Professional Documents
Culture Documents
_______________________________________________________________
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Defendant-Appellee,
_____________________________
CERTIFICATE OF INTEREST
2. The real name of the real party in interest (if the party named in the caption
is not the real party in interest) represented by me is:
None
3. All parent corporations and any publicly held companies that own 10 percent
or more of the stock of the party or amicus curiae represented by me are:
None
4. The names of all law firms and the partners or associates that appeared for
the party or amicus now represented by me in the trial court or agency or are
expected to appear in this court (and who have not or will not enter an appearance
in this case) are:
(a) A Petition for Writ of Mandamus was filed previously in this case
titled In re: Automotive Body Parts Association, Petitioner, 2015-156. An order
issued November 17, 2015 denying the petition. The composition of the panel was
Judge Lourie, Judge Dyk, and Judge Hughes, order by Judge Dyk. The order is
nonprecedential and unreported.
i
(b) The title and number of any case known to counsel to be pending in
this or any other court that will directly affect or be directly affected by this court’s
decision in the pending appeal:
(1) New World International, Inc., and National Auto Parts, Inc., v. Ford
Global Technologies, LLC and Ford Motor Company; 17-1956, pending in the
United States Court of Appeals for Federal Circuit (combined petition for panel
rehearing and rehearing en banc filed April 26, 2018).
(2) Ford Global Technologies, LLC v. New World International, Inc., et al.,
case number 3:17-cv-03201, pending in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
JURISDICTION ……………………………………………… 1
ARGUMENT ……………………………………………………… 12
A. Introduction .............................................................................. 12
iii
G. The District Court Erred in Holding that the Patented
Designs are not Functional ……………………………… 22
A. Introduction ......................................................................... 39
ADDENDUM …………………………………………………………... 61
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES Pages(s)
v
Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Elan Pharm., Inc.,
786 F.3d 892 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ………………………… 11
Gorham v. White,
81 U.S. 511 (1871) ……………………………….. 32
In re Carletti,
328 F.2d 1020 (CCPA 1964) ………………………… 13, 17
In re Skvorecz,
580 F.3d 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ………………………… 12
vi
In re Stevens,
173 F.2d 1015 (CCPA 1949) ………………………… 34
In re Webb,
916 F.2d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ………………………… 34, 35, 36
In re Zahn,
617 F.2d 261 (Fed. Cir. 1980) ………………………… 32, 52
vii
LifeScan Scotland, Ltd. v. Shasta Techs., LLC,
734 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ………………………… 42
Patlex v. Mossinghoff,
758 F.2d 594 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ………………………… 13
viii
Therma-Scan, Inc. v. Thermoscan, Inc.,
295 F.3d 623 (6th Cir. 2002) ………………………… 11
Wilson v. Simpson,
50 U.S. 109 (1850) ………………………………. 47
STATUTES
RULES
ix
SECONDARY AUTHORITY
x
STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES
(a) A petition for writ of mandamus was filed previously in this case
titled In re: Automotive Body Parts Association, Petitioner, 2015-156. An order
issued November 17, 2015 denying the petition. The composition of the panel was
Judge Lourie, Judge Dyk, and Judge Hughes, order by Judge Dyk. The order is
nonprecedential and unreported.
(b) The title and number of any case known to counsel to be pending in
this or any other court that will directly affect or be directly affected by this court’s
decision in the pending appeal:
(1) New World International, Inc., and National Auto Parts, Inc., v. Ford
Global Technologies, LLC and Ford Motor Company; 17-1956, pending in the
United States Court of Appeals for Federal Circuit (combined petition for panel
rehearing and rehearing en banc filed April 26, 2018).
(2) Ford Global Technologies, LLC v. New World International, Inc., et al.,
case number 3:17-cv-03201, pending in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas.
xi
JURISDICTION
appeals from an order entered February 20, 2018 (Appx93-117) denying ABPA’s
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan in Automotive Body Parts Association v.
Ford Global Technologies, LLC, Civil Action No. 2:15-cv-10137, and a final
judgment (Appx91) entered February 23, 2018 in the same action in favor of Ford
Global Technologies, LLC (FGTL). The District Court entered the final judgment
The determinations set forth above became final for the purposes of appeal
when the district court entered final judgment on February 23, 2018 (Appx91).
of that court was based, in whole or in part, on 28 U.S.C. § 1338. The District
Court of the Eastern District of Michigan had subject matter jurisdiction over this
action under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), as the action arose under Title 35.
1
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
(1) Whether the district court erred in denying ABPA’s motion for
summary judgment, which argued that Design Patents D489,299 and D501,685 are
invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 171 because the claimed designs are functional and
(2) Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment for
FGTL under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f)(1) by holding that Design Patents D489,299 and
D501,685 are not invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 171 because the claimed designs are
(3) Whether the district court erred in denying ABPA’s motion for
summary judgment, which argued that Design Patents D489,299 and D501,685 are
(4) Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment for
FGTL under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f)(1) by holding that Design Patents D489,299 and
D501,685 are enforceable and not exhausted under the patent exhaustion doctrine
2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
and non-infringement in the Eastern District of Texas, Civil Action No. 4:13-cv-
705 (Appx119). FGTL filed a motion to dismiss for lack of standing (Appx194),
which was denied (Appx970-978). FGTL filed a motion to transfer venue under
whether the case was moot (Appx1485) and the parties responded (Appx135).
FGTL filed a motion to dismiss the case as moot (Appx1522), ABPA responded
Appx1890). The Court denied FGTL’s motion to dismiss the case as moot,
denied ABPA’s motion for summary judgment, and provided notice to ABPA that
the Court was intending to enter judgment in favor of FGTL pursuant to Rule
Summary Judgment was granted for FGTL on the issues of functionality, patent
3
exhaustion, repair, and implied license under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.
followed.
4
STATEMENT OF FACTS
manufactured, and sold the F-150 Pickup Truck in the United States. (Appx1085,
Motor Company. FGTL owns and manages the intellectual property of Ford.
Since the Ford F-150 Truck (F-150) must be designed before it is built and
sold, the design decisions that go into making the F-150 all are completed before
the F-150 Truck is built and purchased. A model of the F-150 is built with a hood
and a headlamp embodying what FGTL alleges are designs claimed in the ‘299
Patent and the ‘685 Patent. Once the hood and headlamp are designed for
repair part with the original pre-collision part on the vehicle so that the vehicle is
5
only role that design plays in an owner's decision to buy such a part is that the
design must match the design of the original part to return the vehicle back to its
a Ford F-150 hood and headlamp ultimately are sold to, and the repairs are
performed on behalf of, the owner of the Ford vehicle being repaired. (Appx1088).
Most vehicle repairs are paid for by an insurance company and the insurance
company usually has an obligation under the insurance policy to pay for repair that
restores the damaged vehicle to its pre-loss condition, i.e., operational safety,
the State of Texas. ABPA members, including New World International, Inc.
(New World) distribute aftermarket repair parts in the automotive collision repair
trade. (Appx1200).
then sells it to a person or entity needing the parts for repair of the Ford F-150 or
Mustang. (Appx1200). The person or entity purchasing the repair part from New
World may be, for example, the owner of the vehicle or a repair facility.
(Appx1200-1201). The repair parts are always sold for the purpose of repairing the
vehicles and are never sold for any other purpose. (Appx1201). The repair parts
are not sold to reconstruct an essentially new vehicle. Rather, the repair parts are
6
sold to repair a vehicle. (Appx1201). If damage to a F-150 Truck, Mustang, or
the vehicle will not be repaired. That is because the cost of the reconstruction will
greatly exceed the cost of purchasing another F-150 Truck, Mustang, or other
vehicle. (Appx1201).
7
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
(1) The ‘299 and ‘685 design patents are invalid because they are functional and
therefore not ornamental. The claimed designs are functional because they are
dictated by function and not a matter of concern either during F-150 purchase or
when purchased for F-150 repair. The subject patents are dictated by function
because the claimed designs are sold as a combination with other F-150 parts, the
designs are dictated by their need to mate and match with the overall appearance of
the F-150 when sold, and the designs are dictated by their need to bring the F-150
This is a “mate and match” case because the subject claimed designs
allegedly are embodied in parts sold as a combination with other parts when the F-
150 is initially sold. In mate and match cases, such as a combination key and lock
interface design or a printer and printer cartridge design, this Court’s inquiry into
functionality does not focus on the initial design process, but rather after the
combination has been designed. Since the subject patent designs must be designed
a certain way to work with the combination, there are no decorative design choices
to be made.
determining whether the subject designs are functional because the ultimate issue
8
is whether there are alternative designs that allow a conscious design choice to be
made. If no conscious design choices are made, then it should not matter whether
the lack of choices is due to appearance. Further, when a design is the result of
functional necessity and not the result of decorative design choices, granting a
design patent to such a function-dictated design does not serve the purpose of
trademark law, and there are good reasons to accept it in design patent law as well.
The subject claimed designs are not a matter of concern because since the
functionality focus is on the mate and match combination, the initial F-150
purchaser only wants the claimed designs to mate and match with the rest of the
combination. Further, the subject claimed designs are not a matter of concern
when repair/replacement parts are being purchased because the purchaser only is
concerned that the parts match the appearance of the original parts and the parts
Alternatively, since there are two markets for parts embodying the subject
designs (the initial sales market for the F-150 and the repair/replacement market),
this Court can adopt the principle in trademark law that the design can be
considered ornamental and valid in the initial sales market, but functional and
9
(2) The claimed designs allegedly are embodied in the F-150 when it is sold.
Therefore, the authorized sale of the F-150 exhausts the claimed designs and
creates an implied license allowing the purchaser to repair the F-150 by purchasing
repair/replacement parts that allegedly embody the claimed designs. The rule in
patented component part does not apply in design patent law because, unlike utility
includes a right to repair the F-150 free from any threat of design patent
infringement allegations due to the circumstances of the sale. Neither Ford nor
FGTL place any restrictions on the implied license and the hood and headlamp are
not marked with design patent numbers. Based on this reasonable expectation, and
FGTL’s lack of action or notice to dissuade this reasonable expectation, the scope
of the implied license extends to repairing the F-150 with the repair/replacement
parts allegedly embodying the claimed designs. Finally, since the owner of the F-
150 has an implied license to repair the F-150, the owner also has “have made”
rights that shields the manufacture of the repair part and all members of the
10
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
This Court applies the law of the regional circuit when reviewing a district
Pharm., Inc., 786 F.3d 892, 896 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The Sixth Circuit reviews a
Thermoscan, Inc., 295 F.3d 623, 629 (6th Cir. 2002). Summary judgment is
appropriate if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a).
infringement of a design patent, and must be proved by the party asserting the
defense by clear and convincing evidence. L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe
preponderance of the evidence. Jazz Photo Corp. v. U.S., 439 F.3d 1344, 1350
(Fed. Cir. 2006). Preponderance of the evidence in civil actions means "the greater
weight of evidence, evidence which is more convincing than the evidence which is
offered in opposition to it." Hale v. Dep't of Transp., Fed. Aviation Admin., 772
F.2d 882, 885 (Fed. Cir. 1985). ABPA may carry its burden of proving patent
11
ARGUMENT
A. Introduction
ABPA’s argument for why the subject design patents are not ornamental will
in case law will be discussed and applied. The facts will be analyzed in light of
Best Lock Corp. v. Ilco Unican Corp., 94 F.3d 1563 (Fed Cir. 1996), which is a
case involving mate and match principles where this Court invalidated a key blade
design patent based on functionality. The argument then will explain why the
District Court erred in holding that the subject design patents were not functional
and not invalid. The argument will conclude with an alternative argument that
does not invalidate the design patents based on functionality, but rather renders
The current design patent statute, 35 U.S.C. § 171, provides in relevant part
"[w]hoever invents any new, original and ornamental design for an article of
1
The MPEP does not have the force of law, but it is made available to the public
and describes “procedures on which the public can rely.” In re Skvorecz, 580 F.3d
12
“[t]herefore, for a design to be ornamental within the requirements of 35 U.S.C.
(citing In re Carletti, 328 F.2d 1020, 1022 (CCPA 1964). The court in In re
Carletti explained: “But it has long been settled that when a configuration is the
ornamental design for the simple reason that it is not ‘ornamental’ - was not
created for the purpose of ornamenting.” Id. (emphasis added). This statement
expresses the principle that when a design results from functional considerations
only, a designer has not made any conscious ornamental design choices and the
relevant part "[i]t is clear that the ornamentality of the article must be the result of
a conscious act by the inventor, as 35 U.S.C. 171 requires that a patent for a design
be given only to 'whoever invents any new, original, and ornamental design for an
In Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Auto Body Panels of Ohio, Inc., 908 F.2d 951
(Fed. Cir. 1990), this Court stated "[t]he question of when the functionality of a
available under the law is a complex issue and one that continues to be the subject
1262, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Patlex v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 606
(Fed. Cir. 1985)).
13
"complex issue" has been to develop a framework of general principles that
In L. A. Gear Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1993),
this Court stated "[w]hen there are several ways to achieve the function of an
article of manufacture, the design of the article is more likely to serve a primarily
ornamental purpose." Id. at 1123. However, this Court has been careful to explain
that the presence or absence of alternative designs is just one factor to consider and
that it does not carry dispositive weight. In Berry Sterling Corp. v. Pescor
Plastics, Inc., 122 F.3d 1452 (Fed. Cir. 1997), this Court stated “alternative designs
join the list of other appropriate considerations for assessing whether the patented
protected design represents the best design; whether alternative designs would
adversely affect the utility of the specified article; whether there are any
concomitant utility patents; whether the advertising touts particular features of the
design as having specific utility; and whether there are any elements in the design
In Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien, Inc., 796 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir.
2015), this Court stated "an inquiry into whether a claimed design is primarily
functional should begin with an inquiry into the existence of alternative designs,"
14
id. at 1330, but reaffirmed it has "not mandated applying any particular test for
Cases from this Court and other courts indicate that the list of functionality
factors is continuing to develop and that other factors also are considered relevant
on functionality. For example, several cases discuss the importance of "mate and
match" principles. In Best Lock, supra, the design patent was for a key blade,
which is the portion of the key designed to fit into the matching front face of a
keyway. This Court held that since the key blade had to be designed to fit into the
matching keyway, the design of the key blade was dictated solely by its function,
meaning that there were no decorative design choices to be made. This Court
found the design was not ornamental and held the patent invalid.
Cir. 2012), a case involving printers and replacement toner cartridges, the design
patent in question covered the toner cartridge. The district court found on motion
for summary judgment that the design patent was invalid based on two theories.
First, since the toner cartridges were generally hidden from view inside the printer,
the district court found "the appearance of Lexmark's printer cartridges in question
are [sic] of no matter of concern during those cartridges' entire existence." Static
15
Control Components v. Lexmark Intern., 487 F.Supp.2d 830, 839 (E.D. Ky. 2007).
Second, the court held the design patent invalid because the toner cartridge design
was primarily functional in that the “printers dictate the design of the printer
cartridges." Id. at 841. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court on both
counts, stating:
The district court applied the correct standard and evaluated the
undisputed facts offered by Static Control establishing that the design
of the cartridges was functional and not ornamental. The toner
cartridges are visible to users at some points, but are generally hidden
from view inside the printer. Their design is dictated solely by the
printer with which they are compatible. Lexmark itself explained that
the advertisements containing photographs were primarily to assist the
customer in selecting the cartridge that was compatible with the
printer they owned. The cartridges' appearance had no other role in
the purchaser's decision of which cartridge to purchase.
Id. at 422. (footnote and record reference omitted). The district court, when ruling
the design patents were invalid due to functionality, considered it important that
"[the patentee's] own averments emphasize that the consumer is locked into buying
a certain replacement cartridge in order for his printer to operate" 487 F.Supp.2d at
840, and "customers can purchase replacement cartridges for printers online by
model number; printers are generally shipped with the correct toner cartridge
additional functionality factors has held design patents invalid because the design
16
standards, or other requirements. A case example of the “specifications and
standards” situation is In re Carletti, 328 F.2d 1020 (CCPA 1964), which involved
a design patent covering a gasket. The court held the patent invalid because the
only differences between the claimed design and the prior art were functional and
the gasket design was standardized in a military specification that dictated “the
exact position, dimensions, and tolerances of the grooves and ribs etc., without the
slightest suggestion that they serve in any way as ornamentation.” Id. at 1021.
The cases cited above have produced additional factors to consider when
the claimed design of the article of manufacture (or portion thereof) is designed to
fit into or onto a parent article of manufacture. Second, when the article of
manufacture typically is sold with the parent and will need replacing during the
useful life of the parent article due to foreseeable damage, use, or loss of the article
dictated by its need to mate with and match the appearance of the parent due to
Fourth, when the appearance of the design has no other role in the purchaser's
17
manufacture by part number rather than by the appearance of the article of
manufacture.
match context, the focus is not on potential alternative designs that might be
created during the design process, but rather on the practical mate and match
compatibility after the designs are created and whether alternative designs exist
that will mate and match with the complementary or parent article. For example,
in Best Lock, although it was possible to create many different key blade – keyway
design interfaces during the design process, this Court found functionality by
examining how many key blade designs were possible after the original design had
been selected.
to the conclusion that the subject patents are functional and invalid. The hood and
headlamp that FGTL alleges to embody the subject portion claims2 are designed to
fit into or onto a F-150 body. The hood and headlamp are sold with the F-150 and
typically may need repair or replacing during the useful life of the F-150 due to
2
To be clear, all comparisons between the accused parts and the subject claimed
designs should be understood as being based on FGTL’s allegations that the
accused parts infringe the claimed designs and not upon a concession by ABPA
that infringement is occurring.
18
and headlamp are dictated by their need to mate with and match the overall
The appearance of the hood and headlamp designs have no other role in the
purchaser's decision to buy them other than to be compatible with the overall F-150
appearance and to match the parts they are being used to repair/replace.
purchased solely by part number. (Appx1107, Appx1118). Since the hood and
headlamp designs at issue fit the above criteria for invalidity, the '299 and '685
of this case under this Court’s holding in Best Lock confirms this is so.
F. The Subject Design Patents are Invalid under this Court’s Rationale
and Holding in Best Lock
In Best Lock Corp. v. Ilco Unican Corp., 896 F.Supp. 836 (S.D. Ind., 1995),
a design patent covered a portion of a key blade that inserts into a keyway. The
district court held the design patent was invalid for two reasons. First, it found that
the key blades were not "a matter of ornamental concern to the purchaser or the
user." Id. at 843. Second, it “found that the design patent was invalid because the
shape of the blank key blade was dictated by its function.” Id.
key blade and corresponding keyway designs are available,” the design claimed for
19
the key blade is ornamental because it “is not dictated solely by functional
Id. at 1566.
of a given key blade and keyway design, an inventor is not allowed to divide the
combination and have a design patent on just the key blade when it must be
designed as shown to make the combination function as a lock and key set.
Significantly, this Court’s analysis did not focus on alternative designs that might
be created during the design process for the interface between the key blade and
keyway, but rather focused on the practical mate and match compatibility issues
The parties to this litigation agree that there are myriad possible
designs of key profiles. All keys require, of course, mating keyways.
In holding that because the key must fit a keyway, the abstract design
of the key profile is converted to one solely of function, the court
creates an exception to design patent subject matter. An arbitrary
20
design of a useful article is not statutorily excluded from § 171 simply
because in use it interacts with an article of complementary design.
….
In sum, the fact that the key blade is the mate of a keyway does not
convert the arbitrary key profile into a primarily functional design. It
is not the design of the key profile that is functional, but the key itself.
Id. at 1569.
matching, the Judge Newman had a good point - the patent on the key blade was
However, what made the key blade functional under mate and match principles
was that (1) it was designed with a complementary article (the keyway in the lock),
and (2) the key blade, including the replacement key blades, had to have a certain
When the Best Lock analysis is applied to the instant case, the subject
patents are invalid as functional. First, just as the key blade and keyway are
designed together, so too are the hood and headlamp designed together with the
rest of the F-150 exterior. Second, just as the key blade and keyway are arbitrary
designs when considered as a combination, the hood, headlamp, and F-150 also are
arbitrary designs when considered as a combination. Finally, just as the key blade
and keyway purchaser in Best Lock needed a key blade that would mate and match
with the lock, so too does a purchaser of a F-150 need a hood and a headlamp that
21
will mate and match with the F-150 overall appearance and bring it back to its
key blade that could fit into the keyway (for example that was shorter, or that had
only half the vertical design), but the important point is that such a key blade
would not open the lock. Similarly, a F-150 owner can purchase a differently
designed hood and headlamp that could fit into the F-150, but the important point
is that it would not bring the F-150 back to its original condition and appearance.
Just as this Court did not allow the patentee in Best Lock to divide up the
combination of a key blade and keyway to obtain a design patent on just the key
blade, this Court also should not allow FGTL to divide up the combination F-150
design to obtain design patents on portions of the parts when the repair/
replacement parts must be designed a certain way to return the F-150 back to its
G. The District Court Erred in Holding that the Patented Designs are not
Functional
The District Court cited evidence that hoods and headlamps with designs
different from the patented designs (performance parts) could be used to replace
the original parts embodying the patented designs. (Appx110). The District Court
then stated that the existence of such performance parts served to distinguish this
case from this Court’s opinion in Best Lock. (Appx111). According to the District
22
Court, “the existence of performance parts demonstrates that the designs claimed
in the ’299 and ’685 patents are not necessary for the hood and headlamp to
perform their intended functions.” (Appx111). This conclusion does not take into
consideration that the performance parts cited are not originally sold with the F-
return the F-150 back to its original condition and appearance, something a
performance part cannot do. The District Court considered this type of
The District Court in essence held that the appearance alone of the hood and
aspect to the designs separate and apart from the functional need to match the F-
150 appearance. This holding constitutes error. As explained in the section setting
forth general principles, the ultimate issue is not whether there are other designs
that can perform the same mechanical or "utilitarian" function as the subject
design, but rather whether there are alternative designs that allow for a conscious
then it should not matter whether the lack of choices is due to so called "utilitarian"
factors, or whether the lack of choices is due to the appearance of the design.
with the overall F-150 design aesthetic and to bring the F-150 back to its original
23
appearance if damaged. It is this need to match the F-150 appearance that dictates
the design by eliminating conscious design choices and makes it proper to include
U.S. 159 (1995), the Supreme Court discussed the issue of aesthetic functionality
in the context of whether the Lanham Act permitted the registration of a trademark
to control a useful product feature." Id. at 164. The Court stated further "[t]his
Court consequently has explained that, '[i]n general terms, a product feature is
functional,' and cannot serve as a trademark, 'if it is essential to the use or purpose
of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article,' that is, if exclusive use
disadvantage. [citing] Inwood Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S., at 850, n. 10, 102 S.Ct.,
The Court noted "that lower courts have permitted competitors to copy the
green color of farm machinery (because customers wanted their farm equipment to
match) and have barred the use of black as a trademark on outboard boat motors
24
(because black has the special functional attributes of decreasing the apparent size
of the motor and ensuring compatibility with many different boat colors)." Id. at
169 (citing Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 560 F.Supp. 85, 98 (SD Iowa 1982),
aff'd, 721 F.2d 253 (CA8 1983) and Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35
that, “if a design's ‘aesthetic value’ lies in its ability to ‘confe[r] a significant
benefit that cannot practically be duplicated by the use of alternative designs,’ then
Comment c, pp. 175-176 (1993).” Id. at 170. And “[t]he ‘ultimate test of aesthetic
adversely affected, but rather whether there is a conscious design choice being
made that promotes the decorative arts. Since after the entire F-150 combination is
designed the claimed designs must appear a certain way to match the combination
and to bring it back to its original appearance if damaged, there are no design
choices to be made, the decorative arts are not promoted, and the designs are
25
In Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 560 F.Supp. 85 (SD Iowa 1982), aff'd,
721 F.2d 253 (8th Cir. 1983), Plaintiff John Deere sued Defendant Farmhand in an
effort to prevent the sale of front-end loaders that were painted "John Deere green."
Id. at 88. Plaintiff argued that the appearance of the color green served no
functional purpose and therefore was protectable under the Lanham Act.
Defendant argued that the color green was aesthetically functional because farmers
preferred to match the color of their loaders to that of that tractors. The court
agreed with defendant that the color green was aesthetically functional under
reasoning found in Keene v. Paraflex Industries, Inc., 653 F.2d 822 (3d Cir.1981):
Id. at 98.
26
In sum, since the purchaser farmers wanted to match the appearance of their
loaders with the appearance of their tractors, the court considered design
want to match the appearance of the hoods and headlamps with the appearance of
the original parts to bring their vehicles back to their original condition and
appearance, this Court should consider the appearance of the hood and headlamp in
35 F.3d 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1994). In Brunswick, the Mercury Marine division of
Brunswick Corporation sought to register the color black for its outboard marine
engines. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board concluded that the color black
[A]lthough the color black is not functional in the sense that it makes
these engines work better, or that it makes them easier or less
expensive to manufacture, black is more desirable from the
perspective of prospective purchasers because it is color compatible
with a wider variety of boat colors and because objects colored black
appear smaller than they do when they are painted other lighter or
brighter colors. The evidence shows that people who buy outboard
motors for boats like the colors of the motors to be harmonious with
the colors of their vessels, and that they also find it desirable under
some circumstances to reduce the perception of the size of the motors
in proportion to the boats.
Id. at 1529. This Court found no error in the Board's legal reasoning and no clear
27
The color black, as the Board noted, does not make the engines
function better as engines. The paint on the external surface of an
engine does not affect its mechanical purpose. Rather, the color black
exhibits both color compatibility with a wide variety of boat colors
and ability to make objects appear smaller. With these advantages for
potential customers, the Board found a competitive need for engine
manufacturers to use black on outboard engines. Based on this
competitive need, the Board determined that the color was de jure
functional.
Id. at 1531.
In sum, when determining whether there are alternative designs that can
perform the same function as the claimed designs, it is proper to consider the
aesthetic compatibility of the hood and headlamp with the F-150. Just as the
aesthetic compatibilities of the green loaders with green tractors, black engines
with surrounding boat colors, and wall cubes with surrounding architecture were
hood and headlamp design with the surrounding vehicle be considered in the
importance in its respective field: competitive need in trademark law and conscious
from trademark law to design patent law for three reasons, each of which is
addressed as follows: First, regarding the point that no court yet has applied
aesthetic functionality to design patent law “despite that both trademarks and
28
design patents have coexisted for well over a century,” (Appx109), design patent
law currently is a rapidly developing and dynamic area of patent law. This Court
has not hesitated to change long standing precedent in the design patent area when
a strong argument was made that the law should be further developed or modified.
See Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc)
(eliminating the “point of novelty” test that had existed in design patent law for
twenty-five years).
Further, this Court already has imported other important principles from
trademark functionality law into design patent functionality law because the
concepts are so similar. In Berry Sterling, supra, this Court imported trademark
functionality factors into design patent law. 122 F.3d at 1456. Although the court
cited no authority, several of the factors are similar to those listed in In re Morton-
Norwich Products, Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1340, 1341 (CCPA 1982) for determining
Second, the District Court’s analysis that trademark law and design patent
law serve different purposes is incomplete because the purpose of design patent
law is not considered. The District Court states “trademark law ‘seeks to promote
competition’” and “[i]n contrast, patents inhibit competition,” (Appx109) but the
court does not consider that design patent law seeks to balance the promotion of
29
design patent statute.” See Avia Group International Inc. v. L. A. Gear California
Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The balance of these dual purposes is
These principles indicate that when a design is not the result of decorative design
serve the purpose of promoting the decorative arts. As explained earlier, it does
not matter whether the decorative design choice is not available due to mechanical
or aesthetic reasons.
Finally, the District Court reasons that trademark law has a greater concern
over functionality than design patent law given the potential perpetual monopoly
patents, and design patents have been used to establish secondary meaning to
The District Court also found the subject designs were not functional
because they were a “matter of concern” when the F-150 was purchased.
(Appx106). The District Court distinguished the rationale of the district court in
Best Lock, which found the key blade’s design was not a matter of concern because
30
it was never a matter of concern either during product use or purchase. In Best
Lock, this Court did not address the matter of concern issue because the designs
from “matter of concern.” See Static Control, supra, 487 F. Supp. at 840 (“A
functionality.”). As discussed above, the subject designs are functional under this
Court’s reasoning in Best Lock because they are dictated by function, which makes
its associated company FGTL) are applying for and receiving design patents on the
exterior appearance of vehicles. Examples are U.S. Design Patent Nos. D500,462
31
Automotive companies also have applied for and received patents on parts of
the exterior design of vehicles such as the hood and headlamp designs involved in
this lawsuit. A design patent on a portion of a vehicle can protect the design from
than the entire exterior design of the vehicle. However, Ford and FGTL are going
beyond the "portion claiming" reason for obtaining design patents on parts and are
attempting to use vehicle part design patents to control the market and price for
individual automotive repair parts. That is, even though a purchaser pays for the
vehicle and its overall patented design (that naturally includes patented designs on
all constituent parts) when the vehicle is initially purchased, vehicle manufacturers
are attempting to use separate design patents on repair parts to obtain a double
should be noted that two of the seminal cases on portion claiming in design patent
law permitted portion claiming of an integrated design (a drill bit) In re Zahn, 617
F.2d 261 (Fed. Cir. 1980) and (silverware handle) Gorham v. White, 81 U.S. 511
(1871). These cases did not involve the type of claiming at issue here where
design patents are being asserted over separate parts needed for repair.
through design patents, the reaction of the courts, including this Court, has been
negative. Two case examples are Best Lock and Static Control, discussed
32
previously. The district court in Best Lock and both courts in Static Control found
the designs not to be a matter of concern for several reasons. In Static Control, the
Sixth Circuit primarily focused on the period of time that a replacement cartridge
was being purchased: “Lexmark itself explained that the advertisements containing
photographs were primarily to assist the customer in selecting the cartridge that
was compatible with the printer they owned” and “[t]he cartridges' appearance had
no other role in the purchaser's decision of which cartridge to purchase.”3 697 F.3d
at 422. In Best Lock, the district court focused both on when the key blade and
keyway were originally purchased and when replacement key blades were being
of concern during either the use of the product or at the time the key or lock is
purchased. . . . There is no evidence that at any time in the commercial process the
In the instant case, ABPA argues that the subject designs are not a matter of
concern because (1) during initial F-150 purchase the customer concern is on the
overall vehicle appearance (not the hood and headlamp in isolation), the hood and
headlamp designs allegedly are part of the overall F-150 combination, and the only
3
Note that design patents are functional either when the design is “dictated by
function,” or when the design is not a “matter of concern.” The “dictated by
function” principle focuses on the function of the design itself whereas the “matter
of concern” principle focuses on the concerns of the purchaser and user.
33
concern for the hood and headlamp designs is that they are aesthetically
repair/replacement part purchase, the only customer concern is that the hood or
headlamp appearance match the original parts, which can be purchased by part
number.
The District Court believed that In re Webb, 916 F.2d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
Interferences (Board) held the design was not patentable because it was hidden
from sight while in normal use. This Court believed the Board’s ruling improperly
created a per se rule that if an article is hidden in final use, it is not ornamental.
This Court stated the correct inquiry is whether an article “is always concealed in
its normal and intended use,” 916 F.2d at 1557 (citing and quoting In re Stevens,
173 F.2d 1015, 1016 (CCPA 1949), including the time it is displayed for sale
where design features can be noticed by potential purchasers. Evidence in the case
indicated the devices were displayed in advertisements and trade shows, but the
Board disregarded the evidence due to its per se rule. This Court reversed and
involve mate and match principles or articles that can be sold as repair/replacement
34
items such as key blades, printer cartridges, hoods, or headlamps. However, with
they are noticed during sale only to assess functionality. In such circumstances, the
PTO may properly conclude that an application provides no evidence that there is a
period in the commercial life of a particular design when its ornamentality may be
Second, if the rule set forth in In re Webb is strictly applied to the fact
patterns in Best Lock and Static Control, the outcomes may not have been the
advertisement displaying the unusual key blade design profile might be better
purchaser. Note that the “matter of concern” determinations in Best Lock and
Static Control were not made by this Court, and In re Webb sets a low bar for
ornamentality in cases not involving repair/replacement parts. This Court did not
address the “matter of concern” issue in Best Lock because it based its ruling solely
on dictated by function.
understand the “matter of concern” rationale is to realize that the court did not
35
strictly apply the In re Webb rule for the initial purchase, but rather emphasized the
compatibility between the printer and cartridge and the post-sale replacement
nature of the printer cartridge. In short, the rule from In re Webb is more
Another way to understand the reasoning and outcomes in Best Lock and
Static Control is to realize that the courts are dealing with two different markets for
goods. One is the initial market for sale of the F-150, and the second is the market
for the replacement components. Although the cases do not expressly recognize
the two markets, they do exist. The cases emphasize that the product designs are
matter of concern, and thereby also foreclose use of the design patents to protect
the designs in the original market. This, in effect, emphasizes a rationale to not let
design patents control a market for replacement parts. This same rationale is
Although Static Control and the district court decision in Best Lock
ground that would allow the design patent to remain valid for portion claiming, but
36
not enforceable for the repair/replacement market. The principle is that the
market they are being used in. This concept exists in trademark law and is being
(DHS) (LKQ Corporation, et al. v. DHS, Case No. 1:18-cv-00225, D.C. Del.,
attempting to invalidate the trademarks as functional, but “is arguing that in the
unique circumstances of this particular market (i.e., the aftermarket repair parts
marks are functional in this context.” (Appx3624) In support, LKQ cites Chrysler
must be assessed within the context in which the product design is used” because
LKQ). (Appx3624-3625).
focusing on the particular market served also is appropriate in design patent law
because the matter of concern inquiry relates to the concerns of the purchaser.
37
In the event this Court finds it necessary to address the matter of concern
issue and assuming arguendo this Court rejects ABPA’s argument over “matter of
concern” during the initial purchase, this Court can find the subject design patents
not invalid regarding the initial sale, but unenforceable because they are functional
trademark law and design patent functionality is a flexible concept that has been
used in ways other than to invalidate a design patent. For example, during claim
1293-94 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (construing a design patent by factoring out functional
elements in the context of a bench trial). Further, such an approach would achieve
the results and objectives of Best Lock and Static Control by rendering the design
the validity of the design patents for portion claiming purposes, previously
mentioned.
law. See, e.g., Torspo Hockey Intern., Inc. v. Kor Hockey Ltd., 491 F. Supp.2d
871, n. 4 (D. Minn. 2007). However, the case cited for functionality in the
38
invalidity context, Hupp v. Siroflex of Am., Inc., 122 F.3d 1456, 1461 (Fed. Cir.
for substantial evidence. The district court final judgment in Hupp was entered on
967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) was decided on April 5, 1995. Markman made claim
construction an issue of law. Since the functionality analysis for invalidity and
claim construction are substantively the same, it does not make sense that one is
treated as an issue of fact and the other as an issue of law. To avoid potential
A. Introduction
ABPA’s argument for why the subject design patents are exhausted will
begin with a discussion of general legal principles. The argument then will explain
why patent exhaustion exists in this case and why the District Court’s patent
exhaustion analysis and holding are incorrect. The argument then will explain why
conclude with a statement that the “have made” rights of F-150 purchasers protect
39
Under the patent exhaustion doctrine, the unrestricted sale of a patented
the authority of the patentee, ‘exhausts’ the patentee's right to control further sale
and use of that article by enforcing the patent under which it was first sold." Jazz
Photo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm., 264 F.3d 1094, 1105 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also
Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., Inc., 816 F.3d 721 (Fed. Cir., 2016)
(stating “[t]he doctrine of patent exhaustion (or ‘first sale’ doctrine) addresses the
embodying a patent), when the sale is made or authorized by the patentee, confers
on the buyer the ‘authority’ to engage in acts involving the article, such as resale,
that are infringing acts in the absence of such authority.”). Id. at 726.
patented device exhausts the patentee's right to control the purchaser's use of that
item thereafter because the patentee has bargained for and received full value for
the goods.” Keurig, Inc. v. Sturm Foods, Inc., 732 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
like other issues in which there are no disputed factual questions, may be properly
applies to design patents. See Jazz Photo, 264 F.3d at 1110 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
40
The “authorized sale of a patented product places that product beyond the
reach of the patent," Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Technology, Inc., 995 F.2d 1566,
1568 (Fed. Cir. 1993), and creates an “implied license,” under which “a patent
holder receives a reward for inventive work in the first sale of the patented
product.” McCoy v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc., 67 F.3d 917, 921 (Fed. Cir 1995).
The “implied license to use include[s] the right to repair the patented article and
Medical Technology, Inc., 85 F.3d 1570, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The implied
license covers both the original purchaser of the article and all subsequent
1445, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1997). “The right to repair is implied as a matter of law.”
85 F.3d at 1573. The right to repair is a question of law. See Bottom Line
Management, Inc. v. Pan Man, Inc., 228 F.3d 1352, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
patented items after they have been placed in commerce by the patentee, has been
distilled into the terms ‘repair’ and ‘reconstruction.’” Jazz Photo, 264 F.3d at
repair has occurred." Sandvik Aktiebolag v. E.J. Co., 121 F.3d 669, 674 (Fed. Cir.
41
of the entity as to `in fact make a new article' . . . a second creation of the patented
entity." Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 346,
(1961).
rights: "[B]y exercising their rights to 'have [licensed products] made,' licensees
can shield the unlicensed manufacturer who makes the products for them and
licensing the otherwise infringing actions." Intel Corp. v. Broadcom Corp., 173 F.
Supp. 2d 201, 232 (D. Del. 2001). This is because "[t]he right to 'make, use, and
sell' a product inherently includes the right to have it made by a third party, absent
a clear indication of intent to the contrary." CoreBrace LLC v. Star Seismic LLC,
the entity that authorized the sale, then the patent is exhausted as to the thing sold.
Quanta Computer Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 638 (2008).
only reasonable and intended use of the article is to practice the allegedly
exhausted patent; and (2) the article embodies the essential or inventive features of
the allegedly exhausted patent. See id. at 631; LifeScan Scotland, Ltd. v. Shasta
42
C. Patent Exhaustion Exists in This Case
(Appx1060, Appx1062-1064). FGTL has alleged that the subject patented designs
are both applied to and are embodied in the F-150 (Appx991), and FGTL has made
designs are exhausted by the first sale of the F-150. See Jazz Photo, supra, 264
F.3d at 1105; Quanta Computer, supra, at 638. (“If the thing that is sold
authorized the sale, then the patent is exhausted as to the thing sold.”).
Further, although the subject patented designs also are alleged to be portions
of components parts of the F-150 (the hood and headlamp), the Supreme Court has
stated that “[t]he term ‘article of manufacture,’ as used in § 289, encompasses both
Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S.Ct. 429, 434, 196 L.Ed.2d 363 (2016). The Supreme
with 35 U.S.C. § 171(a), which makes ‘new, original and ornamental design[s] for
The F-150 sometimes is involved in collisions and needs repair. The process
of repair often involves purchasing repair parts from third parties, such as ABPA
4
“Patent exhaustion is an affirmative defense to a claim of patent infringement….”
Keurig, Inc. v. Sturm Foods, Inc., 732 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
43
members. Since the subject design patents are exhausted as to the thing sold, and
the thing sold is the F-150, purchasers of the F-150 have an implied license to use
the subject design patents. See McCoy, supra, at 921. This implied license
includes the right to repair and return the F-150 back to its original appearance.
See Kendall Co., supra, at 1573. If the repair and return to the original appearance
requires the purchase of repair parts, then this is permitted under the implied
license. Id. That is because the focus is not on the repair parts themselves, but
rather on the article of manufacture that needs repair. See Kendall Co., supra, at
1573. (The “implied license to use include[s] the right to repair the patented article
The repair that occurs to the F-150 is not prohibited reconstruction because
the repair of the F-150 does not “construct an essentially new article on the
template of the original.” Jazz Photo, 264 F.3d at 1102. (Appx1201). Indeed, if
the damage to the F-150 is so extensive that essentially a new F-150 has to be
constructed, the F-150 will not be repaired. (Appx1201). That is because the cost
of the reconstruction will greatly exceed the cost of purchasing a new F-150.
(Appx1201).
Since the owner of the F-150 has an implied license to repair the F-150, the
owner also has “have made” rights that shields the manufacture of the repair part
and all members of the distribution chain from liability for patent infringement.
44
See CoreBrace LLC, supra, at 1072-73; Intel Corp., supra, at 232 ("[B]y
exercising their rights to 'have [licensed products] made,' licensees can shield the
unlicensed manufacturer who makes the products for them and subsequently sells
methodically analyze the court’s rationale. The District Court begins its discussion
mentioned by the District Court is that an initial authorized sale creates an “implied
license,” under which “a patent holder receives a reward for inventive work in the
first sale of the patented product.” McCoy v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc., 67 F.3d 917,
921 (Fed. Cir 1995). And it is under the concept of an implied license that the
“implied license to use include[s] the right to repair the patented article and
repair, which is that it does not include the right to replace. In the words of the
District Court, “[t]he authorized sale of a patented item permits the owner to sell
and use the one item that he purchased—not to make a replacement should that one
45
item be destroyed.” (citing Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 569 U.S. 278, 283–84
(2013)). “In other words, ‘the [exhaustion] doctrine restricts a patentee’s rights
only as to the ‘particular article’ sold; it leaves untouched the patentee’s ability to
prevent a buyer from making new copies of the patented item.’ Id. at 284 (internal
citations omitted).” (Appx113). Notably, the case cited for the concept of a
“particular article” sold, Bowman v. Monsanto Co., supra, involves utility patents
The District Court then illustrates the repair vs. replace limitation with
another utility patent case, Aiken v. Manchester Print Works, 1 F. Cas. 245
with a full set of needles and a surplus number of needles. The knitting machine
was the subject of various patents not specified in the case, and the needles were
subject to United States Patent No. 6,025. The needles wore out after a period of
time and had to be replaced. When the purchaser of the knitting machine ran out
of needles, he began making his own needles and was sued by the patentee for
patent infringement.
The purchaser argued that the purchase of the machine implied the right to
use it, and when the needles wore out and the machine could not be used, the
purchaser had the right, despite the separate patent on the needles, to make new
needles “as the necessary means to enable [the purchaser] to enjoy the right of use
46
implied by the purchase.” Id. at p.3. The court disagreed, stating that
“[p]urchasers in this case may repair the needles they purchased, but they cannot
The general rule from Aiken is that in a situation involving utility patents, a
patented machine may not be permissibly repaired under the patent exhaustion
replaced is patented separately from the machine being repaired. The District
Court expresses this general rule with the statement “[i]n reaching its conclusion
that the machine could not be repaired by replacing worn out needles with new
ones, the court explicitly distinguished the first example provided above, i.e.,
where a patent covered the knitting machine but no patent covered just the needles.
The District Court then states “[t]he Supreme Court long ago approved of
the reasoning of Aiken, see Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated Wrapping
Paper Co., 152 U.S. 425, 434–36 (1894), and the Federal Circuit says that the
venerable case is still the law, see Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC v. N.Y. Times
Co., 778 F.3d 1293, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2015). (Appx114). Notably, Aiken, Wilson,
Morgan Envelope, and Helferich all involve utility patents and not design patents.
The District Court then sets forth a general statement of ABPA’s argument
on patent exhaustion and concludes “[t]he problem with the ABPA’s argument is
47
that the F-150 is just like the knitting machine in Aiken and its hood (or headlamp)
is just like the needles in Aiken.” (Appx114-115). The District Court continues:
“The patents at issue cover the design for those two parts—not the design for the
truck as a whole—so while the authorized sale of an F-150 permits the owner to
use and repair her hood and headlamp, it does not permit her to make unauthorized
As will be explained below, since this case involves a design patent and not
utility patents, it is incorrect to say that the F-150 is just like the knitting machine
in Aiken, and the F-150’s hood (or headlamp) is just like the needles in Aiken.
Further, it also is incorrect to say that the patents at issue “cover the design for
those two parts [the hood and headlamp].” Rather, the designs at issue cover
portions of the hood and headlamp, just as they cover portions of the F-150.
The District Court sets out in a general way ABPA’s argument regarding the
distinction between design patents and utility patents in the context of patent
exhaustion and states “[t]here is no case dividing patent law this way—i.e.,
creating separate exhaustion doctrines for utility and design patents.” (Appx115).
The District Court then continues “[i]ndeed, in Aiken, the needles were not only
their own item but also a necessary part of another: the knitting machine. And so
while the needle patent could be viewed as covering one entire item (a needle), it
could also be viewed as covering a portion of an item that incorporates the other
48
(the knitting machine).” (Appx115-116). Explaining why this last statement is
incorrect is a helpful way to begin explaining the error of the District Court and the
opinion, ABPA is not arguing that a separate exhaustion doctrine should be created
for design patents. Rather, ABPA is arguing that established patent exhaustion
principles should be applied to design patents in a way that recognizes the unique
nature of design patents and how the design patent statutory scheme differs from
the utility patent statutory scheme. This is the way that courts historically have
approached patent exhaustion – recognizing that the doctrine must remain flexible
617, 128 S.Ct. 2109 (2008), a case involving microprocessors and chipsets, the
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether patent exhaustion applied to method
patents. Respondent LGE argued that “because method patents are linked not to a
tangible article but to a process, they can never be exhausted through a sale.” Id. at
S.Ct. 2117. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating “[i]t is true that a patented
method may not be sold in the same way as an article or device, but methods
rights.” Id. In finding that patent exhaustion applied, the Supreme Court followed
49
its earlier approach in United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U. S. 241 (1942) and
exhausts the patent holder's rights and prevents the patent holder from invoking
patent law to control postsale use of the article” and “Intel's microprocessors and
chipsets substantially embodied the LGE Patents because they had no reasonable
noninfringing use and included all the inventive aspects of the patented methods.”
Id. at 2122.
across patents,” id. at 2120, the Supreme Court agreed on the general principle that
“[t]he sale of a device that practices patent A does not, by virtue of practicing
patent A, exhaust patent B.” Id. But, the Supreme Court continued, “if the device
patent A does not prevent exhaustion of patent B.” Id. The Court concluded “the
exhaustion analysis is not altered by the fact that more than one patent is practiced
by the same product. The relevant consideration is whether the Intel Products that
In the instant case the factual situation is different, but the reasoning is the
“thousands of individual patents.” Id. In the instant case, two articles (the F-150
50
and the hood or headlamp) embody the subject design patents. However, the key
to exhaustion is not how many patents are embodied in a product or how many
products embody a patent, but whether the article sold embodies the patent. If so,
the patent is exhausted. In the instant case, since the F-150 embodies the subject
patents, patent exhaustion applies as to the F-150 and a right to repair the F-150
exists.
comparison, the District Court states “[a]nd so while the needle patent could be
viewed as covering one entire item (a needle), it could also be viewed as covering
a portion of an item that incorporates the other (the knitting machine).” (emphasis
in original) (Appx115-116). The problem with this statement is that while the
knitting machine physically incorporates the needle, the patent covering the needle
design patent context where the subject design patents properly can be viewed as
being embodied in both the hood (and headlamp) and a portion of the F-150, utility
patents are directed only toward the actual machine or article of manufacture
invented, and not also toward a portion of a machine or article of manufacture that
may incorporate the subject matter claimed. An examination of the relevant patent
51
The utility patent statute, 35 U.S.C. § 101, states “[w]hoever invents or
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor,
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” In contrast, the design
patent statute, 35 U.S.C. § 171(a), states “[w]hoever invents any new, original and
The word “therefor” in the utility patent statute refers to, inter alia, the
words “machine” and “manufacture,” whereas in the design patent statute the word
Zahn, 617 F.2d 261, 268 (C.C.P.A. 1980). This distinction means that, unlike
utility patents, design patents are not limited to an “article of manufacture,” but
also can include designs for portions of articles of manufacture. Id. Further, since
the patented design can be just a portion of an article of manufacture, the design
patent need not be limited to just one article of manufacture. Rather, the design
example. The design claimed in the ‘299 Patent is embodied both in a portion of
the F-150 and in a portion of the component F-150 hood. Likewise, the design
52
claimed in the ‘685 Patent is embodied both in a portion of the F-150 and in a
Supreme Court’s statement in Samsung Electronics, supra, that “[t]he term ‘article
and a component of that product.” Id. at 434. The Supreme Court also stated
171(a), which makes ‘new, original and ornamental design[s] for an article of
The importance of the distinction between utility patents and design patents
explained above is that the general rule from Aiken does not apply to the subject
design patents. Under the general rule cited, the patent covering the separate
patent directed toward the article of manufacture being repaired (knitting machine).
As explained above, under § 101, a utility patent is directed toward the actual
needle together exhausts both patents, the patent exhaustion doctrine only permits
repair and not replacement. Since the patents and articles of manufacture are
53
replacement is occurring for each. Permissible repair of the machine does not
needles is not occurring, and the needles are being replaced instead as in Aiken,
then patent infringement of the needle patent may exist and the affirmative defense
circumstances of the instant case. First, there are not multiple patents involved as
in Aiken. Rather, for the F-150 and hood, and F-150 and headlamp, there is just
one design patent each to consider. Second, when the one subject patented design
is placed on or in the F-150, the one design patent is exhausted. And as long as it
is the F-150 that is being permissible repaired, then the patent exhaustion doctrine
allows use of the subject patented design (originally a part of the F-150 that was
sold) to repair the F-150 that was sold with the patented design. This is to be
distinguished from the situation in Aiken where the court had to go through a
separate repair/ reconstruction analysis with regard to the needle itself because the
needle was covered by a separate patent directed only toward the needle. There is
the instant case because the patented design covering a portion of the repair parts is
the same as the patented design covering a portion of the F-150 being permissibly
54
E. Authorized Sale of the F-150 Created an Implied License that
included the Right to Repair the F-150 and Purchase Repair Parts
underlies the right to repair and the right to purchase repair parts. Kendall Co.,
sold, the patentee grants an implied license to the purchaser to repair it. And as
long as there is a legal relationship, such as embodiment, between the patent and
the article of manufacture sold, the implied license grants a right to repair the
instant case, there is such a legal relationship between the F-150 sold and the
subject design patents because the claimed designs are embodied in the F-150 and
the right to repair the knitting machine by replacing the needles. That is because
there is no legal relationship between the needle patent and the knitting machine.
Although there is a physical relationship between the needles and the knitting
machine, there is no legal relationship between the needle patent and knitting
Other implied licensing principles also support the conclusion that the scope
of the implied license in this case includes the right to repair the F-150 by
55
purchasing the hood and headlamp as repair/replacement parts. Once a court
determines that a license should be implied due to an initial authorized sale, the
court next should look to the circumstances of the sale to determine the scope of
the implied license. See Carborundum Co. v. Molten Metal Equip. Innovs., 72 F.3d
872, 878 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In this case, since the claimed designs were embodied
in the F-150 and in the hood and headlamp, it is clear that an implied license to
repair exists. And the circumstances of the sale further support the conclusion that
the scope of the implied license includes the right to repair the F-150 by
There is no evidence in this case that when Ford sells an F-150, FGTL
places any restrictions on the implied licenses granted as a result of the sale. See
Met-Coil Systems Corp. v. Korners Unlimited, Inc., 803 F.2d 684, 686, 687 (Fed.
Cir. 1986). Further, there is no evidence that Ford and FGTL mark the F-150 or
any of its component parts with design patents. Therefore, when a customer
purchases an F-150, they have no notice, actual or constructive, that the hood and
the headlamp are separately patented. Further, the F-150 is advertised and sold as
of individual parts with individual designs. Finally, to the extent a customer may
be aware of the subject design patents, the subject patents state the hood and
56
Based on this evidence, the reasonable expectation is that a purchaser of the
F-150 receives an implied license to repair the F-150 free from any patents
covering portions of the designs. See Carborundum, supra, at 878 (The scope of an
implied license “must be based on what the parties reasonably intended as to the
scope of the implied license based on the circumstances of the sale.”). Based on
this reasonable expectation, and FGTL’s lack of action or notice to dissuade this
reasonable expectation, the scope of the implied license extends to repairing the F-
FGTL may argue that even if an implied license exists on the subject patents
to repair the F-150, an independent cause of action for patent infringement still
may exist because the subject patents also are embodied in a portion of the hood
and headlamp, and the hood and headlamp are being purchased for the repair of the
F-150. This would be, in effect, an attempt to apply the Aiken rule even though the
subject claimed designs are embodied in the F-150 sold. To the extent a hood or
headlamp is being purchased for reasons other than for repair of an F-150
originally sold by Ford, then an implied license would not exist. However, if the
parts are being purchased for repair of an F-150, then an implied license will exist
regarding the subject patents that, in turn, should negate any cause of action for
subject design patents could be enforced on the repair parts, then that would
57
effectively negate the right to repair the F-150. This would allow a patentee to do
manufacture into separate portions and then claiming the design portions for
individual enforcement. This Court did not allow such an approach in the method
patent context, see Quanta Computer Inc., supra, at 2117, 2118 and it similarly
Since the implied license covers the right to repair the vehicle, the “have
made” rights of the vehicle purchaser protects the manufacturers and distributors,
including ABPA members, from liability for patent infringement. See CoreBrace
Based on the arguments and authorities set forth above, the District Court
erred in denying ABPA’s motion for summary judgment and granting summary
judgment in favor of FGTL. ABPA requests that this case be reversed and
summary judgment rendered in favor of ABPA, and that this Court grant such
other and further relief to which ABPA may show itself to be justly entitled.
******
58
Respectfully submitted,
59
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
excluding the parts of the brief exempted by the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure 32(a)(7)(B)(iii).
60
ADDENDUM
61
2:15-cv-10137-LJM-RSW Doc # 74 Filed 02/23/18 Pg 1 of 2 Pg ID 1997
Plaintiff,
Case No. 2:15-cv-10137
v. Honorable Laurie J. Michelson
Defendant.
JUDGMENT
Consistent with the opinion and order entered on February 20, 2018 (R. 72) and the
Automotive Body Parts Association’s subsequent notice (R. 73) it is HEREBY ORDERED and
ADJUDGED that Ford Global Technologies, LLC is entitled to judgment on the ABPA’s
complaint seeking a declaration that U.S. Patent Nos. D489,299 and D501,685 are invalid or
unenforceable. In entering this judgment, the Court notes that, as reflected by the citations in its
February 20, 2018 opinion, it did consider and address New World International’s response brief
filed in Case No. 15-10394 (R. 104) and associated appendix (R. 105) in issuing the February 20
opinion. Those filings from that case are thus deemed part of the record in this case.
SO ORDERED.
s/Laurie J. Michelson
LAURIE J. MICHELSON
Dated: February 23, 2018 U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record
and any unrepresented parties via the Court=s ECF System to their respective email or First Class
U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on February 23, 2018.
s/Keisha Jackson
Case Manager
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Plaintiff,
Case No. 2:15-cv-10137
v. Honorable Laurie J. Michelson
Defendant.
The Automotive Body Parts Association effectively asks this Court to eliminate design
patents on auto-body parts. Members of the ABPA import, make, and sell auto-body parts that
are used to repair cars and trucks damaged in a collision. Ford Global Technologies, LLC holds a
large portfolio of patents that protect the designs for body parts for Ford vehicles. The ABPA, on
behalf of its members, filed this lawsuit asking this Court to declare that two of Ford’s patents
protecting the design of two F-150 body parts are either invalid or unenforceable. But the
ABPA’s arguments are not specific to those two patents. Instead, the ABPA argues that designs
for auto-body parts are simply not eligible for patent protection because consumers seeking to
repair their vehicles do not select body parts for their design and because the designs were
dictated by the body parts’ function. In the alternative, the ABPA says that patents protecting the
designs of auto-body parts are unenforceable against its members because the patent rights are
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The ABPA now seeks summary judgment. (R. 39.) It asks this Court to declare as a
matter of law that two of Ford’s design patents are invalid or unenforceable. The Court has
carefully considered the parties’ arguments made not only in this case but in a related case
presenting the same invalidity and unenforceability questions. Having done so, the Court finds
that the ABPA has not shown that Ford’s designs for an F-150 hood and headlamp are not
eligible for design patent protection and has not shown that Ford’s patent rights to those designs
I.
distribute automotive body parts. (See R. 2, PID 10–11.) Members of the ABPA sell auto-body
Defendant Ford Global Technologies, LLC owns a portfolio of well over a hundred
patents protecting the designs for auto-body parts. (See R. 62, PID 1253–1321.) Two are at issue
in this case: U.S. Patent No. D489,299 and U.S. Patent No. D501,685. The ’299 patent protects
the design for a Ford F-150 hood and the ’685 patent protects the design for an F-150 headlamp:
It appears that the first significant dispute between Ford and the ABPA arose in 2005.
That year, Ford filed an action with the United States International Trade Commission against
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seven members of the ABPA. (R. 68, PID 1453, 1585.) Ford initially accused these ABPA
members of infringing 14 of its design patents for auto-body parts, including the two at issue in
this case. (See R. 68, PID 1585.) Ford later dropped those two patents from the ITC action. The
ITC action (and a second one) settled in 2009, with Ford granting a single ABPA member, LKQ
Corporation, the exclusive right to sell auto-body parts protected by Ford’s design patents. (See
As relevant to this case, things between Ford and the ABPA remained relatively quiet
until 2013, with Ford sending only two cease-and-desist letters to ABPA members in 2011 and
2012. (See R. 68, PID 1466, 1471.) But in 2013, the tension between Ford and ABPA member
New World International, Inc. escalated. (R. 62, PID 1250.) Ford wrote to New World, “We
purchased several articles from New World International that are covered by Ford design
patents[.]” (R. 62, PID 1260.) Ford referenced one of the design patents at issue in this case, the
’299 patent. (Id.) Ford asked New World to “refrain from importing or selling parts covered by
Ford design patents.” (R. 62, PID 1251.) New World did not comply (or at least that is what Ford
thought), so in November 2013, Ford sent New World another letter. The second letter warned
that if New World did not stop offering certain auto-body parts on its website, Ford “w[ould] be
forced to consider all avenues available to protect and enforce its intellectual property rights.”
Less than two weeks after Ford’s November 2013 letter, the ABPA filed this lawsuit in
the Eastern District of Texas. See Auto. Body Parts Assoc. v. Ford Global Techs., No. 13-00705
(E.D. Tex. filed Nov. 25, 2013.) The ABPA asked the federal court in Texas to declare six of
Ford’s design patents, including the ’299 and the ’685 patents, invalid or unenforceable.
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A few months later, Ford challenged the ABPA’s standing to seek such relief. One way
for an association to have standing to sue is for the association to satisfy the Hunt test: “(a) its
members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to
protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the
relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Hunt v. Wash.
State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). In September 2014, the federal court
in Texas found that the ABPA had satisfied this test. Auto. Body Parts Ass’n v. Ford Glob.
Techs., LLC, No. 4:13-CV-705, 2014 WL 4652123, at *8 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 17, 2014). As to the
first Hunt requirement, the court found that “in its cease and desist letters, Ford accused New
World of infringing the design patents, which is sufficient to establish that New World would
have standing in its own right to bring an action for declaratory judgment against Ford.” Id. at
*8.
Following that determination, the ABPA amended its complaint. Instead of seeking a
declaration that six of Ford’s design patents for auto-body parts were invalid or unenforceable, it
only sought that declaration as to the ’299 and ’685 patents. (See R. 2.)
In January 2015, the federal court in Texas transferred the case to the Eastern District of
Just two weeks later, Ford filed a separate lawsuit against New World in the Eastern
District of Michigan. Ford Global Techs., LLC v. New World Int’l, Inc. et al., No. 15-10394
(E.D. Mich. filed Jan. 29, 2015). Ford initially accused New World of infringing the two patents
at issue in this case along with several others. Like in the ITC action, Ford later dropped its
claims that New World had infringed the two patents at issue here. Ford’s case against New
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In October 2016, the ABPA filed the motion for summary judgment now pending before
this Court. (R. 39.) According to the ABPA, the ’299 and ’685 patents are invalid because they
do not protect ornamental designs and they are unenforceable against ABPA members because
when Ford sells an F-150 truck, its patent rights in the design of the truck’s hood and headlamp
That same month, New World, which is represented by the same counsel as the ABPA,
filed for summary judgment in the companion to this case. New World essentially made the same
invalidity and unenforceability arguments as did the ABPA. Although New World subsequently
withdrew that motion, Ford then filed a mirror-image motion for summary-judgment: it claimed
that its design patents were not invalid for failing to protect ornamental designs and that they
were not unenforceable under the doctrine of exhaustion. Given that ABPA’s motion in this case
and Ford’s in the companion addressed the same two issues, the parties agreed that the Court
should consider the arguments presented in all the briefs in both cases in deciding both motions.
While this Court was in the midst of drafting its opinion on the two motions, a threshold
issue arose in each case. The first was a result of TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group
Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017). There, the Supreme Court held that a corporation can be
sued for patent infringement only in its state of incorporation. See id. at 1517. New World’s was
Texas. So this question arose: should Ford’s suit against New World remain in the Eastern
District of Michigan?
The other threshold issue involved this case. Although it had made similar statements
earlier, in its summary-judgment briefing, Ford made clear that it was not accusing New World
of infringing the two patents at issue in this case. (See R. 54.) As noted above, under Hunt, the
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ABPA’s standing to seek a declaratory judgment was premised on New World’s standing to do
so. So the Court asked the parties to brief the issue of mootness. (See R. 54.) In that briefing,
Ford went a step further: it offered a covenant never to sue New World (and a few others) for
infringing the ’299 and ’685 patents. (See R. 61, PID 1104.) So this question arose: is this case
moot?
The Court has already answered one of the two threshold questions. In particular, the
Court found that under TC Heartland, the Eastern District of Michigan was not the proper venue
for Ford’s suit against New World and that New World had not waived the defense of improper
venue. See generally Ford Glob. Techs., LLC v. New World Int’l Inc., No. 2:15-CV-10394, 2017
WL 5635451 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 7, 2017). The Court thus transferred Ford’s infringement case to
the Northern District of Texas. See Ford Glob. Techs., LLC v. New World Int’l Inc., No. 3:17-cv-
03201-N (N.D. Texas filed Nov. 22, 2017.) Ford’s summary-judgment motion—the one that
mirrors the one the ABPA asks this Court to decide—remains pending before the federal court in
Texas.
II.
The Court now turns to the other threshold issue: whether this case is moot.
On the surface, it seems so. Based on the covenant it has offered and associated
representations it made at oral argument, Ford is willing to irrevocably commit to never suing
New World (and three other entities) for infringing the two patents at issue in this case, the ’299
and ’685 patents. (See R. 63, PID 1104, 1348.) And, as explained, the federal court in Texas
found that the ABPA had standing in this case because Ford had sent New World cease-and-
desist letters. In other words, the ABPA’s standing to seek a declaration that the two patents-in-
suit are invalid or unenforceable was built upon New Worlds’ standing to do so. But now, Ford
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has cut out that foundation by saying that it will never sue New World for infringing the two
patents-in-suit.
But this case is not between New World and Ford—it is between the ABPA and Ford.
And so if there is a case or controversy between another ABPA member and Ford, the ABPA
In examining this issue, the Court is mindful that after MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech,
Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007), “a declaratory judgment plaintiff does not need to establish a
between the parties.” See SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1384 (Fed.
Cir. 2007). Instead a “more lenient legal standard,” Micron Tech., Inc. v. Mosaid Techs., Inc.,
518 F.3d 897, 902 (Fed. Cir. 2008), applies: “whether the facts alleged, under all the
circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal
interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment,”
Considering “all the circumstances,” the controversy between Ford and National
Autobody Parts Warehouse, an ABPA member, is just substantial and just immediate enough
that an opinion on the merits of the ABPA’s two defenses will not be advisory. It appears that
NAPW is a middle-man in the auto-body parts distribution chain: it buys auto-body parts from
manufacturers (or others more upstream than it) and then resells them to repair shops (or others
more downstream than it). (See R. 69, PID 1678–80.) According to NAPW, manufacturers of the
hood and headlamp covered by the two patents in this case have been told by Ford’s exclusive
licensee, LKQ, that if they manufacture the hood and headlamp for anyone but LKQ, they would
“be subject to patent enforcement efforts by” Ford. (R. 69, PID 1680.) Notably, these
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manufacturers are themselves ABPA members. (R. 69, PID 1680.) Thus, if Ford is willing to sue
those ABPA members for selling the hood and headlamp to NAPW, it seems likely that Ford
would sue NAPW if it, in turn, sold the hood and headlamp to collision repair shops or vehicle
owners.
NAPW might someday buy the hood and headlamp from a manufacturer and might someday sell
it. But NAPW has averred that in the past, it purchased and sold a hood and a headlamp that Ford
claims are covered by the two patents-in-suit. (R. 69, PID 1679.) And NAPW says it is “ready
and willing” to do so now. (Id.) It has even asked Ford for a license to sell the hood and
headlamp and was denied. (Id.) And it asked Ford’s exclusive licensee to buy the hood and
headlamp from it, but LKQ refused. (Id.) So, on this record, there is more than speculation that
NAPW might sell the hood and headlamp. It has in the past, it wants to now, and has tried to
The Court is aware that even under MedImmune’s less-stringent test it is not enough that
NAPW subjectively believes that it would be sued for patent infringement if it purchased and
then sold the hood and headlamp—there must be “some affirmative act” by Ford. SanDisk, 480
F.3d at 1380–81; accord Asia Vital Components Co. v. Asetek Danmark A/S, 837 F.3d 1249,
1253 (Fed. Cir. 2016). But there have been affirmative acts by Ford against ABPA members in
the past: the ITC actions and the cease-and-desist letters. See Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharm.
Corp., 537 F.3d 1329, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Prior litigious conduct is one circumstance to be
And there is an affirmative act by Ford against an ABPA member right now: Ford’s lawsuit
against New World alleging infringement of the 13 design patents. Of course, Ford is not suing
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New World for the two patents at issue in this case and has said it never will. But to the extent
that this would quell NAPW’s fear of suit should it purchase and sell the hood and headlamp,
another fact heightens it: Ford has refused to extend the covenant to all ABPA members and
NAPW specifically.
Thus, while a close call, the Court finds a sufficient case or controversy between Ford
and NAPW. MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 127. And given that NAPW is an ABPA member, it
follows that the ABPA may seek a declaration that the ’299 and ’685 patents are invalid or
unenforceable.
III.
The Court thus turns to the ABPA’s motion for summary judgment.
Here too there is a threshold question: what is the ABPA’s summary-judgment burden?
At trial, an accused infringer must show that a design patent is invalid because it protects
Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien, Inc., 796 F.3d 1312, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2015). And, at trial, the accused
infringer must show that a patent cannot be enforced against it by a preponderance of the
evidence. Jazz Photo Corp. v. United States, 439 F.3d 1344, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Thus, the
ABPA moves for summary judgment on issues it has the burden of proof on at trial, which would
usually mean that the ABPA has the considerable summary-judgment burden of showing that
every reasonable jury would find in its favor (clearly and convincingly or by a preponderance, as
the case may be). See Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. Nat’l Ret. Fund, 778 F.3d 593, 601 (7th Cir.
2015); Surles v. Andison, 678 F.3d 452, 455–56 (6th Cir. 2012).
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But the ABPA argues that whether a design is directed to function is a question of law
(See R. 39, PID 579.) (Its position on exhaustion is less clear. (See R. 39, PID 580–81.)) It strikes
the Court that even if the ultimate question is one of law, there are often underlying questions of
fact. For example, whether there are alternative designs for the product that allow it to perform
the same function is a question of fact. So to the extent that there are material factual disputes, it
would seem that the ABPA would have the considerable burden of showing that every
reasonable jury would resolve the material factual dispute in its favor. See Hotel 71, 778 F.3d at
Ultimately, the Court need not decide whether invalidity due to functionality and
unenforceability due to exhaustion present pure questions of law or mixed questions of law and
fact. The Court will assume in the ABPA’s favor that it only needs to convince this Court that
the two patents in suit are invalid or unenforceable. It may proceed this way because, as will be
explained, the ABPA has not persuaded this Court to find in its favor and so it would follow that
it has not persuaded the Court that every reasonable jury would find in its favor.
The Court starts with the ABPA’s claim that the ’299 and the ’685 patents are invalid.
The Patent Act restricts design-patent protection to “ornamental” designs. See 35 U.S.C. § 171.
The ABPA claims that the designs of the ’299 and the ’685 patents are not ornamental. The
ABPA makes two main arguments in support of this claim: the designs of the two patents-in-suit
are not “a matter of concern” and the two designs are “dictated by function.” (See R. 39, PID
571–74; R. 51, PID 575–76; Case No. 15-10394, R. 104, PID 5586–87.) (The ABPA places its
dictated-by-function argument under the matter-of-concern umbrella (see Case No. 15-10394, R.
10
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104, PID 5585–86), but whether part of the matter-of-concern test or a separate test for patent
The Court considers these two primary arguments in turn and then addresses ABPA’s
1.
protection is based on a straightforward concept: if no one cares about a particular design, then
the design is not deserving of patent protection. See Application of Stevens, 173 F.2d 1015, 1019
(C.C.P.A. 1949) (“It has been held repeatedly that articles which are concealed or obscure in
normal use are not proper subjects for design patents, since their appearance cannot be a matter
of concern.”). An example of a design that is of no concern is the design for a rotary brush for a
vacuum cleaner that, during its normal use, is concealed from view. Id. at 1019.
The ABPA argues that the designs of the ’299 and ’685 patents are not a matter of
concern because when an F-150 is damaged (say in a crash), the owner simply wants the body
parts that will return her F-150 to the way it looked when it was new. (R. 39, PID 572.) In other
words, the ABPA says that the F-150 owner will not shop around and compare various hood
designs; instead she will, in mechanistic fashion, simply order the hood that came with the truck
when it came off the assembly line. (See R. 39, PID 573; Case No. 15-10394, R. 104, PID 5586–
87.) In further support of this assertion, the ABPA claims that vehicle owners (or collision repair
shops on the owner’s behalf) “typically” order a replacement body part by part number and thus
never even consider the part’s design. (See R. 39, PID 573.) And, says the ABPA, insurance
policies often only cover returning the vehicle to “its pre-loss operational safety, function, and
appearance.” (R. 39, PID 572, 660.) Thus, the ABPA implies that if the owner of an F-150 wants
11
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her insurer to pay the repair costs, she needs to have her truck restored to the way it looked
before the accident. (See R. 39, PID 572, 577; but see R. 39, PID 627.)
The ABPA has not established a necessary premise of its argument: that the “matter of
concern” inquiry is constrained to the perspective of a vehicle owner at the time that she is
buying a replacement body part, as opposed, for example, to the time she initially buys the truck.
None of the ABPA’s legal authorities—Gorham Manufacturing Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511
(1871), the district court and Federal Circuit opinions in Best Lock Corp. v. ILCO Unican Corp.,
or the district court and Sixth Circuit opinions in Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark
Starting with Gorham, the ABPA relies on this language: “[The acts of Congress which
authorize the grant of patents for designs] manifestly contemplate[] that giving certain new and
original appearances to a manufactured article may enhance its salable value, may enlarge the
demand for it, and may be a meritorious service to the public.” 81 U.S. at 524–25 (emphasis
added). The Court agrees with the ABPA that the references to “salable value” and “demand”
suggest that in deciding whether a design is entitled to patent protection, a court should take into
account whether design plays a role in consumers’ purchase decisions. (See Case No. 15-10394,
R. 104, PID 5582–83.) But even if a consumer’s valuation of the design is key to deciding
whether the design is a matter of concern, it does not follow that it is only the consumer’s
perspective when she seeks to replace the product with the patented design that matters. After all,
an article’s design may have been the very reason the consumer bought the article in the first
The two Best Lock opinions also do not help the ABPA establish that the design of an
auto-body part is a matter of concern only if it is a matter of concern when the auto-body part is
12
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being replaced. The design patent in Best Lock covered a unique-looking key blade (the portion
of a key that is inserted into a lock). 94 F.3d 1563, 1564–65 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Although the
district court found that the blade’s design was not “a matter of concern to a purchaser,” it did so
by finding that the design of the blade was never a matter of concern to the purchaser:
“Ornamentation, or the aesthetic quality of this design, is not a matter of concern during either
the use of the product or at the time the key or lock is purchased. . . . There is no evidence that at
any time in the commercial process the appearance of the cross-section of the key or keyway
represented a matter of ornamental concern to the purchaser or the user.” 896 F. Supp. 836, 843
(S.D. Ind. 1995) (emphases added). In other words, the district court in Best Lock did not limit
the matter-of-concern inquiry to when a lost key might need to be replaced (at which point
design would obviously not be a matter of concern because the lock owner needs the one key
that will open his lock). And, as will be discussed below, the Federal Circuit’s holding did not
depend on whether the key blade design was a matter of concern to purchasers. See Best Lock, 94
F.3d at 1566.
That leaves the ABPA with the two Static Control opinions. Neither establish the premise
missing from the ABPA’s matter-of-concern argument. Static Control involved a patent for the
design of a toner cartridge. 697 F.3d 387, 421 (6th Cir. 2012). As in Best Lock, the district court
in Static Control found that the appearance of the cartridges were “of no matter of concern
assembly and ending with the ultimate destruction, loss, or disappearance of those cartridges.”
487 F. Supp. 2d 830, 839 (E.D. Ky. 2007) (emphasis added). And the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning
largely tracked that of the district court. See 697 F.3d at 422.
13
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In short, none of Gorham, Best Lock, or Static Control limit the matter-of-concern
inquiry to the consumer’s thought process when she is replacing an article with a patented
design. As such, the ABPA has not established a necessary premise of its matter-of-concern
argument.
And, in fact, there is binding precedent that strongly supports a finding that designs for
auto-body parts pass the matter-of-concern test for patent eligibility. At issue in In re Webb was
whether the design for an artificial femur was eligible for patent protection. 916 F.2d 1553, 1555
(Fed. Cir. 1990). The patent examiner and appeal board thought not, reasoning that the femur,
once placed inside the body, would never be seen and thus its aesthetic was of no concern to
anyone. Id. at 1556. The Federal Circuit rejected this argument. It acknowledged that
“replacement items” (like a vacuum cleaner’s rotary brush) are either sold by part number or at
most viewed to assess whether they will do the job; thus, how these items look are of no concern
to consumers. Id. at 1558. But the Federal Circuit pointed out that the design of other items (like
a casket or artificial femur), while of no concern in their ultimate use, are of concern when
marketed. Id. at 1558. Thus, the Court held, “the inquiry must extend to whether at some point in
the life of the article an occasion (or occasions) arises when the appearance of the article
In re Webb closes the door (or hood) on the ABPA’s matter-of-concern argument. Even if
Ford had not produced considerable evidence on the point (see Case No. 15-10394, R. 99, PID
4455–59), it is beyond reasonable debate that the design of an auto-body part is important to
consumers at least when they are deciding which car to buy. In other words, the look of the
14
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2.
The ABPA also argues that the designs protected by the ’299 and ’685 patents are not
Like the matter-of-concern test for design-patent eligibility, the dictated-by-function test
captures a simple concept: if an article had to be designed a certain way for the article to
function, then the design does not deserve patent protection. See Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v.
Covidien, Inc., 796 F.3d 1312, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2015). This is for two related reasons. One: the
point of granting monopolies on designs is to encourage people to come up with innovative ones.
See Donald S. Chisum, 8 Chisum on Patents § 23.03[4] at 23–38 (2016). But if a design was
dictated by how the article works, then the design is more byproduct than innovation. See Avia
Grp. Int’l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear California, Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“When
function dictates a design, protection would not promote the decorative arts, a purpose of the
design patent statute.”), abrogated on other grounds by Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc.,
543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Two: if a design patent could protect a design dictated by the
article’s function, then the holder of a design patent would effectively be granted a monopoly on
the function without having to clear the hurdles for obtaining a utility patent, i.e., the monopoly
The ABPA asserts that several functions dictate the designs covered by the ’299 and ’685
patents. For one, the ABPA says that the designs for the hood and headlamp are dictated by the
need to physically fit onto the F-150, including mating with the surrounding body parts and
connecting to the truck’s frame. (See R. 39, PID 572; R. 51, PID 1031; Case No. 15-10394, R.
104, PID 5587.) For another, the ABPA says that the designs are dictated by the need to match
the F-150’s overall aesthetic. (See R. 39, PID 572; R. 51, PID 1031; Case No. 15-10394, R. 104,
15
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PID 5587.) And the ABPA implies that insurance provisions and government regulations dictate
the designs of the hood and headlamp. (See R. 39, PID 572.)
Taking this last point first, the cases the ABPA cites are inapposite. In Application of
Carletti, 328 F.2d 1020, 1021–22 (C.C.P.A. 1964), the court did find that the gasket was
designed to meet military specifications but it also found that the design was simply not for
aesthetics: “[i]t seems naive in the extreme to believe that anyone would try to ‘ornament’ the
rubber gasket on the under side of the bung cap for a gasoline drum.” As for Shop*TV, Inc. v.
Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., No. 09CV00057, 2010 WL 427782 (D. Colo. Jan. 19, 2010), the
district court later withdrew its adoption of that report and recommendation because the case
settled. See 2010 WL 582165. And legal authority aside, ABPA has no evidence that insurance
provisions or government regulations are so restrictive that auto manufacturers cannot chose how
to design their trucks’ hoods or headlamps. Indeed, a stroll through a used-car lot (or
The ABPA’s aesthetic-functionality argument has more merit. Indeed, it has been
accepted in trademark law. Take Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 85 (S.D. Iowa
1982), for instance. There, John Deere’s claim of trademark infringement rested in part on the
fact that a competitor had painted its loaders—a bulldozer-like part that attaches to the front of a
tractor—“John Deere green.” See id. at 88–89. While farm-equipment consumers might well
have associated the distinct shade of green with John Deere, the court found that the color could
still not serve as a trademark because the color was aesthetically functional. Id. at 96–99. In
particular, farmers testified that matching the loader’s color with their tractor’s color was an
important factor in choosing which loader to buy. Id. at 91, 98. The ABPA implies that the
situation in this case is similar: just like “John Deere green” allowed one part of the tractor (the
16
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loader) to match the aesthetic of the tractor as a whole, Ford’s designs allow the hood and
headlamp to match the aesthetic of the truck as a whole. (See R. 39, PID 572; Case No. 15-
For at least three reasons the Court declines to import the aesthetic-functionality doctrine
First, no court has done so. This despite that both trademarks and design patents have
Second, trademark law and patent law serve different purposes. By ensuring that a mark
is associated with a particular source, trademark law simultaneously encourages the mark holder
to make high-quality goods and discourages competitors from selling poor-quality goods under
the guise of the mark. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prod. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995). In
other words, “by protecting a firm’s reputation,” trademark law “seeks to promote competition.”
Id. at 164. In contrast, patents inhibit competition. Schering-Plough Corp. v. F.T.C., 402 F.3d
1056, 1065–66 (11th Cir. 2005) (“By their nature, patents create an environment of exclusion,
and consequently, cripple competition.”); see also Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448
U.S. 176, 215 (1980); Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 842 F.3d 883, 893
(5th Cir. 2016). Yet the “policy predicate for the entire [trademark] functionality doctrine stems
from the public interest in enhancing competition.” Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653
Third, there is greater reason for trademark law to be concerned with functionality
(aesthetic or otherwise) than design-patent law. If a trademark could protect function, the mark
holder would gain a perpetual monopoly over the product’s function without clearing the hurdles
for obtaining any patent—utility or design. See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165; Keene, 653 F.2d at
17
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824. In contrast, those seeking a design patent must clear at least some hurdles related to novelty.
And the term of monopoly is limited to 15 years. Thus, the inequity of a design patent protecting
the aesthetically functional aspect of an article is simply not as great as a trademark doing so.
In short, the ABPA has not persuaded the Court that a design is not entitled to patent
protection if it performs an aesthetic function (like matching the aesthetic of a hood to the
aesthetic of an F-150).
That leaves the ABPA’s claim that the designs of the ’299 and ’685 patents are dictated
by their need to physically fit the F-150. But the need for the hood and headlamp to mate with
surrounding parts and truck frame only restricts the pool of available designs in a limited way.
Those who buy trucks for their looks can imagine a dozen hood and headlamp designs that
would physically fit the existing structure of the F-150. But one does not have to imagine
Performance Part ’685 patent, Fig. 2. Performance Part ’299 patent, Fig. 1.
(Case No. 15-13094, R. 99, PID 4639–40, 4678–4707, 4714–29.) The fact that there are
“performance parts,” i.e., alternative hood and headlamp designs that both perform their intended
function and fit the F-150, strongly suggests that the designs are not dictated by function. See
Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien, Inc., 796 F.3d 1312, 1329–30 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“We
have not mandated applying any particular test for determining whether a claimed design is
dictated by its function and therefore impermissibly functional. We have often focused, however,
18
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The existence of performance parts also serves to distinguish this case from one of the
ABPA’s principle cases that the Court said it would revisit: the Federal Circuit’s opinion in Best
Lock. (See Case No. 15-10394, R. 104, PID 5590–92.) There, the patent holder argued that the
design of the key blade was not dictated by function because there were “unlimited” key blade
and corresponding lock designs. 94 F.3d at 1566. The Federal Circuit rejected this argument. It
noted that the patent was not directed to key-and-lock combination but just a key blade. Id. And,
said the Court, there was exactly one key blade that would physically fit the corresponding lock.
Id. So the blade had to be designed as shown in the patent or it would not serve its intended
function. Id. Here, the existence of performance parts demonstrates that the designs claimed in
the ’299 and ’685 patents are not necessary for the hood and headlamp to perform their intended
functions.
In short, the ABPA has not persuaded the Court that the designs of the ’299 and ’685
3.
For one, the ABPA claims that design patents are premised on a quid pro quo: in
exchange for a monopoly on its design, the patent holder contributes to the decorative arts. (R.
39, PID 574–75.) The ABPA thinks that Ford has not kept up its end of the bargain because
“design patent protection for automotive repair parts does not promote the decorative arts or
provide other public benefits.” (R. 39, PID 575.) But it appears that the basis for this last
19
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statement is that auto-body part designs are dictated by function or of no concern to consumers.
As the Court has rejected these two arguments, the policy argument must be rejected too.
The ABPA also says that if Ford is allowed to protect its designs for F-150 body parts it
is allowed “double recovery”: once when the truck is sold, and then again when the truck is
repaired. (R. 39, PID 575.) But the ABPA has no evidence that the revenue Ford receives by
selling (or licensing LKQ to sell) replacement body parts does not lower the initial sale price of
the vehicle. In any event, if the designs are “ornamental” within the meaning of § 171, then it is
for Congress, not this Court, to address any “double recovery” issues.
The ABPA further identifies a “practical problem that would arise if design patents on
automotive repair parts are not held invalid.” (R. 39, PID 576.) It refers to the fact that patents
give their holders the right to exclude others from using the patented design so, if Ford wanted, it
could decide not to sell any replacement body parts itself and further decide to preclude anyone
else from doing so. (Id.) The result: “if an owner wants an original design, then the owner has to
purchase a new vehicle.” (Id.) But the ABPA offers no evidence to suggest that Ford has any
plans to force its customers to purchase a new vehicle every time a customer’s vehicle sustains
significant body damage. And there are good reasons to think Ford has no such plans: General
* * *
In sum, the ABPA has not persuaded the Court (by clear and convincing evidence or
otherwise) that Ford’s design patents covering the F-150 hood and headlamp are invalid.
In the alternative, the ABPA argues that the ’299 and ’685 patents are unenforceable
against ABPA members under the doctrine of patent exhaustion. The Court is unpersuaded.
20
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Like the doctrines discussed so far, the patent exhaustion captures a relatively
straightforward concept. Included in a patent holder’s bundle of rights are the rights to exclude
others from selling or using an item covered by her patent. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 171. But when
she sells (or authorizes another to sell) the patented item, she has reaped her reward, and so all
patent rights to that one item are “exhausted.” See Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 569 U.S. 278, 283–
84 (2013). In other words, the authorized sale “confers on the purchaser, or any subsequent
owner, the right to use or sell the [item] as he sees fit.” Id. at 283 (internal quotation marks and
alteration omitted). And the purchaser’s right to use the patented item includes the right to use it
for its lifetime, Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 455 (1873), so the doctrine of patent exhaustion
also grants the purchaser of a patented item the right to repair it, Standard Havens Prod., Inc. v.
Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1991). And the right to repair the patented
item “includes the right to purchase repair parts.” Standard Havens, 953 F.2d at 1376.
For example, suppose a company holds a patent that covers a knitting machine (but has
no patents covering any individual part of the machine). If the company sells the patented
machine, the machine’s owner can use the machine and, if it breaks, repair the machine without
worry that he is violating the patent-holder’s rights. See Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm’n,
264 F.3d 1094, 1102–03 (Fed. Cir. 2001), other grounds abrogated by Impression Prod., Inc. v.
Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017). And the machine’s owner may even repair the
machine by replacing worn out parts, say the knitting machine’s needles, with new ones. Cf.
But exhaustion has its limits. The authorized sale of a patented item permits the owner to
sell and use the one item that he purchased—not to make a replacement should that one item be
destroyed. See Bowman, 569 U.S. at 283–84. In other words, “the [exhaustion] doctrine restricts
21
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a patentee’s rights only as to the ‘particular article’ sold; it leaves untouched the patentee’s
ability to prevent a buyer from making new copies of the patented item.” Id. at 284 (internal
citations omitted).
A second example helps illustrate this rule. In Aiken v. Manchester Print Works, a
company held a patent that covered unique needles for a knitting machine. See 1 F. Cas. 245
the company’s patent rights to the needles, the purchaser of the bundle could use the needles and
repair them (say by straightening out a bend). Id. at 247. But the Aiken court held that the
purchaser of the bundle was not permitted to make replacement needles. Id. In reaching its
conclusion that the machine could not be repaired by replacing worn out needles with new ones,
the court explicitly distinguished the first example provided above, i.e., where a patent covered
the knitting machine but no patent covered just the needles. See id. (distinguishing Wilson v.
Simpson, 50 U.S. 109 (1850)). The Supreme Court long ago approved of the reasoning of Aiken,
see Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated Wrapping Paper Co., 152 U.S. 425, 434–36
(1894), and the Federal Circuit says that the venerable case is still the law, see Helferich Patent
Licensing, LLC v. N.Y. Times Co., 778 F.3d 1293, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
These settled rules and accompanying illustrations show that the ABPA’s exhaustion
defense fails as a matter of law. In the ABPA’s view, when Ford sells an F-150, its rights in the
’299 and ’685 are exhausted. (R. 39, PID 583–84.) So, says the ABPA, when an F-150 is
damaged in an accident, the owner of the F-150 has the right to repair it. (R. 39, PID 584.) Thus,
according to the ABPA, the owner may replace the hood and headlamps on the vehicle by
making new ones or by having new ones made for her. (See R. 39, PID 584–85.) The problem
with the ABPA’s argument is that the F-150 is just like the knitting machine in Aiken and its
22
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hood (or headlamp) is just like the needles in Aiken. The patents at issue cover the design for
those two parts—not the design for the truck as a whole—so while the authorized sale of an F-
150 permits the owner to use and repair her hood and headlamp, it does not permit her to make
The ABPA responds that Aiken involved a utility patent while this case involves design
patents. And, says the ABPA, while utility patents are for an article of manufacture, design
patents are for a design for an article of manufacture. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 101, with 35 U.S.C.
§ 171. Thus, the ABPA claims, while a utility patent can only protect an item, a design patent
can protect the design for a portion of an item. (R. 51, PID 1034; Case No. 15-10394, R. 104,
PID 5597); see also Application of Zahn, 617 F.2d 261, 268 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (“While the
[patented] design must be embodied in some articles [of manufacture], the statute is not limited
to designs for complete articles[] or ‘discrete’ articles[.]”). From the ABPA’s perspective then, a
patent protecting a design for one item “is the same as” a patent protecting the design for a
portion of a larger item that includes the other item. (R. 39, PID 589; Case No. 15-10394, R. 104,
PID 5600.) As applied to this case, while the ’299 and ’685 patents protect the design for the
hood and headlamp for an F-150, that is the same as protecting the design for a portion of the F-
150. (See id.) According to the ABPA, this is different than in Aiken where the patent at issue
protected an item, i.e., the needles. (See id.) And, says the ABPA, this difference means that
exhaustion permits repair of the F-150 (not just repair of the hood and headlamps), including by
There is no case dividing patent law this way—i.e., creating separate exhaustion
doctrines for utility and design patents. Indeed, in Aiken, the needles were not only their own
item but also a necessary part of another: the knitting machine. And so while the needle patent
23
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2:15-cv-10137-LJM-RSW Doc # 72 Filed 02/20/18 Pg 24 of 25 Pg ID 1726
could be viewed as covering one entire item (a needle), it could also be viewed as covering a
And if there were a case where the ABPA’s distinction would warrant creating separate
exhaustion doctrines for utility and design patents, this is not that case. Like the multi-component
machine with a patented part in Aiken, the F-150 body is comprised of multiple components with
patented parts. This is not a case dealing with a unitary vehicle body, a portion of which is
protected by a design patent. In the event of an accident, F-150 owners do not need to replace the
entire vehicle body as if it were a one-piece shell. They can instead replace separate body parts.
But, as in Aiken, they must do so subject to Ford’s patent rights on those parts.
In short, under the long-standing limits on the doctrine of patent exhaustion, the mere
purchase of an F-150 does not convey to the owner the right to make new auto-body parts
covered by Ford’s design patents. It follows that the owner lacks the right to have those parts
made for her by ABPA members. The ABPA’s exhaustion defense thus fails as a matter of law.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that this case is not presently moot and thus
DENIES Ford’s motion to dismiss (R. 61). The Court further finds that the ABPA has not shown
that U.S. Patent Nos. D489,299 and D501,685 are invalid because the designs they protect fall
outside the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 171 or that those two patents are unenforceable against ABPA
members because they become exhausted when Ford sells F-150 trucks. It follows that the
Moreover, having considered two full sets of briefing on the ABPA’s two affirmative
defenses, which is the entirety of the ABPA’s declaratory-judgment complaint, the Court intends
to enter judgment in favor of Ford for the reasons set forth in this opinion and pursuant to Rule
24
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56(f)(1). While Ford has not moved for summary-judgment in this case, it has in the case that
was formerly before this Court and now pending before a federal court in Northern Texas. And
New World—which is represented by the same counsel as the ABPA—responded to that motion
and, at the parties’ urging, this Court considered that response and addressed those arguments in
writing this opinion. Discovery in this case closed over a year ago (R. 35, PID 551), and both
parties’ have indicated, if not outright said, that ABPA’s two defenses could be decided as a
matter of law. The Court thus sees no basis for further argument on the ABPA’s claims of
SO ORDERED.
s/Laurie J. Michelson
LAURIE J. MICHELSON
Dated: February 20, 2018 U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record
and any unrepresented parties via the Court=s ECF System to their respective email or First Class
U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on February 20, 2018.
s/Keisha Jackson
Case Manager
25
Appx0117
Form 30
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Cusmail
I:IFax
CHand
Iii Electronic Means
(by email or CMIECF)
I
Law Firm Oake Law Office
I
City, State, ZIP Allen, Texas 75013
NOTE: For attorneys filing documents electronically, the name of the filer
under whose log-in and password a document is submitted must be preceded
by an "/sf' and typed in the space where the signature would otherwise appear.
Graphic and other electronic signatures are discouraged.
No. 18-1613
IN THE
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
___________________
AUTOMOTIVE BODY PARTS ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
FORD GLOBAL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Counsel for Appellee Ford Global Technologies, LLC certify the following:
3. All parent corporations and any publicly held companies that own 10% or
Motor Company. Ford Motor Company has no parent company and no publicly
4. The names of all law firms and the partners or associates that appeared
for the parties now represented by me in the trial court or are expected to appear in
Wellington.
Brooks Kushman PC (in the trial court): Amy C. Leshan and Linda D.
Mettes.
Oake Law Office (on appeal and in the trial court): Robert Oake, Jr.
i
Cardelli Lanfear PC (on appeal and in the trial court): Paul M. Kittinger.
5. Related cases are disclosed below (at ix) in the Statement of Related
Cases.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW...................................................................... 18
II. ABPA’S INVALIDITY ARGUMENT IS MERITLESS. ....................... 20
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Page
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 46
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
CASES:
Aiken v. Manchester Print Works,
2 Cliff. 435 (1865) .......................................................................................passim
Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co.,
365 U.S. 336 (1961) ................................................................................17, 39, 40
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Ex parte Adams,
84 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 311 (1898) ................................................................... 21
In re Webb,
916 F.2d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ........................................................30, 31, 32, 36
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
In re Zahn,
617 F.2d 261 (C.C.P.A. 1980) ......................................................................20, 21
Leary v. Daeschner,
349 F.3d 888 (6th Cir. 2003) ........................................................................19, 20
Wilson v. Simpson,
50 U.S. (9 How.) 109 (1850) ........................................................................38, 39
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
STATUTE:
35 U.S.C. § 171(a) .......................................................................................15, 21, 22
RULE:
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f)(1) ......................................................................................14, 15
LEGISLATIVE MATERIAL:
H.R. 5638, 110th Cong. (2008)................................................................................ 10
S. 780, 113th Cong. (2013) ...................................................................................... 10
OTHER AUTHORITIES:
Intervenor/Appellants’ Br., Ford Glob. Techs., LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
Nos. 07-1357, 07-1526 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 21, 2008), 2008 WL 1995548 ................ 9
In re Certain Automotive Parts, Inv. No. 337-TA-557, USITC Pub.
4012 (June 6, 2007) (Final), available at
https://www.usitc.gov/publications/337/pub4012.pdf .......................................... 9
viii
STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES
writ of mandamus in this case, titled In re Automotive Body Parts Association, No.
15-156. The panel was composed of Judge Lourie, Judge Dyk, and Judge Hughes.
Judge Dyk authored the order denying the petition on November 17, 2015. The
3:17-cv-03201, pending in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Texas, involves, in part, the same issues that are presented as this appeal and
therefore will be directly affected, in part, by the Court’s decision in this appeal.
3. Counsel for Ford Global previously identified two other related cases
LLC, No. 17-1956, was decided by this Court on March 13, 2018. A
petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied on May 29,
LLC, No. 16-2097, was decided by this Court on June 8, 2017. The mandate
ix
IN THE
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
___________________
INTRODUCTION
Members of the Automotive Body Parts Association (ABPA) want to import
and sell unlicensed copies of Ford auto-body parts that infringe design patents on
those parts held by Ford Global Technologies, LLC (Ford Global). To that end,
more than a decade ago, they came up with the theory that design patents on auto-
body parts are uniquely invalid—or at least unenforceable against ABPA members.
This theory depends on ignoring two basic undisputed facts: (1) extensive artistic
work goes into designing automobiles and their component parts and (2) a variety
of alternatives exist for auto-body parts including, among others, parts sold by
1
also depends on ignoring the law. The Supreme Court held more than a century
ago that designs for component parts are patentable—a holding that it reaffirmed
just two years ago. ABPA’s theory snubs the facts and contradicts well-established
law.
ABPA or its members have been pressing their theory in various venues—all
of which have rejected them. ABPA members first advanced their theory before
the International Trade Commission, and got nowhere. They then made the same
arguments before Congress, and again got nowhere. And yet again, they got
nowhere when ABPA asserted these same arguments before the District Court in
this case. Since that ruling, ABPA’s position has been rejected by another district
court as well. In this fifth attempt, ABPA seeks to convince this Court to overturn
over a century of patent law and create a unique framework to assess design
silverware handle in Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 530-531
(1871). The Supreme Court revisited the same issue two years ago, and there too
concluded that the design of a component part may be patented. See Samsung
Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429, 435 (2016). In a bid to avoid this
unpatentable because those components must “mate and match” with the vehicle,
2
and because consumers do not care about the design of those components when
replacing them after a collision. Under this Court’s precedent, however, a design
is unpatentable when it is the only design that will work and when the appearance
Because ABPA cannot make out its case under this Court’s patent
design patents and that it should consider the specific market in which an article is
sold. Those concepts, however, are unique to trademark law and have no
ABPA also argues that Ford Global’s patents are unenforceable against sales
of replacement parts that ABPA members engage in, because the sale of a vehicle
to a consumer forever exhausts all design patents on any component part of that
been established since the Civil War that the exhaustion doctrine does not permit a
consumer to create (or purchase) a new copy of a patented article. See Aiken v.
Manchester Print Works, 2 Cliff. 435 (1865); see also Morgan Envelope Co. v.
Albany Perforated Wrapping Paper Co., 152 U.S. 425, 435 (1894) (adopting
arguments. Because ABPA cannot make out its case for invalidity or
3
unenforceability, the District Court properly denied ABPA’s motion for summary
concluding that auto-body parts are not categorically ineligible for design patent
protection.
unenforceability after concluding that design patents for auto-body parts are not
exhausted by an initial vehicle sale to a consumer and thus are enforceable against
1
ABPA (at 2) frames the issues presented as both the grant of summary
judgment to Ford Global and the denial of summary judgment to ABPA on these
two issues. It is unclear whether the denial of ABPA’s request for summary
judgment in its favor is a final appealable decision. Compare MRC Innovations,
Inc. v. Hunter Mfg., LLP, 747 F.3d 1326, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[A] denial of a
motion for summary judgment is not a final appealable decision.”), with Cobra
Int’l, Inc. v. BCNY Int’l, Inc., 702 F. App’x 994, 995-996 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (per
curiam) (suggesting that the denial of summary judgment may be reviewable in
some circumstances). To the extent the District Court’s denial of ABPA’s
summary judgment motion is reviewable, this Court should affirm. As described
in this brief, Ford Global’s patents are valid and enforceable.
4
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Art of Designing the F-150 Truck. The redesigned F-150 truck
debuted in model year 2004. To create the truck’s new design, Ford Global
Schiavone, and Tyler Blake. See Appx174, Appx183. All four attended the
College for Creative Studies, a well-known art and design school in Detroit with a
the College for Creative Studies for training. See Appx2533, Appx3305. Ford
Redesigning the F-150 truck was a lengthy, creative process. It began with a
discussion of the story that the vehicle was intended to tell. See Appx271. Ford
were created and evaluated, most were discarded. See Appx3267-3268. For the
remaining designs, Ford’s artists sculpted clay models, repeatedly changing and
artists then focused on the design for each individual vehicle component. See
Appx3279, Appx3295. Metros, the lead artist for the F-150 truck, ultimately
selected the final designs for the truck and for each component. See Appx3291.
5
As Schiavone testified, “[a]ll details of the exterior appearance of the 2004
Ford F-150 truck were created by the design team to be attractive and aesthetically
desirable.” Appx2538. In contrast to the design team’s role, the engineering team
for the F-150 truck was not involved in the design process. The engineering team
was asked only to confirm that the design developed by the artistic team was
150’s redesign won numerous prestigious awards, including the 2004 North
American Truck of the Year award, the 2004 Motor Trend Truck of the Year, and
the 2004 Car and Driver Best Pickup Truck. Appx2558, Appx2560-2561,
Appx2565.
F-150 truck, including the hood and headlamp. See Appx862. Design patent
D489,299 (’299 patent), issued May 4, 2004, claims the design used on the
redesigned F-150 hood. See Appx174-182. Design patent D501,685 (’685 patent),
issued February 8, 2005, claims the design used on the redesigned F-150
headlamp. See Appx183-193. The hood and headlamp designs are reproduced
below:
6
F-150 Hood F-150 Headlamp
’299 Patent ’685 Patent
See Appx174-193. These designs were used on the F-150 truck from
components designed by Ford Global’s artists, a variety of other parts are available
for the redesigned F-150 truck. Ford Motor Company offered different trim
packages for the F-150 truck, including four different grille designs. See
manufacture and sell “performance parts” for the redesigned F-150 truck. As
they want components that “look different” but “still function[ ]” in the same way.
hood with “a different design.” Appx1313. Performance parts are available for
7
both the redesigned F-150 hood and headlamp. See Appx110, Appx1340 (ABPA
admissions).
functionally the same but “sport[ier]”). As ABPA Board Member and New World
executive Joseph Tsai testified, performance parts “mate and fit with the original
vehicles” and “can be installed on [the] vehicles for which they are intended.”
Appx941; see also Appx1330 (“ABPA admits that the identification of a part as a
performance part in the Partslink database status field indicates that the
performance part will fit the associated vehicle specified by the Partslink
numbering system but may differ in appearance from the original part.”).
so that its members can sell unlicensed knock-off versions of those parts.2 Ford
Global, the wholly-owned subsidiary of Ford Motor Company that owns, manages,
and licenses intellectual property, filed a complaint in 2005 with the U.S.
2
ABPA is trade association for automotive parts distributors. Appx94. Those
distributors purchase automotive repair parts from manufacturers or distributors
and then resell those parts to repair shops or vehicle owners. ABPA Br. 6. ABPA
members include New World International, Inc. (New World), LKQ Corporation,
and National Autobody Parts Warehouse. Appx95, Appx99.
8
International Trade Commission (ITC) to stop ABPA members from infringing
certain of Ford Global’s design patents on automotive parts. Appx266. In the ITC
components are not ornamental and thus invalid, and that such patents are
exhausted after a sale and thus unenforceable against replacement parts. See
An administrative law judge for the ITC rejected both arguments. As the
demonstrates that those designs are ornamental rather than functional. See
“permit [ABPA’s members] to manufacture and/or distribute new ‘crash parts’ for
F-150 trucks without [Ford Global’s] authority would be in essence to nullify the
pieces of the F-150.” Appx241; see also Appx267. The ITC did not disturb those
rulings, nor did ABPA’s members appeal them to the Federal Circuit.3
loss in the ITC proceedings, the automotive parts distributors turned to Congress.
3
See In re Certain Automotive Parts at 2, Inv. No. 337-TA-557, USITC Pub.
4012 (June 6, 2007) (Final), available at https://www.usitc.gov/publications/
337/pub4012.pdf; Intervenor/Appellants’ Br. at 3, Ford Glob. Techs., LLC v. Int’l
Trade Comm’n, Nos. 07-1357, 07-1526 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 21, 2008), 2008 WL
1995548. ABPA’s members appealed other issues, see id., and the case ultimately
settled. Appx95.
9
In 2008, the House of Representatives considered—but did not enact—a bill to
exclude automotive repair parts from design patent protections. See H.R. 5638,
110th Cong. (2008), Appx661-662. In 2013, a similar bill was introduced in the
Senate, but it too failed to gain traction. See S. 780, 113th Cong. (2013),
Appx664-667.
ABPA’s Suit Against Ford Global. After failing before both the ITC and
Congress, ABPA filed this declaratory judgment suit against Ford Global in the
Eastern District of Texas. See Complaint, Auto. Body Parts Ass’n v. Ford Glob.
Techs., LLC, No. 4:13-cv-00705 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 25, 2013) (ABPA suit). ABPA
once again raised the same arguments that had been rejected in the ITC
proceedings: That Ford Global’s design patents were invalid because automotive
component designs are functional, not ornamental, and that they are unenforceable
against replacement parts because Ford Global’s patent rights are exhausted by the
initial sale of the vehicle to a consumer. See Appx983. ABPA initially challenged
Ford Global moved to dismiss on the basis (among other things) that ABPA
was not an adequate representative of its members. See Appx210-213. One of its
protected by Ford Global’s design patents. See Appx95. The Eastern District of
Texas denied Ford Global’s motion and held that ABPA had standing to challenge
the patents based on an alleged injury to another member, New World. See
10
Appx972-978.
Shortly after that ruling, ABPA amended its complaint to challenge only the
’299 and ’685 patents, which claim the design of the hood and headlamp used on
the redesigned F-150 truck. See Appx96, Appx997.4 Ford Global moved to
transfer venue to the Eastern District of Michigan, and the Eastern District of
(denying mandamus petition challenging the change of venue). The case was
Ford Global’s Suit Against New World. Following the venue transfer of
ABPA’s suit against Ford Global, Ford Global filed an infringement action against
ABPA member New World in the Eastern District of Michigan. See Complaint,
Ford Glob. Techs., LLC v. New World Int’l, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-10394 (E.D. Mich.
Jan. 29, 2015) (New World suit). The New World suit was assigned to Judge
ABPA and New World Summary Judgment Motions. ABPA filed for
summary judgment in its suit against Ford Global. Appx97. ABPA asserted that
the ’299 and ’685 patents are invalid because the designs for the covered
4
Although the amended complaint only challenged these two patents,
ABPA’s arguments were far broader. As the District Court recognized, “ABPA’s
arguments are not specific to those two patents,” and ABPA instead seeks a ruling
“that designs for auto-body parts are simply not eligible for patent protection” and
that Ford Global’s patents “are unenforceable against its members.” Appx93.
11
components are functional rather than ornamental and are not a matter of concern.
See Appx102. ABPA also asserted that the patents are unenforceable because the
original vehicle sale to a consumer exhausts the design patents on the vehicle’s
components, such that they cannot be enforced against replacement parts sold by
ABPA’s members. See Appx112-114. Ford Global detailed the many flaws in
ABPA—filed a parallel motion for summary judgment asserting the same two
Appx97. When New World withdrew that motion, Ford Global filed its own
motion for summary judgment, explaining that its patents were not invalid or
New World, the parties agreed that Judge Michelson should consider the arguments
presented by the parties in both cases in deciding ABPA’s and Ford Global’s
motions were pending, however, the Supreme Court held that the patent venue
statute had a narrower scope than prior case law provided. See TC Heartland LLC
v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017). Based on TC Heartland,
Judge Michelson transferred Ford Global’s infringement suit against New World to
the Northern District of Texas without ruling on Ford Global’s summary judgment
12
motion. See Appx98; see also Ford Glob. Techs., LLC v. New World Int’l Inc.,
No. 3:17-cv-03201-N.
in its favor. The court’s ruling first evaluated ABPA’s burden at summary
ABPA would have to show that every reasonable juror would find in its favor
Appx101. The court concluded that ABPA had not met that burden.
The court rejected ABPA’s argument that Ford Global’s patents are invalid
because the design of those patents is not a matter of concern, concluding that “it is
consumers at least when they are deciding which car to buy.” Appx106. The court
also rejected ABPA’s argument that Ford Global’s patents are invalid because the
5
During the proceedings before Judge Michelson, Ford Global offered a
covenant not to sue New World for infringement of the ’299 and ’685 patents. See
Appx97-98. As a result of that covenant, Judge Michelson concluded that the
controversy between Ford Global and New World was moot. See Appx98-99.
Judge Michelson ruled that the case was not moot, however, because a controversy
remained between Ford Global and National Autobody Parts Warehouse, another
ABPA member. See Appx98-99.
13
hood and headlamp designs are not ornamental. As it explained, the “fact that
there are ‘performance parts,’ i.e., alternative hood and headlamp designs that both
perform their intended function and fit the F-150, strongly suggests that the designs
are not dictated by function.” Appx110. Finally, the court declined ABPA’s
trademark law into design patent law. As the court pointed out, no other court had
ever done so, and trademark and patent law serve different purposes. See
Appx108-110.
unenforceable due to exhaustion, the court held that although “the authorized sale
of an F-150 permits the owner to use and repair her hood and headlamp, it does not
permit her to make unauthorized replacements or have replacements made for her.”
Appx115. The court similarly rejected ABPA’s assertion that separate exhaustion
regimes should apply to utility and design patents. See id. The court accordingly
After “having considered two full sets of briefing on the ABPA’s two
complaint,” the court stated that it intended “to enter judgment in favor of [Ford
Global] for the reasons set forth in [its] opinion and pursuant to Rule 56(f)(1).”
Appx116-117.
14
ABPA Requests Entry of Judgment. Following the District Court’s
in New World. Agreeing with the reasoning in the District Court’s ruling rejecting
Ford Global on its summary judgment motion in the New World suit. Appx173
(Docket Entry 202). That summary judgment ruling resolved New World’s
affirmative defenses, and Ford Global’s infringement suit against New World is set
Global on the question whether its design patents on the hood and headlamp for its
F-150 truck are valid. The Supreme Court has long recognized that a design for a
component part may be protected by a patent as long as the design is new, original,
and ornamental. See Gorham, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) at 525-531; see also 35 U.S.C.
§ 171(a). ABPA does not contest the novelty or originality of the hood and
headlamp designs. ABPA instead argues that those designs—which were created
ornamental. But a design is functional only if it is “the only possible form of the
article that could perform its function.” Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co., 304 F.3d
15
1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, numerous alternative designs for the hood and headlamp exist, including
Appx1340. Ford Global’s design patents are accordingly ornamental and eligible
ABPA does not contend that the hood and headlamp designs are functional
omitted). Rather, ABPA asserts that those designs are functional because
automotive components must “mate and match” with the vehicle in the same way a
key must “mate and match” with a lock. See id. at 19-22. That is clearly wrong:
There are many different ways to design an automotive component that will fit on
the F-150 truck, as the robust market for performance parts demonstrates.
ABPA also asserts that the hood and headlamp designs cannot be patented
because those components do not contain any design choices, and because the
design for such components is not a matter of concern. But that is clearly wrong
too: The components of the F-150 truck were crafted by talented artists, are visible
on the exterior of the vehicle, and are selected by consumers because of the way
they look.
serves an entirely different purpose and has never been used by any court to define
16
the boundaries of patent law. This Court should reject ABPA’s unprecedented
request and affirm the District Court’s ruling that Ford Global’s patents are valid.
II. As a fallback, ABPA asserts that Ford Global’s design patents are
unenforceable against its members’ sales of replacement parts under the exhaustion
doctrine. That doctrine holds that the unrestricted sale of a patented article
exhausts the patentee’s right to control further use or sale of the article by
enforcing the patent under which it was first sold. Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade
Comm., 264 F.3d 1094, 1105 (Fed. Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by
Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017). The
buyer from making new copies of the patented item.” Bowman v. Monsanto Co.,
Here, the sale of an F-150 truck exhausts Ford Global’s design patent rights
in the actual hood and headlamp parts attached to the vehicle that a consumer
drives off the dealership lot. But it does not exhaust Ford Global’s design patent
rights in new hoods and headlamps that are available for sale as replacement parts.
See id. This long-established principle was first articulated in Aiken and adopted
by the Supreme Court in Morgan Envelope. It has since been reaffirmed by the
Supreme Court in Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336,
339-343 (1961), and by this Court in Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC v. New York
Times Co., 778 F.3d 1293, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Those precedents foreclose
17
ABPA’s exhaustion argument in this case. And moreover, because ABPA’s
members are upstream manufacturers, they are not entitled to exert exhaustion as a
defense in the first place. See Crossroads Sys., Inc. v. Dot Hill Sys. Corp., 48 F.
Undeterred, ABPA conjures up the idea that this Court should create a new
somehow runs differently for design patents than utility patents. ABPA’s
arguments lack merit and defy common sense. This Court should affirm the
judgment below.
ARGUMENT
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW.
Like all issued patents, design patents are presumed valid. See Ethicon
Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien, Inc., 796 F.3d 1312, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2015). It is
See id. A design patent is invalid if, rather than being ornamental, “its overall
to meet: ABPA must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that no other
designs, apart from those claimed in Ford Global’s patents, would perform the
likewise ABPA’s burden to prove that Ford Global’s patents are unenforceable by
18
a preponderance of the evidence. See Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
summary judgment. Keurig, Inc. v. Sturm Foods, Inc., 732 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed.
Cir. 2013). In “evaluating a motion for summary judgment,” this Court “views the
record evidence through the prism of the evidentiary standard of proof that would
pertain at a trial on the merits.” Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955,
962 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Thus, “a moving party seeking to invalidate a patent at
summary judgment must submit clear and convincing evidence of invalidity so that
no reasonable jury could find otherwise.” Id. Likewise, “a moving party seeking
to have a patent held not invalid at summary judgment must show that the
nonmoving party, who bears the burden of proof at trial, failed to produce clear
reasonable jury could invalidate the patent.” Id. (emphasis added). As noted, a
preponderance standard applies to patent exhaustion. See Fuji Photo, 474 F.3d at
1293.
This Court reviews “the grant of summary judgment under the law of the
regional circuit in which the district court sits.” Keurig, 732 F.3d at 1372. In the
Sixth Circuit, “the moving party has the burden of proving that no genuine issue as
to any material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 897 (6th Cir. 2003). A “dispute over a material
19
fact cannot be ‘genuine’ unless a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Id. The Sixth Circuit reviews the grant of summary judgment
de novo. See id. at 896. In “reviewing the district court’s decision to grant
summary judgment,” the Sixth Circuit “view[s] all evidence and draw[s] all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id. at
897. This Court, however, has stated that it reviews a district court’s ruling on
summary judgment with respect to the issue of functionality “for clear error.”
ABPA’s opening brief: ABPA does not discuss the specific designs claimed in the
hood or headlamp patents, or argue that any particular aspect of those designs is
specific to [the] two patents. Instead, the ABPA argues that designs for auto-body
parts are simply not eligible for patent protection.”). But both this Court and the
Supreme Court have repeatedly held that component parts may be protected
through design patents, and automotive components are no different. See, e.g.,
Samsung, 137 S. Ct. at 435 (design patent on cell phone component); In re Zahn,
617 F.2d 261, 268 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (design patent on drill component). At a
minimum, however, ABPA has failed to meet its burden to produce clear and
20
convincing evidence establishing that the hood and headlamp patents are invalid.
A. The Hood And Headlamp Designs In The ’299 and ’685 Patents
Meet The Patentability Requirements Of Section 171(a).
Congress has provided that “[w]hoever invents any new, original and
design is new, original, and ornamental. See id. at 435 (citing Ex parte Adams, 84
Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 311 (1898); Zahn, 617 F.2d at 268).
ABPA has not contested the novelty or originality of the hood and headlamp
designs in the ’299 and ’685 patents. See ABPA Br. 19-39. Nor could it:
Undisputed record evidence demonstrates that those designs were created for the
F-150 truck by highly acclaimed artists. See supra pp.5-7. Those artists attended
the College for Creative Studies, a well-known art and design school with an
automotive design program. See Appx2538. And they designed the F-150
components from scratch, beginning with a sketch, then drafting the design on a
computer, and then modeling the design in clay. See Appx3267-3269. Throughout
21
that process, the artists considered and discarded hundreds of designs before
making a final choice. See id. The appearance of the F-150 components was
Appx2538. There is no question that the hood and headlamp designs meet both the
This same evidence also demonstrates that the hood and headlamp designs
the use or purpose of the article.” Ethicon, 796 F.3d at 1328 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The relevant inquiry is not whether the design serves a function,
but whether the design was “dictated by function alone.” Best Lock Corp. v. Ilco
Unican Corp., 94 F.3d 1563, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (emphasis added; internal
quotation marks omitted). To put it another way, a design is ornamental unless the
claimed design is “the only possible form of the article that could perform its
function.” Rosco, 304 F.3d at 1378 (emphasis added; internal quotation marks
omitted).
Ethicon, 796 F.3d at 1329-30. Alternative designs exist here. The ’299 and ’685
patents claim merely one way to design a hood or headlamp that will fit on an F-
150 truck and illuminate the road or cover the engine. Consumers may purchase
22
performance parts for both the hood and headlamp that utilize a different design
but function in the same way as the ’299 and ’685 patents:
parts are available for both the F-150 hood and headlamp. See Appx1340. The
the ’299 and ’685 patents are ornamental rather than functional.
23
Other factors this Court has identified that “might be relevant” to assessing
functionality include:
Ethicon, 796 F.3d at 1330 (internal quotation marks omitted). ABPA points to no
evidence that any of these factors suggest a lack of ornamentality. Nor has ABPA
pointed to any specific aspect of either the hood or headlamp design that it claims
automotive components in general, rather than to the patents on the hood and
headlamp in particular. The record leaves no room for debate over whether the
hood and headlamp designs in the ’299 and ’685 patents are functional instead of
ornamental. They are not. The District Court properly entered judgment in Ford
Global’s favor.
because the designs for the hood and headlamp are “mechanical or ‘utilitarian.’ ”
24
terms); see also Appx1041 (“Mechanical function is not relevant to ABPA’s
functionality argument.”). Instead, ABPA asserts (at 19-24) that the patents are
invalid because customers seek only to match the hood and headlamp with the rest
of the truck, and thus choose replacement parts with the same design as the original
ornamental design of the hood and headlamp installed on the truck they
purchased—which is the design in the ’299 and ’685 patents—those designs must
be functional when used in replacement parts. This Court should reject ABPA’s
the ’299 and ’685 patents are functional because those designs are intended to
“mate and match” with the F-150 truck. ABPA’s “mate and match” theory is
derived entirely from two cases—Best Lock and Static Control Components, Inc. v.
Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 697 F.3d 387 (6th Cir. 2012). Neither case supports ABPA’s
assertion.
In Best Lock, a security company had obtained a design patent on the profile
of a blank key blade, from which keys could be made to open a lock. See 94 F.3d
at 1564. Although different keys could be made from the key blade, only a single
design for the key blade—the design claimed in the patent—would make a key that
opened the lock. See id. at 1566. This Court concluded that the key blade design
25
was functional (and thus ineligible for design patent protection) because “no other
shaped key blade would fit into the corresponding” lock. Id. In Static Control, the
Sixth Circuit similarly concluded that a design for a printer ink cartridge was
functional in part because the cartridge had to be designed a certain way to fit in
Best Lock and Static Control are plainly inapplicable here. The hood and
headlamp designs claimed in the ’299 and ’685 patents are not the only designs for
those components that fit on an F-150 truck. As the District Court pointed out, and
ABPA agreed, any number of differently designed hoods and headlamps can be
used on a F-150 truck. See Appx110, Appx1340. Indeed, an entire industry has
The District Court reproduced designs for performance parts for the F-150
hood and headlamp in its opinion. See Appx110; see also supra p.23 (illustrating
completely different arrangement of lights, and the performance hood has different
elevations, depressions, and stylized lines, just to name the most obvious
differences between the original and performance parts. Yet both the original and
performance parts “mate and match” with the F-150 truck. In a deposition, ABPA
Board Member and New World executive Joseph Tsai admitted that companies
sold performance parts with a different design that “mate and fit with the original
26
vehicles.” Appx940-941. ABPA’s analogy to Best Lock and Static Control
accordingly fails.
ABPA also reads Best Lock to stand for the proposition that the hood and
headlamp designs in the ’299 and ’685 patents are functional because they were
“designed together with the rest of the F-150 exterior,” and because “the hood,
ABPA Br. 21. But neither of those suggests that a design is functional. The fact
that one design is made in conjunction with another design does not make either
design functional. And to the extent a design is arbitrary, that suggests it is not
ABPA further contends that the specific hood and headlamp designs in
the ’299 and ’685 patents are required to “mate and match” with the F-150 truck
because “the insurance company usually has an obligation under the insurance
policy to pay for repair that restores the damaged vehicle to its pre-loss condition,
i.e., operational safety, function, and appearance.” ABPA Br. 6; see also id. at 19.
But ABPA does not cite any case saying that a design on a component part cannot
be patented because that part may someday need to be replaced, and because an
insurance company may choose to pay only for certain replacement parts. Nor
would that make any sense: A private agreement between third parties cannot
27
ABPA has also failed to cite any record evidence that an insurance company
would refuse to pay for a replacement part of equivalent value simply because that
part has a different design than the F-150’s original part. The “expert report”
ABPA cites, see ABPA Br. 6 (citing Appx1090) and ABPA Br. 19 (citing
and when deposed, the witness clarified both that she is not an expert in insurance
contracts and that auto-body repair shops simply charge the difference or give a
refund when an owner selects a replacement part with a different value than the
insurance company has priced out for a repair, such as a performance part with a
sometimes need to be replaced, and consumers may choose a replacement part with
the same appearance as the original part. According to ABPA, in this situation,
6
ABPA also suggests in passing (at 16-17) that government regulations and
industry standards might require a particular design, but it does not cite any record
evidence on this point (much less any clear and convincing evidence).
28
interested only in returning his or her vehicle to its original “design aesthetic,”
ABPA Br. 23. ABPA has invented wholesale this purported functionality test.
To the extent ABPA is arguing that the hood and headlamp designs are
functional because they do not embody any conscious design choices, ABPA is
purpose. Thus, in In re Carletti, 328 F.2d 1020 (C.C.P.A. 1964), this Court held
that a rubber gasket was functional in part because “[i]t seems naive in the extreme
to believe that anyone would try to ‘ornament’ the rubber gasket on the under side
of the bung cap for a gasoline drum.” Id. at 1021. Here, however, the hood and
headlamp are prominent features on the exterior of the F-150 vehicle, and Ford
spent millions of dollars employing artists whose job was to create hundreds of
potential designs for these and other features of Ford vehicles so that consumers
the same thing, creating their own designs for these parts. See supra pp.7-8.
ABPA cannot seriously contend that the hood and headlamp designs embodied in
the ’299 and ’685 patents contain no conscious design choices. To the contrary,
ABPA lacks any record evidence (much less clear and convincing evidence)
29
To the extent ABPA’s position is that the hood and headlamp designs in the
’299 and ’685 patents are functional because some consumers do not consider
argument boils down to this: Because consumers liked the way a component such
as a hood or headlamp looked when they bought the vehicle, consumers will
choose a replacement part with the same design if an accident damages the original
part. That is the opposite of failing to make a conscious design choice. Even
under ABPA’s made-up test for functionality, the hood and headlamp designs are
ornamental.
components are invalid because the design of such components is not a “matter of
concern.” ABPA Br. 30-36. This Court has explained that a design is not a matter
of concern—and thus not a proper subject for a design patent—when the article is
“concealed or obscure.” In re Webb, 916 F.2d 1553, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(internal quotation marks omitted). And it has clarified that even concealed or
obscure articles may still be entitled to design patent protection when “at some
point in the life of the article an occasion (or occasions) arises when the
30
ABPA’s not-a-matter-of-concern argument fails for the straightforward
reason that the F-150’s hood and headlamp are not hidden from view. That makes
them distinctly unlike a vent tube placed inside the wall of a house or a brush
located inside a vacuum cleaner. See, e.g., In re Cornwall, 230 F.2d 457, 459
(C.C.P.A. 1956) (vent tube not a matter of concern because it is not “exposed to
view”); In re Stevens, 173 F.2d 1015, 1019 (C.C.P.A. 1949) (vacuum cleaner brush
light of the relevant legal question—the “nature of [the] visibility” of the article,
Webb, 916 F.2d at 1558—there is no doubt that the “matter of concern” test simply
But the problems with ABPA’s arguments do not end there. Even if the
matter-of-concern test did apply here, it would be satisfied. This Court has held
matter of concern at some point in the article’s life. See Webb, 916 F.2d at 1557.
That is true even for an article that may be ordered solely by parts number. See id.
and ends “with the ultimate destruction, loss, or disappearance of the article.” Id.
7
The Sixth Circuit appears to take a broader view of the “matter of concern”
test, and apply it in cases where an article is “generally hidden from view,” rather
than always hidden from view. Static Control, 697 F.3d at 422. Even if that were
the rule in this Court, the hood and the headlamp are not generally hidden from
view.
31
Thus, in the case of an artificial femur, the design of the femur is a matter of
select the femur—even if the femur is ultimately hidden from view in the human
Although ABPA asserts (at 33-34) that consumers are interested only in the overall
design of the vehicle, and not the design of any particular component, ABPA does
not cite any record evidence (much less clear and convincing evidence) for that
point. See ABPA Br. 33-34. Nor does ABPA explain why the design of a
appearance of the vehicle, and thus qualify as a matter of concern. See id. And in
any event, ABPA concedes that consumers are concerned that the hood and
appearance,” undercutting its own position that those designs are irrelevant to
consumers. Id.
ABPA argues that Webb does not mean what it says, because if “Webb is
strictly applied to the fact patterns in Best Lock and Static Control, the outcomes
may not have been the same.” ABPA Br. 35. According to ABPA, a “Webb type
argument could be made that in Best Lock an advertisement displaying the unusual
key blade design profile might be better noticed by a prospective purchaser, and in
32
Static Control a printer cartridge displaying a sleek or elegant profile might also be
better noticed by a prospective purchaser.” Id. But that misses the point: The
patents at issue in Best Lock and Static Control were functional because no other
design would work; the key blade had to fit the lock, and the cartridge had to fit the
printer. The fact that the blade or the cartridge may have been aesthetically
pleasing was beside the point. Here, the opposite is true: Any number of
replacement parts for the hood or headlamp would fit the F-150 truck.
of design patent law. See ABPA Br. 29 (requesting that this Court “change long
position). Because ABPA cannot win under design patent law, it asks this Court to
limit designs eligible for patent protection by applying trademark law’s “aesthetic
functionality” doctrine. See id. at 28. But as ABPA recognizes, “no court yet has
applied aesthetic functionality to design patent law despite that both trademarks
and design patents have coexisted for well over a century.” Id. at 28-29 (internal
unavailable where the “aesthetic value” of the design confers “a significant benefit
that cannot practically be duplicated by the use of alternative designs” and granting
33
trademark protection “would significantly hinder competition.” Qualitex Co. v.
Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 170 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Thus, the Southern District of Iowa has held that because farmers want their farm
equipment to match in color, John Deere was not entitled to trade dress protection
in a particular shade of green. See Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 560 F. Supp.
85, 98 (S.D. Iowa 1982), aff’d, 721 F.2d 253 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam). This
Court has similarly held that because the color black decreases the apparent size of
a boat motor and ensures compatibility with different boat colors, a boat company
was not entitled to trade dress protection in the color black. See Brunswick Corp.
because trademark rights are potentially permanent; the policy behind granting
reputation. See id. at 1530-31. Design patents have a different purpose: They
competition for a period of time. That is an expected part of the patent law
34
bargain, not a reason to deny design patent protection.8
ABPA seems to recognize that the test for aesthetic functionality that applies
in trademark cases does not work for design patents. ABPA thus asserts that “the
whether there is a conscious design choice being made that promotes the
decorative arts.” ABPA Br. 25. If that is the case, however, ABPA is not even
asking the Court to apply the aesthetic functionality doctrine from trademark law.
It is instead asking the Court to make up a brand new standard for judging the
components. This Court need not follow ABPA down a new legal path. ABPA
has conceded that it is not arguing that the ’299 or ’685 patents have mechanical or
utilitarian functionality. See ABPA Br. 23; Appx1041. This Court should
new test—one that will separately consider the validity of Ford Global’s design
patents with respect to the “initial sales” market and the “repair” market.
According to ABPA, even if the ’299 and ’685 patents are valid design patents
8
Trademark law’s aesthetic functionality doctrine is also a mismatch for the
design patent context, because Ford Global’s patents are distinctly unlike a claim
for a color that may be applied to many different articles made in many different
ways. Ford Global claims a single design for a hood and headlamp.
35
when an F-150 is first purchased, those patents lose their validity when it comes to
assessing replacement parts. See ABPA Br. 36-38. ABPA does not cite a single
case holding that a design patent’s validity depends on—and varies with—the
market in which the product is sold. Instead, ABPA once again attempts to import
principles of trademark law into design patent law—and once again, this Court
“focusing on the particular market served also is appropriate in design patent law
because the matter of concern inquiry relates to the concerns of the purchaser.”
ABPA Br. 37. That argument makes no sense. Trademark law evaluates the
consumers are likely to be confused about the origin of the product. See, e.g.,
Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir.
2011). No such concerns are present in patent law. And this Court has made clear
that if a design is a matter of concern at any point in an article’s life, that design is
patentable. See Webb, 916 F.2d at 1557. This Court should reject ABPA’s
contorted analogy to trademark law, and affirm the District Court’s ruling granting
36
III. THE EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE DOES NOT EXCUSE BLATANT
COPYING OF PATENTED DESIGNS BY ABPA’S MEMBERS.
ABPA asserts that once a Ford dealer has sold an F-150 truck to a consumer,
Ford Global’s patents covering the hood and headlamp design used on that truck
are exhausted such that the truck purchaser can buy as many new components as it
wants without regard to Ford Global’s patent rights. But that is not how
exhaustion works. Under the exhaustion doctrine, the sale of a patented article
exhausts the patentee’s rights as to that article. See Jazz Photo, 264 F.3d at 1105.
It has long been established that the doctrine does not permit the purchaser to
infringe a patent by making (or buying) new copies of a patented component and
claiming the new copies are “repairing” the original article. See Aiken, 2 Cliff. 435;
see also Morgan Envelope, 152 U.S. at 435 (adopting Aiken). Thus, the sale of an
F-150 truck may exhaust design patents that cover the specific hood and headlamp
components installed on that truck, but it does not permit the truck owner to make
(or buy) a completely new hood or headlamp covered by Ford Global’s patents as
though those patents do not exist. See id. The District Court properly applied
these well-established principles to this case, and its ruling should be upheld.
Hampshire court addressed whether the defendant could replace worn-out needles
on a sewing machine, when the sewing machine and its accompanying needles
37
were both patented. See Aiken, 2 Cliff. 435. The court concluded that the answer
was no. See id. As the court explained, “[t]he indubitable right of the defendants
is to repair or improve the articles as long as they will last, but they cannot make
new ones, nor can they, in the exercise of their right to repair the old ones, infringe
another man’s patent.” Id. at 437. Because the sewing machine needles were
separately patented, the court held that creating replacements for them violated that
Two patents were at issue in Morgan Envelope: A patent on a toilet paper roll and
a patent on the same toilet paper roll combined with a toilet paper holder. See 152
U.S. at 427, 430. The Supreme Court held that the toilet paper roll patent was
invalid (as obvious), but that the combination was patentable. See id. at 429-431.
The Supreme Court then analyzed whether the patent on the combination
See id. at 431-433. The answer to that question was no—but only because the
Aiken to Wilson v. Simpson, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 109 (1850). In Aiken, the Supreme
Court stated, the sewing machine’s replacement “needles were the subject of a
separate patent.” Morgan Envelope, 152 U.S. at 435. Thus, the purchase of the
sewing machine and its accompanying needles “did not confer upon the purchaser
38
any right, after the needles were worn out and became useless, to manufacture
other needles.” Id. In Wilson, in contrast, the patent holder had obtained a patent
on the combination of a planing machine with cutting knives, but the cutting
knives “were not subject to a patent.” Id. Thus, the purchaser of the planing
machine could replace the cutting knives without violating any patent rights. See
id.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed this distinction in Aro. There, the Supreme
365 U.S. at 337-338. The Supreme Court concluded that the purchaser could
replace the fabric because it was “an unpatented element of [the] combination
patent.” Id. at 339-340, 342-343 & n.9 (citing Wilson and Morgan Envelope). The
Supreme Court repeatedly stressed throughout Aro that the fabric top was not
unpatented elements”); id. (fabric is “an unpatented element”); id. (fabric has not
an unpatented part”); id. at 345 (“No element, not itself separately patented, that
monopoly.”).
39
This Court has held that the Supreme Court “approved” the Aiken court’s
treatment of the “circumstance in which the patent owner sold to purchasers two
distinct, separately patentable inventions, even when they are designed to be used
together.” Helferich Patent Licensing, 778 F.3d at 1304. And this Court has
permits the repair of a patented article with an unpatented component. See Aro,
365 U.S. at 339-340. The repair of a patented article with a patented component,
however, is impermissible. See Aiken, 2 Cliff. at 435; see also Morgan Envelope,
152 U.S. at 435. That makes sense: The right to repair a patented article does not
include the right to make (or buy) a new copy of a patented article. See Jazz Photo,
264 F.3d at 1103. As the District Court explained, “[t]he authorized sale of a
patented item permits the owner to sell and use the one item that he purchased—
not to make a replacement should that one item be destroyed.” Appx113 (citing
Bowman, 569 U.S. at 283-84). Thus, although consumers may repair a hood or
headlamp that is damaged, they may not replace the hood or headlamp with a
completely new part. See Jazz Photo, 264 F.3d at 1103. The District Court
Global’s favor.
40
B. This Court Should Reject ABPA’s Attempt To Create A New
Exhaustion Regime For Design Patents.
ABPA’s position is foreclosed by longstanding precedent. See, e.g., Morgan
Envelope, 152 U.S. at 435. ABPA thus asks this Court to create a new exhaustion
regime, solely for design patents, that favors ABPA’s position. See ABPA Br. 49
to design patents in a way that recognizes the unique nature of design patents and
how the design patent statutory scheme differs from the utility patent statutory
scheme.”). Yet again, this Court should decline ABPA’s request to upend the law.
Aiken on the ground that the patent at issue there was a utility patent rather than a
design patent. See id. at 51. According to ABPA, because a utility patent claims a
Here is where ABPA’s position gets confusing: ABPA appears to argue that
when one utility patent claims a combination product and a separate utility patent
claims a component of that product—such as the sewing machine and the sewing
machine needle in Aiken—the patents claim two separate machines. See id. at 53-
54. According to ABPA, that explains why Aiken concluded that the defendant
41
could not manufacture a new copy of a sewing machine needle in order to repair
the sewing machine. See id. at 54. In contrast, ABPA asserts, where a design
design for an F-150 truck, the relevant “article” is the larger product, not the
component. See id. Thus, according to ABPA, the right to repair the F-150 truck
See id.
ABPA’s theory is, once again, completely made up. Not only that, it is
contrary to Supreme Court precedent: In Samsung, the Supreme Court held that an
“article” is “simply a thing made by hand or a machine.” 137 S. Ct. at 435. Thus,
that the F-150 truck is the relevant “article” (rather than a component such as the
hood or headlamp) is simply incorrect under Samsung. The ITC rejected ABPA’s
theory, see Appx242, the District Court rejected ABPA’s theory, see Appx115, the
New World district court rejected this theory, see Appx173 (Docket Entry 202),
“implied license” to repair that truck by replacing components such as the hood or
42
headlamp. ABPA Br. 55-56. According to ABPA, because Ford Global does not
tell consumers that they do not have an implied license to replace patented
components of the truck, there is an implied license to do so. See id. at 56-57.
ABPA says that this license arises from the “legal relationship” between the F-150
truck and the design patents on the hood and headlamp components (whatever that
ABPA has made this argument up too. It does not cite any case saying that
when a patent owner sells a patented article, it grants an implied license to make
(or purchase) new copies of that article anytime the patent owner does not
explicitly disclaim such a license. To the extent ABPA is merely reiterating its
position that the sale of an F-150 truck exhausts Ford Global’s rights in the ’299
and ’685 patents even with respect to new copies of the hood or headlamp, both
this Court and the Supreme Court have rejected that argument. See supra pp.37-40;
see also Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil Mfg. Corp., 123 F.3d 1445,
1451 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (re-creation of a patented article “is an infringement because
such activity is beyond the implied authorization to use and sell a patented device”).
has not established that either ABPA or its members are entitled to assert that
defense. ABPA claims that because the owner of the F-150 “has an implied
43
license to repair the F-150, the owner also has ‘have made’ rights that shields the
manufacture of the repair part and all members of the distribution chain from
liability for patent infringement.” ABPA Br. 44-45. But ABPA does not cite any
In the case ABPA cites—CoreBrace LLC v. Star Seismic LLC, 566 F.3d
1069 (Fed. Cir. 2009)—this Court held that a party licensed to manufacture a
patented product could, in the circumstances of that case, contract with third
parties “to have the licensed products made for it.” Id. at 1072. Even if the
here (and they are not), it would get ABPA nowhere. ABPA is not contending that
auto-body parts and then offer them for sale to the public generally in an attempt to
The fact that a purchaser may have a license to make or purchase a patented
part does not retroactively grant ABPA’s members immunity for making that part
Commc’ns, Inc. v. DirecTV, Inc., 1 F. Supp. 3d 1305, 1307-08 (N.D. Fla. 2014)
(upstream manufacturers may not assert patent exhaustion defense); see also
Appx241 (ITC decision). As the Northern District of California has stated, “[n]o
44
court that this Court is aware of has ever applied the patent exhaustion doctrine to
Inc. v. CoolIT Sys., Inc., No. C-12-4498 EMC, 2013 WL 5640905, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 11, 2013). The affirmative defense of exhaustion is thus unavailable to both
ABPA and its members.9 For this reason as well, the District Court properly
9
It bears emphasis that at no point in this suit has ABPA identified any
individuals who have contracted with an ABPA member to manufacture a
replacement hood or headlamp.
45
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the judgment of the
Respectfully submitted,
/s/Jessica L. Ellsworth
Marc Lorelli Jessica L. Ellsworth
Frank A. Angileri Katherine B. Wellington
BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C. HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
1000 Town Center, 22nd Floor 555 Thirteenth Street, N.W.
Southfield, MI 48075 Washington, D.C. 20004
(248) 358-4400 (202) 637-5600
46
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 5th day of July, 2018, I caused a copy of the
foregoing Corrected Brief for Appellee to be served by electronic means via the
/s/Jessica L. Ellsworth
Jessica L. Ellsworth
contains 10,648 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by the rules.
spaced typeface using Microsoft Office Word 2010 in Times New Roman 14-point
font.
/s/Jessica L. Ellsworth
Jessica L. Ellsworth
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Defendant-Appellee,
_____________________________
CERTIFICATE OF INTEREST
2. The real name of the real party in interest (if the party named in the caption
is not the real party in interest) represented by me is:
None
3. All parent corporations and any publicly held companies that own 10 percent
or more of the stock of the party or amicus curiae represented by me are:
None
4. The names of all law firms and the partners or associates that appeared for
the party or amicus now represented by me in the trial court or agency or are
expected to appear in this court (and who have not or will not enter an appearance
in this case) are:
(a) A Petition for Writ of Mandamus was filed previously in this case
titled In re: Automotive Body Parts Association, Petitioner, 2015-156. An order
issued November 17, 2015 denying the petition. The composition of the panel was
Judge Lourie, Judge Dyk, and Judge Hughes, order by Judge Dyk. The order is
nonprecedential and unreported.
i
(b) The title and number of any case known to counsel to be pending in
this or any other court that will directly affect or be directly affected by this court’s
decision in the pending appeal:
(1) New World International, Inc., and National Auto Parts, Inc., v. Ford
Global Technologies, LLC and Ford Motor Company; 17-1956, (mandate issued,
time for filing petition for writ of certiorari to United States Supreme Court not yet
expired).
(2) Ford Global Technologies, LLC v. New World International, Inc., et al.,
case number 3:17-cv-03201, pending in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ARGUMENT ………………………………………………… 1
iii
C. The Sale of an F-150 Grants an Implied License to
Repair the F-150 …………………………………… 27
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES Page(s)
Ex parte Adams,
84 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 311 (1898) ………………. 3
Gorham v. White,
81 U.S. 511 (1871)…………………………………… 3
v
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil Mfg. Corp.,
123 F.3d 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ……………………… 28
In re Carletti,
328 F.2d 1020 (C.C.P.A. 1964) ……………………… 10, 12
In re Webb,
916 F.2d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ……………………… 11, 12, 16
In re Zahn,
617 F.2d 261 (C.C.P.A. 1980) ……………………… 3
STATUTES
vi
35 U.S.C. § 171(a) …………………………………………… 4
SECONDARY AUTHORITY
OTHER
vii
ARGUMENT
since alternative hood and headlamp designs can fit the F-150, FGTL’s design
patents are ornamental. FGTL Br. 22-23. This argument takes a far too limited and
Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien, Inc., 796 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2015), this Court
stated "an inquiry into whether a claimed design is primarily functional should begin
with an inquiry into the existence of alternative designs," id. at 1330 (emphasis
added), but reaffirmed it has "not mandated applying any particular test for
In ABPA’s opening brief, ABPA explained that the case law, including Best
Lock Corp. v. Ilco Unican Corp., 94 F.3d 1563 (Fed Cir. 1996) and Static Control
Components v. Lexmark International, 697 F.3d 387 (6th Cir. 2012) has developed
including: (1) when the claimed design of the article of manufacture (or portion
thereof) is designed to fit into or onto a parent article of manufacture; (2) when the
article of manufacture typically is sold with the parent and will need replacing during
the useful life of the parent article due to foreseeable damage, use, or loss of the
1
article of manufacture or parent; (3) when the design of the article of manufacture is
dictated by its need to mate with and match the appearance of the parent due to
(4) when the appearance of the design has no other role in the purchaser's decision
other than to be compatible with another article of manufacture; and (5) when
part number rather than by the appearance of the article of manufacture. ABPA Br.
17-18.
ABPA further pointed out that when evaluating the functionality of a design
in a mate and match context, “the focus is not on potential alternative designs that
might be created during the design process, but rather on the practical mate and
match compatibility after the designs are created….” ABPA Br. 18.
its analysis and instead focuses erroneously on whether alternative hood and
headlamp designs are available that will fit the F-150. When all the appropriate
functionality factors and analysis are considered, this Court should find that the
general. FGTL Br. 20. That is incorrect. ABPA is challenging the validity of the
2
subject design patents to obtain an opinion from this Court that potentially can be
used to challenge patents on designs that meet the criteria described above (or as
FGTL argues that both this Court and the Supreme Court “have repeatedly
held that component parts may be protected through design patents, and automotive
components are no different. See, e.g., Samsung, 137 S. Ct. at 435 (design patent on
cell phone component); In re Zahn, 617 F.2d 261, 268 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (design
patent on drill component).” FGTL Br. 20. But the component parts addressed in
these cases clearly are different from the automotive repair parts addressed in this
case. In re Zahn involved a portion of an integrated drill bit and Samsung involved
design patents on the front face and grid of icons of a smart phone. There was no
evidence that these components typically were damaged in normal use and that a
Gorham v. White, 81 U.S. 511 (1871), the silverware handles were integrated with
the remainder of the fork and spoon and there was no evidence of a
1
FGTL also cites Ex parte Adams, 84 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 311 (1898). FGTL Br.
21. Ex parte Adams involved rejection of an application for “Design for Truck Side
Frames” for having movable parts. The opinion states the “movable parts may each
separately be patented as a design; but the machine itself cannot be so patented….”
3
Rather, in each of these cases, defendants were attempting to sell articles that
included the accused design (drill bit, smart phone, silverware), but were not
design. These cases are to be distinguished from cases such as Best Lock and Static
part that included the accused design (replacement key blade and printer cartridge).
A. The Hood and Headlamp Designs in the ‘299 and ‘685 Patents Do
Not Meet the Ornamental Requirement of Section 171(a).
35 U.S.C. § 171(a) states in relevant part “[w]hoever invents any new, original
and ornamental design for an article of manufacture may obtain a patent therefor….”
FGTL is correct that in this action ABPA is not challenging the novelty or originality
of the hood and headlamp designs in the USD 489,299 (“the ‘299 Patent”) and the
USD 501,685 (“the ‘685 Patent”). The effort FGTL spends on these two issues is
not relevant.
FGTL argues that ABPA has misread and misapplied Best Lock, but it is
FGTL that fails to understand the significance of this Court’s legal analysis in the
Best Lock case. According to FGTL, in Best Lock “[t]his Court concluded that the
key blade design was functional (and thus ineligible for design patent protection)
4
because ‘no other shaped key blade would fit into the corresponding’ lock.” FGTL
Br. 25-26. (citing Best Lock at 1566). FGTL argues Best Lock is inapplicable
because “[t]he hood and headlamp designs claimed in the ’299 and ’685 patents are
not the only designs for those components that fit on an F-150 truck.” FGTL Br. 26.
blade that inserts into a keyway. The district court found the design patent invalid
because it lacked ornamentality. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that that since “an
unlimited number of key blade and corresponding keyway designs are available,”
the design claimed for the key blade is ornamental because it “is not dictated solely
and this Court’s analysis and rationale for the rejection is the true significance of
Best Lock.
This Court first acknowledged that “different interfaces between key blades
function as a lock and key set.” Id. at 1566. “However,” this Court continued, “Best
Lock's patent does not claim the combination of a lock and corresponding key.
Instead, the claim in the '636 design patent is limited to a key blade, which must be
designed as shown in the '636 patent in order to perform its intended function.” Id.
ABPA explained the significance of this in its opening brief: “this Court’s analysis
5
did not focus on alternative designs that might be created during the design process
for the interface between the key blade and keyway, but rather focused on the
practical mate and match compatibility issues after the designs were created.”
Since the focus is on compatibility after the original designs are created, there
is no reason that compatibility need be limited to whether the designs fit together
mechanically. Rather, compatibility also includes whether the designs fit together
Indeed, the only reason the particular part is being purchased is to return the F-150
back to its pre-damaged appearance. Just as a particular appearance of the key blade
was needed to be compatible with the keyway in Best Lock, a particular appearance
FGTL argues Best Lock is not applicable because it was mechanical fit that
was important and not the appearance of the key blade. FGTL’s argument focuses
patent statute, 35 U.S.C. § 171, requires that the design be ornamental, not that it be
simply because one of the tests for determining ornamentality is whether a design is
6
conscious design choice. When ornamentality is thought of this way and is
combined with the Best Lock analysis, it can be seen that appearance compatibility
FGTL’s response indicates that FGTL misreads ABPA’s brief, the evidence,
and the Best Lock case. FGTL first mentions the performance parts referred to in
the District Court opinion and states the performance parts look different than the
original parts. FGTL then states “[y]et both the original and performance parts
“mate and match” with the F-150 truck.” FGTL Br. 26. That is incorrect. Although
the performance parts may “mate” with the F-150, they clearly do not “match” the
original appearance of the F-150. Indeed, in the deposition testimony of Joseph Tsai
quoted by FGTL at FGTL Br. 26-27, Mr. Tsai never states that the performance parts
“match” the appearance of the F-150. Rather, Mr. Tsai testifies that the performance
parts “mate and fit with the original vehicles” Appx940-941 (emphasis added),
which is quite a different thing than mating and matching with the original vehicles.
Referring to Best Lock, FGTL states “ABPA also reads Best Lock to stand for
the proposition that the hood and headlamp designs in the ’299 and ’685 patents are
functional because they were ‘designed together with the rest of the F-150 exterior,’
and because ‘the hood, headlamp, and F-150 . . . are arbitrary designs when
considered as a combination.’” FGTL Br. 27. FGTL then states “[b]ut neither of
those suggests that a design is functional” and “[t]he fact that one design is made in
7
conjunction with another design does not make either design functional.” FGTL Br.
27. FGTL’s conclusion is contrary to the majority holding in Best Lock. Indeed,
FGTL’s reasoning and conclusion are the same as the reasoning and conclusion in
In the Best Lock dissent, Judge Newman states “[i]n holding that because the
key must fit a keyway, the abstract design of the key profile is converted to one
solely of function, the court creates an exception to design patent subject matter”
and “[a]n arbitrary design of a useful article is not statutorily excluded from § 171
at 1569. This is the argument made by FGTL referenced above that was rejected by
the majority in Best Lock. The important point is that because the key blade and
keyway were designed together and had to be compatible in use, this Court found
This Court’s rationale in Best Lock indicates that when evaluating the
focus is not on potential alternative designs that might be created during the design
process, but rather on the practical mate and match compatibility after the designs
are created. This type of analysis also was followed in Static Control, supra, where
the Sixth Circuit found invalid as functional a design patent on a printer replacement
toner cartridge where, inter alia, (1) the toner cartridge design was dictated solely
8
by the printer with which it was compatible and (2) customers selected replacement
toner cartridges based solely on whether the cartridge was compatible with the
Although FGTL wants to focus the attention on the design process that occurs
when the F-150 originally is being designed, that is not the proper focus in the mate
and match and repair/replacement context under Best Lock and Static Control.
FGTL states “ABPA has invented wholesale this purported functionality test”
that the subject designs are not ornamental because they do not contain any
conscious design choices. FGTL Br. 29. FGTL is incorrect because ABPA’s
argument is derived from this Court’s rationale in Best Lock that the focus is on
the designs are created, it is understandable why the designs do not contain any
conscious design choices. The only conscious design choices occur while the
designs are being created. If the design creation process was the time that was
relevant, then the key blade in Best Lock and the printer cartridge in Static Control
would have been eligible for design patent protection because the original designs
and design interfaces were arbitrary. However, this Court and the Sixth Circuit, in
the mate and match and repair/replacement context, focus solely on the compatibility
9
of designs after they were created and how a consumer would select a replacement
design.
FGTL cites the gasket design in In re Carletti, 328 F.2d 1020 (C.C.P.A. 1964)
as an example of a design that lacks ornamentality. FGTL Br. 29. FGTL then tries
to distinguish the subject designs, stating “Ford spent millions of dollars employing
artists whose job was to create hundreds of potential designs for these and other
features of Ford vehicles so that consumers will want to purchase them.” FGTL Br.
29. The problem with FGTL’s argument is that it is focuses on the wrong period of
time. The designers in Best Lock and Static Control also no doubt spent a substantial
amount of time designing the products at issue. But the problem was that the designs
were created to be compatible with another design, and in the mate and match and
repair/replacement context, the proper focus is not when designs originally are
FGTL next argues that because a consumer post collision can replace a hood
or headlamp with a performance part that does not look like the original, the
consumer is making a conscious design choice to choose the original design. This
argument is surprising given that FGTL states Ford spends millions of dollars
designing the F-150. Given the effort Ford puts into the design, it is understandable
that an owner will want to return the vehicle back to original appearance, and a return
to original appearance does not involve a conscious design choice by the designer.
10
Indeed, returning a vehicle back to original appearance is no less important than
having a lock that works or a printer cartridge that fits. A replacement key blade or
replacement toner cartridge can be bought with a different design, but they will not
work. Likewise, a performance hood or headlamp can be bought, but it will not
work to return the F-150 back to original appearance. Finally, the typical insurance
policy requirement to return the vehicle back to its “its pre-loss operational safety,
Since the subject designs are not ornamental under this Court’s reasoning in
Best Lock, it is not necessary to address the issue of “matter of concern.” However,
Citing In re Webb, 916 F.2d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1990), FGTL argues the
appearances of the hood and headlamp are a matter of concern because they are not
hidden from view. FGTL Br. 30-31. FGTL fails to consider that the hood and
headlamp are repair/replacement items sold by part number and In re Webb states
replacement or order number, or they are noticed during sale only to assess
functionality” and “[i]n such circumstances, the PTO may properly conclude that an
11
application provides no evidence that there is a period in the commercial life of a
particular design when its ornamentality may be a matter of concern.” Id. at 1558.
Further, In re Webb involved a design for a femoral hip stem prosthesis and
did not involve a design for a component part or portion of the article sold. The case
therefore does not address the issue of whether a design, when considered
overall design that is being considered for purchase. There is no record evidence in
this case that a consumer purchases an F-150 based on the design of the claimed
portions of the hood and headlamp separate and apart from the appearance of the
overall design of the F-150. As argued by ABPA in the opening brief and as
supported by the analysis in Best Lock, the only customer concern for the hood and
headlamp designs during original purchase is that they are aesthetically compatible
The ultimate issue regarding ornamentality is not whether there are other
designs that can perform the same mechanical function as the subject designs, but
rather whether there are alternative designs that allow for a conscious design choice
to be made. See MPEP 1504.01(c); In re Carletti, supra, at 1022; ABPA Br. 12-13.
If there are no conscious design choices to be made, then it should not matter whether
the lack of choices is due to mechanical factors or due to appearance. It is for this
12
reason that consideration of so called “aesthetic functionality” is proper when
repair/replacement context.
In its response argument, FGTL states “ABPA appears to recognize that its
functionality arguments fail as a matter of design patent law.” FGTL Br. 33. That
whether a conscious design choice was made. FGTL states that ABPA is requesting
this Court to “change long standing precedent in the design patent area.” FGTL Br.
33. However, the quote referred to the elimination of the “point of novelty” test in
Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) and
not to the issue of aesthetic functionality, which has yet to be addressed by this Court.
trademark protection, thus are intended to inhibit competition for a period of time.”
FGTL Br. 34. FGTL’s argument suffers from the same problem as the District
Court’s opinion: neither considers that design patent law seeks to balance the
promotion of competition with promotion of the decorative arts. See Avia Group
International Inc. v. L. A. Gear California Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1563 (Fed. Cir.
1988). This balance is reflected in the statutory requirement that a patentable design
be "ornamental,” meaning that when a design is not the result of decorative design
13
choices, granting a design patent to such a design would not serve the purpose of
choice being made that promotes the decorative arts,” FGTL Br. 35, FGTL does not
even attempt a substantive response. Rather, FGTL simply states “ABPA is not even
asking the Court to apply the aesthetic functionality doctrine from trademark law”
and “[ABPA] is instead asking the Court to make up a brand new standard for
ABPA is not asking this Court to make up a “brand new standard,” but rather
when determining whether a conscious design choice was made, which is the
aesthetic functionality in the field of trademarks.” ABPA Br. 24. ABPA therefore
helpful to the analysis - not due to any claim that it is exactly the same in purpose
and effect.
14
FGTL concludes “[t]his Court need not follow ABPA down a new legal
path,” and because “ABPA has conceded that it is not arguing that the ’299 or ’685
accordingly affirm the District Court’s functionality ruling on that basis.” FGTL Br.
whether a conscious design choice was made in the mate and match and
repair/replacement context.
FGTL states ABPA’s argument to be “even if the ’299 and ’685 patents are valid
design patents when an F-150 is first purchased, those patents lose their validity
when it comes to assessing replacement parts.” FGTL Br. 35-36. ABPA is not
arguing that the patents are invalid in the repair/replacement market, but rather that
market served also is appropriate in design patent law because the matter of concern
inquiry relates to the concerns of the purchaser.” ABPA Br. 37. FGTL states “that
argument makes no sense” because “this Court has made clear that if a design is a
15
matter of concern at any point in an article’s life, that design is patentable. [citing]
matter of concern for the customer is that the part design match the original design.
To partially repeat the quote from In re Webb: “many replacement items … are sold
by replacement or order number” and [i]n such circumstances, the PTO may
the commercial life of a particular design when its ornamentality may be a matter of
patent functionality is a flexible concept that has been used in ways other than to
invalidate a design patent such as factoring out elements during claim construction.
FGTL fails to properly analyze the exhaustion issue for design patents and
focuses instead on the analysis used for utility patents. As indicated by the line of
cases involving exhaustion and method patents such as Quanta Computer Inc. v. LG
Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008), the exhaustion doctrine is flexible enough to
be adapted to different types of patents. ABPA argues that the patent exhaustion
16
FGTL states “[u]nder the exhaustion doctrine, the sale of a patented article
exhausts the patentee’s rights as to that article.” (emphasis in original). (citing Jazz
Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm., 264 F.3d 1094, 1105 (Fed. Cir. 2001). However,
in Jazz Photo there were no design patents covering less than the entire exterior of
the cameras and the exterior design was unaffected by the remanufacturing process.
Therefore, issues involving component parts and portion claiming simply were not
raised or analyzed and the reference to “that article” necessarily could not have
distinguished between the article sold or a component part of the article sold.
FGTL states: “[i]t has long been established that the doctrine does not permit
the purchaser to infringe a patent by making (or buying) new copies of a patented
component and claiming the new copies are “repairing” the original article.” FGTL
Br. 37. However, FGTL then only cites two cases involving utility patents, Aiken v.
Manchester Print Works, 2 Cliff. 435 (1865) and Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany
Perforated Wrapping Paper Co., 152 U.S. 425 (1894). FGTL cites no cases
Every case cited by FGTL involves a utility patent, including the Jazz Photo
case, which also involved a utility patent in the portion of the Jazz Photo opinion
cited by FGTL. As explained in ABPA’s opening brief and as explained below, the
analysis for patent exhaustion in a utility patent case is different from the analysis
17
for patent exhaustion in a method patent case and should be different in a design
patent case as well. When the patent exhaustion doctrine is properly adapted to the
FGTL argues that ABPA is requesting “a new exhaustion regime, solely for
design patents ….” FGTL Br. 41. That is incorrect, as ABPA is arguing that
recognizes their unique nature, which is precisely what this Court and the Supreme
Court did when adapting exhaustion principles to method patents. Indeed, in the
method patent context, when the patentee argued that method patents were not
directed toward the sale of a product and that exhaustion should not apply, the
Supreme Court adapted the doctrine and reasoned that exhaustion applied to the sale
Computer, supra, at 2117. This was an effective solution to a complex issue and
one that has proven both predictable and workable in practice. Notably, FGTL
avoids any mention of how the patent exhaustion doctrine has been adapted to
follow” FGTL Br. 41, but FGTL does not explain why it finds the argument difficult
to follow other than to say it finds ABPA’s argument to be “confusing.” FGTL Br.
18
41. However, it appears FGTL’s confusion may be the result of FGTL misstating
ABPA’s argument.
FGTL states ABPA’s argument is that utility patents are directed to a specific
that is why patent exhaustion did not apply to replacement of the knitting machine
needle in Aiken that was separately patented. FGTL Br. 41-42. Correct so far. But
then FGTL states ABPA’s argument to be “where a design patent claims a design
for a component of a larger product, such as a headlamp design for an F-150 truck,
the relevant ‘article’ is the larger product, not the component” and “the right to repair
the F-150 truck permits a consumer to make (or buy) a copy of a patented headlamp
component.” FGTL Br. 42. FGTL claims ABPA’s theory is “completely made up”
and contrary to Samsung, which held “the term ‘article of manufacture’ is broad
that product.” 137 S. Ct. at 435. FGTL Br. 42. FGTL concludes that “ABPA’s theory
that the F-150 truck is the relevant ‘article’ (rather than a component such as the
exhaustion analysis for design patents the relevant article of manufacture is the larger
product to the exclusion of the component part or portion thereof. Rather, ABPA
argues that “the design claimed can be embodied in both a portion of [an] article of
19
manufacture and also a portion of a component of an article of manufacture,” ABPA
Br. 52, and that exhaustion applies to any product sold that embodies the patented
Further, rather than being “completely made up,” ABPA’s argument is the
same type approach this Court uses when analyzing exhaustion for method patents.
In Quanta Computer, supra, when LGE argued “because method patents are linked
not to a tangible article but to a process, they can never be exhausted through a sale,”
Id. at S.Ct. 2117, the Supreme Court disagreed, stating “[i]t is true that a patented
method may not be sold in the same way as an article or device, but methods
rights.” Id. Similarly, although design patents are not specifically linked to one
particular article of manufacture because they are for an article of manufacture and
may claim a portion thereof, design patents can be embodied in more than one article
at page 42: “the term ‘article of manufacture’ is broad enough to encompass both a
citing Samsung, 137 S. Ct. at 435) (emphasis added). That is exactly what ABPA is
arguing – the term article of manufacture is broad enough to include the F-150, the
20
hood and headlamp, and the portions of the hood and headlamp claimed in the design
patents.
manufacture was for computing damages under 35 U.S.C. § 289. But that is an
Indeed, under section 289, the focus is on the article sold by the accused infringer
and under exhaustion, the focus is on the article sold by the patent owner.
calculate the accused infringer’s “total profit.” The current test for determining
article of manufacture under section 289 consists of these factors: (1) the scope of
the design claimed in the plaintiff's patent, including the drawing and written
description; (2) the relative prominence of the design within the product as a whole;
(3) whether the design is conceptually distinct from the product as a whole; and (4)
the physical relationship between the patented design and the rest of the product,
including whether the design pertains to a component that a user or seller can
physically separate from the product as a whole, and whether the design is embodied
in a component that is manufactured separately from the rest of the product, or if the
component can be sold separately. See Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd,
21
Notably, references to “product as a whole” in factors (2), (3) and (4), and
references to “product” in factor (4) are references to the product sold by the accused
infringer, and not to the “product as a whole” and “product” sold by the patent owner.
So clearly this test is not meant to determine article of manufacture for exhaustion
purposes.
Further, the four-factor test (or something similar) would not be appropriate
the courts have made the inquiry relatively straightforward by asking whether the
Indeed, ambiguity is the reason the four-factor test is needed under section 289.
exhaustion doctrine is best served by having a test similar to the method patent test
that is broad and includes articles sold that embody the patented design.
Indeed, the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the breadth of the patent
exhaustion doctrine, stating “we conclude that a patentee’s decision to sell a product
22
exhausts all of its patent rights in that item …” and “[t]he sale ‘terminates all patent
rights to that item.’” Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523,
1529, 1531 (2017) (citing Quanta Computer, supra, at 625) (method patent).
for why the exhaustion doctrine does not permit restraints on alienation of patent
Take a shop that restores and sells used cars. The business works
because the shop can rest assured that, so long as those bringing in the
cars own them, the shop is free to repair and resell those vehicles. That
smooth flow of commerce would sputter if companies that make the
thousands of parts that go into a vehicle could keep their patent rights
after the first sale. Those companies might, for instance, restrict resale
rights and sue the shop owner for patent infringement. And even if they
refrained from imposing such restrictions, the very threat of patent
liability would force the shop to invest in efforts to protect itself from
hidden lawsuits. Either way, extending the patent rights beyond the first
sale would clog the channels of commerce, with little benefit from the
extra control that the patentees retain.
This example also serves to illustrate why the embodiment test proposed by
straightforward embodiment test, “the very threat of patent liability [will] force the
shop to invest in efforts to protect itself from hidden lawsuits” and “clog the channels
of commerce.” Id.
23
Significantly, FGTL appears to agree with the principle that an article which
embodies but is larger than the article claimed by the design patent may be repaired
under the patent exhaustion doctrine. FGTL states: “Thus, although consumers may
repair a hood or headlamp that is damaged, they may not replace the hood or
headlamp with a completely new part.” FGTL Br. 40. Notably, it is not the entire
hood or headlamp that is claimed in FGTL’s design patents, but rather only portions
of the hood and headlamp. For the hood as shown below left, the under portion
shown in broken lines is not claimed. Appx181-182. For the headlamp as shown
below right, neither the outer plastic lens nor the rear housing, shown in broken lines,
is claimed. Appx191-193.
damaged” FGTL Br. 40, FGTL does not state specifically what may be repaired and
24
what may be replaced in the hood or headlamp to repair it. For example, under
using the same test for exhaustion advocated by ABPA: as long as the article of
repaired under the patent exhaustion doctrine even though the repair may involve
replacing component articles that also embody the claimed design. The only
difference is that FGTL argues the larger hood and headlamp may be repaired and
ABPA argues the larger F-150 may be repaired. But the arguments are conceptually
the same in that each argues that an article larger than that actually claimed may be
FGTL may argue that the “article of manufacture” is not the component(s)
actually claimed or the F-150, but rather the hood and headlamp.2 But there has been
2
The title of the ‘299 Patent is “Exterior of Vehicle Hood” (Appx174) and the title
of ‘685 Patent is “Vehicle Head Lamp.” (Appx183). The origin of the four-factor
test adopted for determination of the article of manufacture under section 289 is the
“Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party.” 2016 U.S.
S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2322, *46-48 (June 8, 2016). In the brief, the United States
argues that “the factfinder should not treat the patent's designation of the article as
conclusive” out of a concern that the patentee could manipulate the result through
its characterization of the article in the title. Id. at *46. The title likewise should not
be deemed conclusive when considering the article of manufacture for exhaustion
purposes.
25
no such finding in this case and it would be inappropriate to make such a finding for
the purpose of exhaustion. FGTL has not proposed a test for determining a specific
article of manufacture for the purpose of right to repair in a design patent case and
one wonders what it would be. The article of manufacture test for section 289 is not
appropriate because it is complicated and designed for use in litigation when the
purpose is to determine a fair amount of profit that should be disgorged from the
accused infringer.
than determining profits under section 289. As explained in ABPA’s opening brief
at page 55, it is an implied license that underlies the right to repair, and the scope of
the implied license “must be based on what the parties reasonably intended as to the
scope of the implied license based on the circumstances of the sale.” See
Carborundum Co. v. Molten Metal Equip. Innovs., 72 F.3d 872, 878 (Fed. Cir.
1995). Here, as explained in ABPA’s Brief page 56, the circumstances are that the
parts are not marked with patent numbers so when a customer purchases an F-150,
they have no notice, actual or constructive, that components of the hood and the
headlamp are patented. The F-150 is advertised and sold as a complete article with
designs. Finally, to the extent a customer may be aware of the subject design patents,
26
they state the hood and headlamp are “intended for attachment to a vehicle.”
(Appx174, Appx183).
circumstances of the sale. A test that is consistent with the parties’ reasonable
expectations is whether the article sold embodies the patented design, which is the
test proposed by ABPA and the test used in the method patent context.
FGTL concludes its argument with a list of who has supposedly rejected
ABPA’s argument. This Court should not be persuaded. ABPA did not argue before
rulings, and the New World District Court simply adopted the rulings of the District
grants an implied license to repair the F-150, including the purchase and use of
component parts that also embody the claimed designs. FGTL argues “ABPA has
made this argument up” FGTL Br. 53, and states ABPA has cited no case in support
3
The ITC Order is neither controlling, see Powertech Technology Inc. v. Tessera,
Inc., 660 F.3d 1301, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2011), nor correct. See Appx2177-2181.
27
of its position. However, as set forth in ABPA’s opening brief at pages 55-56 and
as set forth above, ABPA cites cases that explain the relevant implied license
Stencil Mfg. Corp., 123 F.3d 1445, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1997) for the proposition that
the implied authorization to use and sell a patented device’” FGTL Br. 43, but
FGTL argues “[t]he fact that a purchaser may have a license to make or
purchase a patented part does not retroactively grant ABPA’s members immunity
for making that part without a license” and cites three cases (Crossroads Systems,
Global Communications, and Asetek Holdings) for the proposition that patent
Br. 44-45. However, none of the cases cited by FGTL involve the right to repair.
When the right to repair is involved, it necessarily includes the right to purchase
repair parts from others. See Kendall Co. v. Progressive Medical Technology, Inc.,
28
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
Based on the arguments and authorities above and in ABPA’s opening brief,
the District Court erred in denying ABPA’s motion for summary judgment and
granting summary judgment in favor of FGTL. ABPA requests that this case be
reversed and summary judgment rendered in favor of ABPA, and that this Court
grant such other and further relief to which ABPA may show itself to be justly
entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
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