1. Alvarez v.

IAC May 7, 1990

FACTS: Aniceto Yanes owned 2 parcels of land Lot 773-A and Lot 773-B.
Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein private respondents, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus,
are the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while the other private respondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe.
Teodora was survived by her child, Jovita (Jovito) Albib.

It is established that Rufino and his children left the province to settle in other places as a result of the outbreak of World War II.
According to Estelita, from the “Japanese time up to peace time”, they did not visit the parcels of land in question but “after liberation”,
when her brother went there to get their share of the sugar produced therein, he was informed that Fortunato Santiago, Fuentebella
(Puentevella) and Alvarez were in possession of Lot 773.

After Fuentebella’s death, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella sold said lots for P6,000.00 to Rosendo Alvarez. On May 26, 1960, Teodora
Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino filed a complaint against Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez and
the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the “return” of the ownership and possession of Lots 773 and 823.
During the pendency of said case, Alvarez sold the Lots for P25,000.00 to Dr. Rodolfo Siason. CFI rendered judgment ordering
defendant Rosendo Alvarez to reconvey to plaintiffs the lots.

ISSUE: W/N the liability of Rosendo Alvarez arising from the sale of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B could be legally passed or transmitted
by operation of law to the petitioners without violation of law and due process.

HELD:The doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction is on the general transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the deceased to his
legitimate children and heirs.

The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the provision of our Rules of Court that money
debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate before the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The
reason is that whatever payment is thus made from the estate is ultimately a payment by the heirs or distributees, since the amount
of the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to receive.

“Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a party’s contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors. The
rule is a consequence of the progressive ‘depersonalization’ of patrimonial rights and duties.

Roman concept of a relation from person to person, the obligation has evolved into a relation from patrimony to patrimony, with the
persons occupying only a representative position, barring those rare cases where the obligation is strictly personal, in consideration
of its performance by a specific person and by no other. . . .”

Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal consequences of their father’s transaction,
which gave rise to the present claim for damages.
RULING: The doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction is on the general transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the deceased to
his legitimate children and heirs. The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the provision
of our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate before the residue is distributed
among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment is thus made from the estate is ultimately a payment by the heirs
or distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to
receive.
"Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a party's contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors. The
rule is a consequence of the progressive 'depersonalization' of patrimonial rights and duties. From the Roman concept of a relation
from person to person, the obligation has evolved into a relation from patrimony to patrimony, with the persons occupying only a
representative position, barring those rare cases where the obligation is strictly personal, in consideration of its performance by a
specific person and by no other. . . ."Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal
consequences of their father's transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages.

2. Bienvenido Gevero v. IAC | Del Monte

FACTS: DELCOR purchased a lot (lot 2476-A; 20,119 sq met) from the late Luis Lancero. As per Deed of Absolute Sale exec in
favor of DELCOR, a TCT was issued. Luis acquired the same parcel of land from Ricardo Gevero(1952). The sale bet Luis and
Ricardo waqs annotated at the back of an OCT covering a mother lot(lot no. 2476) in the names of Ricardo, his mother Teodorica
and his siblings.
Teodorica died long before WW2. In 1966, an extra-judicial settlement and partition was executed by the heirs of Teo. Lot 2476 was
adjudicated in favor of Ricardo who was then alive. DELCOR filed an action with the CFI of Misamis Oriental to quiet title and/or
annul the partition made by the heirs insofar as the same prejudices the land which it acquired. After trial court rendered judgment in
favor of plaintiff corporation. The appellate court affirmed the decision.

ISSUE: WON the 1/2 share of interest of Teodorica in one of the litigated lots is included in the deed of sale.

HELD: Yes. The hereditary share in a decedents' estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the death of the
"causante" or predecessor in interest (Art. 777), and there is no legal bar to a successor disposing of his hereditary share immediately
after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate. Teodorica
Babangha died long before World War II, hence, the rights to the succession were transmitted from the moment of her death. It is
therefore incorrect to state that it was only in 1966, the date of extrajudicial partition, when Ricardo received his share in the lot as
inheritance from his mother Teodorica. Thus, when Ricardo sold his share over lot 2476 that share which he inherited from Teodorica
was also included unless expressly excluded in the deed of sale.

3. Mariano Locsin v. CA | Bicolanong Haciendero

FACTS: Don Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will and Testament instituting his wife, Catalina Jaucian Locsin,as the sole and
universal heir of all his properties. The spouses being childless, had agreed that their properties, after both of them shall have died
shouldrevert to their respective sides of the family, i.e., Mariano's properties would go to his "Locsin relatives"(i.e., brothers and
sisters or nephews and nieces), andthose of Catalina to her "Jaucian relatives. "Don Mariano died of cancer on September 14,1948
after a lingering illness. In due time, his will was probated in Special Proceedings No. 138, CFI of Albay without any opposition from
both sides of the family. Don Mariano relied on Doña Catalina to carry out the terms of their compact, hence, nine (9) years after his
death, as if in obedience to his voice from the grave, and fully cognizant that she was also advancing in years, Doña Catalina began
transferring, by sale, donation or assignment, Don Mariano's as well as her own, properties to their respective nephews and nieces.
Shemade the following sales and donation of properties which she had received from her husband's estate, to his Locsin nephews
and nieces: Four years before her death, she had made a will on October 22, 1973 she had made a will affirming and ratifying the
transfers she had made during her lifetime in favor of her husband's, and her own, relatives. After the reading of her will, all the
relatives agreed that there was no need to submit it to the court for probate because the properties devised to them under the will
had already been conveyed to them by the deceased when she was still alive, except some legacies which the executor of her will
or estate, Attorney Salvador Lorayes, proceeded to distribute. In 1989, some of her Jaucian nephews and nieces who had already
received their legacies and hereditary shares from her estate, filed action in the RTC-Legaspi to recover the properties which she
had conveyed to the Locsins during her lifetime, alleging that the conveyances were inofficious, without consideration, and intended
solely to circumvent the laws on succession. Those who were closest to Doña Catalina did not join the action. After the trial, judgment
was rendered in favor of Jaucian, and against the Locsin. The CA affirmed the said decision, hence this petition.

ISSUE: WON the nephews and nieces of Doña Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin, are entitled to inherit the properties which she had already
disposed of more than ten (10) years before her death.

HELD: NO. They are not entitled since those properties did not form part of her hereditary estate, i.e., "the property and transmissible
rights and obligations existing at the time of (the decedent's) death and those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the
succession.
"The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death, and do not vest in his heirs until such time.
Property which Doña Catalina had transferred or conveyed to other persons during her lifetime no longer formed part of her estate
at the time of her death to which her heirs may lay claim. Had she died intestate, only the property that remained in her estate at the
time of her death devolved to her legal heirs.

Even if those transfers were, one and all, treated as donations, the right arising under certain circumstances to impugn and compel
the reduction or revocation of a decedent's gifts inter vivos does not inure to the respondents since neither they nor the donees are
compulsory (or forced) heirs.

Said respondents are not her compulsory heirs, and it is not pretended that she had any such, hence there were no legitimes that
could conceivably be impaired by any transfer of her property during her lifetime. All that the respondents had was an expectancy
that in nowise restricted her freedom to dispose of even her entire estate subject only to the limitation set forth in Art. 750, Civil Code
which, even if it were breached, the respondents may not invoke: “Art. 750. The donation may comprehend all the present property
of the donor or part thereof, provided he reserves, in full ownership or in usufruct, sufficient means for the support of himself, and of
all relatives who, at the time of the acceptance of the donation, are by law entitled to be supported by the donor. Without such
reservation, the donation shall be reduced on petition of any person affected”. Petition for review is granted.

FACTS: Mariano inherited extensive property from his father Getulio. He brought his inheritance into his marriage with Catalina
Jaucian. Catalina, for her part, brought into the marriage untitled properties which she had inherited form her parents.
Mariano Locsin executed a last will and testament instituting his wife as the sole and universal heir of all his properties. The spouses
being childless, they had agreed that their properties, after both of them shall have died should revert to their respective sides of the
family. After Mariano's death, (1948) his will was probated without opposition from both sides of the family. Nine years after the death
of Don Mariano, Catalina began transferring, by sale, donation or assignment, Mariano's as well as her own, props to their respective
nephews and nieces.
Catalina died in 1977. Four years before her death, she made a will affirming the transfers she made. Six years after her demise,
some of Catalina's nephews and nieces filed an action in the RTC of Legaspi to recover the properties which she had conveyed to
the Locsins, alleging that the conveyances were innoficious, without consideration, and intended solely to circumvent the laws on
succession. After the trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

ISSUE: WON the PRs are entitled to inherit the properties which Catalina had already disposed of more than 10 yrs before her death.

HELD: No. The properties did not form part of her hereditaty estate. The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the
moment of his death, and do not vest in his heirs until such time. 11 Property which Doña Catalina had transferred or conveyed to
other persons during her lifetime no longer formed part of her estate at the time of her death to which her heirs may lay claim. Had
she died intestate, only the property that remained in her estate at the time of her death devolved to her legal heirs; and even if those
transfers were, one and all, treated as donations, the right arising under certain circumstances to impugn and compel the reduction
or revocation of a decedent's gifts inter vivos does not inure to the respondents since neither they nor the donees are compulsory (or
forced) heirs.
There is thus no basis for assuming an intention on the part of Doña Catalina, in transferring the properties she had received from
her late husband to his nephews and
nieces, an intent to circumvent the law in violation of the private respondents' rights to her succession. Said respondents are not her
compulsory heirs, and it is not pretended that she had any such, hence there were no legitimes that could conceivably be impaired
by any transfer of her property during her lifetime. All that the respondents had was an expectancy that in nowise restricted her
freedom to dispose of even her entire estate subject only to the limitation set forth in Art. 750, Civil Code which, even if it were
breached, the respondents may not invoke.

4. Natalia Opulencia v. CA | Sale In Probate

G.R. Mo.125835; July 30, 1998
FACTS: PRs Aladin Simundac and Miguel Oliven filed a complaint for specific performance again NataliaCarpena Opulencia on the
ground that the latter executed in their favor a 'contract to sell' of lot 2125.The defendant, despite demands, failed to comply with her
obligations under the contract. Thedefendant averred that the property subject of the contract formed part of the Estate of
DemetrioCarpena, in respect of which a petition for probate was filed with the RTC of Binan. The court orderedthe parties to submit
their evidence. Pet, instead of submitting evid, filed a demurrer. Moreover, thepet maintained that the contract was null and void for
want of approval of the probate court.Meanwhile, the court a quo granted the demurrer and dismissed the complaint. On appeal,
theappellate court set aside hte trial court's dismissal of the complaint.

ISSUE: WON a contract to sell a real property involved in estate proceedings valid and binding without theapproval of the probate
court.

HELD: Yes. Hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs from the moment of the decedent's death. Petitioner, therefore, became
the owner of her hereditary share the moment her father died. Thus, the lack of judicial approval does not invalidate the Contract to
Sell, because the petitioner has the substantive right to sell the whole or a part of her share in the estate of her late father. Petitioner
contends that "[t]o sanction the sale at this stage would bring about a partial distribution of the decedent's estate pending the final
termination of the testate proceedings." Petitioner's contention is not convincing. The Contract to Sell stipulates that petitioner's offer
to sell is contingent on the "complete clearance of the court on the Last Will Testament of her father." Consequently, although the
Contract to Sell was perfected between the petitioner and private respondents during the pendency of the probate proceedings, the
consummation of the sale or the transfer of ownership over the parcel of land to the private respondents is subject to the full payment
of the purchase price and to the termination and outcome of the testate proceedings. Therefore, there is no basis for petitioner’s
apprehension that the Contract to Sell may result in a premature partition and distribution of the properties of the estate. Indeed, it is
settled that "the sale made by an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the pending administration, in no wise stands in the
way of such administration."

5. Emilio Emnace v. CA | Fishing Partnership

FACTS: Pets Emnace, Tabanao and Divigranacia were partners in a business known as Ma. Nelma Fishing Industry. Sometime in
January 1986, they decided to dissolve their partnership and exec an agreement of partition and distribution. Throughout the
existence of the partnership, and even after Tabanao's death, pet failed to submit to Taba's heirs any financial statements. Pet also
reneged on his promise to turn over the 1/3 share in the total assets of the partnership to the heirs. PRs (heris) filed an action for
accounting, payment of shares, division of assets and damages. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of
improper venue, lack of jurisdiction and lack of capacity of the estate of Tabano to sue. The trial court denied the motion todismiss.
The trial court held that the heirs of Tabano had a right to sue in their own names,in view of the provision of Art. 777 of the CC.

ISSUE: WON surviving spouse of Tabano thas legal capacity to sue.

HELD: Yes. petitioner asserts that the surviving spouse of Vicente Tabanao has no legal capacity to sue since she was never
appointed as administratrix or executrix of his estate.
Petitioner’s objection in this regard is misplaced. The surviving spouse does not need to be appointed as executrix or administratrix
of the estate before she can file the action. She and her children are complainants in their own right as successors of Vicente
Tabanao.
From the very moment of Vicente Tabanao’s death, his rights insofar as the partnership was concerned were transmitted to his heirs,
for rights to the succession are transmitted rom the moment of death of the decedent. Whatever claims and rights Vicente Tabanao
had against the partnership and petitioner were transmitted to respondents by operation of law, more particularly by succession,
which is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a
person are transmitted. Moreover, respondents became owners of their respective hereditary shares from the moment Vicente
Tabanao died. A prior settlement of the estate, or even the appointment of Salvacion Tabanao as executrix or administratrix, is not
necessary for any of the heirs to acquire legal capacity to sue. As successors who stepped into the shoes of their decedent upon his
death, they can commence any action originally pertaining to the decedent. From the moment of his death, his rights as a partner
and to demand fulfillment of petitioner’s obligations as outlined in their dissolution agreement were transmitted to respondents. They,
therefore, had the capacity to sue and seek the court’s intervention to compel petitioner to fulfill his obligations.

6. Rabadilla v. CA | Codicil
FACTS: Testator Aleja Belleza appended a codicil to his last will and testament wherein he instituted Dr. Jorge Rabadilla as a devisee
of 511, 855 sq meters of a parcel of land in Bacolod. Devisee herein is the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner. The codicil was
duly probated and admitted before the CFI of Negros Occidental.
The codicil stated that should the devisee die ahead of the testator, the property and rights shall be inherited by his children and
spouse. The codicil also required Rabadilla to deliver 75 piculs of export sugar and 25 piculs of domestic sugar to Maria Marlina
Cosculuella y Belleza, and should he die, his heir shall have the same obligation. Lastly, in the event that the devisee or his heir shall
later sell, lease, mortgage the said lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee shall also have the obligation to deliver the piculs.

Dr. Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife and children (pet).
In 1989, Maria Marlena brought a complaint against the
heirs to enforce the provisions of the codicil and to revert the ownership to the heirs of the testator.
The RTC dismissed the complaint. The appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court..


HELD: 
Yes. Petitioner maintains that Article 882 does not find application as there was no modal institution and the testatrix intended
a mere simple substitution.
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a
person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were
transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate
of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to
his compulsory heirs upon his death.
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, subject
to the condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered to the herein private respondent every year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights and title over the said property, and they also assumed his (decedent's)
obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot involved to herein private respondent. Such obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally
corresponds to the right of private respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or performance of which is now being demanded by
the latter through the institution of the case at bar. Therefore, private
respondent has a cause of action against petitioner and the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint below.
Modal Institutions: *Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions is not applicable because
what the testatrix intended was a substitution - the contention is without merit. In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the
inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation. [14] In the case under consideration, the
provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the
testatrix's near descendants would substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill
the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrix's near descendants.

FACTS: A certain Aleja Belleza died but he instituted in his will Dr. Jorge Rabadilla as a devisee to a 511, 855 hectare land. A
condition was however imposed to the effect that:
1. the naked ownership shall transfer to Dr. Rabadilla;
2. he shall deliver the fruits of said land to Maria Belleza, sister of Aleja, during the lifetime of said Maria Belleza;
3. that in case Dr. Rabadilla shall die before Maria Belleza, the near descendants, shall continue delivering the fruits to Maria
Belleza;
4. that the said land may only be encumbered, mortgaged, or sold only to a relative of Belleza.

In 1983, Dr. Rabadilla died. He was survived by Johnny Rabadilla.

In 1989, Maria Belleza sued Johnny Rabadilla in order to compel Johnny to reconvey the said land to the estate of Aleja Belleza
because it is alleged that Johnny failed to comply with the terms of the will; that since 1985, Johnny failed to deliver the fruits; and
that the the land was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank, which is a violation of the will.

In his defense, Johnny avers that the term “near descendants” in the will of Aleja pertains to the near descendants of Aleja and not
to the near descendants of Dr. Rabadilla, hence, since Aleja had no near descendants at the time of his death, no can substitute Dr.
Rabadilla on the obligation to deliver the fruits of the devised land.

ISSUE: Whether or not Johnny Rabadilla is not obliged to comply with the terms of the Will left by Aleja Belleza.

HELD: No. The contention of Johnny Rabadilla is bereft of merit. The “near descendants” being referred to in the will are the heirs of
Dr. Rabadilla. Ownership over the devised property was already transferred to Dr. Rabadilla when Aleja died. Hence, when Dr.
Rabadilla himself died, ownership over the same property was transmitted to Johnny Rabadilla by virtue of succession.

Under Article 776 of the Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his
death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Rabadilla had by virtue of the Will were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his
death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed
by the Will on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death. It is clear therefore,
that Johnny should have continued complying with the terms of the Will. His failure to do so shall give rise to an obligation for him to
reconvey the property to the estate of Aleja.

7. Belinda Tanedo v. CA
FACTS: On October 20, 1962, Lazardo Tanedo executed a notarized deed of absolute sale of “one hectare of whatever share I shall
have over Lot No. 191" in favor of his eldest brother and his wife (Ricardo and Teresita PRs). Upon hte death of his father, Lazaro
executed an "Affidavit of Conformity" to reaffirm, respect and acknowledge the sale in favor or PRs. Lazaro executed another
notarized deed of sale on favor of PRs covering 1/12 of a Lot 191. Ricardo learned taht Lazaro sold the same lot to his children. PRs
recorded the deed in the RD. Pets filed a complaint for rescission executed by Lazaro in favor of the PRs. The trial court decided in
favor of PRs. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE: WON the sale of future inheritance is valid.

HELD: Yes.
“Art. 1347. All things which are not outside the commerce of men, including future things, may be the object of a contract. All rights
which are not intransmissible may also be the object of contracts.
No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law.
All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy may likewise be the object of a contract.”

A second deed of sale was executed in favor of private respondents covering Lazaro's undivided inheritance dated 1982, so
nevermind the previous deed ya know. The deed of sale in favor of respondents was executed in 1980. However, according to Art.
1544 of the CC: “Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the
person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property,
the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
The property in
question is land, an immovable, and following the above-quoted law, ownership shall belong to the buyer who in good faith registers
it first in the registry of property. Thus, although the deed of sale in favor of private respondents was later than the one in favor of
petitioners, ownership would vest in the former because of the undisputed fact of registration. On the other hand, petitioners have
not registered the sale to them at all.

8. Sps. Virgilio Santos and Esperanza Lati Santos v. Lambao | “Bilihan Ng Lupa”
FACTS: 
Herein pets are the legitimate and surviving heirs of the late Rita Catoc Santos, who died on October 20, 195. The other
pets are the daughters-in-law of Rita. The respondents are the alleged owners of a lot, which they purportedly bought from on two
occasions. On the first occasion, Rita sold 100 square meters of her inchoate share in her mother’s estate through a document
denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa,” Before her death, Rita allegedly informed the respondents that she could not deliver the title to
the subject prop because the entire property inherited by her had not yet been partitioned. The PRs claimed that pets adjudicated
and partitioned the subject property already sold to them. They filed a formal demand letter but pets still failed and refused to reconvey
the subject property. The trial court denied the complaint. The CA reversed the decision. MR denied.
ISSUE: WON herein pets are legally bound to comply with the "Bilihan ng Lupa" and consequently, reconvey the subject property to
herein respondents.


HELD: 
The general rule that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in- interest applies in the present case.
Article 131132 of the NCC is the basis of this rule. It is clear from the said provision that whatever rights and obligations the decedent
have over the property were transmitted to the heirs by way of succession, a mode of acquiring the property, rights and obligations
of the decedent to the extent of the value of the inheritance of the heirs. Thus, the heirs cannot escape the legal consequence of a
transaction entered into by their predecessor-in-interest because they have inherited the property subject to the liability affecting their
common ancestor. Being heirs, there is privity of interest between them and their deceased mother. They only succeed to what rights
their mother had and what is valid and binding against her is also valid and binding as against them. The death of a party does not
excuse nonperformance of a contract which involves a property right and the rights and obligations thereunder pass to the personal
representatives of the deceased. Similarly, nonperformance is not excused by the death of the party when the other party has a
property interest in the subject matter of the contract. In the end, despite the death of the petitioners’ mother, they are still bound to
comply with the provisions of the "Bilihan ng Lupa,".

9. NHA v. Almeida | “Sinumpaang Salaysay”

FACTS:
The Land Tenure Administration awarded to Margarita Herrera several portions of land in San Pedro, Laguna. She had two
children, Francisca and Beatriz(she died before her mom; mother of PR). When Margarita passed away, Francisca executed a deed
of self- adjudication claiming that she was the only remaining relative of Margarita. The deed of was based on a 'Sinumpaang
Salaysay' allegedly executed by Margarita. The surviving heirs of Beatriz filed a case for annulment of the deed. A decision was
rendered and the deed was declared null and void. During the trial, Francisca filed an application with the NHA to purchase the same
lots. The NHA granted the application.
The PR appealed to the Office of the President. The NHA reso was affirmed.
When Francisca
died, her heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of her estate which they submitted to the NHA. The transfer of rights was approved
by the NHA. The heirs of Francisca directed PR to leave the premises that she was occupying.
Feeling aggrieved, PR sought the
cancellation of the titles issued in favor of the heirs of Francisca. She filed a complaint in the RTC of San Pedro, Laguna. She invoked
her 40 year occupation of the property and re-raised the fact that Francisca's declaration is a nullity because the other heirs were
disregarded. The RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The CA reversed the decision and remanded the case for further
hearing.
The RTC rendered a decision setting aside the resolution of the NHA and the decision of the Office of the President. The
Regional Trial Court ruled that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was not an assignment of rights but a disposition of property which shall
take effect upon death. It then held that the said document must first be submitted to probate before it can transfer property.
The
NHA and the heirs of Francisca filed their respective motions which were both denied. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE: WON the decision of NHA is arbitrary.

HELD: Yes. The NHA gave due course to the application made by Francisca Herrera without considering that the initial applicant's
death would transfer all her property, rights and obligations to the estate including whatever interest she has or may have had over
the disputed properties. To the extent of the interest that the original owner had over the property, the same should go to her estate.
Margarita Herrera had an interest in the property and that interest should go to her estate upon her demise so as to be able to properly
distribute them later to her heirs—in accordance with a will or by operation of law.
When the original buyer died, the NHA should have considered the estate of the decedent as the next "person" likely to stand in to
fulfill the obligation to pay the rest of the purchase price. The opposition of other heirs to the repurchase by Francisca Herrera should
have put the NHA on guard as to the award of the lots. Further, the Decision in the said Civil Case No. B-1263 (questioning the Deed
of Self-Adjudication) which rendered the deed therein null and void should have alerted the NHA that there are other heirs to the
interests and properties of the decedent who may claim the property after a testate or intestate proceeding is concluded. The NHA
therefore acted arbitrarily in the award of the lots.

10. People v. Gloria Umali | Witness of a Will

FACTS: Francisco Manalo, was investigated by operatives of the Tiaong, Quezon Police Department and for which a case for violation
of the Dangerous Drug Act was filed against him. He was likewise facing other charges such as concealment of deadly weapon and
other crimes against property. Pat. Felino Noguerra went to the Tiaong Municipal Jail, and sought the help of Francisco to identify
the source of the marijuana. In return he asked the policeman to help him in some cases pending against him. He did not negotiate
his case for violating the dangerous drug act, as he has entered a plea of guilty. Pfc. Sarmiento, Chief of the Investigation Division
gave Manalo four (4) marked P5.00 bills to buy marijuana from sources known to him. Few minutes there after, Manalo returned with
two (2) foils of dried marijuana which were allegedly bought from the accused Gloria Umali. Thereafter,
he was asked by the police investigators to give a statement on the manner and circumstances of how he wasable to
purchase marijuana foils from accused Gloria Umali.
After securing a search warrant, with the help of Manalo’s affidavit, supported by the toils of marijuana, the police operatives, went
to the house of Gloria Umali, in the presence of Brgy. Capt. Punzalan, served the search warrant and were able to confiscate from
the person of Gloria Umali the four P5.00 bills with serial numbers as reflected in the police blotter and a can of milo, containing
sixteen (16) foils of dried marijuana leaves. Gloria Umali and Suzeth Umali were charged for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972.Upon arraignment, Gloria Umali entered a plea of "not, guilty" as accused Suzeth Umali remained at large. After trial, the lower
court rendered a decision finding accused Gloria Umali guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua.

ISSUE: WON Manalo’s testimony should be given credit

HELD: The appellant vehemently denied the findings of the lower court and insisted that said court committed reversible errors in
convicting her. She alleged that witness Francisco Manalo is not reputed to be trustworthy and reliable and that his words should not
be taken on its face value. Furthermore, he stressed that said witness has several charges in court and because of his desire to have
some of his cases dismissed, he was likely to tell falsehood.

Rule 130, Section 20 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:

 Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving can make known their
perception to others may be witnesses.

Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided
by law, shall not be aground for disqualification.

The phrase "conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law" takes into account Article 821 of the Civil Code which states that
persons convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony" are disqualified from being witnesses to a will." Since the
witness Francisco Manalo is not convicted of any of the above-mentioned crimes to disqualify him as a witness and this case does
not involve the probate of a will, We rule that the fact that said witness is facing several criminal charges when he testified did not in
any way disqualify him as a witness. The testimony of a witness should be given full faith and credit, in the absence of evidence that
he was actuated by improper motive. Hence, in the absence of any evidence that witness Francisco Manalo was actuated by improper
motive, his testimony must be accorded full credence.

11. Torres and Lopez v Lopez GR No. 24569 February 26, 1926
FACTS: Tomas Rodriguez y Lopez, single, died on February, 25, 1924 leaving all his estate to Vicente Lopez. On August 10, 1923,
Tomas Rodriguez designated Vicente Lopez as administrator of his property due to his feeble health, such was questioned by
Margarita Lopez, CFI of Manila concluded Vicente Lopez as Tomas Rodriguez’s gu ardian. Tomas Rodriguez voiced out the need to
form a will, and Vicente Lopez has procured Judge Maximino Mina. Manuel Torres, one of the executors named in the will, asked the
will to be allowed. Such was contested by Manuel Lopez on the grounds:
(a) that testator lacked mental capacity because at the time of institution he was suffering “ senile dementia” and was under
guardianship;
(b) that undue influence had been exercised by the persons benefited; and
(c) that the signature of Rodriguez was obtained through fraud and deceit. (Luz Lopez allegedly deceived Tomas Rodriguez to sign
by stating that such document he was about to sign was in connection with a complaint against Dr. Boanan, one of the witness of the
signing of the will). Trial Court denied legalization of the will on the ground of “lack of mental capacity” at the signing of the will by the
testator.

ISSUES :
(1) Whether or not Tomas Rodriguez has testamentary capacity to consider the will valid?
(2) Whether or not there was undue influence in the procurement of the signature of Tomas Rodriguez in the will?

HELD: Yes. Tomas Rodriguez has testamentary capacity to constitute a will. Though there was conflict of medical opinions on the
soundness of mind of the testator. (Drs. Calderon, Domingo, Herrera claimed that testator had full understanding of the acts he was
performing and that they were witnesses in the said signing of the will; Drs. Delos Angeles, Tietze and Burke certified that Rodriguez
was of unsound mind and is diagnosed of senile dementia). Code of Civil procedure prescribes a requisite that the testator be of
“sound mind”, a Sound mind is a disposing mind. One of the grounds of disallowing a will is if the testator is insane or otherwise
incapable of the execution. With such the Court has adopted a definition of “Testamentary Capacity” as: The capacity to comprehend
the nature of the transaction in which the testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the property to be disposed of and the persons
who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the instrument will
distribute his property among the objects of his bounty. The presumption is that every adult is sane. It is only when those seeking to
overthrow the will have clearly established the charge of mental incapacity that the courts will intervene to set aside a testamentary
document.

12. Danilo ALUAD v. Zenaido ALUAD - GR no 176943 Oct 17,2008

FACTS: Petitioner’s mother, Maria Aluad and respondent Zenaido Aluad were raised by the childless spouses Matilde and Crispin
Aluad. Crispin was the owner of six lots of Pilar Cadastre, Capiz. After his death, Matilde adjudicated the lots to herself and thereafter,
she executed a Deed of Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos in favor of Maria covering all the six lots. The Deed provided that such
will become effective upon the death of the Donor, but in the event that the Donee should die before the Donor, the present donation
shall be deemed rescinded. Provided, however, that anytime during the lifetime of the Donor or anyone of them who should survive,
they could use, encumber or even dispose of any or even all of the parcels of the land.

Matilde sold one of the lots to Zenaido and subsequently, Matilde executed a last will and testament devising four (4) of the lots to
Maria and the remaining lot to Zenaido. Maria died a few months after Matilde’s death. Thereafter, Maria’s heirs (herein petitioners)
filed before the RTC a complaint for declaration and recovery of ownership and possession of the two lots conveyed and donated to
Zenaido, alleging that no rights have been transmitted to the latter because such lots have been previously alienated to them to Maria
via the Deed of Donation. The lower court decided in favor of the petitioners however, CA reversed said decision upon appeal of
Zenaido which held that the Deed of Donation was actually a donation mortis causa, not inter vivos and as such it had to, but did not,
comply with the formalities of a will. Due to the denial of the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, the present Petition for Review
has been filed.

ISSUES: WON the Deed of Donation is donation inter vivos and whether or not such deed is valid.
If so, whether or not Matilde Aluad has the right to convey the lots in question to Zenaido Aluad.

HELD: The Court finds the donation to Maria Aluad (petitioner’s mother) one of mortis causa, it having the following characteristics:

(a) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor, or what amounts to the same thing, that the
transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;
(b) That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be revocable, by the transferor at will, ad nutum, but revocability may
be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and
(c) That the transfer should be void of the transferor should survive the transferee.
The phrase in the earlier-qouted Deed of Donation “to become effective upon the death of the DONOR” admits of no other
interpretation than to mean that Matilde did not intend to transfer the ownership of the six lots to petitioner’s mother during the former’s
lifetime. Further the statement, “anytime during the lifetime of the DONOR or anyone of them who should survive, they could use,
encumber or even dispose of any or even all the parcels of land herein donated,” means that Matilde retained ownership of the lots
and reserved in her the right to dispose them. For the right to dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by
law is an attribute of ownership. The phrase, “anyone of them who should survive” is out of sync. For the Deed of Donation clearly
stated that it would take effect upon the death of the donor, hence, said phrase could only have referred to the donor.

The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been observed but they were not, as it was witnessed by
only two, not three or more witnesses following Article 805 of the Civil Code. It is void and transmitted no right to petitioner’s mother.
But even assuming arguendo that the formalities were observed, since it was not probated, no right to the two lots was transmitted
to Maria. Matilde thus validly disposed the lot to Zenaido by her last will and testament, subject to the qualification that her will must
be probated. With respect to the conveyed lot, the same had been validly sold by Matilde to Zenaido.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Donation is a donation mortis causa and have complied with the formalities of a will.
HELD: The Deed of Donation which is one of mortis causa. The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will
should have been observed but they were not, as it was witnessed by only two, not three or more witnesses following Article
805 of the Civil Code. Further, the witnesses did not even sign the attestation clause the execution of which clause is a
requirement separate from the subscription of the will and the affixing of signatures on the left-hand margins of the pages of the will.