PEOPLE VS PANGILINAN

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed this petition for certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, praying for the nullification and setting aside of the Decision[2] of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 66936, entitled Ma. Theresa Pangilinan vs. People of the Philippines and Private
Complainant Virginia C. Malolos.

The fallo of the assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 218, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153 against petitioner
Ma. Theresa Pangilinan are hereby ordered DISMISSED.[3]

Culled from the record are the following undisputed facts:

On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos (private complainant) filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation
of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 against Ma. Theresa Pangilinan (respondent) with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City. The complaint alleges that respondent issued nine (9) checks with an aggregate amount of Nine Million
Six Hundred Fifty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Two Pesos (P9,658,592.00) in favor of private complainant
which were dishonored upon presentment for payment.

On 5 December 1997, respondent filed a civil case for accounting, recovery of commercial documents, enforceability
and effectivity of contract and specific performance against private complainant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Valenzuela City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1429-V-97.

Five days thereafter or on 10 December 1997, respondent filed a Petition to Suspend Proceedings on the Ground of
Prejudicial Question before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, citing as basis the pendency of the civil
action she filed with the RTC of Valenzuela City.

On 2 March 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben Catubay recommended the suspension of the criminal proceedings
pending the outcome of the civil action respondent filed against private complainant with the RTC of Valenzuela City.
The recommendation was approved by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.

Aggrieved, private complainant raised the matter before the Department of Justice (DOJ).

On 5 January 1999, then Secretary of Justice Serafin P. Cuevas reversed the resolution of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City and ordered the filing of informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent in connection with her issuance
of City Trust Check No. 127219 in the amount of P4,129,400.00 and RCBC Check No. 423773 in the amount of
P4,475,000.00, both checks totaling the amount of P8,604,000.00. The estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 charges
involving the seven other checks included in the affidavit-complaint filed on 16 September 1997 were, however,
dismissed.

Consequently, two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, both dated 18 November 1999, were filed against respondent
Ma.Theresa Pangilinan on 3 February 2000 before the Office of the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC),
Quezon City. These cases were raffled to MeTC, Branch 31on 7 June 2000.

On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant
of Arrest before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged that her criminal liability has been extinguished by reason
of prescription.

The presiding judge of MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City granted the motion in an Order dated 5 October 2000.

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On 26 October 2000, private complainant filed a notice of appeal. The criminal cases were raffled to RTC, Branch 218,
Quezon City.

In a Decision dated 27 July 2001, the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City reversed the 5 October 2000
Order of the MeTC. The pertinent portion of the decision reads:

xxx Inasmuch as the informations in this case were filed on 03 February 2000 with the Clerk of Court although received
by the Court itself only on 07 June 2000, they are covered by the Rule as it was worded before the latest amendment.
The criminal action on two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, had, therefore, not yet prescribed when the same was
filed with the court a quo considering the appropriate complaint that started the proceedings having been filed with the
Office of the Prosecutor on 16 September 1997 yet.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Order dated 05 October 2000 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Court a quo
is hereby directed to proceed with the hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153.[4]

Dissatisfied with the RTC Decision, respondent filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review[5] on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This was docketed as G.R. Nos. 149486-87.

In a resolution[6] dated 24 September 2000, this Court referred the petition to the CA for appropriate action.

On 26 October 2001, the CA gave due course to the petition by requiring respondent and private complainant to
comment on the petition.

In a Decision dated 12 March 2002, the CA reversed the 27 July 2001 Decision of RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City,
thereby dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 89152 and 89153 for the reason that the cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 had
already prescribed.

In reversing the RTC Decision, the appellate court ratiocinated that:

xxx this Court reckons the commencement of the period of prescription for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
imputed to [respondent] sometime in the latter part of 1995, as it was within this period that the [respondent] was notified
by the private [complainant] of the fact of dishonor of the subject checks and, the five (5) days grace period granted by
law had elapsed. The private respondent then had, pursuant to Section 1 of Act 3326, as amended, four years therefrom
or until the latter part of 1999 to file her complaint or information against the petitioner before the proper court.

The informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89152(sic) against the petitioner having been filed with
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City only on 03 February 2000, the said cases had therefore, clearly prescribed.

Pursuant to Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against
the guilty person.

In the case of Zaldivia vs. Reyes[7] the Supreme Court held that the proceedings referred to in Section 2 of Act No.
3326, as amended, are judicial proceedings, which means the filing of the complaint or information with the proper
court. Otherwise stated, the running of the prescriptive period shall be stayed on the date the case is actually filed in
court and not on any date before that, which is in consonance with Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended.

While the aforesaid case involved a violation of a municipal ordinance, this Court, considering that Section 2 of Act
3326, as amended, governs the computation of the prescriptive period of both ordinances and special laws, finds that
the ruling of the Supreme Court in Zaldivia v. Reyes[8] likewise applies to special laws, such as Batas Pambansa Blg.
22.[9]

The OSG sought relief to this Court in the instant petition for review. According to the OSG, while it admits that Act
No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3585 and further amended by Act No. 3763 dated 23 November 1930, governs the
period of prescription for violations of special laws, it is the institution of criminal actions, whether filed with the court
or with the Office of the City Prosecutor, that interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged.[10] It submits
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that the filing of the complaint-affidavit by private complainant Virginia C. Malolos on 16 September 1997 with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City effectively interrupted the running of the prescriptive period of the subject
BP Blg. 22 cases.

Petitioner further submits that the CA erred in its decision when it relied on the doctrine laid down by this Court in the
case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.[11] that the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor is not the judicial
proceeding that could have interrupted the period of prescription. In relying on Zaldivia,[12] the CA allegedly failed to
consider the subsequent jurisprudence superseding the aforesaid ruling.

Petitioner contends that in a catena of cases,[13] the Supreme Court ruled that the filing of a complaint with the Fiscals
Office for preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period. It therefore concluded that the filing
of the informations with the MeTC of Quezon City on 3 February 2000 was still within the allowable period of four
years within which to file the criminal cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 in accordance with Act No. 3326, as amended.

In her comment-opposition dated 26 July 2002, respondent avers that the petition of the OSG should be dismissed
outright for its failure to comply with the mandatory requirements on the submission of a certified true copy of the
decision of the CA and the required proof of service. Such procedural lapses are allegedly fatal to the cause of the
petitioner.

Respondent reiterates the ruling of the CA that the filing of the complaint before the City Prosecutors Office did not
interrupt the running of the prescriptive period considering that the offense charged is a violation of a special law.

Respondent contends that the arguments advanced by petitioner are anchored on erroneous premises. She claims that
the cases relied upon by petitioner involved felonies punishable under the Revised Penal Code and are therefore covered
by Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)[14] and Section 1, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure.[15] Respondent pointed out that the crime imputed against her is for violation of BP Blg. 22, which is
indisputably a special law and as such, is governed by Act No. 3326, as amended. She submits that a distinction should
thus be made between offenses covered by municipal ordinances or special laws, as in this case, and offenses covered
by the RPC.

The key issue raised in this petition is whether the filing of the affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of BP Blg.
22 against respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16 September 1997 interrupted the
period of prescription of such offense.

We find merit in this petition.

Initially, we see that the respondents claim that the OSG failed to attach to the petition a duplicate original or certified
true copy of the 12 March 2002 decision of the CA and the required proof of service is refuted by the record. A perusal
of the record reveals that attached to the original copy of the petition is a certified true copy of the CA decision. It was
also observed that annexed to the petition was the proof of service undertaken by the Docket Division of the OSG.

With regard to the main issue of the petition, we find that the CA reversively erred in ruling that the offense committed
by respondent had already prescribed. Indeed, Act No. 3326 entitled An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of
Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, as amended, is the law applicable
to BP Blg. 22 cases. Appositely, the law reads:

SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance
with the following rules: (a) xxx; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but
less than two years; (c)

SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same
be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.

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The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run
again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more
than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the aforecited law.
The running of the prescriptive period, however, should be tolled upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty
person.

In the old but oft-cited case of People v. Olarte,[16] this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal
Court even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and thus, interrupt the period
of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the
case on the merits. This ruling was broadened by the Court in the case of Francisco, et.al. v. Court of Appeals, et. al.[17]
when it held that the filing of the complaint with the Fiscals Office also suspends the running of the prescriptive period
of a criminal offense.

Respondents contention that a different rule should be applied to cases involving special laws is bereft of merit. There
is no more distinction between cases under the RPC and those covered by special laws with respect to the interruption
of the period of prescription. The ruling in Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.[18] is not controlling in special laws. In Llenes v.
Dicdican,[19] Ingco, et al. v. Sandiganbayan,[20] Brillante v. CA,[21] and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,[22] cases
involving special laws, this Court held that the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the
accused interrupts the period of prescription. In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources
Corporation, et. al.,[23] the Court even ruled that investigations conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission
for violations of the Revised Securities Act and the Securities Regulations Code effectively interrupts the prescription
period because it is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases.

In fact, in the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice,[24] which is in all fours with the instant case, this Court
categorically ruled that commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused before the Office of the
City Prosecutor effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under BP Blg. 22.
Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be
allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accuseds delaying
tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.

We follow the factual finding of the CA that sometime in the latter part of 1995 is the reckoning date of the
commencement of presumption for violations of BP Blg. 22, such being the period within which herein respondent was
notified by private complainant of the fact of dishonor of the checks and the five-day grace period granted by law
elapsed.

The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against respondent on 16 September 1997. The cases reached the
MeTC of Quezon City only on 13 February 2000 because in the meanwhile, respondent filed a civil case for accounting
followed by a petition before the City Prosecutor for suspension of proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question.
The matter was raised before the Secretary of Justice after the City Prosecutor approved the petition to suspend
proceedings. It was only after the Secretary of Justice so ordered that the informations for the violation of BP Blg. 22
were filed with the MeTC of Quezon City.

Clearly, it was respondents own motion for the suspension of the criminal proceedings, which motion she predicated on
her civil case for accounting, that caused the filing in court of the 1997 initiated proceedings only in 2000.

As laid down in Olarte,[25] it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays
that are not under his control. The only thing the offended must do to initiate the prosecution of the offender is to file
the requisite complaint.

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 IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL VS HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA

REGALADO, J.:

An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only to be followed by
a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on
what hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional question.

On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard
Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the
Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time
in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1

Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a separation de facto
between them.

After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent initiating a
divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that
there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982. 2

Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866.
3

On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree
of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. The
records show that under German law said court was locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding
and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign
jurisdiction. 4

On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two
complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner
"had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in
1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal
of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal approved a
resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the petitioner. 6 The
complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-
52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the Philippines

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vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz,
Branch XXV, of the same court. 7

On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution of
respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar petition was filed by James Chua, her
co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due
course to both petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the accused have
already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate the entire records
of both cases to his office for review. 9

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings
thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the
other hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987.
Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension of
proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for review then pending before
the Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12
which motion was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The same order also directed
the arraignment of both accused therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while
the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being considered by respondent judge as direct
contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former was ordered detained until she submitted herself for
arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 14

On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary
restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. The petition is
anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a
private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify
as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal
complaint." 15

On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from implementing the
aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on
March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding
petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the
complaints against the petitioner. 16

We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.

Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity,
cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been
established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal,
requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary

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Law, the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which
starts the prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.

Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the
complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts
of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents,
grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the
first four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as
parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal
action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness, in default of her parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of
adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the
action therefor.

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such
initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action.
This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to
dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.

The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the same requirement
and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been found necessary since criminal actions are
generally and fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of the Philippines, the offended party being
merely the complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted
de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more predominant
role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option.

This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence
rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised
Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal
action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where
the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal
case. 21

In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the action be
definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he
initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be determined by his status before or
subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or was
acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would thereby have the anomalous
spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without the legal capacity to do so.

To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as to when precisely the
status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal prosecution can be commenced only by one
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who in law can be categorized as possessed of such status. Stated differently and with reference to the present case, the
inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds
between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the
former against the latter.

American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours, yields the
rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against
the offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution
for adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have
no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22

In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —

'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband or wife.' Section 4932, Code.
Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said to have been committed, he had ceased to be such
when the prosecution was begun; and appellant insists that his status was not such as to entitle him to make the complaint.
We have repeatedly said that the offense is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the reason
for this provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse must be such when the prosecution
is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)

We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction, considering our
statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant
vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the
adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time
of the filing of the complaint.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private
respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.

Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a United States court
between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court here alleging
that her business concern was conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to render an accounting and that the
plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated
the error of such stance, thus:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree
is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union. ...

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It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are
valid according to their national law. ...

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing
to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. ... 25

Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal
standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack of
knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the
divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a
dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family,
which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there would
thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the
former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.

The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private respondent. In applying
Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code, which punished
adultery "although the marriage be afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to
declare adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even though it should be made to appear that
she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually secures a formal judicial
declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after
the declaration of nullity because such declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never
existed. There being no marriage from the beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity
would no longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and within the purview of the
decision in said case is the situation where the criminal action for adultery was filed before the termination of the
marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite would necessarily apply where the
termination of the marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.

Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must suffer the same fate of
inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a
complaint for adultery, although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the
complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any issue determinative of the
controversy herein.

WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one entered
DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order
issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.

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