RENATO CAYETANO vs.

CHRISTIAN MONSOD

G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991.

FACTS:

Monsod was nominated by President Aquino as Chairman of the Comelec. The Commission on
Appointments confirmed the appointment despite Cayetano's objection, based on Monsod's
alleged lack of the required qualification of 10 year law practice. Cayetano filed this certiorari and
prohibition. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission
on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens
of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of
a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately
preceding elections.However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Monsod has been engaged in the practice of law for 10 years.

2. Whether or not the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in

confirming Monsod’s appointment.

HELD:

1. YES. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. It embraces
the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients, and other works where the
work done involves the determination of the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions (PLA vs. Agrava.) The records of the 1986 constitutional commission show that the
interpretation of the term practice of law was liberal as to consider lawyers employed in the
Commission of Audit as engaged in the practice of law provided that they use their legal
knowledge or talent in their respective work. The court also cited an article in the January 11,
1989 issue of the Business Star, that lawyers nowadays have their own specialized fields such
as tax lawyers, prosecutors, etc., that because of the demands of their specialization, lawyers
engage in other works or functions to meet them. These days, for example, most corporation
lawyers are involved in management policy formulation. Therefore, Monsod, who passed the bar
in 1960, worked with the World Bank Group from 1963-1970, then worked for an investment bank
till 1986, became member of the CONCOM in 1986, and also became a member of the Davide
Commission in 1990, can be considered to have been engaged in the practice of law as lawyer-
economist, lawyer-manager, lawyer-entrepreneur, etc.

2. NO. The power of the COA to give consent to the nomination of the Comelec Chairman by the
president is mandated by the constitution. The power of appointment is essentially within the
discretion of whom it is so vested subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess
the qualification required by law. From the evidence, there is no occasion for the SC to exercise
its corrective power since there is no such grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA.

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Brillantes v. Yorac

G.R. No. 93867 December 18, 1990

Cruz, J.

Facts:

The petitioner is challenging the designation by the President of the Philippines of

Associate Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections,
in place of Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had been named chairman of the fact-finding
commission to investigate the December 1989 coup d’ etat attempt.

The petitioner contends that the choice of the Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections
is an internal matter that should be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of
the President of the Philippines violates their independence. He cites the practice in the Supreme
Court, where the senior Associate Justice serves as Acting Chief Justice in the absence of the
Chief Justice. No designation from the President of the Philippines is necessary.

Issue:

whether the designation of an Acting Chairman of COMELEC is unconstitutional

Held:

Yes. Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly describes all the
Constitutional Commissions as “independent.” Although essentially executive in nature, they are
not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective
functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws
and its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are
subject only to review on Certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by the Constitution in Article
IX-A, Section 7.

The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes under that
discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of
the Philippines.

In the choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of the Commission on Elections would most
likely have been guided by the seniority rule as they themselves would have appreciated it. In any
event, that choice and the basis thereof were for them and not the President to make.

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CONRADO LINDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS:
Lindo was declared as duly elected mayor of Tenate, Cavite. Incumbent mayor Velasco
filed an election protest contesting results from 19 precincts. Revision showed substantial
variance between the number of votes stated in the election returns and as per physical count of
the ballots in 5 precincts. Thus, private respondent was later declared duly elected mayor.
Lindo filed a notice of appeal with the trial court while Velasco filed a motion for execution
pending appeal. The Court granted the motion for execution pending appeal upon private
respondent's filing of cash bond and issued the writ of execution
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the COMELEC, with prayer for
the issuance of a preliminary injunction to prevent the implementation of the Order and writ of
execution. COMELEC issued a Resolution, which denied the petition for certiorari and lifted the
preliminary injunction.

ISSUE:
WON COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in applying Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court.

RULING:
No. Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court applies suppletorily to election cases. As long
as the motion for execution pending appeal is filed before the perfection of appeal, the writ of
execution may issue after the period of appeal.
It may be argued that the trial court should dispose of the motion for execution within the
reglementary 15-day period. Such a rule would be difficult, if not impossible, to follow. It would
not be pragmatic and expedient and could cause injustice.
The motion for execution has to be set for hearing. The good reasons for execution
pending appeal have to be scrutinized. These things cannot be done within the short period of 15
days. The trial court may be confronted with other matters more pressing that would demand its
immediate attention.

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ANTONIO GALLARDO, et. al vs. HON. SINFOROSO V. TABAMO, JR

FACTS:
Private respondent filed Petition 1 (Special Civil Action No. 465) before the court a quo
against petitioners to prohibit and restrain them from pursuing or prosecuting certain public works
projects; from releasing, disbursing and/or spending any public funds for such projects; and from
issuing, using or availing of treasury warrants or any device for the future delivery of money, goods
and other things of value chargeable against public funds in connection with the said projects.
Public respondent Judge issued the questioned TRO but instead of filing the Answer, the
petitioners filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a writ
of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order.

ISSUE:
WON the RTC has jurisdiction over Special Civil Action 465 being a suit intended to enjoin
an alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code.

RULING:
No. Section 2 of Article IX-C of the Constitution implicitly grants the Commission the power
to promulgate such rules and regulations. The judiciary cannot be a co-participant in this particular
instance of enforcing the Election Code because of the literal language of the Constitution which
empowers COMELEC to "have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws
relative to the conduct of the elections."
The 1987 Constitution has granted the Commission on Elections broader powers than its
predecessors. It implicitly grants the Commission the power to promulgate rules and regulations
in the enforcement of laws relative to elections. Accordingly, where the subject of the action is the
enforcement of provisions of the Omnibus Election Code, the case is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Comelec, not of the regular courts.

There is nothing in the law to prevent any citizen from exposing the commission of an election
offense and from filing a complaint in connection therewith. Under the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, initiation of complaints for election offenses may be done motu propio by the
COMELEC or upon written complaint by any citizen, candidate or registered political party or
organization under the party-list system or any of the accredited citizens arms of the Commission.
However, such written complaints should be filed with the "Law Department of the Commission;
or with the offices of the Election Registrars, Provincial Election Supervisors or Regional Election
Directors, or the State Prosecutor, Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal."

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EMMANUEL M. RELAMPAGOS, petitioner, vs. ROSITA C. CUMBA and the COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

G.R. No. 118861 April 27, 1995

FACTS:

Relampagos and Cumba were candidates for the position of Mayor in the municipality of
Magallanes, Agusan del Norte. Cumba was proclaimed the winning candidate. Petitioner filed an
election protest with the RTC of Agusan del Norte where the trial court, Judge Rosario F. Dabalos,
found the petitioner to have won with a margin of 6votes over respondent and rendered judgement
in favor of the petitioner.

Cumba appealed the decision to the COMELEC which was later on given a due course by the
trial court. Petitioner filed with the trial court a motion for execution pending appeal which the trial
court granted. Writ of execution was forthwith issued. Thereafter, the private respondent filed a
motion for a reconsideration which was later on denied. The private respondent then filed with the
respondent COMELEC a petition for certiorari to annul the aforesaid order of the trial court
granting the motion for execution pending appeal and the writ of execution. The COMELEC
granted the petition ordering Cumba restored to her position as Municipality Mayor.

ISSUE:

WON COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitions for, certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in
election cases where it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction

RULING:

Yes. Since the COMELEC, in discharging its appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Sec. 2 (2), Art. IX-
C, acts as a court of justice performing judicial power and said power includes the determination
of whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that the COMELEC, by constitutional mandate, is vested with
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

There is a special law granting COMELEC such jurisdiction, viz., Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697,
which remains in full force as it was not expressly repealed by the Omnibus Election Code (B.P.
Blg. 881). In the performance of its judicial functions, the COMELEC, is the most logical body to
issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in election cases where it
has appellate jurisdiction.

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NORBI H. EDDING, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 112060, July 17, 1995

FACTS:

Edding filed an election protest after Bernardo was declared winner on the elections for municipal
mayor of Sibuco, Zamboanga del Norte. Upon termination of the protest proceedings and
recounting of ballots, RTC rendered judgment proclaiming Edding as winner. Bernardo filed a
Notice of Appeal while Edding moved for immediate execution. Bernardo opposed Edding's
motion. RTC Approved Bernardo's Notice of Appeal but granted Edding's Motion for Immediate
Execution. Edding assumed office and Bernardo filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Certiorari
with Application for Preliminary Injunction and for Issuance of a TRO seeking to enjoin the Order
of the RTC granting execution pending appeal which the COMELEC granted.

ISSUE:

WON COMELEC has jurisdiction to issue Writs of Certiorari against the interlocutory order of the
RTC in election cases.

RULING:

Sections 2(2) and 3 of Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, provides in part:

Sec. 2. The COMELEC shall exercise the following powers and functions:

(2)… Appelate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial
courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of
limited jurisdiction.

(3) COMELEC may sit en banc or in 2 divisions, and shall promulgate its rule of procedure in
order to expedite disposition of election case including pre-proclamation controversies…

In Relampagos vs. Cumba, the court upheld the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus over election cases where it has appellate jurisdiction by
virtue of Section 50 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 which on its last paragraph provides that “the
Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus involving election cases”. Thus, the COMELEC has the authority to
issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.

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Galido vs Comelec

Date: January 18, 1991

Petitioner: Perfecto Galido

Respondents: Comelec and Saturnino GaleonPonente: Padilla

Facts:

Galido and private respondent Galeon were candidates during the January1988 local elections
for mayor of Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol. Petitioner was proclaimed the duly-elected Mayor. Private
respondent filed an election protest before the RTC. After hearing, the said court upheld the
proclamation of petitioner. Private respondent appealed the RTC decision to the COMELEC. Its
First Division reversed the RTC decision and declared private respondent the duly-elected mayor.
After the COMELEC en banc denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and affirmed the
decision of its First Division. The COMELEC held that the fifteen (15)ballots in the same precinct
containing the initial “C” after the name “Galido” were marked ballots and, therefore, invalid.
Undaunted by his previous failed actions the petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari and
injunction before the Supreme Court and succeeded in getting a temporary restraining order. In
his comment to the petition, private respondent moved for dismissal, citing Article IX (C), Section
2(2), paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution, that “Final decisions, orders or rulings of the
COMELEC in election contests involving elective municipal offices are final and executory, and
not appealable.

Issue:

Whether or not a COMELEC decision may, if it sets aside the trial court’s decision involving
marked ballots, be brought to the Supreme Court by a petition for certiorari by the aggrieved party?

Held:

Yes

Ratio: The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the COMELEC in contests involving
elective municipal and barangay offices are final, executory and not appealable, does not
preclude a recourse to this Court by way of a special civil action of certiorari. Under Article IX (A),
Section 7 of the Constitution, which petitioner cites, it is stated, “Unless otherwise provided by
this Constitution or bylaw, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to
the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt thereof.”
We resolve this issue in favor of the petitioner. The petition involves pure questions of fact as they
relate to appreciation of evidence (ballots) which is beyond the power of review of this Court. The
COMELEC found that the writing of the letter "C" after the word "Galido" in the fifteen (15)ballots
of Precinct 14 is a clear and convincing proof of a pattern or design to identify the ballots and/or
voters. This finding should be conclusive on the Court. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
has exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials and has appellate jurisdiction
over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction
or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.(Article IX (C),
Section 2 (2), paragraph 1 of the 1987 Constitution).

In the present case, after a review of the trial court's decision, the respondent COMELEC found
that fifteen (15) ballots in the same precinct containing the letter "C" after the name Galido are
clearly marked ballots. May this COMELEC decision be brought to this court by a petition for
certiorari by the aggrieved party (the herein petitioner)?Under Article IX (A) Section 7 of the
Constitution, which petitioner cites in support of this petition, it is stated: "(U)nless otherwise
provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
(Constitutional)Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. "On the other hand, private respondent
relies on Article IX, (C), Section 2(2),paragraph 2 of the Constitution which provides that decisions,
final orders, or rulings of the Commission on Elections in contests involving elective municipal
and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable. (Emphasis supplied) We
resolve this issue in favor of the petitioner. The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the
Commission on Elections in contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices are final,
executory and not appealable, does not preclude a recourse to this Court by way of a special civil
action of certiorari. The proceedings in the Constitutional Commission on this matter are
enlightening. We do not, however, believe that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering the questioned decision. It is
settled that the function of a writ of certiorari is to keep an inferior court or tribunal within the
bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. As correctly argued by the COMELEC, it has the inherent power
to decide an election contest on physical evidence, equity, law and justice, and apply established
jurisprudence in support of its findings and conclusions; and that the extent to which such
precedents apply rests on its discretion, the exercise of which should not be controlled unless
such discretion has been abused to the prejudice of either party. Finally, the records disclose that
private respondent had already assumed the position of Mayor of Garcia-Hernandez as the duly-
elected mayor of the municipality by virtue of the COMELEC decision. The main purpose of
prohibition is to suspend all action and prevent the further performance of the act complained of.
In this light, the petition at bar has become moot and academic.

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