En Banc: People of The Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee

7/18/2018 People vs Larraaga : 138874-75 : July 21, 2005 : Per Curiam : En Banc : Resolution

EN BANC

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 138874-75
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Present:

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.
PUNO,
- versus - PANGANIBAN,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAAGA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
alias "PACO"; JOSMAN AZNAR; CORONA,
ROWEN ADLAWAN alias CARPIO MORALES,
"WESLEY"; ALBERTO CAO alias CALLEJO, SR.,
"ALLAN PAHAK"; ARIEL AZCUNA,
BALANSAG, DAVIDSON TINGA,
VALIENTE RUSIA alias "TISOY NAZARIO, and
GARCIA, JJ.
TAGALOG"; JAMES ANTHONY

UY alias "WANGWANG"; and
Promulgated:
JAMES ANDREW UY alias "MM",

Accused-Appellants.
July 21, 2005
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

At bar are four (4) motions for reconsideration separately filed by appellants (1)
Francisco Juan Larraaga, (2) Josman Aznar, (3) Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Cao and Ariel
Balansag, and (4) James Anthony Uy and James Andrew Uy, assailing our Decision dated
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/138874_75.htm 1/17
February 3, 2004 convicting them of the crimes of (a) special complex crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention and (b) simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu City in
Criminal Cases Nos. CBU45303 and 45304 is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:

(1) In Criminal Case No. CBU45303, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN
LARRAAGA alias PACO; JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias WESLEY;
ALBERTO CAO alias ALLAN PAHAK; ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES ANDREW UY
alias MM, are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape and are sentenced to
suffer the penalty of DEATH by lethal injection;

(2) In Criminal Case No. CBU45304, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN
LARRAAGA alias PACO; JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias WESLEY;
ALBERTO CAO alias ALLAN PAHAK; ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES ANDREW UY
alias MM, are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple kidnapping
and serious illegal detention and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA;

(3) In Criminal Case No. CBU45303, appellant JAMES ANTHONY UY, who was
a minor at the time the crime was committed, is likewise found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with
homicide and rape and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA; in Criminal Case No. CBU45304, he is declared guilty of simple
kidnapping and serious illegal detention and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
TWELVE (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as MINIMUM, to seventeen
(17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as MAXIMUM;

(4) Appellants are ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Marijoy and
Jacqueline, in each case, the amounts of (a) P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, (b)
P25,000.00 as temperate damages, (c) P150,000.00 as moral damages, and (d)
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Three (3) Justices of the Court maintain their position that RA 7659 is
unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless, they submit to
the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and the death penalty can be
lawfully imposed in the case at bar.

In accordance with Article 83 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section
25 of RA No. 7659, upon the finality of this Decision, let the records of this case be
forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for the possible exercise of Her
Excellencys pardoning power.

SO ORDERED.

Appellants anchor their motions on the following grounds:

A. LARRAAGA

I

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN BARRING LARRAAGA AND THE
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI) REGIONAL
DIRECTOR FLORENCIO VILLARIN FROM TESTIFYING;

II

THE POLICE PLANTED EVIDENCE ON APPELLANTS;

III

LARRAAGA SUFFICIENTLY PROVED HIS ALIBI;

IV

THE TRIAL COURT PREVENTED THE INTRODUCTION OF KEY
DEFENSE EVIDENCE;

V

THE CORPSE FOUND IN THE RAVINE WAS NOT THAT OF MARIJOY;
AND

VI

[1]
PROSECUTION WITNESS RUSIA WAS A COACHED WITNESS.

B. AZNAR

I

THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE TRIAL
COURT DID NOT VIOLATE THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED TO DUE
PROCESS OF LAW.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN (A) DISCHARGING DAVID
RUSSIA AS STATE WITNESS; AND (B) CONVICTING THE
APPELLANTS MAINLY ON THE BASIS OF THE TESTIMONY OF
RUSIA.

III

THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE DEFENSE OF
APPELLANT AZNAR.

IV

THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH
[2]
PENALTY ON THE APPELLANTS.

C. ADLAWAN, BALANSAG, CAO

I

PROSECUTION WITNESS RUSIA IS NOT QUALIFIED TO BE A STATE
WITNESS UNDER PARAGRAPHS (D) AND (E), SECTION 17 OF THE
REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.

II

RUSIAS TESTIMONY AND THAT OF THE OTHER PROSECUTION
WITNESSES WERE INCREDIBLE, INCONSISTENT, AND UNWORTHY
OF BELIEF.

III

BIAS AND PREJUDICE AGAINST THE DEFENSE WERE GLARINGLY
DISPLAYED BY THE COURT A QUO WHICH GREATLY AFFECTED
THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE.

IV

THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS FOR THE CRIME
CHARGED HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
[3]

D. JAMES ANDREW AND JAMES ANTHONY UY

I

ACCUSED JAMES ANDREW S. UY WAS, LIKE HIS YOUNGER
BROTHER JAMES ANTHONY S. UY, A MINOR AT THE TIME THE
OFFENSES AT BAR ALLEGEDLY HAPPENED LAST JULY 16, 1997;
II

THE IDENTITY OF THE DEAD BODY OF THE WOMAN FOUND IN
TANAWAN, CARCAR, CEBU LAST JULY 18, 1997 WAS NEVER
CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHED THUS THE NEED FOR ITS
[4]
EXHUMATION FOR DNA TESTING;

In his supplemental motion for reconsideration dated March 25, 2004, Larraaga
submitted a separate study of Dr. Racquel Del RosarioFortun, Forensic Pathologist, to show
that the examination conducted by the prosecution expert witnesses on the body found in
Tanawan, Carcar is inadequate.

[5]
In a similar supplemental motion for reconsideration , Aznar submitted to this Court
the Affidavit dated February 27, 2004 of Atty. Florencio Villarin, Regional Director of the
National Bureau of Investigation, Central Visayas, to show that: (1) the police investigation of
this case was flawed; (2) he (Aznar) was arrested in 1997 not because of his involvement in this
case but because he had in his possession a pack of shabu and firearms; and (3) David Rusia is
not a credible witness.

[6]
On July 15, 2004, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment praying that the
four (4) motions for reconsideration be denied with finality, there being no new argument
raised. He responded to appellants assignments of errors by exhaustively quoting portions of
our challenged Decision.

[7]
In his consolidated comment to Aznars supplemental motion for reconsideration, the
Solicitor General enumerated the grounds why Atty. Villarins Affidavit should not be given
consideration. On February 15, 2005, Aznar filed a reply alleging that the Solicitor General
read out of context certain portions of the Affidavit. He argued that the
Affidavit only exposes the flawed investigation of the Chiong case and that, at the time of his
arrest, there was no evidence against him. On March 4, 2005, the Solicitor General filed a
rejoinder stating that Aznars reply actually supports the undersigned counsels (Solicitor
Generals) position that Atty. Villarins Affidavit is utterly inadequate to prove his innocence or
at least even acquit them on reasonable doubt, thus, it would be useless to call for new trial on
the basis of such Affidavit. On March 29, 2005, Aznar filed a surrejoinder insisting that the
Affidavit should be given due consideration.

Except for the motion filed by appellants Uy brothers with respect to James Andrews
alleged minority, we find all the motions bereft of merit.

At the inception, let it be emphasized that the filing of a motion for reconsideration does
not impose on us the obligation to discuss and rule again on the grounds relied upon by the
movant which are mere reiteration of the issues previously raised and thoroughly determined
and evaluated in our Decision being questioned. In Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership vs.
[8]
Velasco, we ruled that, "this would be a useless formality of ritual invariably involving
merely a reiteration of the reasons already set forth in the judgment or final order for rejecting
the arguments advanced by the movant."

The foregoing principle applies squarely to the motions filed by appellants Larraaga,
Aznar, Adlawan, Cao and Balansag, it being apparent that the points raised therein are not
neoteric matters demanding new judicial determination. They are mere rehash of the
arguments set forth in their respective briefs which we already considered, weighed and
resolved before we rendered the Decision sought to be reconsidered.

However, in view of the severity of the penalties for the crimes charged, we deem it
necessary to stress once more our basis in convicting appellants.

The following is a prcis of the issues submitted by appellants in their motions:

This Court erred

first, in according credence to Rusias testimony;

second, in rejecting appellants alibi;

third, in holding that the trial court did not violate their right to due process when it
excluded the testimony of other defense witnesses; and

fourth, in holding that the body found in Tanawan, Carcar was not that of Marijoy.
In deciding a criminal case, the policy of the courts is always to look at the case in its
entirety. The totality of the evidence presented by both the prosecution and the defense are
weighed, thus, averting general conclusions from isolated pieces of evidence. This means that
[9]
an appeal of a criminal case opens its entire records for review.

I

Appellants vigorously contend that we should not have sustained Rusias testimony
hook, line and sinker, owing to his tainted record and reputation. However, it must be
stressed that Rusias testimony was not viewed in isolation. In giving credence to Rusias
testimony, the trial court took into consideration the physical evidence and the corroborative
testimonies of other witnesses. Thus, we find no reason why we should not uphold the trial
courts findings.

We reiterate our pronouncement in our Decision that what makes Rusias testimony
worthy of belief is its striking compatibility with the physical evidence. Physical evidence is
one of the highest degrees of proof. It speaks more eloquently than all witnesses put together.
[10]
The presence of Marijoys ravished body in a deep ravine at Tanawan, Carcar with tape
on her mouth and handcuffs on her wrists certainly
bolstered Rusias testimony on what actually took place from Ayala Center to Tanawan.
Indeed, the details he supplied to the trial court are of such nature and quality that only a
witness who actually saw the commission of the crimes could furnish. Reinforcing his
testimony is its corroboration by several other witnesses who saw incidents of what he
narrated. Rolando Dacillo and Mario Minoza witnessed Jacquelines two failed attempts to
escape from appellants near Ayala Center. Benjamin Molina and Miguel Vergara recognized
Rowen as the person who inquired from them where he could find a vehicle for hire on the
evening of July 16, 1997. Alfredo Duarte saw Rowen when he bought barbeque and Tanduay
at Nenes Store while the white van, driven by Cao, was waiting on the side of the road and he
heard voices of quarreling male and female emanating from the van. And lastly, Manuel
Camingao and Rosendo Rio testified on the presence of Larraaga and Josman at Tanawan,
Carcar at dawn of July 17, 1997. All these bits and pieces of story form part of Rusias narration.
Now, with such strong anchorage on the physical evidence and the testimonies of
disinterested witnesses, why should we not accord credence to Rusias testimony? Even
assuming that his testimony standing alone might indeed be unworthy of belief in view of his
character, it is not so when considered with the other evidence presented by the
prosecution.

II

Appellants likewise claimed that we should have not sustained the trial courts rejection
of their alibi. Settled is the rule that the defense of alibi is inherently weak and crumbles in the
[11]
light of positive declarations of truthful witnesses who testified on affirmative matters.
Being evidence that is negative in nature and selfserving, it cannot attain more credibility
[12]
than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify on clear and positive evidence.
On top of its inherent weakness, alibi becomes less plausible as a defense when it is
[13]
corroborated only by relatives or close friends of the accused.

This case presents to us a balance scale whereby perched on one end is appellants alibi
supported by witnesses who were either their relatives, friends or classmates, while on the
other end is the positive identification of the herein appellants by the prosecution witnesses
who were not, in any way, related to the victims. With the above jurisprudence as guide, we
are certain that the balance must tilt in favor of the latter.
Besides, a thorough examination of the evidence for the prosecution shows that the
[14]
appellants failed to meet the requirements of alibi, i.e., the requirements of time and place.
They failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for
them to be at the Ayala Center, Cebu City when the Chiong sisters were abducted. What is
clear from the evidence is that Rowen, Josman, Ariel, Alberto, James Anthony and James
Andrew were all within the vicinity of Cebu City on July 16, 1997.

Not even Larraaga who claimed to be in Quezon City satisfied the required proof of
physical impossibility. During the hearing, it was shown that it takes only one (1) hour to
travel by plane from Manila to Cebu and that there are four (4) airline companies plying the
route. One of the defense witnesses admitted that there are several flights from Manila to
Cebu each morning, afternoon and evening. Indeed, Larraagas presence in Cebu City on July
16, 1997 was proved to be not only a possibility but a reality. Four (4) witnesses identified
Larraaga as one of the two men talking to Marijoy and Jacqueline on the night of July 16, 1997.
Shiela Singson testified that on July 16, 1997, at around 7:20 in the evening, she saw
Larraaga approach Marijoy and Jacqueline at the West Entry of Ayala Center. The incident
reminded her of Jacquelines prior story that he was Marijoys admirer. Shiela confirmed that
she knows Larraaga since she had seen him on five (5) occasions. Analie Konahap also
testified that on the same evening of July 16, 1997, at about 8:00 oclock, she saw Marijoy and
Jacqueline talking to two (2) men at the West Entry of Ayala Center. She recognized the two
(2) men as Larraaga and Josman, having seen them several times at Glicos, a game zone,
located across her office at the third level of Ayala Center. Williard Redobles, the security
guard then assigned at Ayala Center, corroborated the foregoing testimonies of Shiela and
Analie. In addition, Rosendo Rio, a businessman from Cogon, Carcar, declared that he saw
Larraaga at Tanawan at about 3:30 in the morning of July 17, 1997. The latter was leaning
[15]
against the hood of a white van. And over and above all, Rusia categorically identified
Larraaga as one of the participes criminis.

Taking the individual testimonies of the above witnesses in relation with that of Rusia,
we are convinced that Larraaga was indeed in Cebu City at the time of the commission of the
crimes and was one of the principal perpetrators thereof.

At this juncture, it bears mentioning that this case is not the first time that Larraaga was
charged with or complained of pruriently assaulting young female students in Cebu. Months
before the abduction of Marijoy and Jackie, the parents of a certain Rochelle Virtucio,
complained about Larraagas attempt to snatch their young daughter and drag her in a black,
stylish Honda Civic. It happened just near the gate of Rochelles school, thus, showing his
impudence. We quote a portion of the transcript of stenographic notes dated September 23,
1998, thus:
ATTY. HERMOSISIMA:
Your Honor please, this is a . Inspector Era handed to this representation a copy of a
Letter dated September 25, 1996, addressed to the Student Affairs Office, University of
San Carlos,P. del Rosario Street, Cebu City, and this is signed by Leo Abayan and
Alexander Virtucio and noted by Mrs. Aurora Pacho, Principal, University of San
Carlos, Girls High School, and for the record, I will read the content:

TO WHOM THIS MAY CONCERN:

We the parents and guardians of Rochelle Virtucio, a first year high
school student of your University of San CarlosGirls High School, are
writing your good office about an untoward incident involving our
daughter and another student of your school.

xxxxxx

That last Monday at around 5:00 PM, Rochelle and other classmates,
Michelle Amadar and Keizaneth Mondejar, while on their way to get a
ride home near the school campus, a black Honda Civic with five young
male teenagers including the driver, suddenly stopped beside them, and
simultaneously one of them, which was later identified as FRANCISCO
JUAN LARRANAGA, a BSHRM I student of your school, grabbed
Rochelle by her hand to try to get Rochelle to their vehicle. She resisted
and got away from him. Sensing some people were watching what they
were doing, they hurriedly sped away.
We are very concerned about Rochelles safety. Still now, she is suffering
the shock and tension that she is not supposed to experience in her
young life. It is very hard for us parents to think about what shed been
[16]
through.

The presence of such complaint in the record of this case certainly does not enhance Larraagas
chance of securing an acquittal.

III

Larraaga and Aznar bewail our refusal to overturn the trial courts exclusion of Professor
Jerome Bailen and Atty. Florencio Villarin, NBI, Regional Director, as defense witnesses.
Professor Bailen was properly excluded. First, he is not a fingerprint expert but an
archaeologist. And second, his report consists merely of the results of his visual inspection of
the exhibits already several months old. Anent Atty. Villarins failure to testify before the trial
court, suffice it to say that his belated Affidavit, which Aznar submitted via his supplemental
motion for reconsideration dated May 5, 2004, raises nothing to change our findings and
conclusions. What clearly appears in said Affidavit is a man trying to impress people that he
was the one responsible for solving the Chiong case and for that, he deserves a promotion. The
trial court, at the onset, must have seen such immateriality in his intended testimony. Indeed,
we agree with the Solicitor Generals observation that such Affidavit is neither helpful nor
encouraging to Aznars cause. We quote his keen reflection on the matter:

xxxxxx

Third. Atty. Villarins affidavit, in paragraphs 19 and 20 thereof, acknowledged
that the body found in the Carcar ravine was that of Marijoy. This assertion
immediately conflicts with accusedappellant Aznars claim in his Motion for
Reconsideration that the corpse was not Marijoys. Surely, something is amiss in
accusedappellant Aznars recollection of his defense.

Fourth. Atty. Villarin confirmed in paragraph 24 of his affidavit that accused
appellant Francisco Larranaga was a suspect in the subject crimes. Evidently, this
statement completely supports this Honorable Courts findings in its Decision
dated February 3, 2004.

Fifth. In paragraph 30 of Atty. Villarins affidavit, he stated that: The arrest of
Juzman Aznar was the major breakthrough in the investigation of the case
because witnesses came out and identified Juzman Aznar as one of those
allegedly seen talking to the victims on the night they disappeared. Hence,
accusedappellant Aznar was in the beginning already a firstgrade suspect in the
Chiong sisters celebrated abduction and killing.

Sixth. Atty. Villarin admitted in paragraph 36 of his affidavit that: x x x I did
not take this against [Supt. Labra] for preempting our next move to get Juzman
Aznar as we were already placing him under surveillance because I knew
[Supt. Labra] did it in his honest desire to help solve the crime x x x. Clearly,
this statement is not an indictment of the investigation that the police undertook
in the subject crimes.

Seventh. Paragraphs 37 to 40 are nothing but personal tirades against alleged
influence peddling by Mrs. Thelma Chiong, mother of the victims, and the
purportedly undue promotions of the lawyers and police officers who unearthed
the evidence against accusedappellants and successfully prosecuted the latter. In
executing the affidavit, it appears that Atty. Villarin would want to impress
that he, rather than those promoted, deserved the promotion.

Eighth. Atty. Villarins inability to testify in the criminal cases was not due
solely to the prosecutions action. Whether he ought to testify or not was an
argument openly discussed in court. Hence, for the resulting inability, Atty.
Villarin has no one to blame but the defense lawyers who did everything to make
a mockery of the criminal proceedings.

And lastly, there is nothing in Atty. Villarins affidavit of the quality of a
smoking gun that would acquit accusedappellants of the crimes they have been
convicted. For he did not finish the police investigation of the subject crimes; this
is the long and short of his miniscule role in the instant case. Indeed, judging by
the substance of his affidavit, he would not be testifying in case a new trial is
held on anything that has not been said and rejected heretofore, except his own
unsubstantiated opinions (i.e. not facts as required by evidentiary rules), his
selfcongratulatory remarks, and his unmitigated frustration over failing to get
[17]
a promotion when almost everyone else did.

Neither can we entertain at this late stage Dr. Fortuns separate study to show that the
examination conducted on the body found in Tanawan, Carcar is inadequate. Such study
cannot be classified as newlydiscovered evidence warranting belated reception. Obviously,
Larraaga could have produced it during trial had he wished to.

IV

Knowing that the prosecutions theory highly rests on the truth of Rusia testimony,
appellants endeavor to destroy it by claiming that the body found at the foot of a deep ravine
in Tanawan, Carcar was not that of Marijoy. We must reiterate the reasons why we cannot
[18]
give our assent to such argument. First, Inspector Edgardo Lenizo, a fingerprint expert,
[19]
testified that the fingerprints of the corpse match those of Marijoy. Second, the packaging
tape and the handcuff found on the dead body were the same items placed on Marijoy and
[20]
Jacqueline while they were being detained. Third, the body had the same clothes worn by
[21]
Marijoy on the day she was abducted. And fourth, the members of the Chiong family
[22]
personally identified the corpse to be that of Marijoy which they eventually buried. They
erected commemorative markers at the ravine, cemetery and every place which mattered to
Marijoy. As a matter of fact, at this very moment, appellants still fail to bring to the attention
of this Court any person laying a claim on the said body. Surely, if the body was not that of
Marijoy, other families who had lost someone of similar age and gender as Marijoy would
have surfaced and claimed the body. The above circumstances only bolster Rusias narration
that Rowen and Ariel pushed Marijoy into the deep ravine, following Josmans instruction "to
get rid" of her.

On the issue raised by appellants Uy brothers that James Andrew was only seventeen
(17) years and two hundred sixty two (262) days old at the time the crimes were committed,
the records bear that on March 1, 1999, James Andrews birth certificate was submitted to the
[23]
trial court as part of the Formal Offer of Additional Evidence, with the statement that he
was eighteen (18) years old. On March 18, 1999, appellants filed a Manifestation of Erratum
correcting in part the Formal Offer of Additional Evidence by alleging that James Andrew was
[24]
only seventeen (17) years old.

Now, James Andrew begs leave and prays that this Court admits at this stage of the
proceedings his (1) Certificate of Live Birth issued by the National Statistics Office, and (2)
Baptismal Certificate. He prays that his penalty be reduced, as in the case of his brother James
Anthony.

The entry of James Andrews birth in the Birth Certificate is not legible, thus it is extremely
difficult for us to determine the veracity of his claim. However, considering that minority is a
significant factor in the imposition of penalty, we find it proper to require the Solicitor General
(a) to secure from the Local Civil Registrar of Cotobato City, as well as the National Statistics
Office, a clear and legible copy of James Andrews Birth Certificate, and thereafter, (b) to file an
extensive comment on the motion for reconsideration filed by James Andrew and James
Anthony Uy, solely on James Andrews claim of minority.

Insofar as James Anthony is concerned, we maintain his conviction and penalty, there
being nothing in his motion which warrants a reconsideration of our Decision.

In resolving the instant motions, we have embarked on this painstaking task of

evaluating every piece and specie of evidence presented before the trial court in response to
appellants plea for the reversal of their conviction. But, even the element of reasonable doubt
so seriously sought by appellants is an ignis fatuus which has eluded any intelligent
ratiocination of their submissions. Verily, our conscience can rest easy on our affirmance of the
verdict of the trial court, in light of appellants clear culpability which demands retribution.

WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration filed by appellants Francisco Juan
Larraaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Cao and Ariel Balansag are hereby
DENIED. The Solicitor General is DIRECTED (a) to secure from the Local Civil Registrar of
Cotobato City, as well as the National Statistics Office, a clear and legible copy of James
Andrews Birth Certificate, and (b) within ten (10) days therefrom, to file an extensive
comment on the motion for reconsideration filed by James Andrew and James Anthony Uy,
solely on James Andrews claim of minority. The motion is likewise DENIED insofar as James
Anthony Uy is concerned.

SO ORDERED.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice

REYNATO S. PUNO ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Associate Justice Associate Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ANTONIO T. CARPIO


MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA

ONCHITA CARPIO MORALES ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA

MINITA CHICO-NAZARIO CANCIO C. GARCIA

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice

[1]
As summarized by the Solicitor General, Rollo at 1881. It was filed on March 4, 2004.
[2]
Rollo at 1517. It was filed on March 5, 2004.
[3]
Id. at 1480. It was filed on March 3, 2004.
[4]
Id. at 1789. It was filed on March 23, 2004.
[5]
Dated May 5, 2004, Id., at 18411845.
[6]
Id., at 18791924.
[7]
It was filed on January 12, 2005.

[8]
G.R. No. 109645, March 4, 1996, 254 SCRA 234.
[9]
Obosa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114350, January 16, 1997,266 SCRA 281.
[10]
People. v. Bardaje, G.R. No. L29271. August 29, 1980, 99 SCRA 3881 ; G.R. Nos. 76416 and 94312, July 5, 1999;. People v.
Bermas, G.R. Nos. 76416 and 94312, July 5, 1999, 309 SCRA 741; People v. Sacabin, G.R. No. L36638, June 28,1974, 57 SCRA
707; People v. Demeterio, G.R. No. L48255, September 30, 1983, 124 SCRA 914.
[11]
People vs. Rollon, G.R. No. 131915, September 3, 2003, 410 SCRA 295.

[12]
Ibid.
[13]
People v. Datingginoo, G.R. No. 95539, June 14, 1993, 223 SCRA 331; People v. Abatayo, G.R. No. 139456. July 7, 2004, 433
SCRA 562.

[14]
People vs. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 108180, February 8, 1994, 229 SCRA 754.
[15]
TSN, September 15, 1998 at 2647.
[16]
At 4346.
[17]
Consolidated Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General, at 24.
[18]
Inspector Lenizo finished Law and Criminology. He worked for the crime laboratory of the Philippine National Police where he
was trained in fingerprint examination and where he conducted around 500 fingerprint examinations, 30 of which involved dead
persons. At the time he testified, Inspector Lenizo was head of the Fingerprint Identification Branch of the PNP Crime Laboratory,
Region 7.
[19]
TSN, September 22, 1998 at 3140.
[20]
See also TSN, September 23, 1998 at 13, 20.
[21]
TSN, August 18, 1998 at 62; August 19, 1998 at 115; September 23, 1998 at 13, 20.
[22]
TSN, August 18, 1998 at 62; August 19, 1998 at 57, 60.
[23]
Rollo, at 1894.

[24]
Id., at 1948.

En Banc: People of The Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee

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En Banc: People of The Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee

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7/18/2018 People vs Larraaga : 138874-75 : July 21, 2005 : Per Curiam : En Banc : Resolution

Appellants anchor their motions on the following grounds:

In resolving the instant motions, we have embarked on this painstaking task of

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