People of the Philippines vs.
Andre Marti Stonehill vs Diokno
G.R. No. 81561, January 18 1991
Facts: The appellant and his common law wife, Shirley Reyes, went
to the booth of the Manila Packing and Export Forwarders in the
Pistang Filipino Complex Ermita, Manila carrying with them four gift
wrapped packages to be sent in Zurich Switzerland. The proprietress,
Anita Reyes (not related to Shirley Reyes) then asked the appellant if
he could examine and expect the packages however appellant
refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained books,
cigars, and gloves and were just gifts to a friend. Anita no longer
insisted. Before delivery of appellant’s box to the bureau of Customs
and or bureau of Post, Mr. Job Reyes, proprietor and husband of
Anita, following standard procedure opened the boxes for final
inspection. When he opened a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. He
squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt
dried leaves inside. Job prepared a letter reporting the shipment to
the NBI and requesting laboratory examination sample he extracted
from the cellophane. Therefore, job and three NBI agents and a
photographer went to the Reyes’ office at Ermita. Job brought out the
box in which appellants’ packages were places and in the presence
of the NBI agents, open the top flaps, removed the Styrofoam and
took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried
marijuana leaves are found inside the cellophane.
Issue: Whether or not there is violation of appellant’s constitutional
right against unreasonable search and seizure.
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that it is not the NBI who made the
search. Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job who
made search and inspection of the said packages. Said inspection
was reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of
Mr. Job as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to
the Bureau of Custom or Post. If the search is made upon the
request of law enforces, a warrant must generally must be secured
first if it to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is
made in the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private
establishment for its own and private purpose, as in the case at bar,
and without the intervention of the police authorities, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act
of private individual, not the law enforcer, is involved.
In sum, the protection against unreasonable search and seizure
cannot be extended to acts committed by private individual as to
bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government.
The alleged violation against unreasonable search and seizure may
only invoked against the State by an individual unjustly traduced by
the exercise by the sovereign authority.
Facts: Respondents herein secured a total of 42 search warrants
against petitioners herein and/or the corporations of which they were
officers, to search “books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance
sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette
wrappers),” as “the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and
proceeds or fruits of the offense,” or “used or intended to be used as
the means of committing the offense,” which is described in the
applications adverted to above as “violation of Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised
Penal Code.”
The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void
as their issuance violated the Constitution and the Rules of Court for
being general warrants.
The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged
authority of the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major
groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the
aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the
residences of petitioners herein.
Issue: Whether petitioners can validly assail the search warrant
against the corporation.
Held: No. As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein
have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested
warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the
simple reason that said corporations have their respective
personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein
petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the
interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the
offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the
legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights
have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful
search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by
third parties. Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object
to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and
things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations
adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said
papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom
the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate
officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.
Soliven vs Makasiar
● While the President is immune from suit, she may not be
prevented from instituting suit. The privilege of immunity from
suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be
invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person
in the President's behalf.
● Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a
criminal case actuallyfile his counter-affidavits before the
preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is
required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to
submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.
● What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and
personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of
the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses.
Facts: Pres. Cory Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel
against Beltran. Beltranargues that "the reasons which
necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative
disability to file suit". He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue
by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may
subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her
under the trial court's jurisdiction. This would in an indirect way defeat
her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness
stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or
perjury. Beltran also contends that he could not be held liable for libel
because of the privileged character of the publication. He also says
that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a
“chilling effect” on press freedom.
Issues: (1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when
informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of
the existence of a prima faciecase was still under review by the
Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President;
(2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated
when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without
personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to
determine probable cause; and
(3) whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the
Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners
through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.
Held: (1) The allegation of denial of due process of law in the
preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of
submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare
Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the
complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not
require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-
affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed.
All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to
submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.
(2) What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and
personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is
not required to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall:
(1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause
and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the
basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the
fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges
would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and
investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on
hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.
(3) The rationale for the grant to the President of the
privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or
distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the
Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office
holder's time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the
President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the
holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf.
Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is
complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to
prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent
the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the
President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and
submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise
the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a
decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.
(4) Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts. Court finds
no basis at this stage to rule on the “chilling effect” point. (Beltran vs.
Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988)
SILVA VS. PRESIDING JUDGE
Facts: Sgt. Villamor, chief of the PC Narcom Detachment in
Dumaguete City filed an "application for search warrant" and
"Deposition of witness" against petitioner Nicomedes Silva and
Martin Silva. Judge Nickarter Ontal, then the presiding judge of RTC
of Dumaguete issued Search Warrant No.1 pursuant to the said
applications for violation of RA 6425 Dangerous Drugs ACT of 1972.
Such warrant states that there is a probable cause to believe that Mr.
Tama Silva has the possession and control of marijuana dried
leaves, cigarette and joint. The warrant authorizes Sgt. Villamor to
make an immediate search at any time of the room of Mr. Tama Silva
at the residence of his father Comedes Silva and to open aparadors,
lockers, cabinets, cartons and containers to look for said illegal
drugs. In the course of the search, the officers seized money
belonging to Antonieta Silva in the amount of P1,231.40. Petitioner
filed a motion to quash Search Warrant No.1 on the ground that 1) it
was issued on the sole basis of mimeographed 2) the judge failed to
personally examine the complainant and witness by searching
questions and answers.
Issue: Whether or Not Search Warrant No.1 is invalid. WON the
officers abused their authority in seizing the money of Antonieta
Silva.
Held: Search Warrant No. 1 is invalid due to the failure of the judge
to examine the witness in the form of searching questions and
answers. The questions asked were leading as they are answerable
by mere yes or no. Such questions are not sufficiently searching to
establish probable cause. The questions were already
mimeographed and all the witness had to do was fill in their answers
on the blanks provided. Judge Ontal is guilty of grave abuse of
discretion when he rejected the motion of Antonieta Silva seeking the
return of her money.
The officers who implemented the search warrant clearly abused
their authority when they seized the money of Antonieta Silva. The
warrant did not indicate the seizure of money but only for marijuana
leaves, cigarettes..etc. Search Warrant No. 1 is declared null and
void.
*** Sec 4 Rule 126 Rules of Court
Examination of the complainant, record -the judge before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and
answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and any witness
he may produce the facts personally known to them and attach to the
record their sworn statements together with their affidavits.
ESTEBAN MORANO, CHAN SAU WAH and FU YAN FUN vs.
HON. MARTINIANO VIVO
Facts: Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen, together with her minor son
in her first marriage, Fuyan Fun arrived in the Philippines to visit her
cousin. they are permitted only into the Philippines under
a temporary visitor's visa for two months and after they posted a cash
bond of 4,000. afterwards, Chan married Esteban Morano, native
Filipino citizen. to prolong their stay in the Philippines, chan and Fu
obtained several extension. The last extension expired on September
10, 1962.
In a letter, the commissioner of Immigration ordered Chan
and Fu to leave the country on or before September 10 with a
warning that upon failure so to do, he will issue a warrant for their
arrest and will cause the confiscation of their bond.
Instead of leaving the country they petitioned the court of
first instance for mandamus to compel the commissioner of
immigration to cancel petitioners' alien certificate of registration,
prohibition to stop the issuance of warrant of arrest and
preliminary injunction to restrain the confiscation of their cash bond.
Issue: Whether or not the commissioner of immigration can issue
warrant of arrest
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that Section 1 (3), Article III [Bill of
Rights] of the Constitution, to wit:
(3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable
cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
They say that the Constitution limits to judges the authority
to issue warrants of arrest and that the legislative delegation of such
power to the Commissioner of Immigration is thus violative of the Bill
of Rights.
Section 1 (3), Article III of the Constitution, we perceive,
does not require judicial intervention in the execution of a final order
of deportation issued in accordance with law. The constitutional
limitation contemplates an order of arrest in the exercise of judicial
power4 as a step preliminary or incidental to prosecution or
proceedings for a given offense or administrative action, not as a
measure indispensable to carry out a valid decision by a competent
official, such as a legal order of deportation, issued by the
Commissioner of Immigration, in pursuance of a valid legislation.
In consequence, the constitutional guarantee set forth in
Section 1 (3), Article III of the Constitution aforesaid, requiring that
the issue of probable cause be determined by a judge, does not
extend to deportation proceedings
HARVEY VS SANTIAGO
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF:
ANDREW HARVEY, JOHN SHERMAN and ADRIAAN VAN DEL
ELSHOUT vs. HONORABLE COMMISSIONER MIRIAM
DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND
DEPORTATION
Facts: Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles
who were apprehended after three months close surveillance by the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) agents in
Pagsanjan Laguna. Two days after apprehension 17 opted for self
deportation, one released for lack of evidenced, one was charged by
another offense, working without a valid working visa. Thus, three
was left to face the deportation proceedings.
Seized during petitioners apprehension were rolls of photo
negatives and photos of the suspected child prostitute shown in
salacious poses as well as boys and girls engaged in the sexual act.
There were also posters and other literatures advertising the child
prostitution.
Warrant of arrest was issued by respondent against
petitioners for violation of Sec. 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration act
and sec. 69 of the revised administrative Code.
Issue: Whether or not the Philippines immigration act clothed the
commissioner with any authority to arrest and detained petitioner
pending determination of the existence of a probable cause
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that there can be no question that
the right against unreasonable search and seizure is available to all
persons, including aliens, whether accused of a crime or not.
One of the constitutional requirement of a valid search
warrant or warrant of arrest is that it must be based upon probable
cause.
The arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause
determined after close surveillance for three (3) months during which
period their activities were monitored. The existence of probable
cause justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives,
photographs and posters without warrant. Those articles were seized
as an incident to a lawful arrest and, are therefore, admissible in
evidence.
But even assuming arguendo that the arrest of petitioners
was not valid at its inception, the records show that formal
deportation charges have been filed against them, as undesirable
aliens.
That petitioners were not "caught in the act" does not make
their arrest illegal. Petitioners were found with young boys in their
respective rooms, the ones with John Sherman being naked. Under
those circumstances the CID agents had reasonable grounds to
believe that petitioners had committed "pedophilia" defined as
"psychosexual perversion involving children"
Alvarez vs. CFI
ARRESTS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES > Examination of witnesses
Facts: The Anti-Usury Board of the Department of Justice presented to Judge David a
sworn affidavit that a certain Narciso Alvarez is in possession of books, receipts, chits,
lists used by him as money lender/usurer charging usurious rates in violation of law.
Affiant Almeda, chief of the task force, didn’t say that the information was based on his
personal knowledge but was only received by him from a reliable source.
Subsequently, the judge issued the warrant ordering the search of Alvarez’ house. On
June 4, 1936, the agents raided the subject place and seized different documents
namely, banknotes, bankbooks, stubs, cashbooks, bills of lading, credit receipts,
etc. Thereafter, the articles seized was not brought immediately to the custody of the
judge who issued the SW. Alvarez moved that the agents of the Board be declared
guilty of contempt and prays that all articles in question be returned to him because the
SW issued was illegal. On the other hand, the Anti-Usury Board pleaded that they be
allowed to retain custody of the articles seized for further investigation. When the judge
sustained the latter’s motion. Alvarez elevated the matter to the SC and prayed that
the search warrant as well as the order of the judge authorizing the Anti-Usury Board
to retain custody be declared null and void.
Issue: Whether the SW issued by the judge is illegal for having solely as basis the
affidavit of Agent Almeda in whose oath the latter declared that he had no personal
knowledge of the facts which were to serve as basis for the issuance of the warrant but
he had knowledge thereof only through information secured from a person whom he
considered reliable.
Ruling: Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and Section 97 of
General Orders 58 require that there be not only probable cause before the issuance
of a search warrant but that the search warrant must be based upon an application
supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce. In its broadest
sense, an oath includes any form of attestation by which a party signifies that he is
bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully; and it is sometimes
defined as an outward pledge given by the person taking it that his attestation or
promise is made under an immediate sense of his responsibility to God. The oath
required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the
petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the
committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the
issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause. The true test of
sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it
has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and
affiant be held liable for damages caused. The affidavit, which served as the
exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of
the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, the search warrant and the
subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers are illegal. Further, it is
the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the applicant or
complainant to the application. It is admitted that the judge who issued the search
warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the affidavit made by agent Almeda and
that he did not require nor take the deposition of any other witness. The Constitution
does not provide that it is of an imperative necessity to take the depositions of the
witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of
the latter. The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing
more than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause.
Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may
dispense with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent was
insufficient because his knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it
is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose
of determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search
warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts
within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that
there exists probable cause; when the applicant’s knowledge of the facts is mere
hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the
facts is necessary. Thus the warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based
only on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts
MATA VS BAYONA
SORIANO MATA vs. HON. JOSEPHINE BAYONA
Facts: Mata offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by
“selling illegal tickets known as Masiao Tickets” without any authority
from the Philippine Jai Alai and amusement Corporation or from the
government authorities concerned.
Petitioner claims that during the hearing of the case, he
discovered that nowhere from the records of the said case could be
found the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the
issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal
its whereabouts and to which inquiry respondent judge replied “it is
with the curt”. The judge then handed the records to the Fiscal who
attached then to the records
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that under the constitution “no
search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined
by the judge personally or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized b law after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce”.
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are
thus not sufficient. The examining judge has to take depositions in
writing of the complainant and witnesses that he may produce and to
attach then to the records. Such written deposition is necessary in
order that the judge may be able to properly determined the
existence and nonexistence of the probable cause, to hole liable for
perjury the person giving It if it will be found later that his declaration
are false.
Deposition – any written statement certified under oath. –
written testimony of a witness given in the course of a judicial
proceeding in advance of the trail or haring upon oral examination
The search warrant is illegal, the return of the thing seized
cannot be ordered. Illegality of search warrant does not call for the
return of the thing seize, the possession of which is prohibited.
PEOPLE VS ROSARIO Y LOPEZ
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NORMANDO DEL
ROSARIO Y LOPEZ
Facts: Del Rosario was charged with illegal possession of firearms
and ammutions and illegal sale of regulated drugs
Upon application of SPO3 Raymundo Untiveros of PNP
Cavite, before RTC judge Arturo de Guia issued a search warrant
authorizing the search and seizure of an : undetermined quantity of
methamphetamine hydrochloride commonly known as shabu and its
paraphernalia” in the premises of appellant’s house. However, the
search warrant was not implemented immediately due to lack of
police personnel to form the raiding team.
In the course of the search they found a black canister
containing shabu, an aluminum foil, a plastic .22 caliber, three set of
ammunitions and three wallets containing the marked money.
Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional right
against unreasonable search and seizure
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the accused cannot be
convicted of the illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. The
search warrant implemented by the raiding party authorized only the
search and seizure of the described quantity of shabu and
paraphernalia.
A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a
raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate
any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. The
constitution itself and the Rules of Court specifically mandate that the
search warrant must particularly describe the things to be seized.
Thus, the search warrant was no authority for the police officers to
seize the firearms which was not mentioned, much less described
with particularity, in the search warrant.
Neither may it maintain that the gun was seized in the
course of an arrest, for as earlier observed, accused arrest was far
from regular and legal. Aid firearm, having been illegally seized, the
same is not admissible in evidence.
UMIL VS. RAMOS
Facts: On 1 February 1988, military agents were dispatched to the
St.Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify
a confidential information which was received by their office, about a
"sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said
hospital with a gunshot wound. That the wounded man in the said
hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two
(2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at
about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road hump along Macanining St.,
Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. The wounded man's name was listed
by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22)
years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Biñan, Laguna
however it was disclosed later that the true name of the wounded
man was Rolando Dural. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural
was transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM,
for security reasons. While confined thereat, he was positively
identified by the eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2
CAPCOM mobile patrols.
Issue: Whether or Not Rolando was lawfully arrested.
Held: Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA,
an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing
offense, the arrest without warrant is justified as it can be said that he
was committing as offense when arrested. The crimes rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and
crimes or offenses committed in furtherance therefore in connection
therewith constitute direct assaults against the state and are in the
nature of continuing crimes.
PEOPLE VS. SUCRO
FACTS: Roy Fulgencio was instructed by P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi, Jr.
(Station Commander of the INP) to monitor the activities of appellant
Edison Sucro, because of information gathered by Seraspi that Sucro
was selling marijuana.
Pat. Fulgencio saw appellant enter the chapel, taking
something which turned out later to be marijuana from the
compartment of a cart found inside the chapel, and then return to the
street where he handed the same to a buyer, Aldie Borromeo. After a
while appellant went back to the chapel and again came out with
marijuana which he gave to a group of persons. Pat. Fulgencio called
up Seraspi to report that a third buyer later Identified as Ronnie
Macabante, was transacting with appellant.
At that point, the team of P/Lt. Seraspi proceeded to the area and
while the police officers were at the Youth Hostel at Maagma St., Pat.
Fulgencio told P/Lt. Seraspi to intercept Macabante and appellant.
Upon seeing the police, Macabante threw something to the
ground which turned out to be a tea bag of marijuana.
When confronted, Macabante readily admitted that he bought the
same from Sucro. The police team was able to overtake and arrest
appellant and recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from
the cart inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabante
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the arrest without warrant of the accused
is lawful and consequently. 2. Whether or not the evidence resulting
from such arrest is admissible.
HELD: The Court ruled in the affirmative. Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the instances where arrest
without warrant is considered lawful. The rule states:
A peace officer or private person may, without warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and
he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it;
An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an
officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a
warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or
hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the
scene thereof. Fulgencio, within a distance of two meters saw Sucro
conduct his nefarious activity and the fact that Macabante, when
intercepted by the police, was caught throwing the marijuana stick
and when confronted, readily admitted that he bought the same from
accused-appellant clearly indicates that Sucro had just sold the
marijuana stick to Macabante, and therefore, had just committed an
illegal act of which the police officers had personal knowledge, being
members of the team which monitored Sucro's nefarious activity.
Police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of
the crime when it had earlier conducted surveillance activities of the
accused.
That searches and seizures must be supported by a valid
warrant is not an absolute rule. Among the exceptions granted by law
is a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 13, Rule 126 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides that a person
lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense, without a search warrant. There is nothing unlawful about
the arrest considering its compliance with the requirements of a
warrantless arrest. Ergo, the fruits obtained from such lawful arrest
are admissible in evidence.
PEOPLE V. RODRIGUEZA
Facts: NARCOM agents staged a buy-bust operation, after gaining
information that there was an ongoing illegal traffic of prohibited
drugs in Tagas, Albay. The participating agents were given money
treated with ultraviolet powder. One of the agents went to said
location, asked for a certain Don. Thereafter, the Don, herein
accused, met with him and “a certain object wrapped in a plastic”
later identified as marijuana was given in exchange for P200. The
agent went back to headquarters and made areport, based on which,
a team was subsequently organized and a raid was conducted in the
house of the father of the accused. During the raid, the NARCOM
agents were able to confiscate dried marijuana leaves and a plastic
syringe among others. There was no authorization by any search
warrant. The accused was found positive of ultraviolet powder. The
lower court, considering the evidences obtained and testimonies from
the prosecution, found him guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972 and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
Issue: Whether or Not the lower court was correct in its judgment.
Held: The NARCOM agents’ procedure in the entrapment of the
accused failed to meet the qualification that the suspected
drug dealer must be caught red-handed in the act of selling
marijuana to a person posing as a buyer, since the operation was
conducted after the actual exchange. Said raid also violated accused’
right against unreasonable search and seizure, as the situation did
not fall in the circumstances wherein a search may be validly made
even without a search warrant, i.e. when the search isincidental to a
lawful arrest; when it involves prohibited articles in plain view. The
NARCOM agents could not have justified their act by invoking the
urgency and necessity of the situation because the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses reveal that the place had already been put
under surveillance for quite some time. Had it been their intention to
conduct the raid, then they should, because they easily could, have
first secured a search warrant during that time. The Court further
notes the confusion and ambiguity in the identification of the
confiscated marijuana leaves and other prohibited drug
paraphernalia presented as evidence againstappellant:
CIC Taduran, who acted as the poseur buyer, testified
that appellant sold him 100 grams of dried marijuana leaves wrapped
in a plastic bag. Surprisingly, and no plausible explanation has been
advanced therefor, what were submitted to and examined by the
PCCL and thereafter utilized as evidence against the appellant were
the following items:
One (1) red and white colored plastic bag containing the following:
Exh. "A"—Thirty (30) grams of suspected dried marijuana fruiting
tops contained inside a transparent plastic bag.
Exh. "B"— Fifty (50) grams of suspected dried marijuana leaves and
seeds contained inside a white colored plastic labelled "Robertson".
Exh. "C"— Four (4) aluminum foils each containing suspected dried
marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight of seven grams then
further wrapped with a piece of aluminum foil.
Exh. "D"— Five (5) small transparent plastic bags each containing
suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight of
seventeen grams.
Exh. "E"— One plastic syringe.
Evidently, these prohibited articles were among those confiscated
during the so-called follow-up raid in the house of
Rodrigueza’s father. The unanswered question then arises as to the
identity of the marijuana leaves that became the basis of appellant's
conviction. In People vs. Rubio, this Court had the occasion to rule
that the plastic bag and the dried marijuana leaves contained therein
constitute the corpus delicti of the crime. As such, the existence
thereof must be proved with certainty and conclusiveness. Failure to
do so would be fatal to the cause of the prosecution. Conviction is
reversed and set aside and accused is acquitted.
Go vs CA
Facts: Rolito Go while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, nearly
bumped Eldon Maguan’s car. Go alighted from his car, shot Maguan and left the
scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take down petitioner’s car
plate number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the scene of the shooting. A
manhunt ensued.
Six days after, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police
Station to verify news reports that he was being hunted by the police; he was
accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him. An eyewitness to
the shooting, who was at the police station at that time, positively identified petitioner
as the gunman.
Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower court,
setting and commencing trial without preliminary investigation. Prosecutor reasons that
the petitioner has waived his right to preliminary investigation as bail has been posted
and that such situation, that petitioner has been arrested without a warrant lawfully,
falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure which provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to situations of lawful
warrantless arrests.
Petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant because he went to
the police station six (6) days after the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated.
Thus, petitioner argues, the crime had not been “just committed” at the time that he
was arrested. Moreover, none of the police officers who arrested him had been an
eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan and accordingly none had the “personal
knowledge” required for the lawfulness of a warrantless arrest. Since there had been
no lawful warrantless arrest, Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which
establishes the only exception to the right to preliminary investigation, could not apply
in respect of petitioner.
Issue/s: 1. Whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by the San
Juan Police in respect of petitioner Go; 2. Whether petitioner had effectively waived his
right to preliminary investigation
Held: 1. No. The Court does not believe that the warrantless “arrest” or detention of
petitioner in the instant case falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides as follows:
“Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person;
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.”
Petitioner’s “arrest” took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The
“arresting” officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at
the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the “arrest” effected six
(6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected “when [the shooting
had] in fact just been committed” within the meaning of Section 5 (b). Moreover, none
of the “arresting” officers had any “personal knowledge” of facts indicating that
petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the
police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the
shooting — one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down
the alleged gunman’s car’s plate number which turned out to be registered in
petitioner’s wife’s name. That information did not, however, constitute “personal
knowledge.”
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of
petitioner within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113.
2. No. In the circumstances of this case, the Court does not believe that by posting
bail, petitioner had waived his right to preliminary investigation. In People v.
Selfaison, the Court held that appellants there had waived their right to preliminary
investigation because immediately after their arrest, they filed bail and proceeded to
trial “without previously claiming that they did not have the benefit of a preliminary
investigation.”
In the instant case, petitioner Go asked for release on recognizance or on bail and for
preliminary investigation in one omnibus motion. He had thus claimed his right to
preliminary investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash bond posted by
petitioner and ordered his release on 12 July 1991. Accordingly, the Court cannot
reasonably imply waiver of preliminary investigation on the part of petitioner. In fact,
when the Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking for leave to conduct preliminary
investigation, he clearly if impliedly recognized that petitioner’s claim to preliminary
investigation was a legitimate one.
POSADAS Y ZAMORA VS CA
ROMEO POSADAS y ZAMORA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 89139 August 2, 1990
Facts:
Pat. Ursicio Ungad and Pat. Umbra Umpar were conducting
surveillance along Magallanes Street Davao City. While they were
within the preemies they spotted petitioner carrying a buri bag and
they noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They approached
petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP.
Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was thwarted
by the two. They checked the bag and found one caliber and two
ammunitions.
Issue:
Whether or not the arrest is a valid warrantless arrest
Ruling:
Section 12 Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on criminal Procedure
is not applicable because at the time the police officers identified
themselves and apprehended petitioner as he attempted to flee, they
did not know that he had committed or actually committing the
offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. They just
suspected that he is hiding something.
The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted
suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a
probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag
and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same
It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search
the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after they shall have
obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such exercise may prove
to be useless, futile and mush too late.
PEOPLE VS MENGOTE Y TEJAS
People of the Philippines vs. Rogelio Mengote y. TejasG.R. No.
8759, June 22, 1992
Facts: A telephone call was by Western Police district that here were
three suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and
North Bay Boulevard in Tondo Manila. A surveillanve team of
plainclothesmen was dispatch to the place. They saw two men
“looking from side to side” one of whom is holding his abdomen. They
approached these persons and identified themselves as policemen,
whereupon the two tried to run away but were unable to escape
because the other lawmen had surrounded them. The suspects were
then searched. One of them, who turned out to be the accused was
found with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with six live
bullets in the chamber. His companion had a fan knife. The weapons
were taken from them.
Issue: Whether or not the accused constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure is violated
Ruling: The Supreme court held that par(a) section 5 Rule 113 of
rules of court requires that a person be arrested 1 After he has
committed or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting
to commit an offense 2 In the presence of the arresting officer.
These requirements have not been established in the case at
bar at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the accused was
merely “looking from side to side” and “holding his abdomen”. There
was apparently no offense that has just been committed or was being
actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their
presence.
Par. B. is no less applicable because it’s no less stringent
requirements have not been satisfied. The prosecution has not
shown that at the time of arrest an offense had in fact just been
committed and that the arresting officer had personal knowledge of
facts indicating that Mengote had committed it. All they had was
hearsay information from the telephone caller, and about a crime that
had yet to be committed.
– ACQUITTED
A Case of a Warrantless Arrest: MALACAT vs. Court of Appeals PEOPLE VS AMINNUDIN
MALACAT vs. CA PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI
G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988
Facts: Petitioner was arrested for having in his possession a hand grenade after he
was searched by a group of policemen when he was said to be acting suspiciously
when he was hanging around Plaza Miranda with his eyes moving fast together with
other Muslim-looking men. When the policemen approached the group of men, they Facts: The PC (Philippine Constabulary) officer received a tip from
scattered in all directions which prompted the police to give chase and petitioner was one of their informers that the accused was on board a vessel bound
then apprehended and a search was made on his person.
He was then convicted under PD 1866 in the lower court. Hence, the present petition for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. He was identified by name.
wherein petitioner contended that the lower court erred in holding that the search
made on him and the seizure of the hand grenade from him was an appropriate
Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening and approached
incident to his arrest and that it erred in admitting the hand grenade as evidence since him as he descended from the gangplank after the informer pointed
it was admissible because it was a product of an unreasonable and illegal search.
at him. They detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It
Issue: WON the search and seizure conducted by the police was valid.
was found to contained three kilos of what were later analyzed as
Held: The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is marijuana leaves by the NBI forensic examiner. On the basis of the
needed in order to validly effect the same. 31 The Constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly finding, the corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.
issued warrant, 32 subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests,
these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which reads, in part:
Issue: Whether or not accused constitutional right against
Sec. 5. — Arrest, without warrant; when lawful — A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person: unreasonable serach and seizure is violated

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; Ruling: The Supreme Court Held that warrantless arrest allowed
under Rule 113 of the rules of court not justified unless the accused
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and was caught in flagrante or a crime was about to be committed or had
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped . . . just been committed.
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has
A vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and
been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been
described as a "hot pursuit" arrest. seizures for violation of the customs law because these vehicles may
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs
searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant
consent searches; 33 (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest;34 and (6) a "stop and can be secured.
frisk.’
In the present case, from the conflicting declarations of the
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk"
and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches
PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which
differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin
in their allowable scope.
who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the
The vehicle was identified. The date of his arrival was certain. And
validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large
majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for from the information they have received, they could have persuaded
conducting a search. 36 In this instance, the law requires that there first be a
lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be a judge that there was a probable cause, indeed, to justify the
reversed. 37 At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. The Bill of Rights was
the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a
weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of
which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that
which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the
the arresting team had determine on his own authority that a search
means of escaping or committing violence. warrant was not necessary.
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a The evidence of probable cause should be determined by a
"limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus:
judge and not law enforcement agents.
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which ACQUITTED
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be
afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a
policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of
the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is
entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully
limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons
which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the
Fourth Amendment . .

Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a
"stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a
"stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's
experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person
detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a
two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and
detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for
purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable
cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which
permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with
whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and
fatally be used against the police officer.
PEOPLE VS MALMSTEDT
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MIKAEL MALMSTEDTG.R. No.
91107 June 19, 1991
Facts: Captain Alen Vasco, the commanding officer of the first regional
command (NARCOM) stationed at camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up
a temporary checkpoint for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from
the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint was prompted by
persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting
marijuana and other prohibited drugs. And an information also was received
about a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited
drugs.
In the afternoon the bus where accused was riding stopped. Sgt.
Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were
members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection. During
the inspection CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused waist. Suspecting the
bulge on accused waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused’s passport
and other identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer
ESPANO VS CA
RODOLFO ESPANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 120431 April 1, 1998
Facts:
Pat. Pagilagan together with other police officers went to
Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm reports of drug
pushing in the area. They saw petitioner selling something to another
person. After the alleged buyer left, they approached petitioner,
identified themselves as policemen, and frisked him. The search
yielded two plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana. When asked if
he had more marijuana, he replied that there was more in his house.
The policemen went to his residence where they found ten more
cellophane tea bags of marijuana. Petitioner was brought to the
police headquarters where he was charged of possession of
prohibited drugs.

required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging o his waist. And it Issue:
turned out to be a pouched bag and when accused opened the same bag the Whether or not the pieces of evidence were inadmissible
officer noticed four suspicious looking objects wrapped in brown packing Ruling:
tape. It contained hashish, a derivative of marijuana. The Supreme Court held that Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules
Thereafter, the accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. of Court provides:
But before he alighted from the bus accused stopped to get two travelling
“Arrest without warrant; when lawful – a peace officer or a private
bags. The officer inspects the bag. It was only after the officers had opened
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
the bags that the accused finally presented his passport. The two bags
When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
contained a stuffed toy each, upon inspection the stuff toy contained also
hashish. actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense . . . “
Petitioner’s arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule. He
Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional right against was caught in flagrante as a result of a buy bust operation conducted
unreasonable search and seizure by police officers on the basis of information received regarding the
illegal trade of drugs within the area. The police officer saw petitioner
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that under Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules handling over something to an alleged buyer. After the buyer left,
of Court provides:
they searched him and discovered two cellophane of marijuana. His
arrest was, therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bag of marijuana
“Arrest without warrant; when lawful – a peace officer or a private person
seized were admissible in evidence, being fruits of the crime.
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
a) When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporary
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another”
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs. A
crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in
flagrante delicto, thus the search made upon his personal effects falls
squarely under paragraph 1 of the foregoing provision of law, which allows a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which
could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed, and that the object sought in connection with the
offense are in the placed sought to be searched.
When NARCOM received the information that a Caucasian travelling from
Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him a prohibited drug, there was no
time to obtain a search warrant.
Constitutional Law: PAPA VS. MAGO
PAPA VS. MAGO
Facts: Mago, the owner of the goods that were seized, when the
truck transporting the goods was intercepted by the BOC, questioned
the validity of the search conducted by them since it was made
without any search warrant and whether the BOC has jurisdiction
over the forfeited goods.
Issue: Was the search conducted by the BOC valid?
Held:
Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority
to effect the seizure without any search warrant issued by a
competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said
warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes persons having
police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code
to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse,
store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect,
search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or
envelope or any person on board, or to stop and search and examine
any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any
dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary
to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said
cases. 16 But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides
that said "dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon
warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace. . . ." 17 It is our
considered view, therefor, that except in the case of the search of a
dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the
customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant
in the enforcement of customs laws.
In, Carroll vs US, it was made lawful for customs officers not only
to board and search vessels within their own and adjoining
districts, but also to stop, search and examine any vehicle,
beast or person on which or whom they should suspect there
was merchandise which was subject to duty, or had been
introduced into the United States in any manner contrary to law,
whether by the person in charge of the vehicle or beast or
otherwise, and if they should find any goods, wares, or
merchandise thereon, which they had probably cause to believe
had been so unlawfully brought into the country, to seize and
secure the same, and the vehicle or beast as well, for trial and
forfeiture.
PEOPLE VS. MUSA
Facts: A civilian informer gave the information that Mari Musa was
engaged in selling marijuana in Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani
was ordered by NARCOM leader T/Sgt. Belarga, to conduct a
surveillance and test buy on Musa. The civilian informer guided Ani to
Musa’s house andgave the description of Musa. Ani was able to buy
one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for P10.00.
The next day, a buy-bust was planned. Ani was to raise his right
hand if he successfully buys marijuana from Musa. As Ani proceeded
to the house, the NARCOM team positioned themselves about 90 to
100 meters away. From his position, Belarga could see what was
going on. Musa came out of the house and asked Ani what he
wanted. Ani said he wanted more marijuana and gave Musa the
P20.00 marked money. Musa went into the house and came back,
giving Ani two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani
opened and inspected it. He raised his right hand as a signal to the
other NARCOM agents, and the latter moved in and arrested Musa
inside the house. Belarga frisked Musa in the living room but did not
find the marked money (gave it to his wife who slipped away). T/Sgt.
Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and found a ‘cellophane
colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen.’ They
asked Musa about its contents but failed to get a response. So they
opened it and found dried marijuana leaves inside. Musa was then
placed under arrest.
Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the plastic bag and the
marijuana inside it is unreasonable, hence, inadmissible as evidence.
Held: Yes. It constituted unreasonable search and seizure thus it
may not be admitted as evidence. The warrantless search and
seizure, as an incident to a suspect’s lawful arrest, may extend
beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or
surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the ‘plain view’
of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view
are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The ‘plain
view’ doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not
searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. It will not justify
the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object
is not apparent from the ‘plain view’ of the object.
In the case at bar, the plastic bag was not in the ‘plain view’ of the
police. They arrested the accused in the living room and moved into
the kitchen in search for other evidences where they found the plastic
bag. Furthermore, the marijuana inside the plastic bag was not
immediately apparent from the ‘plain view’ of said object.
Therefore, the ‘plain view’ does not apply. The plastic bag was
seizedillegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant
to Article III Section 3 (2) of the Constitution.
Valmonte vs. De Villa
Facts: On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District
Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction
02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission
of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and
peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial
defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere
conducive to the social, economic and political development of the
National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and
order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Petitioners aver that, because of the
installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are
worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the
arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning
the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being
subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at
dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order.
Their alleged fear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July
1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of
Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by
the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along McArthur
Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to
submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off
inspire of warning shots fired in the air.
Issue: WON the installation of checkpoints violates the right of the
people against unreasonable searches and seizures
Held: Petitioner's concern for their safety and apprehension at
being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are not
sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints per se, illegal. No proof
has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of
their routine checks, the military, indeed, committed specific
violations of petitioners'' rights against unlawful search and seizure of
other rights. The constitutional right against unreasonable searches
and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose rights
have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. Not all searches
and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
forbidden. The setting up of the questioned checkpoints may be
considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its
mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining
peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may not
also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the govt,
in the interest of public security. Between the inherent right of the
state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an
individual’s right against a warrantless search w/c is, however,
reasonably conducted, the former should prevail. True, the manning
of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the military in
the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of
abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and
even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal
times, when conducted w/in reasonable limits, are part of the price
we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.
FACTS:
1. November 8, 2002, 1PM: Police Inspector Jose Valencia called
upon his subordinates after being informed of drug-trading
activities in Bagumbong, Caloocan City involving the accused –
Abraham Miclat.
2. 3:50PM: The informant directed the surveillance team to the
residence of the accused. PO3 Rodrigo Antonio positioned
himself at the perimeter of the house, while the rest of the
members of the group deployed themselves nearby.
3. Through a small opening in the curtain-covered window, PO3
Antonio peeped inside and there at a distance of 1½ meters, he
saw Abe arranging several pieces of small plastic sachets which
he believed to be containing shabu. Slowly, he inched his way in
by gently pushing the door as well as the plywood covering the
same.
4. Upon gaining entrance, PO3 Antonio introduced himself as a
police officer while Abe on the other hand, after being informed
of such authority, voluntarily handed over Antonio 4 pieces of
small plastic sachets he was earlier sorting out. He was then
arrested.
5. Accused claimed that he was just watching TV with his father
and sister when they heard a commotion prompting them to go
down and check. He said that one of the operatives kicked him
when he tried to resist the arrest, and that shabu was only
planted on him when he was already arrested. Accused also
claimed that the arrest and seizure was unlawful.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the warrantless arrest was valid – YES
2. WON the seized drugs were admissible– YES
RULING: Appeal DENIED.
RATIO:
1. Sec 5(a) Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure states that a warrantless arrest is reasonable and
valid when the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. Two
elements must be present in order to fall under this: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that
he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence
or within the view of the arresting officer.
The established facts reveal that Miclat was caught in flagrante
delicto and the police authorities effectively made a valid warrantless
arrest.
2. The right against warrantless searches and seizure is subject to
legal and judicial exceptions.i What constitutes a reasonable or
unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely a judicial
question, determinable from the uniqueness of the
circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or
seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the
manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place
or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured.
The seizure made by PO3 Antonio of the plastic sachets from the
petitioner was not only incidental to a lawful arrest, but it also falls
within the purview of the “plain view” doctrine. (See doctrine)
An object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to
sight. Petitioner was caught in the act of arranging the heat-sealed
plastic sachets in plain sight of PO3 Antonio and he voluntarily
surrendered them to him upon learning that he is a police officer.
Since petitioner’s arrest is among the exceptions to the rule requiring
a warrant before effecting an arrest and the evidence seized from the
petitioner was the result of a warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest, which incidentally was in plain view of the arresting officer, the
results of the ensuing search and seizure were admissible in
evidence to prove petitioner’s guilt of the offense charged.