appealed the interlocutory order denying his MFR.
AZNAR VS GARCIA
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

AZNAR vs. GARCIA

G.R. No. L-16749
January 31, 1963
FACTS: EDWARD Christensen died testate. The estate was distributed by
Executioner Aznar according to the will, which provides that: Php 3,600 be given to
HELEN Christensen as her legacy, and the rest of his estate to his daughter LUCY
Christensen, as pronounced by CFI Davao.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen, insofar as it
deprives her of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been
declared by Us an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward in an earlier
case.

As to his citizenship, we find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when
he resided in Sacramento from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the
Philippines, and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of
California by the fact that when he executed his will he declared that he was a citizen
of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to abandon his California
citizenship by acquiring another. But at the time of his death, he was domiciled in the
Philippines.

ISSUE: what law on succession should apply, the Philippine law or the California
law?
HELD: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case
returned to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the
Philippine law on succession provides.
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article
16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country where said property may be found.

The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the
meaning of the term “national law” is used therein.

The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of
personal property?
The decision of CFI Davao, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that
under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in
the form and manner he desires. But HELEN invokes the provisions of Article 946 of
the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:

If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is
deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.

It is argued on executor’s behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the
State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the Kaufman case,
should govern the determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of
Christensen’s will, such law being in force in the State of California of which
Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should
be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi,
the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should be
referred back to the law of the decedent’s domicile, which is the Philippines.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while
the rule applied in In re Kaufman, its internal law. If the law on succ ession and the
conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended
and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens
living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not
domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to
the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved
is in accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law
should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out
as the national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws
of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein
and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions.

It is argued on appellees’ (Aznar and LUCY) behalf that the clause “if there is no law
to the contrary in the place where the property is situated” in Sec. 946 of the
California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that
the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the
national law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained.

As explained in the various authorities cited above, the national law mentioned in
Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil
Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the
law of the testator’s domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946,
Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in
California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of
the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to California; such action
would leave the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like a
football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the country of which
the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must
apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if
the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of
California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and
894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged
forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Edward, a citizen of California,
is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his
acknowledged natural child, the appellant HELEN, should be governed by the
Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not
by the internal law of California..

NOTES: There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary

provisions in the United States, each state of the Union having its own private law
applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state. The “national law”
indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly
mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the
private law of the State of California.
SAUDIA VS. CA
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ LEAVE A COMMENT

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES (SAUDIA) vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MILAGROS P.

MORADA and HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
Branch 89, RTC of Quezon City
G.R. No. 122191 October 8, 1998
FACTS: Petitioner SAUDIA hired private respondent MORADA as a flight attendant in
1988, based in Jeddah. On 1990, while on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, she went to party
with 2 male attendants, and on the following morning in their hotel, one of the male
attendants attempted to rape her. She was rescued by hotel attendants who heard her cry for
help. The Indonesian police arrested the 2.

MORADA returned to Jeddah, but was asked by the company to go back to Jakarta and help
arrange the release of the 2 male attendants. MORADA did not cooperate when she got to
Jakarta.

What followed was a series of interrogations from the Saudi Courts which she did not
understand as this was in their language. In 1993, she was surprised, upon being ordered by
SAUDIA to go to the Saudi court, that she was being convicted of (1) adultery; (2) going to a
disco, dancing and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; and (3) socializing
with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition, sentencing her to five months
imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only then did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her,
together with the 2, for what happened in Jakarta.

SAUDIA denied her the assistance she requested, But because she was wrongfully convicted,
Prince of Makkah dismissed the case against her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia.
Shortly before her return to Manila, she was terminated from the service by SAUDIA,
without her being informed of the cause.

On November 23, 1993, Morada filed a Complaint for damages against SAUDIA, and
Khaled Al-Balawi (“Al-Balawi”), its country manager.
SAUDIA ALLEGES: Private respondent’s claim for alleged abuse of rights occurred in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It alleges that the existence of a foreign element qualifies the
instant case for the application of the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by virtue of the
lex loci delicti commissi rule.

MORADA ALLEGES: Since her Amended Complaint is based on Articles 19 and 21 of the
Civil Code, then the instant case is properly a matter of domestic law.

ISSUE: WON the Philippine courts have jurisdiction to try the case
HELD: YES.
On the presence of a “Foreign Element” in the case: A factual situation that cuts across
territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws of two or more states is said to contain a
“foreign element”. The presence of a foreign element is inevitable since social and economic
affairs of individuals and associations are rarely confined to the geographic limits of their
birth or conception. The forms in which this foreign element may appear are many. The
foreign element may simply consist in the fact that one of the parties to a contract is an alien
or has a foreign domicile, or that a contract between nationals of one State involves
properties situated in another State. In other cases, the foreign element may assume a
complex form.

In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private respondent Morada is
a resident Philippine national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation.
Also, by virtue of the employment of Morada with the petitioner Saudia as a flight
stewardess, events did transpire during her many occasions of travel across national borders,
particularly from Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a
“conflicts” situation to arise.

COURT disagrees with MORADA that his is purely a domestic case. However, the court
finds that the RTC of Quezon City possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit.
Its authority to try and hear the case is provided for under Section 1 of Republic Act No.
7691, to wit:
BP129 Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction:
xxx xxx xxx
(8) In all other cases in which demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney`y’s fees, litigation expenses, and cots or the value of the property in controversy
exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila,
where the demand, exclusive of the above-mentioned items exceeds Two hundred Thousand
pesos (P200,000.00). (Emphasis ours)
xxx xxx xxx
Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court — the venue, Quezon City, is
appropriate:
Sec. 2 Venue in Courts of First Instance. — [Now Regional Trial Court]
(a) xxx xxx xxx
(b) Personal actions. — All other actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant
or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiff
resides, at the election of the plaintiff.

Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a quo found it best to hear the case in
the Philippines. Had it refused to take cognizance of the case, it would be forcing plaintiff
(private respondent now) to seek remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia where she no longer maintains substantial connections. That would have caused a
fundamental unfairness to her.
Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no unnecessary difficulties and
inconvenience have been shown by either of the parties. The choice of forum of the plaintiff
(now private respondent) should be upheld.

The trial court also acquired jurisdiction over the parties. MORADA through her act of
filing, and SAUDIA by praying for the dismissal of the Amended Complaint on grounds
other than lack of jurisdiction.

As to the choice of applicable law, we note that choice-of-law problems seek to answer two
important questions:
(1) What legal system should control a given situation where some of the significant facts
occurred in two or more states; and
(2) to what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation.

Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the “connecting
factor” or “point of contact” could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex
loci actus occurred. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find that the
Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct
took place). This is because it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived
private respondent, a Filipina residing and working here. According to her, she had honestly
believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights and in the performance of its
duties, “act with justice, give her due and observe honesty and good faith.” Instead, petitioner
failed to protect her, she claimed. That certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in
another country is of no moment. For in our view what is important here is the place where
the over-all harm or the totality of the alleged injury to the person, reputation, social standing
and human rights of complainant, had lodged, according to the plaintiff below (herein private
respondent). All told, it is not without basis to identify the Philippines as the situs of the
alleged tort.

In applying “State of the most significant relationship” rule, to determine the State which has
the most significant relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into account and
evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue: (a) the
place where the injury occurred; (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred;
(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the
parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.

As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that over-all injury occurred and lodged in
the Philippines. There is likewise no question that private respondent is a resident Filipina
national, working with petitioner, a resident foreign corporation engaged here in the business
of international air carriage. Thus, the “relationship” between the parties was centered here,
although it should be stressed that this suit is not based on mere labor law violations. From
the record, the claim that the Philippines has the most significant contact with the matter in
this dispute, raised by private respondent as plaintiff below against defendant (herein
petitioner), in our view, has been properly established.

NOTE:
These “test factors” or “points of contact” or “connecting factors” could be any of the
following:

(1) The nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of sojourn, or his
origin;
(2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation;
(3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed to be situated.
In particular, the lex situs is decisive when real rights are involved;
(4) the place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the place where a
contract has been made, a marriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort committed. The
lex loci actus is particularly important in contracts and torts;
(5) the place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of
performance of contractual duties, or the place where a power of attorney is to be
exercised;
(6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern their
agreement, the lex loci intentionis;
(7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or done. The
lex fori — the law of the forum — is particularly important because, as we have seen
earlier, matters of “procedure” not going to the substance of the claim involved are
governed by it; and because the lex fori applies whenever the content of the otherwise
applicable foreign law is excluded from application in a given case for the reason that
it falls under one of the exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and
(8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all legal
relationships of the ship and of its master or owner as such. It also covers contractual
relationships particularly contracts of affreightment.
CONTINENTAL MICRONESIA, INC. (CMI) VS. JOSEPH BASSO

PETITIONER Continental Micronesia, Inc. (CMI) is a foreign corporation organized and existing under the
laws of and domiciled in the United States of America. It is licensed to do business in the Philippines.
Respondent Joseph Basso, a US citizen, resided in the Philippines prior to his death. In 1990, Basso was
employed by Mr. Keith R. Braden, managing director-Asia of Continental Airlines, Inc. (Continental), as
the general manager of its Philippine branch. In Nov. 7, 1992, CMI took over the Philippine operations of
Continental with Basso retaining his position as general manager. For failure to agree on the new terms
and conditions of his employment, Basso was dismissed from the service effective Jan. 31, 1996. Basso
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with moral and exemplary damages against CMI. Alleging the
presence of foreign elements, CMI filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of CMI and the subject matter of the controversy. Does the motion find merit? Ruling: No.
Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of the courts to hear, try and decide cases. Jurisdiction
over the subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or by law and by the material allegations in the
complaint, regardless of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or
reliefs sought therein. It cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties
or conferred by the acquiescence of the court. That the employment contract of Basso was replete with
references to US laws, and that it originated from and was returned to the US, do not automatically
preclude our labor tribunals from exercising jurisdiction to hear and try this case. This case stemmed
from an illegal dismissal complaint. The Labor Code, under Article 217, clearly vests original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving termination disputes to the Labor Arbiter.
Hence, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. As regards
jurisdiction over the parties, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the Labor Arbiter acquired
jurisdiction over the person of Basso, notwithstanding his citizenship, when he filed his complaint
against CMI. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of CMI was acquired through the coercive
process of service of summons. We note that CMI never denied that it was served with summons. CMI
has, in fact, voluntarily appeared and participated in the proceedings before the courts. Though a
foreign corporation, CMI is licensed to do business in the Philippines and has a local business address
here. The purpose of the law in requiring that foreign corporations doing business in the country be
licensed to do so, is to subject the foreign corporations to the jurisdiction of our courts. Considering that
the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this case,
these tribunals may proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of
the parties point to a foreign forum, this being an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country
where the case is filed (Jardeleza, J.:, SC Third Division, Continental Micronesia, Inc. vs. Joseph Basso,
G.R. Nos. 178382-83, September 23, 2015).
G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child
RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM,Petitioner, vs. ERNST JOHAN
BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.
PERALTA, J.:

OBLIGATION OF A FOREIGN NATIONAL TO SUPPORT HIS

MINOR CHILD UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW

Petitioner Norma and respondent Ernst Johan contracted marriage

in Holland. They were blessed with a son named Roderigo, who at
the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16) years
of age.

Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce

Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. At that time,
their son was only eighteen (18) months old. Thereafter, petitioner
and her son came home to the Philippines.

According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide

monthly support to their son in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty
(250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or less).
However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the
Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo.

Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and

remarried in Cebu City, and since then, have been residing thereat.
Petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support
from respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the lett er.

Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint

affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against
respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No.
9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with
petitioner. Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued
a Resolution recommending the filing of an information for the crime
charged against herein respondent with the RTC -Cebu.

The RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order, dis missing the
instant criminal case against respondent on the ground that the
facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with
respect to the respondent who is an alien ,

Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto

reiterating respondent’s obligation to support their child under
Article 195 of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so makes him
liable under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies to all persons in
the Philippines who are obliged to support theirminor children
regardless of the obligor’s nationality."

The RTC-Cebu issued an Order denying petitioner’s Motion for

Reconsideration. Hence, the present Petition for Review on
Certiorari.

ISSUE:

Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child

under our Philippine Law?

RULING:

A foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child.

Petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 of the New Civil Code in
demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since
Article 15 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality.
In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically
the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only applies
to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to
foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with
respect to family rights and duties.

The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under

family rights and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen
of Holland or the Netherlands he is subject to the laws of his
country, not to Philippine law , as to whether he is obliged to give
support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do
so.

It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged

to support petitioner’s son under Article 195 of the Family Code as a
consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This does
not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support
petitioner’s son altogether.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law

applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign
law. In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a
national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the
matter of provision of and capa city to support. While respondent
pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that
he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.

It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the

national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents
the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after
the issuance of a divorce decree). In view of respondent’s failure to
prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor,
the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under
this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and
proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as
our local or domestic or internal law. Thus, since the law of the
Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been
properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to
be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of
parents to support their children and penalizing the non -compliance
therewith. Such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines
because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied
of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
ELLIS V. REPUBLIC (1963)
[ G. R. No. L-16922, April 30, 1963 ]
IN RE: ADOPTION OF CHILD BAPTIZED UNDER THE NAME OF ROSE. MARVIN G. ELLIS
AND GLORIA C. ELLIS, PETITIONERS, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
OPPOSITOR AND APPELLANT.
FACTS:
Petitioner Marvin G. Ellis, a native of San Francisco, California, is 28 years of age. On September 8,
1949, he married Gloria C. Ellis in Banger, Maine, United States. Both are citizens of the United States.
Baby Rose was born on September 26, 1959 at the Caloocan Maternity Hospital. Four or five days later,
the mother of Rose left her with the Heart of Mary Villa&mdashan institution for unwed mothers and
their babies—stating that she (the mother) could not take care of Rose without bringing disgrace upon her
(the mother's) family.

Being without issue, on November 22, 1959, Mr. and Mrs. Ellis filed a petition with the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga for the adoption of the aforementioned baby. At the time of the hearing of the
petition on. January 14, I960, petitioner Marvin G. Ellis and his wife had been in the Philippines for three
(3) years, he being assigned thereto as staff sergeant in the United States Air Force Base, in Angeles,
Pampanga, where both lived at that time. They had been in the Philippines before, or, to be exact, in 1953.

ISSUE:
Whether or not being permanent residents in the Philippines, petitioners are qualified to adopt Baby Rose.
RULING:
No.
Article 335 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, provides that:
"The following cannot adopt:
*******

"(4) Non-resident aliens;"

*******
This legal provision is too clear to require interpretation. No matter how much we may sympathize with
the plight of Baby Rose and with the good intentions of petitioners herein, the law leaves us no choice but
to apply its explicit terms, which unqualifiedly deny to petitioners the power to adopt anybody in the
Philippines.

In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem, which no court may entertain,
unless it has jurisdiction, not only over tho subject matter of the case and over the parties, but, also, over
the res, which is the personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of petitioners herein. Our Civil Code
(Art. 15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is determined by the
latter's nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a
citizen of the Philippines, but not over the status of the petitioners, who are foreigners.
Inasmuch s petitioners herein are not domiciled in the Philippines,—and, hence, non-resident aliens—we
cannot assume and exercise jurisdiction over their status, under either the nationality theory or the
domiciliary theory. ln any event, whether the above-quoted provision of said Art. 335 is predicated upon
lack of jurisdiction over the, res, or merely affects the cause of action, we have no authority to grant the
relief prayed for by petitioners it.
DILWEG V. PHILLIPS (1964)
[ G.R. No. L-19596, October 30, 1964 ]
FACTS:
On 7 February 1958 plaintiff Lavern R. Dilweg, a nonresident American citizen, through counsel, instituted the
complaint at bar consisting of six causes of action against defendants Robert O. Phillips, Inocentes G. Dineros, and
Isaac S. Eceta, claiming civil damages arising out of alleged libelous and defamatory statements uttered and
published in the Philippines by the latter. On 24 February 1958 the first two named defendants presented a motion to
dismiss the complaint. Plaintiff interposed an opposition thereto on 7 March 1958.

On 11 May 1961 the trial court issued an order, which is the subject of the present appeal, the pertinent portion
of which is as follows:

"This action is one for damages by reason of alleged libelous statements uttered in the Philippines by the
defendants against the plaintiff. In other words, it is an action bared on a tort or act, which under the law of the
Philippines, is defined as a criminal offense. At the time the said libelous statements were uttered, the plaintiff was in
Washington, D.C. where, he was and has always been a resident. There is no allegation in the complaint that plaintiff
has ever been in the Philippines or has resided at anytime therein.

"The general rule in this jurisdiction is that a court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff by the filing
of his complaint. It was contended that as the plaintiff therein has never been a resident of the Philippines, the courts
of this country have not acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance of his action bared on a contract which was executed
in the State of New York,USA.

The Court has come to conclusion that in order that it may validly try this case, it must have jurisdiction not only
over the persons of the parties and over the subject matter and the plaintiff must be a resident within the territorial of
this Court in order that jurisdiction over his person can be acquired, otherwise the Court will not be able to render a
valid judgment against him.

ISSUE:
Whether or not our Philippine courts can rightfully refuse to assume jurisdiction over a personal action instituted
by a nonresident alien who is not within the territorial jurisdiction of our courts?

RULING:
It is thus evident that, contrary to the conclusion reached by the court below, it is not indispensable for a
foreigner to establish a residence, nor need he be physically present in a state of which he is not a resident or citizen
in order that he may initiate or maintain a personal action against a resident or citizen of that ether state for rights of
action arising in, or for violations of laws committed within, the territorial jurisdiction of that other state. In this
jurisdiction, no general law has come to our knowledge or notice which restricts the right of nonresident aliens to sue
in our courts. It is not disputed that plaintiff's causes of action arose in, and that the defendants are within, our
territorial jurisdiction. It is conceded by both parties that the law under which the instant case falls is silent on the
matter of the right of an Alien to sue in our courts. On the other hand the particular law evidently availed of by the
plaintiff in filing his complaint is Article 33 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides:
"In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution and shall require only preponderance of evidence."

The above-quoted provision of law does not make any distinction as to whether the "injured party." who may
maintain an action for damages based on defamation, is a Filipino citizen or resident or an alien.

“Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside, and the case is ordered remanded to the court below for
further proceeding consonant with this opinion”.
RAYTHEON V. ROUZIE (2008)
[ G.R. No. 162894, February 26, 2008 ]
FACTS:
Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc., a corporation duly organized and existing under
the laws of the State of Connecticut, United States of America, and respondent Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr.,
an American citizen, entered into a contract whereby BMSI hired respondent as its representative to
negotiate the sale of services in several government projects in the Philippines for an agreed
remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts. On 11 March 1992, respondent secured a service contract
with the Republic of the Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers affected by the Mt.
Pinatubo eruption and mudflows.

On 16 July 1994, respondent filed before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission, a suit against BMSI and Rust International, Inc., Rodney C. Gilbert and Walter G. Browning
for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination and breach of employment contract.

On 8 January 1999, respondent, then a resident of La Union, instituted an action for damages
before the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union. The Complaint named as defendants herein
petitioner Raytheon International, Inc. as well as BMSI and RUST, the two corporations impleaded in the
earlier labor case.

Petitioner also referred to the NLRC decision which disclosed that per the written agreement
between respondent and BMSI and RUST, denominated as “Special Sales Representative Agreement,”
the rights and obligations of the parties shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut.
Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint on grounds of failure to state a cause of action and forum
non conveniens and prayed for damages by way of compulsory counterclaim.

Petitioner asserts that the written contract between respondent and BMSI included a valid choice of
law clause, that is, that the contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. It also
mentions the presence of foreign elements in the dispute – namely, the parties and witnesses involved
are American corporations and citizens and the evidence to be presented is located outside the
Philippines – that renders our local courts inconvenient forums.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPLAINT BE DISMISSED ON THE GROUND OF FORUM NON
CONVENIENS?

RULING:
On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is filed in a Philippine
court and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and the res, it may or can
proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a
foreign forum. This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is filed.

As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over herein respondent
(as party plaintiff) upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner (as party defendant) was acquired by its voluntary appearance in court.
 That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be governed by the lawsof the
State of Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine courts, or any other foreign tribunal for that
matter, are precluded from hearing the civil action. Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct
concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law
asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of
the case is fair to both parties.The choice of law stipulation will become relevant only when the
substantive issues of the instant case develop, that is, after hearing on the merits proceeds before the
trial court.

Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse
impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most “convenient” or available forum and the parties are
not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere. Petitioner’s averments of the foreign elements in the
instant case are not sufficient to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over Civil Case No. No. 1192-BG and
the parties involved.

Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non
conveniens requires a factual determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a matter of
defense. While it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this
ground, it should do so only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances
require the court’s desistance.

Posted by rsb at 2:29 PM

 MIJARES V. RANADA (2005)
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 139325, April 12, 2005 ]
PRISCILLA C. MIJARES, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, HILDA B. NARCISO, SR. MARIANI
DIMARANAN, SFIC, AND JOEL C. LAMANGAN IN THEIR BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF THE CLASS
PLAINTIFFS IN CLASS ACTION NO. MDL 840, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT OF HAWAII,
PETITIONERS, VS. HON. SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF
BRANCH 137, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MAKATI CITY, AND THE ESTATE OF FERDINAND E.
MARCOS, THROUGH ITS COURT APPOINTED LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES IN CLASS ACTION MDL
840, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT OF HAWAII, NAMELY: IMELDA R. MARCOS AND
FERDINAND MARCOS, JR., RESPONDENTS.

Facts:
Invoking the Alien Tort Act, petitioners Mijares, et al.*, all of whom suffered human rights
violations during the Marcos era, obtained a Final Judgment in their favor against the Estate of
the late Ferdinand Marcos amounting to roughly $1.9B in compensatory and exemplary
damages for tortuous violations of international law in the US District Court of Hawaii. This Final
Judgment was affirmed by the US Court of Appeals.

As a consequence, Petitioners filed a Complaint with the RTC Makati for the enforcement of the
Final Judgment, paying P410 as docket and filing fees based on Rule 141, §7(b) where the
value of the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Estate of Marcos however,
filed a MTD alleging the non-payment of the correct filing fees. RTC Makati dismissed the
Complaint stating that the subject matter was capable of pecuniary estimation as it involved a
judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of a definite sum of money allowing
for the easy determination of the value of the foreign judgment. As such, the proper filing fee
was P472M, which Petitioners had not paid.

Issue: Whether or not the amount paid by the Petitioners is the proper filing fee.

Ruling:

Yes, but on a different basis—amount merely corresponds to the same amount required for
“other actions not involving property”. RTC Makati erred in concluding that the filing fee should
be computed on the basis of the total sum claimed or the stated value of the property in
litigation. The Petitioner’s Complaint was lodged against the Estate of Marcos but it is clearly
based on a judgment, the Final Judgment of the US District Court. However, the Petitioners err
in stating that the Final Judgment is incapable of pecuniary estimation because it is so capable.
On this point, Petitioners state that this might lead to an instance wherein a first level court
(MTC, MeTC, etc.) would have jurisdiction to enforce a foreign judgment. Under the B.P.129,
such courts are not vested with such jurisdiction. §33 of B.P.129 refers to instances wherein the
cause of action or subject matter pertains to an assertion of rights over property or a sum of
money. But here, the subject matter is the foreign judgment itself. §16 of B.P.129 reveals that
the complaint for enforcement of judgment even if capable of pecuniary estimation would fall
under the jurisdiction of the RTCs. Thus, the Complaint to enforce the US District Court
judgment is one capable of pecuniary estimations but at the same time, it is also an action
based on judgment against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of §7(a) of Rule 141.
What governs the proper computation of the filing fees over Complaints for the enforcement of
foreign judgments is §7(b)(3), involving “other actions not involving property.”
PHIL. ALUMINUM WHEELS VS. FASGI
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

Philippine Aluminum Wheels vs FASGI Enterprises

GR 137378; 12 October 2000
Facts:
On 01 June 1978, FASGI Enterprises Incorporated (“FASGI”), a corporation organized and
existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of California, United States of America,
entered into a distributorship arrangement with Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Incorporated
(“PAWI”), a Philippine corporation, and Fratelli Pedrini Sarezzo S.P.A. (“FPS”), an Italian
corporation. The agreement provided for the purchase, importation and distributorship in the
United States of aluminium wheels manufactured by PAWI. FASGI then paid PAWI the
FOB value of the wheels. Unfortunately, FASGI later found the shipment to be defective and
in non-compliance with the contract.

On 21 September 1979, FASGI instituted an action against PAWI and FPS for breach of
contract and recovery of damages in the amount of US$2,316,591.00 before the United
States District Court for the Central District of California. In the interim, two agreements
were entered by the parties but PAWI kept on failing to discharge its obligations therein.
Irked by PAWI’s persistent default, FASGI filed with the US District Court of the Central
District of California the agreements for judgment against PAWI.

On 24 August 1982, FASGI filed a notice of entry of judgment. Unable to obtain satisfaction
of the final judgment within the United States, FASGI filed a complaint for “enforcement of
foreign judgment”, before RTC Makati. The Makati court, however, dismissed the case, on
the ground that the decree was tainted with collusion, fraud, and clear mistake of law and
fact. The lower court ruled that the foreign judgment ignored the reciprocal obligations of the
parties. While the assailed foreign judgment ordered the return by PAWI of the purchase
amount, no similar order was made requiring FASGI to return to PAWI the third and fourth
containers of wheels. This situation amounted to an unjust enrichment on the part of FASGI.
Furthermore, the RTC said, agreements which the California court had based its judgment
were a nullity for having been entered into by Mr. Thomas Ready, counsel for PAWI,
without the latter’s authorization. However, the Court of Appeals reversed this decision.

Issue: WON the Philippine Court may enforce the said foreign judgment.
Held:
In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be recognized
insofar as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are concerned so long as
it is convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity for a full and fair hearing before
a court of competent jurisdiction; that trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted,
following due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant and under a system of
jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice; and that there is nothing
to indicate either a prejudice in court and in the system of laws under which it is sitting or
fraud in procuring the judgment. PAWI claims that its counsel, Mr. Ready, has acted without
its authority. Verily, in this jurisdiction, it is clear that an attorney cannot, without a client’s
authorization, settle the action or subject matter of the litigation even when he honestly
believes that such a settlement will best serve his client’s interest. However, PAWI failed to
substantiate this complain with sufficient evidence. Hence, the foreign judgment must be
enforced.

Even if PAWI assailed that fraud tainted the agreements which the US Court based its
judgment, this cannot prevent the enforcement of said judgment. PAWI claimed that there
was collusion and fraud in the signing of the agreements. Although the US Court already
adjudicated on this matter, PAWI insisted on raising it again in this Court. Fraud, to hinder
the enforcement within this jurisdiction of a foreign judgment, must be extrinsic, i.e., fraud
based on facts not controverted or resolved in the case where judgment is rendered, or that
which would go to the jurisdiction of the court or would deprive the party against whom
judgment is rendered a chance to defend the action to which he has a meritorious case or
defense. In fine, intrinsic fraud, that is, fraud which goes to the very existence of the cause of
action – such as fraud in obtaining the consent to a contract – is deemed already adjudged,
and it, therefore, cannot militate against the recognition or enforcement of the foreign
judgment.
ORIONS SAVINGS BANK VS SUZUKI

FACTS: Suzuki a Japanese national bought a property (condominium unit and a parking lot) from Mr.
Kang, a Korean national through his agent Soneja. A deed of absolute sale was executed, however even
after several demands from Mr Suzuki to have the titles of the properties delivered by Mr Kang, still he
failed to deliver the documents. Later he found out that Kang has already left Philippines, this prompted
Suzuki to verify the status of the property. Suzuki learned the title to the Parking Slot No. 42 contained
no annotations although it remained under the name of Cityland Pioneer. This notwithstanding, Cityland
Pioneer, through Assistant Vice President Rosario D. Perez, certified that Kang had fully paid the
purchase price of Unit. No. 53610Â and Parking Slot No. 42. The title to the condominium unit had no
existing encumbrance, except for annotation which provided that any conveyance or encumbrance of
CCT No. 18186 shall be subject to approval by the Philippine Retirement Authority (PRA). Although the
title to the condominium contained an annotation representing a mortgage in favor of Orion for
a P1,000,000.00 loan, that annotation was subsequently cancelled on June 16, 2000 by Entry No.
73232/T. No. 10186. Despite the cancellation of the mortgage to Orion, the titles to the properties
remained in possession of Perez. To protect his interests, Suzuki then executed an Affidavit of Adverse
Claim12 withthe Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong City. Suzuki then demanded the delivery of the
titles.13Â Orion, (through Perez), however, refused to surrender the titles. Thereafter, Suzuki received a
letter from Orion’s counsel dated stating that Kang obtained another loan in the amount
of P1,800,000.00. When Kang failed to pay, he executed a Dacion en Pago dated February 2, 2003, in
favorof Orion covering Unit No. 536. Orion, however, did not register the Dacion en Pago, until October
15, 2003. The registration was made only after Suzuki’s demand for the delivery of the titles to the
properties. Suzuki thus then executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim over Parking Slot No. 42. Suzuki filed
a complaint for specific performance and damages against Kang and Orion. Both the RTC and the CA
ruled in favor of Suzuki’s right over the properties in litigation, contending that he was a buyer in
good faith and the dacion was belatedly registered, only two months after the sale has been executed.
Orion elevated the case to the Supreme Court contending that the deed of sale executed was null and
void for under the Korean law the sale of a conjugal properties should be made with the consent of both
spouses.

ISSUE: What law shall govern in the case at bar?

RULING: Philippine Law governs the transfer of real property. Orion believes that the CA erred in not
ruling on the issue of spousal consent. We cannot uphold this position, however, because the issue of
spousal consent was only raised on appeal to the CA. It is a well-settled principle that points of law,
theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal and considered by a reviewing court.20Â To consider these belated arguments
would violate basic principles of fairplay, justice, and due process. Having said these, we shall
nonetheless discuss the issues Orion belatedly raised, if only to put an end to lingering doubts on the
correctness of the denial of the present petition. It is a universal principle thatreal or immovable
property is exclusively subject to the laws of the country or state where it is located.21Â The reason is
found in the very nature of immovable property — its immobility. Immovables are part of the country
and so closely connected to it that all rights over them have their natural center of gravity there.22
Thus, all matters concerning the titleand disposition ofreal property are determined by what is known as
the lex loci rei sitae, which can alone prescribe the mode by which a title canpass from one person to
another, or by which an interest therein can be gained or lost.23Â This general principle includes all
rules governing the descent, alienation and transfer of immovable property and the validity, effect and
construction of wills and other conveyances.24 This principle even governs the capacity of the person
making a deed relating to immovable property, no matter what its nature may be. Thus, an instrument
will be ineffective to transfer title to land if the person making it is incapacitated by the lex loci rei sitae,
even though under the law of his domicile and by the law of the place where the instrument is actually
made, his capacity is undoubted.25 On the other hand, property relations between spouses are
governed principally by the national law of the spouses.26Â However, the party invoking the application
of a foreign law has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is a question of fact to be
properly pleaded and proved as the judge cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law.27Â He is
presumed to know only domestic or the law of the forum.28 To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it
must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of
Court which reads: SEC. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in
paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer
has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be
made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or
by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country inwhich the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (Emphasis supplied) SEC. 25. What attestation
ofcopy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of the
evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a
specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting
officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
Accordingly, matters concerning the title and disposition of real property shall be governed by Philippine
law while issues pertaining to the conjugal natureof the property shall be governed by South Korean
law, provided it is proven as a fact. In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South
Korean law on the conjugal ownership ofproperty. It merely attached a "Certification from the Embassy
of the Republic of Korea"29Â to prove the existence of Korean Law. This certification, does not qualify as
sufficient proof of the conjugal nature of the property for there is no showing that it was properly
authenticated bythe seal of his office, as required under Section 24 of Rule 132.30 Accordingly, the
International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approachor processual presumption comes into play,
i.e., where a foreign law is not pleaded or, evenif pleaded, is not proven, the presumption is that foreign
law is the same as Philippine Law.31 Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang ‘married to'
Hyun Sook Jung" is merely descriptive of the civil status of Kang.32Â In other words, the import from the
certificates of title is that Kang is the owner of the properties as they are registered in his name alone,
and that he is married to Hyun Sook Jung. We are not unmindful that in numerous cases we have held
that registration of the property in the name of only one spouse does not negate the possibility of it
being conjugal or community property.33Â In those cases, however, there was proof that the
properties, though registered in the name of only one spouse, were indeed either conjugal or
community properties.34 Accordingly, we see no reason to declare as invalid Kang’s conveyance in
favor of Suzuki for the supposed lack of spousal consent.
ANK OF AMERICA VS. AMERICAN REALTY
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

Bank of America vs American Realty Corporation

GR 133876 December 29, 1999
Facts:
Petitioner granted loans to 3 foreign corporations. As security, the latter mortgaged a
property located in the Philippines owned by herein respondent ARC. ARC is a third party
mortgagor who pledged its own property in favor of the 3 debtor-foreign corporations.

The debtors failed to pay. Thus, petitioner filed collection suits in foreign courts to enforce
the loan. Subsequently, it filed a petition in the Sheriff to extra-judicially foreclose the said
mortgage, which was granted.

On 12 February 1993, private respondent filed before the Pasig RTC, Branch 159, an action
for damages against the petitioner, for the latter’s act of foreclosing extra-judicially the real
estate mortgages despite the pendency of civil suits before foreign courts for the collection of
the principal loan.

Issue:
WON petitioner’s act of filing a collection suit against the principal debtors for the recovery
of the loan before foreign courts constituted a waiver of the remedy of foreclosure.

Held: Yes.
1. Loan; Mortgage; remedies:

In the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may institute against the
mortgage debtor either a personal action or debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. In
other words, he may pursue either of the two remedies, but not both. By such election, his
cause of action can by no means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is complete in
itself.
In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are deemed alternative
and not cumulative. Notably, an election of one remedy operates as a waiver of the other. For
this purpose, a remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing of the suit for collection or upon the
filing of the complaint in an action for foreclosure of mortgage. As to extrajudicial
foreclosure, such remedy is deemed elected by the mortgage creditor upon filing of the
petition not with any court of justice but with the Office of the Sheriff of the province where
the sale is to be made.

In the case at bar, petitioner only has one cause of action which is non-payment of the debt.
Nevertheless, alternative remedies are available for its enjoyment and exercise. Petitioner
then may opt to exercise only one of two remedies so as not to violate the rule against
splitting a cause of action.

Accordingly, applying the foregoing rules, we hold that petitioner, by the expediency of
filing four civil suits before foreign courts, necessarily abandoned the remedy to foreclose
the real estate mortgages constituted over the properties of third-party mortgagor and herein
private respondent ARC. Moreover, by filing the four civil actions and by eventually
foreclosing extra-judicially the mortgages, petitioner in effect transgressed the rules against
splitting a cause of action well-enshrined in jurisprudence and our statute books.

2. Conflicts of Law

Incidentally, petitioner alleges that under English Law, which according to petitioner is the
governing law with regard to the principal agreements, the mortgagee does not lose its
security interest by simply filing civil actions for sums of money.

We rule in the negative.

In a long line of decisions, this Court adopted the well-imbedded principle in our jurisdiction
that there is no judicial notice of any foreign law. A foreign law must be properly pleaded
and proved as a fact. Thus, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved,
our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal
law. This is what we refer to as the doctrine of processual presumption.

In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly
pleaded and proved in said foreign law would still not find applicability.

Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established
public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.

Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed
upon in a foreign country.

The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our
jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.

Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable
injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important
function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the
fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.

Clearly then, English Law is not applicable.